Iran Update, November 5, 2024

 

Iran Update, November 5, 2024

Carolyn Moorman, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Kelly Campa, Victoria Penza, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

Fatah is attempting to extend its control over the Gaza Strip after the October 7 War, but Fatah’s lack of pro-Fatah Palestinian Authority (PA)-affiliated military forces in the Gaza Strip will make this extremely difficult. Fatah and Hamas have met in Cairo for the past several days to discuss post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and reportedly agreed in principle to form an administrative committee to manage civil affairs, including humanitarian aid.[1] Hamas reportedly demanded that the committees only include PA civilian employees and remain independent of the PA itself.[2] Fatah Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas demanded in response to Hamas that the committee must be administratively and financially subordinate to the PA or Fatah would not agree to a deal.[3] Either plan will not lead to renewed PA control in the Gaza Strip, however. Hamas guerrilla cells remain active across the Strip, and these cells would attack any attempt by the PA to replace Hamas’ political control with Fatah-affiliated or -dominated PA political control. Hamas likely continues to believe that controlling these committees would enable it to preserve its influence in the Strip.

Fatah likely views the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and Hamas’ weakened military position as an opportunity to confront Hamas over Hamas efforts to maintain control in the Gaza Strip. An anonymous PA official noted that the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on October 16 has created an opening for further discussions with Hamas or alternative governance plans for the post-war Gaza Strip.[4] It does not appear that Hamas has altered its position vis-a-vis political control in the Gaza Strip since Sinwar’s death.[5] Hamas has long attempted to maintain control or influence over any post-war political organization in the Gaza Strip.[6]

Israeli forces are conducting a major clearing operation across the northern Gaza Strip to disrupt militia reconstitution efforts. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on November 5 that the IDF has stationed forces along two separate corridors north and south of Gaza City, isolating North Gaza Governorate from the rest of the Gaza Strip, and Gaza City from the southern Gaza Strip and the North Gaza Governorate.[7] The 162nd Division has reportedly stationed forces along a corridor running from the Black Arrow monument, west of Mefalsim, Israel, to the Gazan coast.[8] The corridor separates Beit Hanoun, Beit Lahia, and Jabalia from Gaza City. The IDF stated that it intends to completely clear the northern Gaza Strip of all Palestinian fighters above and below ground. The 162nd Division reported it has evacuated approximately 60,000 Palestinians from the northern Gaza Strip. Approximately 1,000-1,300 Palestinians remain in Beit Lahia, “a few hundred” remain in Beit Hanoun, and “a few hundred” remain in Jabalia. The IDF plans to evacuate the remaining Palestinians in the northern Gaza Strip to the south in the coming days.

The IDF has conducted two previous clearing operations in Jabalia, where it faced some of the most intense fighting between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters during the war.[9] The IDF stated during its May 2024 clearing operation that Hamas turned civilian infrastructure in Jabalia into a “fortified combat complex.”[10] Palestinian fighters also maintained an unusually high rate of attacks targeting Israeli forces throughout IDF clearing operations in Jabalia.[11] Palestinian militia elements could continue attacks in Jabalia after the IDF withdrew in May 2024, though it was unclear how effective the Hamas military organization in Jabalia would continue to function. Hamas’ military wing has probably attempted to rebuild itself where possible in Jabalia since May 2024. It is unclear how successful these efforts would have been, however, given Hamas’ inability to resupply its fighters and attrition during Israeli operations in May.[12]

Palestinian militias have claimed near-daily attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in the northern Gaza Strip since October 6.[13] The IDF reported it has killed approximately 1,000 Palestinian fighters and detained approximately 700 since the latest clearing operation began on October 6.[14] The IDF reported its fighters also located and destroyed approximately 200 buildings rigged with explosives during this time.

