Iran Updates

 

 

 

Iran Update, December 21, 2024

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Alexandra Braveman, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf described Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al Shara as “pragmatic” but did not specify what concrete steps Shara or the HTS-led interim government will take to combat terrorism or ensure minority rights.[1] Leaf stated that Shara gave ”moderate” statements on issues, including women's rights and protection for minorities, when they met in Damascus on December 20. Leaf confirmed that the United States will no longer pursue the 10-million-dollar Rewards for Justice bounty on Shara due to his commitment to ensuring terrorist groups inside Syria pose no threat to the United States or its regional partners. The US readout offered no details on whether Shara agreed to any binding commitments in exchange. Leaf stated the United States supports a Syrian-led political process that results in an “inclusive and representative government” and includes Syria’s “diverse ethnic and religious communities.”

The HTS-published readout of the meeting between Leaf and Shara portrayed the United States as supporting HTS efforts to consolidate control and deprive Syrian Kurds of regional autonomy, even though the US readout gave no indication of such things.[2] The HTS-published readout framed the United States as supporting a “unified Syrian army” that stands by the interim government “in confronting pending issues and major challenges such as the northeastern region.” This language implies US support for the HTS and Turkish effort to coerce the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into disbanding and forfeiting their autonomy to integrate into a new state structure under HTS.[3] Elements of the SDF would be reintegrated into the Syrian army alongside other militia groups, some of which have worked to kill and displace Kurdish communities, as CTP-ISW has previously reported.[4] The HTS-readout further claimed that the United States “affirmed its commitment to supporting the Syrian people and the new Syrian administration,” likely to portray the United States as recognizing the HTS-led interim government as the official Syrian government, despite the United States having made no such comments. The HTS-readout  — like the US one — provided no specific or binding steps that Shara or the HTS-led government will take to counter terrorist groups in Syria.

HTS is trying to consolidate control over the Syrian coastal region amid reports of instability and violence there. HTS launched an effort purportedly to crack down on crimes, such as drug trafficking, extortion, and theft, in Latakia.[5] Although some lawlessness is probably present in certain parts of Syria at the moment, it appears that HTS is confronting politically motivated civil conflict beyond regular criminal activity. Unspecified individuals fired small arms at an HTS checkpoint south of Tartus, for instance.[6] Unspecified individuals have also conducted arson attacks on former Assad regime courts and police sites, possibly to destroy evidence that could be used to prosecute former regime officials.[7] These arson attacks extend to other Syrian provinces, such as Suwayda.[8] There is a risk that politically motivated civil conflict in the Syrian coastal region could develop along ethnic and sectarian lines. The coastal region is heavily populated by Alawites, who may expect retaliation or persecution from the HTS-led government since Assad is Alawite.[9] Western media has already reported some incidents of violence against Alawite civilians in recent days.[10]

The SDF and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) continued to clash along the lines of control in Aleppo, Hasakah, and Raqqa provinces on December 21. The Manbij Military Council — an element of the SDF—claimed to kill 52 SNA fighters in at least twelve hours of clashes near Tishreen Dam.[11] The SDF also claimed to destroy SNA armored vehicles and seize weapons.[12] The SDF claimed that Turkey provided air support to SNA ground forces near the dam.[13] Local sources reported that the SNA sent reinforcements to the Tishreen Dam near Manbij, east of Aleppo on December 20.[14] The dam has been the site of clashes since December 9 and was specifically named under a now-nullified ceasefire between the SDF and SNA.[15] SDF elements in Tal Othman fired artillery at SNA forces near Tishreen Dam.[16] A Turkish drone subsequently struck the SDF positions in Tal Othman.[17] The SDF engaged the SNA in several areas of Hasakah Province near the lines of control.[18] An SNA faction separately engaged the SDF south of Tal Abyad in Raqqa Province.[19]

Turkish aggression has renewed toward the SDF in recent days after the failure of a ceasefire in Manbij. Turkish officials have defined one of their objectives in Syria as “eliminat[ing]” the SDF.[20] Turkey and the SNA have built up their military presence immediately outside SDF-held territory and indicated that they may attack to seize territory.

The HTS-led interim government appointed officials to key governing posts on December 21. The interim government appointed Syrian Salvation Government official Asaad Hassan al Shaibani as foreign affairs minister.[21] Shaibani’s appointment is consistent with Shara’s pick for other key cabinet officials, such as Interim Prime Minister Mohammad al Bashir, who similarly had headed the Syrian Salvation Government since January 2024.[22] The interim government also appointed SNA-affiliated commander Azzam al Gharib Abu al Ezz Saraqib as governor of Aleppo Province.[23] Saraqib is the commander-in-chief of al Jabhat al Shamiya, or the Levant Front, which controls Azaz in Aleppo Province.[24] Azaz is part of the SNA-held territory, which expanded during the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime. The appointment of Saraqib as provincial governor of Aleppo reflects how HTS seeks to reconcile and distribute power across other armed factions, especially those close to HTS and the SNA.[25] The interim government appointed two Idlib Province-based leaders as provincial governors of Rif Dimashq and Latakia on December 17.[26]

HTS leader Ahmed al Shara is continuing to try to portray himself and HTS as pragmatic and inclusive by engaging minorities. Shara reportedly met with Shia authorities who manage and oversee the services at the Sayyida Zeinab Shrine in Damascus on December 21.[27] Shara assured the authorities that the shrine would be protected and assigned a security unit to guard it, according to a United Kingdom-based, Egyptian-owned outlet.[28] Shara would then be assuming responsibility and accountability for the safety of the shrine. Iranian state media has previously published conflicting accounts of HTS activity at Shia sites, ranging from HTS elements "storming" the sites to agreements for their protection.[29]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei announced the killing of an Iranian embassy staff member, Davoud Bitaraf, in Damascus.[30] Unidentified individuals reportedly opened fire on Bitaraf's vehicle in Damascus on December 15. Baghaei urged the interim government to find and prosecute the perpetrators.[31] Bitaraf reportedly served as a religious scholar at the Damascus seminary and Imam of the Sayyidah Ruqayya Shrine there for over two decades.[32]

The Houthis fired a Palestine-2 ballistic missile targeting an IDF position in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area, central Israel, injuring 16 Israelis on December 20.[33] The IDF detected the missile but failed to intercept it.[34] A preliminary investigation revealed that the IDF air defense systems launched two interceptors that missed the missile.[35] The Houthis have used this missile variant to attack Israel several times in recent weeks, however, the IDF has successfully intercepted each of the previous attacks.[36] The IDF separately intercepted a drone that entered southern Israeli airspace from the east.[37] Israeli Army Radio stated that the drone was launched from Yemen.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf described HTS leader Ahmed al Shara as “pragmatic” but did not specify what concrete steps Shara or the HTS-led interim government will take to combat terrorism or ensure minority rights.
• Syria: HTS is trying to consolidate control over the Syrian coastal region amid reports of instability and violence there. HTS launched an effort purportedly to crack down on crime but appears also meant to counter politically motivated civil conflict.
• Syria: HTS leader Ahmed al Shara is continuing to try to portray himself as pragmatic and inclusive by engaging minorities. Shara met with religious authorities who are responsible for managing a holy Shia shrine in Damascus and committed to protect it.
• Yemen: The Houthis fired a Palestine-2 ballistic missile targeting the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area, injuring 16 Israelis. The IDF fired interceptors but missed the projectile. The IDF separately intercepted a likely Houthi drone that entered southern Israeli airspace.

Iran Update, December 20, 2024

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Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed readiness to help Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) form a new political system in Syria.[1] Erdogan said that Turkey could offer expertise and guidance to this end. Erdogan also emphasized the need to draft a new Syrian constitution. Erdogan added that Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan will travel to Damascus soon to discuss the formation of a new Syrian state. These comments come amid indications from HTS that it wants to establish a centralized and unitary Syrian state without autonomous or federal regions for minorities, such as Druze and Kurds.[2]

Erdogan’s comments also come amid renewed Turkish aggression toward the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in recent days. Turkish officials have defined one of their objectives in Syria as “eliminat[ing]” the SDF.[3] Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have built up their military presence immediately outside SDF-held territory and indicated that they may attack to seize territory. An SNA military commander said on December 20 that his forces were fighting against “separatist parties,” referring to the SDF.[4] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi said on December 10 that he wanted to “enter into a political process for the future of” Syria, but it is unclear what role he would play if Turkey adopts a major role in the formation of a new Syrian state.[5]

The SDF and SNA continued to clash along the lines of control in Aleppo Province on December 20. The head of the SDF media center reported “fierce clashes” on the Qere Qozaq bridge, which spans the Euphrates River.[6] This bridge and a downstream dam have been the site of consistent fighting between the SDF and SNA since December 9.[7]

The SDF deployed forces to clear towns of opposition forces east of Raqqa City on December 19.[8] Local sources reported that opposition forces took control of Madan and five other nearby towns from the SDF.[9] The SDF had seized these areas from the Assad regime on December 6.[10] The SDF stated that its forces deployed on December 19 to operate against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) elements in the towns and pushed them into the desert.[11] The SDF originally took control of these towns from the Assad regime on December 6.[12] Residents of Madan disputed the SDF claim that it was fighting ISIS and instead labeled the opposition fighters actually as ”local revolutionary forces.”[13] The exact identity of these anti-SDF elements is unclear at this time. These events come during an SNA-affiliated leader's visit to Madan on December 20.[14]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Michael Kurilla said that ISIS plans to exploit instability in Syria to break 8,000 of its fighters out of Syrian detention facilities.[15] This statement comes as an ISIS outlet criticized the detention of its fighters in Syria.[16] ISIS has long sought to free its forces from detention facilities, and ISIS supporters have increasingly suggested online that the fall of Bashar al Assad presents an opportunity to exploit to this end.[17] CENTCOM separately killed two ISIS members, including an ISIS commander, in an airstrike in Deir Ez Zor Province, eastern Syria, on December 19.[18] CENTCOM specified that the airstrike was conducted in an area that was formerly controlled by the Assad regime and Russian forces.

There is precedent for Salafi-jihadi groups exploiting political instability, such as what is occurring in Syria, to rapidly reconstitute their forces. ISIS’s predecessor, al Qaeda in Iraq, rapidly reconstituted itself by freeing fighters from Iraqi detention facilities after the US withdrawal from Iraq from 2011 to 2014.[19] The ISIS fighters and commanders held in Syrian detention centers represent a sizeable fighting force that would support further operations in Iraq and Syria.

The US counter-ISIS mission relies heavily on the SDF as the leading counter-ISIS partner force in Syria.[20] The current SDF-SNA fighting, as outlined in the paragraphs above, will likely impact the SDF's ability to execute this mission. ISIS is likely aware of the current SDF-SNA dynamic and views it as a further opportunity that it could exploit. US Department of Defense Press Secretary Pat Ryder said on December 19 that the United States increased its force presence in Syria from 900 troops to approximately 2,000.[21] Ryder specified that these additional troops are “temporary rotational forces” deployed to meet changing mission needs.

A US delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf met HTS leader Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on December 20.[22] Leaf had "good” and “thorough" discussions with Shara on domestic and regional issues.[23] This is the first time that US officials have visited Damascus in over a decade.[24]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in villages in Daraa and Quneitra provinces. Tens of Syrians protested the IDF presence in Maariya, Daraa Province, on December 20.[25] The IDF deemed one approaching protester as a “threat” to Israeli soldiers in the area.[26] The IDF shot the protester in the leg. Israeli media reported that the IDF was operating based on its open-fire procedures, which involve verbally instructing the individual to stop and firing warning shots into the air before shooting at their legs.[27] Geolocated footage posted to X (Twitter) separately showed the IDF in al Rafeed, Quneitra Governorate, for the first time on December 20.[28] Syrian media similarly reported that around 30 IDF soldiers with vehicles operated in al Rafeed to clear trees, search houses, and request a meeting with locals.[29]

Senior Iranian officials are trying to justify domestically the years-long Iranian support for Bashar al Assad while downplaying the fact that the fall of Assad marks a strategic defeat for Tehran. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian reiterated regime talking points along these lines in an interview with the official website of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[30] Ahmadian said that Iran intervened in Syria to fight ISIS and at the request of Assad. This framing ignores that Iran intervened to defend Assad at the early stages of the Syrian civil war in 2011—well before ISIS surged across Iraq and Syria. This framing also ignores how senior Iranian officials have framed previously their role in Syria as part of their efforts to deter and threaten the United States and Israel. Ahmadian admitted that the fall of Assad hurts the Axis of Resistance but then proceeded to argue that Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah are self-sufficient and do not require Iranian support to remain strong. This downplaying of the fall of Assad and its negative impact on Iranian strategy mirrors Russian efforts to frame the fall of Assad as a victory for Moscow.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed readiness to help HTS form a new political system in Syria. These comments come amid renewed Turkish aggression toward the US-backed SDF and fighting with the Turkish-backed SNA.
• US CENTCOM Commander Michael Kurilla stated that ISIS plans to exploit political instability in Syria in order to break 8,000 of its fighters out of detention facilities, which would help ISIS reconstitute rapidly.
• Senior Iranian officials are trying to justify domestically the years-long Iranian support for the Bashar al Assad regime while downplaying the fact that the fall of Assad marks a strategic defeat for Tehran.

Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, Christina Harward, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is consolidating political and security power under HTS in a post-Assad Syrian government. HTS-led forces assumed control of Daraa City and the Nassib border crossing from the Southern Operations Room on December 14.[1] Jolani and Southern Operations Room leaders met on December 11 to discuss coordination in military and civil affairs.[2] It is notable that these Syrian groups have agreed to cooperate with HTS despite historical animosity with HTS’s predecessor and al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra in the mid-2010s.[3]

Jolani has continued to integrate HTS allies into the interim Syrian Salvation Government, securing control over key civil and security services. Jolani met with Nour al Dink al Zink commander Ahmed Rizk on December 14 to discuss the role of “revolutionary cadres” in the future Syrian government and the restructuring of the Syrian Defense Ministry.[4] Rizk and his group have long fought alongside HTS in northwestern Syria. Syrian media reported on December 10 that the HTS-controlled interim government also plans to reorganize the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).[5] Reorganization within the Syrian army and Syrian Defense Ministry supports reconciliation with former regime elements but also creates opportunities to appoint HTS loyalists and gain control over the government bureaucracy.

The HTS-led interim government appears to be pursuing legal recourse against former regime officials outside of a constitutionally-bound justice system. The interim Syrian Ministry of Information announced on December 13 that the HTS-led interim government will hold accountable former regime media officials who directly or indirectly supported crimes against the Syrian people.[6] It is not clear if this process will be undertaken by the interim Justice Ministry or whether the entity that does prosecute former regime officials will use HTS’s Sunni Sharia law or a more secular legal code. HTS has used a ”hybrid civil-Islamic court structure” that uses HTS-approved Sunni Sharia law in the areas it controls in northwestern Syria.[7] HTS has not defined judicial procedures it intends to use to prosecute former regime officials and could decide to use a secular justice system. HTS lacks the formal authority to prosecute regime officials, though it is necessary to hold former regime officials accountable for crimes committed against the Syrian people. That authority should rest with an international tribunal or a new Syrian government and a constitution that have yet to be established. Trials held under HTS’s Sunni Sharia style justice system could raise sectarian tensions regardless of legitimate charges or a fair trial.

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander General Mazloum Abdi is attempting to preserve and unify the SDF’s Kurdish base as the group faces two existential threats in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime.[8] Abdi argued that Kurdish unity was critical to address threats currently facing their community.[9] Arab communities in Deir ez Zor and Raqqa have begun defecting from the SDF and calling for an end to SDF rule in Arab areas. The combination of these events threaten to unravel the fragile Kurdish-Arab coalition that the United States helped establish. Turkey is simultaneously threatening to destroy the SDF. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan threatened on December 13 to “eliminate” the SDF, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and People’s Defense Units (YPG).[10] Abdi added that unity and dialogue among the Kurds is critical for participating in the development of the new Syrian government. CTP-ISW assessed that Abdi intends to negotiate its role in a future Syrian government, likely to prevent further unrest within Arab populations and militias under the SDF.[11]

HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani stated on December 14 that Israel used Iran as a “pretext” to enter Syria but he added that HTS has “no intention of entering into conflict with Israel.”[12] IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi reiterated on December 14 that the IDF has no intention of interfering in Syrian domestic affairs or ”ruling” Syria.[13] Halevi added that the IDF is only operating in Syria to ensure the safety of Israel. An IDF company commander in the 603rd Combat Engineering Battalion (7th Armored Brigade) stated that the IDF advanced 10 kilometers into Syria. [14]

Some elements in Iran are either alarmed or trying to generate alarm over the status of the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Syria. This alarm is not being reflected in the Syrian information space at this time. One Iranian media outlet published a video on December 13 allegedly showing an HTS member reciting a poem praising Umar ibn al Khattab, the Sunni second Caliph, at the Sayyidah Zainab shrine.[15] The outlet stated that reading this poem is ”provocative” and aimed at ”boiling the blood” of Syrian Shia. Followers of Shia Islam believe that Umar is responsible for the death of Fatima, the mother of Zeinab. Approximately 720,000 users read this article, according to the outlet. The same Iranian outlet published an article on December 13 claiming that “takfiri terrorist groups“ in Syria are introducing new restrictions for Shiites to make pilgrimage the Sayyida Zeinab shrine and Sayyidah Ruqayya shrine in Damascus.[16] Iranian media has frequently used the term ”takfiri terrorists” to refer to HTS and ISIS, but it often conflates other Syrian opposition groups with salafi-jihadists. The prevalence of these reports in the information space could stoke sectarian tensions, particularly if the reports begin to gain traction in Arabic-language or Syrian media.

These alarmist reports in Iranian media are not being picked up in the Syrian information space at this time. One local Syrian man who regularly visits the Sayyida Zeinab shrine gave an interview to a Syria-focused analyst claiming that HTS is committed to protecting minority sites, including the Sayyidah Zeynab shrine.[17] The Syrian denied recent social media reports amplified in the Iranian media space that HTS entered the shrine violently and chanted provocative slogans, though he allowed that the chant of ”Allahu Akbar” was seen as provocative by some individuals within the Shia community.[18] CTP-ISW has not observed Syrian media reporting or recirculating reports of violence, provocation, or restriction at the Sayyida Zeinab shrine or the Sayyida Ruqayya shrine at this time.

The Iranian regime does not appear to have assumed a clear strategy for how to approach the HTS-led interim government in Syria, as exemplified by the contradicting reports regarding the safety of Shia holy sites following the fall of the Assad regime. Certain Iranian media outlets have amplified reports of HTS fighters interfering with the Sayyida Zeinab shrine and the Sayyidah Ruqayya shrine, while other Iranian media reports claimed that HTS engaged respectfully during a visit to the shrine in recent days.[19] The fact that the Iranian media is not pursuing a clear messaging campaign about the Shia holy sites in Syria may indicate that the Iranian defense and political establishment has not yet decided how best to interact with the new HTS-led interim government. The rapid pace in which the Assad regime fell, resulting in the loss of billions of dollars for the Iranian regime, has almost certainly forced Iran to re-evaluate its strategy in regard to Syria and the region at large.[20]

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 14 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck at least 20 former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) targets across Syria.[21] The IDF struck former SAA communications sites and ”electronic warfare antennas“ in multiple locations including Damascus, Suwayda, Maysaf, Latakia, and Tartus. The journalist reported that the IDF targeted these sites to ensure the targets did not fall into the hands of ”hostile elements.” Syrian media reported that the IDF airstrikes in Damascus targeted warehouses near Mount Qasioun previously controlled by the Syrian Republican Guard and SAA 4th Division and the SAA‘s al Dumayr airbase in the Damascus countryside.[22]

The prospects for Russia's continued military presence in Syria remain unclear as reports that Russia is evacuating its military assets from Syria continue. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 14 that "hundreds" of Russian soldiers cannot reach Hmeimim Air Base from Homs Governorate out of fear that Russian forces will come under fire from unspecified actors.[23] The GUR stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Africa Corps arrived in Syria to protect Russian forces moving towards Russia's bases on the western coast and that Russian Colonel Dmitry Motrenko is negotiating with military contingents in Syria from other unspecified states in order to secure guarantees of "immunity" for Russian soldiers waiting at the Tiyas Air Base west of Palmyra. The GUR also stated that roughly 1,000 Russian personnel left Damascus on December 13 in a column heading towards the Port of Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base, and ISW observed footage on December 13 of Russian military convoys moving from Damascus and other areas in southern Syria, likely towards the two main Russian bases.[24] Reuters reported on December 14 that a "Syrian security official" stationed near Hmeimim Air Base stated that at least one cargo plane flew out of the base on December 14 bound for Libya.[25] Syrian military and security sources reportedly stated that Russia is withdrawing some heavy equipment and senior officers from the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) to Moscow but is currently not planning to permanently pull out of the Port of Tartus or Hmeimim Air Base. A Russian milblogger posted photos and footage on December 14 purportedly showing Russian military assets still operating at the Russian helicopter base at Qamishli in northeastern Syria, and a Russian source claimed on December 14 that Russian forces have withdrawn from their base in Kobani in northern Syria.[26]

The complex nature of the interim Syrian government is likely resulting in conflicting reports about whether Russia is engaged in talks with Syrian opposition groups. Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) controls the Syrian interim government, but HTS and the interim government do not yet have complete control over the disparate groups that helped overthrow the Assad regime. Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated on December 12 that Russia has established contacts with HTS.[27]Reuters reported on December 14 that a Russian source stated that discussions between Russia and the interim Syrian government are ongoing.[28] A "senior rebel official close to the new interim administration" told Reuters, however, that the issue of Russia's military presence in Syria and Russia's previous agreements with the Assad regime are "not under discussion" and that talks at an unspecified time in the future will address this matter. The official reportedly stated that the "Syrian people will have the final say." Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 13 that Mohammed Sabra, a Syrian politician who represented the Syrian opposition's High Negotiations Committee at the 2016 Geneva peace talks on the Syrian Civil War, similarly stated that there should be a referendum in the future to allow the Syrian people to approve any foreign military presence in Syria.[29] It is unclear if Reuter's "senior rebel official close to the new interim administration" who denied talks between Russia and the interim government is a member of HTS or another Syrian opposition group.[30] It remains unclear if Russia is in contact with all the Syrian opposition groups necessary to guarantee the short- and long-term safety of its military bases and select opposition groups may be unaware that Russia is in discussion with other groups. Russian state media has notably not differentiated between different opposition groups when reporting on the situation in Syria, possibly as part of efforts to present the interim government as more united so as to increase the legitimacy of any agreements Russia reaches with one or some of the groups.[31]

The international community has not yet established a plan for how to engage with the transitional government in Syria. The United States, UN, EU, Turkey, and various Arab states met in Jordan on December 14 to discuss supporting the political process in Syria.[32] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and the foreign ministers of Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia agreed on unspecified ”joint principles” for recognizing a future Syrian government.[33] Blinken stressed that the transition process must be ”Syrian-led.” Blinken stated that the US has engaged in “direct talks” with HTS.[34] The US designated HTS as a foreign terrorist organization in 2018.[35] Blinken stressed that the United States communicated a set of ”governing principles” to HTS that includes ensuring human rights are upheld and the rejection of extremism.[36]

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem is seeking to develop a working relationship with the HTS-led interim government in Damascus in order to restore Hezbollah’s weapons supply route in Syria.[37] HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is unlikely to develop any relationship with Hezbollah. Hezbollah supported the Assad regime by deploying thousands of fighters and helped seized key Syrian cities, such as Qusayr and Aleppo.[38] Qassem gave a televised speech on December 14 where he acknowledged that Hezbollah has lost its ground lines of communication (GLOC) from Iran through Syria and signaled his willingness to restore these GLOCs with the support of the new interim government in Syria.[39] Qassem said that Hezbollah supported the Assad regime due to its “hostile position” against Israel and added that the interim government in Syria should also declare Israel its ”enemy.”[40] HTS leader Jolani said that he has “no intention of entering into conflict with Israel.”[41]

Key Takeaways:

• HTS Consolidates Power in Syria: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is consolidating political and security power under HTS in a post-Assad Syrian government. Jolani has continued to integrate HTS allies into the interim Syrian Salvation Government, securing control over key civil and security services. The HTS-led interim government also appears to be pursuing legal recourse against former regime officials outside of a constitutionally-bound justice system.
• Syrian Democratic Forces: Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander General Mazloum Abdi is attempting to preserve and unify the SDF’s Kurdish base as the group faces two existential threats in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime.
• Religious and Sectarian Tension in Syria: Some elements in Iran are either alarmed or trying to generate alarm over the status of the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Syria. This alarm is not being reflected in the Syrian information space at this time. The Iranian regime does not appear to have assumed a clear strategy for how to approach the HTS-led interim government in Syria, as exemplified by the contradicting reports regarding the safety of Shia holy sites following the fall of the Assad regime.
• Israel in Syria: An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 14 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck at least 20 former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) targets across Syria. HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani stated on December 14 that Israel used Iran as a “pretext” to enter Syria but he added that HTS has “no intention of entering into conflict with Israel.”
• Russia in Syria: The prospects for Russia's continued military presence in Syria remain unclear as reports that Russia is evacuating its military assets from Syria continue. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 14 that "hundreds" of Russian soldiers cannot reach Hmeimim Air Base from Homs Governorate out of fear that Russian forces will come under fire from unspecified actors.
• Hezbollah in Syria: Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem is seeking to develop a working relationship with the HTS-led interim government in Damascus in order to restore Hezbollah’s weapons supply route in Syria.

Click here to read the full report with maps

Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, Christina Harward, Adiv Kuray, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iranian regime is still coming to terms with the fall of the Assad regime and reflecting on its former Syria policy.[1] Five unspecified Iranian officials, including Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps members, told the New York Times on December 13 that the Iranian regime is “disoriented” and “befuddled.”[2] The officials added that the regime is “trying to find a way forward with Syria” and will accept “any level of diplomatic presence” in Syria.[3] The New York Times also reported--citing a Tehran-based analyst--that a “Syria debate” is occurring in Iran “at all levels of society.”[4] Iranian civilians and media have openly criticized the regime for funding and bolstering the Assad regime for years at the expense of developing Iran.[5] Shia cleric Mohammad Shariati Dehghan recently stated that Iran should prioritize developing relations with other countries over supporting militias in the region.[6] Dehghan added that the regime should redirect money and resources “back to the people of Iran.” Dehghan’s statements could be indicative of a broader regime and Iranian conversation about how Iran should adjust its regional strategy after the fall of Assad, though Dehghan presumably does not have a large role in policymaking or the government. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei recently described criticisms such as Dehghan’s as a “crime” during a speech on December 13.[7]

The Turkish Embassy in Damascus will resume operations on December 14 after remaining closed for 12 years.[8] The Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry appointed Turkish Ambassador to Mauritania Burhan Koroglu as the interim charge d’affaires to the Turkish Embassy in Damascus.[9] Koroglu speaks Turkish, English, and Arabic.[10] Turkish media separately reported on December 13 that the Syrian General Consulate in Istanbul has also resumed operations.[11]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed the situation in Syria with senior Turkish and Iraqi officials on December 12 and 13. Blinken met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara on December 12 and 13, respectively, to try to persuade Turkey “not to press [its] advantage” against the Kurdish-controlled, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria.[12] The United States has backed the SDF in the Syrian Civil War to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.[13] The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched an operation to take territory from the SDF in northern Syria on November 30 and captured Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo City, on December 1.[14] Fidan said on December 13 that the destruction of the YPG is Turkey’s objective in Syria.[15] Turkey frequently refers to the SDF as the YPG, suggesting that Fidan is referring to the US-backed partner force.

Blinken separately met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani in Baghdad on December 13.[16] Blinken emphasized the need to form an “inclusive, nonsectarian government” in Syria that “does not become, in any way, a platform for terrorism.”[17] Blinken and Sudani discussed ongoing efforts to prevent ISIS from “resurging and destabilizing” the Middle East.[18] Iraq has bolstered border security since the Syrian opposition offensive began in late November 2024. Iraqi Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh of Fayyadh stated on December 13 that the Popular Mobilization Forces will confront any security or terrorist threat to Iraq.[19]

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is facing two perceived existential threats in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime, which almost certainly caused the SDF to deprioritize the counter-ISIS mission. The United States helped create the SDF by binding together Kurdish and Arab forces in Deir ez Zor.[20] Arab communities in Deir ez Zor and Raqqa have begun defecting from the SDF and an end to SDF rule in Arab areas, which threatens to unravel the fragile Kurdish-Arab coalition that the United States helped establish.[21] Turkey is simultaneously threatening to destroy the SDF. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan threatened on December 13 to “eliminate” the SDF, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and People’s Defense Units (YPG).[22] Fidan added that these groups must leave Syria. The SDF, given that it prioritizes these existential threats over the threat it faces from ISIS, has stopped all counter-ISIS operations. This reallocation of SDF resources creates opportunities for ISIS to reemerge and leaves the United States without a viable counter-ISIS partner in Syria, at least temporarily.

SDF commander General Mazloum Abdi announced that the SDF plans to negotiate its role in a future Syrian government, likely to prevent further unrest within Arab populations and militias under the SDF.[23] Abdi stated that the SDF seeks a ”decentralized” Syrian administration in which the SDF is represented in the future government and armed forces.[24] The defection of Arab SDF formations and protests against SDF rule is probably contributing to Abdi’s decision to negotiate with the interim government. Arab citizens in SDF-controlled areas have long-standing grievances against the SDF which include limited reconstruction, repeated SDF abuses of the local populations, and a lack of representative Arab leadership.[25] Abdi probably calculates that by reaching out to the interim government, he can temper the unrest by expressing his willingness to integrate into the Syrian government. Abdi’s outreach to the interim government does not guarantee the SDF’s ability to control popular unrest. Even if he reaches a deal with the interim government. Arab communities are calling for an end to SDF rule, not just the SDF’s integration into the rest of Syria. This implies that these groups do not seek to be a part of an SDF-led autonomous region.

Reports of Sunni Muslims harassing and threatening minority religious and sectarian groups in Syria continue to gain traction in the information space, which could create opportunities for extreme groups to incite further religious- or sectarian-based violence. A former HTS religious scholar, Abu Yahya al Shami, called upon Sunni Muslims to kill “Nusayri” who have participated in the killing of Muslims in Syria.[26] “Nusayri” is a highly derogatory term for Alawites.[27] Shami circulated an Arabic-language copy of the US-based nonprofit ProJustice’s 2019 report on violations committed by members of the Syrian regime and called upon Sunnis to track down former regime members.[28] Shami praised recent killings of former regime members, including ”shabiha” members, referring to pro-regime militias recruited and armed by the Assad regime.[29] Shami called upon “every honorable free person” who knows the location of Shabiha members to target and kill them.[30] Shami is specifically calling for Sunni Muslims to target the regime, but his use of ”Nusayri” indicates a sectarian angle to his calls that encourages sectarian violence. Reports of revenge killings or violence against minority groups remain relatively isolated and relatively independent of each other at this time. CTP-ISW will continue to report these indicators, however, given the serious nature of these crimes and the risk that revenge, sectarian, and interfaith killings and harassment could spark larger-scale cycles of violence.

