Iran Update, November 1, 2024

 

Iran Update, November 1, 2024

Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Western media reported that Iran will retaliate for the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes around Iran, possibly by launching one-way attack drones and ballistic missiles from Iraq.[1] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the Iranian Supreme National Security Council on October 29 to plan a retaliatory attack on Israel, according to the New York Times.[2] Unspecified Israeli sources told Axios that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attack Israel using a large volume of drones and ballistic missiles in the coming days.[3] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, has repeatedly attacked Israel in recent months, primarily using the following weapons systems:

• Shahed-101 drone. The Iranian-made Shahed-101 has a range of around 600 kilometers.[4]
• Shahed-136 drone. The Iranian-made Shahed-136 reportedly has a range of 2,500 kilometers.[5]
• KAS-04 drone. The KAS-04 is a variant of the Iranian-designed, long-range Samad drone.[6]
• Al Arfad drone. The al Arfad is a variant of the KAS-04 drone.[7]
• Arqab cruise missile. These are Iranian Paveh missiles with a range of around 1,650 kilometers.[8]

Iran also began supplying Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with short-range ballistic missiles, including Zelzal, Fateh-110, and Zolfaghar missiles in 2018, but the militias have not used ballistic missiles to attack Israel in the October 7 War thus far.[9]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has increased its rate of attacks, in particular drone attacks, targeting Israel since mid-September 2024.[10] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed nine drone attacks targeting unspecified locations across Israel on October 31 and November 1.[11] A source close to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq recently warned that the group plans to double its rate of attacks targeting Israel in November 2024.[12] The recent Islamic Resistance in Iraq drone attacks likely served in part as reconnaissance-in-force operations, which are “designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information.”[13] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq could use these attacks to test and learn how to better bypass Israeli air defenses. An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack against Israel, as opposed to a direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory, would benefit Iran by allowing Tehran to preserve its dwindling long-range missile stockpile. Iran launched over 400 cruise and ballistic missiles at Israel in its April and October 2024 attacks.[14]

That Khamenei ordered retaliation against Israel corroborates CTP-ISW's assessment that the recent IDF strikes on Iran inflicted significant damage to Iranian military and defense infrastructure. Three Iranian officials told the New York Times on November 1 that Khamenei ordered retaliation after he reviewed a “detailed report. . . on the extent of the damage” of the IDF strikes.[15] The sources added that Khamenei determined that the scope of the strikes was “too large to ignore” and that failing to retaliate “would mean admitting defeat.”[16] Senior US and Israeli officials recently confirmed that the IDF strikes rendered Iran's S-300 air defense systems inoperable.[17] The S-300 is Russian-made and the most advanced air defense system that Iran operates. The IDF strikes also successfully targeted two Iranian Ghadir passive array detection radar sites, advertised as being capable of detecting ballistic missiles and stealth aircraft.[18] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the damage to the air defenses has likely seriously degraded the Iranian ability to defend against further Israeli attacks.[19] The IDF strikes also inflicted significant damage on facilities tied to the Iranian drone and missile programs, which CTP-ISW previously assessed could disrupt Iran’s ability to manufacture drones and ballistic missiles for itself and its partners, such as Russia.[20]

That Iran could direct an attack against Israel via its proxies in Iraq highlights the extent to which Iran has increased its military and political control over federal Iraq. Iran has increasingly infiltrated Iraqi military and political institutions—such as the Popular Mobilization Forces and the Iraqi Judiciary—in recent years.[21] The most recent example of Iran’s growing influence in Iraq was the election of Shia Coordination Framework-backed politician Mahmoud al Mashhadani as Parliament Speaker on October 31.[22] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties. Mashhadani received 181 votes, which is 16 votes more than the absolute majority required to become parliament speaker.[23] Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri emphasized after Mashhadani’s election that all Shia Coordination Framework leaders, including State of Law Coalition leader Nouri al Maliki, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali, back Mashhadani.[24]

Iran’s growing military and political control over federal Iraq appears to be part of a broader Iranian strategy to turn the country into a base of operations from which Iran and its Axis of Resistance can conduct future operations and attacks against Israel. Iraq has increasingly become a focal point for cooperation and coordination among Axis of Resistance groups in recent months. A Houthi drone expert responsible for training Iranian-backed Iraqi militants died in a US self-defense strike in Iraq in July 2024, highlighting increased cooperation between the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi groups.[25] The Houthis and Hamas have separately opened political offices in Iraq in recent months, and Emirati media reported in June 2024 that Hamas was planning to relocate its political leadership to Baghdad.[26] Growing Iranian influence in Iraq will threaten US and Israeli security and interests in the region, particularly as the United States is considering withdrawing its forces from Iraq.[27]