The commander of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada boasted about Iranian-backed Iraqi militia ballistic missile capabilities on November 5, likely to deter potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada commander and Popular Mobilization Forces official Abbas al Zaidi said that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have “underground factories” for an advanced ballistic missile industry during an interview with an Iraqi television program on November 5, in response to a political analyst who said that Iraq does not have defense capabilities like Iran.[15] Iranian officials, Iraqi intelligence sources, and Western intelligence sources told Reuters in 2018 that Iran was helping Iranian-backed Iraqi militias start to “make their own” short-range ballistic missiles. This insight was likely a reference to an Iranian effort designed to improve the ability of the militias to assemble the technical components of the missiles rather than manufacture them completely.[16] UK-based Saudi outlet Elaph reported on November 2 that Israel warned the Iraqi government that if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to attack Israel from Iraqi territory, Israel may strike predetermined targets in Iraq.[17] These Israeli threats may have led Iraqi groups to attempt to deter the Israelis. The Elaph report followed an earlier Axios report that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attack Israel in response to Israel’s recent October 25 strikes targeting Iran.[18]

Zaidi and the other Iranian-backed Iraqi groups probably also seek to message their strength to gain more influence within the Axis of Resistance amid the severe weakening of the Axis’ previous crown jewel, Hezbollah. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has increased its rate of attacks, in particular drone attacks, targeting Israel since mid-September 2024.[19] Zaidi’s comments about the militias’ missile production are also likely meant to fulfill a dual effect of emphasizing the militias’ ability to produce more missiles if needed, while also highlighting the militias’ perceived closeness with Iran to develop this capability. Zaidi’s comments have the added effect of illustrating the defiance of the Iraqi groups in the face of Israel. Only the Houthis have withstood Israeli attacks while maintaining a defiant face to date, and the Iraqi groups have presumably observed the regional legitimacy this has brought the Houthis in certain pro-Iran circles.

The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deepened collaboration with the Houthis since October 7, 2023, which could give Iraqi militias access to the knowledge necessary to do rudimentary ballistic missile production.[20] A Houthi drone expert responsible for training Iranian-backed Iraqi militants in drone tactics died in a US self-defense strike on an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia facility in Iraq in July 2024.[21] The Houthis have learned to locally assemble drones and ballistic missiles from key components smuggled into Yemen by the IRGC.[22] Increased cooperation between the Houthis and the Iraqi militias, combined with the Houthis’ ability to locally assemble missiles, suggests that the Houthis may have had a role in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias learning to assemble ballistic missiles.

Russia launched the Iranian Kowsar high-resolution sensing satellite and Hodhod communications satellite into orbit using a Russian Soyuz rocket on November 5, which Iran could use to collect imagery on US and Israeli assets and bases in the region.[23] Iranian media claimed that a “private” company—Omid Faza—designed and built the satellites.[24] The head of the Iranian Space Agency, which operates under the Iranian Information and Communications Technology Ministry, stated on November 5 that the agency signed a contract with the Omid Faza Company to buy satellite images.[25] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media previously reported in July 2020 that the IRGC uses satellites to collect intelligence on US military positions in the region, underscoring the importance of satellites to Iran’s military forces.[26]

Omid Faza’s founder, Hossein Shahrabi Farahani, who previously headed US-sanctioned Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) Space Group, created the company in 2018 with several unspecified Amir Kabir University students.[27] The United States sanctioned IEI in 2008 for being “owned or controlled” by the Iranian Defense Ministry.[28] IEI produces electronic warfare equipment, military tactical communication systems, and missile launchers, among other equipment.[29] The launch of the Kowsar satellite into orbit is particularly noteworthy as Iranian officials continue to emphasize that Iran will respond to the recent IDF strikes into Iran.[30]

This launch also highlights how Iran and Russia are continuing to deepen space cooperation.[31] Russia previously launched Iranian satellites into orbit in August 2022 and February 2024.[32]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5.[33] Netanyahu explained his decision by citing a "crisis of trust” that had emerged between him and Gallant.[34] Netanyahu and Gallant, who served on Netanyahu's war cabinet, have publicly disagreed on numerous issues since October 7, 2023, including Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip and Israel‘s approach to negotiating a ceasefire-hostage deal.[35] Gallant’s positions—and particularly the positions that put him at odds with Netanyahu—frequently aligned with those of the IDF.[36] Netanyahu appointed Foreign Minister Israel Katz to replace Gallant as defense minister.[37] Katz lacks significant security or defense experience and previously led several non-defense portfolios in the Israeli government, including transportation, foreign affairs, and intelligence.[38] Katz is seen as a ”long-time ally” to Netanyahu.[39] Minister without a portfolio Gideon Sa’ar will succeed Katz as the new Israeli Foreign Minister.[40]

