Iran Update, November 4, 2024

 

Iran Update, November 4, 2024

Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, Anthony Carrillo, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iran reportedly warned some Arab countries that it will conduct a complex attack on Israel in retaliation for the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes on Iran.[1] Unspecified Arab and Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal that the upcoming Iranian attack will include drones and missiles and that some will have heavier payloads than those which Iran has previously fired at Israel. Western and Iranian analysts have noted that Iran could use the Khorramshahr-4 liquid-fueled, medium-range ballistic missile, which purportedly carries a payload of 1,500 kilograms and has a range of 2,000 kilometers.[2] The Arab and Iranian officials also told the Wall Street Journal that Iran will use other weapons beyond drones and missiles and will include the conventional Iranian military, known as the Artesh, in the attack. The inclusion of the Artesh would mark the first time that it has attacked Israel; the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has taken lead on attacking Israel up until this point. The Artesh would participate presumably because the IDF killed four Artesh officers in its recent strikes on Iran.[3] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly told senior regime officials that the IDF strikes were ”too large to ignore.”[4] The Artesh has some means of supporting an attack on Israel, such as one-way attack drones, decades-old combat aircraft, and ship-launched missiles, though it remains far from clear that these systems would perform well against Israeli defenses.[5]

Hamas and Fatah officials met in Cairo on November 2 to discuss post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and agreed to form an administrative committee to manage borders and other civil affairs.[6] Hamas in the meeting reportedly presented a detailed blueprint for organizing the committee and comprising it of technocrats.[7] Fatah reportedly agreed in principle and asked to review the plan further, particularly who would lead the committee. This meeting comes as Hamas and Fatah have negotiated for months over establishing a national unity government in the Gaza Strip. A Palestinian source told Reuters in October 2024 that Hamas and Fatah may explore the possibility of forming a committee to govern the Gaza Strip if they failed to agree on a national unity government.[8] Hamas seeks to establish an intra-Palestinian government in the Gaza Strip as an alternative to an Emirati-proposed plan that would exclude Hamas from post-war governance. Hamas likely calculates that it could subvert, infiltrate, and ultimately control a national unity government and thus allow Hamas to remain politically dominant in the Gaza Strip. That Hamas developed the plan for an administrative committee indicates that Hamas still this approach as viable toward preserving its influence in the strip. This Cairo meeting notably comes after Hamas asked Russia to pressure the Palestinian Authority (PA) into negotiating further over a national unity government.[9]

A female Iranian student removed some of her clothing in protest after being reportedly harassed and assaulted by regime security forces on campus.[10] The student, named Ahoo Daryaei, was targeted for improperly adhering to the mandatory hijab law. Some Iranian sources stated that Daryaei removed her clothing after security forces tore it.[11] Security forces arrested Daryaei, and Iranian media later reported that she has been hospitalized for being mentally ill.[12] This incident is one of several in which the regime has labeled women mentally ill for protesting the hijab requirement.[13] Human rights organizations called for the immediate and unconditional release of Daryaei.[14] She has rapidly become an online symbol of the Iranian protest movement standing against regime oppression and efforts to enforce behavioral standards on the Iranian population. This protest movement has a long legacy of strong female icons, especially following the regime killing Mahsa Amini in September 2022.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Israel conflict: Iran reportedly warned some Arab countries that it will conduct a complex attack in retaliation for the recent IDF strikes on Iran. Tehran reportedly plans to use drones and missiles, some of which will have heavier payloads than what Iran has previously fired at Israel. The upcoming attack will reportedly include the IRGC and conventional Iranian military.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas and Fatah officials met in Cairo to discuss post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and agreed to form an administrative committee to manage borders and other civil affairs. Hamas seeks to establish an intra-Palestinian government that Hamas can ultimately control as an alternative to a UAE plan that would exclude Hamas from post-war governance in the strip.
• Iran: A female Iranian student removed some of her clothing in protest after being reportedly harassed and assaulted by regime security forces. She has rapidly become an online symbol of the Iranian protest movement standing against regime oppression and efforts to enforce behavioral standards on the Iranian population.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF 162nd Brigade continued clearing operations around Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on November 4. Israeli forces killed Palestinian fighters and destroyed militia infrastructure.[16] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) detonated an explosively formed penetrator targeting an Israeli vehicle east of Jabalia camp.[17] A soldier from the IDF 84th Brigade was seriously wounded in battle in the northern Gaza Strip.[18]