Israeli forces engaged Lebanese Hezbollah while advancing around the tactically significant town of Khiam in southern Lebanon.[28] Israeli forces began advancing toward Khiam on October 28. Hezbollah claimed two rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces in the area on November 1.[29] Lebanese media reported small arms combat there as well.[30] Khiam is located on high ground from which Hezbollah could fire into northern Israel. Khiam, moreover, grants Hezbollah a vantage point from which it could observe Israeli forces and other targets around the Galilee panhandle. Despite the tactical significance of Khiam, Hezbollah does not appear to be mounting a particularly effective defense of the area. This behavior is consistent with CTP-ISW’s observation that Hezbollah has mounted a disorganized and ineffective defense across southern Lebanon.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran will reportedly retaliate for the recent IDF strikes across Iran. Iran would be responding to the significant damage that the IDF inflicted upon Iranian air defenses and missile production facilities.
• Iraq: Iran may retaliate by ordering its Iraqi militias to fire a large volume of drones and missiles at Israel. That Iran is considering this option highlights the extent to which Iran has expanded its military and political influence in Iraq.
• Lebanon: The IDF engaged Lebanese Hezbollah while advancing around the tactically significant town of Khiam in southeastern Lebanon. The town is on high ground from which Hezbollah could fire into Israel and observe the IDF and other targets in the area.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip, on November 1. The IDF killed several Palestinian fighters and struck several military buildings.[32] The IDF reported that dozens of civilians have claimed in recent days that Hamas is pressuring civilians against evacuating from Jabalia amid IDF clearing operations in the area.[33] CTP-ISW previously reported that Hamas is trying to compel civilians to stay in Jabalia by threatening and assaulting them. The IDF has evacuated over 20,000 Palestinian civilians from Jabalia since the IDF resumed clearing operations there on October 6.

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson stated on November 1 that intelligence received from hundreds of Palestinian fighters detained in Jabalia is supporting IDF clearing operations there, such as by helping identify targets.[34]

The IDF 252nd Division continued operations in the central Gaza Strip on November 1.[35] A Palestinian journalist reported that the IDF conducted an airstrike that killed 13 individuals in Nuseirat.[36] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) conducted a rocket attack targeting an IDF bulldozer near the Nuseirat refugee camp.[37]

The IDF conducted an airstrike that killed Hamas Political Bureau member Izz al Din Kasab in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, on November 1.[38] Kasab was traveling in a vehicle with his deputy when the IDF struck the vehicle, killing both.[39] The IDF stated that Kasab was one of the last surviving Hamas Political Bureau members in the Gaza Strip. Kasab oversaw Hamas’ intra-Palestinian relations and acted as a liaison between Hamas and other Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip.[40] Kasab was responsible for coordinating military efforts alongside other militias in the strip.[41] Hamas coordinates with other Palestinian militia groups in the Gaza Strip as a coalition supported by Iran and organized through the Palestinian Joint Operations Room, which was founded initially in 2006.[42] This operations room, which is backed by Iran and led by Hamas, includes several militias and enables collective decision-making and coordinated actions against Israel.[43]

The IDF 143rd Division continued operations in Rafah on November 1.[44] The IDF Air Force struck Palestinian fighters in a building. The IDF stated that the building had a tunnel shaft underneath. PIJ fired rockets targeting an IDF command-and-control site in eastern Rafah City.[45]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The IDF killed three Palestinian fighters during overnight raids in Nour Shams refugee camp on October 30 and 31.[46] The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting two Palestinian fighters who had fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Nour Shams refugee camp.[47] The IDF separately killed one Palestinian fighter and injured several others in small-arms engagements.[48] An IDF drone located Palestinian fighters using a hospital in the refugee camp as a weapons storage facility. IDF engineers destroyed several improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Nour Sham refugee camp.[49]

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini blamed the IDF on November 1 for destroying a UNRWA office during operations in Nour Shams refugee camp.[50] Lazzarini claimed that an Israeli bulldozer destroyed the office. The IDF denied Lazzarini’s claim, stating that Palestinian IED attacks likely damaged the office.

IDF Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Amir Baram visited the northern West Bank and conducted a situational assessment of the area on November 1.[51] Baram met with the IDF 887th Division commander and other senior IDF officers during his visit.

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW’s last data cut off on October 31.[52] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Nablus and the Bekaot settlement.