Gazans protested price gouging of humanitarian aid and goods in Deir al Balah, central Gaza Strip, on November 4 and 5.[41] A Palestinian journalist claimed that the Hamas-run Ministry of Economy implemented a 35% tax on goods entering Gaza, though CTP-ISW has not observed proof of a tax and cannot confirm whether this is an official tax or merely Hamas-guided price gouging.[42] The journalist and protesters claimed that local merchants and Hamas have coordinated to control the price of goods.[43] CTP-ISW observed over 100 Palestinian protesters demonstrating against the price gouging in Deir al Balah on November 4 and 5.[44] It is notable that Palestinian civilians are protesting in Deir al Balah given that it remains a Hamas stronghold. These protests suggest that some Gazans are no longer fearing Hamas’ internal security apparatus and willing to break previous taboos by protesting. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated during a briefing on September 4 that Hamas often steals humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip, hoards goods, and gouges prices to raise funds to support its operations.[45]

Key Takeaways:

• Post-War Control in the Gaza Strip: Fatah is attempting to extend its control over the Gaza Strip after the October 7 War, but Fatah’s lack of pro-Fatah Palestinian Authority (PA)-affiliated military forces in the Gaza Strip will make this extremely difficult. Fatah likely views the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and Hamas’ weakened military position as an opportunity to confront Hamas over Hamas efforts to maintain control in the Gaza Strip.
• Israeli Military Operations in the Gaza Strip: Israeli forces are conducting a major clearing operation across the northern Gaza Strip to disrupt militia reconstitution efforts. Palestinian militia elements could continue attacks in Jabalia after the IDF withdrew there in May 2024, though it was unclear how effective the Hamas military organization in Jabalia would continue to function. Hamas’ military wing has probably attempted to rebuild itself where possible in Jabalia since May 2024. It is unclear how successful these efforts would have been, however, given Hamas’ inability to resupply its fighters and attrition during Israeli operations in May.
• Iraqi Militias and Ballistic Missiles: The commander of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada boasted about Iranian-backed Iraqi militia ballistic missile capabilities on November 5, likely to deter potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. The Iranian-backed Iraqi groups probably also seek to message their strength to gain more influence within the Axis of Resistance amid the severe weakening of the Axis’ previous crown jewel, Hezbollah. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deepened collaboration with the Houthis since October 7, 2023, which could give Iraqi militias access to the knowledge necessary to do rudimentary ballistic missile production.
• Russia Launches Iranian Satellites: Russia launched the Iranian Kowsar high-resolution sensing satellite and Hodhod communications satellite into orbit using a Russian Soyuz rocket on November 5, which Iran could use to collect imagery on US and Israeli assets and bases in the region. Omid Faza’s founder, Hossein Shahrabi Farahani, who previously headed US-sanctioned Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) Space Group, created the company in 2018 with several unspecified Amir Kabir University students.
• Israeli Defense Minister Fired: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5. Netanyahu explained his decision by citing a "crisis of trust” that had emerged between him and Gallant.
• Hamas Price Gouging Aid in the Gaza Strip: Gazans protested price gouging of humanitarian aid and goods in Deir al Balah, central Gaza Strip, on November 4 and 5. It is notable that Palestinian civilians are protesting in Deir al Balah given that it remains a Hamas stronghold.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias claimed two attacks targeting Israeli forces northwest of Beit Lahia on November 5. The National Resistance Brigades and Popular Resistance Committees launched a combined mortar attack targeting Israeli forces northwest of Beit Lahia.[46] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades also claimed a mortar attack targeting Israeli infantry and vehicles northwest of Beit Lahia.[47]

The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations around Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on November 5. Israeli forces destroyed militia infrastructure and killed “dozens” of Palestinian fighters through airstrikes and ground engagements.[48] The IDF dropped leaflets in Jabalia titled “The Collapse of Jabalia,” that warned civilians in the area to evacuate along a specified route to the Salah ad Din Road.[49] Local Palestinian footage showed families evacuating the area.[50] Israeli forces have operated in Jabalia since October 6 to disrupt Hamas reconstitution efforts.[51]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—claimed three attacks targeting Israeli forces at the al Yemen al Saeed Hospital in central Jabalia refugee camp. PIJ detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting an IDF Merkava tank present near the hospital.[52] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed separate mortar and anti-tank fire attacks targeting Israeli vehicles present at the hospital.[53]

