Iran Updates

Iran Update, April 29, 2025

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Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Ben Schmida, Johanna Moore, Kelly Campa, and Brian Carter

The United States sanctioned six entities and six individuals based in Iran and China on April 29 for procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which demonstrates how Iran draws meaningful military support from China.[1] This network of entities and individuals has facilitated the procurement of sodium perchlorate and dioctyl sebacate from China to Iran. Two US-sanctioned Iranian cargo vessels delivered over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Bandar Abbas, Iran, in early 2025.[2] Chinese assistance to Iran could help Iran replenish its missile stockpile and circumvent US sanctions. It is unclear if the Chinese government is directly supporting the effort, but the government’s inaction against the entities involved enables continued Chinese support for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.

The Houthis have continued to provide conflicting information about a facility in southwestern Saada City that US Central Command (CENTCOM) targeted in an airstrike on April 27.[3] The Houthis claimed that the facility was a migrant detention center run by the International Organization of Migration (IOM), but IOM denied that it maintained the facility.[4] IOM did confirm that it was a migrant facility. The Houthis have similarly provided inconsistent casualty numbers.[5] The facility is located next to a military base, according to publicly available maps.[6] It is unclear whether the Houthis still operate this military base. An unspecified US defense official told Reuters that CENTCOM is conducting a battle-damage assessment and inquiry into these claims.[7] A UN report condemned Saudi-led coalition airstrikes targeting the same detention center in Saada in 2022 that killed 66 people and injured 113 more.[8]

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem argued that Lebanon could not rebuild without an Israeli withdrawal from the five small positions Israel holds, an end to Israeli airstrikes, and the release of Lebanese prisoners.[9] Qassem said that the Lebanese state—not Hezbollah—would need to fulfill these goals.[10] Iranian media falsely portrayed this statement as a priority that Hezbollah would pursue on its own, rather than a priority that Qassem believes the Lebanese state and people should adopt.[11] Qassem reiterated Hezbollah’s commitment to the November 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement and stated that the Lebanese government serves as the main negotiator and armed force responsible for enforcing the ceasefire with Israel.[12] Qassem secondarily called on the Lebanese state to prioritize the reconstruction of infrastructure in Lebanon. Qassem also voiced support for a stronger Lebanese state and for removing the IDF. Qassem stated that assuming these co-occurring priorities would facilitate the revival of Lebanon.

Qassem may be attempting to absolve Hezbollah of responsibility for the slow pace of reconstruction in pro-Hezbollah areas by blaming the Lebanese government. Hezbollah has faced considerable financial challenges after the end of major fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. These challenges have prevented Hezbollah from rapidly reconstructing pro-Hezbollah areas as Hezbollah did after previous rounds of fighting.[13] Hezbollah’s effort to blame the government may be an attempt to rebuild Hezbollah’s political capital in Lebanon after the war and amid slow reconstruction.

Confessionalist-motivated armed militants targeted the Syrian Druze community on April 28 and 29 after an audio in which a Druze sheikh allegedly insults the Prophet Mohammad circulated on social media. The accused sheikh denied that he was responsible for the recording, and the Syrian Interior Ministry vowed to investigate and bring the real perpetrators to “justice.”[14] Syrians protested the video in at least nine Syrian provinces on April 28 and 29, and videos of armed men threatening to retaliate reportedly circulated on social media.[15] A group of gunmen entered Jaramana, a majority Druze town southeast of Damascus, on April 28 and opened fire on a residential area.[16] Security sources told Western media that the gunmen were reportedly from neighboring Sunni-majority towns, including Meliha.[17] The General Security Services (GSS) and the Defense Ministry (MoD) deployed to Jaramana and cordoned off the town.[18] A Ministry of Interior source said that armed militants launched an “organized attack” against security services when they arrived at the scene.[19] It is unclear if the fighters were from any organized group. Engagements between the militants, Druze fighters, and government forces resulted in the deaths of at least 12 people.[20] Unspecified gunmen also attacked a joint checkpoint between local Druze factions and the GSS at the entrance to Ashrafiyeh Sahnaya, a town southwest of Damascus that has a large Druze population.[21]

Confessionalist violence in Jaramana and across the country may discourage minority groups, including the Syrian Druze, from disarming and integrating into the state. The Druze community has held significant reservations about Syrian Transitional President Shara’s government since the fall of the regime. Slow governmental response to large-scale confessionalist-motivated attacks against the Druze community epitomizes Druze fears about the new government. Druze leader Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri denounced the attackers as terrorists similar to al Qaeda and ISIS and criticized the Syrian transitional government’s lack of protection of the Druze community in a speech on April 29.[22] This is similar to how Hijri recently described HTS as the ”armed terrorist faction” that controls Damascus, suggesting that he views Shara‘s HTS-dominated government forces and the likely Sunni attackers of Jaramana in a similar light.[23] A Suwayda-based news outlet accused the government of remaining ”silent” on the numerous anti-Druze demonstrations that took place in Syrian cities.[24] Other minority groups, such as the Kurds in northeastern Syria, are likely watching this incident with alarm. Kurdish political parties recently cited government protection of Kurdish citizens and their rights as one of their most important demands of the government.[25] The transitional government’s inability to prevent confessionalist violence against minority groups is unlikely to build Kurdish confidence that the government will protect them if they disarm.

Shara’s government took several initial steps following the Jaramana attacks that suggest it may move more resolutely to protect the Druze community. A transitional government delegation met with Jaramana’s Druze leaders on April 29 and agreed to hold the perpetrators of the attack responsible.[26] The GSS also coordinated with Druze militias to escort hundreds of Druze university students from Latakia, Tartous, and Homs provinces back to Jaramana and Suwayda Province.[27] Security services were also deployed to Druze areas across Syria.[28] These are minor steps that certainly do not meet the expectations that the Druze or Kurdish communities have demanded of Shara, however. Shara is unlikely to allay the fears of these groups without repeated concrete actions that take real steps towards protecting Syria’s minority communities.

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Priorities: Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem argued that Lebanon could not rebuild without an Israeli withdrawal from the five small positions Israel holds, an end to Israeli airstrikes, and the release of Lebanese prisoners. Qassem may be attempting to absolve Hezbollah of responsibility for the slow pace of reconstruction in pro-Hezbollah areas by blaming the Lebanese government.
• Iran-China Relations: The United States sanctioned six entities and six individuals based in Iran and China on April 29 for procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients for the IRGC, which demonstrates how Iran draws meaningful military support from China.
• US Air Campaign in Yemen: The Houthis have continued to provide conflicting information about a facility in southwestern Saada City that US Central Command (CENTCOM) targeted in an airstrike on April 27.
• Druze-Government Relations in Syria: Confessionalist-motivated armed militants targeted the Syrian Druze community on April 28 and 29 after audio in which a Druze sheikh allegedly insults the Prophet Mohammad circulated on social media. Confessionalist violence in Jaramana and across the country may discourage minority groups, including the Syrian Druze, from disarming and integrating into the state.

Iran Update, April 28, 2025

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Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Ben Schmida, Alexandra Braverman, Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Western media reported that the April 26 US-Iran nuclear talks in Oman ended in “major disagreements” despite repeated positive messaging from senior Iranian and US officials.[1] The Wall Street Journal reported on April 26 that one of the key disputes is whether a final agreement should address the Iranian missile program, which Iran is unlikely to make concessions on.[2] Iranian officials repeatedly stressed that negotiations must remain strictly limited to the nuclear issue and sanctions relief and reaffirmed that zero uranium enrichment and missile discussions are non-negotiable red lines.[3] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi called the talks serious and technical and added that while some disagreements are serious and complex, progress so far has been good, but warned that Iran’s optimism should remain “extremely cautious.”[4] US President Donald Trump stated that the talks are going “very well” and that a "deal is going to be made" without "starting to drop bombs."[5] While Iranian and US officials described the talks as positive and productive, Iran’s unwillingness to make concessions on its missile program may risk collapsing the talks or pushing negotiations toward a deal less expansive than the deal US President Donald Trump reportedly desires.

It is not clear what restrictions the United States hopes to put on Iran’s missile program. Iranian missile development could increase the threat from Iran’s missile program. Iran has previously hinted at ambitions to develop missiles with ranges beyond 2,000 kilometers, which would significantly expand the missile ranges to include US bases in the region, such as Diego Garcia. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to attack US bases in the region in recent months in response to any military action.[6] An unspecified senior Iranian military official stated that Iran could target Diego Garcia, located about 3,700 kilometers from Iran’s southern coast.[7] Iran’s current missile range is around 2,000 kilometers, meaning Iran would need longer-range missiles or significant warhead modifications to reach such targets.[8] These threats underscore how expanded missile capabilities would directly increase Iran’s threats beyond the Middle East. The Iranian missile program is one of the core pillars of Iran’s military strength, due to the weakness of its conventional armed forces, which makes it further unlikely that Iran would agree to include missile restrictions in the ongoing nuclear talks.

The next round of indirect US-Iran talks is tentatively scheduled for May 3 in an undisclosed location in Europe, with Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) experts expected to join the technical talks.[9] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Deputy Director General Massimo Aparo separately met with AEOI Deputy Chief Behrouz Kamalvandi in Tehran on April 28 to discuss outstanding safeguards issues.[10]

A large-scale explosion occurred at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 26.[11] Western media reported that the blast was caused by the explosion of a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant.[12] The explosion occurred within the Sina Port and Marine Services Company (SPMCO) premises at the port.[13] SPMCO is subject to US Treasury secondary sanctions for its affiliation with the Mostazafan Foundation and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).[14] The Associated Press reported on April 27 that the explosion was caused by the improper handling of a shipment of solid fuel intended for ballistic missiles, citing a private security firm.[15] An unspecified individual with ties to the IRGC told the New York Times on April 26 that a container of sodium perchlorate exploded at the port and triggered a series of fires.[16] Sodium perchlorate can be converted to ammonium perchlorate, which is the main component for solid propellant for missiles. Two US-sanctioned Iranian cargo vessels delivered over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Bandar Abbas in early 2025.[17] The IRGC Procurement Department of the Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO), partially responsible for Iran's ballistic missile research and development, reportedly received the first shipment.[18] The loss of a large amount of key chemical precursor for Iranian missiles may further delay Iran's ability to rebuild its intermediate-range, solid-fuel ballistic missile stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024.

The presence of Chinese chemicals, regardless of whether the chemicals caused the explosion, further illustrates how China-based entities have likely helped Iran replenish its missile stockpile and restore key aspects of its defense capabilities. Western officials estimated that recent Chinese shipments of sodium perchlorate, if converted to ammonium perchlorate, can fuel up to 260 mid-range Iranian ballistic missiles.[19] That amount of ammonium perchlorate can also produce larger quantities of smaller munitions that require less solid fuel, including shorter-range ballistic missiles. China also remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, which undermines the US maximum pressure campaign aimed at driving Iranian oil exports to zero. Chinese assistance to Iran has likely exacerbated US military concerns with Iran and the Axis of Resistance.

The explosion at the port may further exacerbate Iran's deteriorating economic conditions. Iran will reportedly lose approximately $25 million per day since it halted operations at the port on April 26.[20] Shahid Rajaee is Iran's largest port and accounts for 85 percent of Iran's shipping container traffic, including a significant portion of its oil exports.[21] The loss of the port—even temporarily—will likely worsen Iran's economic conditions and could cause internal unrest. Iranian media reported 70 deaths and over 1,200 confirmed injuries on April 28, which may also further stoke anti-regime sentiment and unrest.[22]

The Houthis used a complex strike package combining ballistic and cruise missiles and drones to force the USS Harry S. Truman to take evasive action. It is unclear if the attack overwhelmed air defenses or how close the projectiles came to hitting the Truman. The Houthis claimed the attack on April 28, without specifying the number of systems they used in the attack.[23] The US Navy confirmed on April 28 that a US Navy F/A-18 and tow tractor aboard the USS Harry S. Truman fell overboard into the Red Sea.[24] An unspecified US official told CNN that the Truman made a “hard turn” to evade Houthi fire, which contributed to the F/A-18 and tow tractor falling overboard.[25] The US Navy confirmed that the Truman remains fully operational, and all crew are accounted for. The Houthis will continue to optimize their strike packages and implement lessons learned as part of an effort to target and ultimately impact US Navy vessels in the Red Sea.

The Houthis claimed on April 26 that they launched an unspecified number of drones at the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier in the northern Red Sea.[26]

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Kurdish political parties remain at odds over Syria’s form of government. Neither side has made any major adjustments to their positions on Syrian centralization or military integration despite the March 10 Agreement between the two parties. Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) signed an eight-point framework agreement on March 10 that did not attempt to resolve the main issues between the two parties and appeared to lay out starting positions for future negotiations.[27] The agreement called for the representation of all Syrian communities and their participation in the political process, as well as the integration of all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the Syrian state.[28] The Kurds expressed frustration after the government unveiled the Constitutional Declaration on March 13, which concentrated power in Shara’s hands and did not make allowances for popular participation in the political process.[29]

Kurdish political parties, including the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC), have since unified and called on April 26 for a federal Syrian structure that would create a unified entity to administer all Kurdish-majority regions in northeastern Syria.[30] Shara rejected these demands on April 27, calling the push for federalism "divisive" and urging the PYD-controlled Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to preserve "national unity."[31] Shara emphasized that national unity remains a "red line" and reaffirmed that Damascus would protect Kurdish rights within a single governing entity.[32]

Shara is attempting to frame the Syrian Kurds as secessionists by incorrectly treating federalism and “unity” as mutually exclusive concepts.[33] Shara desires a centralized state and dislikes sharing power, as would be required in a federal system. The Kurdish parties have not called for an independent Kurdish state and have repeatedly emphasized that they seek to remain a part of Syria.[34] The Kurdish parties are simultaneously calling for greater Kurdish representation in the political process in Syria, thus demonstrating that the Kurds seek to be a part of the Syrian state.[35] The calls for representation reflect that Shara has not upheld his responsibilities under the agreement regarding participation in the political process. There are currently no members from a major Kurdish political party in Shara’s cabinet.

The continued Damascus-Kurdish tension over the formation of the Syrian state and its structure could be further enflamed by the formation of the People’s Assembly in the coming weeks. Shara will appoint one-third of the representatives to the assembly, and a committee that Shara appoints will tap the remaining two-thirds of the assembly.[36] The formation of this assembly will be a key indicator of the direction of the Syrian state and the seriousness with which Shara intends to stick to his commitments under the March 10 Agreement.

Unverified reports continued to circulate in the Syrian information space that the Syrian transitional government and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are building up forces near Tishreen Dam in anticipation of renewed hostilities.[37] Syrian sources claimed that unspecified Syrian MoD factions deployed to Tishreen Dam on April 28.[38] Some sources indicated that the MoD sought to assert control over the dam by deploying forces, while other sources asserted the deployment was a show of force after rumors circulated that the ceasefire at the dam collapsed.[39] International Coalition and NGO groups also reportedly deployed to the dam on April 28.[40] The SDF was separately deployed to several villages on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.[41] Turkey, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, and Syrian transitional government forces have not engaged the SDF near Tishreen Dam, eastern Aleppo Province, since early April.[42] 

Former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi may be cooperating with Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties to unseat his rival and current Parliament Speaker, Mahmoud al Mashhadani. Iranian-backed political parties likely conspired to remove Halbousi as parliamentary speaker in late 2023 by using an unconstitutional Federal Supreme Court decision.[43] The Federal Supreme Court is heavily influenced by Iranian-backed factions.[44] Halbousi reportedly formed an “alliance” with Iranian-backed Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali in January 2025 after Halbousi’s Sunni rivals formed a bloc that excluded Halbousi.[45] This new bloc, the United Sunni Leadership Coalition, includes Mashhadani and top Iraqi Sunni rivals of Halbousi.[46] The formation of this new coalition and its explicit support for long-held Sunni political demands opposed by Iranian-backed political parties creates a confluence of interests between Halbousi and his Iranian-backed former enemies like Khazali.[47] Iranian-backed groups tried and failed to remove Mashhadani from his post as parliament speaker in January 2025 after he passed a law that favored Sunnis, for example.[48]

The Baghdad Court of Appeals dismissed the charges that caused Halbousi’s removal as speaker in November 2023 on April 27.[49] The degree of control and coercion that Iranian-backed groups in Iraq exercise makes it improbable that such a decision would be taken without their acquiescence. The lack of response by Iranian-backed groups and their allies similarly suggests that they do not disapprove of the acquittal. Halbousi’s acquittal could pave the way for him to unseat Mashhadani before or after the upcoming November 2025 elections, which would support Halbousi’s ambition of returning to the speakership and the Iranian-backed groups’ desire to remove Mashhadani.

The Syrian transitional government requested that the United States clarify several conditions that would enable Syria to attain partial sanctions relief, including the removal of foreign fighters’ influence on the Syrian government.[50] The Syrian government responded on April 14 to a letter that US diplomats sent in mid-March 2025 that laid out eight “confidence-building” measures.[51] The Syrian government letter said that the transitional government plans to fully address five of the eight demands, including the destruction of any remaining chemical weapons stockpiles and the appointment of a liaison to assist efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice.[52] A source familiar with the Syrian transitional government's approach to retaining foreign fighters said that Damascus seeks to delay a decision that would prevent the government from appointing foreign fighters to senior Syrian government roles for as long as possible.[53] CTP-ISW assessed on March 26 that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara would likely oppose the condition to bar foreign fighters from senior government positions, given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him.[54] Damascus asked for further talks to establish "mutual understandings" around the place of foreign fighters in Syria and about permissions for US airstrikes in Syria.[55] The letter pledged that Syria would not tolerate any threats to Western, Israeli, or US interests.[56]

Key Takeaways:

• US-Iran Nuclear Talks: Western media reported that the April 26 US-Iran nuclear talks in Oman ended in “major disagreements” despite repeated positive messaging from senior Iranian and US officials. One of the key disputes is reportedly over whether a final agreement should address the Iranian missile program. Iran’s unwillingness to make concessions on its missile program may risk collapsing the talks or pushing negotiations toward a deal less expansive than the deal US President Donald Trump reportedly desires.
• Chemical Explosion in Iran: A large-scale explosion occurred at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 26. Western media reported that the blast was caused by the explosion of a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant. The loss of a large amount of key chemical precursor for Iranian missiles may further delay Iran's ability to rebuild its intermediate-range, solid-fuel ballistic missile stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024. China delivered the same precursor to Bandar Abbas earlier this year. These chemicals further illustrate how China-based entities have likely helped Iran replenish its missile stockpile and restore key aspects of its defense capabilities.
• Houthi Attack Campaign Against US Navy: The Houthis used a complex strike package combining ballistic and cruise missiles and drones to force the USS Harry S. Truman to take evasive action.
• Syrian Kurd-Syrian Government Negotiations: Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Kurdish political parties remain at odds over Syria’s form of government. Neither side has made any major adjustments to their positions on Syrian centralization or military integration despite the March 10 Agreement between the two parties. Shara is attempting to frame the Syrian Kurds as secessionists by incorrectly treating federalism and “unity” as mutually exclusive concepts. Shara desires a centralized state and dislikes sharing power, as would be required in a federal system. The Kurdish parties have not called for an independent Kurdish state and have repeatedly emphasized that they seek to remain a part of Syria.
• Iraqi Politics: Former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi may be cooperating with Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties to unseat his rival and current Parliament Speaker, Mahmoud al Mashhadani. The formation of a new coalition that includes Mashhadani and its explicit support for long-held Sunni political demands opposed by Iranian-backed political parties creates a confluence of interests between Halbousi and his Iranian-backed former enemies like Khazali.
• Syrian Sanctions Relief: The Syrian transitional government requested that the United States clarify several conditions that would enable Syria to attain partial sanctions relief, including the removal of foreign fighters’ influence in the Syrian government.

Iran Update, April 24, 2025

Click here to read the full report.

Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Iran reportedly asked the United States during nuclear talks in Rome on April 19 to negotiate an interim deal, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran may calculate an interim deal would delay or prevent snapback sanctions or a strike.[1] Axios reported that Iran said it may not be possible to reach a final deal by US President Donald Trump's proposed 60-day deadline. Trump reportedly set a 60-day deadline to reach a new nuclear agreement and previously warned that ‘there will be a bombing’ if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[2] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff reportedly told Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi that he wants to focus on reaching a comprehensive deal within 60 days, but the two parties could reach an interim deal if both sides agree they need more time.[3] Axios previously reported on April 10 that Iran may propose that Iran and the United States first negotiate an “interim deal” prior to beginning negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear agreement.[4] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may calculate that an interim deal with the United States could delay or prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions by European JCPOA signatories or a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.[5] Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia and Germany) reached an interim deal in 2013 that froze elements of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for temporary sanctions relief prior to further negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.[6] Iran agreed to yield its 20 percent enriched uranium stockpile, refrain from operating any inactive centrifuges, halt the production and installation of new centrifuges, cease construction of the Arak heavy water reactor, and accept new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight measures.[7] It is unclear what concessions Iran would be willing to make for an interim deal in the current nuclear negotiations.

IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi continued to hold meetings on ongoing US-Iran nuclear talks. Grossi met with Witkoff on April 23 to discuss nuclear negotiations.[8] Grossi separately met with the Iranian, Russian, and Chinese permanent representatives to the UN on April 24 to discuss the Iranian nuclear program.[9] Iran, Russia, and China continue to present a unified position on US-Iran nuclear negotiations.

Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for possible US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh visited two air defense sites responsible for protecting Iranian nuclear facilities on April 24.[10] Sabahi Fard and Hajizadeh visited the Khondab Air Defense Group site near the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor in Markazi Province to inspect military units and defense capabilities at the site. The two commanders also inspected the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) air defense site in Esfahan Province.[11]

Sabahi Fard previously inspected the Fordow air defense site near the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) on April 16.[12] These continued inspections likely reflect a broader Iranian effort to assess and reinforce air defense readiness around key nuclear facilities amid concerns about potential US or Israeli strikes.[13]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-US Nuclear Negotiations: Iran reportedly asked the United States during nuclear talks in Rome on April 19 to negotiate an interim deal, according to two unspecified sources with knowledge of the issue who spoke to Axios. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may calculate that an interim deal with the United States could delay or prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions by European JCPOA signatories or a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.
• Iranian Air Defense Inspections: Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for possible US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Iran Update, April 23, 2025

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Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

A Salafi-jihadi group ideologically close to the Islamic State (IS) is conducting extrajudicial killings against Syrians perceived to be tied to the now-deposed Bashar al Assad regime. The group—Saraya Ansar al Sunnah—called for the killing of an Assad informant in Aleppo on April 13 and has claimed two killings targeting informants since then.[1] The group has conducted 19 other attacks targeting former Assad officials and the Alawite minority in western Syria as well.[2] The group has also announced that it will attack the Druze community in southwestern Suwayda Province.[3]

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah appears to support IS and share its extremist ideology. The group has stated that it seeks to excommunicate the “apostates” who fought IS, suggesting that the group opposes Assad supporters and the transitional government and could eventually fight both.[4] The group has also stated that it rejects worldly laws and modern borders, meaning that it recognizes neither the transitional government nor the borders of the Syrian state.[5] These statements indicate that Saraya Ansar al Sunnah would only acknowledge an Islamic polity under its interpretation of Sharia law, and that does not conform to internationally recognized borders. These views are extremely close to those of IS. The group denied that it cooperates with IS but acknowledged that cooperation “may happen in the future and will be announced as [it] happens.”[6]

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah likely seeks to destabilize the fragile political transition in Syria as part of its effort to establish an Islamic state. The group opposes a Syrian state that includes Alawites, Druze, or Shia, further indicating that it opposes the ongoing transition.[7] The group’s killing of Syrians considered close to the Assad regime may be meant to stoke renewed conflict between Assad regime elements and the transitional government. These killings could generate support for the group from other sectarian Islamists and encourage Assad loyalists to reorganize militarily to defend themselves. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah could probably co-opt easily some of the sectarian Islamists who have already formed vigilante groups to attack Assad loyalists.[8] A reorganized force of Assad loyalists could seriously threaten the transitional government. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah could exploit the ensuing tensions to recruit new fighters and form an armed, hardline opposition to the current transition process. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is not currently strong enough to seriously threaten the transitional government, though it could strengthen over time.

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is exploiting real grievances in Syria caused by a lack of transitional justice in order to justify its attacks on Assad loyalists. The group’s killing of alleged Assad loyalists reflects that some Syrians believe that there has been no justice for the atrocities that the Assad regime committed.[9] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah likely views the punishment of Assad loyalists as secondary to the establishment of an Islamist state, however. Concerted efforts by the transitional government to hold former Assad officials accountable should undermine Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s messaging, nonetheless. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns the extrajudicial killings conducted by Saraya Ansar al Sunnah and vigilante groups of all political persuasions.

Iran has reportedly established ties with extremist groups to destabilize the Syrian transition, meaning that Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s destabilizing activities could support Iranian objectives.[10] There is no evidence that Iran supports Saraya Ansar al Sunnah at this time. But Iran has previously engaged other extremist Salafi-jihadi groups, such as al Qaeda, in support of its objectives.[11]

Iran continues to expand its nuclear infrastructure near Natanz. The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on April 23 that Iran is constructing a security perimeter around two underground nuclear tunnel complexes located within Mount Kolang Gaz La, south of the Natanz enrichment complex, citing commercially available satellite imagery.[12] The International Atomic Energy Agency has not visited either site. Imagery from March 2025 shows partially erected wall panels and road grading and leveling efforts to install a security perimeter. The security perimeter appears to encircle the base of the mountain and join with one side of the perimeter around Natanz. Iran announced in September 2020 that it was building a tunnel complex near Natanz to make advanced centrifuges after a former centrifuge production facility was destroyed in July 2020.[13] More advanced centrifuges enable Iran to enrich uranium at a faster rate.[14] These centrifuges may allow Iran to rapidly rebuild its nuclear program in the event that, after a nuclear deal, Iran decreases its amount of highly enriched uranium and then the nuclear deal collapses. The second, much smaller, tunnel complex located within Mount Kolang Gaz La was revealed in 2007 but was inactive until recently, according to ISIS.[15] ISIS reported that the complex may store enriched uranium stockpiles or centrifuge-related equipment. The report also stated that construction of the security perimeter has been ongoing at least since 2023, but has accelerated in recent months. The United States and Israel have repeatedly threatened to strike Iranian nuclear facilities.[16]

Iran continues to coordinate with China and Russia on nuclear issues ahead of talks with the United States, highlighting growing alignment between major US adversaries. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Chinese Vice Premier Din Xuexiang and Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi in Beijing, China, on April 23 to discuss nuclear negotiations and deliver a written message from Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.[17] Araghchi emphasized Iran’s intent to brief China, alongside Russia, on all nuclear-related developments, citing China’s roles as a UN Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board member.[18] Unspecified diplomatic sources told anti-regime media that Araghchi also carried a written message from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to Chinese President Xi Jinping, affirming that the any agreement with the United States ”solely intended to reduce tensions” and Iran will not alter its ”Look to the East” policy or the terms of its 25-year Sino-Iranian cooperation agreement.[19] The Look to the East policy aims to strengthen ties with non-Western countries, like China, to expand its global partnerships and boost its economic and political interests.[20] China also remains the largest importer of Iranian oil. China’s Iranian oil imports help Iran circumvent US sanctions.[21] Iran reportedly seeks to include provisions in a potential nuclear deal to guarantee oil exports—especially to China—and prevent future US “maximum pressure” sanctions that could disrupt its energy revenues.[22]

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara will very likely fail to secure weapon supplies from Russia as part of an emerging deal for military basing rights in Syria because Russia cannot spare military equipment for Syria. Shara alluded to procuring weapons from Russia or additional countries as part of developing new military basing agreements in an interview with the New York Times published on April 23.[23] Russia is currently facing a serious materiel shortage over the medium term, and its commitment to fighting in Ukraine will take priority over shipping arms and other military equipment to Syria. Russia will likely already face materiel shortages in 2026 and 2027 if Ukrainian forces continue to inflict damage on Russian forces on the battlefield at the current rate, and many of these assets will be difficult to replace.[24] Russia and the Syrian transitional government have engaged in months-long talks over the future of Russian bases in Syria.[25] These talks have thus far not resulted in an agreement about Russian basing rights in Syria. Syrian and Western media have reported that Russian forces remain present at three military bases in Syria: Hmeimim airbase in Latakia, the naval base at Tartus, and Russia’s former helicopter base in Qamishli, Hasakah Province.[26]

Shara will likely pursue weapon supply agreements with alternative partners as it becomes clear Russia will not exchange arms for basing rights. The Syrian transitional government’s armor, mechanized vehicles, and aircraft consisted predominantly of Russian-made models seized from the Assad regime.[27] Some of these systems were probably inoperable by the fall of the regime, though Israeli airstrikes have also destroyed a significant portion of Syrian stocks since December 2024.[28] It is unclear at this time how Shara would finance these arms purchases from other states, given the dire state of Syria’s economy. Shara confirmed to the New York Times that he had not yet received offers from “other nations to replace Syrian arms.”[29]

Key Takeaways:

• Salafi-Jihadi Group in Syria: A Salafi-jihadi group ideologically close to the Islamic State (IS) is conducting extrajudicial killings against Syrians perceived to be tied to the now-deposed Bashar al Assad regime. The group has stated that it seeks to excommunicate the “apostates” who fought IS, suggesting that the group opposes Assad supporters and the transitional government and could eventually fight both. The group likely seeks to destabilize Syria’s fragile transition.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran continues to expand its nuclear infrastructure near Natanz.
• Iran, China, and Russia Continue Cooperation: Iran continues to coordinate with China and Russia on nuclear issues ahead of talks with the United States, highlighting growing alignment between major US adversaries.
• Syria and Russia: Syrian President Ahmed al Shara will very likely fail to secure weapon supplies from Russia as part of an emerging deal for military basing rights in Syria because Russia cannot spare military equipment for Syria.

Iran Update, April 22, 2025

Click here to read the full report with maps

Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Unspecified Iranian sources told a Qatari-owned, London-based outlet on April 22 that the US-Iran nuclear talks are progressing “beyond belief.”[1] Iran could calculate that by framing the talks as positive, even if the reality does not match, Iran could delay a US or Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program or the imposition of snapback sanctions on Iran. The Iranian sources claimed that the United States, which was represented by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, did not demand complete dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program and expressed approval to the principle of Iran’s right to enrich uranium during the nuclear talks. Unspecified Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 12 that Iran would be willing to reduce its uranium enrichment to 3.67 percent, which is the same level agreed upon in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[2] The sources stated that they believe Iran and the United States will reach an agreement within the next two months.[3] Iran’s negotiating team could calculate that presenting the talks as positive could enable them to continue the talks and thereby avoid negative consequences while still failing to make any serious concessions.

Former Iranian diplomat Abdolreza Faraji Rad also told the Qatari-owned outlet on April 22 that the upcoming US-Iran technical talks will focus on “enrichment levels and centrifuges.”[4] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei confirmed on April 22 that the US and Iran agreed to reschedule the technical talks from April 23 to April 26 at the suggestion of Oman.[5] Rad stated that the outcome of the technical talks would be presented to US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi on April 26.[6] The head of a Tehran-based think tank stated that the technical talks will focus on what to do about Iran’s reserves of 60 percent enriched uranium.

Syrian authorities arrested two senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officials in Damascus after the United States requested that the transitional government expel Palestinian militants in exchange for partial sanctions relief. The General Security Services (GSS) arrested PIJ’s Syria Operations Commander Khaled Khaled and PIJ’s Organizing Committee head Yasser al Zafari in Damascus on April 19 and 17, respectively.[7] PIJ released a statement on April 22 in which it asked “our brothers in the Syrian government” to release the two men.[8] The Syrian Interior Ministry acknowledged the arrests but did not clarify why it arrested the pair.[9] The United States reportedly asked the Syrian transitional government in mid-March to ”[crack] down on extremist groups” and end Palestinian political and militia activity in Syria in exchange for partial sanctions relief.[10] It is unclear if the PIJ arrests are tied to this request, but Shara may view the pursuit of Palestinian groups with long-standing ties to Iran and the Assad regime as a compromise that would be favorable to the United States but also palatable to his Syrian constituents. The Assad regime has hosted Syria-based PIJ fighters over the years and allowed PIJ to base its headquarters in Damascus.[11] It is unclear how many Palestinian militias currently operate in Syria, given that the Syrian government has largely expelled other Axis of Resistance militias, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, from Syria since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[12]

The new Syrian People’s Assembly may more closely resemble previous Shura councils used by HTS and other Syrian Islamist factions, rather than a Western-style legislative branch. Syrian constitutional committee member Ahmed al Qabri told Qatari-owned, London-based media on April 18 that the Syrian transitional government, which is led by Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara has begun “consultations” to select committee members that will select two-thirds of the People’s Assembly.[13] The People’s Assembly is a transitional legislative body that will propose, adopt, and amend Syrian laws, according to the Syrian Constitutional Declaration.[14] Shara’s direct hand in forming the People’s Assembly enables him to wield significant influence over who and which groups will be represented in the body. The constitution declaration allows Shara to directly appoint one-third of the body’s members.[15] Electoral sub-committees will choose the other two-thirds of the Assembly’s members.[16] A supreme committee, which is directly appointed by Shara, will “oversee” these electoral sub-committees, suggesting the Shara-appointed Supreme Committee could veto any actions taken by the electoral sub-committees.[17]

The methods through which Shara will form the People's Assembly imitate how HTS elected the members of its Shura Council. The HTS General Shura Council effectively served as the HTS-led Syrian Salvation Government’s legislature from 2017 to 2024.[18] The majority of Idlib residents did not participate in electing the council’s members, however. HTS tasked a small number of representatives with nominating and “electing” members of the council.[19] Representatives were chosen from “diverse” northern Syrian regions, tribes, camps, and unions, but the methods of their selection allowed HTS to wield influence over the council appointments.[20] Syrian opposition media reported in 2021 that the majority of the council’s candidates were “pre-determined” and approved by HTS.[21] Other Syrian groups, like Ahrar al Sham, previously used Shura Councils to grant representation to the different armed groups that fought under their banner.

Such a consultative body differs from Western expectations of representative democracy, as it does not derive its authority from the people in the form of popular elections. It is unlikely that the similarities between HTS’s former General Shura Council’s and the People’s Assembly’s elections are a coincidence. Current Syrian Justice Minister and close Shara adviser Mazhar al Wais noted in December 2024 that Shara, when asked about parliamentary-style rule, spoke instead of “advisory and consultative councils” and specifically compared a possible Syrian parliament to a Shura Council.[22] This does not necessarily suggest that Shara will renege on his commitment to eventually hold “free and fair elections” to elect a permanent representative legislature.[23] The People’s Assembly is only designed to be a transitional mechanism, but the Constitutional Declaration notes that the transition will last for five years.[24] Council members are only permitted to serve for 30 months or until a permanent constitution is drafted and proper elections are held.[25] Shara could theoretically plan to introduce a consultative-style body in the short term as a precursor to a Western model of parliament in the coming years as Syria stabilizes. He has not made explicit promises about doing so, however.

Suwaydawi political and civil society factions established the “National Assembly” in Suwayda on April 19 in opposition to the Syrian transitional government.[26] The National Assembly interim leader Omar al Aysami stated that the organization opposes the Syrian National Dialogue Conference and subsequent transitional Constitutional Declaration, which centralized power under transitional Syrian President Ahmed al Shara.[27] Aysami added that the National Assembly seeks to establish a unified, representative, political institution that derives legitimacy from the people. The National Assembly also seeks to organize armed factions and weapons under a single command within the province. The Druze community, which is predominantly located in Daraa and Suwayda provinces, has been fractured into distinct armed factions, but many have held similar reservations about joining the transitional government.[28] These factions appear to be coalescing into a unified coalition. CTP-ISW warned on March 17 that widespread Suwaydawi rejection of the constitution could impact ongoing governance and military integration agreements.[29]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-US Nuclear Negotiations: Unspecified Iranian sources told a Qatari-owned, London-based outlet on April 22 that the US-Iran nuclear talks are progressing “beyond belief.” Iran could calculate that by framing the talks as positive, even if the reality does not match, Iran could delay a US or Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program or the imposition of snapback sanctions on Iran.
• Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Damascus: Syrian authorities arrested two senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officials in Damascus after the United States requested that the transitional government expel Palestinian militants in exchange for partial sanctions relief.
• Syria’s Legislative Branch: The new Syrian People’s Assembly may more closely resemble previous consultative or advisory councils used by HTS and other Syrian Islamist factions, rather than a Western-style legislative branch. The methods through which Shara will form the People's Assembly imitate how HTS elected the members of its Shura Council, and senior former HTS officials have explicitly compared a future Syrian parliament to a Shura Council.
• Political Opposition to the Syrian Transitional Government: Suwaydawi political and civil society factions established the “National Assembly” in Suwayda on April 19 in opposition to the Syrian transitional government.

Iran Update, April 18, 2025

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Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Avery Borens, Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Iran proposed a three-stage nuclear deal proposal that caps Iranian uranium enrichment but would leave the necessary infrastructure in place to enable Iran to rapidly rebuild its nuclear program if the deal collapsed. Anti-regime Iranian media reported that Iran proposed a three-stage nuclear deal proposal that capped Iranian uranium enrichment but preserved Iranian nuclear infrastructure, such as advanced centrifuges.[1] The reported plan does not include a timeline for the phases of the deal. This proposal would likely preserve Iran’s ability to rapidly rebuild its nuclear program. Former UN weapons inspector David Albright warned on April 18 that Iran could make enough weapons-grade uranium in 25 days, even with a small low-enriched uranium (LEU) stock, if it maintains all of its current centrifuges.[2] Iran is also developing new advanced centrifuges, such as the IR-8, which Iranian officials have claimed is “sixteen times” more capable than the IR-1 centrifuge.[3] Iran has increased the number of its operational centrifuges since it signed the JCPOA in 2015.[4]

An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on April 18 that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will refuse any deal that requires Iran to dismantle centrifuges, halt uranium enrichment, and reduce its stockpile below Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) levels.[5] The reported Iranian proposal lacks sunset clauses, but leaves Iran’s centrifuge infrastructure intact, which would allow Iran to rapidly rebuild its stockpile of enriched uranium.[6] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio separately stated on April 18 that the United States seeks a durable deal that will prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon both now and in the future.[7] The Iranian proposal does not achieve the stated US government objective of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon now and in the future because it leaves the necessary infrastructure in place to rapidly build a weapon if the deal collapses.

Unspecified Israeli sources told Axios on April 18 that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and Mossad Director David Barnea in Paris to discuss the upcoming US-Iran nuclear talks in Rome on April 19.[14] Iran and the United States will continue the second round of negotiations in Rome, Italy, on April 19.[15]

An analysis of available satellite imagery from a Chinese military-affiliated satellite company shows that the vast majority of Houthi attacks took place in areas imaged by the Chinese company. An open-source analyst posted a map on X on April 17 that shows the available satellite imagery overlaid with Houthi attacks on vessels transiting the Red Sea.[16] It is unsurprising that a commercial satellite company would take images of a highly trafficked maritime route like the Red Sea, but the Houthi access to the imagery could improve Houthi targeting capabilities when used in conjunction with other Houthi targeting methods. This map comes after reports that this Chinese military-linked satellite company, Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., Ltd, provided intelligence to the Houthis, according to US officials speaking to the Financial Times on April 17.[17]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) struck Houthi fuel stockpiles and oil export and import facilities at Ras Issa Port, Hudaydah Governorate, on April 17.[18] CENTCOM stated that they conducted these airstrikes to ”eliminate” the Houthis‘ fuel source and isolate the Houthis economically.[19] The strikes damaged vessels at the port, three oil depots, oil transporters, and pipelines.[20] This satellite imagery also showed possible oil leaks into the Red Sea.[21] A Yemeni economic analyst estimated that CENTCOM airstrikes on Ras Issa Port, which the Houthis have controlled since 2016, resulted in approximately $700 million worth of losses for the Houthis.[22] A Saudi news outlet noted that the Houthis received millions of dollars' worth of Iranian oil and gas exports, among other Houthi energy imports, through Ras Issa Port.[23] The Houthi-run Health Ministry reported that these CENTCOM airstrikes killed at least 74 people and injured 171 others.[24] Many of the casualties were workers at the port.

A large proportion of US airstrikes have targeted Hudaydah Governorate, likely in an effort to degrade Houthi targeting capabilities and degrade other Houthi infrastructure. CENTCOM has conducted at least 112 airstrikes in at least 33 sorties targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled Hudaydah Governorate on the Red Sea coast, since the start of its airstrike campaign on March 15.[25] Hudaydah Governorate is important because it hosts Hudaydah Port, Yemen’s largest port, and Ras Issa and al Salif ports. The coastal radar systems in Hudaydah allow the Houthis to track maritime traffic through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, facilitating their drone and missile attacks on international shipping.[26] CENTCOM airstrikes in Hudaydah have reportedly targeted and killed mid-level commanders who coordinate logistics in Houthi-controlled areas, and Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[27]

An air campaign can only achieve temporary effects. The temporal effects of this air campaign could be significant, however, and could deter the Houthis from continuing attacks if the United States renders the Houthis unwilling to continue. A campaign to permanently prevent the Houthis from using Hudaydah Governorate to launch attacks targeting international shipping would require a ground operation to take and hold ground.

The United States will withdraw from three bases in northeastern Syria, including two positions designed to support counter-ISIS operations along the Euphrates River in Deir ez Zor Province.[28] Two senior US officials told The New York Times on April 17 that the US will close three bases: Mission Support Site Green Village, Mission Support Site Euphrates, and an unspecified smaller third facility.[29] Both mission support sites are located east of the Euphrates River in Deir ez Zor Province.[30] These bases have enabled US forces to support Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) operations along the Euphrates River in zones where ISIS cells operate and collect zakat from locals.[31] The New York Times reported that the US withdrawal began on April 17, which locally based Syrian media also confirmed.[32] The officials also said that the United States will withdraw about 600 of the 2,000 US troops currently deployed and that the remaining 1,400 US troops will remain stationed in Syria.[33] The United States maintained roughly 900 US personnel in Syria between 2019 and 2024.[34]

The officials said that the United States will assess after 60 days whether to withdraw additional troops from Syria.[35] A full US withdrawal from Syria would severely undermine the counter-ISIS mission in Iraq and Syria and would create a vacuum that ISIS could exploit to reconstitute. US forces provide critical intelligence and logistical support to the SDF and assist SDF units in managing and securing detention camps in northern Syria. The Syrian Defense Ministry (MoD) is expected to soon deploy to northeastern Syria in order to backfill the SDF as part of a recent integration agreement, but MoD forces are unlikely to provide any suitable replacement for US forces, at least in the short term. Syrian transitional government forces deployed for the first time in former SDF-controlled territory will need time to organize their forces and understand their new areas of operation. The international coalition reportedly conducted a joint patrol with the SDF and MoD forces along the M4 highway between Ain Issa and Tal Tamr on April 18, likely in preparation for MoD deployments in the region. [36]

The United States reportedly brokered a ceasefire agreement between Turkey and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on April 17.[37] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi led an SDF delegation to meet with Turkish officials at the Tishreen Dam, which marked the first direct meeting between the two sides.[38] Turkey and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched near-daily attacks on SDF positions across northeastern Syria from November 2024 through late March 2025.[39] Turkish officials have consistently demanded that the SDF fully disarm and integrate into the Syrian MoD before reaching a ceasefire agreement.[40] It is unclear what the terms of this ceasefire agreement are and to what degree the SDF has fulfilled previous Turkish demands.

The Houthis claimed on April 18 that the group shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone with a locally produced missile over Sanaa Governorate.[41] The Houthis have claimed that they have shot down 20 drones since the beginning of the October 7 War.[42] A Yemen analyst reported that the Houthis likely used relatively makeshift air defenses to quickly fire before moving to avoid strikes in response.[43] The same analyst noted that many of these systems are repurposed radar and optical systems from the former Yemeni Armed Forces or supplied by Iran and built with Chinese technology.[44] These air defense systems can intercept slow, relatively low-flying drones, but cannot destroy cruise missiles or advanced fighter aircraft.[45]

Iraqi media reported on April 17 that the Iraqi federal government replaced Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) brigades controlled by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with PMF brigades close to Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani along the Iraq-Syria border.[46] “Official sources” told al Aalem that the PMF 44th and 72nd Brigades had deployed near Sinjar and al Qaim, respectively, following the withdrawal of PMF units affiliated with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Liwa al Taluf from near al Qaim. The PMF 44th and 72nd Brigades are known as “shrine militias” that are loyal to Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani and the Iraqi Defense Ministry.[47] The “official sources” and a “prominent” Iranian-backed Iraqi militia member added that these deployments are part of an Iraqi federal government plan to “reduce international and tribal pressure” on the government to remove the militias from the border.[48] An advisor to the Anbar Provincial Council told al Aalem that the incoming PMF brigades are “more disciplined and have an excellent relationship with the Anbar tribes.”[49]

CTP-ISW has not observed photo evidence of these redeployments. It is unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would withdraw from their positions on the Syria-Iraq border because the militias derive significant economic benefit from controlling these border crossings.[50] UK-based media reported in late December 2024 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that had recently withdrawn from Syria to Iraq after the collapse of the Assad regime would soon begin moving from the al Qaim area due to unspecified regional and international pressure on the Iraqi federal government to remove militias from the Syrian border.[51]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Proposed Nuclear Deal: Iran proposed a three-stage nuclear deal proposal that caps Iranian uranium enrichment but would leave the necessary infrastructure in place to enable Iran to rapidly rebuild its nuclear program if the deal collapsed.
• China-Houthi Connections: An analysis of available satellite imagery from a Chinese military-affiliated satellite company shows that the vast majority of Houthi attacks took place in areas imaged by the Chinese company. An open-source analyst posted a map on X on April 17 that shows the available satellite imagery overlaid with Houthi attacks on vessels transiting the Red Sea.
• CENTCOM Airstrikes in Ras Issa, Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) struck Houthi fuel stockpiles and oil export and import facilities at Ras Issa Port, Hudaydah Governorate, on April 17.
• US Air Campaign in Yemen: A large proportion of US airstrikes have targeted Hudaydah Governorate, likely in an effort to degrade Houthi targeting capabilities and degrade other Houthi infrastructure. An air campaign can only achieve temporary effects. A campaign to permanently prevent the Houthis from using Hudaydah Governorate to launch attacks targeting international shipping would require a ground operation to take and hold ground.
• US Withdrawal from Syria: The United States will withdraw from three bases in northeastern Syria, including two positions designed to support counter-ISIS operations along the Euphrates River in Deir ez Zor Province. The US troop presence in Syria will drop from 2,000 to 1,400 under the current drawdown plan.
• Turkey-SDF Ceasefire Agreement: The United States reportedly brokered a ceasefire agreement between Turkey and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on April 17.

Iran, China, and Russia issued a joint statement on March 14 effectively condemning the US “maximum pressure” strategy vis-a-vis Iran.[1] The statement came from a meeting of the Iranian, Chinese, and Russian deputy foreign ministers in Beijing.[2] The statement called on “relevant parties”—a reference to the United States—to “lift all illegal unilateral sanctions” on Iran. The statement described Iranian nuclear activities as “exclusively for peaceful purposes,” despite numerous indications that Tehran has restarted its nuclear weapons program.[3] Iran currently has enough high-enriched uranium to build six nuclear weapons, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.[4] The statement also emphasized the parties’ commitment to strengthening their cooperation through BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Tehran wants to use these institutions to undermine US sanctions and build a parallel economic order to the US-led one.

The Iran-China-Russia statement underscores that Russia is unlikely to play a constructive role in mediating between the United States and Iran. Western media reported that the Kremlin has offered to mediate in recent days.[5] CTP-ISW has assessed that Russia is unlikely to secure US interests via such mediation, especially in negotiations focused on Iranian nuclear activities and the Axis of Resistance.[6]

The Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) rejected the draft constitution that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara adopted on March 13.[7] The SDC is the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). The AANES similarly stated on March 13 that the constitution was too like the Bashar al Assad regime’s constitution and noted that the focus on Arab identity is a “de-facto falsification of Syria’s national and societal identity.”[8] The SDC claimed that the constitution “grants the executive authority absolute powers, while restricting political activity” and obstructs democratic transition.[9] CTP-ISW noted on March 13 that Shara could use some of the articles in the constitution to consolidate his power over the Syrian state.[10]

The SDC view of the constitution could impact the political and military integration efforts between AANES and Damascus that began on March 10, but it is unclear what exact effects it will have at this time.[11] The SDC condemned the constitution drafting process when National Dialogue Conference sessions were not held in AANES territory before committing to integration efforts.[12] Civilians in SDF-controlled Hasakah shared the SDC sentiment and demonstrated against the new constitution on March 14.[13]

Assadist insurgents ambushed an interim government patrol securing fuel trucks between Baniyas and Latakia on March 12.[14] The Syrian Popular Resistance (SPR) claimed the attack and stated that government forces did not detain the fighters responsible.[15] Local media contrastingly reported that government forces did detain someone.[16] The SPR has little incentive to lie about the detention of its fighters, as the repeated publication of clearly false information risks discrediting the group among its target communities. Acquiring the intelligence necessary to consistently detain insurgents—rather than innocent bystanders—very often plagues counter-insurgency operations, moreover. Arresting the wrong person could spur additional grievances and mistrust of the interim government in these coastal communities.

Attacks on fuel transports in this area could have wide-reaching effects if conducted at a larger scale, as the Baniyas port is critical for energy shipments into Syria. Continuing attacks that target energy infrastructure could worsen the economy and living conditions outside of coastal Syria, where the Assadist insurgency is currently centered. Insurgent leaders may calculate that deteriorating economic conditions will weaken popular support for the interim government and generate momentum for the Assadist movement. Interim government forces collected small arms in negotiated settlements with locals around Baniyas on March 14, suggesting that wrongful arrests have not deterred some communities from collaborating with security officials.[17]

Interim government forces responded to several fires in insurgent attack zones in Latakia Province on March 13.[18] It is unclear at this time whether the fires near both Sunni and Alawite communities were intentionally set or by whom. Sectarian Sunni group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah set forest fires that it claimed endangered Alawites in Qardaha, Latakia Province, on March 5 before major insurgent violence began in coastal Syria.[19] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has made repeated sectarian statements that warned it would attack Alawites for crimes committed under Assad and that the group would continue its attacks until the Alawites and Shia were “eliminated” or displaced from the region.[20] These forest fires exhaust limited government resources and could exacerbate disorder in an already tense environment.