Northern Israel and Lebanon

Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:

• End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
• Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

The IDF continued to conduct clearing operations and seize terrain in southern Lebanon on November 1.[53] Israeli forces destroyed Hezbollah infrastructure, located weapons, and killed Hezbollah militants.[54]

Hezbollah claimed that it attacked the IDF 210th Division as it advanced toward Kfarchouba and Shebaa, southeastern Lebanon.[55] Lebanese media reported artillery shelling near both Shebaa and Kfarchouba.[56] CTP-ISW has not observed any Israeli forces advancing toward these towns, however, artillery fire can support ground maneuvers.

The IDF 3rd Brigade (91st Division) has located hundreds of weapons and Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon in recent weeks, including rocket launchers ready to fire on Israeli communities in the Galilee area.[57] Israeli forces also directed an airstrike that killed several Hezbollah militants in a wooded area near Israeli forces. Five soldiers from the IDF 8th Armored Brigade died in an Israeli attack on a village in southern Lebanon on October 25.[58] Nineteen other Israeli soldiers were wounded in the attack.[59]

Hezbollah claimed it has confronted the IDF 98th Division advancing toward Kafr Kila, southeastern Lebanon, since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on October 31.[60] Israeli forces have conducted numerous covert operations into Kfar Kila village and its surroundings over the past year, and the IDF stated on October 28 that these operations have “destroyed” Hezbollah’s capabilities to conduct ground raids into Israel from the area. Hezbollah last claimed that it engaged Israeli forces near Kfar Kila on October 28.[61]

Hezbollah claimed on November 1 that Israel maintains “fire control” over the eastern outskirts of Blida, Mays al Jabal, and Houla. “Fire control” loosely denotes when a force denies an adversary the ability to operate along a specific route through heavy fire. This tactical task is closely related to a denial measure, which is an action to hinder or prevent enemy use of territory, personnel, or facilities.[62] Hezbollah claimed that although Israeli forces have denied Hezbollah this freedom of movement, Israeli forces have not advanced within these areas. CTP-ISW has observed Israeli forces in eastern areas of these towns, contrary to Hezbollah claims.

Hezbollah claimed that it confronted the IDF 36th Division trying to advance around Aita al Shaab and Aitaroun on October 31. [63] The 36th Division expanded clearing operations in Aitaroun and Aita al Shaab on October 24.[64]

Hezbollah claimed that the IDF 146th Division has attempted to advance in multiple areas in southwestern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 31. Hezbollah claimed that it thwarted attempts by the 146th Division to advance north toward Shihine and Jibbain.[65] Hezbollah claimed Israeli forces advanced with air and artillery cover.[66] Hezbollah also claimed that it engaged an IDF reconnaissance force northeast of Naqoura.[67] Hezbollah added that it attacked Israeli forces near Dhuhayrah, Ras al Naqoura, and Jal al Alam along the Israel-Lebanon border.[68]

The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah's capabilities and infrastructure on November 1. The IDF Air Force struck over 200 Hezbollah targets, including command-and-control sites, launchers, and other military infrastructure.[69] Around southern Beirut, the IDF struck military equipment production sites, headquarters, and other military targets in southern Beirut.[70] The IDF stated that these strikes are part of its ongoing against Hezbollah infrastructure around Beirut.[71] Lebanese state media stated that the IDF strikes in southern Beirut killed at least 24 people and damaged dozens of buildings.[72] Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati said that the IDF strikes on Beirut indicate that Israel is rejecting efforts to reach a ceasefire while meeting with UN peacekeepers in Beirut.[73] The IDF Air Force also struck Hezbollah command-and-control sites and intelligence infrastructure in Nabatieh, southeastern Lebanon.[74] The IDF stated that these facilities were used by Hezbollah’s Southern Front Command.[75] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued evacuation notices to residents of Nabatieh and several towns in southern Beirut before attacking the area.[76]

The IDF continued its campaign to disrupt Hezbollah’s smuggling of weapons from Syria into Lebanon. The IDF Air Force struck numerous targets in the Baalbek region in eastern Lebanon.[77] Local Lebanese sources claimed that the IDF strikes killed at least 54 people.[78] The IDF Air Force has been conducting airstrikes in the Baalbek region targeting Hezbollah Unit 4400, which is responsible for transferring funds and weapons from Iran.[79] A Local Lebanese source claimed that the IDF also conducted an airstrike in al Qusayr, Syria.[80] The IDF has previously stated that the Hezbollah Armaments Unit is responsible for storing weapons in Lebanon and recently expanded its operations to al Qusayr.[81]

The IDF Air Force struck several targets in the Bint Jbeil region, southeastern Lebanon.[82] These airstrikes are near where IDF units are conducting clearing operations.[83]

This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on October 30 to 2:00pm ET on October 31. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.