An unidentified Palestinian militia detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) that injured six Palestinian civilians and hit nearby IDF convoy vehicles and parts of the Kamal Adwan hospital in Jabalia on November 3. The World Health Organization reported an explosion near an IDF humanitarian convoy passing Kamal Adwan Hospital to evacuate civilians to other hospitals in the northern Gaza Strip.[19] Shrapnel hit the courtyard and roof of the hospital and several convoy vehicles parked nearby, injuring six children. The Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) confirmed a Palestinian militia IED caused the explosion.[20]

The IDF 252nd Division continued operations in the central Gaza Strip on November 4.[21] Israeli forces killed Palestinian fighters and destroyed militia infrastructure.

Palestinian militias conducted two combined rocket attacks targeting Israeli soldiers and an Israeli command-and-control site on November 4.[22]

The IDF 143rd Division continued operations around Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip on November 4. Israeli forces directed an airstrike that killed PIJ military intelligence officer Ahmed al Dalu and another Palestinian fighter.[23] Dalu participated in the October 7 attacks and planned and executed other attacks targeting Israel. The IDF 933rd Brigade (143rd Division) killed Palestinian fighters around Rafah.[24] Israeli forces also directed an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters in a military building that stored mines, killing them and destroying the mines.[25]

Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Israel Katz sent a letter to UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres stating that Israel has terminated its agreement legally recognizing UNRWA.[26] The Israeli parliament passed legislation on October 29 banning UNRWA from operating in Israel.[27] UNRWA spokeswoman Juliette Touma said on November 4 that UNRWA expects to continue coordinating the distribution of aid in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.[28]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on November 3.[29] PIJ fired small arms targeting Israeli forces around Jenin.[30] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms at an Israeli settlement near Nablus.[31]

PA security forces seized a rocket that was ready to fire along the Israel-West Bank border on November 4.[32] An Israel Army Radio correspondent reported that the forces located a rocket on a launcher in Budrus, which is about five kilometers from Israeli towns.[33]

Northern Israel and Lebanon
Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:

• End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
• Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

The IDF has seized at least 10,000 advanced anti-tank guided munitions during ground operations in southern Lebanon.[34] Israeli media called the cache “unprecedented” and reported that the IDF is considering forming specialized military units to use the seized weapons.[35] Lebanese Hezbollah would have very likely sought to keep control of this stockpile if it could coordinate a serious defense of the border towns. The IDF capture of such a large number of anti-tank munitions suggests that Hezbollah is unable to defend key stockpiles and infrastructure sites in southern Lebanon. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the IDF air and ground campaigns temporarily degraded Hezbollah command-and-control and logistical networks.[36]

The IDF estimated on November 2 that it has killed 2,000 Hezbollah militants in ground and air operations since October 1, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[37] The IDF also assessed that nearly 3,000 Hezbollah militants have been killed since October 8, 2023.[38]

Hezbollah-affiliated media reported on November 4 that the IDF withdrew from Khiam, southeastern Lebanon.[39] The report claimed that Hezbollah attacks forced the IDF to withdraw from southern and eastern Khiam, Sarda, al Umrah, Tal al Hamamis, and al Wazzani.[40] Hezbollah did not claim any attacks targeting the IDF in Khiam on November 4. Lebanese sources reported that the IDF continued shelling around Khiam on November 3 and November 4.[41] The IDF advanced into the southern outskirts of Khiam on October 28.[42]

The IDF 91st Division continued operations in southeastern Lebanon.[43] The IDF 228th Infantry Brigade (Res.) identified a Hezbollah militant in a building in a border village.[44] The IDF directed an attack that killed the militant and produced secondary explosions from the building.[45] An Israeli journalist posted footage of the IDF 3rd Infantry Brigade (Res.) conducting a controlled demolition of 80 Hezbollah infrastructure sites in northern Mays al Jabal on November 3.[46] These infrastructure sites were adjacent to the Israeli border with Manara.

