Iran Update, November 14, 2024

 

Iran Update, November 14, 2024

Ria Reddy, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Israeli forces have likely disrupted Lebanese Hezbollah’s ability to fire into Israel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported the daily rate of Hezbollah attacks has declined on average over the “past few weeks” and has decreased by half in the past week.[1] The IDF also reported that it is targeting stockpiles of observed and unobserved indirect fire systems that are difficult to reach with airstrikes.[2] The IDF added that approximately 60 percent of Hezbollah indirect fire launches use small single- or triple-barreled launch systems.[3] The stated Israeli war aim of returning displaced citizens safely to their homes in northern Israel requires stopping Hezbollah rocket fire into Israel. The recent relaxation of IDF restrictions for gatherings in northern Israel indicates the reduced threat of Hezbollah rocket fire.[4] The IDF reported that Hezbollah has also struggled to conduct large, coordinated rocket attacks into Israel, suggesting that Hezbollah is cannot easily communicate across tactical units or operational-level headquarters.[5] Israeli forces continue to exploit this disruption and have expanded clearing operations up to five to six kilometers into “second line” of Lebanese towns.[6]

Unknown gunmen shot at a UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) patrol in southern Lebanon after the patrol discovered an ammunition cache on November 14.[7] UNIFIL stated that its forces informed the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and shortly thereafter came under fire from two or three individuals.[8] UNIFIL requested that Lebanese authorities fully investigate the incident.[9] The LAF would be responsible for enforcing the disarmament of Hezbollah during a ceasefire with Israel, according to a leaked US-proposed draft.[10]

The IDF reported that it is facing a severe shortage of soldiers.[11] The IDF published data showing that it is currently has only 83 percent of the combat manpower that it requires. The IDF accordingly urged the government to increase the required time for mandatory IDF regular military service to three years, a jump from the current requirement of two and a half years for men and two years for women.[12] The IDF also urged the government to approve a service extension law. The IDF added that recruitment of ultra-Orthodox soldiers has increased in recent years but that it still fell short of the IDF goal of recruiting 1,300 ultra-Orthodox Israelis in the July-October 2024 recruitment cycle. The IDF reported that combat unit reservists served an average of 136 days in 2024 and are projected to serve an average of 70-72 days in 2025. The IDF data revealed that approximately 40,000 reservists in combat and combat-support roles did not respond to reserve duty call ups during an unspecified period. Senior Israeli officers previously attributed the fall off in participation to burnout after over a year of war.[13] Israeli media reported that the failure of the Israeli government to enact policy to draft the ultra-Orthodox Israeli population contributed to the reduced reservist responses to the call ups.[14]

Iranian leaders appear concerned about the possibility of the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggering international “snapback” sanctions on Iran. Unspecified diplomats told Reuters that the E3 are drafting a resolution to present at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting in Vienna from November 18 to 22 to “pressure Tehran over its poor cooperation” with the IAEA.[15] The resolution would require the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities in addition to its regular quarterly ones. The report would likely lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions because the report would almost certainly confirm--as previous IAEA reports have already--Iranian noncompliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[16] The sanctions would target Iran’s nuclear and missile program and arms transfers.[17] The most recent IAEA report in August 2024 concluded that Iran continues to develop its nuclear program outside the parameters of the JCPOA.[18] The IAEA report stated that Iran possesses 164.7 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, marking a 22.6 kilogram increase in the Iranian stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium since May 2024.[19] The report also verified that Iran has installed eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow and 10 out of 18 planned cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz.[20] Iran also continues to severely limit the ability of the IAEA to conduct various verification and monitoring activities related to the JCPOA.

Iran has continued to expand its nuclear program since the IAEA published its last verification and monitoring report in August 2024. The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on November 14 that high resolution satellite imagery from October 2024 shows new construction at a former Iranian nuclear weapons development site at Golab Dareh.[21] The imagery reveals new trench excavations and cabling that can be used to implement new security measures at the site, including alarms and surveillance cameras. ISIS previously reported renewed activity at another Iranian nuclear site at Sanjarian, citing imagery from September 2024.[22]