Hezbollah has conducted at least four attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 1.[84] Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israel forces in Metula, which is adjacent to where the IDF is conducting clearing operations in southern Lebanon.[85] Hezbollah conducted two rocket attacks targeting towns in northwestern Israel.[86] At least 30 rockets struck Karmiel in northwestern Israel, injuring several.[87] The IDF Air Force intercepted a drone crossing from Lebanon into Israel as well.[88]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

Lead Iranian nuclear negotiator Kazem Gharib Abadi met International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Raphael Grossi in Vienna, Austria, on October 31 to discuss Grossi's "upcoming" visit to Tehran.[89] Grossi said that he had a "timely and substantive" discussion with Gharib Abadi in preparation for visiting Iran.[90] Gharib Abadi was the Iranian representative to the IAEA from 2018 to 2021, during which time he played a key role in engaging Western diplomats and negotiating teams.[91]

Iranian Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairman Kamal Kharazi said that Iran has the ability to build nuclear weapons and that Khamenei’s fatwa is the only barrier preventing Iran from doing so.[92] Kharazi also added that there is a possibility of increasing Iran's missile range in an interview with Al Mayadeen on November 1.[93] Kharazi, who is also a senior adviser to Khamenei, suggested that Iran has considered the sensitivities of the West, especially the Europeans, regarding the issue of the range of missiles. But, when they do not consider Iran’s sensitivities, especially on the issue of territorial integrity, there is no reason why Iran should not consider their sensitivities either.[94] Senior Iranian officials have recently indicated a potential change in Iran's nuclear doctrine since April 2024.[95]

 

[1] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/31/israel-iran-planning-attack-iraq

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/31/world/middleeast/iran-threatens-retaliation-israel-strikes.html

[3] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/31/israel-iran-planning-attack-iraq

[4] https://www.haaretz dot com/middle-east-news/2024-09-26/ty-article/.premium/skilled-and-armed-with-iranian-weapons-these-are-the-shiite-groups-attacking-israel/00000192-2e27-d324-afdf-2fe7e99d0000 ;

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tripling-iraqi-militia-claimed-attacks-israel-october

[5] https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2024/06/04/the-islamic-resistance-in-iraq-increases-its-drone-attacks-on-israel/ ;

https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2024/feb/02/roster-iran%E2%80%99s-drones

[6] https://thedispatch.com/article/how-iran-tries-to-conceal-its-meddling/ ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/anti-israel-surge-iraqi-militants-metrics-and-trends

[7] https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2024/06/04/the-islamic-resistance-in-iraq-increases-its-drone-attacks-on-israel/

[8] https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1786303696915046671

[9] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/exclusive-iran-moves-missiles-to-iraq-in-warning-to-enemies-idUSKCN1LG0W7/ ;

https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2024/10/01/houthis-and-iraqi-militias-target-israel-amidst-lebanon-escalation/

[10] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-30-2024

[11] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1427 ;

https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1430 ;

https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1431 ;

https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1432 ;

https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1434 ;

https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1436 ;

https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1438 ;

https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1439 ;

https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1441

[12] https://baghdadtoday dot news/260996-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA.html

[13] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/adrp/3-90/adrp3_90.pdf Section 5-2.

[14] https://www.aei.org/articles/irans-attempt-to-h-it-israel-with-a-russian-style-strike-package-failedfor-now/

[15] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/31/world/middleeast/iran-threatens-retaliation-israel-strikes.html

[16] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/31/world/middleeast/iran-threatens-retaliation-israel-strikes.html

[17] https://www.foxnews.com/world/israels-strike-iran-took-missile-defense-systems-islamic-republic-is-essentially-naked

[18] https://x.com/BenTzionMacales/status/1851006118136361143 ;

 https://x.com/dex_eve/status/1851000042708222012 ;

https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/108392/Iran-deploys-cutting-edge-Ghadir-radar-system

[19] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-30-2024

[20] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-26-2024

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces

[22] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A

[23] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A

[24] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B8%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B2%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A

[25] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2024

[26] https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/09/17/hamas-houthis-open-offices-in-iraq/ ;

https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2024/06/24/hamas-leaders-iraq-qatar-gaza/

[27] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/

[28] https://t.me/mmirleb/8599

[29] https://t.me/mmirleb/8606 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8613

[30] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98367

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-10-2024

[32] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852240076920516625

[33] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1852034356493127756

[34] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1852034356493127756

[35] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852240090573025705

[36] https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1852325313969066476

[37] https://t.me/sarayaps/18765

[38] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852398082073473056

[39] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852398090726289687 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/16133