Assadist insurgents likely exploited Latakia Province’s mountainous geography to delay the interim government’s response to major insurgent attacks on March 5-7. Insurgent cells attacked Syrian interim government personnel across Latakia and Tartous provinces, leading government forces to deploy to re-impose security over the coastal region in early March.[21] The interim government response resulted in sectarian violence and extrajudicial killings in some instances. Insurgents chose a choke point on an east to west highway from which interim government forces could access insurgent attack zones on the coast.[22] The fighters fired at vehicles passing the area, blocking the road with disabled cars and discouraging anyone from trying to pass.[23] Insurgents will likely reuse this road-blocking tactic to isolate areas where they are conducting attacks. The terrain in these areas is such that any road-bound force will be canalized by the terrain and roadways and thus easily ambushed from the high ground surrounding the roads.[24] This method highlights the tactical proficiency of this insurgency of former Assad regime officers and soldiers.[25]

Russia is using both diplomatic and economic incentives to gain favor with the interim Syrian government, likely to retain its military basing rights in Syria. Russia and the interim government have engaged in months-long talks over the future of Russian bases in Syria without conclusion.[26] Interim Syrian President Ahmed al Shara told Reuters on March 11 that he aims to ”preserve. . . deep strategic relations” with Russia, suggesting that Russian officials still have room to influence Shara’s decision making, especially through incentives.[27] Russia has avoided publicly condemning Damascus for its response to insurgent activity on Syria’s coasts, which led to mass extrajudicial killings, but reportedly strongly denounced the new Syrian administration in a closed-door UN briefing on March 10.[28] Russian envoy Vassily Nebenzia compared the partially government-perpetrated sectarian violence to the 1994 Rwandan genocide.[29] Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said on March 13 that Moscow has faith “that the current authorities in Damascus recognize their responsibility to protect the legitimate rights of citizens in Syria, regardless of their religious affiliations.” Zakharova's statement is far from accusing Damascus of perpetrating a genocide, further suggesting that Moscow is tempering its public condemnation of the Shara government, which may be part of a larger effort to maintain good working relations with the interim government and to secure a deal for the bases.[30]

Russia has also established some economic cooperation with Syria since February. Russia delivered local Syrian currency to the Syrian central bank on February 12 following a call between Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara and Russian President Vladimir Putin.[31] A tanker sanctioned for transporting Russian oil also arrived at the Baniyas Port on March 6.[32] Russian fuel could alleviate the energy shortages that the interim government is facing. Syria also sources fuel through other avenues, such as Qatar and the SDF, which present adequate alternatives to Russian fuel, possibly making Russian economic leverage less effective in this context.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran, China, and Russia issued a joint statement effectively condemning the US “maximum pressure” strategy vis-a-vis Iran. The statement reaffirms that Russia is unlikely to play a constructive role in mediating between the United States and Iran.
• Syria: The Kurdish-majority SDC rejected the draft constitution that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara approved. It is unclear what effect this rejection will have on ongoing efforts to integrate the SDF into the interim Syrian government armed forces.
• Syria: Russia is using diplomatic and economic incentives to develop and maintain a working relationship with the interim Syrian government, likely in order to maintain Russian military basing there.

Iran and China continue to cooperate to circumvent US sanctions. At least eight tankers have participated in ship-to-ship transfers to move Iranian oil to China in recent weeks.[1] These transfers reflect the “dark fleet” of vessels that Iran uses to move oil through Malaysian waters to China.[2] Iran was reportedly holding around 16.82 million barrels of oil in floating storage facilities in December 2024, with two-thirds of these barrels based off the eastern Malaysian coast.[3] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with the Malaysian foreign minister in Tehran on February 25.[4] Iran depends heavily on revenues from energy sales to support its economy. China continues to import Iranian oil because of its cheap cost, despite China signaling that it is adhering to US sanctions by banning sanctioned tankers from Shandong Province ports.[5] China wants low energy costs to maintain competitiveness in its manufacturing industry.

Lebanese airport authorities seized 2.5 million US dollars in cash on February 28 that a man attempted to smuggle from Turkey to Lebanon for Hezbollah, likely on Iran’s behalf.[6] This incident follows an uptick in Iranian money smuggling efforts to Hezbollah via air routes in recent months. Israel reported in January 2025 that Turkish citizens have been involved in efforts to smuggle cash from Istanbul to Beirut for Hezbollah.[7] Lebanon reportedly indefinitely suspended landing rights for Iranian airlines flying to Beirut on February 13.[8] Commercially available flight tracking data revealed only two instances of Iranian flights landing in Beirut since February 11. The suspension of Iranian landing rights to Lebanon could explain why Iran may now rely on money smuggling routes from Turkey.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran and China continue to cooperate to circumvent US sanctions. At least eight tankers have participated in ship-to-ship transfers to move Iranian oil to China in recent weeks.
• Lebanon: Lebanese airport authorities seized 2.5 million US dollars in cash that a man tried to smuggle from Turkey to Lebanon for Hezbollah, likely on Iran’s behalf.

Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, Ben Rezaei, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, Avery Borens, Victoria Penza, Christina Harward, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

Turkish officials appear to believe that a planned call by imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm would pressure the SDF into an agreement to disarm and integrate into the HTS-led interim government. Turkey and Ocalan have reportedly reached an agreement in which Ocalan will publicly call on the PKK to “lay down arms” on February 15. Unspecified Turkish officials told regional media on January 27 that Ocalan's announcement would "easily" pressure the SDF to integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry.[1] This belief reflects misplaced Turkish thinking that the entire SDF will be responsive to PKK demands, which is unlikely. The SDF is composed of Syrian Kurds, some of whom were members of the PKK. The SDF’s leadership presumably recognizes that Turkish-backed attacks pose a possibly existential threat to the SDF and Kurds, given that many Turkish-backed forces have previously committed human rights abuses against Kurdish people in northwestern Syria. The SDF is unlikely to willingly give up its ability to defend Kurdish areas against active military attacks, regardless of Ocalan’s position.

The Turkish theory that the disarmament of the PKK would cause the SDF to disarm and integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry directly conflicts with how the SDF views its future in the Syrian government and northeastern Syria. The SDF has articulated clear and specific demands since it began talks with the HTS-led government in late December 2024. These demands include joining the new Syrian army as an integrated unit, remaining deployed in northeastern Syria, and maintaining some regional autonomy in a ”decentralized” system.[2] It is unlikely that the SDF would ”easily” give up these demands if the PKK disarms.

An unspecified source told Middle East Eye that Turkey seeks to encourage Kurdish political parties, including the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to participate in the political system in Damascus.[3] The PYD controls the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which governs SDF-controlled areas in northeastern Syria.[4] The SDF and PYD almost certainly hope to be involved in the political system in Damascus, but that is not mutually exclusive with SDF demands for regional autonomy. The SDF’s stated demands suggest that it would not be satisfied with mere political representation in Damascus and that it seeks firmer guarantees of political and security autonomy.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi implicitly threatened that Iran could decide to pursue a nuclear weapon during an interview with Sky News on January 28.[5] Araghchi stated that Iran would ”have to look for an alternative” if the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered snapback sanctions on Iran before October 2025. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[6] The E3 has until October 2025 to trigger snapback sanctions if it decides to do so. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a ”comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[7] The IAEA Board of Governors is next set to meet in March 2025.[8] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose snapback sanctions.[9] Araghchi added that there is a "heated debate" in Iran about what an "alternative" to diplomacy would be.[10] Araghchi is likely referring to the debate among Iranian officials about whether Iran should revise its nuclear doctrine and pursue a nuclear weapon.[11] That Araghchi interviewed with British outlet Sky News in English suggests that his statements were directed at the E3.

The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria.[12] The Russian delegation includes Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Presidential Special Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev. Reuters reported that two Syrian sources stated that the delegation will meet with the new Syrian government sometime this week.[13] Bogdanov told Russian state media outlet RT that the visit aims to strengthen Russian-Syrian historical relations based on common interests.[14] Bloomberg reported that a Russian source familiar with the matter stated that Russia is struggling to retain access to the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus because negotiations with the new Syrian government are "stuck."[15] Russian milbloggers responded to the Russian delegation's arrival, claiming that Syria is "far from" Russia's first or even second priority and cautioning against believing Russian or Syrian officials' "standard phrases" about cooperation.[16] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that there is no hope that Russian-Syrian relations can return to their previous strength and that Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) holds the upper hand in negotiations and can extract greater concessions from Russia.[17]

The Russian military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. Commercially available satellite imagery collected by Planet Labs PBC from January 18 and 27 shows that the Russian military loaded equipment onto the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships at Tartus and that the Sparta II ship left the port while the Sparta remained.[18] OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from January 23 showing the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler alongside the port and possibly suggesting that the Russian military was loading vehicles onto the Sparta. [19]Bloomberg reported on January 28 that a Russian source stated that two Russian transport ships - likely the Sparta and Sparta II - had been waiting for weeks off Tartus before Syrian authorities allowed them to dock.[20]

CTP-ISW has recorded no verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut-off on January 27.

Key Takeaways:

• Kurds in Syria: Turkish officials appear to believe that a planned call by imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan for the PKK to disarm would pressure the SDF into an agreement to disarm and integrate into the HTS-led interim government. The Turkish theory that the disarmament of the PKK would cause the SDF to disarm and integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry directly conflicts with how the SDF views its future in the Syrian government and northeastern Syria.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi implicitly threatened that Iran could decide to pursue a nuclear weapon during an interview with Sky News on January 28.
• Russia in Syria: The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria. The Russian military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations.

Click here to read the full report.

Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Avery Borens, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Gazan civilians began to return to the northern Gaza Strip on January 27 after Hamas fulfilled outstanding obligations under the ceasefire agreement.[1] Hamas agreed to release a female civilian hostage held by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) after the IDF prevented Palestinians from returning to the northern Gaza Strip on January 25 and 26.[2] The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) announced that Hamas would release the hostage and two additional Israeli hostages on January 30.[3] This is in addition to the three hostages Hamas will release on February 1.[4] Hamas also provided Israel with a list that confirmed 18 of the 26 remaining hostages scheduled for release during the first phase of the ceasefire are alive.[5] The list did not specify which specific individuals were and were not alive, however.

PIJ’s failure to release the hostage is unlikely to be a result of friction between PIJ and Hamas. PIJ has previously released hostages as part of the November 2023 ceasefire agreement and it has not engaged Israeli forces in the strip during the ceasefire, which indicates that PIJ continues to cooperate with Hamas.[6] Hamas released four female Israeli soldiers as part of the second hostage release on January 25 before PIJ agreed to release the fifth hostage.[7] Hamas leads a 12-member coalition of Palestinian militias that allows Hamas to coordinate operations between various Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip.[8] The breakdown surrounding the release of the fifth hostage on January 25 could be the result of a breakdown in the coordination mechanisms within this coalition, rather than a disagreement between the two factions. IDF operations have probably weakened the institutional coordination mechanisms between the two factions on the ground in the strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew from the Netzarim Corridor on January 27 to allow Gazans to return to the northern Gaza Strip via established routes.[9] The IDF withdrew from the corridor two days later than mandated under the ceasefire because Hamas violated the ceasefire agreement on January 25 by failing to release a hostage.[10] Gazans began returning to the northern Gaza Strip on foot via al Rashid Road, which is the coastal road that connects the northern and southern Gaza Strip.[11] US and Egyptian private security contractors started operating a checkpoint on the Netzarim Corridor along the Salah al Din Road where they will inspect Palestinian vehicles returning to the northern Gaza Strip.[12] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued instructions to Gazans as they returned to the northern strip and prohibited returnees from carrying weapons.[13] The spokesperson reiterated the IDF’s warnings that asked Gazans to avoid Israeli forces. Social media footage showed a large number of Palestinians moving to the northern Gaza Strip uninspected as several Hamas fighters greeted them along al Rashid Road.[14]

The return of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip will make it difficult for the IDF to conduct operations with the same intensity as it did before the ceasefire if Israel and Hamas fail to agree on a second-phase ceasefire.[15] Relatively few Gazans remained in the northern Gaza Strip after months of intense Israeli combat operations.[16] The lack of civilians enabled Israeli forces to operate more freely with a decreased risk that Israeli troops would encounter civilians. The return of approximately 650,000 Gazans will significantly increase the number of civilians in the northern strip, which will complicate the execution and planning of IDF operations.[17] New major Israeli combat operations would necessitate the evacuation of Gazan civilians, for example.

Individual Hamas fighters disguised as civilians who move north on foot could also be able to bring small numbers of weapons and small amounts of ammunition to Hamas forces in the north. Such an effort to move supplies by foot is likely insufficient to resupply Hamas forces to a point that would seriously challenge Israeli forces if the IDF resumes operations.

CTP-ISW has recorded no verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut-off on January 26.

The United States announced on January 26 that Israel and Lebanon had extended the ceasefire in Lebanon for an additional 23 days.[18] The ceasefire will now be in effect until February 18. Axios reported that the Trump administration negotiated the extension with Israel and Lebanon over the past few days.[19] The ceasefire will presumably require the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon by February 18. The LAF is also expected to backfill the IDF by this date. Israel has withdrawn from about three positions in southern Lebanon thus far and remains active in at least 12 border towns, according to local Lebanese media.[20] An IDF spokesperson announced on January 27 that the IDF had recently ”re-deployed” to several unspecified locations in southern Lebanon in order to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure.[21] The IDF spokesperson said that the implementation of the ceasefire ”is postponed” in some areas of Lebanon as the IDF needs more time to ensure that Hezbollah cannot use those areas to rebuild itself.[22]

Hezbollah requires time to rebuild and is unlikely to resume significant operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon over the next three weeks. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem rejected the ceasefire’s extension in a January 27 speech and called on Israel to withdraw immediately.[23] Hezbollah had previously threatened to resume attacks on Israel if Israel stayed in Lebanon past the January 26 deadline.[24] Qassem said that Hezbollah ”has the right to act as it sees fit” against Israel and that any ”repercussions” from the IDF’s delayed withdrawal are the responsibility of Israel and the monitors of the ceasefire, which includes the US, France, and the UN.[25] Qassem did not directly promise to resume attacks against Israeli troops operating in Lebanon, however. Qassem's restrained response to the ceasefire extension is likely a result of the severe degradation that Israeli operations had inflicted on Hezbollah prior to the ceasefire. Hezbollah likely aims to avoid engaging Israeli forces or attacking Israel as it helps rebuild Lebanon and reconstitute its forces. It is doubtful that Hezbollah has been able to reconstitute a significant portion of its military capabilities during the 60-day ceasefire period.

The SDF reportedly rejected a concessionary proposal from the HTS-led Syrian government that would require it to integrate into the interim Defense Ministry. Unspecified sources close to the new administration told Al Jazeera on January 26 that the SDF rejected a recent proposal from the Syrian government that would allow for a “decentralized” management system that provides local councils with “broad” unspecified powers, recognition of Kurdish rights and inclusion in the new Syrian constitution, and a pathway for Kurdish fighters to join Syrian military and security institutions.[26] The SDF reportedly insisted that it join the new Syrian army as an integrated unit, remain deployed in northeastern Syria, and receive portions of future oil revenue.[27] The SDF has not strayed far from its position since it began negotiations with the HTS-led government on December 30.[28] It is notable that the government’s offer does not provide any meaningful, irreversible protection for Syrian Kurds. HTS and its predecessor organizations have a long history of co-opting groups and then steadily eroding their power. The SDF is also extremely unlikely to willingly disarm while its units are actively repelling SNA attacks along the Euphrates River and Peace Spring frontlines.

Turkey’s encouragement of Turkish-backed factions to join the Syrian army is likely part of a Turkish effort to coerce the SDF to concede to the Syrian government in negotiations. Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan said on January 27 that Ankara has told Turkish-backed Syrian armed factions to integrate into the Syrian army.[29] Fidan said there are over 80,000 members of factions ”loyal” to Turkey in northern Syria.[30] Fidan also encouraged armed groups in southern Syria to do the same.[31] The integration of Turkish-backed groups, including groups currently operating within the Syrian National Army (SNA), would enable Turkey to wield significant influence within Syria’s armed forces. Turkey’s direct influence on Turkish-backed Syrian factions varies by group and some factions would be more responsive to Turkish direction than others. The HTS-led Defense Ministry has already promoted several fighters from these groups to high ranks within the Defense Ministry, however.[32] Turkey is likely encouraging these factions to join the Syrian army because it believes it will retain some influence over these groups. Turkey could then use their integration into the Syrian Defense Ministry and the Turkish influence that the integration would generate for Turkey to demonstrate to the SDF that it can encourage both the SNA and HTS-aligned forces to unite against SDF interests. The SDF has so far been unwilling to compromise on its demands as it contends with attacks from the SNA and Turkey. HTS, for its part, has been reticent to threaten the SDF with military force, though this reticence could change as the SDF maintains its position.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Gazan civilians began to return to the northern Gaza Strip on January 27 after Hamas and PIJ fulfilled outstanding obligations under the ceasefire agreement. PIJ’s failure to release the hostage is unlikely to be a result of friction between PIJ and Hamas. PIJ has previously released hostages as part of the November 2023 ceasefire agreement and it has not engaged Israeli forces in the strip during the ceasefire, which indicates that PIJ continues to cooperate with Hamas.
• Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire: The United States announced on January 26 that Israel and Lebanon had extended the ceasefire in Lebanon for an additional 23 days. Hezbollah requires time to rebuild and is unlikely to resume significant operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon over the next three weeks.
• Syrian Army Formation: The SDF reportedly rejected a concessionary proposal from the HTS-led Syrian government that would require it to integrate into the interim Defense Ministry. Turkey’s encouragement of Turkish-backed factions to join the Syrian army is likely part of a Turkish effort to coerce the SDF to concede to the Syrian government in negotiations.

Iran Update, January 26, 2025

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Annika Ganzeveld, Siddhant Kishore, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Kelly Campa, and Nicholas Carl

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) agreed to release a female civilian hostage after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) prevented Palestinians from returning to the northern Gaza Strip on January 25 and 26.[1]PIJ confirmed that hostage, Arbel Yehud, is “alive and in good health” and stated it will release Yehud after reaching an agreement with the mediators.[2] Israel accused Hamas of violating the ceasefire agreement on January 25 by releasing female soldiers before female civilians.[3] In response, the IDF maintained its position in the Netzarim Corridor along al Rashid Road—the coastal road that connects the northern and southern Gaza Strip—preventing Gazans from returning to the northern Gaza Strip.[4] The IDF reiterated on January 26 that it will only fulfill its requirement to allow Palestinians to move to the northern part of the strip once PIJ releases Yehud.[5] The Palestinian Resistance Committee (PRC) and PIJ jointly took Yehud hostage on October 7, 2023.[6]

CTP-ISW has recorded no verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 25.

The IDF fired at individuals in southern Lebanon on January 26 in order to eliminate “imminent threats” to Israeli forces. The 60-day Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire period ended on January 26.[7] The ceasefire agreement stipulates a full IDF withdrawal from Lebanon by January 26.[8] Israel announced on January 24 that the IDF will refrain from withdrawing from southern Lebanon by January 26 because the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) purportedly failed to destroy Hezbollah weapons and military infrastructure south of the Litani River, which it is required to do, according to the ceasefire agreement.[9] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson re-issued warnings to residents against returning to 62 towns in southern Lebanon on January 25.[10] Lebanese media claimed that returning residents entered 22 towns in southeastern Lebanon and 13 towns in southwestern Lebanon on January 26.[11] The LAF “accompanied" some residents as they returned to several towns.[12]  The IDF stated that it used ”dispersal fire” to eliminate threats posed to Israeli forces, including at ”rioters” and at a vehicle flagged with a Hezbollah flag that approached Israeli forces.[13]  Lebanese media claimed that the IDF fired artillery and small arms at Lebanese residents and LAF soldiers in several towns in southeastern Lebanon.[14] The Lebanese Health Ministry reported that Israeli operations killed at least 23 people, including an LAF soldier, and injured 124 additional people in southern Lebanon.[15] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson accused Hezbollah of exploiting residents to cover up the repercussions of its “irresponsible decisions.”[16]

The Iraqi Progress Party, which is a Sunni political party headed by former Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, signaled its openness to forming an alliance with the Sadrist Movement ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections. Progress Party spokesperson Yahya al Mohammadi stated on January 26 that the Sadrist Movement’s withdrawal from politics after the October 2021 parliamentary elections created a “defect” in the Iraqi political system.[17] Mohammadi stated that “political balances” and “future visions for the formation of the next government” will determine whether the Progress Party allies with the Sadrist Movement. Mohammadi’s statements come after the newly formed United Sunni Leadership Coalition has aligned with Sadr on several issues in recent weeks.[18] Prominent Sunni politician Khamis al Khanjar, who helped establish the United Sunni Leadership Coalition, recently called on Iraqi political parties to adopt Sadr’s position of “non-interference” in Syria, for example.[19]

The United States will deliver a shipment of 1,800 MK-84 general purpose aircraft munitions to Israel in the “coming days.”[20]  US President Donald Trump said that the United States has been holding these bombs in storage since May 2024.[21]

Syrian border forces thwarted a smuggling attempt to resupply Hezbollah in Lebanon from Rif Dimashq on January 25.[22] The General Directorate of Border Security announced that it seized a shipment of rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and ammunition in Serghaya, Rif Dimashq, before the shipment reached Lebanon.[23] The General Directorate specified that the weapons were intended for Hezbollah.[24] Syrian government forces recently interdicted a drone shipment in Tartus likely intended to resupply Hezbollah.[25] The General Directorate did not specify the identities of the smugglers but noted that the shipment traveled through existing smuggling routes. It is unlikely that these networks fully collapsed when the Assad regime fell, despite the flight of numerous Iranian-backed elements from Syria.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: PIJ agreed to release a female civilian hostage after the IDF prevented Palestinians from returning to the northern Gaza Strip.
• Lebanon: The IDF fired at individuals in southern Lebanon on January 26 in order to eliminate “imminent threats” to Israeli forces.
• Iraq: The Iraqi Progress Party signaled its openness to forming an alliance with the Sadrist Movement ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections.
• Syria: Syrian border forces thwarted a smuggling attempt to resupply Hezbollah in Lebanon from Rif Dimashq.

Iran Update, January 25, 2025

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Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Johanna Moore, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Israel announced on January 25 that it will prevent Palestinians from returning to the northern Gaza Strip because Hamas violated the ceasefire agreement.[1] Hamas released four female Israeli soldiers as part of the second hostage release on January 25.[2] Israel accused Hamas of violating the ceasefire agreement by releasing female soldiers before female civilians.[3] Israel announced that it will only fulfill its requirement to allow Palestinians to move to the northern part of the strip once Hamas releases female civilian hostage Arbel Yehud, whom Israel expected to be released on January 25.[4] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is holding Yehud in the Gaza Strip.[5] A Hamas official said that Yehud is alive and will be released during the next hostage release on February 1.[6] Israeli media reported that talks are underway to expedite Yehud’s release.[7] A US National Security Council official told Axios that the United States is ”continuing to push” for Yehud’s release ”through negotiation channels.”[8] Israel released 200 Palestinian prisoners, including 120 who were serving life sentences for killing Israelis, into the West Bank, Egypt, and the Gaza Strip as part of the hostage-prisoner release on January 25.[9]

CTP-ISW has recorded no verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 24.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) tried to attack the Sayyidah Zeynab shrine in Damascus, which a prominent Shia religious site, likely in order to stoke sectarian tensions in Syria. The Washington Post, citing informed officials, reported that the United States has shared intelligence with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) to thwart recent ISIS attacks, including one targeting the Sayyidah Zeynab shrine, southeast of Damascus.[10] Syrian state media reported on January 11 that the General Security Department and General Intelligence Service stopped four ISIS suicide bombers from attacking the shrine.[11] ISIS attacks targeting Shia sites could delegitimize HTS as the primary governing authority in Syria. Iran has similarly leveraged the shrine’s religious significance to drive a sectarian information operation against HTS.[12] Attacks on the shrine resonate with other Syrian minority groups outside of the Twelver Shia sect who also appear increasingly distrustful of the HTS-led interim Syrian government.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israel announced that it will prevent Palestinians from returning to the northern Gaza Strip because Hamas violated the ceasefire agreement.
• Syria: The ISIS tried to attack the Sayyidah Zeynab shrine in Damascus, which a prominent Shia religious site, likely in order to stoke sectarian tensions in Syria.

Iran Update, January 24, 2025

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Carolyn Moorman, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Israel stated that the list of four female soldier hostages whom Hamas will release on January 25 would violate the ceasefire agreement.[1] Hamas provided a list of four female soldiers to be released on January 25, though the Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal stipulated that Hamas would release female civilians before soldiers.[2] The Wall Street Journal reported that two female civilian hostages expected to be released in phase one of the deal remain in the Gaza Strip.[3]

CTP-ISW has recorded no verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut-off on January 23.

The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office announced on January 24 that the IDF will refrain from withdrawing from southern Lebanon by January 26.[4] The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement stipulates that the IDF would withdraw by then and that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would backfill.[5] Axios reported that Israel maintains that the LAF failed to destroy Hezbollah weapons and military infrastructure south of the Litani River, which it is required to do according to the ceasefire agreement.[6] The Lebanese government stated that it considers the continued IDF presence a “violation“ of the ceasefire agreement and called for the United States to intervene.[7] US National Security Council spokesperson Brian Hughes said on January 24 that a “short, temporary ceasefire extension is urgently needed.”[8]

The Autonomous Administration of North and Eastern Syria (AANES), the de-facto governing authority of northeastern Syria, announced on January 23 that it has “open[ed] the door” for Syrian internally displaced persons (IDP) in al Hol to return to their place of residence.[9] Al Hol is a refugee camp for ISIS family members and persons displaced by ISIS in Hasakah, northeastern Syria. Al Hol camp director Jihan Hanan stated on January 24 that the camp has begun preparations to return 66 volunteer families to areas in Syria.[10] Hanan did not comment on whether the families’ return is being coordinated with the HTS-led interim Syrian government.

Al Hol camp continues to constitute a serious risk to Syrian stability and US national security due to the presence of ISIS supporters in the camp. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) faces bandwidth and resource constraints as it contends with separate possibly existential fights with Arab tribal forces and a potential Turkish offensive.[11] The SDF has almost certainly redirected resources away from al Hol and counter-ISIS operations to support other lines of effort already.[12] The SDF has previously announced large-scale releases of IDPs, however, the SDF very likely lacks the capacity to ensure thorough repatriation, rehabilitation, and reintegration efforts.[13] Al Hol contains over 40,000 IDPs, many of whom have ties to ISIS and support ISIS recruitment.[14] The mass release of displaced persons risks providing new opportunities to ISIS by dispersing a vulnerable population into areas where ISIS is active.[15] ISIS would likely capitalize on the mass release of Syrians to increase recruitment efforts among these returnees.[16] The SDF, HTS, and Turkey almost certainly lack the ability to adequately integrate the camp’s occupants into Syrian society.

Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid claimed on January 24 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have stopped military activities due to the Iraqi federal government’s insistence.[17] Rashid added that there is “no threat to any party in Iraq,” in an interview with Sky News Arabia.[18] Rashid’s remarks follow multiple Iraqi officials saying that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are integrating into the Iraqi armed forces or the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[19] The United States has reportedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the PMF and warned that the United States could strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[20] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that the integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi armed forces must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or partner interests in the Middle East.[21] The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the armed forces in a way that does not meet these criteria would harm US interests in the region.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israel stated that the list of four female soldier hostages whom Hamas will release would violate the ceasefire agreement.
• Lebanon: Israel announced that the IDF will refrain from withdrawing from southern Lebanon by January 26.
• Syria: The governing authority in northeastern Syria announced plans to release IDPs from the heavily ISIS-penetrated al Hol refugee camp.
• Iraq: Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid claimed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have stopped military activities after insistence from the Iraqi federal government.

Iran Update, January 23, 2025

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Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Annika Ganzeveld, Avery Borens, Victoria Penza, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

CTP-ISW has recorded no verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 22.

Israel and Hamas appear to have agreed to allow Gazans to return from the southern to the northern Gaza Strip. This agreement may prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from moving large quantities of weapons and fighters to the northern Gaza Strip. A multinational consortium led by US and Egyptian contractors will oversee the movement of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip. Unspecified Israeli officials told Axios on January 23 that Israel and Hamas agreed to establish a multinational consortium to oversee vehicle movement through the Netzarim Corridor.[1] The consortium will include two United States-based private security firms and an Egyptian company. The consortium will establish a vehicle checkpoint on Salah al Din Road at the corridor once the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdraws from the area. Hamas will likely try to move materiel and resources to the northern Gaza Strip via Salah al Din Road, which the vehicle checkpoint should prevent. Hamas announced that Gazans can return to the northern Gaza Strip on foot via al Rashid Road — the coastal road that connects the northern and southern Gaza Strip—after the IDF withdraws from there.[2] The ceasefire agreement requires the IDF to withdraw from al Rashid Road by January 25.[3] Hamas will likely try to move fighters and weapons via al Rashid Road to the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas fighters who transit al Rashid Road on foot will not be able to carry large weaponry or large amounts of ammunition, however.

Lebanese Hezbollah called on the Lebanese government to pressure the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon if the IDF remains past January 26, which is the date by which the IDF is required by the ceasefire with Hezbollah to withdraw.[4] Hezbollah emphasized that the IDF must withdraw from Lebanon by January 26 but refrained from explicitly threatening to attack if the IDF does not withdraw. CTP-ISW continues to assess that it is unlikely that Hezbollah will resume attacks targeting Israel at this time. Israeli media reported on January 23, citing an informed source familiar, that Israel submitted a request to the United States to postpone its withdrawal from Lebanon by 30 days. Israeli media reported that members of the ceasefire monitoring committee, including the United States, France, Lebanon, and Israel, discussed the request. Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri met with the chair of the ceasefire monitoring committee, US Army Major General Jasper Jeffers, on January 23, likely to discuss the request.[5] Israeli government spokesperson David Mencer stated on January 23 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UNIFIL have made “positive movements . . . but not fast enough.”[6]

The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or allied interests in the Middle East. The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the security establishment in a way that does not meet these criteria would harm US interests in the region. The presence of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the Iraqi security establishment who answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister would increase Iranian influence and facilitate Iranian capture of the Iraqi security establishment. The Iraqi federal government’s failure to punish militias who conduct attacks without the permission of the state would encourage the militias to conduct further attacks, given that they have no incentive to stop their attacks. The Iraqi federal government has notably previously failed to deter Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from attacking Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria.

The Iraqi federal government has reportedly offered to protect Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from foreign attacks and allow them to keep their weapons in return for the militias integrating into the Iraqi security establishment.[7] These concessions do not guarantee that the militias will answer to the Iraqi prime minister instead of Iran. These concessions also do not guarantee that the militias will not conduct attacks targeting US or allied interests. Granting these concessions and failing to impose other requirements on the militias to join the Iraqi security establishment could therefore harm US security interests in the region.

Over 130 unspecified Iraqi parliamentarians signed a petition to remove Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, possibly because he recently helped establish a new Sunni political alliance and pass the General Amnesty Law. Parliament passed three “controversial” laws — including the General Amnesty Law — on January 21.[8] The General Amnesty Law will grant amnesty to a large number of Iraqis who were previously wrongfully imprisoned. The law is a long-standing demand for Sunni political parties in Iraq. The State of Law Coalition, which is headed by former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and part of the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework, and some independent parliamentarians have challenged the constitutionality of the January 21 parliament session in the Iraqi Federal Court.[9] A petition to remove the parliament speaker requires 109 signatures. An absolute majority vote of 165 parliamentarians is subsequently required to remove the parliament speaker.[10] Mashhadani’s deputy, Shia Coordination Framework member Mohsen al Mandalawi, would become the temporary parliament speaker if Mashhadani was removed.[11] Mandalawi previously served as interim parliament speaker between November 2023 and October 2024, while Parliament struggled to elect a new speaker.[12] The petition to remove Mashhadani comes after he helped form the United Sunni Leadership Coalition in early January 2024. The coalition called on the Sudani administration to implement nine long-standing Sunni demands — including passing the General Amnesty Law — on January 18.[13]

Turkey has reportedly made an agreement with imprisoned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan to disarm the PKK. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Nationalist Movement Party leader Devlet Bahçeli have recently held talks with Ocalan.[14] Ocalan will reportedly publicly call on the PKK to “lay down arms” on February 15, according to the director of the Washington DC-based Middle East Institute’s Turkey Program.[15] The Turkish government will reportedly release Ocalan from prison and draft a new constitution that includes Kurdish rights and other unspecified changes in return.[16] "PKK-linked groups" will reportedly share power with the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and integrate some forces into the new Syrian armed forces as part of the agreement.[17] It is unclear whether “PKK-linked groups” includes the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Turkey often conflates the SDF and the PKK-linked Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) with the PKK and uses “PKK” to refer to the entire SDF. PKK groups in Qandil, northern Iraq, have reportedly agreed to the terms of the agreement.[18] CTP-ISW cannot verify this report. The demand for “PKK-linked groups” to share authority with the KNC is consistent with Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani’s efforts to pressure the SDF to work with minority Kurdish parties and avoid a full-scale conflict with Turkey.[19] It remains unclear whether the PKK would heed calls from Ocalan to disarm. The disarmament of the PKK would also likely not satisfy Turkey’s demand to “eliminate” the SDF.[20]

Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra warned that the Syrian interim government is “ready” to use force against the SDF if needed as part of the government effort to integrate the SDF into the new Syrian armed forces.[21] Qasra told reporters on January 22 that the interim government is continuing to negotiate with the SDF but that “if we have to use force, we will be ready.”[22] Qasra's comment is the most explicit threat an interim government official has made to use military action against the SDF. The SDF has so far refused to disarm and integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry and has instead called for a “decentralized” system that would allow the SDF to join the new Syrian armed forces as a “bloc” and remain deployed in northeastern Syria.[23] The interim government is currently pursuing a two-pronged strategy to coerce the SDF to disarm: it is actively negotiating with the SDF while simultaneously coordinating with Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). Turkey and the SNA are both actively fighting the SDF in northern Syria. A Syrian government decision to deploy forces to SDF frontlines would mark a significant departure from the government’s current strategy. Syrian government leadership, such as Shara and Qasra, may calculate that HTS military involvement would sufficiently coerce the SDF to disarm, which it has so far been unwilling to do through negotiations with HTS alone.

The HTS-led Department of Military Operations seized a swath of strategically significant territory near the Zamla oil field, south of Raqqa, in the Syrian Badia on January 23. Geolocated footage shows a Department of Military Operations convoy arriving in Zamla, a town around 12 kilometers south of Rusafa, on January 23.[24] Syrian media reported that HTS-led forces took control of several oil fields near Zamla and several towns in the desert west of Zamla.[25] The commander of the SDF-affiliated Northern Democratic Brigade said on January 23 that the SDF recently warned the international coalition about the threat of ISIS in the “significant security vacuum” between SDF-held territory and Syrian interim government-held territory.[26] Assad regime forces and Iranian-backed militias formerly controlled Zamla and its oil fields, and the withdrawal of regime-affiliated forces could allow ISIS to resurge in those areas.[27] The commander said that the SDF, Department of Military Operations, and international coalition recently held a meeting near Rusafa and that Department of Military Operations forces subsequently deployed to the area.[28] This meeting and subsequent deployment is consistent with likely HTS objectives to consolidate control over areas of the Syrian Badia, particularly in areas where ISIS could grow and resurge.

The Department of Military Operations forces deployed to a strategically significant position, from which they could pressure the SDF salient south of Lake Assad. The deployment of these forces comes after Qasra warned that the Syrian government is ready for a potential military operation against the SDF. The interim government's deployment of forces to Rusafa may set conditions for a potential operation. The current HTS position in the Rusafa desert is located at the crossroads of government-held territory to the west and SDF-held territory to the north. Such a position would allow HTS-led forces to advance north and potentially cut off the SDF’s southern salient along the southwestern bank of Lake Assad from the rear, disrupting an SDF defense of Raqqa. The Rusafa position is furthermore located south of Ain Issa, where SNA forces are currently deployed. The HTS-led forces and SNA could possibly coordinate to envelope Raqqa City from the north and south. CTP-ISW has not observed any indicators that HTS is planning a military operation targeting the SDF at the time of this writing, however.

Anti-SDF media reported that the Department of Military Operations reportedly clashed with SDF-affiliated gunmen in the village of Amala, west of Zamla, and captured several men.[29] The SDF denied that its forces clashed with Syrian government forces in the area and blamed “Turkish-run media” for spreading false narratives.[30]

The HTS-led interim government appears to be forming a police force that is centered on Islamic principles.[31] Members of the HTS police force in Idlib have traveled to Damascus to recruit police officers. The HTS police has asked applicants a series of questions about their beliefs and training for new recruits is focused on Sharia Law. Unspecified Syrian officers cited by Reuters stated that the Islamic teaching is intended to instill morality in the new Syrian police force. Reuters cited Syrian civilians who expressed apprehension toward a police force based on religious doctrine. Minority Syrian communities have expressed distrust toward the Sunni majority HTS-led interim government following reports of sectarian motivated attacks by HTS-affiliated fighters.[32]

Key Takeaways:

• Turkey and Syria: Turkey has reportedly made an agreement with imprisoned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan to disarm the PKK. Ocalan will reportedly publicly call on the PKK to “lay down arms” on February 15.
• SDF Negotiations: The Syrian Interim Defense Minister said that the interim government is continuing to negotiate with the SDF but that “if we have to use force, we will be ready.” His comment is the most explicit threat an interim government official has made to use military action against the SDF.
• HTS Deployment: The HTS-led Department of Military Operations seized a swath of strategically significant territory near the Zamla oil field, south of Raqqa, in the Syrian Badia on January 23. The Department of Military Operations forces deployed to a strategically significant position, from which they could pressure the SDF salient south of Lake Assad.
• Iraq: The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or allied interests in the Middle East.

Iran Update, January 22, 2025

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Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

CTP-ISW did not record verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or reports of attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 21.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) announced the formation of joint operations rooms in the West Bank on January 22 with Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades’ fighters.[1] The PIJ statement claimed the joint operations rooms would coordinate and develop ”field work” and ”joint action.” The joint operations rooms will be comprised of fighters from PIJ’s al Quds Brigades, Hamas’ al Qassem Brigades, and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades’ ”Youth of Revenge and Liberation” branch.[2] The ”Youth of Revenge and Liberation” branch, which is one of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades many branches based in various locations throughout the West Bank, was active in Tulkarm in summer 2024.[3] It is unclear at this time where the joint operations rooms will be based, or which subgroup or groups of the ”Youth of Revenge and Liberation” branch will be involved. Hamas, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and PIJ previously established a combined operations room known as ”the Hornets’ Nest” that was based in Jenin and active from 2022-2024. The Hornets’ Nest also included the military wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, among others.[4] PIJ, Hamas, and the “Youth of Revenge and Liberation” claimed to fire small arms and detonate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in a combined operation targeting the IDF in Jenin on January 22.[5]

Iraq may attempt to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi army after the withdrawal of US forces, which would not satisfy US demands to dissolve the militias. A senior Iraqi diplomat claimed on January 22 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will only integrate into the Iraqi army after US forces completely withdraw from Iraq.[6]  The outgoing Biden administration reportedly pressured the Iraqi government to dissolve the Iranian-backed Iraq militias.[7] The integration of the militias would instead increase their influence within the army, which is deeply problematic given the backgrounds and loyalties of many of these groups. Many of these groups have committed acts of sectarian cleansing dating back to the 2000s, which would destroy the national character of the Iraqi army if the government reflagged entire militia units as Iraqi army units.[8] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and the Badr Organization, swear allegiance to the Iranian supreme leader, not the Iraqi state.[9] The state-recognized wings of these groups within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) already answer to militia chains of command—not the Iraqi prime minister—and there is no reason to believe that these groups would adhere to an Iraqi army chain of command if reflagged as Iraqi army units. The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining troops would withdraw by the end of 2026.[10] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani told Saudi outlet al Elaph in January 2025 that the Iraqi government is actively trying to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within Iraq’s legal and institutional framework.[11]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba head Akram al Kaabi threatened to resume rocket and missile attacks targeting US forces in Iraq if the United States extends its presence past the September 2025 withdrawal date or makes “sudden moves.”[12] Kaabi added that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will increase the pace of attacks targeting US forces if the United States delays its withdrawal from Ain al Asad airbase.[13] It is notable that US-led international coalition forces will withdraw from some areas in Iraq, including the Ain al Asad airbase, by September 2025 but will not withdraw completely from Iraq until the end of 2026.[14]

Unspecified Western officials told The Financial Times on January 22 that two Iranian cargo vessels carrying a large amount of chemical precursor for solid missile propellant will travel from China to Iran over the next few weeks.[15] The officials expect the vessels to arrive at Bandar-e Abbas port in southern Iran and deliver the material to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The ships are expected to carry more than 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate, which can be converted to slightly over 1000 tons of ammonium perchlorate, the main component for solid propellant for missiles. Ammonium perchlorate needs to be mixed with other components to create solid fuel propellant for missiles. The unspecified officials estimated that 1000 tons of ammonium perchlorate can—if converted to solid fuel propellant—fuel up to 260 mid-range Iranian ballistic missiles, including the Kheybar Shekan and Haj Qassem. Iran used Kheybar Shekan missiles in both April and October 2024 missile attacks on [16]

Israeli damage estimates from the IDF strikes on Iran in October 2024 suggest that Iran’s missile production capabilities likely remain limited, however. Unspecified Israeli sources reported that the IDF strikes hit 12 planetary mixers used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[17] Iran can reportedly not produce the mixers domestically and remanufacturing the mixers could take at least a year. Iran needs these mixers to combine various components, including ammonium perchlorate, and create solid propellant for missiles. It is not clear if Iran has mixing facilities at other locations but the loss of 12 mixers has likely significantly degraded Iran’s ability to produce missiles and mount a large-scale attack on Israel soon, regardless of Iran’s supply of ammonium perchlorate.

Iran has previously used ammonium perchlorate for internal missile production and exported it to members of the Axis of Resistance. Iran engaged in secret negotiations with China and Russia in April 2023 to acquire a Chinese supply of ammonium perchlorate for its solid-fueled missiles.[18] The US Navy also interdicted an IRGC shipment of 70 tons of ammonium perchlorate en route from Iran to the Houthis in November 2024. The Houthis could use ammonium perchlorate as a precursor for solid fuel propellant, but there is currently no evidence that the Houthis can manufacture solid fuel. The ammonium perchlorate can also be used to make explosives.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: CTP-ISW did not record verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or reports of attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 21.
• West Bank: Palestinian Islamic Jihad announced the formation of joint operations rooms in the West Bank on January 22 with Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades’ fighters.
• Iraq: Iraq may attempt to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi army after the withdrawal of US forces, which would not satisfy US demands to dissolve the militias. The integration of the militias would instead increase their influence within the army, which is deeply problematic given the backgrounds and loyalties of many of these groups.
• Iran: Unspecified Western officials told The Financial Times on January 22 that two Iranian cargo vessels carrying a large amount of chemical precursor for solid missile propellant will travel from China to Iran over the next few weeks. Israeli damage estimates from the IDF strikes on Iran in October 2024 suggest that Iran’s missile production capabilities likely remain limited, however.

Iran Update, January 21, 2025

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Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Hamas coordinated the distribution of aid and facilitated the movement of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip, which demonstrates that Hamas retains some degree of governing authority after 15 months of war. The Associated Press reported that Hamas has patrolled aid convoy routes, coordinated the distribution of humanitarian aid, and monitored the return of Gazans to Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip after the ceasefire went into effect.[1] Some Gazans began to return from IDF-designated humanitarian zones to the northern Gaza Strip on January 19, and the IDF announced on January 21 that it would soon allow Gazans to return from the southern Gaza Strip to the northern Gaza Strip.[2]

These tasks make Hamas the de facto governing body in the Gaza Strip, at least in certain areas. The activities listed above—distribution and protection of aid and “monitoring” returnees—do not indicate that Hamas runs a Gazan government like it did prior to October 7. Hamas does appear to function as a proto-government that can provide and distribute basic services and goods while controlling the population, which would be consistent with an insurgent organization that seeks to re-exert control over the Gaza Strip. It is notable in this context that Hamas is the sole actor in the Gaza Strip capable and willing to undertake this relatively broad spectrum of tasks. Hamas therefore appears to be prepared to reemerge as the sole authority in the Gaza Strip, even though the IDF destroyed its government structure. Hamas will likely begin to use its small, insurgent-like cells of fighters to reimpose its control over the population and other armed groups, including criminal elements.

Hamas announced that it will release four female Israeli hostages on January 25.[3] Hamas previously announced that it would release the next group of hostages on January 26.[4] The ceasefire agreement requires Hamas to release three hostages every Saturday during the first phase of the ceasefire-hostage deal and 14 hostages on the last day of the first phase.[5] Hamas released three Israeli hostages on the first day of the ceasefire on January 19.[6]

The IDF chief of staff and Southern Command commander both resigned on January 21. Both officers said that they took responsibility for failing to prevent Hamas’ October 7 attack into Israel.[7] Herzi Halevi will officially leave as chief of staff on March 6, four days after the first phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement ends.[8] Halevi stated that the IDF has not fully destroyed Hamas’ governance and military capabilities or returned Israeli hostages held in the Gaza Strip.[9] Halevi called for an external committee to investigate the IDF’s failure on October 7.[10] IDF Southern Command Commander Major General Yaron Finkelman also resigned on January 21. Finkelman cited his failure to protect Israel on October 7.[11] The IDF Southern Command is responsible for areas of southern Israel, including the area along the Israel-Gaza Strip border.[12]

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) faces resource and bandwidth constraints as it contends with separate possibly existential fights with Arab tribal forces and a potential Turkish offensive. The SDF is currently engaged against the SNA on the western bank of the Euphrates River and Arab tribal forces under the command of Sheikh Ibrahim al Hifl in Deir ez Zor.[13] The SNA has deployed to the lines of control at Kobani, Ain Issa, and Tal Tamr, which CTP-ISW assessed may be in preparation for a three-pronged assault to collapse SDF defenses along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.[14] The SNA and Turkey have continued to attack SDF positions along key ground lines of communication to interdict supplies and reinforcements from the east, which would isolate SDF forces along the river.[15]

The Arab tribal attacks against the SDF may imperil the SDF’s ability to defend against a Turkish or Turkish-backed offensive. The SDF deployed reinforcements from Hasakah to Deir ez Zor on January 21, which could leave SDF defenses in Tal Tamr, Hasakah Province, vulnerable to a Turkish or SNA attack if the SDF weakened any reserve or frontline positions near Tal Tamr.[16] The SDF’s decision to withdraw forces from Hasakah leaves this front relatively more vulnerable to Turkish or SNA capture, depending on the strength of the forces that the SDF has redeployed. CTP-ISW cannot ascertain from where in Hasakah Province the SDF redeployed forces. The requirement on the SDF to deploy forces to Deir ez Zor nonetheless further strains SDF bandwidth. A Deir ez Zor-based journalist reported that the SDF deployed forces to Dhiban, Tayyana, Kasra, and Hajin in Deir ez Zor Province.[17] The SDF has fought Arab tribal forces that are likely under the guidance of Sheikh Ibrahim al Hifl in Deir ez Zor since December 20.[18] The SNA has deployed forces toward Tal Tamr in recent weeks, possibly in preparation for a Turkish or Turkish-backed offensive.[19]

Turkey and the SNA have concentrated air and artillery strikes on SDF positions around the Tishreen Dam since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on January 20.[20] The SNA has deployed forces to the lines of control at Ain Issa and Kobani. CTP-ISW assessed that these forces could launch two lines of advance to collapse SDF defenses along the eastern bank of the Euphrates.[21] Turkish and SNA strikes on SDF positions could set conditions for an SNA assault. The SNA and Turkey have conducted strikes on SDF positions along a key ground line of communication in northern Syria that would isolate the SDF at Qara Qozak Bridge.[22]

The head of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba’s political bureau claimed on January 19 that the group would disarm only if Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani “frankly or directly” requested its disarmament.[23]  Sistani is the highest Shia religious authority in Iraq. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Political Bureau head Ali al Asadi likely made this comment in response to Iraqi federal government efforts to convince Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to either surrender their weapons or join the official Iraqi security apparatus.[24]  Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba leader Akram al Kaabi has previously said that this militia takes its political and religious direction from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei instead of Sistani. Kaabi’s previous statement that Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba takes direction from Khamenei is inconsistent with Asadi’s invocation of Sistani’s authority.[25] Sistani said in November 2024 that arms should be confined to the Iraqi state.[26] Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, denied that Sistani’s call was directed at the militias.[27] It is unclear if other Iranian-backed militias besides Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba would agree to disarm if Sistani directly requested that they disarm. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba is also implicitly bypassing and rejecting the authority of the Iraqi federal government by the invocation of Sistani’s authority. Sistani does not hold an official position in the Iraqi government.