Iran’s clear and explicit violations of the JCPOA could prompt the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions against Iran. Telegraph reported on November 2 that the United Kingdom is “prepared” to trigger snapback sanctions against Iran due to Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA.[23] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Director Mohammad Eslami stated that “any resolution on Iran’s nuclear affairs will face Iran’s immediate response” during a press conference with IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi, likely referring to the E3 resolution and sanctions.[24] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters that Tehran would send a message to the E3 through Grossi about Tehran's seriousness to resolve its nuclear standoff, likely to try to convince the E3 not to trigger the snapback mechanism.[25] Senior Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, similarly emphasized Iran’s willingness to cooperate with the IAEA during separate meetings with Grossi on November 14.[26]

The United States sanctioned on November 14 a Syrian network involved in selling oil to the Syrian regime and China and generating revenue for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force and Houthis.[27] The sanctions targeted 26 companies, individuals, and vessels associated with the al Qaterji Company.[28] The company finances and maintains a militia in Syria and is connected to Hezbollah Unit 4400, which is involved in arms smuggling.[29] The IDF killed one of the company’s founders in an airstrike in July 2024.[30] The United States previously designated al Qaterji Company as a terrorist financing entity in 2022 after it facilitated trade between the Syrian regime and Islamic State.[31] The United States stated that al Qaterji Company executives met directly with senior IRGC Quds Force officers as well as a sanctioned Iranian-backed Houthi financial official, Said al Jamal.[32] The United States previously sanctioned al Jamal and affiliated companies facilitating Iranian oil trade to support the funding of Iranian proxy and partner militias.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF has likely disrupted the ability of Lebanese Hezbollah to fire into Israel. Hezbollah is struggling to conduct coordinated, large-scale attacks into Israel, suggesting challenges communicating across tactical units or operational-level headquarters.
• Iran: Iranian leaders appear concerned that the E3 could trigger international “snapback” sanctions on Iran. The E3 has expressed concern, as Iran has continued to expand its nuclear program in violation of the JCPOA.
• Syria: The United States sanctioned a Syrian network involved in selling oil to the Syrian regime and China and generating revenue for the IRGC Quds Force and Houthis. Some of the designated entities are tied to Syria militias and Lebanese Hezbollah arms smuggling.

Gaza Strip:

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip on November 14. The IDF engaged and killed Palestinian fighters in Beit Lahia and Jabalia.[34] The IDF 900th Infantry Brigade killed Palestinian fighters who launched anti-tank munitions targeting the IDF.[35] Commercially available satellite imagery published on November 14 and local Palestinian reports indicate that the IDF 84th Infantry Brigade demolished several buildings around Jabalia refugee camp.[36]

The IDF continued clearing operation in Gaza City on November 14. A Palestinian journalist reported IDF gunfire in areas north and south of Gaza City.[37] Hamas mortared the IDF north of Gaza City.[38]

The IDF 143rd Division continued clearing operations in Rafah on November 14.[39] The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a weapons warehouse, killing a Palestinian fighter.[40] The IDF separately conducted an airstrike targeting a loaded rocket launcher in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone in the southern Gaza Strip.[41] The IDF stated that the launcher was aimed at Israel and posed an imminent threat to Israeli forces and civilians. The IDF observed secondary explosions following the airstrike targeting the rocket launcher.[42] The IDF issued warnings to Gazans in the area to evacuate ahead of the airstrike and used precision munitions to avoid civilian casualties.[43] The airstrike killed one civilian and injured 20 others, however, according to the New York Times.[44]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

•  Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces killed a Palestinian militia leader near Tulkarm on November 14.[45] The IDF stated that the fighter was involved in attacks and recruiting fighters.[46] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) mourned the loss of three fighters in Tulkarm on November 14.[47] The IDF stated that its operation there was part of a larger counterterrorism effort in the northern West Bank.[48]

Northern Israel and Lebanon

Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:

• End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
• Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

Elements of the IDF 91st Division continued operating in southeastern Lebanon on November 13.[49] The 91st Division directed airstrikes targeting Hezbollah headquarters and ammunition depots.[50] The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (91st Division) conducted clearing operations in mountainous terrain to destroy hidden Hezbollah indirect fire launch sites.[51] The 89th Commando Brigade uncovered one launch platform that supported 32 launch tubes pointed toward Israel.[52] Geolocated footage posted on November 14 showed the 89th Commando Brigade advancing west from Markaba towards Tallouseh.[53] The IDF 769th Territorial Brigade also located and destroyed rocket launch sites, anti-tank positions, storage facilities, and military buildings.[54] Hezbollah claimed two rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in Markaba.[55]