[40] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852398090726289687 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852398086070415380

[41] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852398086070415380

[42] https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/hamas-view-of-the-october-7-war/

[43] https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/hamas-view-of-the-october-7-war/

[44] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852240090573025705

[45] https://t.me/sarayaps/18764

[46] https://www dot idf.il/%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%99%D7%97%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94/%D7%9B%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%94%D7%A4%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%97%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%9C%D7%95-%D7%A9%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%94-%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%91%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%A9%D7%94%D7%A9%D7%AA%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%95-%D7%91%D7%91%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%97%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%9C%D7%98%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%91%D7%9E%D7%91%D7%A6%D7%A2-%D7%91%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%90-%D7%A9%D7%9E%D7%A1/ ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851852533020377163

[47] https://www dot idf.il/%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%99%D7%97%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94/%D7%9B%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%94%D7%A4%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%97%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%9C%D7%95-%D7%A9%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%94-%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%91%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%A9%D7%94%D7%A9%D7%AA%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%95-%D7%91%D7%91%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%97%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%9C%D7%98%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%91%D7%9E%D7%91%D7%A6%D7%A2-%D7%91%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%90-%D7%A9%D7%9E%D7%A1/

[48] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1852251539231867368

[49] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1852251539231867368

[50] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/unrwa-chief-says-agencys-office-in-west-bank-camp-was-damaged-by-israeli-bulldozers/

[51] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852277272083890239

[52] https://t.me/nedalps/4475 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7782

[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852238444119871939

[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852238444119871939

[55] https://t.me/mmirleb/8599

[56] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98366 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98183 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98423

[57] https://www.idf dot il/244488

[58] https://www.idf dot il/244488

[59] https://www.idf dot il/244488 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-25-2024

[60] https://t.me/mmirleb/8599

[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-28-2024

[62] https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_15.pdf ; https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_05.pdf

[63] https://t.me/mmirleb/8599

[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-24-2024

[65] https://t.me/mmirleb/8599

[66] https://t.me/mmirleb/8599

[67] https://t.me/mmirleb/8599

[68] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98256

[69] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852238430647755059 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/over-200-hezbollah-and-hamas-targets-struck-in-lebanon-and-gaza-over-past-day

[70] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852284521988710504 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1852290874778014087

[71] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852284537293668429 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1852290874778014087

[72] ttps://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-hezbollah-mideast-latest-1-november-2024-6ea222bd6dbe87123934833e92626aeb ; https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-palestine-gaza-war-11-01-24-intl-hnk#cm2yo989200003b6oa4xf1xbz

[73] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-palestine-gaza-war-11-01-24-intl-hnk#cm2ylh2lt00003b6osuj87vnp

[74] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1852290874778014087 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852284527193821514

[75] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1852290874778014087 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852284527193821514

[76] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1852151791321837851; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1852151460089209028; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1852132152928014755 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1852069278805299444

[77] https://t.me/dahieh4all/44576 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98428; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98433; https://t.me/dahieh4all/44584; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98444; https://t.me/dahieh4all/44588; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98445; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98408; https://x.com/Lebanon24/status/1852319681622818925; https://t.me/dahieh4all/44566

[78] https://t.me/dahieh4all/44661

[79] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851965497698328653; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-30-2024

[80] https://t.me/dahieh4all/44503

[81] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851965489720770705

[82] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98364 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98364; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98364; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98364; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98369; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98369; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98369

[83] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-29-2024

[84] https://t.me/mmirleb/8595; https://t.me/mmirleb/8607; https://t.me/mmirleb/8608; https://t.me/mmirleb/8609

[85] https://t.me/mmirleb/8595; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-30-2024

[86] https://t.me/mmirleb/8607 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8608

[87] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852317336742531223

[88] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852071726517227727 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852075509108142200

[89] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/10/31/736375/Iran-IAEA-Grossi-Gharibabadi-nuclear-program-JCPOA-US

[90] https://x.com/rafaelmgrossi/status/1851980803820925005

[91] https://irannewsupdate dot com/news/infightings/iran-who-is-kazem-gharibabadi/ ; ://unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2018/unisbio1186.html ; https://iranwire.com/en/politics/133992-irans-new-nuclear-negotiator-the-hawkish-son-in-law-of-a-senior-irgc-commander/ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-10-2024

[92] https://english.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/-existential-threat--may-pose-nuclear-doctrine-change--kharr

[93] https://english.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/-existential-threat--may-pose-nuclear-doctrine-change--kharr

[94] https://english.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/-existential-threat--may-pose-nuclear-doctrine-change--kharr

[95] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-9-2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-16-2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-12-2024