Iranian media is boosting reports of sectarian harassment, though it is unclear how widespread the harassment is currently. Iranian media claimed that HTS-led fighters interfered with holy Shia shrines in Damascus and that HTS ordered the removal of flags and religious items including prayer stones, and religious texts from Sayyidah Ruqayya Shrine in Damascus.[31] HTS has reportedly made an informal agreement with Iran to protect Shia sites in Syria and it is unclear at this time why HTS ordered the removal of religious items from the shrine. Iranian sources also reported that HTS members conducted a “respectful” visit to the shrine.[32] The prevalence of these reports in the information space could stoke sectarian tensions, particularly if the reports begin to gain traction in Arabic-language or Syrian media. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba warned Syrian opposition forces on December 13 not to “touch” the Sayyida Zeinab shrine after social media reports on December 12 claimed that HTS-led fighters “forcefully” entered the Sayyidah Zeynab shrine—a Shia site in Damascus—and chanted provocative slogans.[33]

The HTS-led operations room is taking steps to solidify its control over Deir ez Zor City following its recent capture from the SDF on December 11. HTS has deployed military police to the city in an effort to maintain order. These units will oversee security, manage the transition of key institutions, and ensure the transfer of government centers to the Syrian Transitional Government.[34] The deployment of additional forces strengthens HTS's control over Deir ez Zor City and its military airport.

The HTS-led interim government in Damascus continued to provide security and public safety services to residents. Thousands of Syrians in cities and villages across the country joined mass celebrations after Friday prayers on December 13 to celebrate the fall of the regime.[35] HTS leader Jolani called upon Syrians to celebrate in town squares “without firing bullets.”[36] HTS announced it would deploy “intensive security” during the celebrations in Damascus to maintain order and public safety.[37]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 474th Territorial Brigade (210th Division) continued to operate in the Israel-Syria disengagement zone and on the Israel-Syria border on December 13.[38] The IDF located anti-tank missiles, vests, ammunition, and other weapons during searches in unspecified areas of the Israel-Syria disengagement zone. The IDF reiterated its mission is to protect the citizens of Israel and not to interfere in Syria. Syrian media and a Syria-focused analyst reported that the IDF operated in or entered multiple towns and villages in Quneitra and Daraa Province, just east of the disengagement zone, since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 12.[39] The IDF is not maintaining a presence in these towns, suggesting that it is conducting raids. Raids include a planned retrograde from the target area. The IDF has not commented on its activities outside of the disengagement zone at this time of writing.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced on December 13 that he ordered the IDF to prepare to stay on Syrian Mt. Hermon during the coming months.[40] The IDF seized the Syrian side of Mt Hermon on December 8.[41] Mt Hermon is a strategic site as it allows a full view of the entire surrounding Syrian plain. Israel and Syria agreed that Mt Hermon would be part of the 235 square kilometer demilitarized buffer zone that ended the Yom Kippur War in 1974, which Israel considers void until order is restored in Syria.[42] Katz ordered this decision following an assessment on December 12 with IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and other senior IDF officials.[43]

The IDF has likely conducted airstrikes in at least three locations in Syria since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 12. Local Syrian media reported on December 13 that the IDF conducted airstrikes targeting the Mezzeh military airport, an IRGC headquarters, and various unspecified warehouses near Damascus.[44] Fox News’ foreign correspondent also reported airstrikes in Damascus.[45] Geolocated footage posted on X on December 12 showed a recent IDF targeting the Shayrat airbase, southeast of Homs city.[46] The IDF has conducted an air campaign targeting military capabilities of the former Assad regime in Syria in recent days.[47] Syrian media reported separate IDF airstrikes targeting SAA warehouses near Latakia.[48] The IDF has not commented on the latest reported airstrikes at this time of writing.

Russia is evacuating elements of its force grouping in Syria while continuing negotiations with select Syrian groups about Russia's longer-term military presence in the country. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 13 that an unspecified source familiar with the matter stated that Russia is currently negotiating with unspecified new Syrian "authorities" about maintaining Russia's military presence at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus.[49] The source reportedly stated that Russia has only secured "temporary security guarantees" but that the two military bases are "functioning as usual." Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated on December 12 that Russia has established contacts with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), which currently controls the areas at Hmeimim and Tartus, and the TASS source is likely referring to ongoing Russian talks with HTS.[50]

Maxar satellite imagery from December 13 shows two Russian An-124 military transport aircraft preparing to load cargo while a Ka-52 helicopter and elements of an S-400 air defense system are likely undergoing preparations for transport at Hmeimim Air Base (see embedded imagery below). The Maxar imagery also shows two Russian frigates still offshore of the Port of Tartus. Drone footage reportedly of Hmeimim Air Base shows An-72, An-26, and Il-76 transport aircraft; Ka-52 and Mi-8 or Mi-17 helicopters; and at least four Su-34, seven Su-24M2, and four Su-35S fighter jets under hangars.[51] Geolocated footage published on December 13 shows a Russian military convoy moving from Hisyah (south of Homs) along the M5 highway.[52] Additional footage published on December 13 reportedly shows Russian military convoys moving from Talkalakh (west of Homs), Homs, and Damascus.[53] It is unclear if the convoys are heading toward the Port of Tartus or Hmeimim Air Base, but the reported movement of Russian military assets indicates that Russia is pulling some of its forward assets in southern Syria to the western coast.

At least four Russian landing ships and cargo ships are reportedly heading from Russian ports to the Port of Tartus but will likely not reach Syria for weeks.[54] Russia is likely evacuating forces from its two main bases in Syria while negotiations are ongoing with new Syrian authorities as the outcome of these negotiations and Russia's longer-term presence at the bases are still unclear. Russia would be able to relatively quickly reestablish its military presence in Syria after evacuating from Hmeimim and Tartus should Moscow be able to secure more permanent agreements with the current Syrian authorities.

The status of Russia's helicopter base at Qamishli in northeastern Syria remains unclear, however. A Kurdish journalist stated on December 11 that Russian forces were withdrawing from the Qamishli base after unspecified authorities granted them safe passage out of Syria.[55] However, photos from December 12 show Russian equipment, helicopters, and personnel at the Qamishli base, and a Russian source claimed on December 12 that Russia maintains a presence at Hmeimim Air Base, the Port of Tartus, Qamishli, and other unspecified sites in Syria.[56] It is unclear if Russia is preparing to withdraw assets from Qamishli in the near future. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) currently control Qamishli, and Russian officials have only stated that Moscow has established contacts with HTS, which controls the area of the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus.[57] ISW has not observed reports that Russia is trying to separately negotiate with the SDF about Russia's continued presence at the Qamishli base, and it is unclear if Russian forces intend to or will be able to remain at the base.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Reactions to Syria: The Iranian regime is still coming to terms with the fall of the Assad regime and reflecting on its former Syria policy.
• Blinken in the Middle East: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed the situation in Syria with senior Turkish and Iraqi officials on December 12 and 13. Blinken met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara on December 12 and 13, respectively, to try to persuade Turkey “not to press [its] advantage” against the Kurdish-controlled, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria.
• Syrian Democratic Forces: The SDF is facing two perceived existential threats in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime, which almost certainly caused the SDF to deprioritize the counter-ISIS mission. SDF commander General Mazloum Abdi announced that the SDF plans to negotiate its role in a future Syrian government, likely to prevent further unrest within Arab populations and militias under the SDF.
• Religious and Sectarian Tension in Syria: Reports of Sunni Muslims harassing and threatening minority religious and sectarian groups in Syria continue to gain traction in the information space, which could create opportunities for extreme groups to incite further religious- or sectarian-based violence. CTP-ISW will continue to report these indicators of any interfaith or sectarian violence given the serious nature of these crimes and the risk that revenge, sectarian, and interfaith killings and harassment could spark larger-scale cycles of violence.
• Israel in Syria: The IDF continued to operate in the Israel-Syria disengagement zone and on the Israel-Syria border on December 13. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced on December 13 that he ordered the IDF to prepare to stay on Syrian Mt. Hermon during the coming months.
• Russia in Syria: Russia is evacuating elements of its force grouping in Syria while continuing negotiations with select Syrian groups about Russia's longer-term military presence in the country. The status of Russia's helicopter base at Qamishli in northeastern Syria remains unclear, however.

 

Iran Update, December 12, 2024

Click here to read the full report

Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is trying to retain control over the forces that it leads to maintain its moderate image and prevent sectarian conflict. HTS stated on December 12 that it would hold accountable any fighters who fail to comply with orders.[1] HTS also stated that any individuals violating orders do not represent HTS-led forces or the transitional government.[2] This statement comes after HTS announced that interfering in women’s choice of clothing or demanding that women dress modestly is ”strictly forbidden.”[3] HTS has also ordered its fighters to protect public and private property, respect public institutions, and treat former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) soldiers well.[4] HTS is trying to present itself as a moderate force with these orders.

The most recent statement threatening to punish fighters is likely in response to reports of HTS-led fighters conducting religion-based harassment and revenge killings.[5] Some reports, for instance, claimed that HTS-led fighters “forcefully” entered the Sayyidah Zeynab shrine in Damascus, which is a holy Shia shrine.[6] The reports claimed that the fighters chanted “provocative slogans” while in the shrine.[7] Several reports claimed that the fighters were affiliated with HTS, which reportedly made an informal agreement with Iran to protect Shia sites and minorities in Syria.[8] CTP-ISW cannot verify the details of the event or the accuracy of the reports. But their prevalence in the information space could nevertheless stoke sectarian tensions. CTP-ISW similarly reported on December 11 that an HTS-led fighter questioned a Christian journalist about her religious background, asking specifically whether she was “Christian, Alawi, Shiite, or Druze.“[9]

These incidents and the traction they gain in the information space create opportunities for extreme and sectarian groups to incite further religious-based violence and destabilize the government formation process in Syria. These incidents remain isolated and relatively independent of each other at this time. HTS is comprised of numerous Islamist groups formed with varying degrees of representation in the broader HTS leadership structure.[10] It is unclear which factions of HTS are involved in these instances of sectarian tensions or whether they are coordinated activities amongst several factions. CTP-ISW will continue to report revenge killings and religion-based incidents and violence due to the risk that these events can rapidly destabilize the situation in Syria.

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is factionalizing under internal and external pressure. Local footage posted on December 12 showed the SDF attempt to suppress demonstrators in Raqqa who demanded that the city be brought under the HTS-led transitional government.[11] Citizens have longstanding grievances against the SDF in Raqqa, which include limited reconstruction in Arab areas, repeated SDF abuses of the local populations, and a lack of representative Arab leadership.[12] The head of the al Kasra Military Council--a member of the SDF-- defected from the SDF, citing SDF “violations” against civilians in Deir ez Zor and Raqqa.[13] Arab contingents of the SDF have rapidly begun to defect in recent days.[14] A Syrian journalist reported that approximately 220 members of the Deir ez Zor Military Council have defected from the SDF over the past 48 hours.[15]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) confirmed on December 12 that it reached a ceasefire agreement with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Manbij, northern Syria.[16] The four-day ceasefire will last from December 12 to 16 in order to allow humanitarian aid to enter and unspecified security agreements. Under the agreement, the SNA will transfer control of the Sultan Suleiman Tomb and its surrounding hills to the SDF. In exchange, the SDF and SDF families will also withdraw from Manbij and the surrounding countryside. The ceasefire agreement also established the Tishreen Dam as a demilitarized zone to permit the electrical plant to continue its regular functions. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi confirmed on December 11 that his forces withdrew from Manbij after reaching a settlement with the SNA.[17] The SDF disputed territorial control over Manbij after the SNA seized control on December 8.[18]

The HTS-led interim government is trying to portray itself as the legitimate Syrian state. The transitional government posted a statement on December 12, thanking Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia for resuming their diplomatic missions in Damascus.[19] The statement also noted that Qatar and Turkey would reopen their respective embassies.[20] HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani and caretaker Prime Minister Mohammad al Bashir separately met with the Turkish foreign affairs minister and intelligence chief as well as the Qatari State Security Agency chief in Damascus on December 12.[21] The publication of these events portrays the HTS-led transitional government as the legitimate Syrian state despite no countries having yet formally recognized it as such.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to operate on the ground in southwestern Syria, according to Syrian sources. One outlet reported that the IDF entered towns in and around the disengagement zone in Quneitra Province and seized arms from residents on December 12.[22] Another source reported that the IDF detonated explosives at a former SAA site around Umm Batnah.[23]

Syrian media separately reported that the IDF plans to enter Marbah in western Daraa Province in order to disrupt the movement of arms there. The IDF previously paved a road leading from the disengagement zone to Marbah on December 11.[24] Syrian media stated that the IDF announced on December 12 via loudspeaker to residents that it plans to enter the town.[25] IDF officers met with tribal leaders at a nearby military site to discuss these plans as well. Marbah residents have requested that the HTS-led opposition forces intervene against the IDF.

The IDF has likely conducted three airstrikes in Syria since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 11. Local Syrian media reported two IDF airstrikes targeting Latakia port on December 11.[26] The outlet also reported an IDF airstrike on the outskirts of Damascus on December 12.[27] The IDF air campaign into Syria on December 9 and 10 destroyed approximately 70-80 percent of the Bashar al Assad regime’s military capabilities to prevent "terrorist elements” from seizing weapons, including dozens of anti-ship missiles at al Bayda and Latakia ports.[28] The IDF has given no comment on the latest reported airstrikes at the time of this writing.

The E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) sent a letter to the UN Security Council on December 6, announcing its readiness to impose international “snapback” sanctions on Iran.[29] The E3 would invoke the snapback mechanism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action if Iran continues to expand its nuclear program and decline to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The E3 letter comes after Iran dramatically increased its enrichment of uranium to 60 percent.[30] Iran announced on November 27 that it had activated “thousands of advanced centrifuges.”[31] Iran was retaliating for an earlier censure resolution passed by the IAEA Board of Governors, criticizing the lack of Iranian cooperation with the IAEA.

Reuters reported on December 12 that Iran agreed with the IAEA to increase the “frequency and intensity” of international monitoring of activities at the Fordow nuclear site.[32] Iran is likely responding to the threat from the E3 to impose snapback sanctions. It is notable, however, that greater international monitoring has no effect on Iran’s accelerated rate of uranium enrichment.

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: HTS is trying to retain control over the forces that it leads to maintain its moderate image and prevent sectarian conflict. HTS likely recognizes the risk of revenge killings and sectarian violence, which could destabilize Syria further.
• Syria: The US-backed SDF is facing intense external and internal pressure. The SDF did, however, reach a four-day ceasefire agreement with the Turkish-backed SNA around Manbij in northern Syria.
• Syria: The HTS-led transitional government is trying to portray itself as the legitimate Syrian state by publicizing its engagement with foreign actors. No foreign countries have yet recognized the transitional government as the legitimate state, however.
• Iran: The E3 sent a letter to the UN Security Council, threatening to impose “snapback” sanctions on Iran. The E3 is responding to the dramatic expansion of the Iranian nuclear program and Iranian non-cooperation with the IAEA.

Iran Update, December 11, 2024

Click here to read the full report

Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is attempting to consolidate HTS’s political and military control in a post-Assad interim Syrian government. The HTS-led military coalition has secured control over key civil and security services since the interim Syrian Salvation Government was established on December 9.[1] HTS-led opposition forces have assumed control over the Syrian state media outlet SANA and local police forces, which has enabled the HTS-led opposition to disseminate and enforce official government edicts.[2] HTS has also appointed loyal members to ministerial positions within the interim government to guarantee HTS’s role in shaping policies and the new Syrian constitution during this critical transition period.[3] HTS—and Jolani in particular—is attempting to impose a fait accompli in which it controls the Syrian government, thus enabling it to influence Syria for the foreseeable future.

Jolani and HTS may find it difficult to subordinate other Syrian groups to the control of the HTS-controlled interim government. Other Syrian groups, including southern opposition forces and the SDF, have not yet subordinated themselves to Jolani’s control. The leaders of the Southern Operations Room, an opposition group that now controls most of southwestern Syria, met with Jolani on December 11 to discuss coordination in military and civil affairs.[4] The meeting probably discussed the future of the Syrian government while focusing on “coordination.” These leaders did not explicitly endorse the central government, though noted the importance of a “unified effort” and “cooperation.”[5] The leaders of the Southern Operations Room previously fought against Jolani and the HTS predecessor and al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra in the mid-2010s as part of the Southern Front.[6] The SDF also appears to be preparing itself for negotiations that would create a broader-based Syrian government that is not under Jolani’s control. The SDF voiced support for a ceasefire but did not explicitly voice its support for the HTS-led government.[7] The SDF’s position may harden further as Arab contingents within the SDF defect to HTS.[8]

More extremist and sectarian groups within the HTS coalition may not adhere to HTS’s vow to respect Syria’s religious and sectarian minorities, which would likely trigger sectarian violence in Syria.[9] A Christian journalist from a formerly pro-regime radio station said on December 10 that an HTS-led opposition member asked her about her religious and sectarian background during an encounter in Damascus and asked if she was “Christian, Alawi, Shiite, or Druze.”[10]  It is unclear which specific organization in the opposition coalition controlled this member. This type of harassment could rapidly transform into a way for more extreme and sectarian organizations to identify and kill religious minorities in Syria. This particular incident is relatively minor, and CTP-ISW has not yet observed a well-organized campaign to intimidate, coerce, or kill religious and sectarian minorities. There have been other reports of individual revenge killings targeting ”Alawites” and ”Assad loyalists,” however.[11]

These incidents—though the incidents remain isolated and relatively independent of each other at this time—create opportunities for extreme and sectarian groups to incite further religious- or sectarian-based violence to destabilize a future Syrian government. HTS is an organization consisting of numerous Syrian Islamist opposition groups formed in 2017 with varying degrees of representation in the group’s leadership, however.[12] It is unclear which factions of HTS are involved in these instances of sectarian violence or if they are coordinated activities amongst several factions. CTP-ISW will continue to report revenge killings and sectarian- or religious-based incidents and violence due to the risk that these events can rapidly destabilize the situation in Syria.

Fateh Mubin fighters seized a Captagon factory at Mezzeh Military Airbase on December 11.[13] The opposition fighters claimed that they discovered “millions” of Captagon pills, raw drug materials, and production equipment within an Air Force Intelligence building on the airbase.[14] The Assad regime and its Iranian-backed partners mass-produced Captagon in Syria for years and smuggled it through Jordan to the Gulf Arab states through a smuggling and distribution cartel that has generated billions of dollars in revenue for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[15] HTS has not explicitly stated that it will halt Captagon supply lines into Jordan.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) did not face resistance when it seized Syrian outposts outside of the disengagement zone in Syria. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 11 that the IDF 101st Paratrooper Battalion (35th Paratroopers Brigade) did not fire a single bullet when seizing outposts.[16] SAA soldiers abandoned their positions amid the collapse of the regime. Israeli media also noted on December 11 that the IDF is conducting defensive operations in the disengagement zone.[17] Israeli media reported that the IDF seized several former SAA tanks in the disengagement zone. Israeli media also reported that the IDF 810th Mountain Brigade recently seized a cache of former SAA weapons on Mt. Hermon. The army radio correspondent added that the IDF forces deployed to the Syrian front are preparing for a “long stay in the field.”[18] Geolocated imagery posted on December 11 and local Syrian sources confirmed IDF presence in Hader military base and Hader town, which are both in the disengagement zone.[19] Local Syria media claimed that the IDF had also paved a road that extended out of the disengagement zone from the Golan Heights to Marbah, western Daraa Province.[20]

An anonymous senior Israeli official told an Israeli journalist that the height of the IDF campaign on the Syrian Front is over.[21] CTP-ISW has not recorded any IDF airstrikes in Syria since the last data cutoff at 2pm on December 10. The IDF’s intense air campaign on December 9 and 10 destroyed approximately 70-80 percent of the former Assad regime’s military capabilities to prevent "terrorist elements” from seizing the weapons, including dozens of anti-ship missiles at al Bayda and Latakia ports on December 9.[22] Russian news outlet Sputnik reported that the IDF destroyed radar systems on the outskirts of Tartus, where a Russian naval base is located.[23] Satellite imagery posted on X on December 11 showed the aftermath of IDF airstrikes on December 9 and 10 on ammunition depots at Yafour Base, in Rif Dimashq Province, the air defense systems at Damascus International Airport, and an air defense site in Izraa, Daraa Province.[24]

The HTS-led operations room seized full control of Deir ez Zor City from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on December 10.[25] Local opposition groups demonstrated in Deir ez Zor City on December 9, calling for the HTS-led transitional government to take control of the city from the SDF.[26] HTS-affiliated leaders addressed locals in the street and locals came out in support of the opposition forces.[27] The fighters also seized an oil field near Deir ez Zor and the Deir ez Zor military airport.[28] The HTS-led operations room also claimed to seize Deir ez Zor’s eastern and western countrysides, although it remains unclear at this time what territory the operations room is referring to.[29]

Arab forces within the SDF are also defecting to the HTS-led transitional government in Damascus as HTS-led forces seize more ground on the right bank of the Euphrates. The leader of the Busayrah Military Council, an Arab formation in the SDF, declared allegiance to the Fateh Mubin operations room on December 11.[30] Fateh Mubin is the coordinating body for HTS-led forces. Two other Arab military leaders defected on December 10.[31] These military leaders live on the left, eastern bank of the Euphrates River. The Euphrates serves as a defensive line protecting SDF-held territory from the remainder of Syria. The SDF deployed reinforcements to the areas where Arab forces had defected and reportedly retaliated against a commander by burning his home.[32]

HTS has not yet assisted Arab defectors from the SDF with additional forces. Opposition forces across Syria—except the SNA-SDF fighting—have so far attempted to resolve their issues without resorting to fighting. The SDF and the HTS-affiliated operations room have thus far avoided major armed conflict, and HTS support for the Arab groups in Deir ez Zor would likely undermine reconciliation and transition government negotiations. The emergence of the transitional government is liable to pose a serious problem for the SDF, however, because the SDF has had a difficult relationship with local Arab residents. The existence of the regime—and the risk that Arab areas in northeastern Syria could fall back under regime control—acted as a dampener against large-scale uprisings against the SDF.

SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi confirmed that his forces withdrew from Manbij after reaching a settlement with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA).[33] Abdi said that the United States helped broker the deal to preserve the security of civilians in the town.[34] The SNA sent civil authorities and military police to Manbij to begin managing the city and the surrounding areas on December 9. [35]Abdi said that the SNA attempted to advance on Kobani along the Turkish border on December 10.[36]

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami claimed on December 10 that all Iranian military forces have withdrawn from Syria.[37] Iranian-backed militias reportedly withdrew from Syria as the Syrian opposition forces advanced.[38] Iranian government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani stated that 4,000 Iranian civilians have also returned from Syria, with plans to continue evacuation efforts "until the departure of the last Iranian."[39] Iran maintained forces in Syria since shortly after the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011.[40]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei emphasized the role of Syrian youth in reclaiming the “occupied area[s]” in Syria in a speech on December 11. Khamenei stated that "undoubtedly the occupied area[s] of Syria will be liberated by the zealous Syrian youth,” implying that some of the areas recently recaptured from the Assad Regime are now “occupied.”[41] Khamenei stated that Syrian youth "will definitely rise up and overcome the situation...just as brave Iraqi youth [after Iraq’s] occupation by the United States, were able to...with the help" of former IRGC Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani, in reference to Iran’s support to Iraqi militias against US forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2011. This comparison suggests that Iran may pursue efforts to support similar militias in Syria to combat opposition forces and US-Israeli “interference” while undermining any new government in Syria. Khamenei's repeated praise of Soleimani and his leadership while refraining from any mention of the role that current IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani has played in institutionalizing the Axis of Resistance in the last four years suggests Khamenei may be disenchanted with Ghaani’s approach. The Telegraph reported on December 10 that there is discontent within the IRGC with Ghaani and “calls” for Khamenei to remove him.[42]

Khamenei criticized the "obvious role" that “a neighboring government”—almost certainly a reference to Turkey—played in the developments in Syria.[43] Senior Iranian officials and state media previously criticized Turkish policy in Syria amid the ongoing Syrian opposition offensive.[44] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan approved HTS launching its surprise offensive on November 27 and expressed support for the HTS-led drive toward Damascus from the north.[45] These statements probably suggest an increasingly hostile relationship between Iran and Turkey. Media affiliated with the IRGC suggested that Iran might refrain from supporting Erdogan during future crises--like coups against Erdogan--if the Syrian opposition weakens the Axis of Resistance.[46] CTP-ISW assessed that the fall of Assad marks the end of this phase of the greater Iranian project in the Levant for the foreseeable future.[47] The sudden loss of Assad will severely undermine future Iranian efforts to rebuild Hamas and Hezbollah, key actors within the Axis of Resistance.

Four unspecified Israeli security sources told Reuters on December 11 that Iran has intensified its effort to recruit Israelis susceptible to recruitment over the past two years.[48] Israel has recently arrested 30 individuals operating as a part of nine covert cells across Israel. The recruited assets were responsible for tasks such as sabotage, intelligence gathering on military facilities, and assassination plots against high-profile Israeli figures, such as nuclear scientists and government officials.[49] These intelligence assets have likely supported Iranian-backed efforts to target key Israeli assets.[50] The October 13, 2024, Hezbollah attack targeting an IDF training base‘s dining facility would have required familiarity with pattern-of-life and habits on base to target the dining facility and cause casualties.[51]

Key Takeaways:

• Government Consolidation in Syria: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is attempting to consolidate HTS’s political and military control in a post-Assad Syrian government. Jolani and HTS may find it difficult to subordinate other Syrian groups to the control of the HTS-controlled interim government. Some of these groups have previously fought against Jolani’s organization and may be reticent to see Jolani expand his influence.
• Sectarianism in Syria: More extremist and sectarian groups within the HTS coalition may not adhere to HTS’s vow to respect Syria’s religious and sectarian minorities, which would likely trigger sectarian violence in Syria. Reported sectarian incidents and revenge killings—though the incidents remain isolated and relatively independent of each other at this time—create opportunities for extreme and sectarian groups to incite further religious- or sectarian-based violence to destabilize a future Syrian government.
• Israel in Syria: An anonymous senior Israeli official told an Israeli journalist that the height of the IDF campaign on the Syrian Front is over.
• Eastern Syria: The HTS-led operations room seized full control of Deir ez Zor City from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on December 10. Arab forces within the SDF are also defecting to the HTS-led transitional government in Damascus as HTS-led forces seize more ground on the right bank of the Euphrates. HTS has not yet assisted Arab defectors from the SDF with additional forces. Opposition forces across Syria—except the SNA-SDF fighting—have so far attempted to resolve their issues without resorting to fighting.
• Iranian Response to Syria: The Iranian supreme leader gave a speech in which he claimed that Syria was “occupied” by opposition forces. The supreme leader compared Syria today to Iraq in the 2003-2011 period and said that Syrian youth would free Syrian just like Iranian-backed Iraqi militias “freed” Iraq from the United States.
• Iran-Turkey: Khamenei criticized the "obvious role" that “a neighboring government”—almost certainly a reference to Turkey—played in the developments in Syria.
• Iranian Intelligence Operations in Israel: Four unspecified Israeli security sources told Reuters on December 11 that Iran has intensified its effort to recruit Israelis susceptible to recruitment over the past two years.