The IDF 36th Division expanded its clearing operations in southcentral Lebanon on November 14.[56] The 188th Brigade uncovered a Radwan weapons depot containing rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs), sniper rifles, ammunition, and various combat equipment.[57] The 188th Brigade and 1^st Golani Brigade also located underground infrastructure, mortar shells, and indirect fire launch pads aimed at Israel.[58] Hezbollah has continued indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces attempting to advance from Maroun al Ras into “second line” Lebanese border towns.[59]

The 226th Brigade (146th Division) deployed into southwestern Lebanon on November 14 to conduct clearing operations.[60] The 228th Brigade directed airstrikes and artillery strikes on Hezbollah munitions warehouses and other Hezbollah military buildings.[61]

The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah weapons manufacturing and storage sites in Beirut on November 14.[62] IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari said that the IDF has struck 40 Hezbollah targets in Beirut in recent days.[63] The IDF stated on November 12 that it had destroyed most Hezbollah ammunition depots and weapons manufacturing sites in Beirut as part of its effort to degrade Hezbollah capabilities.[64] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued warnings to residents of Ghobeiry, Burj al Barajneh , Haret Hreik, Choueifat, and al Amrousieh before striking these areas.[65]

The IDF has conducted around 300 airstrikes in Lebanon over the past week.[66] Lebanese sources reported over 100 separate strikes since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on November 13.[67] The IDF struck Hezbollah sites in Nabatieh after issuing evacuation orders for specific buildings in the city.[68]

The IDF Air Force struck two PIJ headquarters in Damascus on November 14.[69] Social media accounts reported that the strikes targeted two buildings in Mezzeh and Qudsaya neighborhoods of Damascus.[70] The IDF noted that the strikes should cause “significant damage” to PIJ’s headquarters and fighting ability.[71] At least seven PIJ fighters have been killed in Israeli airstrikes since the IDF intensified its air campaign in southern Lebanon in September 2024.[72] These Syrian and Palestinian fighters traveled from Syria to fight alongside Hezbollah.[73] The IDF stated that PIJ is a key part of Iranian efforts to support Hezbollah against Israel.[74] The IDF also stated that the Bashar al Assad regime enables PIJ to operate in Syria.[75] The Syrian Defense Ministry reported that the strikes killed 15 and injured 16 others while causing ”significant material damage to private property.”[76]

 

The IDF conducted a second round of airstrikes targeting a bridge in al Qusayr, Syria, on November 14 that Hezbollah uses to smuggle weapons into Lebanon.[77] The IDF Air Force first targeted the bridge on November 13.[78] The Syrian Defense Ministry reported after the first strike that several bridges in Qusayr are closed to traffic.[79] Hezbollah has a prominent presence in al Qusayr, and Iran frequently transfers weapons to Hezbollah through the area.[80] The IDF stated on November 14 that it would ”attack every attempt to transfer weapons from Syria to Hezbollah” and strike all infrastructure in Syria “used to produce or transfer weapons for Hezbollah.”[81]

IDF Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Amir Baram confirmed that Israel is building a “ground barrier” along the Golan Heights-Syria border to strengthen security.[82] Baram said that the IDF 210th Division is “working hard to change the security reality” on the border.[83] The 210th Division has operated adjacent to the Golan Heights in Lebanon since the start of IDF ground operations on October 1.[84] Israeli media reported in September 2024 that Israeli defense officials were concerned about a potential Iranian-backed attempt to launch a ground attack into Israel from Syria.[85] Baram’s acknowledgement of the IDF activity along the Syrian border comes a day after the IDF spokesperson said that Israel is digging berms along the demilitarized zone between the Golan Heights and Syria in order to protect Israel against Iranian-backed infiltration attempts from Syria. The spokesperson acknowledged the activity in response to statements from the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).[86] Syrian media claimed on October 15 that four Israeli tanks, excavators, and about 50 IDF personnel have been operating within the demilitarized zone near al Asbah and al Rafid in Quneitra Province since October 2024.[87]