The IDF 252nd Division killed Palestinian fighters and destroyed militia infrastructure in the central Gaza Strip during clearing operations on November 5.[54]

The IDF 143rd Division has continued operations around Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip since CTP-ISW's data cut off on November 4. Israeli forces located hundreds” of weapons including rifles, rocket-propelled Grenades (RPGs), and explosives.[55] Israeli media reported on November 4 that the 143rd Division has begun constructing outposts along the Philadelphi Corridor.[56] Local Palestinian footage claimed to show Israeli construction equipment for the outposts in Rafah.[57]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The IDF launched a large-scale counterterrorism operation in the northern West Bank on November 5 as part of a broader effort to degrade Palestinian militia capabilities there.[58] The IDF killed at least four Palestinian fighters through air and ground engagements in Jenin and Tubas governorates, including three Hamas fighters.[59] This operation resembles previous IDF operations to degrade Palestinian militia capabilities, though the operation does not appear as large as the late-August 2024 Operation Summer Camps in the northern West Bank that targeted Palestinian militia infrastructure across several governorates.[60] The IDF has executed Operation Summer Camps in several phases since August 27 to systematically degrade Palestinian militia networks in the northern West Bank.[61] The northern West Bank has long been a hotspot of Palestinian militancy, and Israeli forces have focused counterterrorism efforts in the northern West Bank in late Summer and Fall 2024.

Israeli settlers vandalized Palestinian properties and burned approximately 20 vehicles belonging to Palestinian civilians in al Bireh, in the central West Bank, on November 4.[62] Reuters reported that around a dozen Israeli settlers targeted Palestinian properties and vehicles with Molotov cocktails in the Palestinian village of al Bireh.[63] A local Palestinian resident told Reuters that the Israeli settlers also fired small arms targeting Palestinian civilians in the area. Israeli Army Radio reported that the Israeli police started an investigation into the attack.[64] Hamas released a statement in response to the settler violence, calling upon Palestinians to escalate “all means of resistance” against Israeli settlers.[65] Hamas frequently issues similar calls. These calls are rarely heeded by Palestinians.

Northern Israel and Lebanon
Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:

• End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
• Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

Lebanese sources reported that Hezbollah fired rockets targeting IDF armor operating near al Sadana and the Shebaa Heights on November 5.[66] A Hezbollah-affiliated journalist also reported Israeli infantry and vehicle movement toward the two areas on November 4.[67] The IDF 810th Brigade (210th Division) has conducted several “targeted raids” from Mount Dov into the mountainous terrain north of the Israeli-controlled Shebaa Farms since early October.[68] The IDF last announced the brigades’ operations on October 15, however.[69]

The IDF 91st Division continued operations in southeastern Lebanon.[70] The forces engaged Hezbollah fighters and destroyed unspecified Hezbollah infrastructure.[71] Lebanese media reported engagements between Hezbollah fighters and the IDF in Mays al Jabal.[72]

The IDF 36th Division continued operations in southern Lebanon on November 5.[73] Lebanese sources reported engagements between Hezbollah and the IDF in the western outskirts of Ain Ebel, north of Rmeish.[74] ISW-CTP has not observed Israeli forces operating north of Rmeish since the IDF began ground operations in Lebanon on October 1. The IDF 282nd Artillery Brigade directed airstrikes on Hezbollah fighters who were targeting Israeli forces with anti-tank guided munitions in an unspecified area of southern Lebanon.[75] Hezbollah targeted Israeli forces with rocket fire in both the southwestern and northeastern outskirts of Maroun al Ras on November 4.[76]

The IDF 146th Division continued operations in southwest Lebanon. The IDF 646th Paratroopers Brigade (res.) raided several Hezbollah sites in southern Lebanese villages.[77] Israeli forces located a 70-meter-long underground complex used as long-term living quarters for Hezbollah fighters.[78] Israeli forces located another underground structure with living quarters and weapons in a separate raid.[79]

The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting Hezbollah weapons storage facilities located along the Lebanon-Syria border in al Qusayr, Syria on November 5.[80] Al Qusayr is a stronghold for Lebanese Hezbollah and a frequent transit route for Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah in Lebanon.[81] A pro-Syrian regime source claimed that the IDF airstrikes inflicted ”material damage” to the targeted sites.[82] The IDF airstrikes in Syria are part of the IDF’s continued efforts to degrade Hezbollah capabilities and prevent weapons transfers from Syria into Lebanon.[83]