 

Iran Update, December 10, 2024

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Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Ria Reddy, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl

Senior Syrian officials from the deposed Bashar al Assad regime have begun to transfer power to the HTS-led interim government as of December 10. Outgoing Prime Minister Mohammed al Jalili reported that former Assad officials are working with the interim government to preserve state institutions and government workers’ jobs.[1] The chief executive of Sawsan Abu Zainedin—an umbrella group of 200 Syrian civil society groups—emphasized that the interim government would refrain from the “de-Baathification” of the Syrian state.[2] CTP-ISW previously noted that Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) likely recognizes that its own, smaller government apparatus in Idlib Province is ill-equipped to govern all of Syria and that it will need to rely on Syrian institutions at least for a period.[3] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken voiced the United States’ support for a Syrian-led political transition leading to a ”credible, inclusive, and non-sectarian governance” in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.[4]  

Syrian media reported that the interim Syrian Salvation Government will conduct an assessment of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) prior to its reorganization.[5] This activity is part of a broader HTS-led effort to reconcile with members of the former Syrian regime and SAA. HTS announced on December 9 a general amnesty for all Syrian regime military personnel, whom the regime conscripted under compulsory service.[6] HTS has similarly sought to integrate Syrian regime military and security personnel into civilian life in Aleppo City since seizing the city in November 2024.[7] CTP-ISW previously noted that integrating former combatants into civilian life could help ensure security and stability during the post-conflict transition period.[8]

HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Julani stated that “we” will hold former regime officers “accountable” for torturing civilians under Assad.[9] Julani’s statement is alarmingly ambiguous regarding whether HTS or a new Syrian government will oversee the judicial proceedings for former regime officials. While it is necessary to hold former regime officials accountable for crimes committed against the Syrian people, HTS lacks the formal authority to prosecute regime officials. That authority should rest with a new Syrian government and constitution that have yet to be established or with an international tribunal. Julani may be reacting to pressure from hardliners in HTS, as there have already been reports of revenge killings in HTS-controlled territory. Revenge killings have historically exacerbated sectarian conflict, as seen in neighboring Iraq.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reportedly advanced beyond the disengagement zone further into Syrian territory on December 9. Geolocated imagery posted on December 10 showed the IDF near Kudna, which is approximately one kilometer from the disengagement zone.[10] Syrian media claimed on December 10 that the IDF advanced to the towns of Beqaasem, Erneh, Heeneh, and Rima in Damascus Province.[11] Beqaasem is around 25 kilometers from Damascus.[12] CTP-ISW cannot verify these claims. The IDF denied reports on December 9 that it is “advancing [toward] or approaching Damascus” and emphasized that the IDF is operating within the disengagement zone and at “defensive points close to the border.”[13]

The IDF continued to destroy former SAA sites across Syria on December 10. The IDF announced on December 10 that it has destroyed around 70-80 percent of the Assad regime’s military capabilities.[14] The IDF added that it has struck most of the SAA’s strategic weapons stockpiles in the past 48 hours to prevent "terrorist elements” from seizing the weapons.[15] The IDF Navy struck the ports of al Bayda and Latakia on December 9.[16] Fifteen Syrian naval vessels were docked at the ports at the time of the strikes.[17] The IDF reported that it destroyed dozens of anti-ship missiles with ranges of 80-190 kilometers.[18]

The Arab contingents within the US-backed, Kurdish-controlled Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) defected to the HTS-led transitional government. The leader of the Hajin Military Council—an Arab-majority militia in the SDF—declared allegiance to the Fateh Mubin operations room on December 10.[19]Fateh Mubin is the coordinating element for the HTS-led forces that were formerly centered in Idlib Province and recently took Damascus City. Two militia leaders in eastern Deir ez Zor Province have separately posted videos declaring allegiance to the HTS-affiliated coalition.[20] A tribal leader who incited an Arab uprising against the SDF in the autumn of 2023 and later defected to regime-controlled territory called for Arabs to leave the SDF on December 9.[21] Some of the Arab-majority communities in Deir ez Zor Province hold longstanding grievances against the SDF due to limited reconstruction efforts, repeated SDF abuses of the local populations, and a lack of representative Arab leadership.[22] Local sources reported that the SDF deployed reinforcements to areas where the Arab commanders defected, including Hajin, Hawji, and Theban on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.[23]

The defected militias have no guarantee of holding territory in Deir ez Zor Province, particularly without military support from the Fateh Mubin operations room. The SDF quashed an Arab-militia revolt in Deir ez Zor Province in ten days in the autumn of 2023.[24] Arab-majority militias under the SDF led the offensive into regime-controlled areas of Deir ez Zor Province on December 6, but other likely Kurdish SDF units have since deployed to province.[25]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is consolidating control over Manbij in northern Syria after seizing it from the SDF on December 8.[26] The SNA claimed that it began providing basic services to locals and that “life has returned to normal" there.v[27] The SNA sent civil authorities and military police to Manbij to begin managing the city and the surrounding areas.[28] The SNA deployed its forces east of Manbij along the line of contact with the SDF.[29] The SNA claimed control over a site east of Manbij along the Euphrates River on December 10.[30]

Iran is trying to project continued confidence in its regional position despite the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria. This comes amid reports of infighting within the Iranian security establishment. Senior Iranian officials, including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami, have asserted in recent days that Iran and the Axis of Resistance remain strong.[31] Salami said that Iran has "not been weakened, and Iranian power has not diminished."[32] The supreme leader representative to the IRGC, Abdollah Hajji Sadeghi, similarly said that the Axis of Resistance "has not changed at all" while acknowledging that the fall of Assad has created ”a major obstacle."[33] CTP-ISW has contrastingly assessed that the fall of Assad marks the end of the greater Iranian project in the Levant for the foreseeable future.[34] Iranian influence in Syria historically allowed the IRGC to project force westward and move material to proxy and partner forces around the Israeli periphery. The sudden loss of Assad deprives Iran of these military and strategic advantages and will severely undermine future Iranian efforts to rebuild Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah.

The fall of Assad has reportedly stoked divisions within the IRGC. An unspecified IRGC official told the Telegraph that senior IRGC officers are blaming one another for the fall of Assad.[35] Another unspecified IRGC official said that Iran is at an "impasse" in its efforts to rearm Hezbollah because everyone who Iran sends to move the weapons "are either getting killed or escaping." The officials noted that some officials are blaming IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani and that "many are now calling" for his removal as he is formally responsible for managing the Axis of Resistance, of which Assad was a part. Ghaani does not solely manage Iranian policy vis-a-vis Syria, however. Other key Iranian officials, including officials close to the supreme leader, are involved as well. These officials include senior advisers to the supreme leader, such as Ali Larijani and Ali Akbar Velayati.[36] CTP-ISW previously assessed that regime infighting could lead to the removal of top Iranian military commanders.[37]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias responded on December 10 to the fall of Assad. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba claimed that a Turkish operations room facilitated the fall of Assad with Israeli, UK, and NATO support, while the Axis of Resistance was “preoccupied with supporting Gaza.”[38] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba claimed that the operations room seeks to “sabotage Iraq.”[39] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba also claimed that Syrian opposition forces allowed Israel to “create a federation” in Suwayda Province in return for its support for the opposition forces.[40] The militia claimed that Israel seeks to annex parts of Syria and receive guarantees from the new Syrian government that it will work to normalize ties with Israel.[41]

Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada separately stated that it will approach the situation in Syria based on the national security interests of Iraq, and Kataib Hezbollah stated that it is “monitoring the situation” in Syria.[42] Kataib Hezbollah stated that HTS and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) will retain their core character ”no matter how much they pretend to be humane in front of the cameras.”[43] Kataib Hezbollah added that it is waiting for the establishment of a new Syrian government to ”reach an understanding [with it] on the basis of resistance and the Palestinian cause.”[44]

Commander of the Iraqi Rapid Response Division, Lieutenant General Thamer al Husseini, stated on December 10 that Iraqi forces will “crush anyone” who tries to approach the Iraq-Syria border.[45] This statement reflects Iraqi concerns that the conflict in Syria could create a security vacuum and allow ISIS to resurge. Iraqi political and military officials have emphasized in recent days the need to prevent a “repetition of 2014,” referring to the ISIS takeover of Mosul in June 2014.[46] The statement also reflects how the Iraqi federal government appears to be equating Syrian opposition forces with Salafi-jihadi groups, such as ISIS. Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh emphasized on December 2, for example, that the Syrian opposition forces are ”internationally recognized as terrorist organizations.”[47]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Michael Kurilla traveled to Syria and Iraq.[48] Kurilla discussed international efforts to fight and defeat ISIS during his travels. Kurilla met with senior Iraqi officials, including Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani and Chief of Staff General Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah. Kurilla also met with US officers and SDF members in Syria. Kurilla’s travel comes after CENTCOM struck over 75 ISIS targets in central Syria on December 8.[49]

Hamas indicated willingness to concede slightly on some of its maximalist demands for a ceasefire-hostage deal with Israel. Hamas leaders are reportedly willing to accept an extended IDF presence along the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors while still demanding an eventual, complete IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, according to a Hamas source speaking to the New York Times.[50] Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu’s insistence on a continued IDF presence on the Philadelphi Corridor has been one of the most significant obstacles in negotiations.[51] Netanyahu has said that retaining a presence in the corridor is required to achieve Israeli war aims.[52] An unspecified Israeli official reported that Israeli leaders hope that the combined effect of Yahya Sinwar’s death, the ceasefire in Lebanon, and the incoming Trump administration will facilitate further ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[53] Israel reportedly assessed that Hamas wanted a ceasefire deal in late November 2024, marking the first suggestion that Hamas would break from its maximalist demands maintained throughout most of the ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[54]

Hamas’ unwillingness to grant even minimal concessions until this point in the ceasefire-hostage negotiations highlights the group’s zealous commitment to fighting Israel. The IDF has already defeated Hamas militarily and is close to destroying the group militarily as well. That Hamas has retained such a hardline negotiating position is remarkable in this context.

An Egyptian official told Israeli media on December 10 that a ceasefire-hostage deal between Israel and Hamas is “imminent.”[55] Egypt presented an Israeli-proposed ceasefire-hostage deal to Hamas on December 2.[56] The updated Israeli proposal included a ceasefire between 42-60 days and the release of all surviving female hostages, men over the age of 50, and hostages in a serious medical condition. An Egyptian official told Ynet on December 10 that an Israeli delegation will receive a list of names for a hostage-prisoner release in Cairo in the coming days.[57] Hamas provided this list to Egyptian intelligence officials after asking other Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip to share the names of the hostages in their custody, according to Egyptian and Palestinian officials.[58]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: Senior Syrian officials from the deposed Bashar al Assad regime have begun to transfer power to the HTS-led interim government. HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Jolani vowed to hold accountable former regime officials for crimes against the Syrian people.
• Syria: The IDF reportedly advanced further into southwestern Syria. The IDF is also conducting a large-scale air campaign to destroy sensitive SAA capabilities that other armed Syrian groups could seize.
• Syria: Arab contingents in the US-backed SDF defected to the HTS-led interim government. These defections highlight the tenuous relationship that the SDF has with some of the Arab communities in its territory.
• Iran: Iran is trying to project continued confidence in its regional position despite the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria. This comes amid reports of infighting within the Iranian security establishment.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas indicated willingness to concede slightly on its maximalist demands in ceasefire-hostage negotiations with Israel. Hamas’ unwillingness to grant even minor concessions until now highlights its zealous commitment to fighting Israel.

Iran Update, December 9, 2024

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Iran Update, December 9, 2024

Annika Ganzeveld, Ria Reddy, Siddhant Kishore, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is establishing a transitional government and reconciling with members of the former Syrian regime and the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). HTS is attempting to ensure continuity of governance to prevent widespread anarchy in Syria, which is consistent with HTS’ longstanding approach to “liberated areas.”[1]  HTS appointed HTS-led Syrian Salvation Government Prime Minister Mohammad al Bashir to lead the transitional government on December 9.[2] HTS established the Salvation Government in northwestern Syria in 2017.[3] Bashir met with HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani and former Assad Regime Prime Minister Mohammed al Jalali on December 9 to discuss the transfer of power from the Assad regime to HTS.[4] Jalali stated on December 8 that he and HTS agreed on “the importance of preserving government institutions and trying to return 400,000 employees to their jobs.”[5] HTS-led Salvation Government Justice Minister Shadi al Waisi separately met with former Assad Regime Justice Minister Ahmed al Sayeh on December 9 to discuss “an efficient handover.”[6] HTS has rapidly rolled out its own governance apparatus in areas of Syria it has liberated from the Assad Regime in the past.[7] HTS likely correctly recognizes that it cannot rely upon its own much smaller and Idlib-focused government apparatus to govern all of Syria it has recently captured and will need to rely upon Syrian government institutions in the interim.

HTS announced on December 9 a general amnesty for all Syrian regime military personnel whom the regime conscripted under compulsory service.[8] HTS emphasized that these individuals’ lives “are safe” and that “no assault on them is permitted.”[9] HTS has similarly sought to integrate Syrian regime military and security personnel into civilian life in Aleppo City since it seized that city on November 30.[10] CTP-ISW previously noted that integrating former combatants into civilian life could ensure stability and security during the post-conflict transition period.[11]

HTS is likely attempting to improve its image among the Syrian people and international community by framing itself as an organization that is devoted to building a pluralist Syrian state. HTS announced on December 9 that it is “strictly forbidden” to interfere in women’s choice of clothing or to demand that women dress modestly.[12] HTS emphasized that “respect[ing] the rights of individuals is the basis for building a civilized nation.”[13] HTS separately announced on December 9 that it is “strictly forbidden” to attack or threaten journalists and reporters.[14] It is unclear whether HTS will indefinitely protect the rights of women and journalists. HTS’s “morality police,” called Markaz al Falah, has previously arrested women for dressing “inappropriately.”[15] HTS has also imprisoned journalists who criticized its rule in northwestern Syria.[16]

The Kurdish-controlled, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) may face increased challenges governing Arab areas in northeastern Syria due to the emergence of the HTS-led transitional government as a viable alternative to the SDF.  Local opposition to SDF rule has broken out in several cities and villages in Raqqa Province since the fall of the Assad regime.[17]  Arab sources reported that locals seized SDF military checkpoints and headquarters in Karamah and Tabqa on December 8.[18] The SDF deployed reinforcements to Karamah on December 9 and conducted a large arrest campaign in several villages involved in opposition activities the day before.[19]  Armed local resistance in these towns does not appear to be organized or well-equipped enough to force the SDF out of these areas.  The emergence of the transitional government is liable to pose a serious problem for the SDF, which has a difficult relationship with local Arab residents. The existence of the regime—and the risk that Arab areas in northeastern Syria could fall back under regime control—acted as a dampener against large-scale uprisings against the SDF. Several Arab-majority areas in Deir ez Zor Province began an armed uprising and participated in demonstrations against the SDF in the autumn of 2023, demonstrating the existing discontent in the region, however.[20] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi called Assad’s fall ”an opportunity to build a new Syria based on democracy and justice“ on December 8, but did not elaborate further on the SDF’s willingness to join the transitional government.[21]

The SDF is also facing local dissent in the areas of Deir ez Zor Province that it seized from the Syrian regime on December 6.[22]  Local opposition groups demonstrated in Deir ez Zor City on December 9, calling for the HTS-led transitional government to take control of the city.[23] Local media reported that the SDF opened fire on the demonstrators and killed several of them.[24] The HTS-affiliated Fateh Mubin operations room confirmed that its forces were operating in Deir ez Zor City on December 7 shortly before Assad fled the country.[25] Local media has since reported that convoys affiliated with Fateh Mubin are operating between Deir ez Zor and Albu Kamal, but few reliable sources are reporting direct clashes between the SDF and HTS-affiliated forces.[26] Engagements between the SDF and local opposition demonstrate that HTS-affiliated forces have not established full security control over the Deir ez Zor corridor.[27]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is also attacking the SDF as the SDF contends with internal dissent. SNA forces advanced east of Manbij to Qara Qozak Bridge and Tishrin Dam, which are two key river crossings in SDF territory.[28] The SDF confirmed that its forces engaged SNA fighters at both sites and did not acknowledge that its forces lost control over the river crossings.[29] Opposition media claimed that the SNA took control of the Qara Qozak Bridge and posted a video from the site, however.[30] The SDF continued to dispute that SNA forces seized full control of Manbij on December 9.[31] The SNA claimed that it seized Manbij on December 8.[32]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to establish a buffer zone in Syria along the Golan Heights on December 9. Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar stated on December 9 that the IDF “advanced into new positions” in the disengagement zone between Syria and the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.[33] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 9 that the IDF had advanced several kilometers into the disengagement zone.[34] Geolocated imagery posted on December 8 showed Israeli forces near a UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) position on Mount Hermon.[35] Israeli forces captured an SAA position at the top of Mount Hermon on December 8.[36] Geolocated imagery posted on December 9 also showed Israeli tanks entering the disengagement zone from Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights and Israeli forces operating west of the town of Hader in Quneitra Province.[37] The IDF operated in Quneitra and al Hamidiyah cities on December 9 after issuing warnings to residents in these cities on December 8 to stay inside.[38]

The IDF Air Force continued conducting airstrikes targeting former SAA and Lebanese Hezbollah sites in Syria on December 9. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 9 that the IAF conducted airstrikes targeting over 100 SAA targets in the past day.[39] The IAF targeted the SAA 9th Division, 112th Brigade, and 12th Brigade bases in Daraa Province.[40] The IAF also targeted SAA military sites, barracks, and missile warehouses, as well as unspecified Hezbollah sites in the Qalamoun area north of Damascus.[41] Israeli officials told Axios on December 9 that the IAF has targeted facilities that were part of the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons and ballistic missile programs to ”make sure strategic weapon systems don’t fall into the wrong hands.”[42]

The fall of the Assad regime has exposed fissures between Iran and Iraq. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi was “surprised” during his visit to Baghdad on December 6 that the Iraqi federal government refused to send forces to Syria to defend the Assad regime, according to an unspecified Iraqi official speaking to the Washington Post on December 9.[43] The official stated that Araghchi assumed that the Iraqi federal government would support Assad as it had previously done in the Syrian Civil War.[44] Senior Iraqi security officials, including Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, emphasized in recent days that the conflict in Syria is an “internal matter.”[45] Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders, including Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri, seemed to oppose the stance of the Iraqi government and called on fighters to bolster the SAA and not wait for "Baghdad to escalate” against opposition forces.[46]

Iran is attempting to reframe its role in the Syrian Civil War in order to reestablish influence within the new Syrian government. A senior Iranian official told Reuters on December 9 that Iran opened direct communication with unspecified Syrian rebels to "prevent a hostile trajectory" between the two countries.[47] Another official stated that Iran aims to build ties with "those within Syria's new ruling groups whose views are closer to [Iranian views]," though the specific opposition groups are unclear. Iran's "main concern" is that Assad's successor may shift Syria away from Iranian influence, demonstrating that Iranian officials remain concerned about the requirement to reestablish Iranian influence in Syria. Key Iranian officials, including the foreign affairs minister and parliament speaker, have recently tried to reframe the role Iran held in the war. The Iranian foreign affairs minister claimed that Iran has always advocated for “dialogue” with opposition forces, but it is highly unlikely that Iran would have supported talks that would have given Assad or a pliant pro-Iran actor a subordinate role to any opposition organization.[48] Iran's parliament speaker falsely claimed that Iran had only intervened to counter ISIS, not rebel groups.[49] Iran launched a concerted effort to keep Assad in power and maintained its forces in Syria since shortly after the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011.[50] This effort required Iran to fight ISIS, but Iran also fought all threats to Assad’s rule, including the opposition.

This Iranian effort is unlikely to succeed, at least in the near term. HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani stated on December 9 that the victory of Syrian opposition forces would end Syria's role as a "playground for Iranian ambitions, spreading sectarianism, and stirring corruption", reflecting deep resentment toward Iranian influence in Syria.[51]

Members of Iran’s armed forces and Iranian policymakers are increasingly disillusioned with Iran’s handling of the collapse of the Assad Regime. Iran observers have noted that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij members are critical of Iran's failure to intervene more decisively in Syria to support Assad against the opposition's surprise offensive, citing IRGC communication channels and interviews with IRGC members.[52] An IRGC member stated that Syria was "crucial” for the Axis of Resistance, and "abandoning" Assad was a "betrayal" that would have serious consequences for Iran.[53] Another member stated that the "[IRGC youth] will not forget the cowardice of the decision-makers."[54] Iranian Parliamentarian Mohammad Manan Raisi stated that "after sacrificing six thousand martyrs and spending billions of tomans, we handed Syria over [in just one week]."[55] These statements reveal dissatisfaction within Iran over its failure to support the Syrian regime, raising concerns about Iran's ability to sustain its influence via the Axis of Resistance. These frustrations—if they become wildly held among the security services and key Iranian leaders—could lead to the removal of top Iranian military commanders, including in the IRGC.

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Transitional Government Formation: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is establishing a transitional government and reconciling with former Syrian regime and Syrian Arab Army (SAA) members. HTS likely attempting to improve its image among the Syrian people and international community by framing itself as an organization that is devoted to building a pluralist Syrian state.
• Northeastern Syria: The Kurdish-controlled, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) may face increased challenges governing Arab areas in northeastern Syria due to the emergence of the HTS-led transitional government as a viable alternative to the SDF.  The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is also attacking the SDF as the SDF contends with internal dissent.
• Israel in Syria: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to establish a buffer zone in Syria along the Golan Heights on December 9. The IDF Air Force continued conducting airstrikes targeting former SAA and Lebanese Hezbollah sites in Syria on December 9.
• Iraq and Iran in Syria: The fall of the Assad regime has exposed fissures between Iran and Iraq. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi was “surprised” during his visit to Baghdad on December 6 that the Iraqi federal government refused to send forces to Syria to defend the Assad regime.
• Iranian Syria Policy: Iran is attempting to reframe its role in the Syrian Civil War to reestablish influence within the new Syrian government.
• Iranian Reactions to Assad’s Collapse: Members of Iran’s armed forces and Iranian policymakers are increasingly disillusioned with Iran’s handling of the collapse of the Assad Regime.

Iran Update, December 8, 2024

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Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Annika Ganzeveld, and Nick Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Syrian opposition forces toppled the Bashar al Assad regime on December 7 after only 11 days of fighting.[1] Opposition forces declared victory over Assad as they advanced into Damascus.[2] The regime negotiated its surrender as Assad fled to Russia without making any statements to his people to acknowledge the instability.[3] The opposition group led by Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) noted that regime supporters even “laid down [their] weapons” in Sayyidah Zeynab in southern Damascus, where Iran has long held deep influence.[4] HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Julani arrived in Damascus on December 8.[5] Opposition forces separately entered the final remaining regime strongholds of Jableh, Latakia, and Tartus on the Syrian coast on December 8.[6]

HTS under Julani is beginning to consolidate power in Damascus and across formerly regime-controlled territory.[7] The “Military Operations Management” of opposition groups issued orders to protect public and private property in Damascus and issued a curfew in the city.[8] Opposition forces attempted to restore order after a bank heist on the Central Syrian Bank as well.[9] Opposition leaders have visited the former regime stronghold of Latakia as a show of goodwill and religious tolerance toward the Alawite people there.[10] The opposition forces quickly established alternative political and security institutions in Aleppo City, consolidating control and support of the local population and former regime elements after seizing control there on November 30.[11] It remains unclear what government structure will emerge among the opposition groups in the coming weeks; it is not a given that HTS will by default lead the next Syrian government.

All groups in control of Syrian territory have praised the fall of the Syrian regime and articulated a hopeful but unspecific view for the future. HTS’s relationship with other groups that remain in control of Syrian territory remains ambiguous, making the coming days of consolidation and negotiations pivotal. Both the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have capitalized on the HTS-led offensive to expand their territory, including by fighting with each other.[12] Clashes between the SDF and SNA continued on December 8.[13] An SNA-affiliated operations room praised the overthrow of Assad on December 8 and emphasized the importance of preserving state institutions, the need for cooperation, and the “sense of responsibility” shared by the Syrian people.[14] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi called Assad’s fall ”an opportunity to build a new Syria based on democracy and justice“ but without elaborating further.[15] A key Druze leader who holds influence with the southern opposition groups called on December 8 for a transitional administration to create a new, united, and free Syria.[16]

HTS-affiliated forces appear to be taking control of the western bank of the Euphrates River in Deir ez Zor Province, which the SDF had seized from the Syrian regime on December 6.[17] SDF units have reportedly struggled to keep control over the local population in Deir ez Zor Province despite issuing a military curfew.[18] The HTS-affiliated opposition spokesperson said that opposition forces had entered Deir ez Zor City and that hundreds of regime soldiers surrendered.[19] Local sources reported tribal militias joined the HTS-led opposition and seized the Albu Kamal-al Qaim crossing between Iraq and Syria from the SDF on December 8.[20] HTS-affiliated convoys traveled along the Deir ez Zor-Albu Kamal road on December 8.[21] Opposition forces reportedly seized control over the main Damascus-Deir ez Zor road that runs through Sukhnah and Palmyra in Homs Province, which was essential to Iran’s former ground line of communication to Lebanese Hezbollah.[22] Opposition groups, possibly those based in the al Tanf Deconfliction Zone, seized Palmyra on December 7.[23]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) clashed with the SDF in Manbij in eastern Aleppo Province on December 8. An SNA-affiliated operations room claimed to seize all of Manbij on December 8 after days of clashes in the surrounding area.[24] The SDF rejected the claim and stated later in the day that clashes were ongoing in several neighborhoods of Manbij.[25] The SNA claimed that it seized several formerly SDF-controlled towns west of Manbij on December 8.[26] CTP-ISW is not prepared to assess control of Manbij at this time.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) deployed forces to establish a buffer zone in Syria along the Golan Heights.[27] The IDF stated that these deployments are a defensive and temporary operation to protect Israel from possible instability in Syria resulting from the fall of the Syrian regime.[28] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on December 8 that he considers the 1974 disengagement agreement on the Golan Heights to have ”collapsed” with the fall of the Syrian regime.[29] Netanyahu said that he ordered the IDF to take the vacated Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions ”to ensure that no hostile force” took them.[30] IDF activity is concentrated around Khan Arnabeh in the center of the disengagement zone in Quneitra Governorate.[31] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued warnings to residents of Ufaniya, Quneitra, al Hamidiyah, Samdaniya al Gharbiya, and al Qahtaniah in Syria to stay inside on December 8.[32] Israeli Air Force's Shaldag special operations forces unit captured an SAA position at the top of Mt. Hermon without resistance on December 8.[33] The IDF continued building defensive features, such as trenches, along the border.[34] HTS-led opposition forces announced that they took control of Quneitra on December 7.[35]

The IDF Air Force (IAF) conducted airstrikes targeting former SAA sites, including advanced weapons and ammunition depots in Syria to prevent opposition groups from acquiring these materials.[36] The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting a weapons and ammunition depot in Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Province.[37] The IDF hit at least seven military targets in southwestern Syria, including Mezzeh Military Airport and the former SAA 4th Division base at Mount Qasioun outside Damascus.[38] The IDF also struck the former SAA 90th Brigade base near the Israel-Syria border and Khalkhala airbase north of Suwayda City in southwest Syria.[39] The IDF also targeted the Scientific Research Center and a security complex in Damascus, including intelligence and customs administration buildings, which unspecified regional security sources told Reuters had both been used previously by Iran to develop and store missiles as well as sensitive military data and other equipment.[40] Opposition-affiliated sources reported that an IDF airstrike hit the al Qusayr crossing on the Lebanon-Syria border, which Hezbollah has previously used to transport arms into Lebanon.[41] Israel is destroying Iranian military infrastructure in Syria, which will hinder Hezbollah efforts to reconstitute in Lebanon and thus limit the Iranian threat to Israel.

The United States conducted airstrikes against more than 75 ISIS targets in central Syria on December 8.[42] The airstrikes targeted ISIS personnel and sites and caused no civilian casualties.[43] US President Joseph Biden and US Central Command Commander General Michael Kurilla separately emphasized that the United States would prevent ISIS from reconstituting and exploiting instability in Syria.[44] These statements reflect the risk that the collapse of the Syrian regime could enable ISIS to consolidate and expand its position in Syria. Kurilla warned that the United States would hold accountable any actor in Syria that supports or partners with ISIS.[45]

The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a generic statement acknowledging the collapse of the Syrian regime. The ministry stated that the Syrian people should determine the future of their country without foreign interference.[46] The ministry expressed readiness to engage “all influential parties” and “help establish security and stability in Syria.” The ministry also expressed interest in friendly relations with a future Syrian government. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated separately that the Syrian people should determine the future of their country.[47] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi expressed support for UN Security Council Resolution 2254, calling for a political settlement, wherein “all different parties have their role.”[48] An internal Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) memo stated that Iranian leaders “accepted the fall of Assad and…lost the will to resist,” according to the New York Times.[49]

A hardline Iranian parliamentarian stated that Iran should focus on "atomic bomb testing" following the fall of the Syrian regime. Ahmad Naderi posted on X (Twitter) on December 8 that Iran should focus on testing nuclear bombs and reviving the Axis of Resistance.[50] Naderi has previously stated that Iran should acquire a nuclear weapon to restore deterrence.[51] Naderi’s rhetoric is consistent with growing calls from senior Iranian officials encouraging Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to revoke his 2003 fatwa banning the production and use of nuclear weapons.[52] This rhetoric is especially noteworthy given the recent expansion of the Iranian nuclear program, which is making it easier for Iran to build a weapon. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in November 2024 that Iran continues to develop its nuclear program outside the parameters of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[53] Iran notified the IAEA on November 29 that it plans to expand its uranium enrichment capacity significantly by installing over 6,000 additional centrifuges and activating some at the Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities.[54]

Iraqi media reported on December 7 that between 2,500 and 2,700 former SAA soldiers and officers and Syrian regime employees have entered Iraq over the past day.[55] Iraqi media reported that the soldiers and officers handed in their weapons before entering Iraq.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have not commented on the overthrow of the Assad regime at the time of this writing.

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian opposition forces toppled the Bashar al Assad regime after only 11 days of fighting. HTS under Julani is beginning to consolidate power in Damascus and across formerly regime-controlled territory.
• HTS-affiliated forces appear to be taking control of the western bank of Deir ez Zor Province, which the SDF had seized from the Syrian regime. The SDF clashed with the Turkish-backed SNA east of Aleppo City.
• The IDF deployed units to establish a buffer zone in Syria along the Golan Heights. The IDF also conducted airstrikes targeting ammunition depots and advanced weapons to prevent opposition forces from acquiring those materials.
• The United States conducted airstrikes against over 75 ISIS targets in central Syria. US leaders emphasized that they would prevent ISIS from reconstituting and exploiting the instability in Syria amid the collapse of the Syrian regime.

 

 

Iran Update, December 5, 2024

click here to read the full report

Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Andie Parry, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-aligned opposition groups have begun a campaign to capture Homs after capturing Hama City on December 5. HTS-aligned forces seized control of Hama City and Hama military airport from Syrian Arab Army (SAA) forces on December 5.[1] Fateh Mubin—a joint operations room led by HTS— announced after it secured Hama that its forces would advance south to secure Homs.[2] Syrian opposition media posted footage reportedly showing a convoy of HTS-aligned fighters prepared to advance south along the M5 highway to Homs.[3] Unverified reports claim that locals in Talbiseh, approximately 8 kilometers north of Homs, have started their own localized effort to liberate the town ahead of the opposition advance.[4] 

Syrian opposition groups are using negotiated settlements with localities to rapidly seize territory without fighting. Locals in two Christian-majority towns north of Hama reportedly negotiated surrender with advancing opposition forces, avoiding any large-scale fighting in the towns.[5] Ismaili Shia officials in Salamiyah, southeast of Hama, also reportedly came to an agreement with opposition forces to avoid fighting.[6] Regime forces reportedly withdrew from Salamiyah on December 5 after opposition forces advanced to the town’s outskirts on December 4.[7] The decision by towns to abandon the regime appears to be a trend across Hama countryside. This trend may help HTS-aligned forces approach Homs within the next day without being slowed down by fighting through country villages.

Opposition groups may also advance rapidly towards Homs due to the rapid collapse of regime forces. The regime does not appear to have established any defensive line between Hama City and the Orontes River. Regime forces appear to be collapsing between Hama City and Homs City. A pro-regime aircraft bombed the Rastan Bridge over the Orontes River after Opposition forces seized the left, north bank of the Orontes.[8] A force retreating in good order and not under significant pressure would have presumably blown the bridge themselves, rather than relying on aircraft. Airstrikes will usually fail to damage a bridge sufficiently to prevent a crossing, making ground-based detonation preferable unless a force is unable to detonate the bridge. The reported low casualties among Regime forces during the collapse around Hama suggest that Regime forces were not under significant pressure.[9] It is also possible that the regime was forced to rely on aircraft due to a lack of combat engineers to detonate the bridge. The regime similarly failed to set up strong defensive lines until well into Hama Governorate after opposition forces seized Aleppo on November 30.[10] There are other intact bridges and likely fords east and west of the Rastan Bridge that opposition forces could use to cross the Orontes, however.