The IDF 36th Division directed a strike targeting a Hezbollah commander in Baraachit, southern Lebanon, on November 4.[47] The IDF killed Abu Ali Rida, who directed anti-aircraft fire against Israeli forces and commanded Hezbollah in the Baraachit area.[48]

The IDF 36th Division continued operations in southern Lebanon on November 4. The IDF 188th Armored Brigade operated in “rugged and wooded” areas along the Israel-Lebanon border and discovered a stockpile of Hezbollah weapons, including anti-tank guided missiles and small arms.[49] Hezbollah claimed that it fired a drone targeting the IDF east of Maroun al Ras.[50] Geolocated footage that the IDF posted on November 4 showed it clearing a residential area in central Aitaroun.[51] Lebanese media reported that the IDF conducted clearing operations in Wadi Qatmoun, south of Rmeish.[52]

Hezbollah is likely trying to preserve its standing among Christian and Druze communities in southern Lebanon in order to bolster its long-term political survival.[53] The New York Times reported on November 3 that officials from Hasbaya--a majority Christian and Druze in southeastern Lebanon--have tried to keep Hezbollah militants out of the town out of fear of Israeli airstrikes. Hasbaya leaders reportedly negotiated directly with Hezbollah to keep militants from launching rockets from the area and have turned away Shia families displaced from nearby Hezbollah-affiliated villages. That Hezbollah militants are not fleeing into Christian and Druze villages to seek shelter from Israeli airstrikes or operations suggests that Hezbollah seeks to maintain some of the tolerance that non-Shia communities extend to it in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah likely calculates that preserving its relationships and good will with non-Shia communities can contribute to its long-term political survival in Lebanon. This also suggests that Hezbollah maintains the command-and-control among units in the south to prevent its fighters from fleeing into Christian or Druze villages for safety.

The IDF Air Force conducted several airstrikes targeting Hezbollah intelligence headquarters outside Damascus, Syria, on November 4.[54] The IDF said Hezbollah intelligence maintains a Syrian branch that operates independently from Lebanese offices.[55] Damascus-based media reported that the IDF targeted three sites in Sayyida Zeinab, Najha, and near the Damascus International Airport hotel.[56] Syrian state media reported that the strike inflicted “significant” material damage.[57] The IDF had previously killed the Hezbollah intelligence chief, Hossein Ali Hazimah, and the Syrian intelligence office head, Mahmoud Muhammad Shahin, in Beirut on October 4.[58] Shahin led the Syrian office for 17 years and developed close relationships with the Syrian regime and Iranian networks.[59] The IDF has repeatedly struck Hezbollah intelligence infrastructure in Beirut and across Lebanon to disrupt Hezbollah intelligence activities.[60]

The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah capabilities, infrastructure, and leadership on November 4. The IDF Air Force struck and killed a Hezbollah Radwan special operations forces (SOF) anti-tank unit commander in al Sultaniyeh.[61] The Radwan commander directed anti-tank fire at Israel and Israeli forces in Lebanon.[62] The IDF struck and killed a Hezbollah commander responsible for supplying weapons to units and recruiting fighters around Bint Jbeil.[63] The strikes around Bint Jbeil targeted several Hezbollah buildings as well.[64] The IDF Air Force also targeted a Hezbollah rocket launcher in southern Lebanon used to attack the Upper Galilee.[65]

Seven PIJ fighters have been killed in Israeli airstrikes since the IDF started its intensified air campaign in southern Lebanon.[66] These Syrian and Palestinian fighters traveled from Syria to fight alongside Hezbollah.[67] PIJ maintains cells in Lebanon, particularly in the south, and has launched attacks into Israel from Hezbollah-controlled territory.[68] A Syria-focused analyst reported that Israeli airstrikes have killed least 27 PIJ fighters in southern Lebanon since October 2023.[69]

This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on November 3 to 2:00pm ET on November 4. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.