The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah capabilities, infrastructure, and leadership on November 5.[84] Lebanese sources reported that the IDF conducted airstrikes in over 65 locations across Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 4.[85] Local sources reported that the IDF conducted several airstrikes targeting vehicles in southern Lebanon.[86] One of the strikes reportedly injured two Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers.[87] The LAF has not acknowledged the incident as of this writing. The IDF also conducted a drone strike targeting a vehicle in Talia in the Bekaa Valley and killed two people.[88] The IDF has historically struck Hezbollah weapons depots and infrastructure in the Bekaa Valley, strikes targeting individuals or vehicles are less common.[89]

This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on November 4 to 2:00pm ET on November 5. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.

Hezbollah has conducted at least 12 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 4.[90] Hezbollah fired rockets targeting an IDF air defense site at Mount Meron and the IDF 810th Mountain Brigade headquarters near Mount Hermon.[91] These attacks are likely part of a broader Hezbollah campaign to target IDF rear positions in northern Israel and “support lines” as part of its defense against Israel’s ground operation in southern Lebanon, though this effort has proved unsuccessful so far.[92] The Hezbollah also fired drones targeting IDF artillery positions in Neot Mordechai.[93]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed six attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 4. The claims include the following:

• Three drone attacks targeting unspecified “vital target[s]” in Haifa.[94]
• Two drone attacks targeting unspecified sites in northern Israel.[95]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in southern Israel.[96]

The IDF intercepted a drone over Masada, in southern Israel, that crossed into Israeli territory from Syria on November 5.[97]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sarkhat al Quds released a graphic of drones attacking an oil rig, likely in reference to Israel’s Leviathan and Tamar gas fields off the Mediterranean Coast.[98]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Pakistan on November 4 to meet with senior Pakistani officials. Araghchi probably sought in part to communicate Iran’s concerns on border security.[99] Araghchi met separately with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar and Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Asim Munir.[100] Araghchi discussed the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline with Pakistani official and border security and counterterrorism efforts with General Asim Munir. The discussions focused on border security challenges, which would have allowed Araghchi to discuss Iran’s concerns over Jaish al Adl, which is a Baluchi Salafi-Jihadi group operating in southeastern Iran and Pakistan.[101] This diplomatic engagement coincided with the IRGC's recent security operation which began on October 31 and targeted likely Jaish al Adl forces.[102] An IRGC spokesperson reported that since the beginning of the operation in southern Sistan and Baluchistan, the IRGC has arrested 14 fighters and killed eight others.[103

[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-4-2024 ; https://substack dot com/home/post/p-151215827

[2] https://substack dot com/home/post/p-151215827

[3] https://substack dot com/home/post/p-151215827

[4] https://substack dot com/home/post/p-151215827

[5] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate051724

[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-17-2024

[7] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16225 ; https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1853851753373900894

[8] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16225

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-13-2024

[10] https://www.idf dot il/205371

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-13-2024

[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-31-2024

[13] Data available upon request

[14] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16225

[15] https://youtube.com/watch?v=mgnn0hWrSS8 ; https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1853823418292154391

[16] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/exclusive-iran-moves-missiles-to-iraq-in-warning-to-enemies-idUSKCN1LG0W7/

[17] https://elaph dot com/Web/News/2024/11/1552254.html

[18] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/31/israel-iran-planning-attack-iraq

[19] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-30-2024

[20] https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/09/17/hamas-houthis-open-offices-in-iraq/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-12-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2024

[21] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2024

[22] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Yemen%E2%80%99s-Houthis-and-the-expansion-of-Iran%E2%80%99s-Axis-of-Resistance.pdf pg. 15

[23] https://www.reuters.com/technology/space/russia-launches-soyuz-rocket-with-dozens-satellites-including-two-iran-2024-11-05/ ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/15/3193818

[24] https://donya-e-eqtesad dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-62/4119618-%D8%AC%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%88%D8%AB%D8%B1-%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%AF ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/15/3193818

[25] https://www.mashreghnews dot ir/news/1659508

[26] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2020/07/29/2317175

[27] https://www.spaceomid dot com/fa ;

https://www.iranhavafaza dot com/index/article/2801

[28] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1145

[29] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1145

[30] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/703617

[31] https://www.reuters.com/technology/space/russia-launches-soyuz-rocket-with-dozens-satellites-including-two-iran-2024-11-05/ ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/15/3193818