HTS is establishing alternative political and security institutions in Aleppo City, consolidating control and support of the local population and former regime elements.  Fateh Mubin, HTS’ joint operations room, has ordered all Syrian regime army, security, and police defectors to report to one of two designated processing centers in the city.[11] HTS has presumably designed this effort to reintegrate former combatants into civilian life, which in theory ensures stability and security during the post-conflict transition period.[12] Fateh Mubin has also sought to prevent its fighters from harassing civilians or coming into conflict with locals by restricting the activity of fighters in the city.[13] Fateh Mubin ordered the fighters to report to the front lines and continue their advance to secure regime-held towns. The group has also mobilized local quasi-police forces to backfill these military units.[14] Fateh Mubin released the names and contact information for new opposition government ministers, effectively establishing HTS and the HTS-led Syrian Salvation Government as the de facto governing authority of Aleppo.[15] HTS has pursued similar successful government-building approaches in northwestern Syria by incorporating local religious and political figures into the governing body to eliminate rivalry.[16]

HTS is attempting to use diplomacy to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from bolstering Syrian regime forces after regime forces retreated south. HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Jolani asked Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on December 5 to prevent the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) from intervening in the Syrian conflict.[17] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[18] The PMF reports directly to Sudani on paper, but many of the militias that comprise the PMF answer to Iran in reality.[19] Dozens of PMF fighters have reportedly entered Syria in recent days to help defend the Syrian regime against opposition forces.[20] Sudani is likely unable to prevent militias that answer to Iran from intervening in Syria.

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem said on December 5 that Hezbollah is committed to “sheltering and rebuilding” in Lebanon and abiding by the ceasefire deal with Israel.[21] Qassem acknowledged that Hezbollah fighters will withdraw north of the Litani River in exchange for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon, in accordance with the ceasefire deal.[22] Qassem claimed that Israel violated the ceasefire deal ”at least 60 ” times since it went into place on November 26. Qassem stated that it is the responsibility of the Lebanese government—and not Hezbollah—to address these violations. Qassem stated that Hezbollah will provide financial assistance, mainly through Iranian donations, to Lebanese civilians in Beirut to rebuild. Qassem also stated that Hezbollah ”stands by” the Syrian regime amidst the ongoing Syrian opposition offensive.

The IDF conducted an airstrike on December 5 targeting a weapons stockpile southeast of Aleppo, Syria.[23] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent noted that the SAA previously held the targeted area, but that Syrian opposition forces had recently seized the area.[24]

Egypt presented an Israeli-proposed ceasefire-hostage deal to Hamas on December 2.[25] Israel desires to capitalize on Hamas’ ”willingness to be flexible” on implementing a partial deal due to the ceasefire in Lebanon, former Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death, and the incoming Trump Presidency, according to two Israeli officials speaking to Axios. Israel’s updated proposal includes a ceasefire between 42-60 days and the release of all surviving female hostages, men over the age of 50, and hostages in a serious medical condition.[26] Hamas has not commented on this proposal as of the time of this writing. An Israeli official told Ynet on December 2 that Hamas may be willing to compromise on an IDF presence on the Philadelphi Corridor.[27] Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu’s insistence on an Israeli military presence on the Philadelphi Corridor has been one of the most significant sticking points in the negotiations.[28] Netanyahu has said that retaining a presence in the corridor is required to achieve Israeli war aims.[29]

Israeli officials also told Axios that Egypt is now the “main channel” for negotiations with Hamas after Qatar announced on November 9 that it would cease its efforts to mediate a ceasefire-hostage deal until Israel and Hamas showed a “willingness” to resume negotiations.[30] Reuters reported on December 4 that Qatar has resumed its role as a mediator.[31] This news follows reports that Qatari officials had ordered Hamas’ political leadership to relocate from Qatar. [32] Hamas denied on November 18 that it had departed Qatar.[33]

Hamas confirmed that it approved an Egyptian proposal to form a post-war governance committee in the Gaza Strip on December 5.[34] Hamas added in a statement that the committee should help implement the “comprehensive agreements” to “achieve national unity.” This is possibly about the joint declaration Hamas, Fatah, and other unspecified Palestinian political factions signed in July 2024 to form a “temporary national unity government” responsible for governing the Gaza Strip and the West Bank after the war.[35] Hamas said it met with several Palestinian figures during post-war governance and ceasefire-hostage negotiations in Cairo, including the leadership of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).[36] Israeli media reported that Hamas and Fatah agreed to form an independent civilian committee to manage post-war governance on November 3.[37] Hamas will almost certainly attempt to infiltrate or subvert whatever civilian government emerges to manage the post-war Gaza Strip unless Hamas is prevented from doing so by force.

Key Takeaways:

• Hama City-Homs City Axis: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-aligned opposition groups have begun a campaign to capture Homs after capturing Hama City on December 5. Syrian opposition groups are using negotiated settlements with localities to rapidly seize territory without fighting.
• State of Regime Forces: Opposition groups may also advance rapidly towards Homs due to the rapid collapse of regime forces. Regime forces appear to be collapsing between Hama City and Homs City. The regime similarly failed to set up strong defensive lines until well into Hama Governorate after opposition forces seized Aleppo on November 30.
• Aleppo: HTS is establishing alternative political and security institutions in Aleppo City, consolidating control and support of the local population and former regime elements. 
• HTS Diplomacy: HTS is attempting to use diplomacy to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from bolstering Syrian regime forces after regime forces retreated south. HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Jolani asked Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on December 5 to prevent the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) from intervening in the Syrian conflict.
• Lebanese Hezbollah: Secretary General Naim Qassem said on December 5 that Hezbollah is committed to “sheltering and rebuilding” in Lebanon and abiding by the ceasefire deal with Israel.
• Gaza Ceasefire-Hostage Negotiations: Egypt presented an Israeli-proposed ceasefire-hostage deal to Hamas on December 2. Israel desires to capitalize on Hamas’ ”willingness to be flexible” on implementing a partial deal due to the ceasefire in Lebanon, former Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death, and the incoming Trump Presidency, according to two Israeli officials speaking to Axios.

Iran Update, December 4, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)–aligned opposition groups are likely prioritizing the capture of Hama City. Fateh Mubin—a joint operations room led by HTS—is conducting a campaign that appears to have several different subordinate objectives. Fateh Mubin's main effort is focused around the city itself. The main effort aims to isolate Hama City, presumably before assaulting it. The group is supporting its main effort by interdicting regime reinforcements coming from eastern Syria in order to prevent any relief force from reaching the city.

The main effort bypassed key regime defensive positions north of the city and proceeded to cut ground lines of communication (GLOCs) traveling into the city from the east and southeast, thus isolating the city from the east. A second force to the west may be seeking to capture Hama Military Airport. A commander directs their unit to bypass an obstacle in order to maintain the momentum of an operation.[1] The regime has positioned forces on Zain al Abidin Hill, north of the city, and Qomhana town, a key town northwest of the city.[2] The hill is a tactically advantageous position from which a defender has sweeping views northwards up the M5 Highway. Some opposition forces likely fixed these forces while the main western Hama and eastern Hama advances proceeded southwards. Opposition forces east of Hama had proceeded directly south along the M5 Highway before swinging east, bypassing the hill.[3] Opposition forces in the west attacked Qomhana while the remainder continued towards the Hama Military Airport.[4] An unspecified Fateh Mubin military source cited by al Quds al Araby stated that opposition forces plan to "encircle” the city of Hama, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's observation that opposition forces cut two major roads connecting Hama City to areas east of it.[5] Hama is not fully isolated, given major roads moving south.

Fateh Mubin’s supporting effort captured key ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting Hama City to eastern Syria likely in order to interdict resupply and reinforcements from the east. Interdict is defined as a tactical mission task that “prevents, disrupts, or delays the enemy’s use of an area or route ... [to] impact ... an enemy force’s plans and ability to respond to friendly actions.”[6] Opposition forces have captured SAA bases northeast of Hama and cut multiple roads far east of Hama to prevent or delay regime forces from reaching the battlefield in time to support regime forces in Hama.[7] Pro-Syrian regime sources claimed that the SAA has continued to send reinforcements to Hama City from Raqqa and Rusafa, which are connected to Hama by these roads, to counter the expected attack on the city.[8] Opposition forces’ advance into towns surrounding Hama with little SAA resistance suggests that the supporting line of effort has had some success.

Opposition groups retained control of previously seized territory in Aleppo Province, including Aleppo City, on December 4. Social media users posted footage of HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Julani visiting Aleppo Citadel on December 4, emphasizing the extent of control that opposition forces maintain in Aleppo City.[9]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted several self-defense airstrikes targeting weapons systems in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, on December 3.[10] The strikes targeted three truck-mounted Multiple Rocket Launchers, a T-64 tank, and an armored personnel carrier.[11] CENTCOM confirmed that unspecified fighters fired mortars toward US forces at Conoco Mission Support Site before the strikes.[12] The strikes occurred during a Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) offensive into seven regime-controlled villages on the left bank of the Euphrates River.[13] CTP-ISW has not yet observed lasting control-of-terrain changes on the left bank of the Euphrates River as a result of the SDF offensive.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on December 4 that it recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from an unspecified location in the Gaza Strip.[14] The IDF said that Hamas fighters killed the hostage, Itay Svirski, in January 2024 and kept his body in the Gaza Strip.

An IDF investigation revealed that Hamas fighters shot and killed six hostages in the Gaza Strip in early 2024.[15] The IDF launched an investigation after recovering the bodies of six hostages and six Hamas fighters from a tunnel in Khan Younis in August 2024.[16] Hamas moved the hostages to the tunnel in January 2024.[17] The IDF conducted an airstrike that struck the tunnel in February 2024. The IDF clarified that it did not have any information on the presence of hostages there during the time of the airstrike, however.[18] The investigation found that the bodies had bullet wounds and assessed with high confidence that Hamas fighters shot and killed the hostages. The IDF could not clarify if the Hamas fighters shot and killed the hostages before or after the IDF struck the tunnel. The IDF investigation determined that if the hostages had been alive at the time of the airstrike, the collapse of the tunnel would have killed them by causing the hostages to suffocate. The forensic investigation revealed that the Hamas fighters likely suffocated to death inside the tunnel after the IDF airstrike.[19]

Lebanese Hezbollah will likely try to reconstitute its forces despite significant Israeli degradation to the organization. Reuters, citing a senior US official, a senior Israeli official, and US lawmakers, reported that Hezbollah has begun recruiting new fighters and trying to find new ways to rearm through domestic production and by smuggling materials through Syria in recent weeks.[20] It is unclear, however, if those efforts have slowed due to the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire deal on November 26. US intelligence agencies assessed that Israel destroyed more than half of Hezbollah’s weapons stockpile and killed “thousands” of Hezbollah fighters. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Hezbollah will almost certainly try to reconstitute its forces despite Israel’s victory in Lebanon.[21]

Hezbollah is likely unable to send its newly recruited fighters to Syria due to the severe losses it suffered in Lebanon and the requirements on the group to train its new fighters. Hezbollah may choose to send these fighters to Syria in the future if the group becomes concerned that it will lose its overland resupply route through Syria due to the Syrian Opposition offensive. Reuters reported that US officials are “concerned” about Hezbollah’s access to Syria following the recent Syrian opposition offensive due to Hezbollah’s previous use of Syria as a safe haven for fighters and a weapons transport corridor.[22] Hezbollah also historically maintained GLOCs in Syria.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Hama Campaign: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-aligned opposition groups are likely prioritizing the capture of Hama City. The main effort bypassed key regime defensive positions north of the city and proceeded to cut ground lines of communication (GLOCs) traveling into the city from the east and southeast, thus isolating the city from the east. Fateh Mubin’s supporting effort captured key GLOCs connecting Hama City to eastern Syria likely in order to interdict resupply and reinforcements from the east.
• Eastern Syria: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted several self-defense airstrikes targeting weapons systems in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, on December 3.
• Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on December 4 that it recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from an unspecified location in the Gaza Strip.
• Hezbollah and Syria: Lebanese Hezbollah will likely try to reconstitute its forces despite significant Israeli degradation to the organization. Hezbollah is likely unable to send its newly recruited fighters to Syria due to the severe losses it suffered in Lebanon and the requirements on the group to train its new fighters.

Iran Update, December 3, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Christina Harward, Anthony Carrillo, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Syrian opposition forces have continued to advance rapidly and pushed through regime defensive lines in the northern Hama countryside on December 3. Opposition forces—led by Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)—advanced through the northern Hama countryside and seized numerous towns that regime force previously secured only two days ago.[1] Opposition forces captured Halfaya, northwest of Hama City, after advancing over the Orontes River possibly using the Mahrada dam. Opposition forces also seized Tayybat al Imam, Souran, and Maardis from regime control in their advance toward Hama City.[2] The opposition seized SAA tanks in at least one of these towns, suggesting that regime forces withdrew in a disorderly fashion.[3] Russian forces conducted several airstrikes targeting the al Ghab plain, about 25 kilometers northeast of Hama City, possibly to interdict reinforcements as opposition forces advanced south and seized towns.[4] Regime and Russian forces continued airstrikes in opposition-controlled areas of northwest Syria on December 3.[5]

 

Opposition forces have advanced within five kilometers of Hama City and likely seized key defensive terrain in the area.[6] Regime forces withdrew from Qomhana—a village immediately north of Hama City—and Zine al Abdine hill, which overlooks Hama City.[7] The SAA previously established  a first line of defense for Hama City on Zine al Abdine hill, which opposition forces then targeted with drone strikes.[8] The withdrawal of regime forces will almost certainly cede this hill to opposition forces. Opposition forces announced that they also captured the second hill overlooking Hama City, Jabal Kafra.[9] Opposition forces appear to remain outside Hama City at the time of this writing. Opposition forces fired drones targeting SAA tanks near the northern entrance to the city, however.[10] The Syrian Defense Ministry claimed on December 3 that it sent “large reinforcements” to Hama City to counter the expected attack on the city.[11]

 

Opposition forces’ capture of Hama City would facilitate successive campaigns, such as an effort to take Homs City. The fall of Hama would enable opposition forces to continue to move south into Homs Province. Syrian social media users have reported that pro-regime forces have begun establishing defensive lines in Homs City and forcibly conscripting youths into the SAA.[12] Maintaining regime control of Homs City is vital to Iranian-backed efforts to transport materiel from Iran and Iraq to Lebanese Hezbollah.

 

Hama City is also a critical node connecting Damascus and southern Syria to regime- and Russian-controlled coastal areas. Tartous and Latakia provinces are long-time Assad strongholds that risk being isolated from the rest of regime-held territory. The Russian evacuation of naval assets from Tartous and the reported deployment of additional Russian forces to Syria suggest that Moscow is worried that opposition forces may advance southward to Hama City and threaten the Tartous base.[13]

 

Opposition forces simultaneously claimed to seize terrain in as Saan District, located in the desert about 55 kilometers east of Hama City.[14] CTP-ISW cannot verify this advance. As Saan District is located along the 42 Highway, which is a critical ground line of communication reaching Aleppo City. The Syrian Defense Ministry claimed to conduct defensive activities along the nearby Athariya-Aleppo axis.[15]

 

Opposition groups retained control of previously seized territory in Aleppo Province, including Aleppo City, on December 3. Geolocated footage and local reports posted on December 3 showed SDF elements evacuating Aleppo Province.[16] Opposition forces previously issued a statement on December 1 promising to allow all SDF units safe passage out Aleppo City toward northeastern Syria.[17]

 

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) launched an offensive to seize Syrian regime-controlled territory in Deir ez Zor Province in eastern Syria. The Deir ez Zor Military Council—an Arab-majority militia in the SDF—mobilized locals from seven villages on the left bank of the Euphrates River on December 2 in an operation to re-claim and expel Iranian-backed militias from the towns.[18] These seven villages are the only areas east of the Euphrates River that the regime controls.[19] Iranian-backed militias and Russian forces maintain positions on behalf of the regime in these seven towns.[20] A Syrian Arab Army (SAA) officer told Reuters that the offensive intended to exploit pro-regime forces’ “weakness,” while Syrian opposition forces fought the regime in northwestern Syria.[21]

 

The SDF attempted to advance into the Khasham pocket through from the north into al Husseiniya, al Salihiya, and from the east from Jadeed Ekedat into Tabiyah al Jazeera, according to local sources.[22] Syrian sources reported mutual shelling between the SDF and pro-regime forces over the area, and Iranian-backed shelling from Hatla, north of the disputed area, reportedly killed a Syrian woman in al Jalamdeh village.[23] Iranian-backed militias engaged the SDF at the southern point of advance in Taybeh al Jazeera and reportedly fired missiles at an SDF tank advancing into the area from Jadeed Ekedat.[24] Syrian state media reported that the SAA joined Iranian-backed militias in defense of the territory.[25] Local authorities warned residents to stay in their homes in anticipation of further regime shelling over the area.[26] Regime-affiliated media reported that the SDF eventually withdrew from the areas into which it had advanced on December 3.[27]

 

The fighting in eastern Syria risks further drawing in US forces deployed in the area. Iranian-backed militias launched a rocket from the Khasham area targeting the US Conoco Mission Support Site during the fighting, according to Syrian sources.[28] Iranian-backed militias have repeatedly launched rockets from these seven villages targeting US forces nearby.[29] Syrian opposition sources reported that the United States responded by conducting airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed militias in al Husseiniya, al Salihiya, and Tayibah al Jazeera.[30] Local sources reported that the US airstrikes destroyed a dirt bridge connecting Khasham to Iranian-backed militia-controlled territory on the other side of the Euphrates River.[31] An unspecified US official confirmed to Reuters that the United States conducted at least one self-defense strike overnight and that the strike was unrelated to the SDF offensive.[32]

 

Iran appears to be trying to coordinate with Iraq and Russia to support the Syrian regime against the Syrian opposition forces. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri held separate phone calls with Iraqi Army Chief of Staff General Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, and SAA Chief of Staff General Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim on December 3.[33] Bagheri said that Iraq and Russia agreed to provide “decisive support” for the Syrian regime and "take the necessary measures" to back the SAA. Bagheri claimed that the surprise opposition offensive was a "coordinated" US-Israeli effort to "weaken" the Axis of Resistance.

 

Iranian state media outlet al Alam reported that Brigadier General Javad Ghaffari traveled to Damascus with a team of Iranian military advisers to support the Assad regime against the opposition forces. Ghaffari has a long history of supporting pro-regime forces in Syria and had for a time served as the overall Iranian commander in the country. Ghaffari is known as the ‘Butcher of Aleppo’ for his role in the pro-regime campaign to retake Aleppo City in 2016.[34] Syrian President Bashar al Assad expelled Ghaffari in 2021 for his alleged involvement in attacks on US forces as well as deploying Iranian weapons in “unapproved places.”[35] Ghaffari returned to Tehran to head the IRGC Intelligence Organization’s Special Operations division, where he had served until his latest deployment back to Syria.[36]

 

Senior Iranian officials and state media criticized Turkish policy in Syria amid the ongoing Syrian opposition offensive. Turkey maintains ties with and has historically supported some opposition groups against the Bashar al Assad regime. This dynamic has created tensions between Iran and Turkey throughout the Syrian civil war. Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati accused Turkey of betraying its Islamic roots and siding with the United States and Israel.[37] Velayati claimed that “anti-Islamic” elements in the Turkish government are “committing acts that desecrate Islam.”[38] Media affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) separately warned that Iranian trust in Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan could decrease if the Syrian opposition weakens the Axis of Resistance.[39] The IRGC-affiliated outlet proceeded to suggest that Iran might in turn refrain from supporting Erdogan during future crises.[40] Iranian media also circulated images of Iranians protesting in front of the Turkish Embassy in Tehran on December 1.[41] These statements and reports follow Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Turkey on December 2, where he held “frank” discussions with his Turkish counterpart.[42]

 

Hamas and Fatah agreed to form an independent civilian committee to manage post-war governance in the Gaza Strip.[43] The Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) will head the committee and thus manage civilian affairs in the Gaza Strip. The committee will appoint 10 to 15 “technocrats,” who are unaffiliated with any Palestinian militia or political group, according to Israeli media.[44] This agreement comes after a Hamas delegation traveled to Cairo on November 29 to discuss post-war governance and ceasefire-hostage negotiations with Egyptian officials.[45] Hamas will almost certainly try to infiltrate or subvert whatever civilian government emerges to manage the post-war Gaza Strip.

 

The IDF stated that it will conclude its clearing operations in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip in the coming weeks.[46] The IDF 84th Infantry Brigade (162nd Division) commander told Israeli media on December 3 that the IDF has detained and killed around 2,000 Palestinian fighters in Jabalia beginning of clearing operations there in early October 2024.[47] The IDF stated that Hamas in Jabalia maintains a presence of 100 to 200 fighters, who operate in small cells equipped with explosive devices and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).[48] The IDF clearing operation in the Jabalia is designed to pressure Hamas to return Israeli hostages, destroy Hamas infrastructure, and prevent Hamas from reconstituting and rearming there, according to the IDF 84th Infantry Brigade commander.[49] The IDF stated that Palestinian militias have killed at least 30 Israeli soldiers in the northern Gaza Strip since early October 2024.[50]

 

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has conducted over a dozen airstrikes across Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on December 2. The IDF is responding to a Lebanese Hezbollah rocket attack into Israeli-controlled Shebaa Farms.[51] Hezbollah fired two rockets targeting an IDF border site in Shebaa Farms area on December 2 in response to what Hezbollah described as Israeli ceasefire violations.[52] The IDF Air Force responded by striking Hezbollah military infrastructure, including the rocket launch site used for the December 2 rocket attack.[53] Israeli media reported that senior US and French officials, including US Special Envoy Amos Hochstein, told their Israeli counterparts that Israel was violating the ceasefire by conducting military activities in Lebanon and failing to report them to the designated oversight mechanism.[54] Israeli public news outlet Kann reported that Israel will inform the international enforcement mechanism of Hezbollah violations but asserted that it retains the right to unilaterally take action against Hezbollah activity south of the Litani River.[55] Israel retains the “inherent right to self-defense” under the current ceasefire and Israel has justified its military activity in Lebanon since the ceasefire as a response to Hezbollah threats to Israel.[56] Israel and Lebanon both told the White House on December 2 that they are committed to the ceasefire agreement despite recent flare ups, according to unspecified sources cited by Axios.[57]

 

Key Takeaways:

 

• Northwestern Syria: Syrian opposition forces have continued to advance rapidly and pushed through regime defensive lines in the northern Hama countryside. Opposition forces have advanced within five kilometers of Hama City and likely seized key defensive terrain in the area.
• Eastern Syria: The US-backed SDF launched an offensive to seize regime-controlled territory in Deir ez Zor Province. The fighting in the area risks drawing in the US forces deployed in the area to fighting the Islamic State.
• Iran: Iran appears to be trying to coordinate with Iraq and Russia to support the Syrian regime against Syrian opposition forces. The most senior Iranian military officer, Mohammad Bagheri, held separate phone calls with Iraqi and Russian officials to discuss supporting Bashar al Assad.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas and Fatah agreed to form an independent civilian committee to manage post-war governance in the Gaza Strip. Hamas will almost certainly try to infiltrate or subvert whatever non-Hamas government emerges in the strip in order to ultimately control it.
• Lebanon: The IDF conducted over a dozen airstrikes across Lebanon in response to Lebanese Hezbollah firing rockets into Israeli-controlled Shebaa Farms. Israel and Hezbollah have accused one another of violating the ceasefire.

Iran Update, December 2, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, Meghan Bracy, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have reportedly deployed to northern Syria to help defend the Bashar al Assad regime against Syrian opposition forces.[1] Kataib Hezbollah, Badr Organization, and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba fighters have deployed from Iraq to northern Syria over the past day, according to a Syrian Arab Army (SAA) source and two Iraqi security sources speaking to Reuters on December 2.[2] The SAA source told Reuters that dozens of Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters crossed into Syria via the Albu Kamal border crossing overnight on December 1 and 2.[3] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[4] The PMF, on paper, reports directly to the Iraqi prime minister, but in reality, many of the militias that comprise the PMF answer to Iran.[5] Social media users published images on December 1 purporting to show Iranian-backed Iraqi fighters heading toward Syria.[6] A local Syrian source denied on December 2 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias entered Syria from Iraq and instead claimed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias redeployed from Palmyra in central Syria and Deir ez Zor in eastern Syria to northern Syria.[7] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may redeploy from other areas in Syria to the north given that these militias have long operated in Syria.

Hezbollah does not appear willing to commit fighters to assist its pro-regime allies in northern Syria, probably as a result of the severe losses it has suffered in Lebanon. Hezbollah has not yet deployed fighters to Syria to support the Syrian regime. An unspecified Hezbollah spokesperson told Newsweek on December 2 that the SAA does not need Hezbollah fighters to assist in the defense of territory seized by Syrian opposition forces.[8] Hezbollah fighters previously deployed thousands of fighters in defense of Assad in 2011 and Hezbollah was an extremely important element of the pro-regime forces.[9] Decisively supporting regime forces would likely require Hezbollah to organize a large-scale re-deployment of fighters to Syria, as numerous Hezbollah fighters left Syria to join the southern front in Lebanon in the past few months.[10]

It is not clear that Hezbollah can currently support a deployment of this size, given post-war commitments to reconstitute its forces. Hezbollah is currently regenerating and reorganizing its forces after a nearly two-month Israeli campaign in southern Lebanon that has severely degraded its command-and-control networks, communications, and weapons stockpiles.[11] Regeneration and reorganization take place out of contact with enemy forces and cannot be undertaken at the same time as large-scale deployments. Regeneration and reorganization would need to occur before any forces can be deployed as units. It is possible, however, that Hezbollah could choose to deploy individuals to Syria to advise regime forces. The pressure on Hezbollah to defend Syrian territory from rebel advances is greater given that a rebel advance towards Hama begins to threaten Hezbollah’s access to Iranian materiel and equipment through its ground line of communication in Homs Province. It does not appear that pro-regime forces, including Iran, have asked Hezbollah to join in on defensive efforts, however.[12]

Iran is coordinating with Syria and Russia to counter the rebel offensive in Syria. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian discussed countering “the spread of terrorism” in a telephone conversation with President Bashar al Assad on December 2.[13] Assad blamed the United States and Israel for their interference in the region. Iranian Parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf also reiterated Iran’s support for Syria in a phone call with Syrian counterpart Hammouda Sabbagh on December 2.[14] Pezeshkian reemphasized regional cohesion to counter “terrorism” in Syria in separate calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani on December 2.[15]

Iran and Turkey continue to hold different desired political goals in Syria, which could cause increased friction as the Syrian opposition offensive continues. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan both agreed on the preservation of Syria’s territorial sovereignty and returning to the Astana process in a joint press conference in Ankara on December 2.[16] Araghchi acknowledged the “differences of opinion” between Iran and Turkey and emphasized Iran's support for Assad’s regime.[17] Fidan said that Turkey believes Assad is ignoring the “legitimate demands“ of the Syrian opposition.[18] Turkey’s ”legitimate demands“ would presumably include some role for Turkey’s allies in Syria because a total Assad takeover of the country, as Assad and Iran desire, would trigger massive refugee flows north towards Turkey.[19]  Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that Turkey will prioritize its national security on December 2.[20] Erdogan almost certainly believes that the collapse of Turkish allies would endanger Turkish national security by increasing refugee flows as well as the threat from Kurdish militants.

Syrian opposition forces appear to be slowing their advance into regime-controlled areas of northwest Syria after encountering Syrian Arab Army (SAA) defensive lines north of Hama City. Fateh Mubin—a joint operations room including Hayat Tahrir al Sham and several other armed opposition factions leading the offensive—did not claim to seize additional towns in northwest Syria on December 2. The Syrian Defense Minister announced on December 1 that it sent large reinforcements to Hama’s northern countryside to bolster the SAA’s defensive operations in the area.[21] Regime forces reportedly deployed from eastern Hama province near Rusafa to Hama City on December 2, demonstrating that the regime continues to reinforce its defensive lines there.[22] The SAA also deployed forces on the left bank of the Orontes River near Hama City on December 1 and 2 after opposition forces initially claimed to seize towns in the area.[23] Fateh Mubin’s spokesperson said that opposition forces were in control of seven unspecified towns in northern Hama and were approaching regime forces from multiple axes on December 2, however.[24] Idlib-based opposition forces also claimed likely drone attacks targeting regime forces, command centers, and other operationally significant assets on December 2.[25] These attacks may reflect the increased ground-based resistance that opposition forces are facing in Hama. The SAA’s defense of northern Hama is the first effective defense that pro-regime forces have mounted against Syrian opposition forces since the offensive began on November 27.

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is similarly slowing its advance after accomplishing its main goal of seizing Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo, on December 1.[26] The SNA claimed to seize 14 towns north of Aleppo, compared to the more than 30 sites the force seized the day prior.[27] Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and SNA leaders reportedly negotiated a deal to allow civilians and fighters to evacuate east to SDF territory from Tel Rifat and Sheikh Maqsoud, a Kurdish neighborhood of eastern Aleppo.[28] SDF leader Mazloum Abdi confirmed on December 1 that locals were evacuating Tel Rifat through an ”opening a humanitarian corridor.“[29] It remains unclear at this time the extent to which the SNA and Idlib-based opposition groups are coordinating their attacks targeting the Syrian regime.  Social media users circulated footage on December 1 of SNA and HTS fighters joining convoys near the Aleppo International Airport, reportedly to launch an operation northeast of Aleppo City.[30]

A local Syrian source suggested that the SDF may launch an offensive to seize Syrian regime-controlled territory in Deir ez Zor Province.[31] The Deir ez Zor Military Council—an Arab-majority militia within the SDF—reportedly mobilized locals from seven villages on the left bank of the Euphrates River.[32] These seven villages are the only areas east of the Euphrates that the regime controls, making it a strategic holding for the regime and its allies. Both Russia and Iranian-backed militias maintain positions in these seven towns.[33] Iranian-backed militias have repeatedly launched rockets targeting US forces stationed nearby from these seven villages.[34] CTP-ISW is monitoring early rumors about possible clashes between SDF fighters and unspecified militias in Deir ez Zor.[35]

Russian and Syrian regime forces continued a limited airstrike campaign in opposition-occupied areas of northwest Syria on December 2. Pro-regime forces struck sites across Idlib and Aleppo governorates, including hospitals in Idlib.[36] The Syrian Defense Ministry claimed that the air and artillery strikes destroyed five opposition command centers and seven weapons and ammunition depots.[37] The regime said that airstrikes killed at least 400 opposition fighters.[38]

The United States and France reportedly warned Israel that it is violating the terms of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire, according to Israeli media. Israeli media reported on December 2 that senior French and US officials, including US Special Envoy Amos Hochstein, told their Israeli counterparts that Israel was violating terms of the ceasefire agreement by conducting military activities in Lebanese territory and failing to report them to the designated oversight mechanism.[39] The IDF has conducted numerous strikes into Lebanese territory since the ceasefire went into effect on November 27 to thwart what it deemed as Hezbollah’s violations of the ceasefire agreement.[40] Israel and Lebanon are both required to report any possible violations of their obligations to both UNIFIL and the oversight mechanism, according to leaked copies of the agreement published by Israeli Army Radio.[41]

Hezbollah fired two rockets at an IDF border position as a “warning” on December 2 in response to what Hezbollah described as Israeli ceasefire violations.[42] The rockets fell in open areas in the Israeli-controlled Shebaa Farms.[43] Hezbollah has long maintained that Shebaa Farms is Lebanese territory and it has targeted the area repeatedly since October 2023.[44] Hezbollah said in a statement that the “concerned authorities” that reviewed Israel’s violations did not stop them from occurring.”[45] This incident was Hezbollah’s first attack into Israeli territory since the ceasefire went into effect. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to respond “with force” to Hezbollah’s attack and the IDF announced that it began to strike Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.[46] Hezbollah has not conducted any further attacks into Israeli territory at this time.