Hezbollah has conducted at least 18 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 3.[70] Hezbollah attacked a prominent IDF air defense and communications site on Mount Meron three times.[71] Hezbollah attacked Israeli forces near the Israel-Lebanon border with one-way attack drones in five separate locations.[72] Hezbollah also continued to attack Israeli towns without clear military targets.[73]

Northern Israel

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance of Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed two attacks since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 3. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Saraya Awliya al Dam, which claims to be affiliated with the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, separately claimed four attacks on November 4. CTP-ISW cannot verify whether these claims refer to the same attacks, however, all of the attacks were claimed within a 30-minute period. The Islamic Resistance of Iraq claims include:

• Two drone attacks targeting “vital targets” in northern Israel[74]

The Saraya Awliya al Dam claims include:

• Two drone attacks targeting “vital targets” in the Golan Heights[75]
• Two drone attacks targeting “vital targets” in Haifa[76]

The IDF stated that it intercepted several drones from the east around the same time but did not provide further details.[77] The IDF separately intercepted two drones from the east earlier on November 4, including one before it entered Israeli airspace.[78]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sarkhat al Quds released a statement threatening that any Israeli aggression on Iraq will cause “escalation without control or limits.”[79] This statement is likely a response to Israeli media reports that Iran will retaliate for the recent IDF strikes in Iran, possibly by launching one-way attack drones and ballistic missiles from Iraq.[80] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may be concerned about the potential of Israel launching preemptive strikes against Iranian-backed militias in Iraq.

Iranian Interior Minister Eskander Momeni met with Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari in Iran on November 4 to discuss the "expansion of relations" between Iran and Iraq.[81]

US Special Envoy to Yemen Timothy Lenderking told the Washington Post that Arab countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, want to avoid further fighting with the Houthis.[82] Lenderking said that these countries need to do more to support the US-led coalition in deterring the Houthis from attacking international shipping. The Houthis have conducted over 270 attacks targeting commercial vessels. Houthi spokesperson Yahya Sarea said on November 3 that the Houthis will continue attacking ships even if vessels change ownership or flags.[83] The Wall Street Journal reported on October 25 that Russia had provided the Houthis with targeting intelligence to support their attacks on international shipping earlier this year.[84] CTP-ISW cannot verify whether Russia continues to provide intelligence to the Houthis.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said that Iran would take "every necessary military, weapon, and political action" to "prepare" the nation during a speech to Iranian students on November 2.[85] Khamenei emphasized that Iranian ”authorities are currently busy" in these “preparations.” His statement could suggest his recognition of growing calls from Iranian officials to shift Iran’s nuclear doctrine, specifically Khamenei’s 2003 fatwa banning nuclear weapons. [86]

Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Erani claimed that Iranian reconnaissance drones are surveilling sixteen US destroyers and frigates in the Middle East.[87] Erani said that the drones are flying within view of the naked eye to send a message to the United States that it is not welcome in the region.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-tells-region-strong-and-complex-attack-coming-on-israel-2804179f

[2] https://x.com/FarzinNadimi/status/1853418858498994248; https://x.com/mhmiranusa/status/1853142601987211457

[3] https://www.bbc.com/news/live/cn4v67j88e0t

[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/31/world/middleeast/iran-threatens-retaliation-israel-strikes.html

[5] https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2024/feb/02/roster-iran%E2%80%99s-drones ; https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/iran/Iran%20022217SP.pdf

[6] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%AD-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A9

[7] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%AD-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A9

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-9-2024 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-fatah-leaders-hold-palestinian-unity-talks-cairo-2024-10-09/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-23-2024

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-24-2024

[10] https://news.sky.com/story/amnesty-demands-release-of-woman-violently-arrested-after-stripping-off-to-protest-strict-islamic-dress-code-reports-say-13248081

[11] https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/03/middleeast/iranian-woman-detained-after-taking-clothes-off-intl/index.html

[12] https://iranwire.com/en/women/135718-iran-labels-women-protesters-as-mentally-ill-to-discredit-dissent/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/14/3193144

[13] https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-court-controversy-diagnosing-hijab-protesters-mental-illness/32514690.html

[14] https://news.sky.com/story/amnesty-demands-release-of-woman-violently-arrested-after-stripping-off-to-protest-strict-islamic-dress-code-reports-say-13248081

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/data-analysis-mahsa-amini-protest-movement ;