Hezbollah has conducted at least 21 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 13.[88] Hezbollah claimed several attacks targeting IDF sites, including the Stella Maris naval surveillance base north of Haifa and Eliakim base south of Haifa.[89] Hezbollah stated that these two attacks were part of its ”Khaybar” campaign, which is meant to retaliate for Israel killing of Hassan Nasrallah.[90] Hezbollah launched rockets targeting a IDF 146th Division logistical site near Nahariya.[91] The IDF last acknowledged that the 146th Division operated against Hezbollah in southwestern Lebanon on November 5.[92] Hezbollah also claimed multiple attacks targeting Israeli towns and IDF personnel along the Israel-Lebanon border.[93] Hezbollah fighters fired rockets targeting an IDF border post in Jal al Alam, northwestern Israel.[94] Hezbollah conducted two rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces and civilians in Yiron, across the border from where Israeli forces are conducting clearing operations in Yaroun, southwestern Lebanon.[95] Hezbollah attacks targeting IDF personnel and sites near the border are likely meant to degrade the IDF ability to conduct effective ground and air operations into Lebanon, though it is unclear whether Hezbollah attacks have had any meaningful effect.

Hezbollah claimed that it used a Fateh-110 ballistic missile to attack Israel on November 6.[96] The Fateh-110 is an Iranian short-range ballistic missile that has a range of approximately 300 kilometers.[97]IRGC-affiliated media reported on November 14 that this attack marked the first time that Hezbollah has used a Fateh-110 ballistic missile to attack Israel in the October 7 War.[98] Hezbollah claimed that it fired the Fateh-110 missile at an IDF base in Tzrifin, south of Tel Aviv.[99] IRGC-affiliated media claimed that Hezbollah fired a "significant number" of Katyusha rockets at the base to "confuse” Israeli air defenses before firing a single Fateh-110 missile at the base.[100] CTP-ISW cannot verify what kind of projectile Hezbollah used in the attack. If Hezbollah did indeed fire a Fateh-110 missile at Israel, it could have done so as part of a ”reconnaissance-in-force" operation against Israeli air defenses. Reconnaissance-in-force operations are “designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information.”[101]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed seven attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 13. The claims include the following:

• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat.[102]
• Six drone attacks targeting unspecified “vital target[s]” in northern Israel.[103]

The IDF Navy intercepted a drone launched “from the east” near Eilat on November 13.[104] The IDF Air Force separately intercepted two drones launched from Iraq before they entered Israeli airspace on November 13.[105] The IDF Air Force also intercepted a drone launched “from the east” in Syrian airspace on November 13.[106] The drone did not enter Israeli airspace.

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on November 14 that the IDF intercepted around 90 percent of the approximately 70 drones that Iranian-backed militias have fired at Israel since October 31.[107] The correspondent stated that a “significant” portion of the drones were launched from Iraq. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed over 55 attacks targeting Israel since October 31.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s senior security adviser, Ali Larijani, traveled to Damascus and met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad on November 14.[108] Assad pledged Syrian support for Palestinians and Lebanon “by all means,” according to official readouts. Larijani also met with the Syrian Parliament Speaker Hammouda Sabbagh and separately unnamed Palestinian militia leaders at the Iranian Embassy in Damascus.[109] Larijani is next set to meet Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri in Beirut.[110]

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik claimed on November 14 that the Houthis conducted 29 attacks on military and commercial vessels in the Red Sea between November 7 and 14, using drones and ballistic and cruise missiles.[111] Abdulmalik confirmed the Houthi’s complex attack on two US destroyers on November 11, which was confirmed by the US Department of Defense.[112] Abdulmalik also reiterated the Houthi claim of an attack on the USS Abraham Lincoln, which the United States has denied.[113]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16490 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1857093800507683293

[2] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16490

[3] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16490

[4] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1855280056119025721

[5] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16490

[6] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16490

[7] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-14-november-2024

[8] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-14-november-2024

[9] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-14-november-2024

[10]https://isw.pub/IranUpdate103124

[11] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1857060779947672005

[12] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1857060779947672005 ; https://www.idf dot il/en/mini-sites/our-soldiers/

[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-11-2024

[14] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1855979917416284448

[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/european-powers-pushing-resolution-against-iran-iaea-diplomats-say-2024-11-13/

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-8-2023 ; https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9870/

[17] https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/fdd-backgrounder-faq-the-snapback-of-un-sanctions-on-iran.pdf

[18] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2024-41.pdf

[19] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2024-41.pdf ; https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/06/gov2024-26.pdf

[20] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2024-41.pdf

[21] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/imagery-update-new-construction-at-golab-dareh-november-2024#fn1

[22] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/renewed-activity-at-the-sanjarian-and-golab-dareh-amad-sites