Victory Coalition spokesperson Salam al Zubaidi separately claimed on January 21 that the Iraqi federal government will be able to force Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to surrender their weapons and integrate “rehabilitated elements” into the Iraqi military establishment or the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[28] The Victory Coalition is a Shia political party that is led by former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi. It is part of the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework, but Abadi attempted to form a political party with Ammar al Hakim in 2020 that would have supported then-Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi and opposed Iranian-backed groups.[29] Zubaidi claimed that a “large portion” of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could surrender their weapons and integrate into the Iraqi military establishment and the PMF “in the coming days.”[30]

The Iraqi parliament passed three controversial laws on January 21. Some parliamentarians have claimed that parliament lacked a legal quorum when it passed the laws.[31] Parliament passed the Personal Status Law, General Amnesty Law, and Property Restitution Law on January 21. The Personal Status Law, which gives Islamic courts increased authority over matters like marriage, is mainly supported by Shia political parties.[32] Iraqi law previously set the minimum age for marriage at 18, but the Personal Status Law allows Shia and Sunni clerics to permit marriages at younger ages based on different interpretations of Islamic law.[33] The General Amnesty Law grants amnesty to many Iraqis whom Iraqi courts wrongfully convicted. Sunni political parties have long demanded the implementation of this law.[34] Some parliamentarians claimed that parliament passed these laws without a quorum. They also accused Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani and his deputies of adding amendments to the laws without discussion and leading a vote on all three laws as a package.[35] Independent parliamentarian Zuhair Fatlawi told Iraqi media that over 180 parliamentarians left parliament before the vote. Over 50 parliamentarians started a petition to remove Mashhadani.[36]

The Iraqi parliament did not vote on an amendment that would benefit Kurdish political parties during its session on January 21, despite the amendment appearing on the parliamentary agenda.[37] This amendment would increase the Iraqi federal government’s compensation for oil production in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) from $6 to $16 and in return, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) would resume oil exports.[38] Some Shia political parties walked out of parliament on January 19 in protest against the amendment.[39] A Shia Coordination Framework-aligned parliamentarian told Iraqi media on January 21 that parliament delayed the vote on the amendment due to the addition of a new amendment to the budget.[40]

An “official source” told Iraqi media that the Shia Coordination Framework supports legislation that would replace the Accountability and Justice Commission with a judicial body that would vet political candidates.[41] The Iraqi government established the Accountability and Justice Commission in 2008 to rid Iraq of Baathist ideology, but it was weaponized by Shia politicians to target Sunnis and secular Iraqis to prevent Sunnis and secular Iraqis from winning elections.[42] Any government body created to replace the commission and scrutinize political candidates is liable to abuse. It remains unclear what responsibilities the proposed judicial body would have. This report comes after the United Sunni Leadership Coalition called for the dissolution of the Accountability and Justice Commission, among other demands, on January 18.[43]

Russia may have reached an agreement with the HTS-led interim government to evacuate Russian military assets from Syria. Marine Traffic, a shipping tracking website shows that the Russian cargo ship Sparta II entered the port of Tartus on January 21. The Sparta II is likely transferring Russian military equipment to Libya, given that the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russia intended to use the Sparta II to transport equipment from Syria to Libya.[44] Commercially available satellite imagery shows that columns of Russian military equipment and cargo have remained lined up for evacuation at the port since at least December 17.  Sparta II’s entry into the port suggests that Russia and the HTS-led interim government recently reached an agreement that allows Russian vessels to enter the port. The GUR reported as recently as January 12 that the HTS-led government had not granted permission for Russian ships to enter the port.[45] The GUR also reported that Russian Rear Admiral Valery Varfolomeyev failed to negotiate Russian entry to the port on January 9.[46]  At least three other Russian vessels, including two landing ships and a cargo ship, have remained off the coast of Tartus since January 6.[47]

The HTS-led interim government also suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus. The Tartus customs director told Syrian media on January 20 that the interim government suspended a previous agreement that allowed an unspecified Russian company to invest in the port of Tartus.[48] The director claimed that the interim government would receive all the revenue that the Russian company accrued.[49] The Assad regime leased control of the port of Tartous to the Russian oil and gas company Stroytransgaz in 2019 for 49 years.[50] It is unclear if Russia and the HTS-led interim government have reached a definitive agreement on the future of Russian basing rights in Syria. HTS’s decision to end Russian financial involvement in Tartus suggests that HTS intends to reassert Syrian control over the port, which makes it unlikely that Russia will maintain a military presence there.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Hamas coordinated the distribution of aid and facilitated the movement of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip, which demonstrates that Hamas retains some degree of governing authority after 15 months of war. These tasks make Hamas the de facto governing body in the Gaza Strip, at least in certain areas. The activities listed above—distribution and protection of aid and “monitoring” returnees—do not indicate that Hamas runs a Gazan government like it did prior to October 7, however.
• IDF Resignations: The IDF chief of staff and Southern Command commander both resigned on January 21. Both officers said that they took responsibility for failing to prevent Hamas’ October 7 attack into Israel.
• Syrian Democratic Forces: The US-backed SDF faces resource and bandwidth constraints as it contends with separate and possibly existential fights with Arab tribal forces and a potential Turkish offensive. The Arab tribal attacks against the SDF may imperil the SDF’s ability to defend against a Turkish or Turkish-backed offensive.
• Iraqi Militia Disarmament: The head of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba’s political bureau claimed on January 19 that the group would disarm only if Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani “frankly or directly” requested its disarmament. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba leader Akram al Kaabi has previously said that this militia takes its political and religious direction from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei instead of Sistani. Kaabi’s previous statement that Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba takes direction from Khamenei is inconsistent with Asadi’s invocation of Sistani’s authority.
• Iraqi Politics: An “official source” told Iraqi media that the Shia Coordination Framework supports legislation that would replace the Accountability and Justice Commission with a judicial body that would vet political candidates.
• Russia in Syria: Russia may have reached an agreement with the HTS-led interim government to evacuate Russian military assets from Syria. The HTS-led interim government also suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus.

Iran Update, January 20, 2025

Click here to read the full report.

Siddhant Kishore, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Kelly Campa, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

CTP-ISW did not record verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or reports of attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 19

Hamas announced that the next round of hostage releases will occur on January 26.[1] Hamas released three female Israeli hostages on the first day of the ceasefire on January 19.[2] Israel released 90 Palestinian prisoners into the West Bank in exchange.[3]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) facilitated the entry of 630 humanitarian aid trucks into the Gaza Strip on January 19.[4] Israel is required to support the entry of 600 aid trucks into the Gaza Strip daily during the first phase of the ceasefire with Hamas.[5]

The IDF fired warning shots at approaching Gazans in the Gaza Strip on January 20.[6] Palestinian medical officials reported that IDF injured eight Gazans in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip.[7] A Palestinian journalist reported that the IDF also injured two individuals in the central Gaza Strip.[8] The IDF warned Gazans on January 19 to avoid approaching Israeli forces in designated areas.[9]

The IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on January 19 that the IDF must be prepared for “significant operations” in the West Bank in the “coming days.”[10] The IDF similarly stated on January 19 that it will deploy new forces to the West Bank amid Hamas’ efforts to stoke conflict there despite the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[11] Israel is expected to release hundreds of Palestinian prisoners into the West Bank as part of the ceasefire-hostage deal, which informed the IDF decision to deploy new forces.[12] The IDF Central Command will deploy elements from the 900th Infantry Brigade (99th Division) to conduct offensive operations in the West Bank.[13] The IDF 900th Infantry Brigade concluded its two-month deployment to the northern Gaza Strip on January 5.[14]

Likely Arab tribal forces have engaged the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in several locations along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River in SDF-controlled territory since January 19. Sheikh Ibrahim al Hafl issued a call to tribal fighters on January 19 to ”stand as a solid line” and ”liberate” SDF-held territory.[15] Hafl is a tribal leader who previously incited an Arab uprising against the SDF in fall 2023 and later defected to regime-controlled territory.[16] Hafl most recently called for Arabs to defect from the SDF on December 9, 2024.[17] Local, anti-SDF media reported that local gunmen crossed the Euphrates River into SDF-controlled territory and attacked SDF checkpoints, headquarters, and other positions in at least six towns along the western bank of the river on January 19.[18] Syrian media reported that the gunmen captured an SDF headquarters in Suwaidan Jazeera and Dhiban on January 20.[19] At least five SDF personnel were killed in the attacks, according to local reports.[20] The SDF reinforced positions along the western bank and issued curfews over several towns in its territory.[21]

The SDF accused former regime and National Defense Forces remnants of attacking SDF headquarters and capturing main roads in Kasra, Khasham, Dhiban, al Tayyana, and Gharanij.[22] The SDF has previously referred to Hafl’s forces in such terms, describing them as former regime affiliates.[23]A Deir ez Zor-based source reported that most of the fighters who attacked SDF positions are affiliated with Hafl.[24]

A Deir ez Zor-based source reported that the SDF responded to the tribal fighters’ attacks by firing at HTS-led forces positions across the Euphrates River.[25] The HTS-led Department of Military Operations currently operates from these positions, and numerous Syrian outlets reported that the SDF and HTS-led forces exchanged fire across the river.[26] The SDF denied on January 20 that it engaged any HTS-affiliated fighters in Deir ez Zor and accused “Turkish-affiliated” outlets of spreading a false narrative.[27]Deir ez Zor

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Hamas announced that the next round of hostage releases will occur on January 26.
• West Bank: The IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said that the IDF must be prepared for “significant operations” in the West Bank in the “coming days.”
• Northern Syria: Likely Arab tribal forces have engaged the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in several locations along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River in SDF-controlled territory.
• Northern Syria: Anti-SDF outlets have continued to circulate unconfirmed reports that the HTS-led Department of Military Operations deployed forces to the SDF-SNA frontlines near Manbij. An HTS decision to send fighters to reinforce the SNA would represent a significant departure from current HTS efforts to coerce the SDF to disarm.

Iran Update, January 19, 2025

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Siddhant Kishore, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Kelly Campa, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hamas released three female Israeli hostages after the ceasefire went into effect.[1] Hamas handed over the three hostages to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Gaza City. The ICRC confirmed that the hostages were in “good condition” before the ICRC transferred them to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the southern Gaza Strip.[2] The IDF then transported the hostages to a medical facility in southern Israel for further examination.[3] Israel released 90 Palestinian prisoners as part of the ceasefire-hostage agreement on January 19.[4] Israel is expected to release 1,904 Palestinian prisoners during the first phase of the ceasefire.[5] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent published a list of 67 Palestinian prisoners included among the 1,904 prisoners scheduled for release.[6] Most of these prisoners were members of Palestinian militia groups, including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Fatah, and participated in attacks that targeted Israeli civilians and soldiers.[7]  

The IDF withdrew from areas in the northern and southern Gaza Strip on January 19. The IDF 84th and 933rd Infantry Brigades (162nd Division) withdrew from Jabalia and Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip.[8] Geolocated footage obtained on January 19 showed that the IDF withdrew from the northern Gaza Strip and deployed in the IDF-designated buffer zone along the Gaza Strip’s northeastern boundary.[9] Israeli forces simultaneously withdrew from some areas of Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, according to footage posted by a Palestinian journalist.[10] The IDF remains in other, designated areas of the Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphi corridor.[11]

Gazans began to return to the northern Gaza Strip from IDF-designated humanitarian zones in the southern and central Gaza Strip amid IDF withdrawal from these areas on January 19.[12] Part of the ceasefire agreement requires the IDF to facilitate the return of Palestinian civilians to their homes in the northern Gaza Strip.[13] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued instructions to Gazans that warned Gazan civilians not to approach Israeli forces near the Netzarim Corridor, the Philadelphi Corridor, and the Rafah border crossing.[14] The IDF spokesperson added that movement around these areas remains “dangerous” due to “IDF activities” there. The IDF spokesperson also instructed Gazans to not approach the IDF-designated buffer zone along the Gaza Strip’s northern and eastern boundaries.

The Hamas-run government media office reported that Hamas deployed “thousands” of fighters to “preserve security and order” in the Gaza Strip on January 19.[15] Hamas began to deploy its police personnel across the Gaza Strip.[16] Videos posted on social media showed armed Hamas fighters in a pickup truck in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip.[17] The presence of Hamas fighters in small numbers in several parts of the Gaza Strip does not indicate that Hamas has reconstituted itself as a military organization in the Gaza Strip. The IDF does not need to kill every single Hamas fighter to destroy Hamas' military organization.[18] The existence of these groups of fighters does not inherently imply that these fighters are part of an organized military force with a clear chain of command. This is consistent with the CTP-ISW assessment that Hamas fighters are now operating as small fighting cells and not organized military units that Hamas had in the early days of the war.[19]

Hamas met with several Palestinian political and militant groups in Doha, Qatar to discuss post-war governance in the Gaza Strip on January 18.[20] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Secretary General Ziad al Nakhalah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Deputy Secretary General Jamil Mazhar, and representatives from other Palestinian factions attended the meeting. The Palestinian factions emphasized managing the Gaza Strip “nationally” by the July 2024 Beijing declaration, which calls for a “temporary national unity government” responsible for governing the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.[21] No Fatah representative attended the meeting.[22]

Iran and its partners in Iraq are continuing to try to gain control over the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS). The Iraqi parliament passed the National Intelligence Service Law on January 19.[23] This law reportedly grants oversight of the INIS to the Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee, which is headed by a member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization.[24] The passage of this law comes after Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani appointed Hamid al Shatri as head of the INIS in December 2024.[25] Shatri previously served as an administrative assistant to Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh and supported Fayyadh during the Iranian-backed crackdown on the Tishreen protest movement that began in October 2019.[26] Shatri is also reportedly affiliated with the Badr Organization.[27] Iranian-backed figures have increasingly infiltrated the INIS since Sudani came to power in late 2022.[28]

The IDF Central Command said it will deploy new forces to the West Bank to dissuade and prevent Palestinian militia attacks.[29] Israel will release 1,000 Palestinian prisoners into the West Bank as part of the ceasefire-hostage deal, which informed the IDF decision to deploy new forces.[30] Hamas spokesperson Abu Obeida stated on January 19 that the “responsibility on our people in the West Bank is growing,” particularly in Jenin.[31] The IDF Central Command said on January 19 that it assesses Hamas will try to conduct attacks in the West Bank despite the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[32] The IDF said that it will also increase the number of checkpoints on the road.[33] The IDF’s 89th Commando Brigade will reinforce Central Command and conduct offensive operations in the West Bank.[34] The Egoz Unit (89th Commando Brigade), the 90th Infantry Battalion (900th Infantry Brigade), and seven other companies will be deployed throughout the area.[35]  The 90th Infantry Battalion is specialized in urban warfare. The 900th Infantry Brigade is normally assigned to IDF Central Command. The IDF offensive plans in the West Bank are being coordinated with the Palestinian Authority (PA).[36]

PIJ’s Jenin Battalion signaled that it may resume attacks targeting PA security forces in the Jenin refugee camp.[37] The Jenin Battalion claimed that it had agreed to “stop shedding blood“ in Jenin on January 14.[38] An unspecified Palestinian official cited by Times of Israel on January 18 claimed that the Palestinian Authority (PA) has reached an agreement with the Jenin Battalion.[39] The Jenin Battalion blamed the PA for violating their agreement in a statement on January 19.[40] The Jenin Battalion had reportedly demanded that the PA withdraw all its security forces, including snipers, from the Jenin camp. The Jenin Battalion stated the PA opened fire on fighters in Jenin camp after the Israeli Air Force conducted airstrikes on the camp a few days ago.[41]

Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra rejected Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi’s proposal that the SDF join the Syrian Defense Ministry as a “military bloc.”[42] Abdi has repeatedly advocated for a  “decentralized” administration and said on January 14 that he wants the SDF to integrate into the Defense Ministry as a “bloc.“[43] Qasra told Reuters on January 19 that it is not ”right” for the SDF to remain as a separate entity within the Syrian armed forces and accused the SDF of procrastinating in negotiations.[44] Abdi later said in a January 19 interview with Saudi media that the SDF has not yet decided to hand over its weapons to the Syrian interim government.[45]

The SDF is very unlikely to disarm itself while engaged in defensive operations against Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) attacks by groups that have repeatedly committed atrocities against Kurdish populations elsewhere in Syria. The SDF has continued to engage SNA fighters on multiple fronts, including at the bridgeheads of Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak, southern frontlines in Deir Hafer and Maskanah, and mutual shelling along eastern frontlines near Ain Issa and Tal Tamr.[46] The Hamza Division and the Suleiman Shah Brigade are both active near the Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak bridgeheads.

Turkey and the Turkish-backed SNA also appear to be deploying and reinforcing elements along SDF frontlines on the Euphrates River and near Ain Issa. Syrian media posted footage that purportedly shows Turkish tank transporters and other vehicles that entered Tal Abyad from Turkey on January 19.[47] These deployments would presumably reinforce existing SNA troop concentrations near Ain Issa.[48] Syrian media also circulated footage on January 19 that shows the arrival of reinforcements, including armor, from Aleppo to join the SNA frontlines near Manbij.[49] A Deir ez Zor-based source stated that most of the reinforcements are from the Hamza Division, which is a member of the SNA’s Joint Force.[50] The Joint Force includes the Hamza Division and the Suleiman Shah Brigade. The US Treasury Department has sanctioned both the Hamza Division and the Suleiman Shah Brigade for human rights abuses against Kurds.[51] Anti-SDF media claimed that a Turkish army convoy entered Jarabulus, north of Manbij, from Turkey and headed towards the Manbij countryside.[52] The reported SNA and Turkish reinforcements would support SNA efforts to fix the SDF units at Tishreen Dam and prevent them from reinforcing other positions along the frontline. 

Several Syrian outlets reported on January 19 that the HTS-controlled Department of Military Operations, which is affiliated with the Syrian interim government, deployed forces to the SNA-SDF frontlines.[53] CTP-ISW cannot confirm local reporting, and the Syrian government has not acknowledged any deployment in Aleppo.

Negotiations will likely continue between the Syrian interim government and the SDF, despite Qasra’s rejection of the SDF proposal.  The HTS-led interim government and the SNA are likely collaborating by using military force to coerce the SDF to agree to disarm. Abdi reportedly asked Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani to intervene to stop Turkish attacks on the SDF in a recent meeting, even as Barzani appears to be trying to pressure the SDF to conclude an agreement with the SNA and Turkey.[54] Five sources directly involved in negotiations between the United States, Turkey, the SDF, and the HTS-led Syrian government told Reuters that all actors are showing more “flexibility” and “patience” than their hardline public statements might suggest.[55] Several of the sources said that these talks could set the stage for an agreement in the “coming months” for some Kurdish fighters to leave the northeast and other Kurdish fighters integrated into the Defense Ministry.[56] The Kurdish fighters that would exist in northeast Syria likely refer the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Abdi recently said that the PKK would withdraw from Syria if Turkey agreed to a ceasefire.[57]

The Syrian Interim Defense Ministry announced that over 60 military factions agreed to join the new Syrian armed forces.[58] The HTS-led government has not yet announced how it intends to integrate these factions under the Defense Ministry. The Defense Ministry said on January 19 that it had met with over 60 military factions and that ”all” had agreed to join Syria’s new military formation.[59] The Syrian interim government may decide to absorb HTS-aligned factions and functionally re-flag them as new Syrian army units, even as the Syrian government prevents the SDF from doing so. This would allow the HTS-led government to consolidate control over Syria’s defense and security apparatus and ameliorate concerns from its close allies about losing power. The Southern Operations Room (SOR), which had previously indicated that it sought to integrate into the army as a ”pre-organized entity,” reached an “initial” agreement and has begun “extensive” preparations to integrate into the Defense Ministry, according to sources close to the ”Eighth Brigade.”[60] The ”Eighth Brigade” refers to former opposition fighters who reconciled with the Assad regime and reorganized themselves as the ”Eighth Brigade.” Ahmed al Awda, the current SOR commander, led the Eighth Brigade. The details of this ”initial agreement” are unclear, but HTS could decide to re-flag SOR-affiliated factions. Awda and his deputy Ali Bash reportedly recently visited Turkey to hold unspecified meetings about the ”next stage.”[61]

The Defense Ministry announced that it will next work to compile data on military assets and human resources of armed factions.[62] The Eighth Brigade reportedly has issued orders to all affiliated groups to prepare lists of fighters and assets to provide to the Defense Ministry.[63]  The Defense Ministry will hold new sessions to establish the army’s structure and appoint leaders after the SOR and other factions send the data to the ministry.[64] A committee will be formed to draft the Ministry’s internal regulations.[65] The Defense Ministry has not yet announced who will comprise this committee, but the committee would presumably have significant influence over the internal structure of the Defense Ministry and of Syria’s armed forces. Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra told Reuters on January 19 that he hopes to finish the integration process by the transitional government’s expiration date on March 1.[66]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: The IDF withdrew from areas in the northern and southern Gaza Strip on January 19.
• Iraqi Intelligence Community: Iran and its partners in Iraq are continuing to try to gain control over the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS).
• West Bank: The IDF Central Command said it will deploy new forces to the West Bank to dissuade and prevent Palestinian militia attacks. Israel will release 1,000 Palestinian prisoners into the West Bank as part of the ceasefire-hostage deal, which informed the IDF decision to deploy new forces.
• Syrian Defense Ministry Negotiations: Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra rejected Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi’s proposal that the SDF join the Syrian Defense Ministry as a “military bloc.” The SDF is very unlikely to disarm itself while engaged in defensive operations against Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) attacks by groups that have repeatedly committed atrocities against Kurdish populations elsewhere in Syria.
• Northern Syria: Turkey and the Turkish-backed SNA also appear to be deploying and reinforcing elements along SDF frontlines on the Euphrates River and near Ain Issa.

Iran Update, January 18, 2025

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Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, and Brian Carter

The newly-formed Iraqi United Sunni Leadership Coalition (USLC) called on the Mohammad Shia al Sudani administration to implement nine long-standing Sunni demands on January 18.[1] It is uncommon after the counter-ISIS war for Sunni political parties in Iraq to assert their demands so boldly. The demands include:

1. Amending the General Amnesty Law to free innocent Iraqis who were arrested based on false statements made by “secret informants;”
2. Returning displaced individuals to Jurf al Sakhr and al Awja;
3. Revealing the fate of missing individuals and compensating the families of these individuals,
4. Dissolving the Accountability and Justice Commission and transferring its responsibilities to the Independent High Electoral Commission and the Federal Service Council;
5. Ending the “militarization” of cities, removing the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) from cities, and transferring security responsibilities to the Interior Ministry;
6. Closing economic offices affiliated with the PMF in provinces that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) once controlled;
7. Creating a “balance” between political and military institutions affiliated with the Iraqi federal government;  
8. Closing security checkpoints in provinces that were previously taken over by ISIS;
9. Compensating individuals who were harmed during military operations against ISIS.[2]

Iraqi Sunnis have held many of these demands since before the US withdrawal in 2011. Iraqi Sunnis have demanded the dissolution of the Accountability and Justice Committee since before December 2011, for example.[3] The Accountability and Justice Committee replaced the De-Baathification Committee in 2008 and is ostensibly responsible for preventing “the return of the Baath’s ideology, power, or practices.”[4] In reality, however, the Shia Coordination Framework--a coalition of Iranian-backed Shia political parties--has weaponized the Accountability and Justice Commission to sideline political opposition.[5]

Other demands, such as the demand to return displaced individuals to Jurf al Sakhr and al Awja, stem from after the defeat of ISIS. Jurf al Sakhr is a former Sunni town that Iranian-backed Shia forces recaptured from ISIS in October 2014.[6] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah subsequently occupied the town and prevented the residents from returning, which was an act of sectarian cleansing.[7] Kataib Hezbollah does not allow the Iraqi federal government access to Jurf al Sakhr, which means that the Iraqi government does not have control over the town.[8]

Al Awja is a town located south of Tikrit, Salah al Din Province, and is the hometown of Saddam Hussein.[9] The Popular Mobilization Forces, which includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, has prevented residents who fled from al Awja during the fight against ISIS from returning home.[10] A member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Imam Ali claimed in an interview in March 2023 that “residents of al Awja joined the Islamic State and committed massacres in the area. They are loyalists of Saddam who joined the terrorists to avenge his death, so their return is not possible.”[11] This, too, is an act of sectarian cleansing.

It is unlikely that the United Sunni Leadership Coalition (USLC) will be able to achieve most or all of these demands. The coalition therefore likely published these demands to rally support from Iraqi Sunnis ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections. The Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework currently controls the Iraqi parliament, and it is therefore unlikely that the USLC will be able to achieve these demands through the political process. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will also almost certainly resist concession on the demands, particularly the demands that call on them to reduce their military presence in Sunni and urban areas.

The Iraqi parliamentary leadership placed an amendment that appears to benefit Kurdish political parties on the parliamentary agenda for January 19, likely to try to ensure that Kurdish political parties attend parliament on January 19. The participation of Kurdish parties in parliament on January 19 would make it more difficult for Sunni parties to prevent a quorum. The Sunni parties previously prevented quorum on January 15, possibly to avoid a vote on the Intelligence Service Law. Parliament is scheduled to vote on the first amendment of the Federal Budget Law on January 19.[12] This amendment would increase the Iraqi federal government’s compensation for oil production in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) from $6 to $16 in return for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) resuming oil exports.[13] The Iraqi federal government seeks to resume oil exports from the Iraqi Kurdistan Region in order to increase federal revenue.[14] The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) ceased oil exports to the Ceyhan Port in Turkey in March 2023.[15] Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework leaders agreed to move forward with the amendment after Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani visited Baghdad on January 13.[16] The KRG spokesperson stated on January 16 that the KRG is “ready to hand over internal revenues” and export oil through the Iraqi State Organization for Marketing of Oil if the government pays the KRG’s full share of the federal budget, including public sector salaries.[17]

The Israeli government approved the Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage deal on January 18. The ceasefire will go into effect at 1:30AM ET on January 19 and the release of Israeli hostages will start at 9:30AM ET on January 19.[18] Unspecified security sources cited by Israeli Army Radio stated that Israel estimates that 25 out of the 33 hostages Hamas will release in the first phase of the deal are alive.[19] Hamas is expected to release three hostages on January 19 and release the other 30 hostages every subsequent Saturday until March 1.[20] An unspecified Israeli official said that Hamas has not provided the names of the three hostages to Israel for the January 19 exchange as stipulated under the agreement.[21] The official warned that Israel would not move forward with the prisoner-hostage exchange if Hamas fails to provide the list prior to the deadline. Israeli media said that Israel will release 1,904 Palestinian prisoners in the first phase of the ceasefire deal.[22] The IDF has begun to withdraw some forces from the Gaza Strip and redeploy others to the buffer zone ahead of the ceasefire implementation.[23] The BBC cited an unspecified senior Palestinian official who claimed that Hamas will be permitted to operate its police force in the Gaza Strip under the ceasefire agreement.[24] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim.

Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir resigned on January 18 after the Israeli government approved the ceasefire deal.[25] Ben Gvir voted against the ceasefire-hostage agreement during the Israeli cabinet vote on January 17.[26] Ben Gvir stated that he would return to his position if the war eventually resumes.[27] Gvir also called on Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich to resign.[28] 

The Palestinian Authority (PA) seeks to lead post-war governance in the Gaza Strip, but assuming governing authority will almost certainly require a military confrontation with Hamas. PA President Mahmoud Abbas’s office stated on January 17 that the PA holds legal and political jurisdiction over the Gaza Strip as the recognized governing authority of the Palestinian territories and is prepared to deploy administrative and security teams to the Gaza Strip.[29] The ceasefire agreement does not task the PA with governing the Strip, nor does the ceasefire discuss post-war governance in any capacity.[30] PA Prime Minister Mohammed Mustafa separately stated on January 18 that the PA has a “hundred-day plan” for after the ceasefire goes into effect.[31]

IDF operations have destroyed Hamas as a military organization, but small Hamas cells will remain capable of resisting a PA takeover after the IDF leaves. These cells are presumably organized on personal, and social ties and not institutionalized in a quasi-military structure like existed immediately after October 7, 2023. The PA and Hamas have repeatedly discussed post-war governance since the October 7 war began, including the formation of an independent civilian committee to manage civilian affairs.[32] Hamas would almost certainly attempt to resist or subvert any PA takeover in the Gaza Strip unless Hamas is prevented by force from doing so.[33] Hamas‘ cells cannot defeat PA security forces in battles at this time, but the PA would need to seek out and destroy these Hamas cells to prevent Hamas from gradually rebuilding and overthrowing the PA’s new authority. It is unclear if the PA is willing to fight Hamas in a long guerrilla campaign to cement PA rule in the Strip. A senior Palestinian official told BBC on January 18 that uniformed, mostly unarmed Hamas police will operate within designated areas in the Strip to manage the movement of displaced civilians after the ceasefire begins while avoiding areas of IDF presence.[34] This BBC report indicates that some elements of Hamas' authority remain in the Gaza Strip. CTP-ISW is unable to certify the validity of this report, but Hamas police activity throughout the Strip could create more opportunities for friction between Hamas and PA forces.

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is reportedly continuing to pursue a decentralized government against Turkish and Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) pressure.[35] A Deir ez Zor-based journalist reported that SDF leadership met with representatives from Raqqa in an attempt to secure their support for a decentralized government in exchange for increased governing authorities. Turkey has threatened to launch a full-scale military operation against the SDF since December 2024 as part of an effort to coerce the SDF to disarm.[36] HTS has supported this Turkish effort. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi has maintained that he seeks a “decentralized” administration and wants the SDF to integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry as a “military bloc” rather than on an “individual” level.”[37] A decentralized government would enable to SDF to continue operating in its current capacity, which directly contradicts Turkish demands.

The SDF’s outreach to Raqqa may be an attempt to secure local Arab support ahead of a potential Turkish and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) attack into SDF territory. The Raqqa representatives present rejected the SDF’s offer and emphasized the unity and sovereignty of Syrian territory.[38] The representatives called for a conference with other groups in SDF-controlled territory to address popular demands. Arab communities under SDF control in Raqqa, Hasakah, and Deir ez Zor have ”defected” from the SDF and called for an end to SDF rule since the fall of the Assad regime on December 8.[39] CTP-ISW has not observed other Syrian reports about this meeting, which suggests that this source may have unique access.

An unidentified individual, likely an Iranian Judicial office service employee, killed two senior Iranian Supreme Court judges, Mohammad Moghiseh and Ali Razini, at the Iranian Supreme Court in Tehran on January 18.[40] The suspect reportedly fled the scene and later committed suicide.[41] Iranian Judiciary spokesperson Asghar Jahangir described the attacker as an "infiltrator" who entered the offices of the two judges and carried out the attack using “a handgun.”[42] Jahangir rejected claims that the gunman injured another judge, but Jahangir confirmed that a judicial security guard also suffered injuries.[43] Both judges had long histories of handling political and security cases, including high-profile prosecutions and issuing harsh sentences against dissidents, minorities, and political prisoners.[44] Mohammad Moghiseh, known as "Naserian," oversaw trials against Baha’i leaders, 2009 Green Movement protesters, and political prisoners in the 1980s and 1990s [45] The US Treasury sanctioned Moghiseh in December 2019 for his role in issuing harsh sentences against journalists, internet users, and Baha’is.[46] Ali Razini held multiple key positions in Iran’s judiciary, including Head of Tehran’s Department of Justice and Legal deputy of the Judiciary chief under former head of Judiciary Sadegh Amoli Larijani.[47] Anti-regime media called both Razini and Moghiseh "hanging judges" for their direct involvement in the late 90s mass executions of political prisoners.[48]

The official Iranian response to this attack has not yet materialized, but incidents like this often trigger paranoia about infiltration and foreign plots. The way Iran responds to the incident will indicate whether it perceives a broader security threat. Iranian authorities could frame the attack as an operation by the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) or foreign intelligence rather than an isolated act, for example.

Key Takeaways:

• Iraqi Sunni Coalition: The newly-formed Iraqi United Sunni Leadership Coalition (USLC) called on the Mohammad Shia al Sudani administration to implement nine long-standing Sunni demands on January 18. It is unlikely that the United Sunni Leadership Coalition (USLC) will be able to achieve most or all of these demands. The coalition therefore likely published these demands to rally support from Iraqi Sunnis ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Politics: The Iraqi parliamentary leadership placed an amendment that appears to benefit Kurdish political parties on the parliamentary agenda for January 19, likely to try to ensure that Kurdish political parties attend parliament on January 19. The participation of Kurdish parties in parliament on January 19 would make it more difficult for Sunni parties to prevent a quorum.
• Ceasefire-Hostage Deal: The Israeli government approved the Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage deal on January 18. It will enter into effect at 0130 ET on January 19. Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir resigned on January 18 after the Israeli government approved the ceasefire deal.
• Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip: The Palestinian Authority (PA) seeks to lead post-war governance in the Gaza Strip, but assuming governing authority will almost certainly require a military confrontation with Hamas. IDF operations have destroyed Hamas as a military organization, but small Hamas cells will remain capable of resisting a PA takeover after the IDF leaves. Hamas‘ cells cannot defeat PA security forces in battles at this time, but the PA would need to seek out and destroy these Hamas cells to prevent Hamas from gradually rebuilding and overthrowing the PA’s new authority.
• Syrian Democratic Forces: The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is reportedly continuing to pursue a decentralized government against Turkish and Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) pressure. The SDF’s outreach to Raqqa may be an attempt to secure local Arab support ahead of a potential Turkish and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) attack into SDF territory.
• Assassination in Iran: An unidentified individual, likely an Iranian Judicial office service employee, killed two senior Iranian Supreme Court judges, Mohammad Moghiseh and Ali Razini, at the Iranian Supreme Court in Tehran on January 18. The official Iranian response to this attack has not yet materialized, but incidents like this often trigger paranoia about infiltration and foreign plots. The way Iran responds to the incident will indicate whether it perceives a broader security threat.

Iran Update, January 17, 2025

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Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Israeli security cabinet approved the Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage deal on January 17.[1] Israel’s full cabinet began deliberating on the deal on January 17 but has not released a decision on it as of the time of this writing. The full cabinet will very likely approve the deal, given that the security cabinet recommended the deal’s approval.[2] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told the cabinet that the United States promised to support Israel resuming the war in the Gaza Strip if the second phase of ceasefire negations fail or Israel’s security demands are not met, according to a Netanyahu aide speaking to Axios on January 17.[3]

The Prime Minister’s office said that the ceasefire and the release of Israeli hostages should start at 0900 ET on January 19.[4] The Israeli government reportedly believes that most of the 33 hostages that Hamas will release in the first phase of the deal are alive, but Hamas has not confirmed a list of living and dead hostages.[5] An Israeli official told Axios on January 17 that Israel will not release the list of the Palestinian prisoners it will release under the deal until Hamas shares this information.[6] Israeli media correspondents reported on January 17 that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) created three forward reception points on the border of the Gaza Strip to receive the hostages.[7] The hostages will also receive immediate support from the IDF, doctors, and mental health professionals upon their release.

Israeli officials and media detailed the IDF’s planned withdrawal from the Gaza Strip under the ceasefire deal on January 17.[8] Israeli media correspondents confirmed that the IDF 99th Division will gradually withdraw from the Netzarim Corridor during the ceasefire’s first phase, while the IDF 162nd Division will secure the area north of the Gaza Strip. The 99th Division deployed to the central Gaza Strip in early November 2024 to replace the 252nd Division.[9] The 162nd Division deployed to the northern Gaza Strip in early October 2024.[10] The media correspondents also confirmed that the IDF 143rd Division will secure the southern Gaza Strip and gradually withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor.[11] A senior Israeli official confirmed on January 16 that the IDF will remain in the Philidelphi Corridor beyond the first phase of the agreement until Israel achieves its war objectives.[12] 

An Israeli official told Axios that Qatari and Egyptian officials will ensure no heavy weaponry enter the area.[13] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent contradicted the Axios reporting and claimed on January 17 that an American security company would inspect civilians returning to the northern Gaza Strip in vehicles.[14] Displaced Gazans will begin to return to the northern Gaza Strip during the first phase of the deal.[15]

Both Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthi movement ceased military operations against Israel after the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, which underscores that the October 7 War was a regional conflict between Iran and its Axis of Resistance and Israel. All elements of the Iranian-backed Axis of Resistance, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthi movement, began their offensive in support of Hamas against Israel’s response to Hamas’s October 7 attack.[16] The opening attacks by the Houthis, the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, and Hezbollah were de-facto declarations of war against Israel that escalated and regionalized the war. Hezbollah only made a separate peace with Israel after the IDF compelled it to do so by defeating Hezbollah militarily.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias officially suspended attacks against Israel after the ceasefire. Iranian-backed Iraqi attacks against Israel stopped in November 2024, following Israeli threats. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Secretary-General Akram al Kaabi announced the suspension of Iraqi militia attacks against Israel on January 15 and warned that the militias will react harshly to any Israeli “foolishness.”[17] Kataib Sarkhat al Quds similarly threatened that Iraqi militias would respond “forcefully” to any Israeli actions against Palestinian rights.[18] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and Kataib Sarkhat al Quds are part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[19] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq consistently launched drone strikes that targeted Israel between February to November 2024.[20] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq dramatically increased its rate of attacks against Israel in September and October 2024.[21] This attack increase spurred the United States and Israel to warn the Iraqi government in early November 2024 that the IDF would potentially attack targets in Iraq if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continued to attack Israel.[22] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has not claimed any attacks since November 24 at the time of this writing.[23]

The Houthis also paused their campaign against Israel, which will enable the Houthis to institutionalize lessons learned and replenish arms stockpiles as needed. The Houthis have continuously launched drone and missile attacks targeting Israeli territory, international shipping, and US military vessels in the Red Sea since October 2023.[24] The Houthis have not conducted attacks on international vessels in the Red Sea since November 2024, however.[25] A pause—however short—will provide the Houthis time to institutionalize lessons learned and disseminate that guidance throughout their force. Iran has almost certainly supplied the Houthis weapons throughout the campaign, but it is unclear to what extent they were able to resupply the Houthis during the 14-month campaign.[26]

The Houthis framed their ceasefire pause as conditional and implied that the ceasefire is only a pause in the wider war that the Houthis believe will end in the destruction of the Israeli state. The Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi vowed on January 16 to halt attacks targeting Israel if the ceasefire is upheld.[27] Abdulmalik provided significant caveats to this pause, however. The Houthi supreme leader said that ”after this round, the matter is not over...[the Houthis] are with [the Palestinian people]...and [the Houthis] will always be with [the Palestinian people] until the liberation of [all] of Palestine.”[28] The Houthis can resume attacks on Israel and against international shipping to ”blockade” Israel at any time and for any reason that the movement’s leadership chooses.

The Houthis said that they would respond to any attacks against Houthi targets by the United States or Israel. Abdulmalik also stated that the Houthis will increase their attacks targeting Israel should Israel or the United States try to “distance” Yemen from its “jihadist orientation.” Abdulmalik added that the Houthis will continue to develop their military capabilities. The Houthi Military Spokesperson Yahya Sarea also confirmed the Houthis’ “constant readiness to take comprehensive action to confront any criminal Israeli aggressive escalation, whether in these days or beyond,” during a mass Houthi demonstration in Sanaa on January 17.[29]

Turkey continues to pressure the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to rapidly disarm and integrate into the HTS-led interim Syrian government. Turkish President Recep Erdogan stated that Kurdish armed groups in northern Syria must choose to either lay down their arms peacefully or “be forced to do so,” presumably by Turkey and its proxies.[30] Turkey has threatened to launch a full-scale military operation against the SDF since December 2024 as part of an effort to coerce the SDF to disarm.[31] Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) has supported the Turkish effort. Turkey has continued to encourage negotiations between the SDF and the HTS-led interim government while Turkish and Turkish-backed forces continue to prepare for an offensive.[32]

The Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) representative to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region Hoshang Darwish stated that the Kurdish National Congress in Syria will establish a “consensus” over Kurdish demands in Syria.[33] Darwish argued that the Iraqi Kurdistan Region has a positive relationship with Turkey and that the Iraqi Kurdistan Region can address Ankara’s concerns about armed Kurdish groups in Syria. Darwish’s statement is consistent with CTP-ISW's observation that the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), one of two major parties in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and the ruling party under the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), appeared to be pressuring the SDF to avoid a full-scale war with Turkey and the SNA.[34] The KDP has steadily improved its relationship with Turkey, primarily due to the KDP’s hostility to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).[35]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty in Moscow on January 17 to deepen bilateral economic, political, and security ties.[36] The agreement does not represent a significant shift in Russo-Iranian relations and uses very similar language to Iran and Russia’s 2001 agreement.[37] The new Iran-Russia agreement is largely a framework agreement, intended to outline terms for more detailed discussions and agreements on specifics in the future. Iran frequently pursues these vague framework agreements to establish strategic partnerships as it struggles to secure binding commitments with other nations. Such framework agreements have historically failed to materialize into significant outcomes for Iran, however.

The Iran-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement notably lacks a mutual defense clause.[38] The agreement outlines bilateral defense and security cooperation, including joint military exercises and operations, personnel training, port visits by military vessels, the exchange of military officers, and intelligence sharing.[39] The agreement, consistent with the 2001 agreement, requires both parties to refrain from aiding any aggressor that targets the other and to prevent their territory from being used to support actions that threaten the stability and territorial integrity of the other. The agreement does not include any collective security clause, however. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that the agreement is "not a military alliance.”[40] Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalili similarly told Russian state media that the agreement differs from Russia's agreements with North Korea and Belarus which include collective defense provisions.[41]

The lack of a mutual defense clause in the Iran-Russia agreement indicates that Iran is unlikely to provide military personnel to support Russia's war in Ukraine. Russia similarly likely does not have the military and defense industrial capacity to support any significant military operations apart from its war in Ukraine.[42] Russia’s willingness to offer security guarantees to North Korea suggests North Korea currently holds greater relative importance to Russia than Iran does, as North Korea has supplied soldiers to Russia while Iran likely neither wants to nor can provide such support.

The Iran-Russia agreement also focuses on economic, energy, and nuclear cooperation. The agreement emphasizes key transportation initiatives, including the completion of the International North-South Transport Corridor.[43] The agreement calls for opposing "unilateral coercive measures"—almost certainly referring to sanctions—and limiting their impact on economic relations. The agreement also expands energy cooperation in the oil and gas sectors.[44] Putin stated that Russian gas deliveries to Iran would start at 2 billion cubic meters per year but could reach 55 billion cubic meters annually.[45] The energy swaps would come amid one of Iran's worst energy shortages.[46] The agreement also covers joint “peaceful” atomic energy projects, including the construction of nuclear energy facilities.[47] Russia and Iran signed a joint nuclear cooperation agreement in 2014 to construct two new nuclear reactors at Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: The Prime Minister’s office said that the ceasefire and the release of Israeli hostages should start at 0900 ET on January 19. All three IDF divisions currently in the Strip will gradually withdraw, with the 99th Division (currently in the Netzarim Corridor) departing first.
• Regional Implications of Gaza Ceasefire: Both Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthi movement ceased military operations against Israel after the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, which underscores that the October 7 War was a regional conflict between Iran and its Axis of Resistance and Israel. The opening attacks by the Houthis, the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, and Hezbollah were de-facto declarations of war against Israel that escalated and regionalized the war. Hezbollah only made separate peace with Israel after the IDF compelled it to do so by defeating Hezbollah militarily.
• Houthis React to Gaza Ceasefire: The Houthis also paused their campaign against Israel, which will enable the Houthis to institutionalize lessons learned and replenish arms stockpiles as needed. The Houthis framed their ceasefire pause as conditional and implied that the ceasefire is only a pause in the wider war that the Houthis believe will end in the destruction of the Israeli state.
• Syrian Democratic Forces: Turkey continues to pressure the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to rapidly disarm and integrate into the HTS-led interim Syrian government. Turkish President Recep Erdogan stated that Kurdish armed groups in northern Syria must choose to either lay down their arms peacefully or “be forced to do so,” presumably by Turkey and its proxies.
• Russo-Iranian Agreement: The Iran-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement signed on January 17 notably lacks a mutual defense clause. The agreement outlines bilateral defense and security cooperation, including joint military exercises and operations, personnel training, port visits by military vessels, the exchange of military officers, and intelligence sharing.

Iran Update, January 16, 2025

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Siddhant Kishore, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braveman, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Victoria Penza, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Israeli cabinet will vote on the ceasefire-hostage agreement on January 17 after it postponed its vote due to delays in Hamas approving an unresolved issue.[1] Both sides resolved the issue. Hamas reportedly renegotiated the names of the Palestinian prisoners it expects Israel to release as part of the agreement.[2] An Israeli official confirmed that both sides resolved the issue, and the Israeli cabinet will vote on the ceasefire-hostage agreement on January 17. The ceasefire will take effect on January 19, if approved.[3]

A senior Israeli official confirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will remain in the Philadelphi Corridor during the first 42-day phase of the ceasefire.[4] The withdrawal of the IDF from the Philadelphi Corridor, an operationally and strategically significant IDF-held area in the southern Gaza Strip, was a major point of contention between Israel and Hamas during the ceasefire talks.[5] The official stated that Israel will stay in the Philadelphi Corridor beyond the first phase of the ceasefire until Israel achieves its war aims.[6] These aims include the release of all hostages. The IDF will gradually withdraw from the remaining parts of the Gaza Strip to a 700-meter-deep buffer zone along the Gaza Strip’s eastern and northern boundaries, however.[7]  Israel will also temporarily halt air reconnaissance over the Gaza Strip during the first phase.[8]

Hamas will likely use the first phase to reorganize its forces and move cells around the Gaza Strip without Israeli aerial observation. Hamas can only achieve limited reorganization and will be unable to regenerate itself during this period, however. Reconstitution is a very time- and resource-intensive task even under ideal conditions when the reconstituting force is out of contact with the opposing force. It includes restoring degraded units to combat effectiveness and increase their survivability.[9] IDF operations have destroyed Hamas‘ military organization in the Gaza Strip by damaging the organization so badly that it cannot be made usable without being completely rebuilt. Israel has also depleted Hamas’ weapons stockpile. Hamas can execute limited reorganization tasks, perhaps even including efforts to organize isolated cells under some semblance of a military hierarchy. The regenerative tasks that would create true, cohesive military units within a fighting organization would take months free of Israeli interference to complete. Regenerating the weapons stockpile is similarly impossible in the 42-day window.[10]

Regeneration of Hamas’ military force is not possible in this 42-day window. Regeneration requires large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.[11] The replacement of personnel to a capable level requires training, which is not possible without sanctuary and a period longer than 42 days. Hamas may be able to undertake some minimal training, but these newly trained fighters will be unable to seriously impede Israeli forces if the IDF chooses to resume combat operations. Recent reports indicate that Hamas has intensified recruitment efforts, but these recruits are inexperienced and untrained.[12]

The IDF will be able to rapidly re-seize areas it withdraws from if the ceasefire deal collapses after the first phase. The limited and inadequate regeneration and reorganization Hamas may be able to undertake will almost certainly be wholly insufficient to seriously impede the IDF from achieving any tactical mission it must complete, such as reoccupying the Netzarim Corridor, if the ceasefire collapses.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) appears to be trying to pressure the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to avoid a full-scale conflict with Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). A representative of KDP leader Masoud Barzani met with SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi in Hasakah, northeastern Syria, on January 13.[13] Unspecified sources told Iraqi media that Barzani likely seeks to pressure the SDF to conclude an agreement with Turkey and the SNA to “prevent the destruction” of Kurdish areas in Syria. Turkey and the SNA continue to threaten the SDF positions in northeastern Syria.[14] The KDP has steadily improved its relationship with Turkey in recent years, primarily due to the KDP’s hostility to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).[15] Turkey often conflates the SDF and the PKK-linked Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) with the PKK and uses ”PKK” as a euphemism for the entire SDF.[16]

The KDP is also pressuring the SDF to cooperate with minority Syrian Kurdish political parties in negotiations with the HTS-led interim government. Masoud Barzani met with Abdi in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, on January 16.[17] A senior KDP member told Western media that Barzani and Abdi focused on unifying Kurdish political efforts in Syria.[18] The KDP has historically aligned itself with the Kurdish National Council, a coalition of Syrian Kurdish political parties.[19] The SDF’s political body is led by the Kurdish National Council’s political rival.[20] Barzani’s representative also met with Kurdish National Council officials on January 13 to attempt to dissolve tensions between the Syrian Kurdish political parties.[21]

Barzani and Abdi also reportedly discussed ways to distance the SDF from the PKK in their meeting on January 16.[22] A PKK official separately told Reuters that PKK forces would withdraw from Syria if the SDF had joint or solo control of northeastern Syria.[23] Abdi similarly said that the PKK would withdraw from Syria if Turkey agreed to a ceasefire.[24] The difference in how the SDF and Turkey define the PKK and its role in the SDF makes a ceasefire difficult to obtain. Turkey may define SDF leader Mazloum Abdi, a Syrian and former PKK member, as an active member of the PKK, for example, due to his role within the YPG and SDF. Abdi and the SDF are unlikely to hold the same view. Turkey has also explicitly called for the destruction of the YPG/PKK and views the SDF and YPG and PKK as undistinguishable.[25]

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader and interim head of state Ahmed al Shara addressed Israeli military activity in southern Syria on January 16 during a meeting with the Qatari foreign minister.[26] Shara said that Israel’s advance into Syria was “due to the presence of Iranian militias and Hezbollah” but that such a “pretext” no longer exists with HTS in power.[27] He emphasized that Israeli forces must return to the 1974 disengagement line in the Golan Heights and that UN forces should deploy to the buffer zone.[28] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on December 8 that he considers the 1974 disengagement agreement on the Golan Heights to have ”collapsed” with the fall of the Syrian regime.[29] Interim Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani reportedly went further than Shara and said that Syria must ”defend our country and our people.”[30]

Shara and Shaibani’s statements were very likely spurred by an IDF Air Force strike on an HTS-affiliated convoy near the Syria-Golan Heights border on January 15 that killed two Public Security Department members as they collected surrendered weapons.[31] The Israeli strike also killed the mayor of Ghadir al Bustan.[32] The January 15 strike appears to be the first IDF strike that has directly targeted HTS-led government forces.[33] It remains unclear at this time how much effort Shara will devote to the restoration of the 1974 disengagement line with Israel and whether this statement is predominantly due to public pressure after the January 15 attack.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire Deal: The Israeli cabinet will vote on the ceasefire-hostage agreement on January 17 after it postponed its vote due to delays in Hamas approving an unresolved issue. Both sides resolved the issue.
• Military Implications for Ceasefire: Hamas will likely use the first phase to reorganize its forces and move cells around the Gaza Strip without Israeli aerial observation. Hamas can only achieve limited reorganization and will be unable to regenerate itself during this period, however. The limited and inadequate regeneration and reorganization Hamas may be able to undertake will almost certainly be wholly insufficient to seriously impede the IDF from achieving any tactical mission it must complete, such as reoccupying the Netzarim Corridor, if the ceasefire collapses.

• Kurdish Coordination: The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) appears to be trying to pressure the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to avoid a full-scale conflict with Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). Barzani and Abdi also reportedly discussed ways to distance the SDF from the PKK in their meeting on January 16.
• Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the SDF: A PKK official told Reuters that PKK forces would withdraw from Syria if the SDF had joint or solo control of northeastern Syria. The difference in how the SDF and Turkey define the PKK and its role in the SDF makes a ceasefire in northern Syria difficult to obtain. Turkey may define SDF leader Mazloum Abdi, a Syrian and former PKK member, as an active member of the PKK, for example, due to his role within the YPG and SDF. Abdi and the SDF are unlikely to hold the same view.
• Hayat Tahrir al Sham and Israel: Shara said that Israel’s advance into Syria was “due to the presence of Iranian militias and Hezbollah” but that such a “pretext” no longer exists with HTS in power. Interim Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani reportedly went further than Shara and said that Syria must ”defend our country and our people.” Shara and Shaibani’s statements were very likely spurred by an IDF Air Force strike on an HTS-affiliated convoy near the Syria-Golan Heights border on January 15 that killed two Public Security Department members as they collected surrendered weapons.

Iran Update, January 15, 2025

Click here to read the full report.

Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Siddhant Kishore, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Israel and Hamas approved a ceasefire-hostage agreement on January 15.[1] Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani announced that mediators from the United States, Qatar, and Egypt will monitor the ceasefire, which will take effect on January 19.[2] Hamas confirmed that it agreed to the final draft agreement on January 15.[3] The agreement outlines three phases, as proposed by US President Joe Biden in May 2024.[4] During the first phase, which will last for 42 days beginning on January 19, Hamas must release 33 hostages.[5] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will gradually withdraw from the central Gaza Strip to an 800-meter-deep buffer zone along the Gaza Strip’s eastern and northern boundaries during the first phase.[6] Reuters reported that “Israel will release 30 Palestinian prisoners for every Israeli civilian and 50 Palestinian prisoners for every female Israeli soldier that Hamas releases.”[7] Israel will also allow displaced Gazans to return to the northern Gaza Strip during this phase.[8] Israel and Hamas will begin negotiations on the 16th day of the ceasefire to secure the release of the remaining Israeli hostages, a complete IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and a permanent ceasefire.[9] This presumably means that if negotiations for the second phase of the ceasefire fail, the fighting would resume. The third phase of the ceasefire reportedly includes provisions for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip supervised by Egypt, Qatar, and the United Nations.[10]

Hamas appears to have agreed to allow the IDF to remain in the Philadelphi Corridor, an operationally and strategically significant IDF-held area in the southern Gaza Strip, during at least the first phase of the ceasefire.[11] The withdrawal of the IDF from the Philadelphi Corridor was a major point of contention between Israel and Hamas during the ceasefire talks.[12] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office announced on January 15 that Hamas "backed down" on its demand for an IDF withdrawal from the corridor "at the last minute."[13]

A large number of Iraqi political parties boycotted parliament on January 15, likely to demonstrate their ability to rally sufficient support to block parliament.[14] Iraqi media reported that “the majority of [political] blocs” boycotted parliament because Parliament Speaker Mahmoud Mashhadani and the two deputy speakers did not place the General Amnesty Law on Parliament’s agenda.[15] The Iraqi Parliament Speaker and the two deputies are responsible for ”jointly” determining the agenda.[16] The General Amnesty Law would grant amnesty to many Iraqis, including some who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[17] This law has been a long-standing demand of Sunni political parties in Iraq and was part of the “political agreement paper” that enabled the formation of Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s administration in 2022.[18] Former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi’s Progress Party announced on January 13 that it would boycott parliament until the speaker places the General Amnesty Law on Parliament’s agenda.[19] The newly-formed United Sunni Leadership Coalition separately discussed the implementation of the General Amnesty Law in a meeting on January 11 suggesting that this coalition may have boycotted parliament on January 15 as well.[20] This coalition includes Sovereignty Alliance leader Khamis al Khanjar, Azm Alliance leader Muthanna al Samarrai, and Mashhadani, among others.[21]

Mashhadani and his allies, including the United Sunni Leadership Coalition, may also have deliberately blocked the General Amnesty Law in order to block the passage of the Intelligence Service Law, which was also on the agenda.[22] The Intelligence Service Law was also on the December 5, 2024, agenda but Parliament again failed to reach quorum.[23] There are no other laws on both the December 5 and January 15, 2025, agendas.[24] A member of the Parliamentary Defense and Security Committee told Iraqi media that the Intelligence Service Law expanded the ”legal cover” for the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, which is now led by an Iranian-backed Badr Organization-linked director.[25] The Parliamentary boycott comes after several notable Sunni politicians, including Mashhadani, called in December 2024 for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to address political and economic grievances.[26] The boycott also comes after Khanjar warned in December 2024 that Sunnis would turn to “other parties” that oppose dialogue and negotiation if the Iraqi federal government fails to defend them, suggesting that Sunni Iraqis remain frustrated by the federal government’s treatment of the Sunni community.[27]

Syrian interim government officials met with senior Turkish defense officials in Ankara on January 15, likely to discuss military coordination as well as Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and Turkish efforts to coerce the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to disarm. Syrian interim Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra, and interim Intelligence Chief Anas Khattab met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[28] The Syrian officials also met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yasar Guler, and intelligence head Ibrahim Kalin.[29] A meeting between key defense and security stakeholders suggests that the parties likely discussed military coordination in northern Syria, where the Turkish aircraft and drones are supporting the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) against the SDF. CTP-ISW previously assessed that HTS and Turkey are coordinating to disarm and integrate the SDF into the HTS-led defense apparatus.[30] Turkish officials have repeatedly threatened to “destroy” the SDF in a military operation if it does not disarm. Turkey has directly supported SNA efforts to isolate and destroy SDF elements along the Euphrates River since at least late December 2024.[31] Turkish support efforts could also be a precursor to a Turkish operation into Syria. Shaibani said during a press conference in Ankara that the HTS-led government will not allow Syrian territory to be used as a ”launchpad” for actors to threaten Turkey, signaling HTS support for Turkey’s effort to destroy the SDF.[32]

The SDF has continued to push back against HTS demands for its disarmament and integration into the Syrian Defense Ministry. The Syrian delegation in Ankara also likely briefed Turkish officials on the progress of their negotiations with the SDF. Fidan suggested on January 10 that Turkey would give the Syrian interim government an opportunity to disarm and dissolve the SDF before Turkey takes military action.[33] HTS and the SDF have not yet made tangible progress toward an agreement. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi said on January 14 that he and HTS leader Ahmed al Shara have not agreed on the terms of the SDF and Kurdish-controlled government’s integration into the new Syrian military and political establishment but are in the process of forming a committee to discuss such issues.[34] Shaibani confirmed during a press conference in Ankara that Syrian officials are engaged in “dialogue and negotiation” with the SDF.[35] Abdi maintained that he seeks a “decentralized” administration and wants the SDF to integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry as a “military bloc” rather than on an “individual” level.”[36] Abdi likely calculates that maintaining some degree of Kurdish political and security autonomy would provide Kurds in northeastern Syria with better security guarantees than if the Kurdish-controlled government and SDF fully subordinated themselves to a centralized government. The ongoing Turkish and SNA attacks on the SDF have likely heightened Abdi’s concerns about the need to retain political and security autonomy. HTS officials have maintained that they will not allow any “federal” entities in Syria, however, and are unlikely to capitulate on this demand.[37] Shaibani declared in Ankara that the HTS-led interim government cannot “accept” the SDF in its current form outside the central government.[38] Abdi also mentioned that the SDF would allow HTS to take control of the oil fields in SDF-held territory, provided that the profits of the oil fields are distributed “fairly.”[39]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Israel and Hamas approved a ceasefire-hostage agreement on January 15. Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani announced that mediators from the United States, Qatar, and Egypt will monitor the ceasefire, which will take effect on January 19. Hamas appears to have agreed to allow the IDF to remain in the Philadelphi Corridor, an operationally and strategically significant IDF-held area in the southern Gaza Strip, during at least the first phase of the ceasefire.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Politics: A large number of Iraqi political parties boycotted parliament on January 15, likely to demonstrate their ability to rally sufficient support to block parliament. The Iraqi Parliament Speaker and his allies, including the United Sunni Leadership Coalition, may also have deliberately blocked the General Amnesty Law in order to block the passage of the Intelligence Service Law, which was also on the agenda.
• Syria-Turkey Meeting: Syrian interim government officials met with senior Turkish defense officials in Ankara on January 15, likely to discuss military coordination as well as Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and Turkish efforts to coerce the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to disarm. The Syrian delegation in Ankara also likely briefed Turkish officials on the progress of their negotiations with the SDF. The SDF has continued to push back against HTS demands for its disarmament and integration into the Syrian Defense Ministry.

Iran Update, January 14, 2025

Click here to read the full report

Siddhant Kishore, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Annika Ganzeveld, Avery Borens, and Nicholas Carl

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is confronting small pockets of locally organized fighter cells in areas under its control. Some of these groups are led by known Assad regime officials who have military experience and control pre-existing militias.[1] HTS-led forces have successfully confronted and suppressed these isolated incidents of resistance in a way that mirrors the Assad regime’s counter-revolutionary approach at the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011-2012.[2] The HTS-led forces have deployed tanks and used attack helicopters and drones to target pro-regime forces in coastal Syria.[3] These deployments have enabled HTS-led forces to swiftly confront small groups of regime remnants.[4] The organization, coordination, size, and spread of these opposition groups do not currently appear to strain HTS-led forces‘ bandwidth. An increase in pro-Assad activity coupled with an ISIS resurgence in HTS-held areas would very likely present HTS with a bandwidth problem, however, and thus impede future efforts to suppress dissent.[5]

A pro-Assad group is attempting to coordinate and expand attacks targeting HTS-led forces but has yet to demonstrate any ability to do so. The “Syrian Popular Resistance” announced in late December 2024 the launch of armed resistance against the HTS-led interim government.[6] The group has since claimed on multiple occasions that its fighters have attacked and killed interim government forces. It remains unclear whether the group has had any real involvement in these attacks, however.[7] The “Syrian Popular Resistance” claimed on January 13 that it killed over 35 HTS-led forces in western Homs near the Lebanon-Syria border in coordination with fighters from Hermel, Lebanon.[8] Some security analysts attributed the clashes to Lebanese Hezbollah or smugglers, omitting mention of the ”Syrian Popular Resistance.”[9] The interim government gave no comment on the clashes, which would be surprising if opposition fighters had indeed killed 35 HTS-led fighters. The “Syrian Popular Resistance” also claimed to be affiliated with a former Syrian regime officer who led an attack taking interim government forces hostage in Latakia on January 14.[10] The militia leader did not mention the ”Syrian Popular Resistance” in a video he posted shortly after the attack.[11] That the perpetrators of these attacks do not independently acknowledge any affiliation with the "Syrian Popular Resistance” suggests that this coordinating body is largely aspirational at this time. The formation of an opposition group that operates under the Syrian Popular Resistance would likely strain the interim government’s bandwidth and make them less effective in responding to anti-HTS resistance.

A likely Islamist HTS splinter group announced its opposition to the HTS-led interim government on January 11. The group, which calls itself the “Sayf al Bahr Battalion,” reportedly formed on January 3 after defecting from HTS.[12] The group’s spokesperson, Abu Khaled al Shami, accused HTS leader Ahmed al Shara of stripping HTS of its “Islamic character and working to dissolve it in the name of the secular civil state.”[13] Shami announced the “start of the fighting” against HTS-led forces in a statement on January 11.[14] Shami called on Syrians to prevent their sons from joining the new Syrian army and to reject nationalism and secularism.[15] The Sayf al Bahr Battalion claimed to fire on HTS military vehicles at an unspecified town in Rif Dimashq on January 11.[16] CTP-ISW cannot confirm that this attack took place or verify the exact nature and origin of the group. CTP-ISW has observed the formation of nascent opposition against HTS, particularly along the Syrian coast.[17] The Sayf al Bahr Battalion appears to be the first organized opposition faction that has defected from HTS. Armed opposition from this group could encourage more extreme jihadist elements in HTS’s coalition to revolt against its rule.

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani met with prominent Iraqi Sunni politicians in Baghdad on January 13, which is consistent with previous indications that some Iraqi Sunni and Kurdish politicians are trying to build an alliance ahead of the October 2025 Iraqi Parliamentary elections.[18] Barzani held separate meetings with Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, Sovereignty Alliance leader Khamis al Khanjar, and Azm Alliance leader Muthanna al Samarrai. Barzani emphasized the role of Parliament in “strengthening national dialogue” in his meeting with Mashhadani.[19] Mashhadani and five other Sunni politicians recently called in mid-December 2024 for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to address political and economic grievances.[20] It is unclear where Barzani was referring to these politicians’ call when he mentioned ”national dialogue.”

Barzani also discussed the 2025 Iraqi budget with Iraqi political officials on January 13. Barzani called on the Iraqi judiciary to “guarantee the [KRG’s] financial rights” during a meeting with Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zaidan. Barzani and former interim Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi reportedly agreed to amend the 2025 budget to guarantee the salaries of [KRG] employees.”[21] The KRG recently threatened on January 8 to withdraw from the Iraqi government if the latter failed to regularly pay public sector salaries.[22]

A source close to nationalist Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr separately claimed on January 13 that Sadr opposes the return of his political bloc—the Shia National Movement—to politics. The Sadrist political bloc withdrew from Parliament in 2022, enabling the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework to gain a majority in parliament. Sadr’s reported opposition to his political bloc reentering politics is noteworthy given that some Sunni politicians have recently aligned with Sadr on some issues. CTP-ISW previously noted that the alignment of Sadr’s and Sunni positions could provide a foundation for political collaboration in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Israel and Hamas have reportedly made progress toward a ceasefire-hostage agreement but have yet to solve a key outstanding issue.[23] An unspecified Palestinian official told the BBC on January 14 that the final draft of the ceasefire agreement allows Israel to maintain an 800-meter-long buffer zone along the Gaza Strip’s eastern and northern boundaries.[24] Israel’s ability to establish such a buffer zone was reportedly a significant point of disagreement between Israel and Hamas.[25] Israel and Hamas have yet to solve another key outstanding issue--the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors--however.[26]

Unspecified Arab officials told the Wall Street Journal on January 14 that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip, Mohammad Sinwar, has “agreed in principle” to the terms of the final ceasefire draft.[27] Sinwar may be making autonomous decisions about the ceasefire agreement without consulting Hamas central leadership.[28] The Wall Street Journal reported on January 13 that Sinwar has begun operating autonomously and ignoring the Hamas decision to make decisions through a leadership council. It is unclear how Sinwar would implement the terms of a ceasefire agreement given that he lacks sufficient command-and-control across the northern and southern halves of the Gaza Strip.[29]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned Israel on January 14 that Hamas has recruited “almost as many new militants as it has lost.”[30] Blinken stated that Hamas’ new recruitment effort is a “recipe for an enduring insurgency and perpetual war.” The Wall Street Journal similarly reported on January 13 that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip Mohammad Sinwar has begun recruiting Gazans by targeting funerals and prayer gatherings and offering food, aid, and medical assistance in return for service.[31] These new recruits are not capable of successfully operating in organized military units given that Hamas has lost adequate safe areas to train new recruits.[32] Current Israeli military operations are designed to prevent the regeneration of Hamas by denying Hamas the sanctuary to conduct training programs, particularly in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF is preventing the reconstitution of Hamas units by isolating Hamas’ forces in the north and denying them safe areas there by conducting repeated raids.[33] These raids gradually attrit Hamas fighters and make it impossible for Hamas to train new recruits in a way that would make them competent and capable of fighting against the IDF.

The IDF has successfully achieved two key operational-level objectives: the isolation of Hamas military forces in the northern Strip and the destruction of Hamas’ military organization.[34] Hamas fighters are now operating as small fighting cells and not organized military units that Hamas had in the early days of the war. The IDF’s operational success in the Gaza Strip obscures the strategic insufficiency of IDF operations if the Israeli government desires to destroy Hamas fully. Sinwar and his close commanders will almost certainly begin to rebuild Hamas after any IDF withdrawal, though such an effort will take years of patient reconstitution.[35]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: Small pockets of locally organized, armed resistance against HTS have emerged in Syria. The expansion of such resistance would strain the bandwidth of HTS-led forces and impede any efforts to suppress this resistance.
• Iraq: KRG President Nechirvan Barzani met with prominent Sunni politicians in Baghdad, which is consistent with early indications that Kurdish and Sunni parties are trying to build a political coalition ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025.
• Gaza Strip: Israel and Hamas made significant progress toward a ceasefire-hostage agreement. They appear to have yet to resolve disagreement over whether the IDF would withdraw from the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors, however.

Iran Update, January 13, 2025

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Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa, Katherine Wells, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Israeli and Hamas officials appear to be optimistic after achieving a "breakthrough” in ceasefire negotiations in Doha on January 13. Israel and Hamas have yet to solve at least two outstanding issues, however.[1] Two Israeli officials told Axios that mediators from Qatar, the US, and Egypt presented Hamas with a “final draft” of the agreement.[2] The draft stipulates that Hamas must release 33 hostages during a 42-day ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Israel will begin negotiations on the 16th day of the ceasefire to secure the release of the remaining hostages in exchange for "high-profile" Hamas members, according to details shared by an Israeli military correspondent.[3]

Negotiations over the buffer zone and a continued IDF presence in the Gaza Strip remain sticking points.[4] Israeli officials told an Israeli military correspondent that the IDF will maintain its presence in the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors, which are two operationally significant IDF-held areas, between the first and second phase of the ceasefire agreement.[5] Another presumably separate Israeli official told Axios that the IDF will “gradually withdraw” to a buffer zone along the border and that the IDF will withdraw from the corridors.[6] The official did not make clear when the IDF would withdraw from the corridors. A Hamas official told CNN that negotiations regarding the buffer zone and a permanent ceasefire are ongoing and remain “sticking points.”[7] Hamas demands the buffer zone return to its pre-war width of 300-500 meters, while Israel insists on a two-kilometer-wide zone along Gaza’s eastern and northern boundaries.[8] The IDF intends to use this buffer zone to protect Israeli communities in southern Israel. Israel will not completely withdraw from the Gaza Strip until its war objectives are achieved, among them the return of all the hostages, according to Israeli officials speaking to an Israeli military correspondent.[9]

Hamas is attempting to rebuild its military organization, but persistent IDF pressure and the severely degraded state of Hamas’ military forces will make this process extremely difficult and long. The Wall Street Journal reported that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip Mohammad Sinwar has reportedly begun operating autonomously from the main Hamas leadership and ignored the Hamas decision to make decisions through a leadership council.[10] Sinwar has begun recruiting Gazans by targeting funerals and prayer gatherings and offering food, aid, and medical assistance in return for service.[11] Hamas has obtained some of these resources by hijacking aid convoys. The Wall Street Journal also reported that Hamas is using unexploded ordinance to build new improvised explosive devices.[12] New recruits are not capable of successfully disassembling and reassembling unexploded ordinance to build improvised explosive devices. Such efforts require relatively experienced explosives experts. The loss of those experts due to Israeli military action would likely have outsized effects on the nascent reconstructed Hamas military organization, which will already need substantial time and space to reconstitute itself.

Current Israeli military operations are designed to prevent the successful regeneration of Hamas by denying Hamas adequate safe areas to train new recruits, particularly in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF has successfully achieved two key operational-level objectives: the isolation of Hamas military forces in the northern Strip and the destruction of Hamas’ military organization. Hamas fighters are now operating as small fighting cells and not organized military units that Hamas had in the early days of the war. Military units have institutionalized command, recruitment, and replenishment functions that make them resilient in the face of casualties and degradation. Individual cells of fighters lack this institutionalization and are relatively easy to destroy. A decentralized, guerrilla force like the one Hamas employs can “wait out” the Israelis and prepare to rebuild, however. The IDF is preventing the reconstitution of Hamas units by isolating Hamas’ forces in the north and denying them sanctuary there by repeatedly raiding areas where Hamas is strong.[13] These raids gradually attrit Hamas fighters and make it impossible for Hamas to train their new recruits to make them competent and capable against the IDF.[14]

Sinwar has likely delegated control of day-to-day efforts in the northern Gaza Strip to Hamas Gaza City Brigade commander Izz al Din al Haddad, as CTP-ISW has previously assessed.[15] The successful IDF effort to isolate the northern Gaza Strip both above and below ground means that it is highly unlikely that Sinwar is capable of communicating with forces in the north by runner or other physical means. Sinwar or someone close to him could presumably communicate electronically, but the use of electronic communications would be extremely risky and therefore unlikely to enable Sinwar to exert day-to-day control over Hamas’ military organization in the northern Strip. Sinwar likely retains significant control over Hamas forces in the central Gaza Strip and in Khan Younis, however.[16] The IDF raids these areas only rarely and it is not permanently present close to many of the major Gazan towns and cities in the Central Camps or Khan Younis areas.

The IDF’s operational success in the Gaza Strip obscures the strategic insufficiency of IDF operations if the Israeli government desires to destroy Hamas fully. Sinwar and his close commanders will almost certainly begin to rebuild Hamas after any IDF withdrawal, though such an effort will take years of patient reconstitution.[17] It is also far from clear that Sinwar would decide to rebuild Hamas in the same way Hamas built itself from the 1990s to 2023, given the obvious failure of Hamas’ military operations in the Gaza Strip and the inability of those operations to achieve any of Hamas’ war aims. These war aims include the destruction of the Israeli state by triggering a regional war or the destruction of the Abraham Accords.

Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) may be attempting to stretch the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)’s bandwidth by threatening multiple areas simultaneously. Turkey and the SNA continued shelling SDF positions along both the line of control and deeper into SDF-held territory on January 13.[18] The SNA has also reportedly deployed forces to the line of control near Tal Tamr since at least January 8.[19] These deployments and the shelling around Tal Tamr will almost certainly force the SDF to deploy forces to the area to protect against any possible Turkish-SNA offensive, thus fixing significant SDF forces far from the main fighting near the Euphrates. Turkey and the SNA can therefore force the SDF to stretch its bandwidth by allocating forces to Tal Tamr without an attack from Tal Tamr. Stretching the SDF’s bandwidth would likely make Turkish or SNA operations near Kobani or the Euphrates River much easier.

Turkey has continued to support SNA efforts to isolate and destroy SDF elements along the Euphrates River. Turkey and the SNA are attempting to isolate the SDF forces in their bridgeheads on the western bank of the Euphrates by striking along supply lines and key nodes behind the front while pressuring the SDF bridgeheads with ground attacks. Local, anti-SDF media reported that Turkey struck an SDF barracks and two guard posts in Sarrin, east of the Qara Qozak bridge.[20] The SDF operates from a base in Sarrin that Russian forces evacuated after the fall of the regime, meaning that Turkey is striking an SDF rear base that could be used to sustain the bridgeheads.[21] Turkey also reportedly conducted several airstrikes targeting SDF positions west of the Tishreen Dam.[22]

The SNA has followed up these airstrikes by pressuring the SDF bridgehead on the western bank of the Euphrates. Geolocated footage posted on January 13 showed SNA-affiliated fighters firing small arms at an unseen target in a village northwest of Tishreen Dam.[23] The SDF posted footage on January 12 of an SDF drone strike that targeted an SNA personnel carrier.[24] Neither the SDF nor SNA appears to have made any significant territorial gains as of this writing, but the pressure that the SNA has put these bridgeheads under will make it difficult for the SDF to disengage and withdraw in good order if the SNA or Turkey forces the SDF to contend with a threat to its rear. Withdrawing a military force while under enemy pressure is an extremely difficult undertaking, particularly when the withdrawing force comes under pressure from a large military force.[25] The enemy force—if it discovers a withdrawal is underway—will typically attempt to turn the withdrawal into a rout to destroy the withdrawing force.[26]

Geolocated footage posted by the commander of the Suleiman Shah Brigades—a faction affiliated with the SNA—on January 13 showed SNA armored vehicles traveling through a village northwest of Tishreen Dam.[27] Abu Amsha claimed that the video showed SNA reinforcements arriving at the frontlines.[28] The SNA may seek to move more forces to the frontline in order to continue pressuring the SDF positions or prepare for a large-scale assault to collapse the bridgehead.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Israeli and Hamas officials appear to be optimistic after achieving a "breakthrough” in ceasefire negotiations in Doha on January 13. Negotiations over the buffer zone and a continued IDF presence in the Gaza Strip remain sticking points.
• Hamas Reconstitution: Hamas is attempting to rebuild its military organization, but persistent IDF pressure and the severely degraded state of Hamas’ military forces will make this process extremely difficult and long. Current Israeli military operations are designed to prevent the successful regeneration of Hamas by denying Hamas adequate safe areas to train new recruits, particularly in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Hamas Leadership: The Wall Street Journal reported that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip Mohammad Sinwar has reportedly begun operating autonomously from the main Hamas leadership and ignored the Hamas decision to make decisions through a leadership council. Sinwar has likely delegated control of day-to-day efforts in the northern Gaza Strip to Hamas Gaza City Brigade commander Izz al Din al Haddad.
• Turkish and Syrian National Army (SNA) Operations: Turkey and the SNA may be attempting to stretch the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)’s bandwidth by threatening multiple areas simultaneously. Turkey has continued to support SNA efforts to isolate and destroy SDF elements along the Euphrates River.
• SDF Bridgeheads on the Euphrates: Neither the SDF nor SNA appears to have made any significant territorial gains around the bridgeheads, but the pressure that the SNA has put these bridgeheads under will make it difficult for the SDF to disengage and withdraw in good order if the SNA or Turkey forces the SDF to contend with a threat to their rear. Withdrawing a military force while under enemy pressure is an extremely difficult undertaking, particularly when the withdrawing force comes under pressure from a large military force.

Iran Update, January 12, 2025

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Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Iran conducted an air defense exercise for the second time in recent days. This activity reflects Iranian concerns about possible airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, as Tehran has continued to expand its nuclear program. The Artesh—the conventional Iranian military—conducted the latest air defense exercise across northern and western Iran on January 12.[1] This exercise notably covered the Iranian nuclear facilities around Arak and Fordow.[2] Though Iran typically conducts air defense exercises around this time of year, this activity nonetheless probably reflects Iranian leaders’ assumption that they will face airstrikes against their nuclear program in the near term. This assumption has no bearing on the likelihood that the United States or Israel would actually conduct such a strike, however.

The Artesh exercises tested the manned and unmanned aircraft as well as the following air defense systems, according to Iranian state media:[3]

• Rad missile. An Iranian-made, short-range, anti-tank missile designed for T-72 tanks, fired from a 125 millimeters (mm) caliber barrel, and with a target distance of four kilometers (km).[4]
• Majid missile. An Iranian-made, short-range, shoulder-fired, electro-optical-guided missile with a maximum target range of 15 km.[5]
• Talash missile. An Iranian-made, long-range, mobile surface-to-air air defense missile system, capable of hitting all altitude targets with a a maximum range of 200km.[6]
• Misagh-3 missile. An Iranian-made, short-range, shoulder-fired system with a laser fuse and a maximum range of five km and flight altitude of 3,500 meters (m).[7]
• Khordad-15 system. An Iranian-made, long-range air defense system with a detection range of 85 km and target range of 45 km.[8]
• Shahid Jalilvand radar system. An Iranian-made, medium-range, phased array radar system able to detect small flying targets with low cross-sections in three dimensions and a 24-hour operational continuity.[9]
• Samavat radar-controlled artillery system. A short-range Iranian version of the Swiss low-altitude Skyguard radar system with a range of 4 km and uses an anti-aircraft 35mm Oerlikon caliber barrel gun.[10]
• Seraj radar-controlled air defense artillery system. Iranian-made artillery system with a 35mm caliber barrel gun, radar, and a new optical system.[11]

This activity comes after the IRGC Aerospace Force conducted an air defense exercise around the other major Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz on January 7.[12] This flurry of air defense activity is part of the larger military exercise that the Iranian armed forces are holding across Iran until March 2025.[13] This exercise includes the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). It is unlikely that Iran could repel a US or Israeli airstrike given the inferiority of the Iranian systems that have been used in these exercises relative to the modern US and Israeli capabilities. This is especially the case given that Israel neutralized Iran’s S-300s—its most advanced air defense platform—in October 2024.

Iran could use part of its exercises to prepare for an attack on US or Israeli targets, though CTP-ISW assesses that this possibility is relatively unlikely at this time. Iran previously conducted exercises ahead of its Operation True Promise and Operation True Promise II attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 respectively.[14] And Iranian officials have yet to fulfill their vow to conduct a third missile attack on Israel.

Fatah released a statement on January 11 affirming that the PA will prevent any Hamas effort to stoke conflict in the West Bank.[15] Fatah stated that Hamas is responsible for the destruction of the Gaza Strip because Hamas ”gambled with the interests and resources of the Palestinian people for Iran’s benefit.” PA forces have been operating in Jenin Governorate, northern West Bank, since early December 2024 to degrade Palestinian militia networks there.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran conducted an air defense exercise for the second time in recent days. This activity reflects Iranian concerns about a possible US or Israeli airstrike on Iranian nuclear facilities.
• West Bank: Fatah released a statement affirming that it will prevent any Hamas effort to stoke conflict against Israel in the West Bank.

Iran Update, January 11, 2025

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Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, and Nicholas Carl

The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led Syrian interim government announced that it thwarted an attempted Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attack on a prominent Shia shrine outside Damascus. The Syrian Interior Ministry announced on January 11 the arrest of ISIS members who were planning a suicide bombing attack at the Sayyidah Zeinab shrine.[1] The ministry stated that the General Intelligence Directorate and General Security Administration coordinated to thwart the attack.[2] ISIS has previously attacked Shia shrines in Syria, including in July 2023, when ISIS detonated a bomb near the Sayyidah Zeinab Shrine, killing six individuals and wounding 20 others.[3] CTP-ISW cannot verify the interim government claim about the most recent attempted ISIS attack. If true, it would indicate that ISIS seeks to attack Shia targets to stoke sectarian tensions and delegitimize HTS as the primary ruling power in Syria. HTS announced recently that it has accepted responsibility for securing the Sayyidah Zeinab shrine.[4]

HTS-led Syrian interim government officials met with a senior Lebanese delegation in Damascus to discuss border security, counter-smuggling efforts, and immigration on January 11.[5] HTS leader and interim head of state Ahmed al Shara and Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with a Lebanese delegation headed by Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati.[6] Shara said that they agreed to securing the border to prevent illegal smuggling as a top priority.[7] Such efforts could impede Lebanese Hezbollah's efforts to reconstitute militarily. Hezbollah has long relied on Syria as a conduit to receive funds and materiel from Iran. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem acknowledged that Hezbollah had lost its ground access to Iran via Syria and signaled his willingness to restore this connection with the support of the new interim government in Syria in December 2024.[8] The border policies that the HTS-led interim government and Lebanon enact in the coming months will determine how easily Iran can revive its ground access to Hezbollah.

The Iraqi Army and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) launched an operation targeting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Hamrin Mountains, Diyala Province. The Iraqi Air Force conducted an airstrike on January 10 that killed four ISIS members.[9] Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah visited the site of the airstrike on January 11.[10] The PMF announced on January 11 that the Iraqi Army and PMF Diyala Operations Command launched a security operation under the direction of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to “clear and search” the Hamrin Mountains.[11] The Diyala Operations Commander, Talib al Musawi, is affiliated with the Badr Organization and the Badr-controlled PMF 1st, 4th, 23rd, and 24th brigades all operate in Diyala.[12]

The security operation in Diyala Province comes after Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) special operations forces conducted military exercises in neighboring Kermanshah Province, Iran, between January 4 and 9.[13] The Gilan Province-based Mirza Kuchak Khan Special Forces Brigade and Saberin Special Forces Brigade participated in the exercises.[14] IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour stated on the sidelines of the exercise that Diyala Province was previously a “cradle of terrorist and Takfiri groups.”[15] The exercises and Pakpour’s statement highlight heightened concerns among Iranian officials over external threats, particularly the possibility of ISIS infiltrations into Iran.

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: The HTS-led Syrian interim government announced that it thwarted an attempted ISIS attack on a prominent Shia shrine outside Damascus.
• Syria: The HTS-led Syrian interim government hosted a senior Lebanese delegation to discuss border security, counter-smuggling efforts, and immigration.
• Iraq: The Iraqi Army and PMF launched an operation targeting ISIS in the Hamrin Mountains in eastern Iraq.

Iran Update, January 10, 2025

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Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Avery Borens, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

There are early indications that some Iraqi Sunni and Kurdish politicians are trying to build an alliance ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. Such an alliance would challenge the Iranian-backed Shia parties in these elections. A prominent Sunni politician, Khamis al Khanjar, met with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masoud Barzani on January 9 to discuss the upcoming parliamentary elections and “the formation of alliances that can guarantee the rights of their people and regions.”[1] This meeting comes as Khanjar helped form a political coalition—the United Sunni Leadership Coalition—with other prominent Sunni leaders on January 7.[2] The leader of the Shammari tribe in northwestern Iraq separately praised Barzani and emphasized the need for Arab-Kurdish unity in a statement on January 8, suggesting that the Shammari tribe is aligned with Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP).[3]

Khanjar has been vocal about the need to address Sunni grievances in recent weeks. Khanjar said in an interview with Kurdish media in December 2024 that Sunnis in western Iraq are upset about the injustices they face.[4] Khanjar added that Sunnis would turn to “other parties” that oppose dialogue and negotiation if the federal government fails to defend them.[5] Khanjar’s remarks are consistent with a recent statement from Sunni politicians calling for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to address political and economic grievances.[6] The KRG similarly threatened to boycott the Iraqi federal government if the latter failed to regularly pay public sector salaries.[7] The payment of public sector salaries is a common point of tension between the Iraqi federal government and the KRG, but the KRG threat is still notable given the current discussions between Barzani and the newly formed Sunni political alliance.[8]

The newly formed Sunni political coalition could align with national Iraqi Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr as well. Sadr emphasized in early December 2024 that the Iraqi federal government and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias must avoid interfering in Syria.[9] Khanjar subsequently called on Iraqi political parties to “adopt” Sadr’s position of non-interference.[10] The alignment of Sadr’s and the Sunni positions here could provide a foundation for political collaboration in the upcoming parliamentary elections. The United Sunni Leadership Coalition’s outreach to the KDP and possible alignment with Sadr is noteworthy given that these factions previously allied following the 2021 Iraqi Parliamentary elections.[11]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly rejected plans to postpone the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq during his meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani in Tehran on January 8.[12] Khamenei told Sudani that there is “no justification” for postponing the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, according to an unspecified source close to the Iranian presidency speaking to Iraqi media on January 9.[13] An Iraqi official told the Washington Post in December 2024 that the Iraqi federal government was reconsidering its request for US forces to withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2026 because it is concerned that the fall of Bashar al Assad in Syria threatens Iraqi security.[14] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining troops would withdraw by the end of 2026.[15]

Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan said on January 10 that the HTS-led interim Syrian government should be given the opportunity to address Kurdish militants' presence within the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) before Turkey takes military action.[16] Fidan said that the HTS-led interim government has an “agenda” to address the “PKK/YPG” but promised that “Turkey will” take action if others—presumably HTS—fail to do so.[17] HTS and Turkey have coordinated in recent weeks to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense apparatus. HTS leader Ahmed al Shara recently met with the SDF but there have been no specific reports of tangible progress toward an agreement, despite SDF commander Mazloum Abdi’s claim on January 9 that the SDF came to an unspecified agreement on Syrian unity.[18] It remains unclear if Turkey would be satisfied by the SDF merely being re-flagged under the new Syrian Defense Ministry.

Turkish officials have repeatedly threatened to launch a military operation to “destroy” the SDF if it fails to disarm.[19] Fidan said on January 10 that Turkey has the objective of “cleans[ing]” Syria of “terrorism” in 2025.[20] Turkey rejected on January 10 a proposal to deploy US and French troops to secure the Syria-Turkey border.[21] The deployment of US and French forces would likely preclude Turkey from conducting its offensive. Local Syrian media reported on January 10 that Turkey sent reinforcements to the Syrian border and posted footage of a convoy of heavy equipment transporters carrying 155-mm self-propelled howitzers.[22]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) reportedly shelled SDF positions along the eastern Peace Spring frontlines on January 10 amid a possible SNA offensive against the SDF. Local, anti-SDF media reported that the SNA shelled several SDF positions in the Tal Tamr countryside and east of Ras al Ain.[23] The reported SNA shelling comes amid possible SNA deployments and preparations for an offensive into SDF-controlled territory. CTP-ISW cannot verify the local reporting about shelling along the frontline, however.

Turkey continued to support SNA operations to isolate SDF elements along the Euphrates River ahead of the possible offensive. Turkey conducted several airstrikes targeting SDF positions in several villages near Sarrin and along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River, according to local media.[24] The SDF accuses Turkey of striking Sarrin’s grain silos.[25] Turkey also reportedly struck at least three SDF targets in northern Hasakah Province along the Qamishli-Faysh Khabur road.[26] Local media reported that one of the strikes killed an SDF commander with two others in a vehicle in Khan Jabal.[27] These strikes are likely meant to undermine SDF defenses against the SNA along the Euphrates River and the SDF's ability to defend against a potential SNA offensive from Peace Spring territory.

The SNA continued to engage the SDF northwest of Tishreen Dam on January 10. Commander of the Suleiman Shah Brigades—a faction affiliated with the SNA—Abu Amsha claimed on January 10 that the SNA seized two hills northwest of the Tishreen Dam.[28] Geolocated footage posted on January 10 showed SNA and SDF drone strikes about three kilometers northwest of Tishreen Dam.[29] Geolocated footage showed the SDF conducting a drone strike targeting SNA fighters north of Deir Hafer, east of Aleppo City.[30]

The HTS-led interim government located and dismantled a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in the Aleppo countryside on January 10.[31] Syrian state media reported that the VBIED was headed to Aleppo from SDF-controlled territory, citing a source in the Interior Ministry.[32] Unspecified fighters have detonated three other car bombs or VBIEDs in SNA-controlled territory since December 24.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: There are early indications that some Iraqi Sunni and Kurdish politicians are trying to build an alliance ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. Such an alliance would challenge the political influence of the Iranian-backed Shia parties.
• Iraq: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly rejected any plans to postpone the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq during his meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani in Tehran.
• Syria: Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan said that the HTS-led interim government in Syria should have the opportunity to address Turkish concerns vis-a-vis the SDF before Turkey launches a major military operation into northern Syria.

Iran Update, January 9, 2025

Click here to read the full report.

Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Ria Reddy, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Fighting reportedly erupted along parts of the frontline between the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) in northern Syria amid indications of an upcoming SNA offensive against the SDF. Local, anti-SDF media reported on January 9 that the SDF and SNA exchanged artillery fire and “clashed” near the Balikh River, north of SDF-controlled Ain Issa.[1] Three SNA-affiliated fighters were reportedly injured in the fighting.[2] Local media reported artillery shelling and fighting along the M4 highway, west of Tal Tamr as well.[3] The SNA has reportedly sent units to the frontlines in recent days, indicating that the SNA is preparing to attack the SDF.[4] Such an attack would be part of the Turkish and SNA effort to coerce the SDF into disarming and disbanding. CTP-ISW cannot verify the local reporting about fighting along the frontline. Although it is unclear which side initiated the reported fighting, the SNA may nevertheless exploit the recent shelling to set conditions for further attacks on the SDF.

The SNA continued offensive operations against the SDF around Tishreen Dam on January 8, possibly in order to fix the SDF units there and prevent them from reinforcing other positions along the frontline. The SNA launched a “large-scale” attack against the SDF about five kilometers northwest of the dam.[5] The SNA also ambushed SDF fighters around Tal al Zamalah, south of the dam.[6] The SDF accused Turkey of providing air support to the SNA attacks.[7] A Kurdish journalist reported that the SNA launched the attacks after receiving reinforcements from al Bab, Mare, and Jarabulus.[8] The journalist previously reported that the SNA had sent ”significant” reinforcements to Jarabulus.[9] SNA forces likely advanced within three kilometers of Tishreen Dam, given that geolocated footage posted on January 8 showed the SDF conducting drone strikes on SNA fighters in Khirbet Tueni, which is 2.8 kilometers northwest of the dam.[10] It is unclear whether the SNA has retained any territorial gains from its attacks, however. The SNA has continued to conduct artillery and drone strikes targeting the SDF around Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge.[11] Fixing the SDF to these locations could impede any SDF effort to reinforce its positions elsewhere along the frontline.

Turkey conducted several airstrikes targeting SDF positions on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River near the SDF-SNA frontline on January 9. Local media reported that Turkey struck an SDF rocket launcher near al Jarniyah, which is along an SDF supply line.[12] Turkish artillery and aircraft also struck SDF positions near Qara Qozak Bridge and north of the bridge.[13] CTP-ISW has noted that Turkey is conducting airstrikes targeting SDF in support of SNA offensive operations but that these efforts could also be a precursor to a wider Turkish or Turkish-backed operation.

SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi told Agence France-Presse that the SDF came to an unspecified agreement on Syrian unity with the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government on December 30, 2024.[14] HTS and Turkey have coordinated in recent weeks to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense apparatus. Turkish officials have called for destroying the SDF as well—a step farther than HTS leaders have gone.[15] The report of an agreement between the SDF and HTS raises the question of whether HTS may accept a lesser objective, such as the integration of coherent SDF units into the new Syrian armed forces, which would presumably fall short of the desired Turkish end state in Syria. The SDF may seek to integrate into the larger Syrian Defense Ministry apparatus by simply reflagging as opposed to fully dismantling its command structures. This type of absorption and reflagging often results in armed group leaders failing to observe the actual chain of command, however.

Abdi separately said that the interim government has the responsibility to intervene and achieve a ceasefire throughout Syria, likely as an implicit call for HTS to negotiate with Turkey and the Turkish-backed SNA to cease offensive operations against the SDF.[16] Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan has threatened that both the HTS-led interim government and Turkish armed forces could begin “military operations” against the SDF if the organization fails to disarm.[17]

Behrouz Esbati, one of the seniormost Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Syria, discussed in a leaked video Iranian plans to rebuild proxy and partner militia networks in Syria that would oppose the HTS-led interim government.[18] These remarks are consistent with CTP-ISW's ongoing assessment that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Syria and exploit it to rebuild the Axis of Resistance there. Esbati claimed to command over 10,000 Syrian fighters before the fall of Bashar al Assad.[19] Esbati said that Iran can “activate all the networks” that it has developed over the years in Syria and use social media to “form resistance cells.”[20] Esbati made these comments during a speech to military members at the Vali-ye Asr mosque in Tehran. An unspecified IRGC official—likely a member of the IRGC Quds Force—told the New York Times that Esbati’s comments about recruiting militia fighters were aspirational rather than reflective of discrete IRGC plans.[21] This denial is likely meant to suppress the narrative that the IRGC is trying to subvert the new Syrian government. The unspecified IRGC official also said that Iran would have a better chance at securing its interests in the Middle East if Syria descended into chaos, which is consistent with CTP-ISW‘s assessment that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Iran.

Esbati also notably said candidly that Iran "was defeated very badly, [and] took a very big blow and it's been very difficult.”[22] Esbati’s statements are a stark contrast from the formal Iranian regime line that has aimed to downplay the fact that the fall of Assad marks a strategic defeat for Tehran.[23] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the fall of Assad marks the end of the greater Iranian project in the Levant for the foreseeable future and will make it extremely difficult for Iran to transfer the resources needed to recuperate other actors within its Axis of Resistance namely Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah.[24]

The Iraqi federal government is considering integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi armed forces, which would facilitate Iranian capture the Iraqi security sector. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba has reportedly agreed to such integration, according to an informed source speaking to Iraqi media on January 9.[25] The source added that the Iraqi federal government seeks to integrate Kataib Hezbollah and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada into the armed forces as well.[26] This report comes after Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly agreed to preserve the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[27] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Hezbollah, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada all control brigades in the PMF.[28] Khamenei opposes dissolving the PMF outright but may support the integration of the PMF into the Iraqi armed forces. The Iraqi federal government could reflag PMF brigades as new units, which would largely retain the units’ composition and structure. Integrating the PMF and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment would more entrench the militias into the Iraqi security sector more thoroughly, which would enable deeper Iranian infiltration.

The Anbar Province Police Command will reportedly assume responsibility for security in Anbar Province, Iraq, from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[29] The Anbar Police Command, which is headed by Adel Hamid al Alwani, will reportedly control border areas and checkpoints that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias previously controlled.[30] This report comes after the Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) 13th Brigade (Liwa al Tafuf) withdrew from security checkpoints in al Qaim, along the Iraq-Syria border, on January 5.[31] The Iraqi Federal Police operates under the Iraqi Interior Ministry, which is headed by Abdul Amir al Shammari.[32] Shammari is a Shia whom Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s al Furatain Movement nominated as interior minister in late 2022.[33] Major General Saleh Nasser al Ameri has commanded the Iraqi Federal Police since January 2021.[34]

Prominent Iraqi Sunni politician and former Ninewa Province Governor Atheel al Nujaifi said that the newly formed “United Sunni Leadership Coalition” will likely oppose former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi.[35] Five prominent Iraqi Sunni politicians, including current Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, established the “United Sunni Leadership Coalition” on January 7.[36] The establishment of the coalition came after Mashhadani and five other Sunni politicians called for a “comprehensive national dialogue” in mid-December 2024.[37] Halbousi notably did not sign the statement calling for a national dialogue and has not joined the “United Sunni Leadership Coalition.” Iraqi media reported on January 9 that Halbousi has recently formed an “alliance” with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali.[38] Halbousi reportedly contacted Khazali in March 2024 to try to secure the victory of his preferred candidate in the Iraqi parliament speaker elections.[39] An Iraqi researcher separately observed in October 2024 that an Asaib Ahl al Haq-affiliated Iraqi media outlet had begun “present[ing] [Halbousi] in a beautiful light.”[40]

Key Takeaways:

• Fighting reportedly erupted along parts of the frontline between the US-backed SDF and Turkish-backed SNA in northern Syria amid indications of an upcoming SNA offensive against the SDF.
• The SNA continued offensive operations against the SDF around Tishreen Dam in northern Syria, possibly in order to fix SDF units there and prevent them from reinforcing other positions along the frontline.
• SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi said that the SDF came to an unspecified agreement on Syrian unit with HTS, raising the question of whether HTS would accept a lesser objective than the Turkish one of destroying the SDF outright.
• One of the seniormost IRGC commanders in Syria discussed in a leaked video plans to rebuild Iranian-backed proxy and partner militia networks in Syria that would oppose the HTS-led interim government.
• The Iraqi federal government is considering integrating Iranian-backed militias into the Iraqi armed forces, which would facilitate Iranian infiltration and capture of the Iraqi security sector.

Iran Update, January 8, 2025

Click here to read the full report

Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) are preparing for a possible offensive into US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory in Syria. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on January 7 that Turkey would conduct a “military operation” against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria if the YPG does not disband and integrate into the new Syrian Defense Ministry.[1] Turkey frequently conflates the YPG with the SDF and uses the YPG to refer to the entire SDF. Fidan’s comment is one of the most explicit statements by a senior Turkish official threatening military action against the SDF. The SDF is currently negotiating the terms of its potential integration into the future Syrian armed forces with the HTS-led interim government in Damascus, but it remains unclear if Turkey would wait for these negotiations to conclude before launching an operation.[2]

SNA forces have reportedly deployed and mobilized along SDF-SNA frontlines, which suggests that the SNA is preparing to launch a potential offensive against the SDF from the SNA-controlled Peace Spring area. The Peace Spring area is an SNA-controlled enclave between Ain Issa and Tal Tamr and north of the M4 Highway. Turkish state-run media reported on January 8 that the SNA sent “heavy weapons” to SDF frontlines in the Peace Spring area.[3] A commander in the Joint Force, an SNA formation that includes the Hamza Division and Suleiman Shah Brigade, said that the SNA sent fighters, tanks, and other vehicles to the frontlines overlooking the SDF-controlled towns of Kobani in Aleppo Province, Ain Issa in Raqqa Province, and Tal Tamr in Hasakah Province.[4] The US Treasury Department has sanctioned the commanders of the Suleiman Shah Brigade and Hamza Division for human rights abuses against Kurds.[5] Syrian media circulated footage on January 7 of a small convoy of T-series tanks and vehicles moving through Ras al Ain, a city in northern SNA-controlled territory along the Syria-Turkey border.[6] CTP-ISW can neither confirm local reports about SNA deployments nor comment on their size and scale. The reports of SNA mobilization are consistent with recent Turkish and Turkish-backed airstrikes and artillery shelling targeting SDF positions and assets along the Peace Spring line of control.[7] A Kurdish journalist separately reported that the SNA sent “significant” reinforcements to Jarabulus, which is north of the Qara Qozak Bridge on the western bank of the Euphrates River.[8]

The reported SNA deployments and the current SNA axes of advance toward SDF-controlled territory on the western bank of the Euphrates River provide contours of a potential future SNA offensive. Deployments to the “frontlines” of Kobani, Ain Issa, and Tal Tamr suggest that the SNA could launch a three-pronged assault to collapse SDF defenses along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River. One objective of this advance may be to capture Kobani or fix SDF forces around Kobani while a second prong advances west and southwards from the Ain Issa area towards the rear of the Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge positions. Some interim objectives could include cutting the M4 Highway to block any SDF reinforcements to the Qara Qozak Bridge from areas to the east. The reinforcements that the SNA reportedly sent to the Tal Tamr frontlines suggest that the SNA could advance east toward al Hasakah and attempt to isolate the northernmost Kurdish-controlled territory. The reinforcements that the SNA reportedly sent to Jarabulus could advance southwards toward the SDF bridgeheads on the western bank of the Euphrates River. The timeline of a potential SNA operation from Peace Spring territory is unclear, however.

It remains unclear if Turkey will pursue a military operation into northern Syria at the same time as a potential SNA assault on the SDF. It is unlikely that the SNA’s reported deployments are happening without Turkish approval and support. Turkey is currently conducting airstrikes to interdict SDF supplies in support of SNA operations, but these efforts could also be a precursor to a wider Turkish or Turkish-backed and –approved SNA operation. Turkey has also conducted drone strikes deeper into SDF-controlled territory, which could be part of Turkish efforts to set conditions prior to a Turkish operation. Syrian media reported on January 8 that Turkey conducted a drone strike targeting a vehicle in al Malikiya, in northeast Hasakah Province.[9] The strike likely targeted an SDF commander, given that the strike targeted only one vehicle.

Turkish or Turkish-backed SNA air assets struck a Kurdish government-organized civilian convoy traveling to Tishreen Dam on January 8.[10] The SDF and SNA have fought near the Tishreen Dam, east of Aleppo, since mid-December 2024. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) which is the governing authority in northeast Syria and is affiliated with the SDF, called on January 7 for civilians to travel to the Tishreen Dam and protest Turkish-backed military operations there.[11] Local media reported that the SDF called on employees and teachers in Raqqa and Tabqa to attend the protest.[12] Videos posted on social media show that the convoy included around 100 vehicles, and a Kurdish social media user claimed that thousands of people “answered the call” to participate in the convoy.[13] Photo and video evidence from the site of the attack shows that a single strike targeted the road and a car in the convoy, causing at least two deaths.[14] The SDF said that a Turkish combat drone conducted the strike.[15]

The drone strike targeted an SDF supply line that Turkish forces have targeted since late December 2024 to try to isolate the SDF around the Tishreen Dam.[16] Turkish airstrikes reportedly killed four SDF fighters along the supply line, which flows across the dam, on January 6.[17]  Turkish backed-SNA forces continued to advance against several SDF positions on the western bank of the Euphrates River on January 8 as the civilian convoy approached the dam. The SDF reported intense fighting between the SDF Manbij Military Council and SNA forces in several villages north of Tishreen Dam.[18] The Turkish air campaign to cut off SDF resupply lines to the dam could weaken the SDF’s ability to defend against SNA attacks on the western bank.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani traveled to Iran on January 8, likely to try to urge the Iranian regime to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iranian media reported that Sudani would likely discuss “suspending the activities” of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and Kataib Hezbollah, during his visit to Tehran.[19] Sudani’s visit to Tehran comes after Iraqi media reports that the United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[20] Iraqi National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim stated on January 4 that the incoming Trump administration has warned the Iraqi federal government that it will “target” Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[21] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[22] The PMF reports directly to Sudani on paper, but many of the militias that comprise the PMF answer to Iran in reality.[23] Sudani’s visit to Iraq also follows Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad on January 5.[24]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appears to have rejected Sudani’s request for Iran to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Khamenei stated during a meeting with Sudani that the PMF must be “further strengthened and preserved.”[25]

Sudani separately discussed decreased Iranian gas exports to Iraq.[26] Iran typically supplies approximately 40 percent of Iraq’s gas supply but has reportedly ceased gas exports to Iraq in the past two months.[27] Iran is currently facing a severe energy crisis marked by electricity and natural gas shortages, which has presumably caused it to reduce gas exports to Iraq.[28] Iraq and Turkmenistan signed an agreement in October 2024 for Iraq to import Turkmen gas via Iran to reduce Iraqi dependence on Iranian gas exports.[29] Iranian media reported on January 8 that the agreement has not come into effect, however.[30] It is unclear why Iraq and Turkmenistan have not implemented the agreement, given that there are existing gas pipelines between Iran and Turkmenistan and Iran and Iraq.