Israel retains the “inherent right to self-defense” under the current ceasefire agreement and Israel has justified its military activity in Lebanon since the ceasefire as a response to “immediate” Hezbollah threats to Israel.[47] The IDF also struck a rocket launcher at a Hezbollah site near Sidon on November 28 classified as a “non-immediate” threat that the IDF needed to neutralize.[48] This action is reportedly guaranteed by the US, which pledged to support Israel’s right to respond to threats in a side letter.[49]

Senior IDF officials have recommended that Israel propose a temporary ceasefire-hostage deal in response to Hamas’ perceived willingness to concede on some of its maximalist ceasefire demands.[50] Senior IDF officials told Israeli media on December 2 that several factors, including the ceasefire in Lebanon, may pressure Hamas to accept a deal. Hamas expressed its readiness to resume negotiations after the ceasefire began in Lebanon.[51] A senior Israeli cabinet minister reported on November 29 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is also interested in a partial ceasefire-hostage deal to capitalize on Hamas’ “weaker position” after the ceasefire in Lebanon.[52] Egyptian officials discussed a new ceasefire-hostage proposal with Hamas and Israeli officials during the most recent round of negotiations in Cairo that began on November 29.[53]

Hamas and Fatah have made “significant progress” towards the formation of a civilian committee to handle post-war governance in the Gaza Strip.[54] A senior Hamas official told Al Araby al Jadeed on December 2 that Hamas and Fatah had solved major differences during meetings in Cairo, including the management of relief and construction funds.[55] The official added that Hamas and Fatah agreed that unidentified donors would independently supervise the funds.[56] Hamas will almost certainly attempt to gain control over an independent reconstruction agency. Hamas control--or attempts to control--an independent reconstruction agency would make it more difficult to secure donor funding.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian-backed Support to Syria: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have reportedly deployed to northern Syria to help defend the Bashar al Assad regime against Syrian opposition forces.
• Hezbollah Support to Syria: It is not clear that Hezbollah can currently support a deployment of this size, given postwar commitments to reconstitute its forces. Hezbollah is regenerating and reorganizing its forces after a nearly two-month Israeli campaign in southern Lebanon that has severely degraded its command-and-control networks, communications, and weapons stockpiles. Regeneration and reorganization would need to occur before any forces can be deployed as units. It is possible, however, that Hezbollah could choose to deploy individuals to Syria to advise regime forces.
• Iranian Diplomatic Responses: Iran is coordinating with Syria and Russia to counter the rebel offensive in Syria. Iran and Turkey continue to hold different desired political goals in Syria, which could cause increased friction as the Syrian opposition offensive continues.
• Syrian Opposition Operations: Syrian opposition forces appear to be slowing their advance into regime-controlled areas of northwest Syria after encountering Syrian Arab Army (SAA) defensive lines north of Hama City.  The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is similarly slowing its advance after accomplishing its main goal of seizing Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo, on December 1.
• US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces: A local Syrian source suggested that the SDF may launch an offensive to seize Syrian regime-controlled territory in Deir ez Zor Province. The Deir ez Zor Military Council—an Arab-majority militia within the SDF—reportedly mobilized locals from seven villages on the left bank of the Euphrates River. These seven villages are the only areas east of the Euphrates that the regime controls, making it a strategic holding for the regime and its allies.
• Lebanon Ceasefire: The United States and France reportedly warned Israel that it is violating the terms of the ceasefire, according to Israeli media. The IDF has conducted numerous strikes into Lebanese territory since the ceasefire went into effect. Hezbollah fired two rockets at an IDF border position as a “warning” on December 2 in response to what Hezbollah described as Israeli ceasefire violations.
• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Senior IDF officials have recommended that Israel propose a temporary ceasefire-hostage deal in response to Hamas’ perceived willingness to concede on some of its maximalist ceasefire demands.

Iran Update, December 1, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Syrian Arab Army (SAA) reinforcements fortified defensive lines north of Hama City and prevented Syrian opposition forces from advancing into Hama City. The Syrian Defense Minister announced on December 1 that it sent large reinforcements to Hama’s northern countryside to bolster the SAA’s defensive operations in the area.[1] SAA Chief of Staff General Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim arrived to oversee SAA operations in the area.[2] Opposition forces began advancing south from Idlib towards Hama City on November 30.[3] The Syrian Defense Ministry claimed that SAA units expelled opposition fighters from the town of Maardis, about 10 kilometers from Hama City.[4] The SAA 25th Special Mission Forces Division secured and fortified defensive lines in several villages and towns north of Hama, including villages that rebels claimed to seize on November 30, such as Tayyiba al Imam.[5] Local Syrian sources reported that SAA forces pushed opposition fighters north towards the town of Morek.[6] Fateh Mubin—a joint operations room including Hayat Tahrir al Sham and several other armed opposition factions leading the offensive—appears to remain in control of Khan Sheikhoun, a town immediately north of Morek on the other side of the Hama-Idlib border.[7] This suggests that opposition forces remain in control of Idlib Province. Syrian opposition forces conducted a drone strike that killed the commander of Hama’s Military Security in Souran amid clashes in the area.[8] An SAA-affiliated social media account claimed that the Syrian army would advance into Idlib before continuing to Aleppo.[9]

The Syrian regime appears to be concentrating its efforts on securing Hama Province and has not yet attempted to re-capture or send reinforcements towards Aleppo. The SAA’s defense of northern Hama is the first effective defense that pro-regime forces have mounted against Syrian opposition forces since the offensive began on November 27. Russian forces separately conducted multiple airstrikes—some in cooperation with the SAA—targeting opposition forces in Aleppo City and Idlib Province on December 1.[10]

Syrian opposition forces also advanced southeast of Aleppo to the town of Khanasir on December 1, which is probably part of an effort to isolate Aleppo and block resupply and reinforcements. Syrian opposition forces advanced through Safirah and captured the largest group of SAA forces they have captured so far.[11] The opposition forces captured an SAA general in Safirah.[12] A Syria-focused analyst reported that rebels have captured over 150 Syrian regime soldiers so far.[13] Fateh Mubin announced that it took control of the town of Khanasir and the Khanasir-Aleppo highway.[14] Cutting off this highway would prevent regime reinforcements from approaching Aleppo City from the southeast, further isolating the city from regime attacks.

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) announced that it captured Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo City, from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on December 1.[15] The SNA launched a separate operation into regime-controlled territory on November 30 to take territory from the SDF, Syrian regime, and Iranian-backed militias.[16] The SNA seized Deir Jamal and blocked off access to Tal Rifaat before moving into the town.[17] The SNA also seized several towns and military positions north of Aleppo along Highway 214, including the Menagh military airport.[18] Regime-affiliated media reported that SDF forces based in Deir ez Zor mobilized to deploy to Manbij to increase the SDF‘s force presence there.[19]

The SNA continues to retain territory that it seized during the first day of its operation, including the Kuweires military airport, east of Aleppo City.[20] Local sources circulated footage of SNA fighters seizing SAA L-39 fighter jets, a Syrian Pantsir air defense system, and an Iranian drone from the Ababil family at the airport.[21]

Fateh Mubin and the SNA appear to be coordinating operations to seize territory from the Syrian regime and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Social media users circulated footage of SNA and HTS fighters joining convoys near the Aleppo International Airport to launch an operation northeast of Aleppo City reportedly.[22] It is unclear if HTS’s forces were involved in the seizure of Tal Rifaat or any nearby towns. Fateh Mubin and the SNA have both operated in some of the same towns during the ongoing operation, suggesting that they have at least some degree of tactical coordination.[23] It is not immediately clear to what degree Fateh Mubin and the SNA are coordinating to isolate Aleppo.

Fateh Mubin issued a statement addressed to all SDF combat units in Aleppo City.[24] The group said that they would allow SDF units safe passage out of Aleppo city towards northeastern Syria. The group said that Syrian Kurds are ”our people” and that Fateh Mubin is “responsible for protecting [the Kurds] and ensuring a decent life for “them.”[25] It is unclear if SNA forces will follow Fateh Mubin’s calls for safe passage for the SDF. Damascus-based media reported that SDF forces began to evacuate from Aleppo City towards Manbij.[26]

Syrian regime leadership held several diplomatic meetings with regional officials almost certainly to coordinate with allies and other stakeholders amid the opposition offensive. President Bashar al Assad was reportedly in Moscow, Russia on November 30, though the Kremlin spokesperson declined to comment on the matter.[27] Assad met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Damascus on December 1 to discuss Iranian support for Assad’s regime in Syria.[28] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi will meet with Turkish officials in Ankara, Turkey after he visits Damascus on December 1.[29] Assad also spoke with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on November 30.[30] Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Bassem Sabbagh also spoke with his Jordanian counterpart Ayman Safadi in a telephone conversation.[31]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stressed the importance of cohesion among Islamic countries in countering “regional terrorism” in a telephone conversation with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on December 1.[32] The phone conversation focused on northern Syria.

Some of Assad’s allies have already begun assisting the regime. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have reportedly been active in northwestern Syria since Syrian opposition forces began their surprise offensive on November 27. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada’s Secretary General, Abu Alaa al Walai, claimed that Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada helped to defend against Turkish-backed SNA offensives on November 30.[33] A Syrian journalist claimed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia the Badr Organization deployed fighters in an unspecified area in Syria.[34] These militias have long operated in Syria to support the Syrian regime.[35] Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will probably deploy additional forces into Deir ez Zor Province to secure ground lines of communication between Iraq and the frontline areas if Iranian-backed militias continue to fight in northwestern Syria.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly replaced Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel with Colonel General Alexander Chaiko, who will reprise his previous assignment as commander of the Russian force grouping in Syria, though it remains unclear how Russian operations in Syria may change. Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, including the Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel, claimed on November 30 and December 1 that the MoD removed Kisel as Commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria and replaced him with Chaiko.[36] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 1 that Chaiko replaced Kisel and that Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alexander Moiseyev arrived in Tartous, Syria.[37] Chaiko served as chief of staff of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria from 2015 to 2017 and served as overall commander of the Russian force grouping in Syria from September 2019 to November 2020, February to June 2021, and from September to December 2022.[38] It is unclear what position Chaiko held from December 2022 until present. Kisel has reportedly commanded the Russian force grouping in Syria since at least May 2024.[39] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Kisel's removal will not significantly change the situation or Russian operations in Syria because the Russian military command has routinely rotated commanders to positions in Syria after battlefield failures in Ukraine.[40] ISW is unable to independently confirm this reported command change at this time.

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Regime Operations: Syrian Arab Army (SAA) reinforcements fortified defensive lines north of Hama City and prevented Syrian opposition forces from advancing into Hama City. The Syrian regime appears to be concentrating its efforts on securing Hama Province and has not yet attempted to re-capture or send reinforcements towards Aleppo.
• Syrian Opposition Operations in Tel Rifat: The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) announced that it captured Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo City, from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on December 1.
• Syrian Opposition Operations near Aleppo: Syrian opposition forces also advanced southeast of Aleppo to the town of Khanasir on December 1, which is probably part of an effort to isolate Aleppo and block resupply and reinforcements.
• Coordination Between Opposition Groups: Fateh Mubin and the SNA appear to be coordinating operations to seize territory from the Syrian regime and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Fateh Mubin and the SNA have both operated in some of the same towns during the ongoing operation, suggesting that they have at least some degree of tactical coordination. It is not immediately clear to what degree Fateh Mubin and the SNA are coordinating to isolate Aleppo.
• Syrian Regime Diplomatic Response: Syrian regime leadership held several diplomatic meetings with regional officials almost certainly to coordinate with allies and other stakeholders amid the opposition offensive.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias in Syria: Some of Assad’s allies, including Iraqi militias, have already begun assisting the regime. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have reportedly been active in northwestern Syria since Syrian opposition forces began their surprise offensive on November 27.
• Russian Forces in Syria: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly replaced Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel with Colonel General Alexander Chaiko, who will reprise his previous assignment as commander of the Russian force grouping in Syria, though it remains unclear how Russian operations in Syria may change.

Iran Update, November 30, 2024

Click here to read the full report

Syrian opposition forces seized Aleppo City and advanced toward Hama City on November 30.[1] Opposition forces made this progress after launching their surprise offensive only three days prior.[2] The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) acknowledged that its forces have withdrawn from Aleppo City to “strengthen” defensive lines and “prepare for a counterattack.”[3] The SAA also acknowledged that opposition forces have entered “large parts of Aleppo [City].”[4] A pro-Syrian regime social media account reported that the SAA suffered command-and-control problems in Aleppo City, possibly leading to the rapid collapse of SAA defenses.[5] Fateh Mubin—one of the main opposition groups leading the offensive—announced on November 29 that opposition forces had separately taken control of Khan Sheikoun, which is about 20 miles from Hama City.[6] Geolocated footage posted on November 30 similarly showed opposition forces advancing through towns en route to Hama City.[7] CTP-ISW cannot verify whether opposition forces are operating in Hama City at the time of this writing.

Pro-regime forces have failed to mount an effective defense against the surprise offensive by opposition forces. The Syrian regime and affiliated sources claimed that the SAA was preparing defensive lines in northern Hama Province on November 30. It appears that opposition forces have advanced past northern Hama Province at this time, however.[8] Russian forces have separately conducted multiple airstrikes—some in cooperation with the SAA—targeting opposition forces in Aleppo City.[9] Russian and Syrian airstrikes have continued to target opposition positions in the Aleppo, Hama, and Idlib countrysides as well.[10]

Syrian opposition forces have likely captured valuable military equipment that the SAA and other pro-regime forces abandoned amid disorderly withdrawals.[11] Social media accounts claimed that opposition forces have captured armored vehicles and heavy artillery pieces.[12] Opposition forces also entered the Abu al Duhur and Nairab military airports in Idlib Province and Aleppo City, respectively.[13]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched a separate operation into Syrian regime-controlled territory on November 30.[14] The SNA is currently operating northeast of Aleppo City, reportedly with the intent of capturing Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo City, from the joint control of the Syrian regime and Syrian Democratic Forces.[15] The SNA captured Kuweires military airport east of Aleppo City along with several other villages.[16]

The opposition offensive in northern Syria may be inspiring anti-regime activity in other parts of Syria, particularly restive Daraa and Suwayda provinces. Unidentified fighters targeted the Syrian Regime Military Intelligence building in central Suwayda City with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) on November 30.[17] Local groups have historically targeted this symbol of the Syrian regime in Druze-majority Suwayda City during periods of unrest.[18] Local media separately reported small arms engagements between Syrian regime forces and unspecified actors in multiple areas of Daraa Province.[19] The Syrian regime has faced constant opposition in southern Syria since 2011 and especially since August 2023.[20]

The Syrian regime may struggle to rally the same support from the Axis of Resistance and Russia that they previously provided, which will impede any pro-regime counteroffensives. Hezbollah is in the midst of force regeneration and reorganization after a nearly two-month Israeli campaign in southern Lebanon.[21] Israel’s intense monitoring of the Syria-Lebanon ground line of communication could furthermore disrupt Hezbollah efforts to move materiel and personnel to support the Syrian regime.[22] Iran could still send conventional units and Iraqi militias to support the Syrian regime against the opposition forces, however. Russia is separately constrained by its operations in Ukraine, which are a higher priority than operations in Syria. It is unclear to what extent Russia can divert any attention and resources toward Syria. Russia withdrew S-300 air defense systems from Syria back to Russia in 2022, likely to support Russian operations in Ukraine, highlighting the de-prioritization of operations in Syria.[23] Russian air assets are likewise heavily engaged in Ukraine.

A Hamas delegation traveled to Cairo on November 29 for further ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[24] Egyptian officials are separately discussing a new proposal with Hamas and Israeli officials, according to the Wall Street Journal.[25] The proposal involves pausing fighting for at least 60 days, opening the Rafah border crossing, and increasing the flow of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip to 200 trucks entering daily.[26] The Palestinian Authority would assume control of the Gazan side of the Rafah crossing, according to the proposal.[27] The IDF would then monitor traffic through the border crossing. Wall Street Journal added that Egypt and Hamas have indicated that they will drop their demand that the IDF withdraw from the area around the Rafah border crossing.[28] Hamas may be increasingly willing to accept a ceasefire-hostage deal since Israel and Hezbollah reached a ceasefire in Lebanon.  Hamas expressed its readiness to resume negotiations after the ceasefire began in Lebanon.[29] Hamas may calculate that negotiations are necessary to ensure its survival. Yahya Sinwar previously calculated that Hamas could survive if the October 7 War expanded and thus compelled the IDF to reduce military pressure on Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[30] That scenario is less likely since Hezbollah exited the war.

Hamas published on November 30 a video of an American-Israeli hostage giving what appears to be a coerced testimony.[31] The publication of the video is likely meant to pressure the United States and Israel to support a ceasefire-hostage deal in the Gaza Strip. The hostage, Edan Alexander, called on Israeli citizens to demonstrate daily against IDF operations in the Gaza Strip.[32] Alexander also called on US President-elect Donald Trump to cut military support to Israel and to pressure Israel to negotiate with Hamas. This video is the latest of several that Hamas and other Palestinian militias have published of hostages in recent months as part of an information operation meant to degrade Israeli willingness to sustain military operations in the Gaza Strip.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: Syrian opposition forces seized Aleppo City and advanced toward Hama City. Pro-Syrian regime forces have failed to mount an effective defense against the opposition offensive.
• The Turkish-backed SNA launched a separate offensive into Syrian regime-held territory. The SNA captured a military airport from the joint control of the SAA and SDF.
• The opposition offensive in northeastern Syria may be inspiring anti-regime activity in other parts of the country, particularly restive Daraa and Suwayda provinces.
• The Syrian regime may struggle to rally the same support from the Axis of Resistance and Russia that they previously provided, which will impede pro-regime counteroffensives.
• Gaza Strip: A Hamas delegation traveled to Cairo for further ceasefire-hostage negotiations and has indicated that it will drop its demand for the IDF to withdraw from parts of the Gaza Strip.
• Hamas published a video of an American-Israeli hostage giving what appears to be a coerced testimony in order to pressure the United States and Israel to support a ceasefire.

Iran Update, November 29, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Syrian opposition forces continued their offensive into Syrian regime-held territory and advanced into Aleppo City. The opposition forces have continued expanding their offensive eastward since launching the surprise offensive on November 27. Thousands of fighters and armored elements advanced quickly eastward, seizing several villages within a few hours of launching the offensive.[1] Fateh Mubin—an opposition group based in HTS-controlled Idlib Province—announced on November 28 that they had seized control of another 13 villages and achieved the “complete liberation” of the countryside to the west of Aleppo City.[2] Fateh Mubin designated the western Aleppo countryside a ”closed military zone.”[3] Local Syrian sources reported that opposition forces seized armored vehicles and weapons, including anti-tank guided missiles and man-portable air defense systems, belonging to the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).[4] Fateh Mubin claimed that opposition forces also detained over 20 pro-regime fighters.[5] The opposition forces advanced into the western parts of Aleppo City on November 29, marking the first time that the city has been contested since pro-regime forces captured it in late 2016.[6] Opposition forces then advanced into the city center and declared a curfew over the city, according to local reports and geolocated footage.[7] Social media accounts posted videos of opposition fighters entering a military hospital, a police headquarters, and the Aleppo municipal building.[8]

The opposition forces killed an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officer, Brigadier General Kiomars Pour Hashemi, as they advanced.[9] The IRGC acknowledged his death and described him as a military adviser to the Syrian regime.[10] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami attended a ceremony for Pour Hashemi in Tehran on November 29.[11]

Pro-regime forces have failed to mount an effective defense against the surprise offensive by opposition forces. An SAA-affiliated social media account claimed that opposition forces outnumber the SAA forces around Aleppo City and suggested that the SAA may be unable to respond until reinforcements arrive.[12] Other social media users reported that SAA units retreated toward al Safirah, southeast of Aleppo City, although CTP-ISW cannot verify these reports.[13] Russian forces separately conducted multiple airstrikes—some in cooperation with the SAA—targeting opposition forces.[14] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on November 29 that the opposition offensive is a violation of Syrian sovereignty and that Moscow supports Bashar al Assad in reclaiming the territory.[15]

Iranian officials and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias blamed the United States and Israel for the opposition offensive. Iranian leaders called for “coordinated action” to defeat the offensive and accused the United States and Israel of supporting opposition activity against Assad.[16] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and Kataib Sayyida al Shuhada released statements claiming that Israel is responsible for the offensive because the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was defeated in Lebanon.[17] An official from Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada vowed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—will defeat the opposition forces.[18]

The Israel-Lebanese Hezbollah ceasefire has continued to hold since it went into effect on November 26. Hezbollah has not conducted any attacks into Israel and the IDF and Hezbollah have not engaged in any ground combat. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem gave a public speech to acknowledge the end of fighting on November 29, saying that Hezbollah would abide by the ceasefire “with our heads held high.”[19] Qassem emphasized that the ceasefire includes a full IDF withdrawal from Lebanon by January 25, 2025.[20] The IDF still has a force presence in southern Lebanon for now in order to counter any potential violations of the ceasefire by Hezbollah.[21] Qassem also vowed that Hezbollah would retain a role in Lebanese politics and support reconstruction in Lebanon.[22]

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) began post-war operations across Lebanon. The LAF is clearing roads, detonating unexploded ordinance, and installing checkpoints, especially in southern Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon.[23] The LAF began to deploy forces, including armored elements, to southern Lebanon on November 27—one day after the ceasefire into effect.[24] Hezbollah Secretary General Qassem said that Hezbollah will engage in “high-level coordination” with the LAF to implement the ceasefire.[25]

The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in response to militant activity.[26] The IDF struck a rocket launcher at a Hezbollah site in Bisariya, near Sidon, after detecting unspecified activity at the site.[27] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF detected a ”non-immediate threat” at the site that the IDF needed to neutralize.[28] Axios reported that the United States assessed that Hezbollah was trying to relocate rockets to new sites.[29] The IDF separately struck two fighters who had entered a Hezbollah site and began moving rocket launchers.[30] The LAF accused Israel on November 28 of violating the ceasefire.[31]

The IDF continued trying to prevent displaced citizens from returning to their homes in southern Lebanon.[32] The IDF conducted a drone strike as a “warning” to deter individuals in vehicles from approaching Markaba.[33] The IDF similarly shelled targets near al Wazzani likely to deter individuals from approaching the area.[34] A Hezbollah commander told the Wall Street Journal that Hezbollah fighters who live in southern Lebanon will remain in the area and retain their small arms.[35]

A Hamas fighter conducted a shooting attack targeting Israelis in the West Bank, highlighting the threat that Hamas poses outside the Gaza Strip. The Hamas fighter wounded eight Israelis on a bus near Ariel settlement in the northern West Bank on November 29.[36] Israeli forces then killed the fighter and assessed that the fighter acted on behalf of a cell rather than as an individual.[37] The IDF assessed that attacks in the West Bank will increase in the coming weeks. This attack comes after the IDF assessed in September 2024 that it had defeated Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[38]

Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas designated an interim successor should he die or leave office.[39] Abbas, who has been president since 2005 and is 89 years old, designated on November 28 the Palestinian National Council (PNC) chairman to serve as interim president for no more than 90 days after Abbas leaves office. The PNC is the 747-member legislative body under the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and represents Palestinians from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and diaspora.[40] The current PNC chairman is Rawhi Fattouh, who had been PA President for two months after the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004.[41] Fattouh has served as Abbas’ personal representative since 2006.[42]

Iran notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it plans to expand its uranium enrichment capacity significantly. These plans include installing over 6,000 additional centrifuges and activating others at the Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities.[43] This notification is consistent with the Atomic Energy Organization announcing on November 27 that it began injecting gas into "thousands of advanced centrifuges.”[44] Iran is retaliating for the IAEA Board of Governors passing on November 21 a censure resolution proposed by the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom). The resolution condemned Iran for failing to cooperate fully with the IAEA over outstanding questions about the Iranian nuclear program. The activation and installation of additional centrifuges comes as Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons program in early 2024.[45] CTP-ISW is not prepared to assess that Iranian leaders have decided to build a nuclear weapon at this time, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: Syrian opposition forces continued their offensive into Syrian regime-held territory and advanced into Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces have failed to mount an effective defense against the surprise offensive.
• Lebanon: The Israel-Lebanese Hezbollah ceasefire has continued to hold. The LAF began post-war operations, including clearing roads, detonating unexploded ordinance, and installing checkpoints across Lebanon.
• West Bank: A Hamas fighter conducted a shooting attack targeting Israelis in the West Bank, highlighting the threat that Hamas poses outside the Gaza Strip. This threat remains despite the defeat of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
• Iran: Iran notified the IAEA that it plans to expand its uranium enrichment capacity by installing over 6,000 additional centrifuges and activating others at the Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities.

[There was no update on November 28, 2024]

Iran Update, November 27, 2024

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Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Annika Ganzeveld, Avery Borens, Victoria Penza, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Note: ISW will not be releasing an assessment tomorrow, November 28, in celebration of Thanksgiving

The Israel-Lebanese Hezbollah ceasefire has held as it went into effect on November 26. Hezbollah has claimed no attacks into northern Israel nor any against Israeli targets in Lebanon. Hezbollah continues to falsely claim that it defeated the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and that its forces will continue to ensure that the IDF adheres to the ceasefire.[1] The IDF similarly stated on November 27 that it will remain in its positions in Lebanon for multiple weeks to ensure that Hezbollah complies with the agreement.[2] The IDF is required to withdraw from Lebanon by January 25, 2025.

The IDF fired artillery and small arms at unidentified individuals who approached IDF positions around the Israel-Lebanon border after the ceasefire went into effect.[3] The IDF also detained four Hezbollah fighters, including a local commander, who entered a restricted area along the border.[4] Neither Hezbollah or Israeli officials have claimed that these incidents constitute violations of the ceasefire. CTP-ISW assessed on November 12 that Hezbollah would likely experience command-and-control challenges and struggle to immediately enforce widespread compliance with a full ceasefire, withdrawal, and disarmament among its rank-and-file members.[5] These isolated incidents along the Israel-Lebanon border may reflect those command-and-control challenges rather than Hezbollah leaders‘ intent to violate the ceasefire.

The IDF and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) warned Lebanese civilians against returning to villages where the IDF is deployed on November 27.[6] Western and Lebanese media reported a large-scale movement of displaced Lebanese civilians to villages in southern Lebanon.[7] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson announced that the IDF would inform Lebanese civilians when it was safe to return.[8] The LAF similarly told Lebanese residents of towns near the Israel-Lebanon border to delay returning to their homes until after the IDF withdraws.[9] Senior Israeli officials said that the IDF has yet to have a policy regarding how to address civilians returning to these areas.[10]

The LAF began to deploy forces, including armored elements, to southern Lebanon.[11] The LAF announced on November 27 that it had begun to “strengthen its deployment” south of the Litani River in cooperation with UNIFIL. Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Abdallah Bou Habib said on November 26 that the LAF is prepared to deploy at least 5,000 troops to southern Lebanon.[12]  

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias indicated that they would continue to attack Israel despite the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. An unspecified source in the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee told Iraqi media that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will continue to conduct drone and missile attacks targeting Israel despite the ceasefire in Lebanon.[13] The source claimed that Ansar Allah al Awfiya, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Hezbollah, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada will continue to attack Israel until the IDF ends its operations in the Gaza Strip.[14] Kataib Hezbollah similarly released a statement on November 26 claiming that “new parties” will enter the conflict with Israel following Hezbollah’s “break. . . from the Axis of Resistance.”[15] Kataib Hezbollah emphasized that it will not “abandon [its] people in Gaza.”[16]

Syria opposition forces, including Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), seized at least 19 villages and military sites in western Aleppo from the Syrian regime in a surprise offensive on November 27.[17] Thousands of opposition fighters and armored elements have advanced within five kilometers of Aleppo City, seizing territory from the Syrian regime.[18] The frontlines southwest of Aleppo have remained largely stagnant since the 2020 Idlib ceasefire, which ended an offensive by pro-regime forces, including Iranian-backed militias.[19] Fateh Mubin, an opposition group based in Idlib, stated that its forces seized the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) 46th Regiment front line base and called it one of the “largest positions“ of the Syrian regime west of Aleppo.[20] Local reports indicated that the opposition forces have advanced to the M-5 highway south of Aleppo, seizing a crucial ground line of communication to the city.[21] It remains unclear whether HTS and its partner groups can retain control of the territory seized in the past several hours. Syrian regime and Russian forces have attacked HTS command-and-control sites in Idlib and along the lines of advance in response to the offensive.[22] Fateh Mubin stated that its offensive was preemptive and meant to ”deter the enemy, defeat its gathered forces, and keep its fire away from our people.”[23]

Israeli forces interdicted a significant shipment of weapons that Iran sent to Palestinian militias in Jenin in the West Bank.[24] The IDF announced on November 27 that it seized the shipment, which included explosive devices, remote detonators, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, small arms and sniper rifles, and other military equipment.[25] Israeli media reported that the shipment included three 107-millimeter rockets as well.[26] This shipment is especially noteworthy given that it included weapons, such as mortars and rockets, that are more advanced than what Palestinian militias in the West Bank typically use.[27] CTP-ISW has observed no previous instances of Palestinian militias in the West Bank using rockets since the October 7 War began, though this shipment of only three rockets is relatively minor. The interdiction of this shipment comes as Israel has observed renewed Iranian efforts to smuggle materiel into the West Bank in recent months.[28] Israeli forces thwarted two other weapons smuggling attempts into the West Bank in recent days.[29] Iran may be intensifying its efforts to arm proxy and partner militias in the West Bank to compensate for the defeat of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire has held as it went into effect on November 26. The LAF began to deploy forces, including armored elements, to southern Lebanon.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias indicated that they would continue to attack Israel despite the ceasefire in Lebanon.
• Syria: Syrian opposition forces launched a surprise offensive into regime-held territory in northeastern Syria, seizing several military sites and villages around Aleppo.
• West Bank: Israeli forces interdicted a shipment of weapons that Iran sent to Palestinian militias in the West Bank. The shipment included three 107-millimeter rockets.