[23] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2024/11/02/britain-prepared-to-sanction-iran-nuclear-deal-breaches/

[24] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/705576

[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-tells-iaea-chief-it-is-ready-negotiate-not-under-pressure-x-2024-11-14/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/european-powers-pushing-resolution-against-iran-iaea-diplomats-say-2024-11-13/

[26] https://president dot ir/fa/155189 ; https://mfa dot ir/portal/newsview/756566

[27] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2712

[28] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2712

[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2024 ;

https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/15/middleeast/israeli-airstrike-syrian-businessman-intl-latam/index.html; https://npasyria.com/en/109830; https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/docpreview-s/00-00-16-04-84/2019_2D00_09_2D00_01-The-Katerji-Group_2D00_-A-New-Key-Player-in-the-Syrian-Loyalist-Un_2E00__2E00__2E00_.pdf

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2024 ;

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/prominent-syrian-businessman-killed-israeli-strike-near-lebanon-syria-border-2024-07-15/#:~:text=July%2015%20(Reuters)%20-%20Prominent,three%20security%20sources%20told%20Reuters.

[31] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0806

[32] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2712

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-17-2024 ;

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2652 ;

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2644 ;

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2538 ;

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2469 ;

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2159

[34] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856936660627300370

[35] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856936664481874308

[36] https://t.me/hamza20300/310605 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/310636 ; https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1856667581907702191 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/16471

[37] https://t.me/hamza20300/310594 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/310625

[38] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8268/%D8%AF%D9%83-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%BA%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%B7-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86

[39] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856936664481874308

[40] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856936664481874308

[41] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856806489765167329

[42] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1856808008753582551

[43] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856806493204652409

[44] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/14/world/middleeast/israel-airstrike-humanitarian-zone-gaza.html

[45] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1857012588367757347

[46] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857012695733531058

[47] https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/822

[48] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857012695733531058

[49] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856936653975101805

[50] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856936657506775123

[51] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857067365520810466 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1857045835575697472 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857045911483957534

[52] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857067365520810466 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1857045835575697472

[53] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1857045945252188601 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1857054013490913630

[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856936653975101805

[55] https://t.me/mmirleb/9065 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9041

[56] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1856588328897818727 ; www dot idf.il/248452

[57] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857003899434983537

[58] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856936657506775123

[59] https://t.me/mmirleb/9032 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9033 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9070

[60] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856936649671811294

[61] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856936653975101805

[62] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857140498525495739 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857048239565918386 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856996336324763925

[63] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1857129571826475067

[64] https://www.idf dot il/248007

[65] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857054724970668297 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856996336324763925 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856944537840550249 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856870660422729772 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856812044663570432 ;

[66] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1857129571826475067

[67] Data available on request.

[68] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857108863662653667 ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/120125 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1857042654212583594 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/102399

[69] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857072120963932328

[70] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1857037707467223387 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1857041934776213860

[71] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857072120963932328

[72] https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1838604474090196998; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1838884955243372680; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1853150218226905170

[73] https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1838604474090196998; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1838884955243372680; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1853150218226905170

[74] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857072120963932328

[75] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857072120963932328

[76] https://www.facebook.com/mod.gov.sy/posts/pfbid084zrgmd5R4MFvE76BEVq8up2QzuYbN9CoA9MhQdM88JAwWrpcehK7L391pi3Mjksl?__cft__[0]=AZUH-e_fyx4sab5n-S8yK8hXlV5NDJnOR8hL15p95ooTpSLfbUzX-OKSqrXWniHl7CgoibBxYm4t7hqvtlb9Jlj70uSYrZ8OJxPNqGNG-NOzTvfBCJLiAjukHVn1IKMLzjVwZJvcF3SULn2-DVGT2mtCfV2oYXBTXgDlKHwSs0Vd4050mUheDu0AHoXbzn2AJIo&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[77] https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1857128714896646410 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/102543