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, Azerbaijan, on January 8 to discuss strengthening political and security ties[31] Aliyev thanked Iran for supporting Azerbaijani “territorial integrity” and congratulated Azerbaijan on the “liberation of its land” after the September 2023 Azerbaijani military offensive into the Nagorno-Karabakh region.[32] Aliyev’s praise for Iran is notable given the recent tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia after Russian air defense likely shot an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane on December 25, causing it to crash in Kazakhstan.[33] Ahmadian separately emphasized the need to strengthen energy and transportation cooperation between Azerbaijan and Iran, including by completing the International North-South Transport Corridor.[34] Ahmadian will visit Armenia after his visit to Azerbaijan.

The IDF recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from a tunnel in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip, on January 7.[35] The IDF also found traces of another hostage in the tunnel. The IDF could not confirm the status of the second hostage. Israeli media reported that these hostages were previously thought to be alive.[36] The IDF also located the bodies of two or three militia fighters in the tunnel who were likely the captors of the hostages.[37] The IDF launched an investigation into the death of the hostage.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Syria: Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) are preparing for a possible offensive into US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory in Syria. An SNA commander said that the SNA deployed forces to the line of control between the SNA and SDF in northern Syria. The reported SNA deployments and the current SNA axes of advance toward SDF-controlled territory on the western bank of the Euphrates River suggest the SNA may launch a three-pronged offensive designed to collapse SDF units along the eastern bank of the Euphrates.
• Tishreen Dam Airstrike: Turkish or Turkish-backed SNA air assets struck a Kurdish government-organized civilian convoy traveling to Tishreen Dam on January 8. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) which is the governing authority in northeast Syria and is affiliated with the SDF, called on January 7 for civilians to travel to the Tishreen Dam and protest Turkish-backed military operations there.
• Iraqi Prime Minister in Iran: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani traveled to Iran on January 8, likely to try to urge the Iranian regime to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appears to have rejected Sudani’s request for Iran to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.
• Iran-Azerbaijan Ties: Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, Azerbaijan, on January 8 to discuss strengthening political and security ties.
• Hamas-Held Hostages in the Gaza Strip: The IDF recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from a tunnel in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip, on January 7.

Iran Update, January 7, 2025

Click here to read the full report.

Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Six notable Iraqi Sunni politicians issued a statement on December 14 calling for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to address political and economic grievances.[1] The officials included:

• Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani,
• Former Parliament Speaker Osama al Nujaifi,
• Former Parliament Speaker Salim al Jabouri,
• Former Parliament Speaker Ayad al Samarrai,
• Former Iraqi National Assembly Speaker Hajim al Hassani, and
• Former Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al Mutlaq.[2]

The officials emphasized the need to address issues that have caused “widespread public discontent and anger,” including corruption and “injustices in prisons.”[3] The officials also emphasized that Iraq should be an independent country void of external influence. The officials rejected the use of violence to achieve political transformation and reforms. The Baghdad-based Center for Political Thought interpreted the statement as a warning to the Shia Coordination Framework that the Iraqi federal government could face a major “restructuring” if it does not address these grievances.[4]

Mashhadani separately called on unspecified Iraqi political actors to implement the “Political Settlement” document in a speech on January 4.[5] The Iraqi Forces Alliance, which was a coalition of Sunni political parties, introduced the “Political Settlement” document in March 2017 as a framework for “resolving political and security differences in the post-ISIS period.”[6] Mohammad al Halbousi, who served as the Iraqi parliament speaker until late 2023, previously led the Iraqi Forces Alliance.[7] Mashhadani highlighted that the “Political Settlement” document requires signatories to “reconsider the constitution.”[8] Mashhadani was likely referring to the article in the “Political settlement document” that requires signatories to “make real and fundamental constitutional amendments that address the gaps” in the implementation of the constitution in recent years.[9] Mashhadani stated that the Syrian regime may not have collapsed if it had reconciled with opposition groups.[10]

Senior Iraqi political and security officials appear to have rejected the recent calls for political reform and national dialogue. Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani criticized those who have called for reforming the Iraqi political system following the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria during a speech on January 4.[11] Sudani added that changing the Iraqi political system is “not up for discussion."[12] Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh separately emphasized on January 2 that Iraq has experienced a “greater degree of political calm, harmony, and coexistence between societal components” during the past two years.[13] Fayyadh added that relations between Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds in Iraq are better than they were in the past. These statements suggest that Fayyadh opposes the calls for a ”national dialogue” to address grievances from various elements of Iraqi society.

Iraqi media reported that the United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[14] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The PMF reports directly to Sudani on paper, but many of the militias that comprise the PMF answer to Iran in reality. The Iraqi media reports coincide with calls from prominent Shia figures, including Iraqi Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, nationalist Iraqi Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr, and National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim, to confine the possession of weapons to the Iraqi state.[15]

Turkish forces are likely attempting to isolate the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) by interdicting SDF supply lines to the Tishreen Dam on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.[16] Anti-SDF media reported that Turkish drone strikes have prevented the SDF from accessing a main road that leads to the Dam in Aleppo Province. This would isolate the SDF forces that are holding the Dam and terrain on the western side of the river.[17] The isolation effect generated by these Turkish strikes may be temporary in nature, however, unless Turkey can maintain around-the-clock air superiority over SDF lines of communication. The SDF has shot down some Turkish drones, which would make maintaining around-the-clock air superiority more difficult for Turkey.[18] SDF supply lines currently flow across the Dam itself. Turkish airstrikes reportedly killed four SDF fighters on the supply line road on January 6.[19]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) advanced against several SDF positions on the western bank of the Euphrates River. The SNA seized hilly terrain overlooking the village of Mahshiyyat al Sheikh about three miles from Tishreen Dam.[20] The SNA continued to conduct drone strikes targeting SDF positions on the western bank of the Euphrates River near the dam.[21] The Turkish air campaign to cut off SDF resupply lines to the dam could weaken the SDF’s ability to defend against SNA attacks on the western bank. The SDF retains a salient south of Lake Assad about 20 miles from Tishreen Dam, but SNA forces have reportedly advanced near Maskanah to outflank the SDF along the Aleppo-Raqqa highway.[22] Turkish drone strikes targeted an SDF vehicle along the Aleppo-Raqqa highway east of Maskanah, suggesting that Turkey is also attempting to interdict SDF supplies and reinforcements for the SDF’s southern flank.[23] The SDF may seek to link its forces around Tishreen Dam with the forces moving northwards from Highway Route 4 on the southern salient.

Turkish efforts to interdict SDF supplies may be a precursor to a wider operation, especially if these interdiction strikes attempt to strike deeper behind the front line. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on January 7 that Turkey would carry out a “military operation” against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria if the YPG does not disband and join the new integrated Syrian Ministry of Defense.[24] Turkey frequently fails to differentiate between the YPG and the SDF and uses the ”YPG” as a euphemism for the entire SDF. Fidan said on January 6 that the “eradication” of the ”Kurdish YPG militia” is “imminent.”[25] Fidan, the Turkish defense minister, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have made several similar statements threatening to SDF to disarm and disband but have not up until this point explicitly threatened a military operation into northeastern Syria.[26] Turkish forces have limited their military action to air support for the SNA but have reportedly brought a significant number of ground forces to the border with Syria.[27] Turkey and HTS have coordinated their efforts to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense apparatus since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.

ISIS fighters killed one non-US soldier of the US-led anti-ISIS coalition and wounded two other non-US coalition soldiers during a ground operation in the Hamrin Mountains, Iraq.[28] CENTCOM and Iraqi forces conducted a series of airstrikes and ground operations in the Hamrin Mountains between December 30 and January 6. ISIS engaged non-US coalition forces on the ground during these operations, triggering coalition airstrikes. ISIS forces killed one non-US coalition soldier and wounded two other non-US coalition soldiers, however. No US personnel were killed or wounded.

CENTCOM-supported SDF personnel separately captured an ISIS attack cell leader during a raid near Deir ez Zor, Syria, on the evening of January 2 to 3. [29]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraqi Politics: Six notable Iraqi Sunni politicians called on December 14 for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to address political and economic grievances. The officials emphasized the need to address issues that have caused “widespread public discontent and anger,” including corruption and “injustices in prisons.” Senior Iraqi political and security officials appear to have rejected the recent calls for political reform and national dialogue.
• Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces: Iraqi media reported that the United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
• Northern Syria: Turkish forces are likely attempting to isolate the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) by interdicting SDF supply lines to the Tishreen Dam on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River. Turkish efforts to interdict SDF supplies may be a precursor to a wider operation, especially if these interdiction strikes attempt to strike deeper behind the front line.
• Counter-ISIS Mission: ISIS fighters killed one non-US soldier of the US-led anti-ISIS coalition and wounded two other non-US coalition soldiers during a ground operation in the Hamrin Mountains, Iraq. CENTCOM-supported SDF personnel separately captured an ISIS attack cell leader during a raid near Deir ez Zor, Syria, on the evening of January 2 to 3.

Iran Update, January 6, 2025

Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Iran appears to be feeling more vulnerable after the fall of the Assad regime, Israeli military action against Iranian air defenses and missile production, and the defeats suffered by Hamas and Hezbollah. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Spokesperson Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini told the Financial Times that Iran has doubled the number of military drills this year “in response to the evolving threat landscape” and they have “expanded participation of brigades engaged in realistic operations.”[1] These increases in the scope and quantity of Iranian military exercises indicate that Iran feels increasingly vulnerable after the setbacks it suffered in the October 7 War and after the fall of the Assad regime. Naieini also announced that the IRGC and Artesh will conduct 30 joint land, air, and naval exercises in six western and southern provinces until the end of the Iranian year in mid-March. Naini specified that maritime exercises will start at the end of this week with a large naval parade in the Strait of Hormuz at the end of February, to unveil new equipment.[2] Khatam ol Anbia Joint Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Ghadir Rahimzadeh separately stated that there will be a nationwide joint air defense exercise in the vicinity of sensitive centers “with new and unknown systems” in the next few days.[3]

The Syrian Resistance Movement, which announced its existence in December 2024, is likely a pro-Assad armed group and has begun to frame its operations in Assadist language. The Syrian Resistance Movement acknowledged that Sunni fighters conducted an attack on January 5 (see below for details), and added that it is a multi-sectarian movement.[4] It also framed itself as a protector of the ”Syrian people” against ”terrorist gangs” and ”foreign mercenaries,” which is similar to the language employed by Assadist propaganda outlets before the fall of the regime.[5] The group also uses the flag of the Assad regime. The group has employed sectarian narratives in an attempt to undermine the HTS-led coalition, but this is also consistent with the Assad regime’s propaganda strategy, which sought to portray the HTS and other majority Sunni opposition forces as inherently sectarian.[6] CTP-ISW previously noted that growing conflict between HTS and minority and opposition groups would fuel sectarian tensions, drive an escalation cycle, and risk destabilizing Syria further.[7]

The Syrian Resistance Movement also claimed its first attack targeting HTS-led interim government forces in coastal Syria on January 5, marking the first time that an organized group has claimed an attack against the HTS-led government.[8] The Syria Resistance Movement claimed that it ambushed interim government forces conducting security patrols in al Awaina, Latakia City.[9] This is the first attack claimed by the Syrian Resistance Movement since the group announced its armed opposition to the interim government on December 29.[10] Interim government forces have clashed with pro-Assad remnants in other parts of the country, but this is the first attack claimed by an organized opposition group.[11] Local sources reported that former pro-regime militias recruited and armed by the Assad regime (also known as Shabiha) targeted the forces with an improvised explosive device.[12] The attack killed two interim government forces, including a Jaysh al Izza battalion commander.[13] Jaysh al Izza is subordinated to HTS as part of the Fateh Mubin operations room that overthrew the Assad regime.[14] The Syrian Resistance Movement said its attack was a response to the interim government’s clearing operations in Homs City, which have gone on for four days.[15] The interim government announced that the Homs operations had ended after achieving their goals on January 6.[16] The Syrian Resistance Movement had accused HTS-led forces of sectarian targeting during the operations in Homs and in other cities.[17]

The SNA and Turkey continued offensive operations against the SDF in northern Syria on January 6. The SDF conducted a series of drone strikes targeting SNA vehicles and positions along the frontline northeast of the Tishreen Dam on January 5 and January 6.[18] The drone strikes likely supported the SDF Manbij Military Council as it engaged SNA forces north of the Tishreen Dam. The head of the SDF media center reported that Turkish forces supported the SNA with artillery shelling and drone strikes.[19] SNA artillery also shelled SDF positions on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River near Jaada, which is approximately 4km north of the eastern side of the Qara Qozak Bridge.[20] Local Arab anti-SDF social media accounts said that the SDF still controlled the Tishreen Dam on the Euphrates River, and Maskanah, in Aleppo Province, on January 6.[21]

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reiterated that the “eradication” of the ”Kurdish YPG militia” is “imminent” during a joint press conference with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi on January 6.[22] Turkish officials have repeatedly emphasized that it will destroy the “YPG“ militia, which is a euphemism for the SDF.[23] Turkey has been shelling SDF positions throughout northeastern Syria since the fall of the regime.[24] Turkey more recently increased airstrikes and artillery shelling targeting likely SDF supply lines closer to the battlefields along the Euphrates River.[25] Turkish drones struck SDF positions near the Tishreen Dam on January 6, for example.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• Armed Pro-Assad Opposition to the HTS-led Government: The Syrian Resistance Movement, which announced its existence in December 2024, is likely a pro-Assad armed group and has begun to frame its operations in Assadist language. The group also claimed its first attack targeting HTS-led interim government forces in coastal Syria on January 5, marking the first time that an organized group has claimed an attack against the HTS-led government.
• Iranian Regional Policy: Iran appears to be feeling more vulnerable after the fall of the Assad regime, Israeli military action against Iranian air defenses and missile production, and the defeats suffered by Hamas and Hezbollah. An IRGC spokesperson said that Iran doubled the number of military drills this year “in response to the evolving threat landscape” and they have “expanded participation of brigades engaged in realistic operations.”
• Northern Syria: The SNA and Turkey continued offensive operations against the SDF in northern Syria on January 6. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reiterated that the “eradication” of the ”Kurdish YPG militia” is “imminent” amid increasing Turkish interdiction strikes against the SDF.

Iran Update, January 5, 2025

Click here to read the full report

Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Iran is likely taking a series of steps to prevent instability in Iraq after the fall of the Assad Regime. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani arrived in Baghdad on January 5 for covert meetings with senior Iraqi officials and militia commanders to discuss “restructuring” an informed source told Iraqi media.[1] Ghaani will reportedly meet with the Iraqi prime minister, leaders in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and the Iraqi “armed forces commander.” Ghaani and the IRGC very likely also discuss the fall of the Assad Regime with these key Iraqi leaders. The many militia elements that withdrew from Syria will presumably also need to be reorganized. IRGC Ground Forces Special Forces Brigade also recently conducted military exercises in the western Kermanshah province and the Iranian Artesh Ground Forces deployed several brigades in western Iran to confront hostile groups aimed to create instability on Iran’s western border with Iraq, illustrating Iran‘s preoccupation with the threat posed by insecurity in Iraq.[2]

IRGC-affiliated media separately published an op-ed that highlights some of the probable concerns that Iran has after the fall of Syria. The op-ed claimed that political insecurity in Syria could be transported to Iraq by terrorists who assassinate key Iraqi officials to cause insecurity and destabilize the country. [3]Tasnim‘s Salman al Maliki claimed that other powers, such as the United States and Israel, would try to exploit a power vacuum in Iraq for their own interests. Iran regularly holds the United States and Israel responsible for the formation of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and could conclude that ISIS attacks targeting Iraqi military officers and officials are encouraged by the United States and Israel.[4] Maliki could also be referring to retaliatory Israeli or US strikes against militia targets in response to future attacks targeting Israel or US bases. Maliki urged Iraq to create a joint political and military council for addressing these security threats, sharing intelligence, and responding to terrorism in the op-ed.[5]

Iranian media outlets continue to stoke sectarian conflict over the Shia Sayyida Zeinab Shrine in Damascus. Tabnak reported on January 4 that an HTS-linked commander entered the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus and repeated “sectarian and sarcastic sentences.”[6] Tabnak claimed that the provocative video could lead the Shiites and Alawites in Syria to respond with “harsh actions.” Tabnak has previously claimed that HTS fighters have threatened the security of the sacred Shia shrine.[7]

Syrian Popular Resistance, which is a purportedly Syrian telegram channel espousing sectarian narratives, accused the HTS-led government of killing six Sayyida Zeinab Shrine workers after six dead bodies were reportedly found on January 5.[8] The channel provided no evidence of the deaths or whether the killings were motivated by sectarian violence. This is also the first time the channel has discussed Sayyida Zeinab, which is notable given that most of the claims about the shrine have come from the Iranian information space.

Senior Israeli officials indicated on January 5 that the IDF will likely extend its deployment in southern Lebanon if the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement conditions are not met by January 26. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that if the first condition of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement–the complete withdrawal of Hezbollah and dismantling of Hezbollah weapons and infrastructure by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)–is not met, Israel will be “forced to act on its own.”[9] Katz specified that if Hezbollah does not withdraw there is “no agreement.” The outgoing IDF 91st Division Commander Brigadier General Shai Klepper similarly stated in an interview published on January 5 that the IDF is ”not expected” to leave southern Lebanon after the 60-day ceasefire period concludes if the IDF’s objectives are not fulfilled.[10] The 91st Division is responsible for Israel’s northern border with Lebanon. Israeli media reported that the United States and Israel are making unspecified efforts to extend the 60-day ceasefire with Hezbollah to prevent a ”premature withdrawal” or a return to full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah.[11]

The LAF likely does not have the organizational capability or willingness to meet the conditions of the ceasefire by January 26. Israeli media reported the IDF still controls most of the Lebanese territory as it did in November 2024, when the ceasefire deal was signed.[12] The Washington Post similarly reported that the IDF has withdrawn and allowed the LAF to backfill in only two of the over 60 IDF-controlled areas in southern Lebanon.[13] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that Hezbollah fighters and weapons have not yet moved north of the Litani River, as required by the deal.[14] CTP-ISW has previously noted that it is extremely unlikely that the LAF or UNIFIL would be willing to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament in the south, given their failure to enforce UNSCR 1701 in southern Lebanon since 2006.[15]

Recent skirmishes in southwestern Syria demonstrate the HTS does not yet have full control over terrain in the south. A reportedly former regime-affiliated militia led by Mohsen al Haymad engaged other local factions with rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and small arms in al Sanamayn City, northern Daraa Province, on January 4.[16] Syrian sources suggested that Haymad‘s faction clashed with local groups affiliated with the Southern Operations Room, but it is not clear what started the fighting.[17] Haymad’s faction has operated in al Sanamayn since at least 2018 when the group reconciled with the Assad regime and began collaborating with regime Military Intelligence, according to Syrian opposition media.[18] Many Southern Operations Room commanders—including Ahmed al Awda, a key commander in the group—were also former opposition groups that reconciled with the regime in 2018 under a Russian reconciliation plan.[19] The HTS-led Department of Military Operations deployed reinforcements to al Sanamayn City and convened the factions to negotiate a ceasefire.[20] Haymad’s group and other unspecified local factions agreed to a ceasefire and to hand over heavy weapons to HTS forces.[21] HTS reportedly allowed the local groups to retain their individual weapons, however, which contradicts HTS’s policy of requiring the disarmament of all armed groups within Syria.[22] Short-term arrangements to ensure temporary security in al Sanamyan may present problems in the future as HTS continues its mission to disarm and dissolve armed factions into the Syrian Defense Ministry. This incident also highlights that the Southern Operation Room has not yet been fully folded into HTS’s forces. HTS-controlled forces will remain in al Sanamayn to set up checkpoints and maintain security within the city.[23] The necessity of HTS forces and checkpoints in the city underscores HTS’s lack of control over armed factions in the Daraa and other southern provinces, which regularly sees fighting between local groups.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Regional Policy: Iran is taking a series of steps to prevent instability in Iraq after the fall of the Assad Regime. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani arrived in Baghdad on January 5.
• Iranian Information Space: Iranian media outlets continue to stoke sectarian conflict over the Shia Sayyida Zeinab Shrine in Damascus.
• Lebanon: Senior Israeli officials indicated on January 5 that the IDF will likely extend its deployment in southern Lebanon if the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement conditions are not met by January 26. The Lebanese Armed Forces likely do not have the organizational capability or willingness to meet the conditions of the ceasefire by January 26.
• Southwestern Syria: Recent skirmishes in southwestern Syria demonstrate the HTS does not yet have full control over terrain in the south.

Iran Update, January 4, 2025

Click here to read the full report with maps

Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

An Alawite organization accused the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim Syrian government of failing to address instances of sectarian violence. The Alawite Islamic Forum in Syria released a statement on January 3 expressing its support for the interim Syrian government but argued that the interim government, though it has stated it seeks to respect all Syrians, has so far failed to back words with action.[1] The group cited instances of sectarian-motivated attacks and killings in Homs, Hama, Latakia, Tartous, Damascus, and Daraa. HTS-led security forces have been conducting clearing operations targeting former regime members in these areas since December 28.[2] The Alawite Islamic Forum in Syria rejected the interim government’s claims that acts of violence were perpetrated by individuals and argued that the prevalence of this violence suggested that the violence was a planned revenge campaign.[3] The group added that the government must protect all Syrians by holding the perpetrators accountable, regardless of whether the perpetrators are loyal to the HTS-led interim government or engaging in individual actions against orders.

The HTS leader and interim government head of state Ahmed al Shara has attempted to assuage the Alawite's fears by highlighting the ways HTS and the interim government aim to protect minorities, but he has made only limited concrete, unambiguous steps.[4] The HTS-led interim government has also thus far failed to prevent individual opposition fighters from targeting members of the Alawite community.[5] Accusations of sectarian-motivated attacks can create a dangerous cycle of groups refusing to disarm because they fear for their safety, which then causes HTS-affiliated forces to target those groups that don’t disarm, thereby causing the groups to continue to accuse HTS of sectarianism. This dynamic could easily spiral out of control into larger armed conflict if left unchecked. The HTS-led government has a requirement to assuage the concerns of former regime loyalists and minorities, part of which requires controlling these sectarian narratives as and if they spread.

The interim Syrian government has begun to implement changes to the Syrian government without the consensus of a representative Syrian national dialogue conference. The interim Syrian Education Minister Nazir Mohammed al Qadri released a 12-page document on January 1 detailing changes to the Syrian education curriculum.[6] Qadir held several administrative educational positions under the HTS Syrian Salvation Government in Idlib before being appointed by HTS as the interim Syrian Education Minister.[7] The changes eliminated references to the Assad regime and family and altered several religious phrasings.[8] The Wall Street Journal cited several examples of changes in religious textbooks including “sacrifice one’s life in defense of his homeland” changed to “sacrifice one’s life for the sake of Allah,” “path of goodness” changed to “Islamic path,” and “those who have gone astray” changed to “Jews and Christians.”[9] The Wall Street Journal cited unspecified Syrians who expressed concern that the changes to the education curriculum were made without input from the rest of Syrian society.[10] Shara detailed a three-to-four-year timeline for building a new Syrian state, during which CTP-ISW assessed he would presumably rule and exert heavy influence over the allocation of political power.[11] This timeline would effectively enable Shara to shape a Syrian government into one compatible with HTS’s ideology prior to any referendum.

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) has advanced southeastward towards the Tishreen Dam since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on January 3. Anti-SDF media reported that the SNA advanced through Saideen and Khirbet Tueni, approximately 4 kilometers northwest of the Tishreen Dam, after engaging the SDF near Saideen.[12] Anti-SDF media reported that the SNA continued its advance southward from these two villages towards al Mustafa al Hamada and Mahshiyet al Sheikh to cut off the SDF supply route connecting the Tishreen Dam to areas to the west.[13] The SDF claimed that the SNA forces failed to advance.[14] Turkey provided air and artillery support to SNA forces that targeted SDF positions in and around the Tishreen Dam.[15] Syrian media reported that Turkey launched additional airstrikes that targeted SDF positions in al Jarniyah and al Mazyouna, Raqqa province, and southwest of Tishreen Dam in Deir Hafer City, Aleppo Province.[16] Anti-Kurdish media reported that the SNA launched artillery at SDF positions in al Fatisah, Raqqa province.[17]

Iran is signaling its readiness to resume nuclear talks, probably in an attempt to prevent the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) from triggering "snapback sanctions" later in 2025. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasized Iran's readiness to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiations during an interview with Chinese CCTV on January 4.[18] Araghchi stressed trust-building and sanctions relief as key pillars of the negotiations.[19] The statement likely reflects Iran's concerns over potential snapback sanctions, which could go into effect in October 2025 and, would reimpose all pre-2015 UN sanctions on Iran. The E3 previously said it is prepared to impose international “snapback” sanctions on Iran. The E3 announcement has likely prompted this diplomatic signal from Iran.[20]

Araghchi also reaffirmed Iran's commitment to a unified Syrian government and emphasized cooperation with regional countries to ensure Syria's territorial integrity, which appears to be at odds with statements by other Iranian government officials, including the supreme leader.[21] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has promoted a hardline approach centered on mobilizing Syrian youth against foreign occupiers.[22] Araghchi framed Iran’s approach as a constructive effort to ensure stability and reject external interference. Araghchi stressed that Iran supports an inclusive political process in Syria.[23]

An Israeli media and a Lebanese media report suggested that the IDF may extend its deployment in southern Lebanon by an additional 30 days due to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) failure to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure there. The Israeli Broadcasting Authority (KAN) reported on January 3 that the LAF is not complying with the ceasefire agreement by failing to disrupt Hezbollah reconstitution efforts in southern Lebanon, which KAN suggested could cause the IDF to extend its deployment in Lebanon.[24] The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement requires the LAF to deploy in areas south of the Litani River and destroy Hezbollah infrastructure within 60 days of the ceasefire implementation.[25] Pro-Hezbollah Lebanese newspaper al Akhbar also claimed that Chairman of the Ceasefire Implementation Mechanism US Army Major General Jasper Jeffers sent “serious signals” to the LAF that Israel may extend its presence in south Lebanon for an additional 30 days.[26] Jeffers added that Israel should “take its time” to implement its goals in southern Lebanon due to the LAF’s failure to prevent Hezbollah reconstitution.

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem threatened to break the ceasefire agreement and attack Israeli forces in response to Israeli “violations” of the agreement during a televised speech on January 4.[27] Qassem said that Hezbollah’s patience “may run out” before the 60-day period ends.

Key Takeaways:

• Sectarian Tension in Syria: An Alawite organization accused the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim Syrian government of failing to address instances of sectarian violence. The HTS leader and interim government head of state Ahmed al Shara has attempted to assuage the Alawite's fears by highlighting the ways HTS and the interim government aim to protect minorities, but he has made only limited concrete, unambiguous steps.
• Changes to Education in Syria: The interim Syrian government has begun to implement changes to the Syrian government without the consensus of a representative Syrian National Dialogue Conference.
• Syrian National Army-Syrian Democratic Forces Fighting: The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) has advanced southeastward towards the Tishreen Dam since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on January 3.
• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran is signaling its readiness to resume nuclear talks, probably in an attemptto prevent the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) from triggering "snapback sanctions" later in 2025.
• Iranian-Syrian Relations: Araghchi also reaffirmed Iran's commitment to a unified Syrian government and emphasized cooperation with regional countries to ensure Syria's territorial integrity, which appears to be at odds with statements by other Iranian government officials, including the supreme leader.
• IDF in Lebanon: An Israeli media and a Lebanese media report suggested that the IDF may extend its deployment in southern Lebanon by an additional 30 days due to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) failure to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure there. Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem threatened to break the ceasefire agreement in a January 4 speech.

Iran Update, January 3, 2025

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Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Carolyn Moorman, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Avery Borens, Victoria Penza, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei attempted to justify Iran’s sacrifices in Syria and emphasized resilience amid setbacks during a speech on January 1 that commemorated the death of former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Qassem Soleimani.  Khamenei praised Soleimani’s leadership and defended Iran’s regional interests.[1] Khamenei asserted that the sacrifices of “Defenders of the Shrine” in Syria were meaningful and essential, dismissing claims that their efforts were in vain. Iran refers to all of the Iranian and allied personnel who fought in Syria as “defenders of the shrines.” This speech adopted a notably defensive tone by attempting to justify Iran’s efforts rather than lashing out against the United States for the strike that killed Soleimani. Khamenei has previously said that Iran would seek revenge for the killing of Soleimani by attacking the United States and its partners.[2]

The speech also omitted references to current IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, who some in Iran hold responsible for the rapid unraveling of Iran’s project in Syria and the defeat of Hezbollah and Hamas. This is the second time Khamenei has discussed Soleimani publicly while eschewing any mention of Ghaani.[3] An unspecified Iranian official claimed in early December that many officials in Iran blamed Ghaani for the fall of Assad and were calling for his removal as IRGC Quds Force commander.[4]

Khamenei continued to advance a hard line on Syria, however, emphasizing that Syrian youth will resist “foreign occupation” in Syria, comparing the “Syrian youth” to Iraqi militias mobilized by Soleimani in the mid-2000s against the United States. These militias, which continue to operate in Iraq and today control many government institutions, formed death squads to kill Sunnis and contributed to the ethno-sectarian civil war in Iraq that al Qaeda in Iraq launched in the mid-2000s.[5] Khamenei emphasized that Syrian youth will expel ”foreign occupiers,” which presumably include the United States, Turkey, and possibly HTS.[6]  Khamenei previously emphasized the role of Syrian youth in a December 11, 2024 speech, again likening their efforts to Iraqi militias.[7]

Lebanese Airport security forces searched an Iranian Mahan Air flight in Beirut on suspicion of transporting funds to Hezbollah, which is in line with Lebanese obligations under the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire agreement. The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement requires the Lebanese government to "monitor and enforce" the entry of arms and related materiel to prevent the rearming of Hezbollah.[8] Lebanese media reported that Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport increased security measures following leaks to the media on January 2 that Iran was planning to transfer “millions of dollars” to Hezbollah via a Mahan Air flight.[9] Mahan Air has frequently transported Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force funds, weapons, and operatives in support of Iranian proxy activities abroad and to support Hezbollah directly.[10] The airport security forces searched an Iranian Mahan Air flight that landed at Rafic Hariri International Airport on January 2.[11] An Iranian delegation refused to allow Lebanese security forces to inspect a diplomatic bag containing funds for embassy operations.[12] Iranian media claimed that the security forces did not find suspicious cash transfers for Hezbollah during their searches.[13] Lebanese media posted videos on X (Twitter) on January 2 showing a small group of pro-Hezbollah supporters protesting the inspection of the Mahan Air flight.[14]

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have continued to clash in villages west of Tishreen Dam since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on January 2.[15] The SDF claimed its forces had killed 72 SNA fighters between January 2 and January 3.[16] Anti-SDF media reported that the SNA advanced into or seized two towns west of Tishreen Dam on January 2 after clashing with the SDF in the area.[17] Anti-SDF media also reported that the SNA set up north-facing defensive lines in front of the village Shash al Bubna, a town on the southern end of the SDF advance.[18] Well-prepared SNA defensive lines in this area could prevent the SDF from linking forces with the SDF’s southern advance further south along the west bank of the Euphrates River. SDF supply lines currently flow across the dam itself. The SDF claimed on January 3 that SNA attacks have caused “significant damage” to parts of Tishreen Dam which poses risks to its stability, and connecting the two SDF advances would presumably strengthen supply lines in the event of critical damage to or destruction of the Dam.[19]

Anti-SDF media reported that Turkey conducted an airstrike targeting an SDF position in al Hurriya, northwest of Raqqa.[20] Al Hurriya is located along an SDF supply line between the Manbij frontlines and Raqqa City.[21]

Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh said that the US has no plans to establish a base in Kobani and dismissed local Syrian reports as “inaccurate.”[22] Syrian media posted footage of a convoy of trucks entering Kobani, northern Syria, on January 2 and unloading concrete T-walls in a suburban square in a western neighborhood of the city.[23] One of the trucks in the convoy bore a US flag. There were no obvious US military vehicles in the convoy.

Key Takeaways:

• Khamenei Commemorates Soleimani: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei attempted to justify Iran’s sacrifices in Syria and emphasized resilience amid setbacks during a speech on January 1 that commemorated the death of former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Qassem Soleimani. The speech also omitted references to current IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, who some in Iran hold responsible for the rapid unraveling of Iran’s project in Syria and the defeat of Hezbollah and Hamas.
• Khamenei on Syria: Khamenei continued to advance a hard line on Syria by emphasizing that Syrian youth will resist “foreign occupation” in Syria and comparing the “Syrian youth” to Iraqi militias mobilized by Soleimani in the mid-2000s against the United States.
• Lebanese Security Forces Search Iranian Flight: Lebanese Airport security forces searched an Iranian Mahan Air flight in Beirut on suspicion of transporting funds to Hezbollah, which is in line with Lebanese obligations under the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire agreement.
• Fighting Continues in Northern Syria: The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have continued to clash in villages west of Tishreen Dam since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on January 2. The SDF claimed on January 3 that SNA attacks have caused “significant damage” to parts of Tishreen Dam which poses risks to its stability, and connecting the two SDF advances would presumably strengthen supply lines in the event of critical damage to or destruction of the Dam.
• US Presence in Syria: Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh said that the US has no plans to establish a base in Kobani and dismissed local Syrian reports as “inaccurate.”

Iran Update, January 2, 2025

Click here to read the full report.

Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

This update covers information for the 48-hour period between December 31, 2024, at 2:00pm ET to January 2, 2025, at 2:00pm ET.

A Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) delegation met with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on December 30.[1] There were no specific, public reports of meaningful or tangible progress toward an agreement between Shara and the SDF, despite an unspecified official’s statement to AFP that the meeting was “positive.”[2] This is the first reported meeting between the HTS-led interim government and the SDF since the former assumed power over Damascus, though Shara acknowledged that the government was negotiating with the SDF in an al Arabiya interview on December 29.[3] Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) official Bassem Ishak told Asharq al Awsat on January 2 that the parties only discussed “military issues” at the meeting, suggesting that the two parties discussed HTS’s demands that the SDF subordinate itself to the HTS-organized military.[4] This military is—at present—dominated by HTS-affiliated commanders. It does not appear that HTS and the SDF came to an agreement on or even discussed the political requirements of integrating the Kurdish-controlled autonomous zone into HTS territory and governance. The unspecified official told AFP that this was a “preliminary meeting” that would set the stage for future HTS-SDF dialogue.[5] It remains unclear how high of a priority negotiating with the SDF is to Shara, however, as HTS continues to formalize and deepen its relations with Turkey.[6]

The SDF is almost certainly both unable and unwilling to subordinate itself to the HTS-organized Defense Ministry at this time, given the organizational tasks implicit in that effort. The Kurdish-led SDF is still actively engaging the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and continues to face an existential threat from a potential Turkish offensive in Syria.[7] Reorganizing SDF formations under the HTS-organized Defense Ministry, regardless of whether or not the SDF formations are reflagged or reorganized, would probably require the SDF to break contact with the SNA. The SDF would presumably need to receive certain assurances that the SNA would not continue to attempt to destroy the SDF, especially given that the various SNA formations would make a large portion of the future Syrian army.

The SDF has reportedly widened its salient on the western bank of the Euphrates River around the Tishreen Dam southwards since December 31. The SDF claimed to engage the SNA in Khirbet Zamala, al Atshana, and several other villages between five and ten kilometers south of Tishreen Dam on January 2.[8] Anti-SDF media also reported clashes in the area.[9] Geolocated footage posted on January 1 showed the SDF conducting a drone strike on an SNA vehicle in mountainous terrain in Khirbet Zamala, south of Tishreen Dam.[10] The SDF said it destroyed six armored SNA vehicles in engagements in the area.[11] The SDF may seek to link its forces around Tishreen Dam with the forces moving northwards from Highway Route 4. A link-up between these two advances would presumably strengthen SDF supply lines around the dam, which currently flow across the dam itself and could be more easily disrupted.

The SDF and SNA forces continued fighting west of Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak bridge since December 31. Geolocated footage posted on January 2 showed the SDF conducting drone strikes targeting SNA vehicles and an M113 armored vehicle along a highway west of Tishreen Dam.[12] The SDF also claimed that it shot down a Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone near Qara Qozak bridge on January 1.[13] Anti-SDF media reported that the SNA sent reinforcements to the frontlines near the Tishreen Dam on January 2.[14]

Unspecified fighters have detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) in two separate attacks in SNA-controlled territory since December 31. An unspecified fighter detonated a possible car bomb in central Tal Rifaat, north of Aleppo, on December 31.[15] Six people were injured. The low casualty count in a popular market makes it more likely that the culprit used a relatively rudimentary car bomb and not a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED).[16] This is the third car bomb or VBIED attack in SNA-controlled territory since December 24.[17] An unspecified suspect also detonated a motorcycle in the nearby town of Deir Jamal on January 1.[18] There were no injuries.[19] The SDF condemned the recent IED attacks in Tal Rifaat, Deir Jamal, and Manbij in a statement on January 2.[20]

The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led Military Operations Department continued to conduct raids to detain former Regime members that refused to settle with the interim government and disarm on January 1 and 2. The interim government-run media reported that the Military Operations Department detained at least 28 former regime members in Homs, including those accused of perpetrating atrocities in the early Syrian Civil War.[21] A telegram channel claiming to represent an armed group opposed to the HTS-led government spread claims that the raids targeting former regime members had sectarian motivations.[22] CTP-ISW cannot verify the exact nature and origin of this group and will not at this time report specific claims to avoid amplifying the group’s attempts to foment sectarian violence in Syria. These sectarian narratives can create a dangerous cycle of groups refusing to disarm because they fear for their safety, which then causes HTS-affiliated forces to target those groups that don’t disarm, thereby causing the groups to continue to accuse HTS of sectarianism. This dynamic could easily spiral out of control into larger armed conflict if left unchecked. The HTS-led government has a requirement to assuage the concerns of former regime loyalists and minorities, part of which requires controlling these sectarian narratives as and if they spread.

Interim government forces also engaged “remnants of an Iranian-backed militia” in Albu Kamal, Deir ez Zor Province, on January 1.[23] HTS-led authorities have targeted Iran-affiliated groups over the past several days in Deir ez Zor and Aleppo Provinces.[24] A local correspondent reported that that only a quarter of the estimated 2000 Iranian-backed fighters in Albu Kamal have completed the settlement process with the interim government.[25] Iran had deeply penetrated pro-regime militias in Deir ez Zor Province before the fall of the Assad regime, making it possible that the interim government will encounter greater challenges consolidating security control over the former militia members than in other parts of Syria.

The HTS-led interim Syrian government appears to be taking initial steps to secure cooperation with minority religious communities ahead of the Syrian National Dialogue Conference. A Damascus-based news outlet reported that the Syrian National Dialogue Conference has been delayed until the interim government has extended invitations to all relevant groups.[26] HTS leader Ahmed al Shara met with a Christian clergy from the Damascus area on December 31.[27] HTS leader Ahmed al Shara stated on December 29 that the National Dialogue Conference would represent the breadth of Syria’s diversity.[28]

Interim Syrian Foreign Minister Assad al Shaibani, Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra, and Head of General Intelligence Anas Khattab traveled to Saudi Arabia on January 2 and met with senior Saudi officials.[29] The Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman reported that he discussed ways that Saudi Arabia could support the Syrian government’s transitional process.[30] Shaibani held a separate meeting with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan.[31] Shaibani also visited the Syrian Embassy in Riyadh.[32]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in Quneitra province since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on December 31. Geolocated footage from January 2 showed Israeli bulldozers operating at the Mantara dam on the outskirts of Quneitra, southern Syria.[33] A Syria-focused analyst reported that the IDF seized a former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) base in Hader village, Quneitra province.[34] Syrian media reported that the IDF deployed bulldozers and excavation machinery on a nearby hilltop, likely to construct an observation post.[35] The IDF is paving a road to connect the military base to the hilltop. The IDF separately conducted airstrikes targeting a former Assad regime military base in western Damascus.[36]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s senior advisor, Ali Larijani, justified Iran’s actions in Syria, reaffirmed support of the Axis of Resistance, and linked future Iran-Syria relations to the conduct of new Syrian leaders. Larijani highlighted Soleimani’s fundamental role in the Axis of Resistance.[37] Larijani dismissed claims that the resistance has been weakened and emphasized the resilience of movements such as Hezbollah, which he claimed had rebuilt itself after significant setbacks.[38] Larijani’s speech takes a more defensive tone by framing recent setbacks as temporary and reaffirming Iran’s commitment to its regional objectives. It is notable, however, that Larijani linked future Iran-Syria relations to the conduct of the new Syrian leaders. Other Iranian officials and ex-officials, such as former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei, have advocated for Iran to support resistance movements in Syria against HTS.[39]

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media in Iran claimed that the Shia Sayyida Zeinab Shrine in southern Damascus lacked the power to turn on its lights due to fuel supply issues under HTS.[40] The HTS-led government resumed the shrine’s custodianship on 15 December.[41] Local Syrian reporting did not confirm the Iranian outlet’s claim. Iranian media outlets have previously made false claims about the shrine and the security around it.[42] Iran intends to ignite unrest against the HTS-led interim government in pursuit of regaining a foothold in Syria.[43]

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) negotiations: An SDF delegation met with HTS leader Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on December 30. A Syrian Democratic Council official said the meeting only included “military issues.” The SDF is almost certainly both unable and unwilling to subordinate itself to the HTS-organized Defense Ministry at this time, given the organizational tasks implicit in that effort. The SDF continues to face an existential threat from Turkish-backed forces.
• Fighting in Northern Syria: The SDF has reportedly widened its salient on the western bank of the Euphrates River around the Tishreen Dam southwards since December 31. The SDF may seek to link its forces around Tishreen Dam with the forces moving northwards from Highway Route 4. A link-up between these two advances would presumably strengthen SDF supply lines around the dam, which currently flow across the dam itself and could be more easily disrupted.
• HTS Operations Against Former Regime Members: The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led Military Operations Department continued to conduct raids to detain former Regime members that refused to settle with the interim government and disarm on January 1 and 2. Interim government forces also engaged “remnants of an Iranian-backed militia” in Albu Kamal, Deir ez Zor Province, on January 1.
• Negotiations with Minorities in Syria: The HTS-led interim Syrian government appears to be taking initial steps to secure cooperation with minority religious communities ahead of the Syrian National Dialogue Conference.
• HTS-backed Officials Visit to Saudi Arabia: Interim Syrian Foreign Minister Assad al Shaibani, Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra, and Head of General Intelligence Anas Khattab traveled to Saudi Arabia on January 2 and met with senior Saudi officials.
• Iranian-Syrian Relations: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s senior advisor, Ali Larijani, justified Iran’s actions in Syria, reaffirmed support of the Axis of Resistance, and linked future Iran-Syria relations to the conduct of new Syrian leaders.

Iran Update, December 31, 2024

Click here to read the full report

Johanna Moore, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

A new group announced its opposition to the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government.[1] Armed opposition by the group—named the Syrian Popular Resistance—would likely exacerbate sectarian tensions in Syria and even risk driving fissures in the HTS-led coalition. The Syrian Popular Resistance in a statement on December 29 threatened to attack HTS and HTS-affiliated leaders purportedly in response to the killing of Christians, Shia, and Sunnis since overthrowing the Bashar al Assad regime.[2] The Syrian Popular Resistance labeled the HTS-led coalition as “Kharijites,” which derogatorily frames the coalition as heretical. The statement by the Syrian Popular Resistance comes as nascent opposition against HTS has appeared, especially along the Syrian coast, which is predominantly populated by the Alawite minority.[3] It is possible that the Syrian Popular Resistance is affiliated with this activity, though CTP-ISW cannot verify the exact nature and origin of the group. Growing conflict between HTS and minority and opposition groups would fuel sectarian tensions, drive an escalation cycle, and risk destabilizing Syria further. Although HTS leader Ahmed al Shara has repeatedly used tempered and inclusive rhetoric in recent weeks, he would struggle to contain such a cycle of violence given some of the extreme Salafi-jihadi and sectarian actors that constitute his coalition.

There are growing indications that Iran is trying to stoke and exploit sectarian violence in Syria. Doing so would weaken the HTS-led interim government and help reestablish the Axis of Resistance in Syria. The main outlet of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) called on December 31 for a counter-revolution in Syria, framing it as a response to the "occupation" of Syria by "takfiri terrorists."[4] This term refers to apostates and is commonly used by Iran to refer to the so-called “Islamic State” and other armed Sunni organizations. The IRGC report added that the liberation of Syria is “imminent.” This rhetoric from the IRGC marks the first time that CTP-ISW has observed Iran appearing to call for a revolt against the HTS-led interim government. Rhetoric from Iranian leaders and state media has until this point ambiguously called for the formation of armed resistance in Syria but would often mention resistance to Israeli ground operations in southwestern Syria in the same breath. That the main outlet of the IRGC made these remarks is especially noteworthy given that regional sources have claimed that the IRGC is planning to organize, direct, and support new proxy and partner militia networks in Syria. It is also noteworthy that the IRGC report comes around the same time that the Syrian Popular Resistance announced its formation and opposition to the HTS-led interim government. Iranian state media has previously reported on the formation of armed resistance against HTS in positive terms.[5] Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian separately stated on December 31 that "a new resistance has been born [in Syria] that will manifest itself in the coming years" during a meeting with the Omani foreign affairs minister.[6]

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have continued to clash in northern and northeastern Syria on December 31. The SDF mourned a fighter that died in clashes near Qara Qozak bridge on December 31, indicating that fighting has persisted there.[7] Anti-SDF media claimed that the SDF and SNA continued to clash west of Tishreen Dam in the Manbij countryside.[8] An SDF media official reported that SNA forces in Manbij City attacked the SDF with heavy artillery near a town that is 15 km southwest of Manbij City on December 30.[9] Anti-SDF media also claimed that the SNA fired artillery at SDF positions near Kobani on December 31.[10] US Defense Department deputy press secretary said on December 30 that the ceasefire between Turkey and SDF continued to hold around Kobani, where Turkish forces have reportedly massed along the Syria-Turkey border.[11]

The HTS-led Military Operations Department continued to clash with pro-Assad elements that refused to settle with the interim government and disarm. Syrian media reported small arms fire during a Military Operations Room raid in northern Damascus that is generally considered loyal to the former Assad regime on December 31.[12] Other sources disputed the account of clashes and said that the HTS-affiliated forces only entered the suburb to detain three gunmen when called by neighborhood officials.[13] HTS-affiliated forces operated against former regime elements in other Damascus neighborhoods without reports of small arms fire as well.[14] The Damascus clashes appear to have been isolated and minor, if they even occurred at all, especially compared to the interim government’s deployment to coastal Syria during which its used attack helicopters against pro-regime fighters.[15] The HTS-led Military Operations Department additionally imposed a curfew in Talbiseh, north of Homs City, during an operation to detain former regime fighters.[16]

An unspecified Israeli official speaking to Israeli media expressed interest in increasing cooperation with the US-led international coalition against the Houthis in Yemen.[17] The official emphasized the threat that the Houthis pose to international security and shipping and that the international coalition should ”confront and eliminate this threat.” The Israeli official also emphasized that the Houthis should not be underestimated due to their advanced technologies and intent to threaten Israel, international shipping, and other regional targets, including Saudi Arabia.

These Israeli comments come amid continued US airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed US airstrikes targeting Houthi command-and-control sites and military infrastructure on December 30 and 31.[18] Houthi media confirmed two US airstrikes hit around al Tuhayta, south of Hudaydah on December 30, 10 airstrikes hit the 22nd May military complex and two airstrikes hit al Arad military complex, both in Sanaa.[19] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that the Houthis tried to preempt the US airstrikes by firing a drone and seven cruise missiles at the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier.[20] CENTCOM intercepted these projectiles and destroyed a Houthi coastal radar site.[21]

Sarea also claimed the Houthis fired two ballistic missiles targeting Ben Gurion airport and a power station south of Jerusalem in central Israel on December 31.[22] An Israeli war correspondent confirmed that a Houthi ballistic missile fragment crashed in Beit Shemesh, near Jerusalem, late on December 30 but did not cause any major damage.[23] The IDF intercepted a missile from Yemen before it entered Israeli airspace, and sirens sounded across central Israel to warn of falling debris.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: A new group announced its opposition to the HTS-led interim government. Armed opposition by the group—named the Syrian Popular Resistance—would likely exacerbate sectarian tensions in Syria and even risk driving fissures in the HTS-led coalition. There are growing indications that Iran is trying to stoke and exploit sectarian violence in Syria. Doing so would weaken the HTS-led interim government and help reestablish the Axis of Resistance in Syria.

• Yemen: An unspecified Israeli official speaking to Israeli media expressed interest in increasing cooperation with the US-led international coalition against the Houthis in Yemen. These comments come amid continued US airstrikes targeting the Houthis.
• Gaza Strip:  The IDF Air Force killed a Hamas special operations forces (SOF) commander in the humanitarian area of Khan Younis on December 31. Palestinian fighters returned to their regular tempo and method of attacks in Jabalia refugee camp on December 31.
• Lebanon:  Lebanese and Lebanese Hezbollah media reported IDF shelling around Chebaa, southeastern Lebanon, on December 31. The IDF 91st Division continued to operate in southeastern Lebanon on December 31. A senior IDF Northern Command officer told Israeli media on December 31 that Israel is prepared for all possibilities in Lebanon, including extending the presence of the IDF beyond the ceasefire’s stipulations.