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/16/world/middleeast/mahsa-amini-iran-protests-hijab-profile.html

[16] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853307357427597702

[17] https://t.me/sarayaps/18778

[18] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853375988949770621

[19] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853202506374914079 ; https://x.com/DrTedros/status/1853527793084379521

[20] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853202519712792935

[21] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853307357427597702

[22] https://t.me/pflpgaza1/14792 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7790

[23] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853307350544691471 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853307354638332327

[24] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853307360468459931

[25] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853307363526152524

[26] https://wapo.st/48QAh5n

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-30-2024

[28] https://wapo.st/48QAh5n

[29] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7789 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1712 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1713

[30] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1712 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1713

[31] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7789

[32] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1853491966274617742

[33] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1853491966274617742

[34] https://www dot israelhayom.com/2024/11/04/idf-considers-forming-anti-tank-units-using-captured-hezbollah-weapons/

[35] https://www dot israelhayom.com/2024/11/04/idf-considers-forming-anti-tank-units-using-captured-hezbollah-weapons/

[36] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate103024

[37] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1852774312195117223

[38] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1852774312195117223

[39] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/11788

[40] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/11788

[41] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/99357; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/118168

[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-29-2024

[43] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853307337450152309

[44] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853307337450152309

[45] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853307337450152309

[46] https://t.me/amitsegal/39531; https://x.com/BenTzionMacales/status/1853362397072789534

[47] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853307325043319038

[48] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1853332969085128997

[49] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1853459733484810730

[50] https://t.me/mmirleb/8706

[51] https://x.com/TwistyCB/status/1853410115635802435

[52] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/99369

[53] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/03/world/middleeast/lebanon-hezbollah-israel.html

[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853495834823864701

[55] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853495841262031233

[56] https://t.me/damascusv011/24807

[57] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1853493552799453692

[58] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853495844831678758; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853495848576930275; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-4-2024

[59] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853495848576930275

[60] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853495856072106254

[61] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853398660958114038 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853398664523255818

[62] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853398660958114038 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853398664523255818

[63] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853398667744440790 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853398670412005696 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853398673356357934

[64] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853398667744440790 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853398670412005696 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853398673356357934

[65] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853373541791510565

[66] https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1838604474090196998; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1838884955243372680; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1853150218226905170

[67] https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1838604474090196998; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1838884955243372680; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1853150218226905170

[68] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-hezbollah-lebanese-group-backing-hamas-its-war-with-israel-2023-10-16; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-15-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-2-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-6-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-12-2023

[69] https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1853150218226905170; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1838884955243372680; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1838604474090196998; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1836102216492503386;  https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1806998460119257191; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1801990360995905809; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1795143315857330276; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1789016399895040347; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1788264254677700813; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1762531227058176417; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1757468176068100571; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1741036084203802677; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1733175321833120121; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1719062137509691802; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1716085164239917138; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1715802192181858578

[70] https://t.me/mmirleb/8697 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8698 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8699 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8700 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8701; https://t.me/mmirleb/8702 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8703 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8704 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8705 ‘ https://t.me/mmirleb/8707 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8708 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8709 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8711 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8712 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8713

[71] https://t.me/mmirleb/8713 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8702 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8698

[72] https://t.me/mmirleb/8704 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8705 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8708 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8709 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8709

[73] https://t.me/mmirleb/8697 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8698 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8698 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8698 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8700 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8701; https://t.me/mmirleb/8703 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8711

[74] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1452 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1453

[75] https://t.me/awlialdm/118 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/120

[76] https://t.me/awlialdm/122 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/124

[77] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853393994610327641

[78] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853321456999952570

[79] https://t.me/aishab_alkahf/240

[80] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/31/israel-iran-planning-attack-iraq

[81] https://mehrnews dot com/news/6278616/

[82] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/11/03/us-yemen-houthis-israel-arab-states/

[83] https://x.com/AmeenHa2024yan/status/1853155462071337144

[84] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-25-2024 ;

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-provided-targeting-data-for-houthi-assault-on-global-shipping-eabc2c2b

[85] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27755

[86] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-9-2024#_ednd2d4836e8ccde6c232323efad931e2f418 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-21-2024

[87] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/703187