[78] https://www.facebook.com/mod.gov.sy/posts/pfbid0KZj4i4HB7QxvuoYFzAskZnCA2bsJEWP7UjWAYF9jKwg7sYshxpLm78fmquBNjUiml?__cft__[0]=AZUF3U5f7gvKlf_pVuZ3D_QXqTeQkoWTm3x4ZlUEzPzJXEwatyKy0LHOff54rXI8P03J0oXR_Chb48bJqdoj82XLa7HJB-6Cz4IBrpcAapBLgaQ7sJYTxW90IbJ5_LJvRKKy05ok4d7Lvz1z44VQP0_6CnpNI8Gxd3oeT1W81lkDJ1MEHSYnSYnCU-7cPqzRlUU&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[79] https://www.facebook.com/mod.gov.sy/posts/pfbid0KZj4i4HB7QxvuoYFzAskZnCA2bsJEWP7UjWAYF9jKwg7sYshxpLm78fmquBNjUiml?__cft__[0]=AZUF3U5f7gvKlf_pVuZ3D_QXqTeQkoWTm3x4ZlUEzPzJXEwatyKy0LHOff54rXI8P03J0oXR_Chb48bJqdoj82XLa7HJB-6Cz4IBrpcAapBLgaQ7sJYTxW90IbJ5_LJvRKKy05ok4d7Lvz1z44VQP0_6CnpNI8Gxd3oeT1W81lkDJ1MEHSYnSYnCU-7cPqzRlUU&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[80] https://www.csis.org/analysis/escalating-conflict-hezbollah-syria ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-5-2024#_ednb17f68bd5697f4998787c6a9764de21a81

[81] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857130554870689792

[82] https://www dot idf.il/248358

[83] https://www dot idf.il/248358

[84] https://www.idf dot il/246162

[85] https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-09-24/ty-article/.premium/while-idf-attacks-degraded-hezbollah-it-remains-a-major-threat-to-israeli-home-front/00000192-25a9-dff0-a5f7-3fbf15ad0000

[86] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cpwrvw7x8j9o

[87] https://t.me/damascusv011/24465

[88] https://t.me/mmirleb/9039; https://t.me/mmirleb/9042; https://t.me/mmirleb/9043; https://t.me/mmirleb/9044; https://t.me/mmirleb/9045; https://t.me/mmirleb/9046; https://t.me/mmirleb/9047; https://t.me/mmirleb/9048; https://t.me/mmirleb/9049; https://t.me/mmirleb/9050; https://t.me/mmirleb/9052; https://t.me/mmirleb/9054; https://t.me/mmirleb/9055; https://t.me/mmirleb/9056; https://t.me/mmirleb/9057; https://t.me/mmirleb/9058; https://t.me/mmirleb/9059; https://t.me/mmirleb/9060; https://t.me/mmirleb/9063; https://t.me/mmirleb/9071; https://t.me/mmirleb/9072

[89] https://t.me/mmirleb/9052; https://t.me/mmirleb/9072; https://t.me/mmirleb/9042; https://t.me/mmirleb/9046; https://t.me/mmirleb/9043

[90] https://t.me/mmirleb/9052; https://t.me/mmirleb/9072

[91] https://t.me/mmirleb/9043

[92] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1853761771913277475; www dot idf.il/245331

[93] https://t.me/mmirleb/9039; https://t.me/mmirleb/9056; https://t.me/mmirleb/9047; https://t.me/mmirleb/9048; https://t.me/mmirleb/9050; https://t.me/mmirleb/9054; https://t.me/mmirleb/9055; https://t.me/mmirleb/9057; https://t.me/mmirleb/9058; https://t.me/mmirleb/9059; https://t.me/mmirleb/9060; https://t.me/mmirleb/9063; https://t.me/mmirleb/9071

[94] https://t.me/mmirleb/9042

[95] https://t.me/mmirleb/9071; https://t.me/mmirleb/9058; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-13-2024

[96] https://t.me/mmirleb/8765

[97] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/24/3199813/

[98] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/24/3199813/

[99] https://t.me/mmirleb/8765

[100] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/24/3199813/

[101] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/adrp/3-90/adrp3_90.pdf, Section 5-2.

[102] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1520

[103] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1521 ;

https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1523 ;

https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1524 ;

https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1525 ;

https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1526 ;

https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1527

[104] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856790269343006730

[105] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1856918677301395892

[106] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856819357671690580

[107] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16470

[108] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/224439/President-Assad-Iran-s-leader-adviser-discuss-bilateral-ties

[109] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6288149;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/24/3200279

[110] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/199493

[111] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3396513.htm

[112] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3396513.htm;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-12-2024 ;

https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3962926/pentagon-press-secretary-maj-gen-pat-ryder-holds-a-press-briefing/

[113] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3396513.htm;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-12-2024 ;

https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3962926/pentagon-press-secretary-maj-gen-pat-ryder-holds-a-press-briefing/