Iran Update, December 30, 2024

Click here to read the full report

Katherine Wells, Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Kelly Campa, Avery Borens, and Nicholas Carl

Iran appears increasingly as though it seeks to foment sectarian conflict in Syria, which it could then exploit to establish proxy and partner militias there. Outlets affiliated with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Armed Forces General Staff published reports on December 30 to this end. One outlet reported on HTS-affiliated elements committing violence against Syrian Alawites.[1] Another outlet reported that armed “resistance” has formed against the HTS-led interim government in response to its offenses against the Syrian people.[2] CTP-ISW has independently observed anti-HTS elements appearing in predominantly Alawite areas in recent days. That the Iranian outlet framed these elements as “resistance” is noteworthy given that the term has an overwhelmingly positive connotation in Iranian regime discourse.[3] Other Iranian outlets that have no obvious affiliation with the Iranian security establishment have published reports emphasizing sectarian tensions in recent days as well. For instance, one outlet reported on purported HTS efforts to achieve the “de-Shia-ization of Syria.”[4] A Middle Eastern source separately told a Western analyst that regional countries have shared intelligence with HTS in recent days that the IRGC is planning to “foster, direct, and support an insurgency” in Syria, presumably by exploiting the sectarian tension that Iran is currently trying to stoke.[5] Another source told the Western analyst that HTS-led forces detained two former Syrian regime operatives with IRGC identification cards and at least three Lebanese nationals.[6] CTP-ISW cannot verify these reports, but it is consistent with senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, suggesting in recent days that Syrian youth should arm and mobilize against the interim government.[7]

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al Shara promoted loyalists to the senior levels of the new Syrian security establishment that he is currently forming. Shara promoted these individuals even though the exact organization and structure of the new Syrian armed forces remains unclear. Shara promoted two individuals to major general, five individuals to brigadier general, and over forty individuals to colonel, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[8] The two major generals—Marhaf Ahmed Abu Qasra and Ali Nour al Din—are the interim defense minister and armed forces chief of staff, respectively. The individuals whom Shara promoted to brigadier general all appear to have close ties to HTS, and in some cases, personal relations with Shara. These individuals include:

• Mohammad Khair Hassan Shuaib (also known as Abu al Khair Taftanaz). Shuaib is a military leader in HTS.[9] Shuaib previously headed a military council that was comprised of HTS and the National Liberation Front.[10] Shuaib also reportedly founded the Syrian Salvation Government Military College.[11]
• Abdul Rahman Hussein al Khatib (also known as Abu Hussein al Urduni). Khatib is a Jordanian citizen of Palestinian origin.[12] Khatib went to Syria in late 2013 and is deeply loyal to HTS leader Ahmed al Shara.[13] Khatib is reportedly a member of the HTS Shura Council.[14] Jordanian media reported that Khatib is known for his “Salafi-jihadi approach.”[15]
• Abdul Aziz Dawoud Khodaberdi (also known as Abu Muhammad Turkistan). Khodaberdi commands the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) forces in Syria. The TIP is an al Qaeda-affiliated Uyghur jihadist group.[16] China has labeled the TIP as a terrorist organization and accused it of “gravely threaten[ing]” Chinese interests.[17] The TIP announced that Shara promoted two other Uyghur fighters to the rank of colonel.[18]
• Abdo Mohammad Sarhan. Sarhan previously commanded Jabhat al Nusra in the Eastern Ghouta.[19]
• Omar Mohammad Ciftci (also known as Mukhtar al Turki). Ciftci is a Turkish citizen who previously commander a unit called the Omar Brigade.[20] Ciftci reportedly led the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation room to overthrow the Bashar al Assad regime.[21]

HTS-led interim government officials are continuing to meet with military commanders affiliated with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Ahmed Abu Qasra met with the leaders of the SNA-affiliated Hamza Division and Suleiman Shah Brigade on December 30.[22] HTS leader Ahmed al Shara previously met with these commanders on December 16.[23] The United States sanctioned the Hamza Division and Suleiman Shah Brigade in August 2023 for committing “serious human rights abuses against those residing in the Afrin region of northern Syria.”[24] The HTS-led interim government’s frequent and publicized meetings with SNA-affiliated commanders signals that HTS is continuing to heavily favor the SNA and pursuing “strategic relations” with Turkey, both of which have stated their intent to “eliminate” the SDF.[25]

The SDF and SNA have continued to clash in northern and northeastern Syria since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff. The SDF published footage showing its forces destroying SNA portable radar systems, a radar-jamming system, and an armored vehicle at SNA positions west of Qara Qozak bridge.[26] Anti-SDF media claimed that the SDF and SNA continued to clash west of Tishreen Dam in the Manbij countryside.[27] Anti-SDF media also claimed that Turkey conducted drone strikes targeting SDF positions near the Tishreen Dam in Aleppo Province and at a security point in Raqqa Province on December 30.[28]

The SDF likely advanced north of Deir Hafer, east of Aleppo City, and led SNA forces to withdraw at least four kilometers from Highway 4. An SNA field commander told a local outlet on December 29 that the SNA had withdrawn from towns near Deir Hafer north to Rasm al Harmal al Imam, a town seven kilometers north of Highway 4.[29] The field commander said that the SDF controlled all territory south of an east-west water canal that connects Lake Assad to Aleppo City.[30] The SNA field commander’s statement is consistent with recent local reports about SDF operations in Deir Hafer and nearby towns.[31] The SDF does not appear to have advanced further west than Deir Hafer as of this writing.

HTS leader Ahmed al Shara met with senior Ukranian officials in Damascus on December 30.[32] A delegation led by Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Minister Andrii Sybiha met with Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Assad al Shaibani and Intelligence Chief Anas Khattab.[33] Shaibani said that there will be a “strategic partnership” between Ukraine and Syria during a press conference after the meeting.[34]

HTS leader Ahmed al Shara met with Kuwaiti Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Ali al Yahya and Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council Jassam Mohammed al Badawi in Damascus on December 30.[35] Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Assad al Shaibani and Syrian Intelligence Chief Anas Khattab attended the meeting as well.[36] Shaibani said that Kuwait and Syria will establish political, economic, and humanitarian cooperation during a press conference after the meeting.[37]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued operations within the Israel-Syria disengagement zone on December 30.[38] Syrian media reported that the IDF advanced into al Baath and entered government buildings to search for weapons.[39] The IDF previously entered al Baath and met with local officials to negotiate weapons collection efforts in the area on December 22.[40] Local media reported on December 30 that the IDF remain near Maariyah and Jamleh villages, Daraa Province.[41] The IDF first began operations within the disengagement zone on December 8.[42]  

Palestinian fighters conducted a relatively large attack targeting the IDF in the northern Gaza Strip.[43]

The fighters conducted a multi-wave attack targeting the IDF around Jabalia refugee camp with small arms and in groups that ranged from six to 30 fighters. The IDF has been clearing the area since October 2024.[44] The IDF engaged the attacking Palestinian fighters with drone strikes and tank fire and killed around 106 fighters. This attack is noteworthy given it was significantly larger than most other militia operations in the Gaza Strip in recent months; fighters have typically operated in small squads rather than as a small company. The IDF assesses that around 100-200 fighters remain around Jabalia at this time.[45] The IDF stated on December 3 that it would conclude its clearing operation in Jabalia “in the coming weeks.”[46]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran appears increasingly as though it seeks to foment sectarian conflict in Syria, which it could then exploit to establish proxy and partner militias there.
• Syria: HTS leader Ahmed al Shara appointed loyalists to the senior levels of the new Syrian security establishment that he is currently forming.
• Syria: HTS-interim government officials have continued to meet with military commanders affiliated with the Turkish-backed SNA.
• Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters conducted a relatively large attack targeting the IDF in the northern Gaza Strip.

 ‘

Iran Update, December 29, 2024

Click here to read the full report

Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Ria Reddy, Siddhant Kishore, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al Shara detailed a three-to-four-year timeline for building new Syrian state, during which he presumably would rule and could heavily influence the allocation of political power.[1] Shara articulated this vision, marking his most detailed articulation of the state formation process yet, in an interview with Saudi-owned al Arabiya.[2] He said that he expects writing a constitution will take three years and organizing elections will take four years.[3] Shara justified the long election timeline by emphasizing the need to conduct a “comprehensive population census” for election results to be “valid.”[4] Shara acknowledged that he has appointed HTS members to most major ministries as a “necessity” but that the “National Dialogue Conference” will fully represent Syria’s diversity and be empowered to vote to rebuild the Syrian legal code.[5] This interview is the latest in Shara’s effort to portray himself to international audiences as a moderate leader and distance himself from his extremist al Qaeda in Iraq and al Nusra Front background.[6] Shara and his HTS-led interim government have yet to enact the tangible and irreversible steps toward implementing the type of representative democracy described in his interview at this time.

The HTS-led interim government is negotiating with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to integrate it politically and militarily into the future Syrian state.[7] Shara said that these negotiations are meant to resolve the “crisis” in northeastern Syria.[8] Turkey and HTS have tried in recent weeks to disarm and integrate the SDF into the HTS-led government by threatening the SDF with a full-scale assault.[9] Shara reiterated that, under a potential agreement, there will be no federalism in Syria and noted that the SDF would be integrated into the new Syrian Defense Ministry.[10] It is unclear whether Shara intends to re-flag SDF units and thus retain them as cohesive units or disperse individual SDF members across the Syrian armed forces. Shara and other Syrian former opposition leaders met on December 24 and agreed to dissolve and “merge” their armed factions under the Syrian Defense Ministry.[11]

Shara continues to meet with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) while engaging in negotiations with the SDF. Shara met with SNA leaders, including Turkish ultranationalist and Grey Wolves member Fahim Issa, on December 29.[12] Shara has heavily favored the SNA and is pursuing “strategic relations” with Turkey, both of which have stated their intent to “eliminate” the SDF.[13]

The SDF and SNA have continued to clash in northern and northeastern Syria since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff. The SDF posted footage showing its forces destroying a mobile SNA radar south of Manbij.[14] The SNA shelled at least 16 SDF positions around Kobani and in northeastern Syria.[15] Anti-SDF media claimed that Turkey conducted drone strikes targeting the SDF around Manbij and Kobani.[16]

The HTS-led interim Syrian government promoted HTS commanders and Shara loyalists to senior military ranks on December 29.[17] Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Ahmed Abu Qasra and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Ali Nour al Din were promoted to major general. The interim government also promoted five individuals to brigadier general and 41 individuals to colonel. Former opposition groups who have agreed to merge under the new Syrian Defense Ministry would be subordinating their fighters to this HTS-dominated command structure.[18]

Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chief of Staff Abdul Aziz al Muhammadawi inspected combat units in Anbar Province along the Iraq-Syria border on December 29. Muhammadawi visited the PMF 17th Brigade, which is under the PMF Anbar Operations Command.[19] The PMF 17th Brigade reportedly operates in Akashat along the Iraq-Syria border.[20] Muhammadawi also visited the Second Region Border Command, which is under the Iraqi Interior Ministry.[21] The Second Region Border Command is located in al Waleed, west of Rutba, Anbar Province.[22] Second Region Border Commander Khairallah Issa, Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah, and PMF Anbar Operations Commander Qasim Musleh al Khafaji accompanied Muhammadawi.[23] Khafaji simultaneously commands the 13th PMF Brigade (Liwa al Tafuf) and Anbar Operations Command.[24] Liwa al Tafuf is closely aligned with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah.[25] Muhammadawi previously served as the secretary general of Kataib Hezbollah.[26]

Baloch Salafi-jihadi militia Ansar al Furqan claimed a suicide bombing targeting the head of police intelligence in Bandar Lengeh in southern Iran on December 28.[27] The attack killed the local head of police intelligence and injured another police officer.[28] The attack is notably deep into Iran given that most Baloch militancy in Iran occurs immediately around the border with Pakistan. Ansar al Furqan previously claimed a suicide bombing attack in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, in December 2018.[29]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: HTS leader Ahmed al Shara detailed a three-to-four-year timeline for building a new Syrian state, during which he presumably would rule and could heavily influence the allocation of political power.
• Syria: The HTS-led interim government is negotiating with the US-backed SDF to integrate it politically and militarily into the future Syrian state. It is unclear whether such integration would involve re-flagging SDF units or dispersing SDF members across the new Syrian armed forces.
• Iran: Baloch Salafi-jihadi militia Ansar al Furqan claimed a suicide bombing targeting the head of political intelligence in Bandar Lengeh in southern Iran. The attack is notably deep into Iran given that most Baloch militancy in Iran occurs around the border with Pakistan.

Iran Update, December 28, 2024

click here to read the full report

Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Rezaei, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and its allies are contending with locally-organized cells of fighters in western Syria. HTS’s response to the current violence is fueling accusations of sectarianism and arbitrary targeting, which could in turn trigger further violence. HTS has launched a series of raids targeting former Assad regime members in northwestern Syria but has faced resistance in former Assad strongholds.[1] Unspecified Syrian opposition fighters continue to target the Alawite community fueling distrust and accusations that arrests conducted by the HTS-led security forces are driven by sectarianism and not in pursuit of justice for crimes committed under the former regime.[2] CTP-ISW cannot verify the vast majority of these attacks, but the informational effect generated by the rumors of ethnically- or sectarian-motivated attacks could still drive a cycle of violence between minority communities and the HTS-led coalition, which is predominantly but not solely Sunni Arab. The HTS-led government has attempted to assuage concerns and reassure the Alawite community that it intends to protect the rights of minorities but has taken few concrete steps to do so.[3]

HTS-led forces launched large-scale clearing operations on December 28 in northwestern Syria targeting former Assad regime members.  Clearing operations imply that HTS is operating against at least a locally organized force, even if independent cells of former regime members are not communicating with one another at this time. Military or internal security efforts against unorganized opposition would constitute policing actions, which these clearing operations are not. Clearing operations imply the existence of an at least minimally organized enemy. Syrian and Syrian state media reported that HTS-led forces deployed to Baniyas, about halfway between the Russian-controlled Hmeimim Air Base and Tartous Naval Port, and Sett Markho, approximately 20 kilometers north of Hmeimim Air Base.[4] HTS-led forces arrested an unspecified number of former Assad regime military members and seized weapons and ammunition in Sett Markho.[5] Syrian journalists reported that HTS-led forces have also launched air support from Istamo Air Base approximately 6.5 kilometers north of Hmeimim to support clearing operations targeting former Assad regime officials in the area.[6] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger posted imagery and video on December 28 reportedly showing HTS-led forces present on the perimeter of the Hmeimim air base.[7]

Assad-regime loyalists reportedly ambushed HTS-led forces on December 26 attempting to arrest the former Director of Military Justice and “Butcher of Saydnaya” Mohammed Kanjo al Hassan in Tartous.[8] This ambush, even if organized along familial lines, implies a level of military sophistication that demonstrates a level of organization that goes beyond criminal activity or mere reactive, unplanned self-defense against a raid. Unverified reports claim that HTS-led forces arrested Hassan.[9] The Syrian interim government has not confirmed Hassan’s arrest at the time of this writing.[10] The interim Syrian Foreign Minister Mohammed Abdel Rahman reported that 14 HTS-led fighters were killed fighting with Assad loyalists.[11] HTS-led security forces also engaged alleged former regime fighters in several villages west of Homs on December 26.[12]

The HTS-led interim government has thus far failed to prevent individual opposition fighters from targeting members of the Alawite community. Unspecified opposition fighters attacked and arrested Alawite individuals present at a cafe in Latakia after demanding if an individual was Sunni or Alawite according to the cafe owner interviewed by PBS.[13] The individuals were questioned at an unknown facility before being released. A representative of HTS arrived at the cafe the following day and claimed that those individuals were not members of HTS and encouraged individuals to report similar instances to HTS. Unspecified opposition fighters allegedly affiliated with HTS have targeted the Alawite community in revenge killings, arbitrary arrests, and theft, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.[14] These Alawite community members have framed these events as sectarian-motivated, underscoring the mistrust and fear that is permeating Alawite communities at this time. These instances of sectarian violence have caused some Alawites to refuse to hand in their weapons to the interim government, highlighting how the Alawite community currently distrusts the interim government to guarantee their security.[15] The existence of these reports in the information space, even if they are false or exaggerated, threatens to trigger escalating cycles of violence between different communities. CTP-ISW has not observed any violent retaliation that appears ethnically- or sect-motivated by any minority community against HTS-led forces or other communities at this time.

Unchecked attacks on the Alawite community appear to be driving sectarian accusations against the HTS-led interim government. Syrian-based media outlets have accused HTS of targeting low-level regime officials or supporters while granting amnesty to senior Assad regime members.[16]  Social media reports have alleged that individuals affiliated with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) have killed and kidnapped Alawites and other Syrians accused of being Assad regime officials.[17]

The US-backed, Kurdish-controlled Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reportedly continued to advance into Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)-controlled territory east of Manbij, northern Syria, on December 28. The SDF reportedly claimed that it seized the towns of Tal al Arsh and Halawla west of the Tishreen Dam.[18] The SDF has engaged the SNA west of the Tishreen Dam in recent days and appears to have solidified control over the dam.[19] The SDF claimed on December 28 that it killed 17 SNA fighters in clashes near the dam.[20] Geolocated imagery posted on December 27 showed the SDF conducting a drone strike targeting SNA fighters and vehicles near Abu Qalqal, northwest of the Tishreen Dam.[21]

The SDF reportedly claimed on December 28 that it seized three towns along the Euphrates River between the Tishreen Dam and the Qara Qozak Bridge.[22] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. The SDF likely intends to threaten the SNA’s rear in the Qara Qozak area by expanding the bridgehead, if these advances are accurate. Geolocated imagery posted on December 28 showed the SDF conducting a drone strike targeting SNA excavators west of the Qara Qozak Bridge.[23]

Geolocated imagery posted on December 28 showed the SDF conducting drone strikes targeting SNA positions at the Khafsah water treatment plant south of the Tishreen Dam.[24] The SDF and SNA have fought near the plant in recent days, which has limited the plant’s ability to operate.[25] The Khafsah water treatment plant is critical for providing water to residents in Aleppo City.[26]

Unspecified fighters detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in front of a mosque in Manbij, northern Syria, on December 27.[27] The SDF denied responsibility for the attack and blamed the attack on the SNA.[28] This attack marks the second VBIED attack in Manbij since December 24.[29]

Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan reiterated that Turkey seeks to “eliminate” the SDF during a phone call with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on December 28.[30] Fidan emphasized that Turkey “will not allow PKK/YPG to take shelter” in Syria. Turkey equates the SDF in its entirety to the PKK and YPG. Fidan added that Turkey supports the HTS-led interim government’s efforts to ensure Syrian territorial integrity.[31] This phone call comes as Turkey continues to signal a possible Turkish incursion into Syria or a Turkish-backed operation in northern Syria to “eliminate” the SDF.[32]  The Turkish desire to eliminate the SDF stands in contrast with the US desire to preserve the SDF, which plays a key role in the US counter-ISIS mission.[33]

Arab media and pro-Kurdish social media accounts amplified competing narratives after likely SDF-affiliated Kurdish fighters in northern Aleppo City killed two pro-interim government fighters. An Arab analyst and at least one Salafi pro-HTS social media account claimed that the SDF killed two “government” fighters in Ashrafieh neighborhood, Aleppo City, on December 27.[34] Arab media reported that HTS-affiliated forces then isolated Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods, in Aleppo City.[35] These media platforms also accused the SDF of using Sheikh Maqsoud residents as human shields to prevent an HTS assault into Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh.[36]

Kurdish sources said that People’s Defense Units (YPG)—one Kurdish formation that is part of the SDF—killed two SNA fighters in Ashrafieh neighborhood.[37] These sources also reported that the HTS deployment around the perimeter of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh sought to prevent SNA forces from entering Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh.[38]

These competing claims between anti-SDF and pro-Kurdish media come as the SDF attempts to negotiate with HTS to confirm the status of the SDF and Kurdish minority in the future Syrian state. CTP-ISW cannot adjudicate these competing claims, but it is noteworthy that these narratives are being injected into the information space as the SDF attempts to negotiate with the interim Syrian government. Such negotiations could prevent the SDF’s ultimate destruction, which is the objective of Turkey and its proxies in Syria. The decision to inject this information into the media space may not be a deliberate choice to undermine the SDF’s negotiating position, but the very fact that these rumors are in the media space could undermine the SDF.

Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet al Abasi inspected Iraqi army units and border police at Rabia border crossing, along the Syria-Iraq border, on December 28.[39] Abbasi met with combat units, including the 71st Infantry Brigade (15th Iraqi Army Division). Abasi visited Rabia two days after Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary-General Hadi al Ameri inspected combat units at Rabia border crossing.[40] Abasi’s visit also follows Iraqi Prime Minister Shia al Sudani’s implicit threat that Iraq would intervene in Syria if the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) resurges and threatens Iraq.

The Iranian defense minister emphasized the Iranian armed forces’ preparedness for "hard war" and accused the United States and Israel of exacerbating regional instability, particularly in Syria.[41] Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh announced the commencement of armed forces exercises on December 28, stressing Iran’s readiness and determination to confront any external threats.[42] Nasir Zadeh stated that Iran has "no issues on the frontlines of hard war" and will persist in enhancing its power at all costs. The Iranian regime asserts that it faces three types of threats: soft, semi-hard, and hard threats. Hard threats, which Nasir Zadeh is referring to, involve conventional warfare.[43]  Nasir Zadeh is a military aviator and former commander of the Iranian Artesh Air Force and Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff.[44]

The Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) separately stated on December 28 accusing the United States and Israel of orchestrating the ongoing crisis in Syria, framing the situation as part of a broader geopolitical confrontation.[45] The AFGS emphasized Iran’s readiness, bolstered by public support, to decisively counter any aggression while reiterating its commitment to defending sovereignty and asserting regional power.[46]

Key Takeaways:

• Conflict in Syria: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and its allies are contending with locally-organized cells of fighters in western Syria. HTS’s response to the current violence is fueling accusations of sectarianism and arbitrary targeting, which could in turn trigger further violence. CTP-ISW cannot verify the vast majority of these attacks, but the informational effect generated by the rumors of ethnically- or sectarian-motivated attacks could still drive a cycle of violence between minority communities and the HTS-led coalition, which is predominantly but not solely Sunni Arab.
• SDF Operations Along the Euphrates: The SDF reportedly claimed on December 28 that it seized three towns along the Euphrates River between the Tishreen Dam and the Qara Qozak Bridge. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. The SDF likely intends to threaten the SNA’s rear in the Qara Qozak area by expanding the bridgehead, if these advances are accurate.
• SDF-Government Clashes in Aleppo: Arab media and pro-Kurdish social media accounts amplified competing narratives after likely SDF-affiliated Kurdish fighters in northern Aleppo City killed two pro-interim government fighters. These competing claims between anti-SDF and pro-Kurdish media come as the SDF attempts to negotiate with HTS to confirm the status of the SDF and Kurdish minority in the future Syrian state. CTP-ISW cannot adjudicate these competing claims, but it is noteworthy that these narratives are being injected into the information space as the SDF attempts to negotiate with the interim Syrian government.
• Iraq: Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet al Abasi inspected Iraqi army units and border police at Rabia border crossing, along the Syria-Iraq border, on December 28.

Iran Update, December 27, 2024

click here to read the full report

Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

An explosion from a former SAA position in Homs City suggests that HTS does not yet have full control on the ground and that local groups and individuals can access and repurpose unexploded ordinance. Syrian media reported a large explosion near a former SAA barracks in Homs City on December 27, injuring nine people.[1] The Homs Police Commander Colonel Alaa Omran told state media that former regime elements rigged and detonated ordinance in a missile warehouse in the city to target a passing civilian.[2] A Syrian source contradicted the police commander’s statement, however, and claimed that the explosion was the result of Syrians attempting to remove parts from old air defense missiles to sell them.[3] Taking apart and repurposing explosives inside of munitions is one way military organizations can build rudimentary improvised explosive devices. The incident demonstrates that HTS does not control all former SAA weapons stockpiles and that locals can still access some of these stockpiles. This incident also suggests that the HTS-led security forces have not fully established total control over Homs City if these positions are easily accessible.

The HTS-led interim government has thus far failed to prevent individual opposition fighters from targeting members of the Alawite community. Unspecified opposition fighters have looted homes and stolen vehicles belonging to Alawites in Lattakia Province—a former regime stronghold—since the fall of the Assad regime.[4] An Alawite sheikh in Damascus told Reuters on December 26 that there have been multiple instances of “[Alawites] being beaten at a checkpoint.”[5] The HTS-led interim government has established several checkpoints across Syria since the fall of the Assad regime, but it is unclear who has attacked Alawite citizens at the checkpoint in Damascus.[6] An HTS fighter in Damascus separately told Reuters that unspecified individuals offloaded a bus and beat Alawite passengers on December 26.[7] These Alawite community members are framing these events as sectarian-motivated, underscoring the mistrust and fear that is permeating Alawite communities at this time. These instances of sectarian violence have caused some Alawites to refuse to hand in their weapons to the interim government, highlighting how the Alawite community currently distrusts the interim government to guarantee their security.[8]

The HTS-led interim government deployed forces to the Christian town of al Masmiyah in Daraa Province on December 27 to maintain security in the town during Christmas celebrations.[9] The deployment of forces to al Masmiyah comes after members of the Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria, a member of the HTS-led military coalition with links to al Qaeda, set fire to a Christmas tree in Suqaylabiyah, Hama Governorate, on December 23.[10]

The HTS-led interim government is continuing to pursue and detain former members of the Bashar al Assad regime. HTS forces have pursued Assad regime remnants in areas of Hama, Homs, Lattakia Tartous, Deir ez Zor, and Damascus provinces since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 26.[11] HTS forces arrested a large number of former Assad regime members, including:

• Khaled al Zubaidi. Zubaidi is a Syrian businessman with ties to the Assad regime.[12] The United States sanctioned Zubaidi in June 2020 for supporting Assad’s “corrupt reconstruction efforts.”[13]
• Fakhri Darwish: Darwish headed the office of the pro-Assad regime Palestinian militia Liwa al Quds in Aleppo.[14]
• Riyad Hassan. Hassan previously served as the head of political security in Damascus under Assad.[15]

HTS-led security forces engaged alleged former regime fighters in several villages west of Homs on December 26. HTS-led security forces entered Balqassa village, west of Homs City, on December 26, reportedly to pursue regime-affiliated official Shuja al Ali.[16] Ali was the leader of a regime-supported armed group that operated near the Lebanese border and was accused of kidnapping and torture. [17]Syrian media reported that HTS-led security forces clashed with alleged former regime-affiliated fighters in Balqassa.[18] HTS killed Ali and former regime elements killed two HTS-led security force members in the fighting.[19] A Deir ez Zor-focused social media user stated that the HTS-led security forces used long-range rockets and drones to target former regime remnants in Balqassa and nearby town Khirbet al Hamam.[20] CTP-ISW cannot confirm HTS-affiliated forces’ use of these weapons. This would be the first reported use of indirect and deep strike fires by HTS-affiliated forces since HTS assumed control of Damascus.[21]

The HTS-led interim government is not publicly responding to SDF overtures to negotiate the SDF’s incorporation into the new Syrian army and incorporation into a Syrian state. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi reiterated his desire for the incorporation of the SDF into a future Syria to Asharq al Awsat on December 27.[22] Abdi said that the SDF has not yet engaged in direct negotiations with HTS despite Abdi’s repeated expressed interest in negotiations since the fall of the Assad regime.[23] Abdi outlined his priorities for negotiations with HTS—should such negotiations occur—and noted that the SDF would require an end to Turkish and Turkish-backed attacks on the SDF so that Syrians may discuss the future without “external interference.”[24]

It appears increasingly unlikely, however, that the HTS-led government’s leadership views negotiating with the SDF as a priority as it formalizes relations with Turkey. HTS, while not a Turkish proxy or beholden to Turkey, has been quick to deepen its cooperation with Turkey since the fall of the Assad regime. HTS’s intensifying alignment with Turkish interests continues to pose an existential threat to the SDF as Turkey continues to signal a possible Turkish incursion into Syria or a Turkish-backed operation in northern Syria to “eliminate” the SDF. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced on December 27 that Turkey shall ensure security “beyond its southern borders” and “eliminate terrorist threats” starting in 2025.[25] Abdi warned of a potential “catastrophe” facing Kobani from the Turkish military buildup on the border.[26] Syrian media reported on December 27 that Turkish military reinforcements arrived in the town of Suluk, which is located north of Raqqa in SNA-controlled territory.[27]

The SNA continued to engage the SDF west of Tishreen Dam in the Manbij countryside.[28] Local sources reported that the SNA sent reinforcements to the frontlines near the Tishreen Dam.[29] The SDF claimed on December 27 that it engaged SNA forces near Abu Qalqal in the Manbij countryside.[30]

Local sources reported that the SDF continued to advance southwest of Lake Assad into SNA-controlled territory south of Tishreen Dam on December 27.[31] A pro-SDF social media user posted a photo of SDF members on the “Deir Hafer and Khafsah front” and said that SDF forces are operating in the area.[32] An Aleppo-based outlet reported on December 27 that the Khafsah water treatment plant, which the SDF had reportedly taken control of on December 23, is not operating at ”maximum capacity” due to nearby fighting.[33] The Khafsah water treatment plant is a critical plant services in Aleppo City. The Aleppo Water Establishment asked Aleppo citizens to ration water consumption.[34] The SDF advance in the south may intend to relieve pressure on the Tishreen Dam area by forcing the SNA to redeploy its forces to respond to a new threat.

Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri inspected combat units along the Iraq-Syria border on December 26 and 27. Ameri met with combat units at the Rabia border crossing in northern Ninewa Province on December 26.[35] Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Ninewa Operations Commander Khadir al Matrohi, who is affiliated with the Badr Organization, accompanied Ameri.[36] Ameri met with a military official named Majid Saleh Jassem, although it is unclear whether this official serves in the Iraqi Army, PMF, or Iraqi Border Guard.[37] The 15th and 20th Infantry divisions redeployed to areas between Rabia and Sinjar on December 7.[38]

Ameri separately reviewed security and intelligence plans and emphasized the need to conduct unspecified “preemptive operations” during a visit to the Iraqi Army 7th Infantry Division in al Qaim, western Anbar Province, on December 27.[39] 7th Infantry Division Commander Major General Hassan al Silawi and unspecified PMF commanders attended the meeting. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah controls several PMF brigades that control the al Qaim border crossing.[40] The Iraqi Army 27th Infantry Brigade, which operates under the 7th Infantry Division, oversees border security north of al Qaim across from the Syrian town of Baghouz.[41]

Ameri’s inspections come as Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani implicitly threatened on December 27 to militarily intervene in Syria if the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) resurges and threatens Iraq. Sudani stated that “any dysfunction” in Syrian prisons would “push [Iraq] to counter terrorism.”[42] Sudani was likely referring to the SDF-controlled al Hol camp and network of Syrian prisons that contain thousands of ISIS supporters and fighters.[43] Iraqi National Intelligence Service Director Hamid al Shatri similarly suggested on December 26 that Iraq would consider intervening or allowing Iraqi militias to intervene in Syria if unspecified Syrian armed groups threatened Iraq.[44] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the SDF cannot conduct offensive operations against ISIS while contending with threats from Turkey and its allies in Syria, namely the SNA.[45] Ongoing Turkish-backed operations against the SDF have forced the SDF to prioritize the existential threat posed by Turkey over the counter-ISIS mission.

An Iraqi Shia Coordination Framework member said on December 26 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will resume attacking US forces in Iraq and Syria if US forces extend their presence in Iraq beyond the agreed–upon withdrawal date of December 2026.[46] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining troops will withdraw by the end of 2026.[47] Mukhtar al Musawi, a Shia Coordination Framework member of parliament, denied reports that the Iraqi government is considering its request for US forces to withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2026 due to concerns that the fall of Bashar al Assad in Syria threatens Iraqi security.[48] Musawi also told Iraqi media that the Iraqi militias had stopped targeting US forces due to the withdrawal timeline but added that operations could resume if the United States extends its presence in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias last claimed an attack targeting US forces in Iraq on August 5, 2024.[49] Likely Iranian militias also launched three rockets at Baghdad International Airport on October 1, but no militia claimed this attack.[50]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)'s Jenin Battalion said that it engaged with “occupation forces” in multiple areas of Jenin on December 26.[51] Palestinian militias, including PIJ, historically used the term ”occupation forces” to refer to Israeli forces.[52] CTP-ISW has not observed any reports or indications of Israeli forces operating in Jenin at the time of this writing. The Palestinian Authority (PA), however, continued to operate against Palestinian militias in Jenin on December 26.[53] Palestinian militia fighters killed a PA security forces officer in Jenin on December 26, marking the third PA officer killed in Jenin since the operation began on December 5.[54] It would be a notable inflection if PIJ began referring to the PA as ”occupation forces.” It would, conversely, also be notable if the IDF began operating in Jenin at the same time as the PA operation against Palestinian militias.

Key Takeaways:

• Explosion in Homs: An explosion in Homs suggests that HTS does not yet have full control on the ground and that local groups and individuals can access and repurpose unexploded ordinance.
• Sectarian Tension in Syria: The HTS-led interim government has thus far failed to prevent individual opposition fighters from targeting members of the Alawite community.
• HTS and Christian Communities: The HTS-led interim government deployed forces to the Christian town of al Masmiyah in Daraa Province on December 27 to maintain security in the town during Christmas celebrations.
• HTS Operations Against Former Regime Elements: HTS-led security forces engaged alleged former regime fighters in several villages west of Homs on December 26. HTS-led security forces entered Balqassa village, west of Homs City, on December 26, reportedly to pursue regime-affiliated official Shuja al Ali.
• HTS-Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Negotiations: The HTS-led interim government is not publicly responding to SDF overtures to negotiate the SDF’s incorporation into the new Syrian army and incorporation into a Syrian state. It appears increasingly unlikelythat the HTS-led government’s leadership views negotiating with the SDF as a priority as it formalizes relations with Turkey.
• SDF-Syrian National Army (SNA) Fighting: Local sources reported that the SDF continued to advance southwest of Lake Assad into SNA-controlled territory south of Tishreen Dam on December 27. The SNA also continued to engage the SDF west of Tishreen Dam in the Manbij countryside.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri inspected combat units along the Iraq-Syria border on December 26 and 27. Ameri also reviewed security and intelligence plans and emphasized the need to conduct unspecified “preemptive operations.” Ameri’s inspections come as Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani implicitly threatened on December 27 to militarily intervene in Syria if the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) resurges and threatens Iraq.
• West Bank: Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)'s Jenin Battalion said that it engaged with “occupation forces” in multiple areas of Jenin on December 26. Palestinian militias, including PIJ, historically used the term ”occupation forces” to refer to Israeli forces, but CTP-ISW has not observed IDF operations in Jenin in recent days. It would be a notable inflection if PIJ began referring to the PA as ”occupation forces.”

Iran Update, December 26, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Several trends have placed Syria on a trajectory that is increasingly likely to lead to ethno-sectarian conflict. Social media reports have alleged that individuals affiliated with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) have killed and kidnapped Alawites and other Syrians accused of being Assad regime officials.[1] These killings and kidnappings have taken place outside of formal and documented judicial processes, which may significantly heighten sectarian tension between the majority and empowered Sunni and the minority Alawites. Some of the Alawites targeted are almost certainly Assad regime officials who can and should be prosecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity in fair and transparent tribunals. Failure to prosecute criminals fairly and transparently risks degrading community trust and encouraging tit-for-tat retaliatory violence between ethnic and sectarian groups.

The HTS-led government and transitional government leader Ahmed al Shara has attempted to assuage the Alawite's fears by highlighting the ways HTS and the interim government aims to protect minorities, but he has made only limited concrete, unambiguous steps.[2] The interim government has established a reconciliation program under which former regime elements are granted amnesty in exchange for disarmament and registering with the interim government.[3] The terms of this amnesty have not been publicly discussed, and the lists could be used by sectarian actors to target former regime elements in the coastal areas, who would be predominantly Alawite. The interim government began targeting “criminal gang leaders” who did not hand over weapons and settle with the interim government in Latakia on December 25.[4]

An old video surfaced on December 25 showing Sunni fighters desecrating a major Alawite shrine in Aleppo, which could increase Alawite fears.[5] The Interim Interior Ministry said that that the video was taken at least three weeks ago and that republishing such clips is intended to stir up strife among the Syrian people at this sensitive stage of government creation.[6] The original source of the Alawite shrine video remains unknown at this time. The video spurred Alawite demonstrations on December 25 in several Syrian cities.[7] Some reportedly pro-Assad protesters called for violence and other demonstrators used what at least one anti-Assad media outlet described as “sectarian language.“[8] Alawite community leaders in Latakia called for HTS-led security forces to establish security and disarm former regime elements amid the protests, which suggests genuine concern among community leaders about former regime activity.[9] The HTS-led military operations department sent military reinforcements to Homs, Hama, Damascus, and Latakia and imposed curfews in response to the unrest.[10] A violent HTS crackdown on protests in Alawite areas of Syria could dramatically accelerate sectarian tension and trigger serious violence. HTS has previously violently cracked down on protesters challenging Shara’s rule in Idlib. The newly appointed Syrian intelligence chief (see below) played a major role in that crackdown.[11]

Pro-Assad fighters separately “ambushed” and killed 14 HTS-led interior ministry officers in Khirbet al Maaza on December 26.[12]

Iran is also making remarks that risk stoking sectarian tension. Senior Iranian officials, including the supreme leader, have repeatedly suggested that the Syrian youth will “rise up” in Syria.[13] The Iranian supreme leader compared these “Syrian youth” to the Iraqi militia groups that systematically hunted down and killed Sunni civilians in Baghdad as part of a campaign of sectarian cleansing in Iraq.[14] Core HTS fighters from Jabhat al Nusra and al Qaeda in Iraq, like Shara, are intimately familiar with the Iraqi context and would presumably read “Syrian youth” as a much more sectarian call than it immediately appears. Sectarian Iranian remarks would provide an opening for Sunni sectarian elements in Syria to portray all Alawites and Shia as pro-Iranian proxies to justify a violent crackdown.

Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad Hassan al Shaibani responded to these Iranian statements. He warned Iran against “spreading chaos in Syria” and stated that Syria will hold Iran “accountable for the repercussions of [its] latest remarks,” likely referring to ongoing rhetoric from senior Iranian officials suggesting that Syrian youth will “rise up” in Syria.[15]

The HTS-led interim government appointed former al Qaeda in Iraq and Jabhat al Nusra member Anas Hasan Khattab as head of the General Intelligence Service on December 26.[16] Khattab helped found HTS predecessor and al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra and served as Shara's deputy commander in HTS.[17] Khattab was presumably a member of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), given that Jabhat al Nusra was an outgrowth of AQI. The United States and UN sanctioned Khattab in 2012 and 2014, respectively, for his association with AQI.[18] Khattab’s appointment is consistent with the HTS-led interim governments’ appointment of key HTS allies and loyalists to ministerial positions.[19]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) engaged the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in contested territory southeast of Manbij and likely pushed SDF forces east towards Tishreen Dam. The SDF recently launched a counteroffensive to regain ground seized by the SNA in the Manbij countryside.[20] SDF spokesperson told Western media on December 24 that SDF fighters had advanced about 11 kilometers away from Manbij.[21] The SDF reported that it defended against several SNA attacks on Tishreen Dam and its surrounding villages and that its forces killed nine SNA fighters and destroyed three armored vehicles in operations since December 24.[22] Local sources reported SNA forces pushed the SDF east towards the dam amid intermittent skirmishes in villages east of Manbij.[23] The Turkish Ministry of Defense claimed on December 26 that the SNA took control of the Tishreen Dam, but SDF spokesperson Farhad Shami posted a video of himself at the dam to refute Turkish claims.[24]

Syrian media reported that the SDF advanced on a new axis into SNA-controlled territory east of Aleppo, likely to relieve pressure on the Tishreen Dam area by forcing the SNA to redeploy its forces to respond to a new threat. Syrian journalists and social media users reported on December 23 and 24 that the SDF advanced from SDF-controlled territory towards Deir Hafer.[25] Deir Hafer is a Syrian city along the M4 highway between SDF-controlled territory and Aleppo City, which is currently controlled by Syrian opposition factions. CTP-ISW cannot confirm local reporting about the SDF’s westward advance. Syrian sources reported that the SDF clashed with SNA forces in Kayarieh, north of Deir Hafer, on December 26.[26] Multiple Syrian sources also reported that the SDF secured a water treatment plant south of Kfahsah and clashed with SNA forces in the vicinity of the treatment plant.[27] An Aleppo-based channel reported that one of the water plant’s workers was killed amid the clashes.[28] The Kfahsah plant provides a critical water supply to Aleppo City.[29]

The Turkish Ministry of Defense announced in a statement on December 26 that Turkey supports a “unified Syrian army,” likely referring to a Syrian army that excludes the SDF.[30] The Turkish statement references the HTS-led interim government’s plan to dissolve Syria’s armed factions into a Syrian armed forces under the Syrian Defense Ministry.[31] Turkey’s support for a ”unified Syrian army” likely refers to an army that does not include the SDF.[32] Shara has met extensively in recent days with SNA elements to negotiate the absorption of these factions into the new Syrian armed forces but has yet to meet with SDF leadership.[33] CTP-ISW has assessed that Turkey and the HTS-led government are attempting to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into an HTS-led armed forces.

The pro-Iran Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) director implied to HTS leader Ahmad al Shara on December 26 that Iraq would consider intervening or allowing Iraqi militias to intervene in Syria if unspecified instability threatened Iraq.[34] INIS Director Hamid Shatri's meeting with Shara is the first meeting between Iraqi government representatives and the HTS-led government since the Assad regime fell on December 8. An “informed [Iraqi] governmental source” told Iraqi media on December 26 that Shatri confirmed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would not “interfere” in Syria if Syrian armed groups do not threaten Iraqi stability.[35] It is unclear which precise issue Iraq would define as a threat to its stability, and what armed groups it sees as particularly threatening other than ISIS.[36] Shatri, who is close to Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces head Faleh al Fayyadh and Hadi al Ameri, might mean HTS itself. Shatri and his pro-Iranian allies, including the Badr Organization, fought Ahmed Shara and al Qaeda in Iraq in the 2000s in Iraq. Shatri also expressed the Iraqi government’s concerns of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) elements escaping from SDF detention and threatening Iraq.[37] Shatri is implying that Iraqi militias could intervene if “Syrian armed groups” cross certain unspecified redlines, which is almost certainly a threat towards Shara and HTS.

The IDF continued to operate in villages in Quneitra and Daraa Provinces. Several groups of Syrians protested the IDF presence near Swisah, Quneitra Province, approximately 3 kilometers east of the disengagement zone.[38] The IDF, after instructing the protesters not to approach the IDF forces operating in the area, fired shots to disperse the protesters.[39] Syrian media reported that the IDF injured four Syrian civilians, including one child, near Swisah village.[40] The IDF stated it is investigating the casualties.[41] A separate Syrian outlet reported that the IDF withdrew from Swisah towards Diwaya al Kabira, Quneitra Province, after injuring seven civilians.[42] Syrian media separately reported on December 26 that the IDF withdrew from several towns in western Daraa province, including six towns in the Yarmouk Basin.[43] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify that the IDF withdrew from this area at this time.

The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting port and energy infrastructure in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on December 26. The IDF struck the Houthi sites in Sanaa and Hudaydah provinces in response to persistent Houthi drone and missile attacks against Israel.[44] The IDF targeted the Sanaa International Airport and Heyzaz power station in Sanaa.[45] The IDF also struck Ras Katib power station, Hudaydah Port, al Salif Port, and Ras Issa Oil Facility in Hudaydah province.[46] The Houthis use Hudaydah Port as a logistical hub to facilitate the movement of Iranian officials and Iran’s weapons shipments across the region. The IDF previously struck most of these Houthi positions on December 18.[47]

The Houthis claimed three missile and drone attacks targeting southern and central Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on December 24.[48] The Houthis claimed a drone attack targeting Ashkelon industrial zone in southern Israel on December 25.[49] The IDF reported that the drone fell in an open area in southern Israel.[50]

Key Takeaways:

• Conflict in Syria: Several trends have placed Syria on a trajectory that is increasingly likely to lead to ethno-sectarian conflict. There is already an ongoing ethnic conflict between the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). These trends include killings, arrests, and kidnappings that appear to occur outside of a transparent judicial process for trying war criminals, provocative protests and sectarian imagery on social media, and Iranian provocation.
• HTS Government Formation: The HTS-led interim government appointed former al Qaeda in Iraq and Jabhat al Nusra member Anas Hasan Khattab as head of the General Intelligence Service on December 26.
• SNA-SDF Fighting: The Turkish-backed SNA engaged the US-backed SDF in contested territory southeast of Manbij and likely pushed SDF forces east towards Tishreen Dam. Syrian media reported that the SDF advanced on a new axis into SNA-controlled territory east of Aleppo, likely to relieve pressure on the Tishreen Dam area by forcing the SNA to redeploy its forces to respond to a new threat.
• Turkey: The Turkish Ministry of Defense announced in a statement on December 26 that Turkey supports a “unified Syrian army,” likely referring to a Syrian army that excludes the SDF.
• Iraq in Syria: The pro-Iran Iraqi National Intelligence Service director implied to HTS leader Ahmad al Shara on December 26 that Iraq would consider intervening or allowing Iraqi militias to intervene in Syria if unspecified instability threatened Iraq.
• Israel in Syria: The IDF continued to operate in villages in Quneitra and Daraa Provinces.
• Yemen: The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting port and energy infrastructure in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on December 26.

Iran Update, December 24, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

CTP-ISW will not publish the Iran Update on December 25, 2025, in observance of Christmas. We will resume publication of the Iran Update on December 26, 2025, and cover all events between 2:00 pm ET on December 24 to 2:00 pm ET on December 26.

Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) defended against Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) attempts to recapture SDF-held ground on the west bank of the Euphrates River near the Tishreen Dam and Qere Qozak Bridge. The SDF reported its forces defended against SNA assaults in Mahshiyet al Tawahin and Khirbet Tueni, approximately 5 kilometers west of the Tishreen Dam.[1] The SDF conducted three separate FPV drone strikes targeting SNA vehicles west of the Tishreen Dam.[2] The SDF reported that its fighters killed “dozens” of SNA fighters, seized two SNA tanks, and destroyed SNA equipment.[3]  The Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) reported that the SNA killed 16 of its fighters during the fighting.[4]

SDF forces also defended against an SNA attack on Qabr Imo, approximately 4.3 kilometers west of the Qere Qozak Bridge.[5] SDF fighters conducted an FPV drone strike targeting an SNA military vehicle less than a kilometer away from the Qere Qozak Bridge.[6] The SDF reported that it also destroyed an SNA tank near the Qere Qozak Bridge.[7]

Unspecified sources reportedly told Syria-based al Khabour News that the YPG threatened to cut off bread supplies to Hasakah if the people did not demonstrate in support of the group.[8] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. Arab communities have defected from the SDF in recent weeks and called for an end to SDF rule in the Arab areas in Hasakah.[9] Kurdish media outlets circulated imagery appearing to show Hasakah locals demonstrating in support of the SDF.[10]

HTS leader Ahmed al Shara may face resistance to the current moderate approach to governance from Salafi-Jihadi factions within the HTS-led coalition. Members of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) in Syria, a member of the HTS-led military coalition with links to al Qaeda, set fire to a Christmas tree in Suqaylabiyah, Hama Governorate, on December 23.[11] TIP in Syria is the local affiliate of the main TIP branch in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al Qaeda appointed the overall TIP leader, Abdul Haq al Turkistani, to its Shura Council in 2005.[12] Local footage posted after the incident showed a local HTS government official attempting to reassure locals that government security forces would pursue the perpetrators and that the government would repair the tree.[13] TIP’s religiously motivated attack is an example of the inherent friction between the ideology and objectives of Salafi-Jihadi elements within the HTS-led coalition and HTS’s stated approach to respect and preserve the rights of Syrian minorities. Six Al Qaeda-affiliated groups TIP, Harakat al Islam, Jaysh al Muharijeen wal Ansar, Katibat al Tawhis wal Jihad, Katibat al Alban, and Maldivian Mujahideen have publicly supported HTS in the past.[14] TIP itself has fought alongside HTS and its predecessor organizations since the mid-2010s.

The friction between the Salafi-jihadi ideologues and Shara’s relatively moderate governance could force Shara to compel Salafi-jihadists to adhere to his vision or take a more Salafi approach to preserve Shara’s coalition. Both al Qaeda-linked ideologues and ISIS have denounced HTS’s protection of religious minorities and engagement with the West. A “prominent” al Qaeda supporter publicly “advised” HTS to avoid the mistakes of the Taliban by adhering to “Islamic principles” and avoid “pleasing the West.” He added that Shara must adhere to Islamic principles because the West and “Jews and Christians” would not be pleased with moderate measures until Shara converted to Judaism or Christianity.[15] ISIS similarly argued that HTS’s protection of religious minorities and engagement with “infidel” states is unacceptable. Other ISIS supporters are criticizing Shara’s Western dress — including suits and ties — and implying these make him unIslamic.[16] These arguments may attract some Salafi-jihadists who are resistant to Shara’s approach.[17] Shara has previously suppressed similar Salafi-jihadist opposition by force of arms.[18] He will likely attempt to do so again if he believes he has the bandwidth to do so.

ISIS may be attempting to resupply its forces with weapons captured from regime, Russian, and Iranian stocks in the central Syrian desert. US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted an airstrike targeting ISIS operatives moving a “truckload of weapons” in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, on December 23.[19] CENTCOM confirmed that it killed two ISIS fighters and wounded one fighter in an area of Deir Ez Zor formerly controlled by the Assad regime and Russia. ISIS fighters−who have long fought under threat of airstrikes — would presumably avoid transporting large amounts of weapons from existing ISIS stocks, given the risk that US airstrikes would destroy much-needed weapons stockpiles. The decision to transport these weapons in a “truckload” suggests that ISIS had captured a new stock of weapons and attempted to transport them to a safe location when CENTCOM struck the vehicle. There are many positions throughout the desert in Syria formerly occupied by Russian, Iranian, or Assad regime forces that are currently unoccupied and could contain weapons that ISIS needs to reconstitute itself. ISIS seeks to exploit the hasty withdrawal of Russian and Syrian regime forces by capturing these stocks.