 

Iran Update, November 26, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 4:00 pm ET

Israel and Lebanon approved a ceasefire to end the war in Lebanon on November 26. The ceasefire is set to come into effect on November 27 at 2:00 am GMT.[1] The text published by Israeli media requires a full Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal from Lebanon by January 26, 2025.[2] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu supported the deal in a message to his ministers and noted that Israel needs to focus on Iran, the need to rest its forces, and further isolating Hamas.[3] The ceasefire calls for a Hezbollah withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces to dismantle all non-state military infrastructure, prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament, and deploy to southern Lebanon to play a predominant security role there.[4] The ceasefire agreement also contains a self-defense clause that would allow Israel to act against Hezbollah if needed.[5] US President Joe Biden said that the deal is designed to be a permanent cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel.[6] Only Lebanon and Israel are parties to the agreement, and it is the Lebanese state’s responsibility to ensure Hezbollah’s compliance. An independent committee advised by the United States and France, in addition to the current UN observer force in southern Lebanon, will monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement.[7] The exact structure of the monitoring committee is not codified in the ceasefire text. The deal includes a US letter affirming support for any future Israel operations needed to combat Hezbollah violations of the deal.[8]

This ceasefire and its terms are tantamount to a Hezbollah defeat. Hezbollah has abandoned several previously-held ceasefire negotiation positions, reflecting the degree to which IDF military operations have forced Hezbollah to abandon its war aims.[9] Hezbollah initiated its attack campaign targeting Israel in October 2023 to support Hamas, and Hezbollah’s leaders have said repeatedly that it would not end its attacks without a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[10] This ceasefire does not include an end to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Current Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem has also previously expressed opposition to any stipulations giving Israel freedom of action inside Lebanon.[11]

Israel has accomplished its war aim through two months of military operations in Lebanon and this ceasefire. Hezbollah claimed incorrectly that it defeated Israel.[12] Israel began its ground campaign in Lebanon to create safe conditions to return Israelis to their homes in northern Israel.[13] IDF operations in Lebanese border towns have eliminated the threat of an October 7-style offensive attack by Hezbollah into northern Israel, and the Israeli air campaign has killed many commanders and destroyed much of Hezbollah’s munition stockpiles.[14] Destroying Hezbollah’s military organization—which is the only military objective that would prevent all attacks into Israel permanently—was never the stated objective of Israeli military operations.[15] A ceasefire deal, however, will prevent attacks into Israel through diplomatic means.

The ceasefire contains several elements that will prove difficult to implement.[16] The decision to rely on the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UN observers in Lebanon to respectively secure southern Lebanon and monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement makes no serious changes to the same system outlined by UNSC Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War. Neither the LAF nor the UN proved willing or able to prevent Hezbollah from reoccupying southern Lebanon and building new infrastructure. Some LAF sources, for example, have expressed a lack of will to enforce this ceasefire because they believe that any fighting with Hezbollah would risk triggering ”civil war.”[17] Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib said on November 26 that the LAF is prepared to deploy at least 5,000 troops to southern Lebanon, however.[18] LAF units have been in southern Lebanon since 2006, but have failed to prevent Hezbollah from using the area to attack Israel.

The difficulties in implementing this deal mean that Hezbollah and Iran can recover from this setback if the United States and Israel fail to prevent Hezbollah and Iran from doing so. Netanyahu noted that Israeli operations in Lebanon had “pushed [Hezbollah back] decades.”[19] The group retains fighters, weapons, and political control throughout Lebanon, however.[20] Hezbollah will almost certainly attempt to reoccupy southern Lebanon because Hezbollah’s stated raison d’etre is to end Israel’s control over the Shebaa Farms, which it sees as Israeli-occupied Lebanese territory. The group also supports Iran’s efforts to destroy the Israeli state.[21] Hezbollah will be unable to accomplish this task if it is forced to disarm in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah refused to abide by the last disarmament and withdrawal agreement, and it is unlikely that this war has changed Hezbollah leadership’s willingness to abandon its aspirations for southern Lebanon.

The IDF struck approximately 180 Hezbollah targets across Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on November 25 marking its most intense day of airstrikes on Beirut since September 2024.[22] The IDF expanded evacuation orders throughout Beirut ahead of its airstrikes.[23] The IDF Air Force attacked over 20 Hezbollah military and financial targets across Beirut.[24] The IDF struck facilities used by Hezbollah’s Coastal Missile Unit and various Hezbollah military headquarters and infrastructure.[25] The IDF Air Force also destroyed al Qard al Hassan's financial management and storage facilities.[26] Lebanese media has reported approximately 16 separate Israeli airstrikes in Baalbek and the Bekaa Valley since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on November 24.[27] Hezbollah maintains advanced weapons systems, weapons storage, and military infrastructure across the Bekaa Valley. This intensified activity comes as Israel and Lebanon approved a ceasefire agreement to take effect on November 27 at 2:00 am GMT.

Iran is actively violating the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and continues to advance its ability to develop and deploy its chemical weapons capabilities both inside and outside of Iran. The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) published a report on November 26 stating that Iran continues to develop capabilities to produce and deliver pharmaceutical-based chemical agents (PBAs) for offensive purposes.[28] The report cites research conducted from 2005 to 2023 by individuals affiliated with Iran’s defense establishment, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Defense. PBAs are dual-purpose chemicals that can be used in medical settings but also be weaponized for offensive purposes.[29] The ISIS report focuses on research on fentanyl and medetomidine, which are both agents capable of incapacitating victims by targeting the central nervous system. ISIS identified Iranian research in three key areas: developing large-scale cost-effective methods to synthesize these compounds, exploring techniques to aerosolize these agents for propellant purposes, and creating delivery systems to disperse the agents through grenades, bullets, and drones.[30] The report noted that Iran could use its drones to deliver ammunition containing PBAs. Iranian media released a video in June 2023 showing a multirotor drone dropping rounds of smoke grenades and a bomb, likely containing tear gas.[31]

Iran can use its PBA weapons program both internally and externally. Iranian media confirmed that Iran extensively used grenades against civilians during the Mahsa Amini protests in 2022.[32] Civilian reports indicated symptoms consistent with both fentanyl and medetomidine exposure, rather than traditional riot control gases. Iran has also likely supplied its partners and proxy groups with weaponized PBAs, which the Axis of Resistance could deploy in future military conflicts.[33] Member states of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons are meeting in The Hague from November 25 to 29 to discuss CWC implementation and treaty compliance.[34]

Israeli light infantry advanced to the Litani River near Deir Mimas and Arnoun, southeastern Lebanon, on November 26.[35] Israeli forces operated about four kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border in the closest part of the Litani River to Israel. Geolocated footage posted on November 26 shows the IDF 1st Infantry Brigade inside the St. Mema Church in Deir Mimas and Israeli forces operating near Arnoun.[36] Several IDF brigades destroyed thousands of Hezbollah rockets and missiles and engaged Hezbollah fighters at close range in the area.[37] Hezbollah claimed a rocket attack targeting Israeli forces attempting to remove a damaged tank from the outskirts of Deir Mimas on November 24, indicating that Israeli forces have been operating in this general region for the past several days.[38] IDF Northern Command Commander Ori Gordin accompanied Israeli forces to the Litani.[39]

Key Takeaways:

• Ceasefire in Lebanon: Israel and Lebanon approved a ceasefire to end the war in Lebanon on November 26. This ceasefire and its terms are tantamount to a Hezbollah defeat. Hezbollah has abandoned several previously-held ceasefire negotiation positions, reflecting the degree to which IDF military operations have forced Hezbollah to abandon its war aims. Israel has accomplished its war aim through two months of military operations in Lebanon and this ceasefire. Hezbollah claimed incorrectly that it defeated Israel.
• Shortcomings of the Ceasefire: The ceasefire contains several elements that will prove difficult to implement. The decision to rely on the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UN observers in Lebanon to respectively secure southern Lebanon and monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement makes no serious changes to the same system outlined by UNSC Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War. The difficulties in implementing this deal mean that Hezbollah and Iran can recover from this setback if the United States and Israel fail to prevent Hezbollah and Iran from doing so.
• Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon: The IDF struck approximately 180 Hezbollah targets across Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on November 25 marking its most intense day of airstrikes on Beirut since September 2024.
• Iranian Use of Pharmaceutical-based Agents: Iran is actively violating the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and continues to advance its ability to develop and deploy its chemical weapons capabilities both inside and outside of Iran.
• Israeli Ground Campaign in Lebanon: Israeli light infantry advanced to the Litani River near Deir Mimas and Arnoun, southeastern Lebanon, on November 26. The IDF elements also operated about 10km from Israeli territory in Wadi Saluki, making this advance the deepest penetration into Lebanon since Israeli forces began operations in early October 2024.

Iran Update, November 25, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Anthony Carrillo, Kyle Moran and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

 

Iran Update, November 21, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ria Reddy, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Annika Ganzeveld, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passed the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) censure resolution against Iran on November 21.[1] The resolution censured Iran for failing to cooperate with the IAEA and comply with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.[2] The resolution requires that the IAEA to produce a "comprehensive report" on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[3] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran--known as "snapback" sanctions.[4] The censure resolution comes after the IAEA issued a report on November 19 showing that Iran has increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium since August 2024.[5] The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Director Mohammad Eslami responded to the censure resolution by ordering the activation of a ”large collection of new and advanced centrifuges of various types."[6] The AEOI stated that Iran will continue to cooperate with the IAEA, though it remains unclear to what extent. CTP-ISW will provide further assessments and details in the coming days.

The United States and E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), prior to the IAEA Board of Governors vote on the censure resolution, called on Iran to "immediately dispose" of its highly enriched uranium stockpile on November 21. US Ambassador to the IAEA Laura Holgate said that Iran should stop producing uranium enriched up to 60 percent and "downblend its 60 percent [enriched uranium] stockpile entirely."[7] Downblending is the process of converting highly enriched uranium into low-enriched uranium.[8] The E3 issued a joint statement similarly requesting that Iran “immediately dispose of its high enriched uranium stockpile.”[9] Iran previously offered to cap its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent at 185 kilograms in exchange for the IAEA Board of Governors rejecting the censure resolution.[10] The E3 stated that a cap of 185 kilograms would mean Iran still "retain[s] an excessively large stockpile of high enriched uranium as well the capability to resume enrichment to 60 percent at any point," however.[11] 185 kilograms of 60-percent enriched uranium is enough, if enriched further, to produce four nuclear weapons.[12]

Lebanese officials have reportedly proposed several changes to the US-proposed ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah.[13] Unspecified sources speaking to Lebanese media outlet al Akhbar claimed that Lebanese officials requested that the ceasefire agreement refer to the Blue Line—the UN-drawn provisional border—as the official Israel-Lebanon border. Lebanese officials demanded that a date for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to withdraw be announced in conjunction with the ceasefire and that the IDF conduct a “complete, simultaneous, and rapid withdrawal” from Lebanon. The Lebanese officials also demanded that the IDF release all Hezbollah fighters detained in southern Lebanon. Al Akhbar claimed that the language regarding Israel-Lebanon border and clauses on whether Israel would retain the right to respond to ceasefire violations with force in Lebanon remain sticking points between the parties. The US-proposed ceasefire agreement initially allowed Israel to continue to attack Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL or the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) fail to enforce the ceasefire.[14] Hezbollah has rejected the possibility that the IDF retain the right to operate in Lebanon, however.[15]

A senior Israeli security source said that Hamas wants a ceasefire-hostage deal in the Gaza Strip.[16] Israeli military correspondents, citing the source, reported that Hamas is prepared to accept a deal even if it fails to meet Hamas’ repeated demand for a permanent end to the war.[17] The source added that the deal being considered includes a 42-day ceasefire, the release of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, and other “heavy prices that Israel will be required to pay.”[18] This report marks the first suggestion that Hamas may break from the maximalist demands that it has maintained throughout most of the ceasefire-hostage negotiations. Hamas last reiterated its maximalist demands on November 10.[19]

US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin III said on November 20 that the Houthis increasingly see themselves as a partner to Iran rather than a subordinate.[20] This framing is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that the Axis of Resistance is more accurately described as an unconventional, Iran-led alliance rather than a constellation of Iranian proxies and partners across the Middle East. Iran considers itself a core part and the leader of the Axis of Resistance but does not outright command many of the other members. Rather, they often compromise and negotiate with one another. Iran does, however, frequently leverage its materiel support to the Axis of Resistance to leverage the decision-making of other members.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 21 for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the starvation of civilians.[21] ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan submitted an application to the court to obtain arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant in May 2024.[22]

The ICC issued an arrest warrant for deceased Hamas military leader Mohammad Deif on November 21 for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, including extermination, murder, torture, and sexual violence.[23] The ICC stated that it issued this arrest despite reports that Deif died. The IDF has stated that it killed Deif in an airstrike in the southern Gaza Strip in July 2024.[24] ICC Chief Prosecutor Khan submitted an application to obtain arrest warrants for deceased Hamas leaders Deif, Yahya Sinwar, and Ismail Haniyeh in May 2024.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The IAEA Board of Governors approved a censure resolution against Iran for its failure to cooperate fully with international nuclear inspectors. This resolution could lead to the reimposition of international sanctions on Iran. Iran responded to the resolution by ordering the activation of recently installed advanced centrifuges at its nuclear facilities.
• Lebanon: Lebanon reportedly proposed several changes to the US-proposed ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah. Lebanese media reported that one of the main sticking points is whether Israel will retain the right to strike Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon if Hezbollah violates the ceasefire.
• Gaza Strip: A senior Israeli security source told Israeli military correspondents that Hamas wants a ceasefire-hostage agreement in the Gaza Strip. The source added that Hamas is prepared to accept a deal even a guarantee of a permanent ceasefire, which has been a continuous Hamas demand throughout talks.
• Yemen: US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said that the Houthis increasingly view themselves as a partner to Iran rather than a subordinate. This characterization is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that the Axis of Resistance is an unconventional, Iran-led alliance rather than a constellation of Iranian proxies and partners across the Middle East.

Iran Update, November 20, 2024

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Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Buckley DeJardin, Michael Weiner, Kyle Moran, Avery Borens, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem announced in a November 20 speech that Hezbollah would require a permanent ceasefire and the preservation of Lebanese sovereignty in any agreement with Israel.[1] Qassem clarified that maintaining Lebanese sovereignty requires preventing Israel from operating in Lebanon “whenever [Israel] wants” and refuted that Israel could “impose its conditions” on Hezbollah.[2] Qassem is referring to the current US-proposed ceasefire agreement that would allow Israel to continue to attack Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL or the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) fail to enforce the ceasefire.[3] The draft agreement includes a clause that states that Israel retains its right to self-defense, and the United States sent to Israel a side letter that stipulates US support for the Israeli right to respond with force to Hezbollah threats.[4] Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar and Defense Minister Israel Katz reiterated on November 20 that Israel requires that it retain its ability to “act and defend Israeli citizens from Hezbollah” in any agreement.[5]

Removing these clauses from the ceasefire agreement would likely enable Hezbollah to gradually re-arm and re-entrench itself in southern Lebanon. The current ceasefire agreement provides no other sufficient mechanisms to ensure that Hezbollah remains disarmed in southern Lebanon.[6] UNIFIL and the LAF would be the only other parties responsible for observing and enforcing Hezbollah’s withdrawal and disarmament in southern Lebanon. CTP-ISW continues to assess that it is extremely unlikely that UNIFIL or the LAF would be willing or able to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament given their previous failures to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in southern Lebanon since 2006. The LAF, which would be responsible for dismantling Hezbollah infrastructure and enforcing disarmament, is particularly unlikely to directly confront Hezbollah.[7]

US special envoy Amos Hochstein met with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri for a second day in Beirut to discuss the Hezbollah response to the US-proposed agreement.[8] Hochstein returned to Israel and will meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for further consultations on November 21.[9]

Qassem, in his speech, continued trying to project Hezbollah strength and resilience against Israeli operations in Lebanon.[10] Qassem promised to attack “the center of Tel Aviv” in retaliation for recent Israeli airstrikes in northern and central Beirut.[11] Qassem reiterated that Hezbollah is not a regular standing army and that the group will rapidly attack and ambush Israeli forces as they enter Lebanon.[12] Qassem also continued to grossly exaggerate the success of Hezbollah operations in Israel and the number of IDF casualties and material damage.[13] Qassem asserted that Hezbollah would survive politically after the war and work with the LAF and people to rebuild Lebanon.[14]

Iranian officials are continuing to broadcast their enduring support for Hezbollah. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a message of support to the Lebanese people on November 19.[15] Separately, Khamenei’s senior security adviser, Ali Larijani, during his trip to Beirut on November 15 reportedly promised continued Iranian support and a commitment to help the Hezbollah rebuild its forces as they recover from the war.[16]

Documents that the IDF seized from the Gaza Strip highlight Iranian efforts to promote interoperability between Hezbollah and Hamas. An Israeli think tank close to the Israeli defense establishment released a report on November 18 detailing the Iranian role in establishing the "Palestinian project" in Lebanon, citing documents that the IDF seized from the Gaza Strip.[17]  Senior Hamas official Khaled Meshaal met with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force officer responsible for Palestine in May 2022, during which they agreed to begin working to establish a Hamas presence in Lebanon. Two thousand Hamas fighters, according to the plan, would have integrated into Hamas special operations forces (SOF) units that would have participated in any Hezbollah ground assault into Israel. The IRGC and Hamas ultimately sought to expand the number to ten thousand Hamas fighters integrated into Hezbollah SOF. Hamas would be tasked with recruiting fighters from the Sunni population in Lebanon, according to the documents.[18] Iran would be primarily responsible for funding Hamas activities in Lebanon, including armament and training.[19] CTP-ISW cannot confirm whether the 2,000 Hamas fighters ever deployed to Lebanon, but Hamas does have a limited presence in southern Lebanon. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas’ militant wing—has claimed at least 20 attacks into Israel from Lebanon since October 2023.[20]

Hamas still retains small forces outside the Gaza Strip that its external leaders can use as a cadre to rebuild Hamas militarily. Hamas' severely degraded position in the Gaza Strip and the failure of its war against Israel suggest that both Iran and Hamas may recognize that accomplishing their objective of destroying Israel is not feasible from the Gaza Strip.[21] Hamas will want to rebuild after the October 7 war, and it has several potential avenues for doing so. The Iran-Hamas project outlined in the letter indicates that both parties could view Lebanon as a viable option for Hamas’ reconstitution.[22] Iran’s financial support for Hamas in Lebanon and its strong ties with Hezbollah would give Iran significant influence over Hamas’ military wing there. Promoting cohesion between Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon is part of broader Iranian efforts to increase interoperability across the Axis of Resistance.

The United States and E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) submitted a censure resolution against Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on November 19 in response to Iran not fully cooperating with the IAEA.[23] The IAEA Board of Governors is expected to vote on the resolution on November 21.[24] The proposed censure resolution comes after the IAEA issued a report on November 19 showing that Iran has increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium since August 2024.[25] The IAEA reported that Iran possessed 182.3 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent as of late October 2024.[26] This amount marks a 17.6 kilogram increase in the Iranian stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent since August 2024.[27] The IAEA added that Iran possessed a total of 6,604.4 kilograms of enriched uranium, which marks an 852.6 kilogram increase in the Iranian total enriched uranium stockpile since August 2024.[28] A US weapons expert reported on November 19 that Iran’s breakout timelines have thus reduced significantly since August 2024.[29] The expert stated that Iran can make enough weapons-grade uranium, which is uranium that is enriched to 90 percent purity, to produce almost 10 nuclear weapons in a month, 13 in two months, 14 in three months, 15 in four months, and 16 in five months.[30]

Iran is trying to prevent the IAEA Board of Governors from approving the censure resolution by offering to cap its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent and threatening unspecified consequences if the IAEA censures Iran. Iran offered to cap its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent at 185 kilograms in exchange for the IAEA rejecting the censure resolution.[31] Iran notably did not offer to reduce the amount of 60 percent enriched uranium that it currently possesses but instead only offered to not further increase its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile. 185 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce four nuclear weapons.[32] Senior Iranian officials, including Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, have warned that Iran will respond “appropriately and proportionately” if the IAEA censures Iran.[33] An Iranian outlet claimed on November 19 that Iran could retaliate by activating a “significant number” of advanced centrifuges.[34] The outlet may have been referring to the IR-6 centrifuges that Iran has installed at Fordow in recent months.[35] The IAEA confirmed in August 2024 that Iran installed eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow but that the centrifuges were not yet operational.[36] Iran previously installed new centrifuges at its nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow in response to an IAEA censure resolution in June 2024.[37]

The Iraqi federal government is trying to prevent additional Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks against Israel in order to avoid Israeli strikes on Iraq. Saudi media reported on November 20 that an Israeli attack targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militias is “imminent” unless the Iraqi federal government prevents further militia attacks on Israel, citing unspecified sources.[38] Saudi media added that the United States informed the Iraqi federal government that it has “exhausted all levers of pressure” to try to prevent Israel from striking Iraq.[39] This report comes after Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar wrote a letter to the president of the UN Security Council on November 18 in which he emphasized the Israeli right to defend itself against Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks.[40] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani chaired an emergency National Security Ministerial Council meeting on November 19 during which he ordered Iraqi security forces to “prevent and pursue any military activity outside the control of the state.”[41] Iraqi security forces reportedly secured sites used by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to launch drones and missiles at Israel following the meeting.[42] It is unclear whether the Sudani administration can prevent further Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel given that it has thus far failed to reign in these militias. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, increased its rate of attacks by nearly 150 percent between September and October 2024 and has claimed 59 attacks in November 2024 thus far.[43] 

Israel is exploring options to improve the distribution of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip in the wake of increased looting of humanitarian aid trucks by armed groups. Axios reported on November 20 that a US-based national security consulting company, Orbis, has proposed a plan to Israel to securely deliver humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.[44] Orbis outlined a pilot project that includes establishing a humanitarian aid hub in an area cleared of Hamas.[45] The aid hub will be established by a private aid organization, according to Orbis. The project would also involve a third-party private contractor securing the aid hub in coordination with the IDF.[46] The proposed p project is likely aimed at establishing the humanitarian aid hub in Jabalia, in the northern Gaza Strip, where the IDF has been conducting clearing operations since October 6.[47] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz reviewed the proposed plan.[48] The establishment of the aid hub will require additional IDF operations in Jabalia, which could take three months to fully clear the area of Hamas and secure the area.[49] Israel is exploring methods to distribute aid in the northern Gaza Strip following a rise in armed groups looting humanitarian aid trucks in the strip in recent days.[50] The IDF has taken several steps in recent days to increase the flow of aid in the Gaza Strip following pressure from the United States, including plans to reopen the Kissufim border crossing to facilitate the transfer of aid trucks into the northern Gaza Strip.[51]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the Netzarim Corridor to conduct a situational assessment on November 20 and announced a reward of five million US dollars and safe passage out of the Gaza Strip to any individual who frees an Israeli hostage.[52] Netanyahu, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, and IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi met with the commanders of the IDF 99th Division IDF Southern Command in the corridor to review IDF operations in the Gaza Strip.[53]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah is trying to remove a clause in a US-proposed ceasefire agreement that allows Israel to strike Hezbollah targets if Hezbollah violates the ceasefire. Removing these clauses would enable Hezbollah to gradually re-arm and re-entrench in southern Lebanon.
• Lebanon: Documents seized by the IDF in the Gaza Strip highlight Iranian efforts to promote interoperability between Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. The documents depict Iran-Hamas discussions to send thousands of Hamas fighters to Lebanon to integrate into Hezbollah SOF units. These units are trained to conduct ground attacks into Israel.
• Iran: The United States and E3 submitted a censure resolution against Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors in response to Iran's refusal to cooperate fully with the IAEA. Iran is trying to prevent the censure resolution from passing by threatening unspecified retaliation.
• Iraq: The Iraqi federal government is trying to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on Israel in order to prevent Israeli strikes on Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi attacks on Israel increased by almost 150 percent between September and October 2024.
• Gaza Strip: Israel is exploring options to improve the distribution of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip. These considerations come amid an uptick in armed Palestinian gangs interdicting aid convoys and looting them.

 

Iran Update, November 14, 2024

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Ria Reddy, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, and Nicholas Carl

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Israeli forces have likely disrupted Lebanese Hezbollah’s ability to fire into Israel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported the daily rate of Hezbollah attacks have declined on average over the “past few weeks” and have decreased by half in the past week.[1] The IDF also reported that it is targeting stockpiles of observed and unobserved indirect fire systems that are difficult to reach with airstrikes.[2] The IDF added that approximately 60 percent of Hezbollah indirect fire launches use small single- or triple-barreled launch systems.[3] The stated Israeli war aim of returning displaced citizens safely to their homes in northern Israel requires stopping Hezbollah rocket fire into Israel. The recent relaxation of IDF restrictions for gatherings in northern Israel indicates the reduced threat of Hezbollah rocket fire.[4] The IDF reported that Hezbollah has also struggled to conduct large, coordinated rocket attacks into Israel, suggesting that Hezbollah is cannot easily communicate across tactical units or operational-level headquarters.[5] Israeli forces continue to exploit this disruption and have expanded clearing operations up to five to six kilometers into “second line” of Lebanese towns.[6]

Unknown gunmen shot at a UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) patrol in southern Lebanon after the patrol discovered an ammunition cache on November 14.[7] UNIFIL stated that its forces informed the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and shortly thereafter came under fire from two or three individuals.[8] UNIFIL requested that Lebanese authorities fully investigate the incident.[9] The LAF would be responsible for enforcing the disarmament of Hezbollah during a ceasefire with Israel, according to a leaked US-proposed draft.[10]

The IDF reported that it is facing a severe shortage of soldiers.[11] The IDF published data showing that it is currently has only 83 percent of the combat manpower that it requires. The IDF accordingly urged the government to increase the required time for mandatory IDF regular military service to three years, a jump from the current requirement of two and a half years for men and two years for women.[12] The IDF also urged the government to approve a service extension law. The IDF added that recruitment of ultra-Orthodox soldiers has increased in recent years but that it still fell short of the IDF goal of recruiting 1,300 ultra-Orthodox Israelis in the July-October 2024 recruitment cycle. The IDF reported that combat unit reservists served an average of 136 days in 2024 and are projected to serve an average of 70-72 days in 2025. The IDF data revealed that approximately 40,000 reservists in combat and combat-support roles did not respond to reserve duty call ups during an unspecified period. Senior Israeli officers previously attributed the fall off in participation to burnout after over a year of war.[13] Israeli media reported that the failure of the Israeli government to enact policy to draft the ultra-Orthodox Israeli population contributed to the reduced reservist responses to the call ups.[14]

Iranian leaders appear concerned about the possibility of the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggering international “snapback” sanctions on Iran. Unspecified diplomats told Reuters that the E3 are drafting a resolution to present at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting in Vienna from November 18 to 22 to “pressure Tehran over its poor cooperation” with the IAEA.[15] The resolution would require the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities in addition to its regular quarterly ones. The report would likely lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions because the report would almost certainly confirm--as previous IAEA reports have already--Iranian noncompliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[16] The sanctions would target Iran’s nuclear and missile program and arms transfers.[17] The most recent IAEA report in August 2024 concluded that Iran continues to develop its nuclear program outside the parameters of the JCPOA.[18] The IAEA report stated that Iran possesses 164.7 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, marking a 22.6 kilogram increase in the Iranian stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium since May 2024.[19] The report also verified that Iran has installed eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow and 10 out of 18 planned cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz.[20] Iran also continues to severely limit the ability of the IAEA to conduct various verification and monitoring activities related to the JCPOA.

Iran has continued to expand its nuclear program since the IAEA published its last verification and monitoring report in August 2024. The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on November 14 that high resolution satellite imagery from October 2024 shows new construction at a former Iranian nuclear weapons development site at Golab Dareh.[21] The imagery reveals new trench excavations and cabling that can be used to implement new security measures at the site, including alarms and surveillance cameras. ISIS previously reported renewed activity at another Iranian nuclear site at Sanjarian, citing imagery from September 2024.[22]

Iran’s clear and explicit violations of the JCPOA could prompt the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions against Iran. Telegraph reported on November 2 that the United Kingdom is “prepared” to trigger snapback sanctions against Iran due to Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA.[23] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Director Mohammad Eslami stated that “any resolution on Iran’s nuclear affairs will face Iran’s immediate response” during a press conference with IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi, likely referring to the E3 resolution and sanctions.[24] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters that Tehran would send a message to the E3 through Grossi about Tehran's seriousness to resolve its nuclear standoff, likely to try to convince the E3 not to trigger the snapback mechanism.[25] Senior Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, similarly emphasized Iran’s willingness to cooperate with the IAEA during separate meetings with Grossi on November 14.[26]

The United States sanctioned on November 14 a Syrian network involved in selling oil to the Syrian regime and China and generating revenue for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force and Houthis.[27] The sanctions targeted 26 companies, individuals, and vessels associated with the al Qaterji Company.[28] The company finances and maintains a militia in Syria and is connected to Hezbollah Unit 4400, which is involved in arms smuggling.[29] The IDF killed one of the company’s founders in an airstrike in July 2024.[30] The United States previously designated al Qaterji Company as a terrorist financing entity in 2022 after it facilitated trade between the Syrian regime and Islamic State.[31] The United States stated that al Qaterji Company executives met directly with senior IRGC Quds Force officers as well as a sanctioned Iranian-backed Houthi financial official, Said al Jamal.[32] The United States previously sanctioned al Jamal and affiliated companies facilitating Iranian oil trade to support the funding of Iranian proxy and partner militias.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF has likely disrupted the ability of Lebanese Hezbollah to fire into Israel. Hezbollah is struggling to conduct coordinated, large-scale attacks into Israel, suggesting challenges communicating across tactical units or operational-level headquarters.
• Iran: Iranian leaders appear concerned that the E3 could trigger international “snapback” sanctions on Iran. The E3 has expressed concern, as Iran has continued to expand its nuclear program in violation of the JCPOA.
• Syria: The United States sanctioned a Syrian network involved in selling oil to the Syrian regime and China and generating revenue for the IRGC Quds Force and Houthis. Some of the designated entities are tied to Syria militias and Lebanese Hezbollah arms smuggling.