[32] https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-satellites-space-launch-944a6bc87aa2511e38acf58e37c02c28

[33] https://x.com/netanyahu/status/1853862594958024775

[34] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16229 ; https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-827744

[35] https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/31/middleeast/netanyahu-gallant-gaza-west-bank-intl/index.html

[36] https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/31/middleeast/netanyahu-gallant-gaza-west-bank-intl/index.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-netanyahu-gallant-locked-together-divided-government-2024-09-03/

[37] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16229

[38] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-minister/netanyahu-gives-up-role-as-israels-foreign-minister-idUSKCN1Q60G0/; https://www.barrons.com/news/bulldozer-katz-long-time-ally-of-israel-s-netanyahu-01932136

[39] https://www.barrons.com/news/bulldozer-katz-long-time-ally-of-israel-s-netanyahu-01932136

[40] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16229

[41] https://x.com/IhabHassane/status/1853493780550389967 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/308358 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/308360 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/308388

[42] https://x.com/IhabHassane/status/1853493780550389967

[43] https://t.me/hamza20300/308388 ; https://x.com/IhabHassane/status/1853493780550389967

[44] https://x.com/IhabHassane/status/1853493780550389967 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/308358 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/308360

[45] https://www.c-span.org/video/?538155-1/israeli-prime-minister-netanyahu-news-conference-israel-hamas-war#

[46] https://t.me/alwya2000/7118

[47] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7811

[48] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853677974014267537 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853844880050553129

[49] https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1853755796921733484

[50] https://x.com/Hakeam_ps/status/1853751971720597991

[51] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842805439525691762

[52] https://t.me/sarayaps/18779

[53] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7822 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7827

[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853677974014267537

[55] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853677964090658863

[56] https://x.com/Now14Israel/status/1853515606986826067

[57] https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1853745954316329014

[58] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853760250173706437 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/16210

[59] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853760265990365553 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853760270654394820 ; https://hamasinfo dot info/2024/11/05/4480/

[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-28-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-10-2024

[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-12-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-10-2024

[62] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-settlers-torch-cars-ramallah-outskirts-residents-say-2024-11-04/

[63] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-settlers-torch-cars-ramallah-outskirts-residents-say-2024-11-04/

[64] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1853337557410439531

[65] https://hamasinfo dot info/2024/11/04/4469/

[66] https://t.me/dahieh4all/45027

[67] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/11802

[68] www dot idf.il/240248

[69] www dot idf.il/240248

[70] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853678029303611900

[71] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853678029303611900

[72] https://t.me/dahieh4all/45008

[73] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853678018763337886

[74] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/118372 ; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/11818

[75] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853678018763337886

[76] https://t.me/mmirleb/8719 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8714

[77] www dot idf.il/245331

[78] www dot idf.il/245331

[79] www dot idf.il/245331

[80] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853825868298121227

[81] https://www.csis.org/analysis/escalating-conflict-hezbollah-syria

[82] https://x.com/SAMSyria0/status/1853817433586385233

[83] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate092924

[84] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853678079517851932

[85] Data available upon request.

[86] https://t.me/dahieh4all/45067; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/99435

[87] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/99435

[88] https://x.com/N12News/status/1853759882328965385; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/99512

[89] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-30-2024

[90] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853664549989130349; https://t.me/mmirleb/8720; https://t.me/mmirleb/8721; https://t.me/mmirleb/8723; https://t.me/mmirleb/8724; https://t.me/mmirleb/8725; https://t.me/mmirleb/8726; https://t.me/mmirleb/8727; https://t.me/mmirleb/8728; https://t.me/mmirleb/8729; https://t.me/mmirleb/8730; https://t.me/mmirleb/8733

[91] https://t.me/mmirleb/8724; https://t.me/mmirleb/8721

[92] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-14-2024

[93] https://t.me/mmirleb/8730

[94] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1458; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1460 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1456

[95] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1463 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1462

[96] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1465

[97] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853664549989130349; https://t.me/moriahdoron/16212; https://t.me/moriahdoron/16208

[98] https://t.me/aishab_alkahf/241

[99] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6279322

[100] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6279322

[101] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6279322

[102] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/15/3193839;
https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/11/3191257

[103] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/15/3193839