Syrian armed groups agreed to “dissolve” themselves and merge under the HTS-led Defense Ministry, but this does not mean that Syrian opposition forces will answer to the Defense Ministry in practice. The leaders of Syrian armed groups allied with HTS agreed to “dissolve and merge” their armed groups under the HTS-led Ministry of Defense in a meeting with HTS leader Ahmed al Shara on December 24.[20] It is not immediately clear what groups outside of HTS-led and SNA-led structures participated in the meeting, nor is it clear what concrete steps the groups agreed to as part of dissolving themselves and merging under the HTS-led Defense Ministry. HTS will likely absorb the various armed groups and functionally reflag them as new Syrian army units as a way to ameliorate concerns about losing power among various leaders. Dissolving and integrating therefore does not necessarily mean that these armed groups will cease to exist entirely, but rather they could be absorbed into a new command and control structure in which the armed groups may retain their current leaders and fighters but nominally answer to a higher headquarters. This type of absorption and reflagging often results in armed group leaders failing to observe the actual chain of command, however. The Iranian-backed Badr Corps reflagged some of its formations as part of the Iraqi Interior Ministry in 2005, for example, and these units did not answer to the Iraqi chain of command, but instead to the Badr Organization and Iran.[21]

Most of the militia groups at the meeting have also fought against or are fighting against the SDF, making it notable that the US-backed SDF led by Mazloum Abdi did not attend the meeting.[22] The HTS-led interim government has recently called for the SDF to disarm amid the threat of a Turkish-led assault to “eliminate” the SDF and ongoing fighting between the SDF and SNA.[23] Disarming the SDF would leave it vulnerable to Turkey and Turkish-backed forces which have previously committed atrocities against the Kurdish population and its fighters, as CTP-ISW has previously noted.[24] Leaders of militia groups that have previously fought against the SDF or are currently part of the SNA did attend the meeting.[25] Shara has met extensively in recent days with SNA elements to negotiate the absorption of these factions into the new Syrian armed forces.[26] Shara has also appointed several SNA commanders as governors in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on December 8.

Israeli forces launched an unusual "brigade-wide" counterterrorism operation in Tulkarm, in the northern West Bank, on December 23.[27]  Israeli forces killed one Palestinian fighter in close-quarters combat, confiscated weapons, and arrested two individuals in Tulkarm.[28] The IDF conducted a drone strike targeting armed Palestinian fighters in Nour Shams refugee camp, which is close to Tulkarm, as part of the operation.[29] The IDF clashed with Palestinian militias, including PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, in at least four locations in Tulkarm Governorate on December 24.[30] Most of these engagements included Palestinian militias detonating IEDs targeting IDF forces.

The IDF simultaneously conducted an operation in Nablus, approximately 32 kilometers southeast of Tulkarm, overnight on December 23.[31] The IDF killed one fighter in Nablus.[32] The IDF arrested 18 wanted individuals in several areas across the West Bank between December 23 and December 24.[33]

The IDF is executing its operation at the same time Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces are operating against Palestinian militias to regain security control of Jenin from the militias. Israeli media reported that armed Palestinian fighters killed a second PA police officer in the Jenin refugee camp on December 23.[34] PA forces killed three fighters in recent days who were likely in the combined Hamas-PIJ “Jenin Battalion.”[35] Israeli media reported on December 24 that PA forces used rocket-propelled grenades against armed fighters in the camp for the first time. Israeli media, citing an unspecified Israeli security official, reported that the PA imposed a “closed” the Jenin refugee camp. It is unclear what “closing” the camp implies, though it could be a PA effort to isolate the camp before renewed operations there. Unverified videos circulated on social media showing four men wearing white robes threatening to conduct suicide bombings if the PA entered Jenin refugee camp, suggesting PA security forces are on the outside of the camp at this time.[36] The decision to don white robes for the video is probably meant to signal the participants’ willingness to become martyrs, given that the dead are often shrouded in white for burial in Islamic societies.[37] Armed fighters seized control of an UNRWA health center in Jenin refugee camp on December 17 and it is unclear at this time if the PA has regained control of this center.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Democratic Forces: The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) defended against Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) attempts to recapture SDF-held ground on the west bank of the Euphrates River near the Tishreen Dam and Qere Qozak Bridge.
• HTS Governance: HTS leader Ahmed al Shara may face resistance to the current moderate approach to governance from Salafi-Jihadi factions within the HTS-led coalition. Members of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) in Syria, a member of the HTS-led military coalition with links to al Qaeda, set fire to a Christmas tree in Suqaylabiyah, Hama Governorate, on December 23. The friction between the Salafi-jihadi ideologues and Shara over his relatively moderate governance could force Shara to compel Salafi-jihadists to adhere to his vision or take a more Salafi approach to preserve Shara’s coalition.
• ISIS Activity: ISIS may be attempting to resupply its forces with weapons captured from regime, Russian, and Iranian stocks in the central Syrian desert. CENTCOM targeted a “truckload of ISIS weapons” in Deir ez Zor. ISIS fighters−who have long fought under threat of airstrikes−would presumably avoid transporting large amounts of weapons from existing ISIS stocks, given the risk that US airstrikes would destroy much-needed weapons stockpiles. The decision to transport these weapons in a “truckload“ suggests that ISIS had captured a new stock of weapons and attempted to transport them to a safe location when CENTCOM struck the vehicle.
• Building Syria’s Army: Syrian armed groups agreed to “dissolve” themselves and merge under the HTS-led Defense Ministry, but this does not mean that Syrian opposition forces will answer to the Defense Ministry in practice.  HTS will likely absorb the various armed groups and functionally reflag them as new Syrian army units as a way to ameliorate concerns about losing power among various leaders. Dissolving and integrating therefore does not necessarily mean that these armed groups will cease to exist entirely. This type of absorption and reflagging often results in armed group leaders failing to observe the actual chain of command.  
• West Bank: The IDF is executing its operation at the same time Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces are operating against Palestinian militias to regain security control of Jenin from the militias. Israeli forces launched an unusual "brigade-wide" counterterrorism operation in Tulkarm, in the northern West Bank, on December 23. It also conducted a separate operation in Nablus.

Iran Update, December 23, 2024

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Johanna Moore, Ria Reddy, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led Syrian interim government stated it will discuss mechanisms for disarming and dissolving the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) with SDF leadership, according to unspecified SDF sources.[1] The sources cited by a Syrian journalist claimed that the interim government will avoid any negotiation to establish a decentralized system that grants some autonomy to Kurdish-governed areas. HTS and Turkey have called for a unified Syrian state without federal regions, which CTP-ISW previously identified as implicitly demanding that the SDF disarm and cease to exist as an autonomous organization.[2]

The HTS-led interim government does not appear to have discussed integrating the SDF into the newly forming Syrian armed forces as the interim government has with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). The HTS-led interim government has emphasized the disarmament and dissolution of the SDF.[3] HTS leader Ahmad al Shara has meanwhile met extensively with SNA elements to negotiate the absorption of these factions into the new Syrian armed forces.[4] The interim government’s call for the SDF to disarm comes amid the threat of a Turkish-led assault to “eliminate” the SDF and ongoing fighting between the SDF and SNA.[5] Disarming the SDF would leave it vulnerable to Turkey and Turkish-backed forces which have previously committed atrocities against the Kurdish population and its fighters.[6]

The SDF and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) continued to engage in fighting around Tishreen Dam and Qere Qozak Bridge on December 23. Elements of the Manbij Military Council, which is under the SDF, thwarted an attack on Tishreen Dam, according to the People’s Defense Units (YPG) Media Center.[7] Forces then combed nearby villages used by the SNA to stage attacks. The Manbij Military Council forces reportedly destroyed an SNA tank in Abu Qalqal, around 9.5 kilometers northwest of Tishreen Dam.[8] SDF spokesperson Farhad Shami reported that SDF elements are operating around 15 kilometers from Manbij City.[9] Footage posted on December 23 by anti-Kurdish media appeared to show the SNA in possession of an SDF armored vehicle after reportedly killing its crew.[10]

Elements of the SDF continue to defect in areas that are protesting SDF control. Around 70 Arab SDF fighters from the Raqqa Military Council refused orders to join fighting at Tishreen Dam and turned their weapons into their command headquarters.[11] Anti-Kurdish media claimed tha around 10 fighters abandoned fighting in the Aleppo countryside and returned home to al Shaddadi.[12] A group of fighters from Markada, south of Hasakah, defected from the SDF as well.[1

Russian forces have reportedly withdrawn completely from most of their positions in Syria, including their base at Qamishli in northern Syria. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 23 that Russian elements completed their withdrawal from all positions in Syria’s interior and are now only present at Hmeimim airbase and the port of Tartus.[14] CTP-ISW cannot independently confirm the GUR report, though it is consistent with the pace of Russian military evacuations from Syria since the fall of Assad. CTP-ISW last observed Russian forces present at the Qamishli base, Hasakah Province, on December 18, suggesting that Russian elements fully evacuated the base in the days since.[15] Russia still maintains a presence in coastal Syria at Hmeimim airbase and the port of Tartus, but visual evidence and Syrian reporting continue to indicate that Russian forces are preparing to either significantly draw down or withdraw fully from coastal Syria.[16] The GUR stated on December 23 that a Russian cargo ship that broke down off the coast of Portugal was traveling to Syria to evacuate Russian equipment and weapons from Tartus.[17]

Russia’s reported evacuation from its helicopter base at Qamishli marks its withdrawal from its last sizeable base in northern Syria amid an ongoing Turkish-backed and potential Turkish-led offensive against the SDF. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Russia’s withdrawal from northern Syria and its loss of influence in Syria overall will likely expose the SDF to continued Turkish or Turkish-backed attacks.[18] Russia's presence across northern Syria had previously enabled Moscow to oppose and block Turkish ground offensives into Syria in 2021 and 2022.[19] One of the primary barriers against a Turkish or Turkish-led attempt to ”eliminate” the SDF is now gone.

It remains unclear whether Russia will withdraw from coastal Syria. The GUR stated on December 23 that Russia and the HTS-led interim government have continued negotiations and have discussed alleged Syrian demands that Russia withdraw from Hmeimim and Tartus no later than February 2025.[20] It does not appear that an agreement has yet been reached. Several HTS-affiliated sources have given conflicting statements to Western media about the future of Russia’s presence in Syria, suggesting that there is likely some dissonance within the interim government regarding its plan for Russian bases.[21] HTS is likely facing substantial international pressure to fully remove the Russian presence in Syria. HTS may demand Russia's full military withdrawal to convince the international community to lift sanctions on Syria, which HTS has repeatedly called upon the international community to do.[22]

Syrian interim government officials met with several Arab officials from Jordan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia in Damascus on December 22 and 23. HTS leader Ahmed al Shara and Syrian Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Asad al Shaibani met Jordanian Foreign Affairs Minister Ayman Safadi.[23] Safadi expressed support for the drafting of a new Syrian constitution and noted that Jordan will help Syria rebuild.[24] Safadi also said that Jordan and Syria agreed to combat arms and drug smuggling from Syria to Jordan. Shara and Shaibani also met with Qatari Minister of State Mohammed bin Abdulaziz al Khulaifi to discuss Syria’s impending “broad strategic cooperation” with Qatar, particularly in the energy sector and in rebuilding Syrian ports.[25] Qatar, which never normalized relations with the Assad regime, was among the first states to open contact with HTS after the fall of Assad.[26] Syrian media separately reported that Shara met with a Saudi delegation in Damascus on December 22.[27] Shara recently gave an interview with Saudi outlet Asharq al Awsat in which he praised Riyadh’s economic vision and said that Syria planned to cooperate economically with Saudi Arabia.[28]

An Iraqi parliamentarian claimed on December 20 that Iraq has halted crude oil exports to Syria.[29] Iraq previously exported around 120,000 barrels of crude oil to Syria daily.[30] Syria’s largest oil refinery, the Baniyas refinery, stopped operating on December 20 after Iran ceased oil exports to Syria.[31] Iran previously supplied 90 percent of Syria’s crude oil before the fall of Assad.[32] The Baniyas refinery director told Western media on December 19 that the refinery is undergoing maintenance so that it will be “ready for when crude oil is made available.” The cessation of Iranian and Iraqi oil exports to Syria comes as the Gulf states, particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia, appear to be vying to replace Iran and Iraq as oil suppliers to Syria.[33]

The Iraqi federal government is reportedly reconsidering its request for US forces to withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2026 because it is concerned that the fall of Bashar al Assad in Syria threatens Iraqi security.[34] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining troops would withdraw by the end of 2026.[35] An unspecified Iraqi official told the Washington Post on December 23 that there has been a “shift” in how Iraqi officials view the withdrawal of US forces since the fall of Assad.[36] The official stated that the 2026 deadline for the US military withdrawal “now seems distant” and speculated that the Iraqi federal government will [37][38] An unspecified US official separately told the Washington Post on December 23 that Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani showed a “fresh appreciation” for the presence of US forces in Iraq during his meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Baghdad on December 13.[39] The Iraqi federal government’s shifting view on the presence of US forces in Iraq reflects Iraqi concerns that ISIS remnants and possibly other actors in Syria could threaten Iraq. The Iraqi federal government has equated former Syrian opposition forces to Salafi-jihadi groups, such as ISIS, and repeatedly emphasized the need to prevent a “repetition of 2014,” referring to the ISIS takeover of Mosul in June 2014 and subsequent seizure of swaths of Iraqi territory.[40]

Iran is facing a severe energy crisis marked by electricity and natural gas shortages. Iranian officials have increasingly warned of an energy crisis in recent days and shut down or significantly reduced the operating hours for government buildings, public facilities, and schools.[41] The Iranian regime has cut the fuel supply to several power plants to compensate for shortages.[42] Reduced power plant operation has significantly limited domestic manufacturing. Chief of the Coordination Council of Industries Mehdi Bostanchi estimated that taking power plants offline in recent days could reduce domestic manufacturing by up to 50 percent and lead to billions of dollars in losses. Bostanchi said that the situation in Iran was “unlike anything industries have ever experienced.” The situation is likely to worsen throughout the winter as temperatures drop and demand for energy increases.

A variety of factors have likely caused the severe energy crisis in Iran. IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi lamented on December 23 that Iran ranks “second in gas reserves, but we cannot solve the energy problem.”[43] The Iranian regime heavily subsidizes gas prices, which contributes to overconsumption. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has previously suggested that raising gas prices is necessary to combat overconsumption. The Pezeshkian administration is likely reticent to raise gas prices, however, given that doing so could cause widespread civil unrest. Some Iranian officials have attributed the energy crisis to Israel’s attack on two gas pipelines in Iran in February 2024.[44] Former Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji said that the pipelines were repaired within three days, however, making it seem unlikely that the airstrikes caused the current crisis.[45]

The energy crisis could generate internal unrest in Iran regardless of whether the Pezeshkian administration cuts fuel subsidies. Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei recently ordered Iranian security forces to prepare for potential unrest.[46] Ejei made this statement while discussing the energy crisis, which suggests the regime may be concerned that the crisis will trigger unrest. Protests have previously erupted due to gas shortages.[47] The energy crisis comes at a time when Iran is facing other crises and dire economic conditions, which could compound and drive anti-regime sentiment. The Iranian rial recently reached historically low levels, valuing at 784,000 rials to one US dollar on December 23.

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: The HTS-led Syrian interim government reportedly stated that it will discuss mechanisms for disarming and dissolving the US-backed SDF with SDF leadership. The government also reportedly wants to avoid negotiations that would grant regional autonomy to the SDF.
• Syria: Russian forces have reportedly withdrawn completely from most of their positions in Syria, including their base at Qamishli in northern Syria. Russia’s only remaining positions are at Hmeimim and Tartus along the Syrian coast.
• Iraq: The Iraqi federal government is reportedly reconsidering its request for US forces to withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2025 because it is concerned that the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria could threaten Iraqi security.
• Iran: Iran is facing a severe energy crisis marked by electricity and natural gas shortages. This crisis presents a serious threat to regime stability given that it will likely stoke anti-regime sentiments and could spark protests.

Iran Update, December 22, 2024

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Johanna Moore, Ria Reddy, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

A senior official in the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) expressed the readiness to negotiate with the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government in order to determine the future role of the SDF.[1] The official, Riad Darar, said that the SDF would negotiate to ensure its participation in a new Syrian political structure and unify the country. Darar qualified that the SDF would negotiate only if there were a ceasefire with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and the establishment of a demilitarized zone around Kobani. These comments come as Turkey, the SNA, and HTS have coerced the SDF to disarm and integrate into a new Syrian security sector under HTS control, depriving it of its autonomy.[2]  

Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan separately said on December 21 that Turkey would only discuss the establishment of a demilitarized zone around Kobani after the SDF reaches an settlement with the HTS-led interim government.[3] This demand is incompatible with the SDF requirement for a ceasefire and the establishment of a demilitarized zone precedes negotiations with HTS.

Turkey and HTS are continuing to coordinate their efforts to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense apparatus. Fidan met with HTS leader Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on December 22 to discuss Turkish support for the interim government and its control over all Syrian territory.[4] Fidan previously said on December 21 that Ankara prefers for HTS to address its SDF concerns but reiterated that Turkey would do “whatever it takes” to ensure Turkish national security.[5] This remark refers to the stated Turkish strategic objective of ”eliminat[ing]” the SDF. Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler similarly expressed support for HTS and SNA efforts to “liberate” territory from the SDF during a visit with Turkish forces on the Syria-Turkey border.[6] Turkish forces are stationed on the border near Kobani, Syria, in a fashion that resembles preparations before previous Turkish incursions into northern Syria.[7]

The HTS-led interim government continues to signal a shift away from Iran and the Axis of Resistance. Israeli media reported that HTS leader Ahmad al Shara recently decided to prevent Iranian civilian and military flights from transiting Syrian airspace.[8] Unspecified security sources told Israeli media that this decision represents "the deepest expression of change" in Syrian policy since the fall of Assad. The sources said that this decision will significantly limit Iranian freedom of movement in the Middle East and make it difficult for Iran to help Lebanese Hezbollah reconstitute militarily. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the fall of Assad marks the end of the greater Iranian project in the Levant for the foreseeable future and will make it extremely difficult for Iran to transfer the resources needed to help Hamas and Hezbollah recuperate rapidly at scale.[9]

The HTS-led interim government reportedly appointed HTS military commander Murhaf Abu Qasra (aka Abu Hassan al Hamawi) as the new Syrian defense minister.[10] Qasra has commanded the HTS military wing and spent years developing its drone unit.[11] Qasra also commanded the HTS offensive that toppled the Bashar al Assad regime.[12] Qasra will presumably oversee the dissolution and integration of Syria’s armed factions into the new Syrian armed forces in his role as defense minister. Qasra told Western media recently that HTS planned to be ”the first” to dissolve its armed wing and subordinate its forces to the new Defense Ministry.[13] Qasra, who has overseen Latakia Province since the fall of the regime, appeared with Shara to meet military faction leaders in Damascus on December 21.[14] Qasra’s appointment to defense minister would be consistent with the HTS-led interim governments’ appointment of key HTS allies and loyalists to ministerial positions.[15]

HTS leader Ahmed al Shara met with prominent Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and other Druze sheikhs in Damascus on December 22.[16] Shara said during the meeting that no sects will be excluded in Syria and that it is “our duty to protect” the many Syrian sects.[17] Shara’s meeting with Jumblatt comes amid indications that HTS wants to establish a centralized and unitary Syrian state without autonomous or federal regions for minorities, such as Druze and Kurds.[18] Shara also said during the meeting that Syria seeks to build a “close” relationship with Lebanon.[19] Jumblatt, who has been historically involved in Lebanese political movements, said the meeting was a key step in restoring relations between Lebanon and Syria.[20] Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati recently ordered the re-opening of the Lebanese embassy in Damascus.[21]

Former Syrian regime elements have continued to reconcile and settle their status with the interim government.[22] Former regime military personnel, whom the regime conscripted under compulsory service, have reported to settlement centers in large numbers in the days since HTS announced general amnesty.[23] Syrian newspaper al Watan reported on December 21 that at least 34,000 former regime members have submitted applications to settle their statuses at the centers across eight provinces.[24] At least 20,000 of these applicants were from the former regime strongholds of Latakia and Tartous provinces, according to al Watan.[25]

Syrian media reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in Daraa and Quneitra provinces on December 22. Local media reported that the IDF advanced into the outskirts of al Baath, Quneitra Province, and met with local officials to negotiate weapons collection efforts in the area.[26] Local media reported that the IDF continues to maintain a presence near Maariya, western Daraa Province.[27]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei discussed Syrians revolting against unspecified oppressors during a speech on December 22.[28] Khamenei said that "Syrian youth . . . must stand up to the planners and executors of insecurity [in Syria] with strong will and overcome them." It is unclear exactly whom Khamenei was referencing when he said “planners and executors.” Such comments reflect the second time that Khamenei has discussed young Syrians organizing and arming themselves since the fall of Assad. Khamenei said on December 11 that "undoubtedly the occupied area[s] of Syria will be liberated by the zealous Syrian youth.”[29] Khamenei in the same breath compared Syria today to Iraq in the 2003-2011 period and said that Syrian youth would free Syria in the same way that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias “freed” Iraq from the United States. CTP-ISW previously assessed that this comparison suggests that Iran may pursue efforts to support similar militias in Syria to combat opposition forces and US-Israeli “interference” while undermining any new government in Syria, although CTP-ISW has not observed any material developments to indicate that Iran is currently pursuing these efforts.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: A senior SDF political official expressed the readiness to negotiate with HTS in order to determine the future role of the SDF. Turkey and HTS are continuing to coordinate their efforts to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense apparatus.
• Syria: The HTS-led interim government continues to signal a shift away from Iran and the Axis of Resistance. Israeli media reported that HTS leader Ahmad al Shara recently decided to prevent Iranian civilian and military flights from transiting Syrian airspace.
• Syria: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei discussed Syrians revolting against unspecified oppressors during a speech. This marks the second time that Khamenei has discussed young Syrians mobilizing and arming themselves since Assad fell.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF 162nd Division continued operating in the northern Gaza Strip on December 22. Palestinian militias continued to attack Israeli forces operating in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Gaza Strip: Unspecified sources told Egyptian media that Israel requested the release of 34 hostages, including five female IDF soldiers and 11 men of fighting age, in the first phase of a ceasefire and hostage-prisoner exchange deal with Hamas.
• Lebanon: The IDF 91st Division continued operations in southern Lebanon on December 22. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) continued to seize sites in southern Lebanon on December 22 that were previously affiliated with Palestinian militias.
• Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted airstrikes targeting a Houthi missile storage facility and a command-and-control facility in Houthi-controlled territory in Sanaa, Yemen, on December 21. 

Iran Update, December 21, 2024

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Alexandra Braveman, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf described Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al Shara as “pragmatic” but did not specify what concrete steps Shara or the HTS-led interim government will take to combat terrorism or ensure minority rights.[1] Leaf stated that Shara gave ”moderate” statements on issues, including women's rights and protection for minorities, when they met in Damascus on December 20. Leaf confirmed that the United States will no longer pursue the 10-million-dollar Rewards for Justice bounty on Shara due to his commitment to ensuring terrorist groups inside Syria pose no threat to the United States or its regional partners. The US readout offered no details on whether Shara agreed to any binding commitments in exchange. Leaf stated the United States supports a Syrian-led political process that results in an “inclusive and representative government” and includes Syria’s “diverse ethnic and religious communities.”

The HTS-published readout of the meeting between Leaf and Shara portrayed the United States as supporting HTS efforts to consolidate control and deprive Syrian Kurds of regional autonomy, even though the US readout gave no indication of such things.[2] The HTS-published readout framed the United States as supporting a “unified Syrian army” that stands by the interim government “in confronting pending issues and major challenges such as the northeastern region.” This language implies US support for the HTS and Turkish effort to coerce the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into disbanding and forfeiting their autonomy to integrate into a new state structure under HTS.[3] Elements of the SDF would be reintegrated into the Syrian army alongside other militia groups, some of which have worked to kill and displace Kurdish communities, as CTP-ISW has previously reported.[4] The HTS-readout further claimed that the United States “affirmed its commitment to supporting the Syrian people and the new Syrian administration,” likely to portray the United States as recognizing the HTS-led interim government as the official Syrian government, despite the United States having made no such comments. The HTS-readout  — like the US one — provided no specific or binding steps that Shara or the HTS-led government will take to counter terrorist groups in Syria.

HTS is trying to consolidate control over the Syrian coastal region amid reports of instability and violence there. HTS launched an effort purportedly to crack down on crimes, such as drug trafficking, extortion, and theft, in Latakia.[5] Although some lawlessness is probably present in certain parts of Syria at the moment, it appears that HTS is confronting politically motivated civil conflict beyond regular criminal activity. Unspecified individuals fired small arms at an HTS checkpoint south of Tartus, for instance.[6] Unspecified individuals have also conducted arson attacks on former Assad regime courts and police sites, possibly to destroy evidence that could be used to prosecute former regime officials.[7] These arson attacks extend to other Syrian provinces, such as Suwayda.[8] There is a risk that politically motivated civil conflict in the Syrian coastal region could develop along ethnic and sectarian lines. The coastal region is heavily populated by Alawites, who may expect retaliation or persecution from the HTS-led government since Assad is Alawite.[9] Western media has already reported some incidents of violence against Alawite civilians in recent days.[10]

The SDF and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) continued to clash along the lines of control in Aleppo, Hasakah, and Raqqa provinces on December 21. The Manbij Military Council — an element of the SDF—claimed to kill 52 SNA fighters in at least twelve hours of clashes near Tishreen Dam.[11] The SDF also claimed to destroy SNA armored vehicles and seize weapons.[12] The SDF claimed that Turkey provided air support to SNA ground forces near the dam.[13] Local sources reported that the SNA sent reinforcements to the Tishreen Dam near Manbij, east of Aleppo on December 20.[14] The dam has been the site of clashes since December 9 and was specifically named under a now-nullified ceasefire between the SDF and SNA.[15] SDF elements in Tal Othman fired artillery at SNA forces near Tishreen Dam.[16] A Turkish drone subsequently struck the SDF positions in Tal Othman.[17] The SDF engaged the SNA in several areas of Hasakah Province near the lines of control.[18] An SNA faction separately engaged the SDF south of Tal Abyad in Raqqa Province.[19]

Turkish aggression has renewed toward the SDF in recent days after the failure of a ceasefire in Manbij. Turkish officials have defined one of their objectives in Syria as “eliminat[ing]” the SDF.[20] Turkey and the SNA have built up their military presence immediately outside SDF-held territory and indicated that they may attack to seize territory.

The HTS-led interim government appointed officials to key governing posts on December 21. The interim government appointed Syrian Salvation Government official Asaad Hassan al Shaibani as foreign affairs minister.[21] Shaibani’s appointment is consistent with Shara’s pick for other key cabinet officials, such as Interim Prime Minister Mohammad al Bashir, who similarly had headed the Syrian Salvation Government since January 2024.[22] The interim government also appointed SNA-affiliated commander Azzam al Gharib Abu al Ezz Saraqib as governor of Aleppo Province.[23] Saraqib is the commander-in-chief of al Jabhat al Shamiya, or the Levant Front, which controls Azaz in Aleppo Province.[24] Azaz is part of the SNA-held territory, which expanded during the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime. The appointment of Saraqib as provincial governor of Aleppo reflects how HTS seeks to reconcile and distribute power across other armed factions, especially those close to HTS and the SNA.[25] The interim government appointed two Idlib Province-based leaders as provincial governors of Rif Dimashq and Latakia on December 17.[26]

HTS leader Ahmed al Shara is continuing to try to portray himself and HTS as pragmatic and inclusive by engaging minorities. Shara reportedly met with Shia authorities who manage and oversee the services at the Sayyida Zeinab Shrine in Damascus on December 21.[27] Shara assured the authorities that the shrine would be protected and assigned a security unit to guard it, according to a United Kingdom-based, Egyptian-owned outlet.[28] Shara would then be assuming responsibility and accountability for the safety of the shrine. Iranian state media has previously published conflicting accounts of HTS activity at Shia sites, ranging from HTS elements "storming" the sites to agreements for their protection.[29]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei announced the killing of an Iranian embassy staff member, Davoud Bitaraf, in Damascus.[30] Unidentified individuals reportedly opened fire on Bitaraf's vehicle in Damascus on December 15. Baghaei urged the interim government to find and prosecute the perpetrators.[31] Bitaraf reportedly served as a religious scholar at the Damascus seminary and Imam of the Sayyidah Ruqayya Shrine there for over two decades.[32]

The Houthis fired a Palestine-2 ballistic missile targeting an IDF position in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area, central Israel, injuring 16 Israelis on December 20.[33] The IDF detected the missile but failed to intercept it.[34] A preliminary investigation revealed that the IDF air defense systems launched two interceptors that missed the missile.[35] The Houthis have used this missile variant to attack Israel several times in recent weeks, however, the IDF has successfully intercepted each of the previous attacks.[36] The IDF separately intercepted a drone that entered southern Israeli airspace from the east.[37] Israeli Army Radio stated that the drone was launched from Yemen.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf described HTS leader Ahmed al Shara as “pragmatic” but did not specify what concrete steps Shara or the HTS-led interim government will take to combat terrorism or ensure minority rights.
• Syria: HTS is trying to consolidate control over the Syrian coastal region amid reports of instability and violence there. HTS launched an effort purportedly to crack down on crime but appears also meant to counter politically motivated civil conflict.
• Syria: HTS leader Ahmed al Shara is continuing to try to portray himself as pragmatic and inclusive by engaging minorities. Shara met with religious authorities who are responsible for managing a holy Shia shrine in Damascus and committed to protect it.
• Yemen: The Houthis fired a Palestine-2 ballistic missile targeting the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area, injuring 16 Israelis. The IDF fired interceptors but missed the projectile. The IDF separately intercepted a likely Houthi drone that entered southern Israeli airspace.

Iran Update, December 20, 2024

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Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed readiness to help Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) form a new political system in Syria.[1] Erdogan said that Turkey could offer expertise and guidance to this end. Erdogan also emphasized the need to draft a new Syrian constitution. Erdogan added that Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan will travel to Damascus soon to discuss the formation of a new Syrian state. These comments come amid indications from HTS that it wants to establish a centralized and unitary Syrian state without autonomous or federal regions for minorities, such as Druze and Kurds.[2]

Erdogan’s comments also come amid renewed Turkish aggression toward the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in recent days. Turkish officials have defined one of their objectives in Syria as “eliminat[ing]” the SDF.[3] Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have built up their military presence immediately outside SDF-held territory and indicated that they may attack to seize territory. An SNA military commander said on December 20 that his forces were fighting against “separatist parties,” referring to the SDF.[4] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi said on December 10 that he wanted to “enter into a political process for the future of” Syria, but it is unclear what role he would play if Turkey adopts a major role in the formation of a new Syrian state.[5]

The SDF and SNA continued to clash along the lines of control in Aleppo Province on December 20. The head of the SDF media center reported “fierce clashes” on the Qere Qozaq bridge, which spans the Euphrates River.[6] This bridge and a downstream dam have been the site of consistent fighting between the SDF and SNA since December 9.[7]

The SDF deployed forces to clear towns of opposition forces east of Raqqa City on December 19.[8] Local sources reported that opposition forces took control of Madan and five other nearby towns from the SDF.[9] The SDF had seized these areas from the Assad regime on December 6.[10] The SDF stated that its forces deployed on December 19 to operate against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) elements in the towns and pushed them into the desert.[11] The SDF originally took control of these towns from the Assad regime on December 6.[12] Residents of Madan disputed the SDF claim that it was fighting ISIS and instead labeled the opposition fighters actually as ”local revolutionary forces.”[13] The exact identity of these anti-SDF elements is unclear at this time. These events come during an SNA-affiliated leader's visit to Madan on December 20.[14]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Michael Kurilla said that ISIS plans to exploit instability in Syria to break 8,000 of its fighters out of Syrian detention facilities.[15] This statement comes as an ISIS outlet criticized the detention of its fighters in Syria.[16] ISIS has long sought to free its forces from detention facilities, and ISIS supporters have increasingly suggested online that the fall of Bashar al Assad presents an opportunity to exploit to this end.[17] CENTCOM separately killed two ISIS members, including an ISIS commander, in an airstrike in Deir Ez Zor Province, eastern Syria, on December 19.[18] CENTCOM specified that the airstrike was conducted in an area that was formerly controlled by the Assad regime and Russian forces.

There is precedent for Salafi-jihadi groups exploiting political instability, such as what is occurring in Syria, to rapidly reconstitute their forces. ISIS’s predecessor, al Qaeda in Iraq, rapidly reconstituted itself by freeing fighters from Iraqi detention facilities after the US withdrawal from Iraq from 2011 to 2014.[19] The ISIS fighters and commanders held in Syrian detention centers represent a sizeable fighting force that would support further operations in Iraq and Syria.

The US counter-ISIS mission relies heavily on the SDF as the leading counter-ISIS partner force in Syria.[20] The current SDF-SNA fighting, as outlined in the paragraphs above, will likely impact the SDF's ability to execute this mission. ISIS is likely aware of the current SDF-SNA dynamic and views it as a further opportunity that it could exploit. US Department of Defense Press Secretary Pat Ryder said on December 19 that the United States increased its force presence in Syria from 900 troops to approximately 2,000.[21] Ryder specified that these additional troops are “temporary rotational forces” deployed to meet changing mission needs.

A US delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf met HTS leader Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on December 20.[22] Leaf had "good” and “thorough" discussions with Shara on domestic and regional issues.[23] This is the first time that US officials have visited Damascus in over a decade.[24]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in villages in Daraa and Quneitra provinces. Tens of Syrians protested the IDF presence in Maariya, Daraa Province, on December 20.[25] The IDF deemed one approaching protester as a “threat” to Israeli soldiers in the area.[26] The IDF shot the protester in the leg. Israeli media reported that the IDF was operating based on its open-fire procedures, which involve verbally instructing the individual to stop and firing warning shots into the air before shooting at their legs.[27] Geolocated footage posted to X (Twitter) separately showed the IDF in al Rafeed, Quneitra Governorate, for the first time on December 20.[28] Syrian media similarly reported that around 30 IDF soldiers with vehicles operated in al Rafeed to clear trees, search houses, and request a meeting with locals.[29]

Senior Iranian officials are trying to justify domestically the years-long Iranian support for Bashar al Assad while downplaying the fact that the fall of Assad marks a strategic defeat for Tehran. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian reiterated regime talking points along these lines in an interview with the official website of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[30] Ahmadian said that Iran intervened in Syria to fight ISIS and at the request of Assad. This framing ignores that Iran intervened to defend Assad at the early stages of the Syrian civil war in 2011—well before ISIS surged across Iraq and Syria. This framing also ignores how senior Iranian officials have framed previously their role in Syria as part of their efforts to deter and threaten the United States and Israel. Ahmadian admitted that the fall of Assad hurts the Axis of Resistance but then proceeded to argue that Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah are self-sufficient and do not require Iranian support to remain strong. This downplaying of the fall of Assad and its negative impact on Iranian strategy mirrors Russian efforts to frame the fall of Assad as a victory for Moscow.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed readiness to help HTS form a new political system in Syria. These comments come amid renewed Turkish aggression toward the US-backed SDF and fighting with the Turkish-backed SNA.
• US CENTCOM Commander Michael Kurilla stated that ISIS plans to exploit political instability in Syria in order to break 8,000 of its fighters out of detention facilities, which would help ISIS reconstitute rapidly.
• Senior Iranian officials are trying to justify domestically the years-long Iranian support for the Bashar al Assad regime while downplaying the fact that the fall of Assad marks a strategic defeat for Tehran.

Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, Christina Harward, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is consolidating political and security power under HTS in a post-Assad Syrian government. HTS-led forces assumed control of Daraa City and the Nassib border crossing from the Southern Operations Room on December 14.[1] Jolani and Southern Operations Room leaders met on December 11 to discuss coordination in military and civil affairs.[2] It is notable that these Syrian groups have agreed to cooperate with HTS despite historical animosity with HTS’s predecessor and al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra in the mid-2010s.[3]

Jolani has continued to integrate HTS allies into the interim Syrian Salvation Government, securing control over key civil and security services. Jolani met with Nour al Dink al Zink commander Ahmed Rizk on December 14 to discuss the role of “revolutionary cadres” in the future Syrian government and the restructuring of the Syrian Defense Ministry.[4] Rizk and his group have long fought alongside HTS in northwestern Syria. Syrian media reported on December 10 that the HTS-controlled interim government also plans to reorganize the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).[5] Reorganization within the Syrian army and Syrian Defense Ministry supports reconciliation with former regime elements but also creates opportunities to appoint HTS loyalists and gain control over the government bureaucracy.

The HTS-led interim government appears to be pursuing legal recourse against former regime officials outside of a constitutionally-bound justice system. The interim Syrian Ministry of Information announced on December 13 that the HTS-led interim government will hold accountable former regime media officials who directly or indirectly supported crimes against the Syrian people.[6] It is not clear if this process will be undertaken by the interim Justice Ministry or whether the entity that does prosecute former regime officials will use HTS’s Sunni Sharia law or a more secular legal code. HTS has used a ”hybrid civil-Islamic court structure” that uses HTS-approved Sunni Sharia law in the areas it controls in northwestern Syria.[7] HTS has not defined judicial procedures it intends to use to prosecute former regime officials and could decide to use a secular justice system. HTS lacks the formal authority to prosecute regime officials, though it is necessary to hold former regime officials accountable for crimes committed against the Syrian people. That authority should rest with an international tribunal or a new Syrian government and a constitution that have yet to be established. Trials held under HTS’s Sunni Sharia style justice system could raise sectarian tensions regardless of legitimate charges or a fair trial.

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander General Mazloum Abdi is attempting to preserve and unify the SDF’s Kurdish base as the group faces two existential threats in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime.[8] Abdi argued that Kurdish unity was critical to address threats currently facing their community.[9] Arab communities in Deir ez Zor and Raqqa have begun defecting from the SDF and calling for an end to SDF rule in Arab areas. The combination of these events threaten to unravel the fragile Kurdish-Arab coalition that the United States helped establish. Turkey is simultaneously threatening to destroy the SDF. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan threatened on December 13 to “eliminate” the SDF, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and People’s Defense Units (YPG).[10] Abdi added that unity and dialogue among the Kurds is critical for participating in the development of the new Syrian government. CTP-ISW assessed that Abdi intends to negotiate its role in a future Syrian government, likely to prevent further unrest within Arab populations and militias under the SDF.[11]

HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani stated on December 14 that Israel used Iran as a “pretext” to enter Syria but he added that HTS has “no intention of entering into conflict with Israel.”[12] IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi reiterated on December 14 that the IDF has no intention of interfering in Syrian domestic affairs or ”ruling” Syria.[13] Halevi added that the IDF is only operating in Syria to ensure the safety of Israel. An IDF company commander in the 603rd Combat Engineering Battalion (7th Armored Brigade) stated that the IDF advanced 10 kilometers into Syria. [14]

Some elements in Iran are either alarmed or trying to generate alarm over the status of the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Syria. This alarm is not being reflected in the Syrian information space at this time. One Iranian media outlet published a video on December 13 allegedly showing an HTS member reciting a poem praising Umar ibn al Khattab, the Sunni second Caliph, at the Sayyidah Zainab shrine.[15] The outlet stated that reading this poem is ”provocative” and aimed at ”boiling the blood” of Syrian Shia. Followers of Shia Islam believe that Umar is responsible for the death of Fatima, the mother of Zeinab. Approximately 720,000 users read this article, according to the outlet. The same Iranian outlet published an article on December 13 claiming that “takfiri terrorist groups“ in Syria are introducing new restrictions for Shiites to make pilgrimage the Sayyida Zeinab shrine and Sayyidah Ruqayya shrine in Damascus.[16] Iranian media has frequently used the term ”takfiri terrorists” to refer to HTS and ISIS, but it often conflates other Syrian opposition groups with salafi-jihadists. The prevalence of these reports in the information space could stoke sectarian tensions, particularly if the reports begin to gain traction in Arabic-language or Syrian media.

These alarmist reports in Iranian media are not being picked up in the Syrian information space at this time. One local Syrian man who regularly visits the Sayyida Zeinab shrine gave an interview to a Syria-focused analyst claiming that HTS is committed to protecting minority sites, including the Sayyidah Zeynab shrine.[17] The Syrian denied recent social media reports amplified in the Iranian media space that HTS entered the shrine violently and chanted provocative slogans, though he allowed that the chant of ”Allahu Akbar” was seen as provocative by some individuals within the Shia community.[18] CTP-ISW has not observed Syrian media reporting or recirculating reports of violence, provocation, or restriction at the Sayyida Zeinab shrine or the Sayyida Ruqayya shrine at this time.

The Iranian regime does not appear to have assumed a clear strategy for how to approach the HTS-led interim government in Syria, as exemplified by the contradicting reports regarding the safety of Shia holy sites following the fall of the Assad regime. Certain Iranian media outlets have amplified reports of HTS fighters interfering with the Sayyida Zeinab shrine and the Sayyidah Ruqayya shrine, while other Iranian media reports claimed that HTS engaged respectfully during a visit to the shrine in recent days.[19] The fact that the Iranian media is not pursuing a clear messaging campaign about the Shia holy sites in Syria may indicate that the Iranian defense and political establishment has not yet decided how best to interact with the new HTS-led interim government. The rapid pace in which the Assad regime fell, resulting in the loss of billions of dollars for the Iranian regime, has almost certainly forced Iran to re-evaluate its strategy in regard to Syria and the region at large.[20]

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 14 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck at least 20 former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) targets across Syria.[21] The IDF struck former SAA communications sites and ”electronic warfare antennas“ in multiple locations including Damascus, Suwayda, Maysaf, Latakia, and Tartus. The journalist reported that the IDF targeted these sites to ensure the targets did not fall into the hands of ”hostile elements.” Syrian media reported that the IDF airstrikes in Damascus targeted warehouses near Mount Qasioun previously controlled by the Syrian Republican Guard and SAA 4th Division and the SAA‘s al Dumayr airbase in the Damascus countryside.[22]

The prospects for Russia's continued military presence in Syria remain unclear as reports that Russia is evacuating its military assets from Syria continue. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 14 that "hundreds" of Russian soldiers cannot reach Hmeimim Air Base from Homs Governorate out of fear that Russian forces will come under fire from unspecified actors.[23] The GUR stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Africa Corps arrived in Syria to protect Russian forces moving towards Russia's bases on the western coast and that Russian Colonel Dmitry Motrenko is negotiating with military contingents in Syria from other unspecified states in order to secure guarantees of "immunity" for Russian soldiers waiting at the Tiyas Air Base west of Palmyra. The GUR also stated that roughly 1,000 Russian personnel left Damascus on December 13 in a column heading towards the Port of Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base, and ISW observed footage on December 13 of Russian military convoys moving from Damascus and other areas in southern Syria, likely towards the two main Russian bases.[24] Reuters reported on December 14 that a "Syrian security official" stationed near Hmeimim Air Base stated that at least one cargo plane flew out of the base on December 14 bound for Libya.[25] Syrian military and security sources reportedly stated that Russia is withdrawing some heavy equipment and senior officers from the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) to Moscow but is currently not planning to permanently pull out of the Port of Tartus or Hmeimim Air Base. A Russian milblogger posted photos and footage on December 14 purportedly showing Russian military assets still operating at the Russian helicopter base at Qamishli in northeastern Syria, and a Russian source claimed on December 14 that Russian forces have withdrawn from their base in Kobani in northern Syria.[26]

The complex nature of the interim Syrian government is likely resulting in conflicting reports about whether Russia is engaged in talks with Syrian opposition groups. Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) controls the Syrian interim government, but HTS and the interim government do not yet have complete control over the disparate groups that helped overthrow the Assad regime. Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated on December 12 that Russia has established contacts with HTS.[27]Reuters reported on December 14 that a Russian source stated that discussions between Russia and the interim Syrian government are ongoing.[28] A "senior rebel official close to the new interim administration" told Reuters, however, that the issue of Russia's military presence in Syria and Russia's previous agreements with the Assad regime are "not under discussion" and that talks at an unspecified time in the future will address this matter. The official reportedly stated that the "Syrian people will have the final say." Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 13 that Mohammed Sabra, a Syrian politician who represented the Syrian opposition's High Negotiations Committee at the 2016 Geneva peace talks on the Syrian Civil War, similarly stated that there should be a referendum in the future to allow the Syrian people to approve any foreign military presence in Syria.[29] It is unclear if Reuter's "senior rebel official close to the new interim administration" who denied talks between Russia and the interim government is a member of HTS or another Syrian opposition group.[30] It remains unclear if Russia is in contact with all the Syrian opposition groups necessary to guarantee the short- and long-term safety of its military bases and select opposition groups may be unaware that Russia is in discussion with other groups. Russian state media has notably not differentiated between different opposition groups when reporting on the situation in Syria, possibly as part of efforts to present the interim government as more united so as to increase the legitimacy of any agreements Russia reaches with one or some of the groups.[31]

The international community has not yet established a plan for how to engage with the transitional government in Syria. The United States, UN, EU, Turkey, and various Arab states met in Jordan on December 14 to discuss supporting the political process in Syria.[32] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and the foreign ministers of Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia agreed on unspecified ”joint principles” for recognizing a future Syrian government.[33] Blinken stressed that the transition process must be ”Syrian-led.” Blinken stated that the US has engaged in “direct talks” with HTS.[34] The US designated HTS as a foreign terrorist organization in 2018.[35] Blinken stressed that the United States communicated a set of ”governing principles” to HTS that includes ensuring human rights are upheld and the rejection of extremism.[36]

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem is seeking to develop a working relationship with the HTS-led interim government in Damascus in order to restore Hezbollah’s weapons supply route in Syria.[37] HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is unlikely to develop any relationship with Hezbollah. Hezbollah supported the Assad regime by deploying thousands of fighters and helped seized key Syrian cities, such as Qusayr and Aleppo.[38] Qassem gave a televised speech on December 14 where he acknowledged that Hezbollah has lost its ground lines of communication (GLOC) from Iran through Syria and signaled his willingness to restore these GLOCs with the support of the new interim government in Syria.[39] Qassem said that Hezbollah supported the Assad regime due to its “hostile position” against Israel and added that the interim government in Syria should also declare Israel its ”enemy.”[40] HTS leader Jolani said that he has “no intention of entering into conflict with Israel.”[41]

Key Takeaways:

• HTS Consolidates Power in Syria: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is consolidating political and security power under HTS in a post-Assad Syrian government. Jolani has continued to integrate HTS allies into the interim Syrian Salvation Government, securing control over key civil and security services. The HTS-led interim government also appears to be pursuing legal recourse against former regime officials outside of a constitutionally-bound justice system.
• Syrian Democratic Forces: Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander General Mazloum Abdi is attempting to preserve and unify the SDF’s Kurdish base as the group faces two existential threats in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime.
• Religious and Sectarian Tension in Syria: Some elements in Iran are either alarmed or trying to generate alarm over the status of the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Syria. This alarm is not being reflected in the Syrian information space at this time. The Iranian regime does not appear to have assumed a clear strategy for how to approach the HTS-led interim government in Syria, as exemplified by the contradicting reports regarding the safety of Shia holy sites following the fall of the Assad regime.
• Israel in Syria: An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 14 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck at least 20 former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) targets across Syria. HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani stated on December 14 that Israel used Iran as a “pretext” to enter Syria but he added that HTS has “no intention of entering into conflict with Israel.”
• Russia in Syria: The prospects for Russia's continued military presence in Syria remain unclear as reports that Russia is evacuating its military assets from Syria continue. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 14 that "hundreds" of Russian soldiers cannot reach Hmeimim Air Base from Homs Governorate out of fear that Russian forces will come under fire from unspecified actors.
• Hezbollah in Syria: Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem is seeking to develop a working relationship with the HTS-led interim government in Damascus in order to restore Hezbollah’s weapons supply route in Syria.

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Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, Christina Harward, Adiv Kuray, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iranian regime is still coming to terms with the fall of the Assad regime and reflecting on its former Syria policy.[1] Five unspecified Iranian officials, including Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps members, told the New York Times on December 13 that the Iranian regime is “disoriented” and “befuddled.”[2] The officials added that the regime is “trying to find a way forward with Syria” and will accept “any level of diplomatic presence” in Syria.[3] The New York Times also reported--citing a Tehran-based analyst--that a “Syria debate” is occurring in Iran “at all levels of society.”[4] Iranian civilians and media have openly criticized the regime for funding and bolstering the Assad regime for years at the expense of developing Iran.[5] Shia cleric Mohammad Shariati Dehghan recently stated that Iran should prioritize developing relations with other countries over supporting militias in the region.[6] Dehghan added that the regime should redirect money and resources “back to the people of Iran.” Dehghan’s statements could be indicative of a broader regime and Iranian conversation about how Iran should adjust its regional strategy after the fall of Assad, though Dehghan presumably does not have a large role in policymaking or the government. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei recently described criticisms such as Dehghan’s as a “crime” during a speech on December 13.[7]

The Turkish Embassy in Damascus will resume operations on December 14 after remaining closed for 12 years.[8] The Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry appointed Turkish Ambassador to Mauritania Burhan Koroglu as the interim charge d’affaires to the Turkish Embassy in Damascus.[9] Koroglu speaks Turkish, English, and Arabic.[10] Turkish media separately reported on December 13 that the Syrian General Consulate in Istanbul has also resumed operations.[11]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed the situation in Syria with senior Turkish and Iraqi officials on December 12 and 13. Blinken met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara on December 12 and 13, respectively, to try to persuade Turkey “not to press [its] advantage” against the Kurdish-controlled, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria.[12] The United States has backed the SDF in the Syrian Civil War to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.[13] The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched an operation to take territory from the SDF in northern Syria on November 30 and captured Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo City, on December 1.[14] Fidan said on December 13 that the destruction of the YPG is Turkey’s objective in Syria.[15] Turkey frequently refers to the SDF as the YPG, suggesting that Fidan is referring to the US-backed partner force.

Blinken separately met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani in Baghdad on December 13.[16] Blinken emphasized the need to form an “inclusive, nonsectarian government” in Syria that “does not become, in any way, a platform for terrorism.”[17] Blinken and Sudani discussed ongoing efforts to prevent ISIS from “resurging and destabilizing” the Middle East.[18] Iraq has bolstered border security since the Syrian opposition offensive began in late November 2024. Iraqi Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh of Fayyadh stated on December 13 that the Popular Mobilization Forces will confront any security or terrorist threat to Iraq.[19]

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is facing two perceived existential threats in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime, which almost certainly caused the SDF to deprioritize the counter-ISIS mission. The United States helped create the SDF by binding together Kurdish and Arab forces in Deir ez Zor.[20] Arab communities in Deir ez Zor and Raqqa have begun defecting from the SDF and an end to SDF rule in Arab areas, which threatens to unravel the fragile Kurdish-Arab coalition that the United States helped establish.[21] Turkey is simultaneously threatening to destroy the SDF. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan threatened on December 13 to “eliminate” the SDF, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and People’s Defense Units (YPG).[22] Fidan added that these groups must leave Syria. The SDF, given that it prioritizes these existential threats over the threat it faces from ISIS, has stopped all counter-ISIS operations. This reallocation of SDF resources creates opportunities for ISIS to reemerge and leaves the United States without a viable counter-ISIS partner in Syria, at least temporarily.