Iran Update, November 13, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Siddhant Kishore, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The damage caused by Israel’s October 25 strike targeting Iran’s ballistic missile production facilities combined with Iran’s decreased missile stockpile makes another Iranian large-scale ballistic missile attack targeting Israel unlikely. Iran could use a smaller number of long-range systems combined with a larger number of shorter-range systems fired from Iraq, however. Iran conducted two major strikes on Israel on April 13 and October 1.[1] Iran used 30 ballistic missiles in the April 13 strike and 180 ballistic missiles on October 1. Israel’s October 25 strikes targeting Iranian ballistic missile production facilities severely damaged Iran’s ability to produce long-range ballistic missiles, according to an Israeli intelligence assessment quoted by a Netanyahu-leaning Israeli outlet.[2]  These Israeli assessments are consistent with previous reports that the IDF destroyed mixing equipment used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[3] The assessments also estimate that Iran still has “several hundred long-range missiles” and that Iran is “unlikely to launch all of the missiles at Israel simultaneously.[4] Iran will likely seek to preserve the remainder of its diminishing ballistic missile stockpile rather than further depleting this stockpile by launching another large-scale missile attack on Israel, assuming the Israeli assessments are accurate.

US and Israeli officials are in the "final stages” of drafting language for a ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon, according to unspecified US and Israeli officials.[5] Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer recently met with US Special Envoy for Lebanon Amos Hochstein and US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan.[6] An unspecified US official said that Dermer’s meetings with Hochstein and Sullivan were “productive” and narrowed the gaps between US and Israel on the language of the ceasefire proposal and a “side letter” that would guarantee US support for Israeli freedom of military action against threats from Hezbollah.[7] Hochstein told Axios on November 12 that he believes "there is a shot" of securing a ceasefire deal in Lebanon soon.[8]  Hochstein is expected to travel to Beirut to discuss the proposal draft with Lebanese officials once US and Israeli negotiators have finalized the proposal and side letter’s language.[9]

Israel will likely need to compel Hezbollah to agree to the US-Israeli proposal. Hezbollah may outright reject Israel’s terms or refuse to join negotiations altogether. Hezbollah’s ceasefire demands are directly at odds with Israel’s insistence that the IDF retains the ability to act militarily in Lebanon to thwart Hezbollah threats. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem recently said that Israel would have to end operations in Lebanon before Hezbollah would agree to indirect ceasefire talks and stated that Hezbollah would require the “full protection of Lebanese sovereignty without any reduction” in negotiations.[10] This suggests that Hezbollah will not permit foreign forces to operate in southern Lebanon in any way that is beyond UNIFIL’s current mandate. If indirect negotiations between Hezbollah and Israel break down, the IDF is likely to continue its air and ground campaign, as Israeli military and political officials have indicated in recent days.[11]

Hezbollah may choose accept Israel’s ceasefire terms in order to preserve its forces north of the Litani River, given the damage Hezbollah has suffered throughout Lebanon since the Israeli campaign began. The ceasefire terms, if consistent with current US and Israeli discussions, would allow Israel to continue to attack Hezbollah fighters and targets in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL or the LAF fail to enforce the ceasefire’s terms.[12] Hezbollah may calculate, however, that agreeing to a ceasefire soon would allow it to preserve its forces and infrastructure north of the Litani, enabling it to rebuild its forces and ensure its survival in the long term. It is extremely unlikely that UNIFIL or the LAF would be willing to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament in the south, given their failure to enforce UNSCR 1701 in southern Lebanon since 2006. The details of the speed of the LAF’s deployment to southern Lebanon following a ceasefire are reportedly still up for discussion, with Lebanese sources indicating that the LAF may not be able to deploy as quickly as the US would prefer.[13] Slow LAF deployment would only make it more difficult for the LAF and UNIFIL to support any ceasefire.

Russia refused to block the transit of Iranian supplies to Hezbollah via Syria. The Russian Presidential Special Envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentyev, told Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti on November 13 that Russia could not guarantee that it would block the transit of Iranian materiel to Hezbollah through Syria.[14] Lavrentyev said that monitoring Iranian-backed efforts to transfer materiel is the responsibility of Lebanese and Syrian authorities.[15] These authorities are fully unwilling and unable to block these Iranian-backed and Hezbollah-enabled efforts. Lavrentyev’s comments follow Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer’s recent visit to Russia to discuss a ceasefire agreement in Lebanon.[16] Israeli Army Radio reported on November 12 that Israel is seeking for Russia to guarantee that the Syrian regime will prevent Iranian-backed networks from transferring weapons through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon.[17] It is unclear why Russia would prevent Hezbollah from rearming given that Russian forces in Syria have enabled Hezbollah to arm up to this point by allowing Iranian material transfers through Syria to Lebanon.[18]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published a video of an Israeli hostage giving coerced testimony to degrade Israeli public support for IDF operations in the Gaza Strip. Israeli Russian hostage Alexander “Sasha” Turbanov urged Israelis to demonstrate weekly against IDF operations in the Gaza Strip in the video that was filmed under PIJ coercion.[19] The video is almost certainly timed to exploit Israeli domestic discontent after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5 for Gallant’s support of a ceasefire with Hamas.[20] Gallant identified his support for a ceasefire deal that would return the hostages as one of three reasons that caused Netanyahu to dismiss him. Gallant‘s firing caused an initial, short wave of protests, and 55% of Israelis opposed Netanyahu’s move to fire Gallant.[21] An earlier Netanyahu attempt to fire Gallant during the 2023 Judicial Protests failed after protesters demonstrated in support of Gallant. Hamas has previously released propaganda videos of hostages to trigger domestic Israeli pressure on Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire with Hamas by reinforcing that Israel can only secure the release of living hostages through negotiations rather than military operations.[22] PIJ is likely releasing this video now to capitalize on the renewed Israeli domestic discontent over the lack of a ceasefire-hostage deal after Netanyahu’s dismissal of Gallant.[23]

An IDF spokesperson said that Israel is digging berms along the demilitarized zone between the Golan Heights and Syria to protect Israel against Iranian-backed infiltration attempts from Syria.[24] The IDF spokesperson was responding to statements from the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). UNDOF’s Chief Mission Support Bernard Lee told the BBC on November 12 that Israel had dug two major lines of trenches along the Israeli border with the demilitarized zone.[25] UNDOF said that some of the trenches cross into the demilitarized zone and that Israeli armor and personnel had crossed into the zone during the construction of the trenches.[26] Commercially available satellite imagery confirms UNDOF’s characterizations of the Israeli construction. Syrian media claimed on October 15 that four Israeli tanks, excavators, and about 50 IDF personnel have been operating within the demilitarized zone near al Asbah and al Rafid in Quneitra Province since October 2024.[27]

Israeli media reported in September 2024 that Israeli defense officials were concerned about a potential Iranian-backed attempt to launch a ground attack into Israel from Syria.[28] Iranian-backed groups have previously shown interest in conducting such attacks.  The IDF recently captured a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border arrangements during a ground raid in southern Syria.[29] This Iranian-led intelligence effort was likely an attempt to gather information on Israeli border security that Iranian-backed militias could use to conduct small-scale infiltrations into the Golan Heights.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Retaliation Against Israel: The damage caused by Israel’s October 25 strike targeting Iran’s ballistic missile production facilities combined with Iran’s decreased missile stockpile makes another Iranian large-scale ballistic missile attack targeting Israel unlikely. Iran could use a smaller number of long-range systems combined with a larger number of shorter-range systems fired from Iraq, however.
• Lebanon Ceasefire Talks: US and Israeli officials are in the "final stages” of drafting language for a ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon, according to unspecified US and Israeli officials. Israel will likely need to compel Hezbollah to agree to the US-Israeli proposal.
• Hezbollah’s Ceasefire Considerations: Hezbollah may outright reject Israel’s terms or refuse to join negotiations altogether. Hezbollah’s ceasefire demands are directly at odds with Israel’s insistence that the IDF retains the ability to act militarily in Lebanon to thwart Hezbollah threats. Hezbollah may choose to accept Israel’s ceasefire terms to preserve its forces north of the Litani River, given the damage Hezbollah has suffered throughout Lebanon since the Israeli campaign began.
• Russia in the Middle East: Russia refused to block the transit of Iranian supplies to Hezbollah via Syria. The Russian Presidential Special Envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentyev, told Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti on November 13 that Russia could not guarantee that it would block the transit of Iranian materiel to Hezbollah through Syria.
• Ceasefire-Hostage Negotiations in the Gaza Strip: Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published a video of an Israeli hostage giving coerced testimony to degrade Israeli public support for IDF operations in the Gaza Strip. The video is almost certainly timed to exploit Israeli domestic discontent after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5 for Gallant’s support of a ceasefire with Hamas.
• Syria: An IDF spokesperson said that Israel is digging berms along the demilitarized zone between the Golan Heights and Syria to protect Israel against Iranian-backed infiltration attempts from Syria. Iranian-backed groups have previously shown interest in conducting ground attacks into Israel, and a recent Israeli raid captured a Syrian man who had been collecting intelligence on Israeli border security along the Israeli-Syrian border.

 

Iran Update, November 12, 2024

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Katherine Wells, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Alexandra Braverman and Brian Carter

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Newly-appointed Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reaffirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will continue its operation in Lebanon until it accomplishes its mission.[1] Katz made these comments during a meeting with the IDF General Staff. Katz replaced Yoav Gallant as defense minister on November 8 and was formerly foreign minister.[2] Katz affirmed that Israel would “continue to hit Hezbollah with full force” to capitalize on past successes like the killing of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and “realize the fruits of victory.”[3] He stressed that Israel would not agree to any ceasefire agreement that does not “guarantee Israel’s right to enforce and prevent terrorism on its own,” in addition to other war aims of disarming Hezbollah, forcing a Hezbollah withdrawal north of the Litani River, and returning northern Israeli residents safely home.[4]  Katz’s vision is largely consistent with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has said that Israel needs to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River “with or without an agreement” and that any agreement must include measures to prevent Hezbollah’s reorganization and rearmament.[5]

Israel’s limited operation in frontline border towns of southern Lebanon will not alone accomplish Katz’s outlined goals. The IDF has especially focused on degrading the Hezbollah Radwan special operations forces during the clearing operations.[6] Eliminating the threat of ground attacks is critical to achieving the stated Israeli war aim of returning displaced civilians safely to their homes in northern Israel. Eliminating the threat of ground attacks will not move Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River or prevent rocket attacks from longer-range systems, however. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on November 6 that the IDF will prepare plans to expand military operations in Lebanon.[7] An Israeli journalist reported that Israel recently informed the United States that its operation in southern Lebanon is “coming to an end” and that Israel is interested in reaching an agreement within a few weeks.[8]  US special envoy to Lebanon Amos Hochstein also said on November 12 that "there is a chance to reach a ceasefire in Lebanon soon."[9] Hezbollah does not yet appear willing to agree to a ceasefire on terms desirable to Israel, however. Hezbollah leadership would moreover likely experience command and control challenges and struggle to enforce a full ceasefire, withdrawal, and disarmament terms among its rank-and-file members—many of whom live south of the Litani River.[10]

A likely Hezbollah drone struck a kindergarten in the Haifa suburb of Nesher on November 12. The drone struck outside the kindergarten while the children were in a bomb shelter and did not cause casualties.[11] Israeli journalists reported that the IDF alert system did not sound in Nesher but did activate in neighboring areas.[12] Hezbollah did not claim a drone attack at the same time or area as the strike, nor did it explicitly acknowledge the strike. Hezbollah similarly did not claim its rocket attack that struck a soccer field of Druze children in Majdal al Shams on July 27.[13] It is more likely that Hezbollah’s Majdal al Shams strike was unintentional and caused by technical failures inherent to rockets. One-way-attack drones, however, are much more accurate than rockets. Drones can still suffer failures and miss their intended targets as a result of electronic warfare or a partial interception. Hezbollah’s decision in early 2024 to transition from less-sophisticated rocket and anti-tank guided missile systems to more advanced and deadly rockets, one-way attack drones, and anti-tank guided missile systems increased the risk that a Hezbollah attack would cause significant Israeli casualties, either intentionally or due to a miscalculation.[14]

Iran and Russia have taken the first steps to create a banking network that circumvents international sanctions. Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin announced on November 11 that Iran and Russia have implemented a new interbank network to circumvent the SWIFT system, which is based on the US dollar.[15] Iran’s Shetab interbank network now works with Russia’s Mir system, which means Iranians can now use Iranian bank cards and withdraw money in Russia.[16] The Shetab-Mir network will also enable Iranians to make online purchases in Russia. Iranian state television channel IRINN stated that this plan will be implemented in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey as well.[17] The creation of this network and its emphasis on reducing dependence on the US dollar is part of a broader Iranian effort to mitigate sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy by building relations with regional and international states.

Growing Russo-Iranian tensions in the Caucasus represent fissures in the bilateral relationship, but both states will likely attempt to prevent the Caucasus issue from derailing wider Iranian or Russian policy objectives. The New York Times published an article on growing Russo-Iranian tensions in the Caucasus that included an interview with the Iranian ambassador to Armenia.[18] The ambassador argued that Iran and Russia ”are not allies” and that they have ”some differences” and  ”some mutual interests.” This is in part a reference to the disagreements between Russia and Iran over the Zangezur Corridor project, which is a Turkish project that seeks to connect Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.[19] Such a corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia at a time when Iran hopes to expand trade with Armenia and Europe.[20] This disagreement is unlikely to derail broader Iranian and Russian efforts to deepen bilateral ties, however. Iran would certainly prioritize sanctions mitigation over secondary policy objectives like the Zangezur Corridor. Iran views sanctions mitigation as a way to enhance regime security by improving its economy.

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli War Aims in Lebanon: Newly-appointed Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reaffirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will continue its operation in Lebanon until it accomplishes its mission. Katz said that Israel would not agree to any ceasefire agreement that does not “guarantee Israel’s right to enforce and prevent terrorism on its own.” Israel’s currently limited operation in frontline border towns of southern Lebanon will not alone accomplish Katz’s vision.
• Iran-Russia Relations: Iran and Russia have taken the first steps to create a banking network that circumvents international sanctions. The creation of this network and its emphasis on reducing dependence on the US dollar is part of a broader Iranian effort to mitigate sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy by building relations with regional and international states.
• Iran and Russia in the Caucasus: Growing Russo-Iranian tensions in the Caucasus represent fissures in the bilateral relationship, but both states will likely attempt to prevent the Caucasus issue from derailing wider Iranian or Russian policy objectives. The disagreements between the two countries over the Caucasus is unlikely to derail broader Iranian and Russian efforts to deepen bilateral ties. Iran would certainly prioritize sanctions mitigation through a stronger Russo-Iranian relationship over secondary policy objectives like the Zangezur Corridor. Iran views sanctions mitigation as a way to enhance regime security by improving its economy.
• Hezbollah Attack Campaign in Israel: A likely Hezbollah drone struck a kindergarten in the Haifa suburb of Nesher on November 12. The drone struck outside the kindergarten while the children were in a bomb shelter and did not cause casualties. One-way-attack drones are much more accurate than rockets. Drones can still suffer failures and miss their intended targets as a result of electronic warfare or a partial interception.

Iran Update, November 11, 2024

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Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, and Brian Carter

Iran Update, November 7, 2024

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Annika Ganzeveld, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Victoria Penza, and Brian Carter

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Hezbollah executed a prepared but limited defense of Khiam in southeastern Lebanon against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from October 28 to 31.[1] Hezbollah’s Operations Room claimed that the group prevented an Israeli force from seizing and controlling terrain in Khiam by executing a “fire defense,“ which likely refers to a prepared but limited defense that involved pre-registering targets for indirect fire while committing only a small amount of infantry.[2] This requires a certain level of preparation by Hezbollah but it is limited because a small amount of infantry could not hope to hold Khiam against an Israeli mechanized assault. Hezbollah fighters conducted 70 attacks over the IDF’s three-day advance towards Khiam. Most of these attacks were indirect fire attacks using rockets, thus supporting the theory that Hezbollah planned a defense centering on indirect fire.[3] Hezbollah did not claim small arms engagements with Israeli forces during this period, suggesting that Hezbollah commanders used light infantry fighters sparingly, if at all. Lebanese sources reported small arms engagements between Hezbollah fighters and the IDF but did not specify at what range the engagements occurred.[4] The low number of small arms engagements suggests that Hezbollah commanders were either unwilling or unable to deploy many infantrymen during the IDF advance into Khiam and preferred to deplete stocks of rockets, anti-tank guided missiles, and mortar shells.

Hezbollah’s prepared fire-heavy defense also suggests that Hezbollah commanders were focused on inflicting casualties rather than holding ground. This would be consistent with a defense that prioritizes the attrition of enemy forces and thus the enemy’s will to fight over holding ground. The IDF advanced at least five kilometers from Israel towards and into Khiam during the three-day operation. Hezbollah claimed that the IDF withdrew into northern Israel from Khiam on October 31 but did not provide additional evidence.[5]

Hezbollah’s defense of Khiam has been the most organized defense of a southern Lebanon village since the IDF began its ground operation in Lebanon in early October. Hezbollah commanders may have chosen to defend this area given that Khiam is located on high ground from which Hezbollah could fire into northern Israel. Khiam, moreover, grants Hezbollah a vantage point from which it could observe Israeli forces and other targets around the Galilee Panhandle. The IDF never confirmed that it operated in Khiam and did not publicize Hezbollah equipment or infrastructure seized there. Geolocated footage posted on November 6 showed the IDF 8th Armored Brigade (res.) (91st Division) operating in Khiam in recent days, however.[6]  Israeli forces destroyed firing points aimed toward northern Israeli towns and located and destroyed weapons, including Kornet missiles, grenades, and explosives in Khiam.[7] The IDF killed the commander of Hezbollah’s local unit in Khiam unit on November 3 after the IDF withdrew from the town.[8] The IDF continued artillery shelling of Khiam and its outskirts post-withdrawal.[9]  The fact that Hezbollah’s tactical command echelons near Khiam managed to execute a defense is not a strong indicator that Hezbollah’s higher command echelons have recovered from the severe degradation caused by Israeli air and ground operations. The defense of Khiam could be planned and executed at a relatively low echelon of command.

Recent statements by senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders suggest that the IRGC may conduct a direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory in response to the October 25 Israeli strike targeting Iran. These IRGC commanders have warned in recent days that Iran will conduct a third “True Promise Operation” against Israel. “True Promise Operation” refers to the previous large-scale Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel in April and October 2024, which Iranian officials refer to as True Promise Operation 1 and True Promise Operation 2, respectively.[10] Senior IRGC commanders, including IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi and IRGC Second Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Ali Fazli, have recently warned that Iran will “certainly” launch a third “True Promise Operation” against Israel.[11]

Iran may conduct a smaller-scale direct attack on Israel than it did in April and October 2024 in order to preserve its diminishing long-range missile stockpile. Iran used a total of around 300 long-range ballistic missiles in its attacks on Israel earlier this year.[12] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) damaged mixing equipment and facilities used to produce long-range ballistic missiles in its strikes into Iran on October 25, which will likely disrupt Iran’s ability to manufacture ballistic missiles.[13] This disruption could cause the Iranian regime to refrain from conducting a large-scale missile attack on Israel since it might currently lack the capability to readily replace the missiles it would use in such an attack. Iran could conduct a joint attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Israel in order to preserve its long-range missile stockpile, however. Unspecified US and Israeli officials told Axios on November 5 that the IRGC has been transferring drones and ballistic missiles to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias since the Israeli strikes on October 25.[14]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described the features a future supreme leader should embody during his first public meeting with the Assembly of Experts on November 7.[15] Khamenei stated that the Assembly should select a leader who embodies the revolution and carries it forward to maintain the revolution’s “main goal” of “implementing the religion of Islam in the country and in people‘s lives.”[16] Khamenei notably did not reveal any specific details about his successor. The Assembly of Experts is the regime body constitutionally responsible for monitoring and selecting the supreme leader. The newest Assembly was elected in March 2024 and will serve until 2032.[17] This iteration of the Assembly will likely be the Assembly that chooses the next Supreme Leader following Khamenei’s death.

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stated on November 7 that the reelection of former US President Donald Trump does not impact the Houthis’ campaign against shipping or Israel.[18] Abdulmalik said that Houthi fighters will continue to attack merchant vessels and US and Royal (UK) Navy vessels transiting through the Red Sea.[19] He also said that the Houthis would continue direct attacks on Israel. Abdulmalik added that they have experienced Trump before.[20] CTP-ISW has observed over 270 Houthi attacks targeting commercial vessels since November 2023.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Operations in Lebanon: Hezbollah executed a prepared but limited defense of Khiam in southeastern Lebanon against the IDF from October 28 to 31. The group said that it prevented an Israeli force from seizing and controlling terrain in Khiam by executing a “fire defense,“ which likely refers to a prepared but limited defense that involved pre-registering targets for indirect fire while committing only a small amount of infantry.
• Iranian Retaliation Against Israel: Recent statements by senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders suggest that the IRGC may conduct a direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory in response to the October 25 Israeli strike targeting Iran. Iran may conduct a smaller-scale direct attack on Israel than it did in April and October 2024 to preserve its diminishing long-range missile stockpile.
• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described the features a future supreme leader should embody during his first public meeting with the Assembly of Experts on November 7.
• Houthi Response to US Election: Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stated on November 7 that the reelection of former US President Donald Trump does not impact the Houthis’ campaign against shipping or Israel. Abdulmalik said that Houthi fighters will continue to attack merchant vessels, US and Royal (UK) Navy vessels transiting through the Red Sea, and Israel itself.

Iran Update, November 6, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, Victoria Penza, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

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Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem claimed that Hezbollah would outlast Israel in a “war of attrition” in a speech on November 6.[1] Qassem said that Hezbollah was “ready” for a war of attrition and that Israel would “not win, even if it takes a long time.”[2] The speech marked the 40-day death anniversary of former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and was Qassem’s second public statement since taking over as head of Hezbollah.[3]

Qassem did not tie a Lebanon ceasefire to Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip, a notable shift from Nasrallah’s position before the ground operation.[4] Qassem said that Israel would have to end operations in Lebanon before Hezbollah would agree to indirect ceasefire talks through Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabhi Berri, who is a Hezbollah ally.[5] Qassem said that the ”ceiling” for negotiation would be the ”full protection of Lebanese sovereignty without any reduction,” suggesting that Hezbollah will not permit foreign forces to operate in southern Lebanon in any way that is beyond UNIFIL’s current mandate.[6]

Qassem implicitly threatened the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) against collaboration with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).[7] Qassem implied that LAF allowed an Israeli naval raid into Batroun, north of Beirut by saying that “today I will not accuse” but ”demand” an answer.[8] Qassem further demanded that the LAF protect Lebanese maritime borders.[9] Qassem appears to be implying that Hezbollah would not sit idle while the LAF coordinates with the IDF and could set the tone for LAF activities in southern Lebanon after the end of the Israeli ground operation. Israeli Army Radio reported that senior Hezbollah naval official Imad Amhaz surrendered without resistance to Israeli naval special operations forces in Batroun on November 1.[10] Qassem’s comments are notable given that the LAF is the security force responsible for enforcing Hezbollah’s withdrawal and disarmament in southern Lebanon, according to leaked copies of a late October ceasefire proposal.[11] The leaked text stipulates that LAF would deploy 10,000 troops to southern Lebanon, monitor the Israel-Lebanon border and all land, sea, and air crossings, and dismantle all non-state military infrastructure while confiscating arms.[12] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the success of this proposal depends fully on Hezbollah’s agreement and cooperation with the LAF, making Qassem’s threats notable.[13]

Qassem grossly exaggerated the number of IDF injuries, deaths, and material damage caused by Hezbollah.[14] He falsely claimed that Hezbollah has killed and wounded over a thousand Israeli soldiers over the last 40 days.[15] The IDF has announced that it has suffered 38 soldiers killed in action in southern Lebanon and northern Israel since the start of the ground operation.[16]

Qassem continued to extol Hezbollah’s strength after Israeli operations without providing any evidence. Qassem said that Hezbollah’s weapons stockpiles are not low.[17] The IDF has seized tens of thousands of anti-tank guided munitions from Hezbollah warehouses near the Israel-Lebanon border.[18] The IDF said that it had destroyed 70 percent of Hezbollah drones and 80 percent of Hezbollah rockets through its ground and air campaign.[19] Qassem also claimed that Hezbollah has tens of thousands of fighters in reserve who are ready to engage the IDF.[20] The IDF assessed that it has killed at least 3,000 Hezbollah fighters since October 7, 2023.[21] Israeli operations, including the pager and radio attacks, have injured thousands of additional Hezbollah fighters.[22] Western estimates of Hezbollah’s fighting force range from 20,000 to 50,000 fighters.[23] 

IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on November 6 that the IDF will prepare plans to expand military operations in Lebanon.[24] Halevi said that the IDF will develop plans to “expand and deepen” ground operations and activate those plans as needed.[25] Halevi noted that these plans will be formulated alongside efforts to pursue a diplomatic agreement in Lebanon.[26]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba threatened to target US bases in Iraq and Syria on November 4, likely to pressure the US to prevent potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Political Council leader Sheikh Ali al Asadi threatened that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—would target US bases in Iraq and Syria if the Iraqi government discovered that Israel used Iraqi airspace to attack Iran on October 25.[27] The IDF struck several locations in Iraq and Syria on October 25 before launching strikes into Iran.[28] The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias falsely believe that the United States can control Israeli actions and have often attacked US bases in Iraq and Syria as a retaliation against Israeli action. Both Israel and the United States have reportedly warned Iraq that Israel may strike targets in Iraq if Iranian-backed Iraqi groups target Israel from Iraqi territory.[29] These Israeli threats may have led Iraqi militias to attempt to deter Israel, including by pressuring the United States under the false assumption that the United States can prevent Israeli strikes on Iraq.

The Biden Administration has conveyed to the Iraqi government that the United States will not be able to prevent an Israeli strike in Iraq if Iran attacks Israel from Iraqi territory. The US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan told the Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani that Israel will almost certainly strike in Iraq if Iran attacks Israel from Iraqi territory, according to Axios.[30] Sullivan and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken also pressured Sudani to limit Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria, something Sudani has so far failed to prevent.[31]  Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Ansar Allah al Awfiya leader Ali al Fatlawi also told Lebanese outlet al Akhbar on November 5 that the Iraqi militias have the right to support the Iranian response against Israel, further underscoring Sudani’s failure to prevent militia attacks.[32]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is reportedly transferring ballistic missiles and drones and planning a joint attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Israel, further suggesting Iran will retaliate for Israel’s October 25 strikes in Iran from Iraqi territory. Two unspecified Israeli sources told Axios on October 1 that Iraqi militias may soon attack Israel using ballistic missiles and drones.[33] The IRGC has probably shipped some of these missiles and drones in components to Iraqi militias, allowing the groups to assemble the systems themselves possibly with Houthi support, as CTP-ISW suggested on November 5. This collaboration could have also extended into rudimentary drone production.

Iranian media claimed that Iran and Pakistan conducted a joint airstrike attack against Jaish al Adl, a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia on November 5.[34] Jaish al Adl acknowledged that two high-ranking commanders and 12 fighters were killed in what it said was a joint Iranian-Pakistani airstrike.[35] The Pakistani officials have not confirmed the joint military action with Iran, however. The IRGC conducted drone and missile strikes in January 2024 on two Jaish al Adl headquarters in Koh Sabz, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan, on January 16 without Pakistan's permission. Pakistan responded by launching combination of drones, rockets, and air-launched standoff munitions targeting Baloch separatists in three locations near Saravan, Iran, on January 17.[36] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Pakistan on November 4 to meet with high-ranking Pakistani officials. Araghchi's trip likely aimed, in part, to express Iran's concerns regarding border security.[37]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba threatened to target US bases in Iraq and Syria on November 4, likely to compel the US to prevent potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. The Biden Administration has conveyed to the Iraqi government that the United States will not be able to prevent an Israeli strike in Iraq if Iran attacks Israel from Iraqi territory.
• Iran in Iraq: The IRGC is reportedly transferring ballistic missiles and drones and planning a joint attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Israel, further suggesting Iran will retaliate for Israel’s October 25 strikes in Iran from Iraqi territory.
• Hezbollah: Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem claimed that Hezbollah would outlast Israel in a “war of attrition” in a speech on November 6. Qassem did not tie a Lebanon ceasefire to Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip, a notable shift from Nasrallah’s position before the ground operation.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on November 6 that the IDF will prepare plans to expand military operations in Lebanon.
• Anti-Regime Militancy in Iran: Iranian media claimed that Iran and Pakistan conducted a joint airstrike attack against Jaish al Adl, a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia on November 5.

Iran Update, November 5, 2024

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Carolyn Moorman, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Kelly Campa, Victoria Penza, and Brian Carter

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Fatah is attempting to extend its control over the Gaza Strip after the October 7 War, but Fatah’s lack of pro-Fatah Palestinian Authority (PA)-affiliated military forces in the Gaza Strip will make this extremely difficult. Fatah and Hamas have met in Cairo for the past several days to discuss post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and reportedly agreed in principle to form an administrative committee to manage civil affairs, including humanitarian aid.[1] Hamas reportedly demanded that the committees only include PA civilian employees and remain independent of the PA itself.[2] Fatah Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas demanded in response to Hamas that the committee must be administratively and financially subordinate to the PA or Fatah would not agree to a deal.[3] Either plan will not lead to renewed PA control in the Gaza Strip, however. Hamas guerrilla cells remain active across the Strip, and these cells would attack any attempt by the PA to replace Hamas’ political control with Fatah-affiliated or -dominated PA political control. Hamas likely continues to believe that controlling these committees would enable it to preserve its influence in the Strip.

 

Fatah likely views the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and Hamas’ weakened military position as an opportunity to confront Hamas over Hamas efforts to maintain control in the Gaza Strip. An anonymous PA official noted that the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on October 16 has created an opening for further discussions with Hamas or alternative governance plans for the post-war Gaza Strip.[4] It does not appear that Hamas has altered its position vis-a-vis political control in the Gaza Strip since Sinwar’s death.[5] Hamas has long attempted to maintain control or influence over any post-war political organization in the Gaza Strip.[6]

 

Israeli forces are conducting a major clearing operation across the northern Gaza Strip to disrupt militia reconstitution efforts. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on November 5 that the IDF has stationed forces along two separate corridors north and south of Gaza City, isolating North Gaza Governorate from the rest of the Gaza Strip, and Gaza City from the southern Gaza Strip and the North Gaza Governorate.[7] The 162nd Division has reportedly stationed forces along a corridor running from the Black Arrow monument, west of Mefalsim, Israel, to the Gazan coast.[8] The corridor separates Beit Hanoun, Beit Lahia, and Jabalia from Gaza City. The IDF stated that it intends to completely clear the northern Gaza Strip of all Palestinian fighters above and below ground. The 162nd Division reported it has evacuated approximately 60,000 Palestinians from the northern Gaza Strip. Approximately 1,000-1,300 Palestinians remain in Beit Lahia, “a few hundred” remain in Beit Hanoun, and “a few hundred” remain in Jabalia. The IDF plans to evacuate the remaining Palestinians in the northern Gaza Strip to the south in the coming days.

 

The IDF has conducted two previous clearing operations in Jabalia, where it faced some of the most intense fighting between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters during the war.[9] The IDF stated during its May 2024 clearing operation that Hamas turned civilian infrastructure in Jabalia into a “fortified combat complex.”[10] Palestinian fighters also maintained an unusually high rate of attacks targeting Israeli forces throughout IDF clearing operations in Jabalia.[11] Palestinian militia elements could continue attacks in Jabalia after the IDF withdrew in May 2024, though it was unclear how effective the Hamas military organization in Jabalia would continue to function. Hamas’ military wing has probably attempted to rebuild itself where possible in Jabalia since May 2024. It is unclear how successful these efforts would have been, however, given Hamas’ inability to resupply its fighters and attrition during Israeli operations in May.[12]

 

Palestinian militias have claimed near-daily attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in the northern Gaza Strip since October 6.[13] The IDF reported it has killed approximately 1,000 Palestinian fighters and detained approximately 700 since the latest clearing operation began on October 6.[14] The IDF reported its fighters also located and destroyed approximately 200 buildings rigged with explosives during this time.

 

The commander of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada boasted about Iranian-backed Iraqi militia ballistic missile capabilities on November 5, likely to deter potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada commander and Popular Mobilization Forces official Abbas al Zaidi said that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have “underground factories” for an advanced ballistic missile industry during an interview with an Iraqi television program on November 5, in response to a political analyst who said that Iraq does not have defense capabilities like Iran.[15] Iranian officials, Iraqi intelligence sources, and Western intelligence sources told Reuters in 2018 that Iran was helping Iranian-backed Iraqi militias start to “make their own” short-range ballistic missiles. This insight was likely a reference to an Iranian effort designed to improve the ability of the militias to assemble the technical components of the missiles rather than manufacture them completely.[16] UK-based Saudi outlet Elaph reported on November 2 that Israel warned the Iraqi government that if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to attack Israel from Iraqi territory, Israel may strike predetermined targets in Iraq.[17] These Israeli threats may have led Iraqi groups to attempt to deter the Israelis. The Elaph report followed an earlier Axios report that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attack Israel in response to Israel’s recent October 25 strikes targeting Iran.[18]

 

Zaidi and the other Iranian-backed Iraqi groups probably also seek to message their strength to gain more influence within the Axis of Resistance amid the severe weakening of the Axis’ previous crown jewel, Hezbollah. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has increased its rate of attacks, in particular drone attacks, targeting Israel since mid-September 2024.[19] Zaidi’s comments about the militias’ missile production are also likely meant to fulfill a dual effect of emphasizing the militias’ ability to produce more missiles if needed, while also highlighting the militias’ perceived closeness with Iran to develop this capability. Zaidi’s comments have the added effect of illustrating the defiance of the Iraqi groups in the face of Israel. Only the Houthis have withstood Israeli attacks while maintaining a defiant face to date, and the Iraqi groups have presumably observed the regional legitimacy this has brought the Houthis in certain pro-Iran circles.

 

The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deepened collaboration with the Houthis since October 7, 2023, which could give Iraqi militias access to the knowledge necessary to do rudimentary ballistic missile production.[20] A Houthi drone expert responsible for training Iranian-backed Iraqi militants in drone tactics died in a US self-defense strike on an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia facility in Iraq in July 2024.[21] The Houthis have learned to locally assemble drones and ballistic missiles from key components smuggled into Yemen by the IRGC.[22] Increased cooperation between the Houthis and the Iraqi militias, combined with the Houthis’ ability to locally assemble missiles, suggests that the Houthis may have had a role in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias learning to assemble ballistic missiles.

 

Russia launched the Iranian Kowsar high-resolution sensing satellite and Hodhod communications satellite into orbit using a Russian Soyuz rocket on November 5, which Iran could use to collect imagery on US and Israeli assets and bases in the region.[23] Iranian media claimed that a “private” company—Omid Faza—designed and built the satellites.[24] The head of the Iranian Space Agency, which operates under the Iranian Information and Communications Technology Ministry, stated on November 5 that the agency signed a contract with the Omid Faza Company to buy satellite images.[25] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media previously reported in July 2020 that the IRGC uses satellites to collect intelligence on US military positions in the region, underscoring the importance of satellites to Iran’s military forces.[26]

 

Omid Faza’s founder, Hossein Shahrabi Farahani, who previously headed US-sanctioned Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) Space Group, created the company in 2018 with several unspecified Amir Kabir University students.[27] The United States sanctioned IEI in 2008 for being “owned or controlled” by the Iranian Defense Ministry.[28] IEI produces electronic warfare equipment, military tactical communication systems, and missile launchers, among other equipment.[29] The launch of the Kowsar satellite into orbit is particularly noteworthy as Iranian officials continue to emphasize that Iran will respond to the recent IDF strikes into Iran.[30]

 

This launch also highlights how Iran and Russia are continuing to deepen space cooperation.[31] Russia previously launched Iranian satellites into orbit in August 2022 and February 2024.[32]

 

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5.[33] Netanyahu explained his decision by citing a "crisis of trust” that had emerged between him and Gallant.[34] Netanyahu and Gallant, who served on Netanyahu's war cabinet, have publicly disagreed on numerous issues since October 7, 2023, including Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip and Israel‘s approach to negotiating a ceasefire-hostage deal.[35] Gallant’s positions—and particularly the positions that put him at odds with Netanyahu—frequently aligned with those of the IDF.[36] Netanyahu appointed Foreign Minister Israel Katz to replace Gallant as defense minister.[37] Katz lacks significant security or defense experience and previously led several non-defense portfolios in the Israeli government, including transportation, foreign affairs, and intelligence.[38] Katz is seen as a ”long-time ally” to Netanyahu.[39] Minister without a portfolio Gideon Sa’ar will succeed Katz as the new Israeli Foreign Minister.[40]

 

Gazans protested price gouging of humanitarian aid and goods in Deir al Balah, central Gaza Strip, on November 4 and 5.[41] A Palestinian journalist claimed that the Hamas-run Ministry of Economy implemented a 35% tax on goods entering Gaza, though CTP-ISW has not observed proof of a tax and cannot confirm whether this is an official tax or merely Hamas-guided price gouging.[42] The journalist and protesters claimed that local merchants and Hamas have coordinated to control the price of goods.[43] CTP-ISW observed over 100 Palestinian protesters demonstrating against the price gouging in Deir al Balah on November 4 and 5.[44] It is notable that Palestinian civilians are protesting in Deir al Balah given that it remains a Hamas stronghold. These protests suggest that some Gazans are no longer fearing Hamas’ internal security apparatus and willing to break previous taboos by protesting. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated during a briefing on September 4 that Hamas often steals humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip, hoards goods, and gouges prices to raise funds to support its operations.[45]

 

Key Takeaways:

 

• Post-War Control in the Gaza Strip: Fatah is attempting to extend its control over the Gaza Strip after the October 7 War, but Fatah’s lack of pro-Fatah Palestinian Authority (PA)-affiliated military forces in the Gaza Strip will make this extremely difficult. Fatah likely views the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and Hamas’ weakened military position as an opportunity to confront Hamas over Hamas efforts to maintain control in the Gaza Strip.
• Israeli Military Operations in the Gaza Strip: Israeli forces are conducting a major clearing operation across the northern Gaza Strip to disrupt militia reconstitution efforts. Palestinian militia elements could continue attacks in Jabalia after the IDF withdrew there in May 2024, though it was unclear how effective the Hamas military organization in Jabalia would continue to function. Hamas’ military wing has probably attempted to rebuild itself where possible in Jabalia since May 2024. It is unclear how successful these efforts would have been, however, given Hamas’ inability to resupply its fighters and attrition during Israeli operations in May.
• Iraqi Militias and Ballistic Missiles: The commander of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada boasted about Iranian-backed Iraqi militia ballistic missile capabilities on November 5, likely to deter potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. The Iranian-backed Iraqi groups probably also seek to message their strength to gain more influence within the Axis of Resistance amid the severe weakening of the Axis’ previous crown jewel, Hezbollah. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deepened collaboration with the Houthis since October 7, 2023, which could give Iraqi militias access to the knowledge necessary to do rudimentary ballistic missile production.
• Russia Launches Iranian Satellites: Russia launched the Iranian Kowsar high-resolution sensing satellite and Hodhod communications satellite into orbit using a Russian Soyuz rocket on November 5, which Iran could use to collect imagery on US and Israeli assets and bases in the region. Omid Faza’s founder, Hossein Shahrabi Farahani, who previously headed US-sanctioned Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) Space Group, created the company in 2018 with several unspecified Amir Kabir University students.
• Israeli Defense Minister Fired: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5. Netanyahu explained his decision by citing a "crisis of trust” that had emerged between him and Gallant.
• Hamas Price Gouging Aid in the Gaza Strip: Gazans protested price gouging of humanitarian aid and goods in Deir al Balah, central Gaza Strip, on November 4 and 5. It is notable that Palestinian civilians are protesting in Deir al Balah given that it remains a Hamas stronghold.

Iran Update, November 4, 2024

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Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, Anthony Carrillo, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Iran reportedly warned some Arab countries that it will conduct a complex attack on Israel in retaliation for the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes on Iran.[1] Unspecified Arab and Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal that the upcoming Iranian attack will include drones and missiles and that some will have heavier payloads than those which Iran has previously fired at Israel. Western and Iranian analysts have noted that Iran could use the Khorramshahr-4 liquid-fueled, medium-range ballistic missile, which purportedly carries a payload of 1,500 kilograms and has a range of 2,000 kilometers.[2] The Arab and Iranian officials also told the Wall Street Journal that Iran will use other weapons beyond drones and missiles and will include the conventional Iranian military, known as the Artesh, in the attack. The inclusion of the Artesh would mark the first time that it has attacked Israel; the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has taken lead on attacking Israel up until this point. The Artesh would participate presumably because the IDF killed four Artesh officers in its recent strikes on Iran.[3] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly told senior regime officials that the IDF strikes were ”too large to ignore.”[4] The Artesh has some means of supporting an attack on Israel, such as one-way attack drones, decades-old combat aircraft, and ship-launched missiles, though it remains far from clear that these systems would perform well against Israeli defenses.[5]

Hamas and Fatah officials met in Cairo on November 2 to discuss post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and agreed to form an administrative committee to manage borders and other civil affairs.[6] Hamas in the meeting reportedly presented a detailed blueprint for organizing the committee and comprising it of technocrats.[7] Fatah reportedly agreed in principle and asked to review the plan further, particularly who would lead the committee. This meeting comes as Hamas and Fatah have negotiated for months over establishing a national unity government in the Gaza Strip. A Palestinian source told Reuters in October 2024 that Hamas and Fatah may explore the possibility of forming a committee to govern the Gaza Strip if they failed to agree on a national unity government.[8] Hamas seeks to establish an intra-Palestinian government in the Gaza Strip as an alternative to an Emirati-proposed plan that would exclude Hamas from post-war governance. Hamas likely calculates that it could subvert, infiltrate, and ultimately control a national unity government and thus allow Hamas to remain politically dominant in the Gaza Strip. That Hamas developed the plan for an administrative committee indicates that Hamas still this approach as viable toward preserving its influence in the strip. This Cairo meeting notably comes after Hamas asked Russia to pressure the Palestinian Authority (PA) into negotiating further over a national unity government.[9]

A female Iranian student removed some of her clothing in protest after being reportedly harassed and assaulted by regime security forces on campus.[10] The student, named Ahoo Daryaei, was targeted for improperly adhering to the mandatory hijab law. Some Iranian sources stated that Daryaei removed her clothing after security forces tore it.[11] Security forces arrested Daryaei, and Iranian media later reported that she has been hospitalized for being mentally ill.[12] This incident is one of several in which the regime has labeled women mentally ill for protesting the hijab requirement.[13] Human rights organizations called for the immediate and unconditional release of Daryaei.[14] She has rapidly become an online symbol of the Iranian protest movement standing against regime oppression and efforts to enforce behavioral standards on the Iranian population. This protest movement has a long legacy of strong female icons, especially following the regime killing Mahsa Amini in September 2022.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Israel conflict: Iran reportedly warned some Arab countries that it will conduct a complex attack in retaliation for the recent IDF strikes on Iran. Tehran reportedly plans to use drones and missiles, some of which will have heavier payloads than what Iran has previously fired at Israel. The upcoming attack will reportedly include the IRGC and conventional Iranian military.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas and Fatah officials met in Cairo to discuss post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and agreed to form an administrative committee to manage borders and other civil affairs. Hamas seeks to establish an intra-Palestinian government that Hamas can ultimately control as an alternative to a UAE plan that would exclude Hamas from post-war governance in the strip.
• Iran: A female Iranian student removed some of her clothing in protest after being reportedly harassed and assaulted by regime security forces. She has rapidly become an online symbol of the Iranian protest movement standing against regime oppression and efforts to enforce behavioral standards on the Iranian population.

Iran Update, November 3, 2024

click here to read the full report with maps

Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Israeli Defense Minister emphasized that Iran is “pouring everything [it] can” into the West Bank, indicating that Iran will very likely attempt to pursue a different strategy when rebuilding Palestinian militias to fight Israel again.[1] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Iran is looking for additional routes to destabilize Israel and incite terrorism, particularly utilizing the West Bank, due to the IDF's degradation of Iran’s Axis of Resistance. Iran and Hamas have observed the military degradation of Hamas’ units in the Gaza Strip. Hamas, however, is likely trying to reconstitute regardless of how badly the IDF defeated it as defeat is a temporary condition.[2] It does not follow that Iran and Hamas will decide to rebuild Hamas and other Palestinian militias in the same way again. Iran and Hamas have almost certainly learned many lessons from the October 7 War, including the difficulty of rearming and rebuilding militias in an area that can be easily isolated, such as the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ severe degradation in the Gaza Strip and the difficulty in rebuilding Hamas’ military wing isolated there could cause Iran and Hamas to redouble their efforts to strengthen Hamas and Palestinian military organizations elsewhere, including in the West Bank. Iran has increased its efforts to smuggle weapons and other materiel into the West Bank in recent years.[3] Iran’s efforts have so far had only limited success.

The IDF captured a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border arrangements during a ground raid in southern Syria. This Iranian-led intelligence effort is likely an attempt to gather information on Israeli border security that Iranian-backed militias could use to undertake small-scale infiltrations into the Golan Heights.[4] The IDF said on November 3 that the Egoz Unit captured Ali Suleiman al Asi in Saida, Daraa Province, in recent months.[5] The IDF said that al Asi collected intelligence on Israeli operations along the Syrian border with the Golan Heights for “future terror activity” on behalf of Iran.[6] The IDF “closely monitor[ed]” al Asi before his capture.[7] The IDF did not specify when the raids took place, but Israeli special operations forces (SOF) have conducted numerous covert raids into Lebanon to disrupt Hezbollah border infrastructure since October 2023.[8] The IDF said that Aadi’s capture prevented a future attack and exposed Iranian attempts to gather intelligence on the Syria-Golan Heights border.[9]

Iran’s intelligence collection about Israeli border movements on the Syrian-Golan Heights border is consistent with previous Iranian-backed efforts to gather intelligence to inform future ground attacks. Hamas undertook similar intelligence-gathering exercises ahead of the October 7 attacks.[10] Hezbollah observers on the Israel-Lebanon border likely monitored Israeli border patrols and movements in planning Hezbollah’s ground infiltration into Israel.[11] The intelligence collection effort on the Syrian border could support future ground attacks or small-scale incursions, including the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel needs to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River “with or without an agreement” to achieve Israel's stated war aims.[12] Israel’s stated war aim is to return residents of northern Israel to their homes under safe conditions.[13] Current Israeli operations in southern Lebanon are unlikely to achieve these war aims, though it does not follow that future Israeli operations will fail to achieve the Israeli objectives. Netanyahu made these remarks during a visit to the Israel-Lebanon border on November 3 to meet with IDF commanders.[14] Israel has designed its current ground operations to dismantle border infrastructure and prevent Hezbollah from conducting direct fire and ground attacks into Israel.[15] These operations do not seek to physically push Hezbollah fighters north of the Litani River and have not done so.

Israel is currently engaged in indirect negotiations with Hezbollah to obtain a ceasefire deal that may require Hezbollah military forces to withdraw north of the Litani.[16] The language of the deal from a recently leaked draft stipulates that Lebanese army “forces, infrastructure and weapons will be the only armed groups and assets deployed” south of the Litani River following the ceasefire.[17] It is unclear if Hezbollah will accept a deal that would call for its forces to move north. Hezbollah has not fulfilled its obligations under UNSC Resolution 1701, which required its forces to withdraw from areas south of the Litani River. The implementation of a large-scale Hezbollah withdrawal is extremely complicated, particularly given that many Hezbollah fighters were born and raised in the area that they would then need to leave.

UK-based Saudi outlet Elaph reported that Israel warned the Iraqi government that if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to attack Israel from Iraqi territory, Israel may strike predetermined targets in Iraq.[18] Unspecified Israeli sources stated that the IDF has identified more than thirty “legitimate targets” in Iraq should Israel decide to launch an attack against the militias. Unspecified Israeli sources told Axios on October 31 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attack Israel in response to Israel’s recent strikes on Iran using a large volume of drones and ballistic missiles in the coming days.[19] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has increased its rate of attacks, in particular drone attacks, targeting Israel since mid-September 2024.[20] CTP-ISW recorded that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq increased its rate of attacks by approximately 106 percent between September and October 2024.[21]

Unspecified military officials told Elaph that Israel and the United States have been using satellites to monitor Iranian attempts to transfer ballistic missiles and other unspecified but related equipment from Iran to Iraqi territory.[22] Iran began supplying Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with short-range ballistic missiles, including Zelzal, Fateh-110, and Zolfaghar missiles, in 2018, but the militias have not used ballistic missiles to attack Israel in the October 7 War thus far.[23]

The United States warned Iran against launching another attack on Israel in retaliation for Israel’s strikes into Iran on October 25 because the United States would not be able to restrain Israel’s response.[24] An anonymous US official told Axios that the United States sent this message to Tehran through the Swiss diplomats, adding that the United States cannot confirm that Israel’s next attack will be as ”calibrated and targeted” as before. The Iranian regime is continuing to signal that it will respond to the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25, although the regime does not appear to have decided how it will respond.[25]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that B-52 strategic bombers arrived in the Middle East on November 3.[26] This is part of a larger US military effort to increase its presence in the Middle East ahead of the departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group from the region in the next few months.[27]

US CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla met with IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi in Israel between November 2 and November 3.[28] The IDF stated that the assessment focused on joint preparations against regional threats, especially against threats from Iran. Kurilla toured the US THAAD missile defense system battery during his trip to Israel.

Key Takeaways:

• West Bank: The Israeli Defense Minister emphasized that Iran is “pouring everything [it] can” into the West Bank, indicating that Iran will very likely attempt to pursue a different strategy when rebuilding Hamas to fight Israel again.
• Syria: The IDF captured a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border arrangements during a ground raid in southern Syria. This Iranian-led intelligence effort is likely an attempt to gather information on Israeli border security that Iranian-backed militias could use to undertake small-scale infiltrations into the Golan Heights.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The Israeli prime minister stated that Israel needs to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River “with or without an agreement” to achieve Israel's stated war aims, which is to return residents of northern Israel to their homes under safe conditions. Current Israeli operations in southern Lebanon are unlikely to achieve these war aims, though it does not follow that future Israeli operations will fail to achieve the Israeli objectives
• Iranian Retaliation against Israel: UK-based Saudi outlet Elaph reported that Israel warned the Iraqi government that if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to attack Israel from Iraqi territory, Israel may strike predetermined targets in Iraq.
• US Diplomatic Efforts: The United States warned Iran against launching another attack on Israel in retaliation for Israel’s strikes into Iran on October 25 because the United States will not be able to restrain Israel’s response.
• US Posture in the Middle East: US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that B-52 strategic bombers arrived in the Middle East on November 3. US CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla met with IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi in Israel between November 2 and November 3.
• Saudi Arabia: The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, an Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia, claimed its second attack since announcing its existence.

Iran Update, November 2, 2024

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Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Rezaei, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iranian regime is continuing to signal that it will respond to the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25, although the regime does not appear to have decided how it will respond. Western officials believe that the regime is debating how and whether it should respond to the strikes, according to the Wall Street Journal.[1] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned on November 2 that Iran will give a “tooth-breaking response” to Israel and the United States.[2] This warning comes after Khamenei issued an order on October 29 to the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which is Iran’s highest defense and foreign policy body, instructing the SNSC to prepare a retaliatory attack on Israel, according to the New York Times.[3] Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officer and Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Esmail Kowsari claimed on November 2 that the SNSC agreed on a “military response” to Israel that will involve Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[4] It is more likely that Kowsari would have insight into the SNSC’s decision-making due to his deep personal relationships with top IRGC commanders rather than due to his position in the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee.[5] Kowsari’s claim is consistent with Western media reports that Iran’s retaliation could include Iranian-backed Iraqi militia drone and ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel.[6] Unspecified Iranian sources speaking to Qatari-owned, London-based al Araby al Jadeed denied on November 2 that Iran will launch an attack from Iraq, instead insisting that Iran will respond from Iranian territory.[7] These differing statements from Iranian officials likely reflect current debates within the regime about how the regime should respond to the Israeli strikes.

The United States military is increasing its presence in the Middle East ahead of the departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group from the region in the next few months.[8] US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ordered the deployment of an unspecified number of additional ballistic missile defense destroyers, fighter squadron and tanker aircraft, and several U.S. Air Force B-52 bombers to the Middle East. AP reported, citing unspecified US officials, that the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group is scheduled to leave the Middle East in the middle of November and return to its home port in San Diego.[9] The United States will still maintain the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in Israel and the Amphibious Ready Group Marine Expeditionary Unit in the eastern Mediterranean area despite the imminent departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln.[10] Pentagon Press Secretary Major General Pat Ryder stated that these new deployments demonstrate the “flexible nature of U.S. global defense posture” to deploy world-wide on short notice.[11]

The IDF deployed an additional brigade to Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip, on November 2.[12] The IDF 900th Infantry Brigade started clearing operations in Jabalia on November 2. The IDF 900th Infantry Brigade is the IDF’s largest infantry brigade, consisting of five battalions.[13] The 900th Infantry Brigade specializes in operations in urban environments against ”guerilla” cells in the West Bank.[14] This is notable because Hamas’ military wing in the Gaza Strip has been reduced to operating in small, independent guerilla cells. This makes the 900th Infantry Brigade well-suited to the task of destroying these cells, particularly within Jabalia City and Refugee Camp.

The IDF is sending small units far ahead of the main Israeli force. That the IDF has the confidence to operate regular units in this way is a reflection is Hezbollah’s relatively ineffective defense in these areas. Israeli forces killed the commander of Hezbollah’s coastal sector Mein Musa Az al Din and the commander of Hezbollah’s Coastal Sector Artillery forces Hassan Majed Diab around Tyre on November 1.[15] Hezbollah previously claimed on November 1 that it blocked an Israeli reconnaissance force advancing through the Wadi Hamoul area, north of Alma al Shaab.[16] Commanders may choose to assign reconnaissance units to penetrate deeper into enemy territory due to ”a decision to accept risk due to a low threat level.”[17] CTP-ISW has previously observed that Hezbollah has mounted a disorganized and ineffective defense across southern Lebanon.[18]
Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Retaliation against Israel: The Iranian regime is continuing to signal that it will respond to the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25, although the regime does not appear to have decided how it will respond.
• US Posture in the Middle East: The United States military is increasing its presence in the Middle East ahead of the departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group from the region in the next few months.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF deployed the 900th Infantry Brigade to Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip, on November 2. This brigade, which specializes in operations against “guerilla” cells in the West Bank’s urban environments, would be well-suited to operations in Jabalia’s urban environment, where Hamas has been reduced to operating in small, independent guerilla cells.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The IDF is sending small units far ahead of the main Israeli force. That the IDF has the confidence to operate regular units in this way is a reflection is Hezbollah’s relatively ineffective defense in these areas.
• Israeli Raids in Lebanon: Israeli naval special operations forces captured a senior member of Hezbollah’s naval forces in Batroun, central Lebanon, according to an unspecified Israeli official.

Iran Update, November 1, 2024

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Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Western media reported that Iran will retaliate for the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes around Iran, possibly by launching one-way attack drones and ballistic missiles from Iraq.[1] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the Iranian Supreme National Security Council on October 29 to plan a retaliatory attack on Israel, according to the New York Times.[2] Unspecified Israeli sources told Axios that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attack Israel using a large volume of drones and ballistic missiles in the coming days.[3] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, has repeatedly attacked Israel in recent months, primarily using the following weapons systems:

• Shahed-101 drone. The Iranian-made Shahed-101 has a range of around 600 kilometers.[4]
• Shahed-136 drone. The Iranian-made Shahed-136 reportedly has a range of 2,500 kilometers.[5]
• KAS-04 drone. The KAS-04 is a variant of the Iranian-designed, long-range Samad drone.[6]
• Al Arfad drone. The al Arfad is a variant of the KAS-04 drone.[7]
• Arqab cruise missile. These are Iranian Paveh missiles with a range of around 1,650 kilometers.[8]

Iran also began supplying Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with short-range ballistic missiles, including Zelzal, Fateh-110, and Zolfaghar missiles in 2018, but the militias have not used ballistic missiles to attack Israel in the October 7 War thus far.[9]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has increased its rate of attacks, in particular drone attacks, targeting Israel since mid-September 2024.[10] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed nine drone attacks targeting unspecified locations across Israel on October 31 and November 1.[11] A source close to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq recently warned that the group plans to double its rate of attacks targeting Israel in November 2024.[12] The recent Islamic Resistance in Iraq drone attacks likely served in part as reconnaissance-in-force operations, which are “designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information.”[13] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq could use these attacks to test and learn how to better bypass Israeli air defenses. An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack against Israel, as opposed to a direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory, would benefit Iran by allowing Tehran to preserve its dwindling long-range missile stockpile. Iran launched over 400 cruise and ballistic missiles at Israel in its April and October 2024 attacks.[14]

That Khamenei ordered retaliation against Israel corroborates CTP-ISW's assessment that the recent IDF strikes on Iran inflicted significant damage to Iranian military and defense infrastructure. Three Iranian officials told the New York Times on November 1 that Khamenei ordered retaliation after he reviewed a “detailed report. . . on the extent of the damage” of the IDF strikes.[15] The sources added that Khamenei determined that the scope of the strikes was “too large to ignore” and that failing to retaliate “would mean admitting defeat.”[16] Senior US and Israeli officials recently confirmed that the IDF strikes rendered Iran's S-300 air defense systems inoperable.[17] The S-300 is Russian-made and the most advanced air defense system that Iran operates. The IDF strikes also successfully targeted two Iranian Ghadir passive array detection radar sites, advertised as being capable of detecting ballistic missiles and stealth aircraft.[18] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the damage to the air defenses has likely seriously degraded the Iranian ability to defend against further Israeli attacks.[19] The IDF strikes also inflicted significant damage on facilities tied to the Iranian drone and missile programs, which CTP-ISW previously assessed could disrupt Iran’s ability to manufacture drones and ballistic missiles for itself and its partners, such as Russia.[20]

That Iran could direct an attack against Israel via its proxies in Iraq highlights the extent to which Iran has increased its military and political control over federal Iraq. Iran has increasingly infiltrated Iraqi military and political institutions—such as the Popular Mobilization Forces and the Iraqi Judiciary—in recent years.[21] The most recent example of Iran’s growing influence in Iraq was the election of Shia Coordination Framework-backed politician Mahmoud al Mashhadani as Parliament Speaker on October 31.[22] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties. Mashhadani received 181 votes, which is 16 votes more than the absolute majority required to become parliament speaker.[23] Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri emphasized after Mashhadani’s election that all Shia Coordination Framework leaders, including State of Law Coalition leader Nouri al Maliki, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali, back Mashhadani.[24]

Iran’s growing military and political control over federal Iraq appears to be part of a broader Iranian strategy to turn the country into a base of operations from which Iran and its Axis of Resistance can conduct future operations and attacks against Israel. Iraq has increasingly become a focal point for cooperation and coordination among Axis of Resistance groups in recent months. A Houthi drone expert responsible for training Iranian-backed Iraqi militants died in a US self-defense strike in Iraq in July 2024, highlighting increased cooperation between the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi groups.[25] The Houthis and Hamas have separately opened political offices in Iraq in recent months, and Emirati media reported in June 2024 that Hamas was planning to relocate its political leadership to Baghdad.[26] Growing Iranian influence in Iraq will threaten US and Israeli security and interests in the region, particularly as the United States is considering withdrawing its forces from Iraq.[27]

Israeli forces engaged Lebanese Hezbollah while advancing around the tactically significant town of Khiam in southern Lebanon.[28] Israeli forces began advancing toward Khiam on October 28. Hezbollah claimed two rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces in the area on November 1.[29] Lebanese media reported small arms combat there as well.[30] Khiam is located on high ground from which Hezbollah could fire into northern Israel. Khiam, moreover, grants Hezbollah a vantage point from which it could observe Israeli forces and other targets around the Galilee panhandle. Despite the tactical significance of Khiam, Hezbollah does not appear to be mounting a particularly effective defense of the area. This behavior is consistent with CTP-ISW’s observation that Hezbollah has mounted a disorganized and ineffective defense across southern Lebanon.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran will reportedly retaliate for the recent IDF strikes across Iran. Iran would be responding to the significant damage that the IDF inflicted upon Iranian air defenses and missile production facilities.
• Iraq: Iran may retaliate by ordering its Iraqi militias to fire a large volume of drones and missiles at Israel. That Iran is considering this option highlights the extent to which Iran has expanded its military and political influence in Iraq.
• Lebanon: The IDF engaged Lebanese Hezbollah while advancing around the tactically significant town of Khiam in southeastern Lebanon. The town is on high ground from which Hezbollah could fire into Israel and observe the IDF and other targets in the area.