SDF commander General Mazloum Abdi announced that the SDF plans to negotiate its role in a future Syrian government, likely to prevent further unrest within Arab populations and militias under the SDF.[23] Abdi stated that the SDF seeks a ”decentralized” Syrian administration in which the SDF is represented in the future government and armed forces.[24] The defection of Arab SDF formations and protests against SDF rule is probably contributing to Abdi’s decision to negotiate with the interim government. Arab citizens in SDF-controlled areas have long-standing grievances against the SDF which include limited reconstruction, repeated SDF abuses of the local populations, and a lack of representative Arab leadership.[25] Abdi probably calculates that by reaching out to the interim government, he can temper the unrest by expressing his willingness to integrate into the Syrian government. Abdi’s outreach to the interim government does not guarantee the SDF’s ability to control popular unrest. Even if he reaches a deal with the interim government. Arab communities are calling for an end to SDF rule, not just the SDF’s integration into the rest of Syria. This implies that these groups do not seek to be a part of an SDF-led autonomous region.

Reports of Sunni Muslims harassing and threatening minority religious and sectarian groups in Syria continue to gain traction in the information space, which could create opportunities for extreme groups to incite further religious- or sectarian-based violence. A former HTS religious scholar, Abu Yahya al Shami, called upon Sunni Muslims to kill “Nusayri” who have participated in the killing of Muslims in Syria.[26] “Nusayri” is a highly derogatory term for Alawites.[27] Shami circulated an Arabic-language copy of the US-based nonprofit ProJustice’s 2019 report on violations committed by members of the Syrian regime and called upon Sunnis to track down former regime members.[28] Shami praised recent killings of former regime members, including ”shabiha” members, referring to pro-regime militias recruited and armed by the Assad regime.[29] Shami called upon “every honorable free person” who knows the location of Shabiha members to target and kill them.[30] Shami is specifically calling for Sunni Muslims to target the regime, but his use of ”Nusayri” indicates a sectarian angle to his calls that encourages sectarian violence. Reports of revenge killings or violence against minority groups remain relatively isolated and relatively independent of each other at this time. CTP-ISW will continue to report these indicators, however, given the serious nature of these crimes and the risk that revenge, sectarian, and interfaith killings and harassment could spark larger-scale cycles of violence.

Iranian media is boosting reports of sectarian harassment, though it is unclear how widespread the harassment is currently. Iranian media claimed that HTS-led fighters interfered with holy Shia shrines in Damascus and that HTS ordered the removal of flags and religious items including prayer stones, and religious texts from Sayyidah Ruqayya Shrine in Damascus.[31] HTS has reportedly made an informal agreement with Iran to protect Shia sites in Syria and it is unclear at this time why HTS ordered the removal of religious items from the shrine. Iranian sources also reported that HTS members conducted a “respectful” visit to the shrine.[32] The prevalence of these reports in the information space could stoke sectarian tensions, particularly if the reports begin to gain traction in Arabic-language or Syrian media. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba warned Syrian opposition forces on December 13 not to “touch” the Sayyida Zeinab shrine after social media reports on December 12 claimed that HTS-led fighters “forcefully” entered the Sayyidah Zeynab shrine—a Shia site in Damascus—and chanted provocative slogans.[33]

The HTS-led operations room is taking steps to solidify its control over Deir ez Zor City following its recent capture from the SDF on December 11. HTS has deployed military police to the city in an effort to maintain order. These units will oversee security, manage the transition of key institutions, and ensure the transfer of government centers to the Syrian Transitional Government.[34] The deployment of additional forces strengthens HTS's control over Deir ez Zor City and its military airport.

The HTS-led interim government in Damascus continued to provide security and public safety services to residents. Thousands of Syrians in cities and villages across the country joined mass celebrations after Friday prayers on December 13 to celebrate the fall of the regime.[35] HTS leader Jolani called upon Syrians to celebrate in town squares “without firing bullets.”[36] HTS announced it would deploy “intensive security” during the celebrations in Damascus to maintain order and public safety.[37]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 474th Territorial Brigade (210th Division) continued to operate in the Israel-Syria disengagement zone and on the Israel-Syria border on December 13.[38] The IDF located anti-tank missiles, vests, ammunition, and other weapons during searches in unspecified areas of the Israel-Syria disengagement zone. The IDF reiterated its mission is to protect the citizens of Israel and not to interfere in Syria. Syrian media and a Syria-focused analyst reported that the IDF operated in or entered multiple towns and villages in Quneitra and Daraa Province, just east of the disengagement zone, since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 12.[39] The IDF is not maintaining a presence in these towns, suggesting that it is conducting raids. Raids include a planned retrograde from the target area. The IDF has not commented on its activities outside of the disengagement zone at this time of writing.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced on December 13 that he ordered the IDF to prepare to stay on Syrian Mt. Hermon during the coming months.[40] The IDF seized the Syrian side of Mt Hermon on December 8.[41] Mt Hermon is a strategic site as it allows a full view of the entire surrounding Syrian plain. Israel and Syria agreed that Mt Hermon would be part of the 235 square kilometer demilitarized buffer zone that ended the Yom Kippur War in 1974, which Israel considers void until order is restored in Syria.[42] Katz ordered this decision following an assessment on December 12 with IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and other senior IDF officials.[43]

The IDF has likely conducted airstrikes in at least three locations in Syria since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 12. Local Syrian media reported on December 13 that the IDF conducted airstrikes targeting the Mezzeh military airport, an IRGC headquarters, and various unspecified warehouses near Damascus.[44] Fox News’ foreign correspondent also reported airstrikes in Damascus.[45] Geolocated footage posted on X on December 12 showed a recent IDF targeting the Shayrat airbase, southeast of Homs city.[46] The IDF has conducted an air campaign targeting military capabilities of the former Assad regime in Syria in recent days.[47] Syrian media reported separate IDF airstrikes targeting SAA warehouses near Latakia.[48] The IDF has not commented on the latest reported airstrikes at this time of writing.

Russia is evacuating elements of its force grouping in Syria while continuing negotiations with select Syrian groups about Russia's longer-term military presence in the country. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 13 that an unspecified source familiar with the matter stated that Russia is currently negotiating with unspecified new Syrian "authorities" about maintaining Russia's military presence at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus.[49] The source reportedly stated that Russia has only secured "temporary security guarantees" but that the two military bases are "functioning as usual." Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated on December 12 that Russia has established contacts with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), which currently controls the areas at Hmeimim and Tartus, and the TASS source is likely referring to ongoing Russian talks with HTS.[50]

Maxar satellite imagery from December 13 shows two Russian An-124 military transport aircraft preparing to load cargo while a Ka-52 helicopter and elements of an S-400 air defense system are likely undergoing preparations for transport at Hmeimim Air Base (see embedded imagery below). The Maxar imagery also shows two Russian frigates still offshore of the Port of Tartus. Drone footage reportedly of Hmeimim Air Base shows An-72, An-26, and Il-76 transport aircraft; Ka-52 and Mi-8 or Mi-17 helicopters; and at least four Su-34, seven Su-24M2, and four Su-35S fighter jets under hangars.[51] Geolocated footage published on December 13 shows a Russian military convoy moving from Hisyah (south of Homs) along the M5 highway.[52] Additional footage published on December 13 reportedly shows Russian military convoys moving from Talkalakh (west of Homs), Homs, and Damascus.[53] It is unclear if the convoys are heading toward the Port of Tartus or Hmeimim Air Base, but the reported movement of Russian military assets indicates that Russia is pulling some of its forward assets in southern Syria to the western coast.

At least four Russian landing ships and cargo ships are reportedly heading from Russian ports to the Port of Tartus but will likely not reach Syria for weeks.[54] Russia is likely evacuating forces from its two main bases in Syria while negotiations are ongoing with new Syrian authorities as the outcome of these negotiations and Russia's longer-term presence at the bases are still unclear. Russia would be able to relatively quickly reestablish its military presence in Syria after evacuating from Hmeimim and Tartus should Moscow be able to secure more permanent agreements with the current Syrian authorities.

The status of Russia's helicopter base at Qamishli in northeastern Syria remains unclear, however. A Kurdish journalist stated on December 11 that Russian forces were withdrawing from the Qamishli base after unspecified authorities granted them safe passage out of Syria.[55] However, photos from December 12 show Russian equipment, helicopters, and personnel at the Qamishli base, and a Russian source claimed on December 12 that Russia maintains a presence at Hmeimim Air Base, the Port of Tartus, Qamishli, and other unspecified sites in Syria.[56] It is unclear if Russia is preparing to withdraw assets from Qamishli in the near future. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) currently control Qamishli, and Russian officials have only stated that Moscow has established contacts with HTS, which controls the area of the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus.[57] ISW has not observed reports that Russia is trying to separately negotiate with the SDF about Russia's continued presence at the Qamishli base, and it is unclear if Russian forces intend to or will be able to remain at the base.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Reactions to Syria: The Iranian regime is still coming to terms with the fall of the Assad regime and reflecting on its former Syria policy.
• Blinken in the Middle East: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed the situation in Syria with senior Turkish and Iraqi officials on December 12 and 13. Blinken met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara on December 12 and 13, respectively, to try to persuade Turkey “not to press [its] advantage” against the Kurdish-controlled, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria.
• Syrian Democratic Forces: The SDF is facing two perceived existential threats in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime, which almost certainly caused the SDF to deprioritize the counter-ISIS mission. SDF commander General Mazloum Abdi announced that the SDF plans to negotiate its role in a future Syrian government, likely to prevent further unrest within Arab populations and militias under the SDF.
• Religious and Sectarian Tension in Syria: Reports of Sunni Muslims harassing and threatening minority religious and sectarian groups in Syria continue to gain traction in the information space, which could create opportunities for extreme groups to incite further religious- or sectarian-based violence. CTP-ISW will continue to report these indicators of any interfaith or sectarian violence given the serious nature of these crimes and the risk that revenge, sectarian, and interfaith killings and harassment could spark larger-scale cycles of violence.
• Israel in Syria: The IDF continued to operate in the Israel-Syria disengagement zone and on the Israel-Syria border on December 13. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced on December 13 that he ordered the IDF to prepare to stay on Syrian Mt. Hermon during the coming months.
• Russia in Syria: Russia is evacuating elements of its force grouping in Syria while continuing negotiations with select Syrian groups about Russia's longer-term military presence in the country. The status of Russia's helicopter base at Qamishli in northeastern Syria remains unclear, however.

Iran Update, December 12, 2024

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Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is trying to retain control over the forces that it leads to maintain its moderate image and prevent sectarian conflict. HTS stated on December 12 that it would hold accountable any fighters who fail to comply with orders.[1] HTS also stated that any individuals violating orders do not represent HTS-led forces or the transitional government.[2] This statement comes after HTS announced that interfering in women’s choice of clothing or demanding that women dress modestly is ”strictly forbidden.”[3] HTS has also ordered its fighters to protect public and private property, respect public institutions, and treat former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) soldiers well.[4] HTS is trying to present itself as a moderate force with these orders.

The most recent statement threatening to punish fighters is likely in response to reports of HTS-led fighters conducting religion-based harassment and revenge killings.[5] Some reports, for instance, claimed that HTS-led fighters “forcefully” entered the Sayyidah Zeynab shrine in Damascus, which is a holy Shia shrine.[6] The reports claimed that the fighters chanted “provocative slogans” while in the shrine.[7] Several reports claimed that the fighters were affiliated with HTS, which reportedly made an informal agreement with Iran to protect Shia sites and minorities in Syria.[8] CTP-ISW cannot verify the details of the event or the accuracy of the reports. But their prevalence in the information space could nevertheless stoke sectarian tensions. CTP-ISW similarly reported on December 11 that an HTS-led fighter questioned a Christian journalist about her religious background, asking specifically whether she was “Christian, Alawi, Shiite, or Druze.“[9]

These incidents and the traction they gain in the information space create opportunities for extreme and sectarian groups to incite further religious-based violence and destabilize the government formation process in Syria. These incidents remain isolated and relatively independent of each other at this time. HTS is comprised of numerous Islamist groups formed with varying degrees of representation in the broader HTS leadership structure.[10] It is unclear which factions of HTS are involved in these instances of sectarian tensions or whether they are coordinated activities amongst several factions. CTP-ISW will continue to report revenge killings and religion-based incidents and violence due to the risk that these events can rapidly destabilize the situation in Syria.

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is factionalizing under internal and external pressure. Local footage posted on December 12 showed the SDF attempt to suppress demonstrators in Raqqa who demanded that the city be brought under the HTS-led transitional government.[11] Citizens have longstanding grievances against the SDF in Raqqa, which include limited reconstruction in Arab areas, repeated SDF abuses of the local populations, and a lack of representative Arab leadership.[12] The head of the al Kasra Military Council--a member of the SDF-- defected from the SDF, citing SDF “violations” against civilians in Deir ez Zor and Raqqa.[13] Arab contingents of the SDF have rapidly begun to defect in recent days.[14] A Syrian journalist reported that approximately 220 members of the Deir ez Zor Military Council have defected from the SDF over the past 48 hours.[15]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) confirmed on December 12 that it reached a ceasefire agreement with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Manbij, northern Syria.[16] The four-day ceasefire will last from December 12 to 16 in order to allow humanitarian aid to enter and unspecified security agreements. Under the agreement, the SNA will transfer control of the Sultan Suleiman Tomb and its surrounding hills to the SDF. In exchange, the SDF and SDF families will also withdraw from Manbij and the surrounding countryside. The ceasefire agreement also established the Tishreen Dam as a demilitarized zone to permit the electrical plant to continue its regular functions. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi confirmed on December 11 that his forces withdrew from Manbij after reaching a settlement with the SNA.[17] The SDF disputed territorial control over Manbij after the SNA seized control on December 8.[18]

The HTS-led interim government is trying to portray itself as the legitimate Syrian state. The transitional government posted a statement on December 12, thanking Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia for resuming their diplomatic missions in Damascus.[19] The statement also noted that Qatar and Turkey would reopen their respective embassies.[20] HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani and caretaker Prime Minister Mohammad al Bashir separately met with the Turkish foreign affairs minister and intelligence chief as well as the Qatari State Security Agency chief in Damascus on December 12.[21] The publication of these events portrays the HTS-led transitional government as the legitimate Syrian state despite no countries having yet formally recognized it as such.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to operate on the ground in southwestern Syria, according to Syrian sources. One outlet reported that the IDF entered towns in and around the disengagement zone in Quneitra Province and seized arms from residents on December 12.[22] Another source reported that the IDF detonated explosives at a former SAA site around Umm Batnah.[23]

Syrian media separately reported that the IDF plans to enter Marbah in western Daraa Province in order to disrupt the movement of arms there. The IDF previously paved a road leading from the disengagement zone to Marbah on December 11.[24] Syrian media stated that the IDF announced on December 12 via loudspeaker to residents that it plans to enter the town.[25] IDF officers met with tribal leaders at a nearby military site to discuss these plans as well. Marbah residents have requested that the HTS-led opposition forces intervene against the IDF.

The IDF has likely conducted three airstrikes in Syria since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 11. Local Syrian media reported two IDF airstrikes targeting Latakia port on December 11.[26] The outlet also reported an IDF airstrike on the outskirts of Damascus on December 12.[27] The IDF air campaign into Syria on December 9 and 10 destroyed approximately 70-80 percent of the Bashar al Assad regime’s military capabilities to prevent "terrorist elements” from seizing weapons, including dozens of anti-ship missiles at al Bayda and Latakia ports.[28] The IDF has given no comment on the latest reported airstrikes at the time of this writing.

The E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) sent a letter to the UN Security Council on December 6, announcing its readiness to impose international “snapback” sanctions on Iran.[29] The E3 would invoke the snapback mechanism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action if Iran continues to expand its nuclear program and decline to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The E3 letter comes after Iran dramatically increased its enrichment of uranium to 60 percent.[30] Iran announced on November 27 that it had activated “thousands of advanced centrifuges.”[31] Iran was retaliating for an earlier censure resolution passed by the IAEA Board of Governors, criticizing the lack of Iranian cooperation with the IAEA.

Reuters reported on December 12 that Iran agreed with the IAEA to increase the “frequency and intensity” of international monitoring of activities at the Fordow nuclear site.[32] Iran is likely responding to the threat from the E3 to impose snapback sanctions. It is notable, however, that greater international monitoring has no effect on Iran’s accelerated rate of uranium enrichment.

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: HTS is trying to retain control over the forces that it leads to maintain its moderate image and prevent sectarian conflict. HTS likely recognizes the risk of revenge killings and sectarian violence, which could destabilize Syria further.
• Syria: The US-backed SDF is facing intense external and internal pressure. The SDF did, however, reach a four-day ceasefire agreement with the Turkish-backed SNA around Manbij in northern Syria.
• Syria: The HTS-led transitional government is trying to portray itself as the legitimate Syrian state by publicizing its engagement with foreign actors. No foreign countries have yet recognized the transitional government as the legitimate state, however.
• Iran: The E3 sent a letter to the UN Security Council, threatening to impose “snapback” sanctions on Iran. The E3 is responding to the dramatic expansion of the Iranian nuclear program and Iranian non-cooperation with the IAEA.

Iran Update, December 11, 2024

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Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is attempting to consolidate HTS’s political and military control in a post-Assad interim Syrian government. The HTS-led military coalition has secured control over key civil and security services since the interim Syrian Salvation Government was established on December 9.[1] HTS-led opposition forces have assumed control over the Syrian state media outlet SANA and local police forces, which has enabled the HTS-led opposition to disseminate and enforce official government edicts.[2] HTS has also appointed loyal members to ministerial positions within the interim government to guarantee HTS’s role in shaping policies and the new Syrian constitution during this critical transition period.[3] HTS—and Jolani in particular—is attempting to impose a fait accompli in which it controls the Syrian government, thus enabling it to influence Syria for the foreseeable future.

Jolani and HTS may find it difficult to subordinate other Syrian groups to the control of the HTS-controlled interim government. Other Syrian groups, including southern opposition forces and the SDF, have not yet subordinated themselves to Jolani’s control. The leaders of the Southern Operations Room, an opposition group that now controls most of southwestern Syria, met with Jolani on December 11 to discuss coordination in military and civil affairs.[4] The meeting probably discussed the future of the Syrian government while focusing on “coordination.” These leaders did not explicitly endorse the central government, though noted the importance of a “unified effort” and “cooperation.”[5] The leaders of the Southern Operations Room previously fought against Jolani and the HTS predecessor and al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra in the mid-2010s as part of the Southern Front.[6] The SDF also appears to be preparing itself for negotiations that would create a broader-based Syrian government that is not under Jolani’s control. The SDF voiced support for a ceasefire but did not explicitly voice its support for the HTS-led government.[7] The SDF’s position may harden further as Arab contingents within the SDF defect to HTS.[8]

More extremist and sectarian groups within the HTS coalition may not adhere to HTS’s vow to respect Syria’s religious and sectarian minorities, which would likely trigger sectarian violence in Syria.[9] A Christian journalist from a formerly pro-regime radio station said on December 10 that an HTS-led opposition member asked her about her religious and sectarian background during an encounter in Damascus and asked if she was “Christian, Alawi, Shiite, or Druze.”[10]  It is unclear which specific organization in the opposition coalition controlled this member. This type of harassment could rapidly transform into a way for more extreme and sectarian organizations to identify and kill religious minorities in Syria. This particular incident is relatively minor, and CTP-ISW has not yet observed a well-organized campaign to intimidate, coerce, or kill religious and sectarian minorities. There have been other reports of individual revenge killings targeting ”Alawites” and ”Assad loyalists,” however.[11]

These incidents—though the incidents remain isolated and relatively independent of each other at this time—create opportunities for extreme and sectarian groups to incite further religious- or sectarian-based violence to destabilize a future Syrian government. HTS is an organization consisting of numerous Syrian Islamist opposition groups formed in 2017 with varying degrees of representation in the group’s leadership, however.[12] It is unclear which factions of HTS are involved in these instances of sectarian violence or if they are coordinated activities amongst several factions. CTP-ISW will continue to report revenge killings and sectarian- or religious-based incidents and violence due to the risk that these events can rapidly destabilize the situation in Syria.

Fateh Mubin fighters seized a Captagon factory at Mezzeh Military Airbase on December 11.[13] The opposition fighters claimed that they discovered “millions” of Captagon pills, raw drug materials, and production equipment within an Air Force Intelligence building on the airbase.[14] The Assad regime and its Iranian-backed partners mass-produced Captagon in Syria for years and smuggled it through Jordan to the Gulf Arab states through a smuggling and distribution cartel that has generated billions of dollars in revenue for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[15] HTS has not explicitly stated that it will halt Captagon supply lines into Jordan.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) did not face resistance when it seized Syrian outposts outside of the disengagement zone in Syria. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 11 that the IDF 101st Paratrooper Battalion (35th Paratroopers Brigade) did not fire a single bullet when seizing outposts.[16] SAA soldiers abandoned their positions amid the collapse of the regime. Israeli media also noted on December 11 that the IDF is conducting defensive operations in the disengagement zone.[17] Israeli media reported that the IDF seized several former SAA tanks in the disengagement zone. Israeli media also reported that the IDF 810th Mountain Brigade recently seized a cache of former SAA weapons on Mt. Hermon. The army radio correspondent added that the IDF forces deployed to the Syrian front are preparing for a “long stay in the field.”[18] Geolocated imagery posted on December 11 and local Syrian sources confirmed IDF presence in Hader military base and Hader town, which are both in the disengagement zone.[19] Local Syria media claimed that the IDF had also paved a road that extended out of the disengagement zone from the Golan Heights to Marbah, western Daraa Province.[20]

An anonymous senior Israeli official told an Israeli journalist that the height of the IDF campaign on the Syrian Front is over.[21] CTP-ISW has not recorded any IDF airstrikes in Syria since the last data cutoff at 2pm on December 10. The IDF’s intense air campaign on December 9 and 10 destroyed approximately 70-80 percent of the former Assad regime’s military capabilities to prevent "terrorist elements” from seizing the weapons, including dozens of anti-ship missiles at al Bayda and Latakia ports on December 9.[22] Russian news outlet Sputnik reported that the IDF destroyed radar systems on the outskirts of Tartus, where a Russian naval base is located.[23] Satellite imagery posted on X on December 11 showed the aftermath of IDF airstrikes on December 9 and 10 on ammunition depots at Yafour Base, in Rif Dimashq Province, the air defense systems at Damascus International Airport, and an air defense site in Izraa, Daraa Province.[24]

The HTS-led operations room seized full control of Deir ez Zor City from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on December 10.[25] Local opposition groups demonstrated in Deir ez Zor City on December 9, calling for the HTS-led transitional government to take control of the city from the SDF.[26] HTS-affiliated leaders addressed locals in the street and locals came out in support of the opposition forces.[27] The fighters also seized an oil field near Deir ez Zor and the Deir ez Zor military airport.[28] The HTS-led operations room also claimed to seize Deir ez Zor’s eastern and western countrysides, although it remains unclear at this time what territory the operations room is referring to.[29]

Arab forces within the SDF are also defecting to the HTS-led transitional government in Damascus as HTS-led forces seize more ground on the right bank of the Euphrates. The leader of the Busayrah Military Council, an Arab formation in the SDF, declared allegiance to the Fateh Mubin operations room on December 11.[30] Fateh Mubin is the coordinating body for HTS-led forces. Two other Arab military leaders defected on December 10.[31] These military leaders live on the left, eastern bank of the Euphrates River. The Euphrates serves as a defensive line protecting SDF-held territory from the remainder of Syria. The SDF deployed reinforcements to the areas where Arab forces had defected and reportedly retaliated against a commander by burning his home.[32]

HTS has not yet assisted Arab defectors from the SDF with additional forces. Opposition forces across Syria—except the SNA-SDF fighting—have so far attempted to resolve their issues without resorting to fighting. The SDF and the HTS-affiliated operations room have thus far avoided major armed conflict, and HTS support for the Arab groups in Deir ez Zor would likely undermine reconciliation and transition government negotiations. The emergence of the transitional government is liable to pose a serious problem for the SDF, however, because the SDF has had a difficult relationship with local Arab residents. The existence of the regime—and the risk that Arab areas in northeastern Syria could fall back under regime control—acted as a dampener against large-scale uprisings against the SDF.

SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi confirmed that his forces withdrew from Manbij after reaching a settlement with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA).[33] Abdi said that the United States helped broker the deal to preserve the security of civilians in the town.[34] The SNA sent civil authorities and military police to Manbij to begin managing the city and the surrounding areas on December 9. [35]Abdi said that the SNA attempted to advance on Kobani along the Turkish border on December 10.[36]

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami claimed on December 10 that all Iranian military forces have withdrawn from Syria.[37] Iranian-backed militias reportedly withdrew from Syria as the Syrian opposition forces advanced.[38] Iranian government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani stated that 4,000 Iranian civilians have also returned from Syria, with plans to continue evacuation efforts "until the departure of the last Iranian."[39] Iran maintained forces in Syria since shortly after the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011.[40]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei emphasized the role of Syrian youth in reclaiming the “occupied area[s]” in Syria in a speech on December 11. Khamenei stated that "undoubtedly the occupied area[s] of Syria will be liberated by the zealous Syrian youth,” implying that some of the areas recently recaptured from the Assad Regime are now “occupied.”[41] Khamenei stated that Syrian youth "will definitely rise up and overcome the situation...just as brave Iraqi youth [after Iraq’s] occupation by the United States, were able to...with the help" of former IRGC Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani, in reference to Iran’s support to Iraqi militias against US forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2011. This comparison suggests that Iran may pursue efforts to support similar militias in Syria to combat opposition forces and US-Israeli “interference” while undermining any new government in Syria. Khamenei's repeated praise of Soleimani and his leadership while refraining from any mention of the role that current IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani has played in institutionalizing the Axis of Resistance in the last four years suggests Khamenei may be disenchanted with Ghaani’s approach. The Telegraph reported on December 10 that there is discontent within the IRGC with Ghaani and “calls” for Khamenei to remove him.[42]

Khamenei criticized the "obvious role" that “a neighboring government”—almost certainly a reference to Turkey—played in the developments in Syria.[43] Senior Iranian officials and state media previously criticized Turkish policy in Syria amid the ongoing Syrian opposition offensive.[44] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan approved HTS launching its surprise offensive on November 27 and expressed support for the HTS-led drive toward Damascus from the north.[45] These statements probably suggest an increasingly hostile relationship between Iran and Turkey. Media affiliated with the IRGC suggested that Iran might refrain from supporting Erdogan during future crises--like coups against Erdogan--if the Syrian opposition weakens the Axis of Resistance.[46] CTP-ISW assessed that the fall of Assad marks the end of this phase of the greater Iranian project in the Levant for the foreseeable future.[47] The sudden loss of Assad will severely undermine future Iranian efforts to rebuild Hamas and Hezbollah, key actors within the Axis of Resistance.

Four unspecified Israeli security sources told Reuters on December 11 that Iran has intensified its effort to recruit Israelis susceptible to recruitment over the past two years.[48] Israel has recently arrested 30 individuals operating as a part of nine covert cells across Israel. The recruited assets were responsible for tasks such as sabotage, intelligence gathering on military facilities, and assassination plots against high-profile Israeli figures, such as nuclear scientists and government officials.[49] These intelligence assets have likely supported Iranian-backed efforts to target key Israeli assets.[50] The October 13, 2024, Hezbollah attack targeting an IDF training base‘s dining facility would have required familiarity with pattern-of-life and habits on base to target the dining facility and cause casualties.[51]

Key Takeaways:

• Government Consolidation in Syria: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is attempting to consolidate HTS’s political and military control in a post-Assad Syrian government. Jolani and HTS may find it difficult to subordinate other Syrian groups to the control of the HTS-controlled interim government. Some of these groups have previously fought against Jolani’s organization and may be reticent to see Jolani expand his influence.
• Sectarianism in Syria: More extremist and sectarian groups within the HTS coalition may not adhere to HTS’s vow to respect Syria’s religious and sectarian minorities, which would likely trigger sectarian violence in Syria. Reported sectarian incidents and revenge killings—though the incidents remain isolated and relatively independent of each other at this time—create opportunities for extreme and sectarian groups to incite further religious- or sectarian-based violence to destabilize a future Syrian government.
• Israel in Syria: An anonymous senior Israeli official told an Israeli journalist that the height of the IDF campaign on the Syrian Front is over.
• Eastern Syria: The HTS-led operations room seized full control of Deir ez Zor City from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on December 10. Arab forces within the SDF are also defecting to the HTS-led transitional government in Damascus as HTS-led forces seize more ground on the right bank of the Euphrates. HTS has not yet assisted Arab defectors from the SDF with additional forces. Opposition forces across Syria—except the SNA-SDF fighting—have so far attempted to resolve their issues without resorting to fighting.
• Iranian Response to Syria: The Iranian supreme leader gave a speech in which he claimed that Syria was “occupied” by opposition forces. The supreme leader compared Syria today to Iraq in the 2003-2011 period and said that Syrian youth would free Syrian just like Iranian-backed Iraqi militias “freed” Iraq from the United States.
• Iran-Turkey: Khamenei criticized the "obvious role" that “a neighboring government”—almost certainly a reference to Turkey—played in the developments in Syria.
• Iranian Intelligence Operations in Israel: Four unspecified Israeli security sources told Reuters on December 11 that Iran has intensified its effort to recruit Israelis susceptible to recruitment over the past two years.

Iran Update, December 10, 2024

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Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Ria Reddy, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl

Senior Syrian officials from the deposed Bashar al Assad regime have begun to transfer power to the HTS-led interim government as of December 10. Outgoing Prime Minister Mohammed al Jalili reported that former Assad officials are working with the interim government to preserve state institutions and government workers’ jobs.[1] The chief executive of Sawsan Abu Zainedin—an umbrella group of 200 Syrian civil society groups—emphasized that the interim government would refrain from the “de-Baathification” of the Syrian state.[2] CTP-ISW previously noted that Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) likely recognizes that its own, smaller government apparatus in Idlib Province is ill-equipped to govern all of Syria and that it will need to rely on Syrian institutions at least for a period.[3] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken voiced the United States’ support for a Syrian-led political transition leading to a ”credible, inclusive, and non-sectarian governance” in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.[4]  

Syrian media reported that the interim Syrian Salvation Government will conduct an assessment of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) prior to its reorganization.[5] This activity is part of a broader HTS-led effort to reconcile with members of the former Syrian regime and SAA. HTS announced on December 9 a general amnesty for all Syrian regime military personnel, whom the regime conscripted under compulsory service.[6] HTS has similarly sought to integrate Syrian regime military and security personnel into civilian life in Aleppo City since seizing the city in November 2024.[7] CTP-ISW previously noted that integrating former combatants into civilian life could help ensure security and stability during the post-conflict transition period.[8]

HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Julani stated that “we” will hold former regime officers “accountable” for torturing civilians under Assad.[9] Julani’s statement is alarmingly ambiguous regarding whether HTS or a new Syrian government will oversee the judicial proceedings for former regime officials. While it is necessary to hold former regime officials accountable for crimes committed against the Syrian people, HTS lacks the formal authority to prosecute regime officials. That authority should rest with a new Syrian government and constitution that have yet to be established or with an international tribunal. Julani may be reacting to pressure from hardliners in HTS, as there have already been reports of revenge killings in HTS-controlled territory. Revenge killings have historically exacerbated sectarian conflict, as seen in neighboring Iraq.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reportedly advanced beyond the disengagement zone further into Syrian territory on December 9. Geolocated imagery posted on December 10 showed the IDF near Kudna, which is approximately one kilometer from the disengagement zone.[10] Syrian media claimed on December 10 that the IDF advanced to the towns of Beqaasem, Erneh, Heeneh, and Rima in Damascus Province.[11] Beqaasem is around 25 kilometers from Damascus.[12] CTP-ISW cannot verify these claims. The IDF denied reports on December 9 that it is “advancing [toward] or approaching Damascus” and emphasized that the IDF is operating within the disengagement zone and at “defensive points close to the border.”[13]

The IDF continued to destroy former SAA sites across Syria on December 10. The IDF announced on December 10 that it has destroyed around 70-80 percent of the Assad regime’s military capabilities.[14] The IDF added that it has struck most of the SAA’s strategic weapons stockpiles in the past 48 hours to prevent "terrorist elements” from seizing the weapons.[15] The IDF Navy struck the ports of al Bayda and Latakia on December 9.[16] Fifteen Syrian naval vessels were docked at the ports at the time of the strikes.[17] The IDF reported that it destroyed dozens of anti-ship missiles with ranges of 80-190 kilometers.[18]

The Arab contingents within the US-backed, Kurdish-controlled Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) defected to the HTS-led transitional government. The leader of the Hajin Military Council—an Arab-majority militia in the SDF—declared allegiance to the Fateh Mubin operations room on December 10.[19]Fateh Mubin is the coordinating element for the HTS-led forces that were formerly centered in Idlib Province and recently took Damascus City. Two militia leaders in eastern Deir ez Zor Province have separately posted videos declaring allegiance to the HTS-affiliated coalition.[20] A tribal leader who incited an Arab uprising against the SDF in the autumn of 2023 and later defected to regime-controlled territory called for Arabs to leave the SDF on December 9.[21] Some of the Arab-majority communities in Deir ez Zor Province hold longstanding grievances against the SDF due to limited reconstruction efforts, repeated SDF abuses of the local populations, and a lack of representative Arab leadership.[22] Local sources reported that the SDF deployed reinforcements to areas where the Arab commanders defected, including Hajin, Hawji, and Theban on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.[23]

The defected militias have no guarantee of holding territory in Deir ez Zor Province, particularly without military support from the Fateh Mubin operations room. The SDF quashed an Arab-militia revolt in Deir ez Zor Province in ten days in the autumn of 2023.[24] Arab-majority militias under the SDF led the offensive into regime-controlled areas of Deir ez Zor Province on December 6, but other likely Kurdish SDF units have since deployed to province.[25]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is consolidating control over Manbij in northern Syria after seizing it from the SDF on December 8.[26] The SNA claimed that it began providing basic services to locals and that “life has returned to normal" there.v[27] The SNA sent civil authorities and military police to Manbij to begin managing the city and the surrounding areas.[28] The SNA deployed its forces east of Manbij along the line of contact with the SDF.[29] The SNA claimed control over a site east of Manbij along the Euphrates River on December 10.[30]

Iran is trying to project continued confidence in its regional position despite the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria. This comes amid reports of infighting within the Iranian security establishment. Senior Iranian officials, including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami, have asserted in recent days that Iran and the Axis of Resistance remain strong.[31] Salami said that Iran has "not been weakened, and Iranian power has not diminished."[32] The supreme leader representative to the IRGC, Abdollah Hajji Sadeghi, similarly said that the Axis of Resistance "has not changed at all" while acknowledging that the fall of Assad has created ”a major obstacle."[33] CTP-ISW has contrastingly assessed that the fall of Assad marks the end of the greater Iranian project in the Levant for the foreseeable future.[34] Iranian influence in Syria historically allowed the IRGC to project force westward and move material to proxy and partner forces around the Israeli periphery. The sudden loss of Assad deprives Iran of these military and strategic advantages and will severely undermine future Iranian efforts to rebuild Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah.

The fall of Assad has reportedly stoked divisions within the IRGC. An unspecified IRGC official told the Telegraph that senior IRGC officers are blaming one another for the fall of Assad.[35] Another unspecified IRGC official said that Iran is at an "impasse" in its efforts to rearm Hezbollah because everyone who Iran sends to move the weapons "are either getting killed or escaping." The officials noted that some officials are blaming IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani and that "many are now calling" for his removal as he is formally responsible for managing the Axis of Resistance, of which Assad was a part. Ghaani does not solely manage Iranian policy vis-a-vis Syria, however. Other key Iranian officials, including officials close to the supreme leader, are involved as well. These officials include senior advisers to the supreme leader, such as Ali Larijani and Ali Akbar Velayati.[36] CTP-ISW previously assessed that regime infighting could lead to the removal of top Iranian military commanders.[37]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias responded on December 10 to the fall of Assad. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba claimed that a Turkish operations room facilitated the fall of Assad with Israeli, UK, and NATO support, while the Axis of Resistance was “preoccupied with supporting Gaza.”[38] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba claimed that the operations room seeks to “sabotage Iraq.”[39] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba also claimed that Syrian opposition forces allowed Israel to “create a federation” in Suwayda Province in return for its support for the opposition forces.[40] The militia claimed that Israel seeks to annex parts of Syria and receive guarantees from the new Syrian government that it will work to normalize ties with Israel.[41]

Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada separately stated that it will approach the situation in Syria based on the national security interests of Iraq, and Kataib Hezbollah stated that it is “monitoring the situation” in Syria.[42] Kataib Hezbollah stated that HTS and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) will retain their core character ”no matter how much they pretend to be humane in front of the cameras.”[43] Kataib Hezbollah added that it is waiting for the establishment of a new Syrian government to ”reach an understanding [with it] on the basis of resistance and the Palestinian cause.”[44]

Commander of the Iraqi Rapid Response Division, Lieutenant General Thamer al Husseini, stated on December 10 that Iraqi forces will “crush anyone” who tries to approach the Iraq-Syria border.[45] This statement reflects Iraqi concerns that the conflict in Syria could create a security vacuum and allow ISIS to resurge. Iraqi political and military officials have emphasized in recent days the need to prevent a “repetition of 2014,” referring to the ISIS takeover of Mosul in June 2014.[46] The statement also reflects how the Iraqi federal government appears to be equating Syrian opposition forces with Salafi-jihadi groups, such as ISIS. Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh emphasized on December 2, for example, that the Syrian opposition forces are ”internationally recognized as terrorist organizations.”[47]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Michael Kurilla traveled to Syria and Iraq.[48] Kurilla discussed international efforts to fight and defeat ISIS during his travels. Kurilla met with senior Iraqi officials, including Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani and Chief of Staff General Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah. Kurilla also met with US officers and SDF members in Syria. Kurilla’s travel comes after CENTCOM struck over 75 ISIS targets in central Syria on December 8.[49]

Hamas indicated willingness to concede slightly on some of its maximalist demands for a ceasefire-hostage deal with Israel. Hamas leaders are reportedly willing to accept an extended IDF presence along the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors while still demanding an eventual, complete IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, according to a Hamas source speaking to the New York Times.[50] Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu’s insistence on a continued IDF presence on the Philadelphi Corridor has been one of the most significant obstacles in negotiations.[51] Netanyahu has said that retaining a presence in the corridor is required to achieve Israeli war aims.[52] An unspecified Israeli official reported that Israeli leaders hope that the combined effect of Yahya Sinwar’s death, the ceasefire in Lebanon, and the incoming Trump administration will facilitate further ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[53] Israel reportedly assessed that Hamas wanted a ceasefire deal in late November 2024, marking the first suggestion that Hamas would break from its maximalist demands maintained throughout most of the ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[54]

Hamas’ unwillingness to grant even minimal concessions until this point in the ceasefire-hostage negotiations highlights the group’s zealous commitment to fighting Israel. The IDF has already defeated Hamas militarily and is close to destroying the group militarily as well. That Hamas has retained such a hardline negotiating position is remarkable in this context.

An Egyptian official told Israeli media on December 10 that a ceasefire-hostage deal between Israel and Hamas is “imminent.”[55] Egypt presented an Israeli-proposed ceasefire-hostage deal to Hamas on December 2.[56] The updated Israeli proposal included a ceasefire between 42-60 days and the release of all surviving female hostages, men over the age of 50, and hostages in a serious medical condition. An Egyptian official told Ynet on December 10 that an Israeli delegation will receive a list of names for a hostage-prisoner release in Cairo in the coming days.[57] Hamas provided this list to Egyptian intelligence officials after asking other Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip to share the names of the hostages in their custody, according to Egyptian and Palestinian officials.[58]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: Senior Syrian officials from the deposed Bashar al Assad regime have begun to transfer power to the HTS-led interim government. HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Jolani vowed to hold accountable former regime officials for crimes against the Syrian people.
• Syria: The IDF reportedly advanced further into southwestern Syria. The IDF is also conducting a large-scale air campaign to destroy sensitive SAA capabilities that other armed Syrian groups could seize.
• Syria: Arab contingents in the US-backed SDF defected to the HTS-led interim government. These defections highlight the tenuous relationship that the SDF has with some of the Arab communities in its territory.
• Iran: Iran is trying to project continued confidence in its regional position despite the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria. This comes amid reports of infighting within the Iranian security establishment.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas indicated willingness to concede slightly on its maximalist demands in ceasefire-hostage negotiations with Israel. Hamas’ unwillingness to grant even minor concessions until now highlights its zealous commitment to fighting Israel.

Iran Update, December 9, 2024

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Iran Update, December 9, 2024

Annika Ganzeveld, Ria Reddy, Siddhant Kishore, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is establishing a transitional government and reconciling with members of the former Syrian regime and the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). HTS is attempting to ensure continuity of governance to prevent widespread anarchy in Syria, which is consistent with HTS’ longstanding approach to “liberated areas.”[1]  HTS appointed HTS-led Syrian Salvation Government Prime Minister Mohammad al Bashir to lead the transitional government on December 9.[2] HTS established the Salvation Government in northwestern Syria in 2017.[3] Bashir met with HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani and former Assad Regime Prime Minister Mohammed al Jalali on December 9 to discuss the transfer of power from the Assad regime to HTS.[4] Jalali stated on December 8 that he and HTS agreed on “the importance of preserving government institutions and trying to return 400,000 employees to their jobs.”[5] HTS-led Salvation Government Justice Minister Shadi al Waisi separately met with former Assad Regime Justice Minister Ahmed al Sayeh on December 9 to discuss “an efficient handover.”[6] HTS has rapidly rolled out its own governance apparatus in areas of Syria it has liberated from the Assad Regime in the past.[7] HTS likely correctly recognizes that it cannot rely upon its own much smaller and Idlib-focused government apparatus to govern all of Syria it has recently captured and will need to rely upon Syrian government institutions in the interim.

HTS announced on December 9 a general amnesty for all Syrian regime military personnel whom the regime conscripted under compulsory service.[8] HTS emphasized that these individuals’ lives “are safe” and that “no assault on them is permitted.”[9] HTS has similarly sought to integrate Syrian regime military and security personnel into civilian life in Aleppo City since it seized that city on November 30.[10] CTP-ISW previously noted that integrating former combatants into civilian life could ensure stability and security during the post-conflict transition period.[11]

HTS is likely attempting to improve its image among the Syrian people and international community by framing itself as an organization that is devoted to building a pluralist Syrian state. HTS announced on December 9 that it is “strictly forbidden” to interfere in women’s choice of clothing or to demand that women dress modestly.[12] HTS emphasized that “respect[ing] the rights of individuals is the basis for building a civilized nation.”[13] HTS separately announced on December 9 that it is “strictly forbidden” to attack or threaten journalists and reporters.[14] It is unclear whether HTS will indefinitely protect the rights of women and journalists. HTS’s “morality police,” called Markaz al Falah, has previously arrested women for dressing “inappropriately.”[15] HTS has also imprisoned journalists who criticized its rule in northwestern Syria.[16]

The Kurdish-controlled, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) may face increased challenges governing Arab areas in northeastern Syria due to the emergence of the HTS-led transitional government as a viable alternative to the SDF.  Local opposition to SDF rule has broken out in several cities and villages in Raqqa Province since the fall of the Assad regime.[17]  Arab sources reported that locals seized SDF military checkpoints and headquarters in Karamah and Tabqa on December 8.[18] The SDF deployed reinforcements to Karamah on December 9 and conducted a large arrest campaign in several villages involved in opposition activities the day before.[19]  Armed local resistance in these towns does not appear to be organized or well-equipped enough to force the SDF out of these areas.  The emergence of the transitional government is liable to pose a serious problem for the SDF, which has a difficult relationship with local Arab residents. The existence of the regime—and the risk that Arab areas in northeastern Syria could fall back under regime control—acted as a dampener against large-scale uprisings against the SDF. Several Arab-majority areas in Deir ez Zor Province began an armed uprising and participated in demonstrations against the SDF in the autumn of 2023, demonstrating the existing discontent in the region, however.[20] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi called Assad’s fall ”an opportunity to build a new Syria based on democracy and justice“ on December 8, but did not elaborate further on the SDF’s willingness to join the transitional government.[21]

The SDF is also facing local dissent in the areas of Deir ez Zor Province that it seized from the Syrian regime on December 6.[22]  Local opposition groups demonstrated in Deir ez Zor City on December 9, calling for the HTS-led transitional government to take control of the city.[23] Local media reported that the SDF opened fire on the demonstrators and killed several of them.[24] The HTS-affiliated Fateh Mubin operations room confirmed that its forces were operating in Deir ez Zor City on December 7 shortly before Assad fled the country.[25] Local media has since reported that convoys affiliated with Fateh Mubin are operating between Deir ez Zor and Albu Kamal, but few reliable sources are reporting direct clashes between the SDF and HTS-affiliated forces.[26] Engagements between the SDF and local opposition demonstrate that HTS-affiliated forces have not established full security control over the Deir ez Zor corridor.[27]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is also attacking the SDF as the SDF contends with internal dissent. SNA forces advanced east of Manbij to Qara Qozak Bridge and Tishrin Dam, which are two key river crossings in SDF territory.[28] The SDF confirmed that its forces engaged SNA fighters at both sites and did not acknowledge that its forces lost control over the river crossings.[29] Opposition media claimed that the SNA took control of the Qara Qozak Bridge and posted a video from the site, however.[30] The SDF continued to dispute that SNA forces seized full control of Manbij on December 9.[31] The SNA claimed that it seized Manbij on December 8.[32]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to establish a buffer zone in Syria along the Golan Heights on December 9. Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar stated on December 9 that the IDF “advanced into new positions” in the disengagement zone between Syria and the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.[33] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 9 that the IDF had advanced several kilometers into the disengagement zone.[34] Geolocated imagery posted on December 8 showed Israeli forces near a UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) position on Mount Hermon.[35] Israeli forces captured an SAA position at the top of Mount Hermon on December 8.[36] Geolocated imagery posted on December 9 also showed Israeli tanks entering the disengagement zone from Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights and Israeli forces operating west of the town of Hader in Quneitra Province.[37] The IDF operated in Quneitra and al Hamidiyah cities on December 9 after issuing warnings to residents in these cities on December 8 to stay inside.[38]

The IDF Air Force continued conducting airstrikes targeting former SAA and Lebanese Hezbollah sites in Syria on December 9. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 9 that the IAF conducted airstrikes targeting over 100 SAA targets in the past day.[39] The IAF targeted the SAA 9th Division, 112th Brigade, and 12th Brigade bases in Daraa Province.[40] The IAF also targeted SAA military sites, barracks, and missile warehouses, as well as unspecified Hezbollah sites in the Qalamoun area north of Damascus.[41] Israeli officials told Axios on December 9 that the IAF has targeted facilities that were part of the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons and ballistic missile programs to ”make sure strategic weapon systems don’t fall into the wrong hands.”[42]

The fall of the Assad regime has exposed fissures between Iran and Iraq. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi was “surprised” during his visit to Baghdad on December 6 that the Iraqi federal government refused to send forces to Syria to defend the Assad regime, according to an unspecified Iraqi official speaking to the Washington Post on December 9.[43] The official stated that Araghchi assumed that the Iraqi federal government would support Assad as it had previously done in the Syrian Civil War.[44] Senior Iraqi security officials, including Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, emphasized in recent days that the conflict in Syria is an “internal matter.”[45] Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders, including Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri, seemed to oppose the stance of the Iraqi government and called on fighters to bolster the SAA and not wait for "Baghdad to escalate” against opposition forces.[46]

Iran is attempting to reframe its role in the Syrian Civil War in order to reestablish influence within the new Syrian government. A senior Iranian official told Reuters on December 9 that Iran opened direct communication with unspecified Syrian rebels to "prevent a hostile trajectory" between the two countries.[47] Another official stated that Iran aims to build ties with "those within Syria's new ruling groups whose views are closer to [Iranian views]," though the specific opposition groups are unclear. Iran's "main concern" is that Assad's successor may shift Syria away from Iranian influence, demonstrating that Iranian officials remain concerned about the requirement to reestablish Iranian influence in Syria. Key Iranian officials, including the foreign affairs minister and parliament speaker, have recently tried to reframe the role Iran held in the war. The Iranian foreign affairs minister claimed that Iran has always advocated for “dialogue” with opposition forces, but it is highly unlikely that Iran would have supported talks that would have given Assad or a pliant pro-Iran actor a subordinate role to any opposition organization.[48] Iran's parliament speaker falsely claimed that Iran had only intervened to counter ISIS, not rebel groups.[49] Iran launched a concerted effort to keep Assad in power and maintained its forces in Syria since shortly after the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011.[50] This effort required Iran to fight ISIS, but Iran also fought all threats to Assad’s rule, including the opposition.

This Iranian effort is unlikely to succeed, at least in the near term. HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani stated on December 9 that the victory of Syrian opposition forces would end Syria's role as a "playground for Iranian ambitions, spreading sectarianism, and stirring corruption", reflecting deep resentment toward Iranian influence in Syria.[51]

Members of Iran’s armed forces and Iranian policymakers are increasingly disillusioned with Iran’s handling of the collapse of the Assad Regime. Iran observers have noted that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij members are critical of Iran's failure to intervene more decisively in Syria to support Assad against the opposition's surprise offensive, citing IRGC communication channels and interviews with IRGC members.[52] An IRGC member stated that Syria was "crucial” for the Axis of Resistance, and "abandoning" Assad was a "betrayal" that would have serious consequences for Iran.[53] Another member stated that the "[IRGC youth] will not forget the cowardice of the decision-makers."[54] Iranian Parliamentarian Mohammad Manan Raisi stated that "after sacrificing six thousand martyrs and spending billions of tomans, we handed Syria over [in just one week]."[55] These statements reveal dissatisfaction within Iran over its failure to support the Syrian regime, raising concerns about Iran's ability to sustain its influence via the Axis of Resistance. These frustrations—if they become wildly held among the security services and key Iranian leaders—could lead to the removal of top Iranian military commanders, including in the IRGC.

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Transitional Government Formation: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is establishing a transitional government and reconciling with former Syrian regime and Syrian Arab Army (SAA) members. HTS likely attempting to improve its image among the Syrian people and international community by framing itself as an organization that is devoted to building a pluralist Syrian state.
• Northeastern Syria: The Kurdish-controlled, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) may face increased challenges governing Arab areas in northeastern Syria due to the emergence of the HTS-led transitional government as a viable alternative to the SDF.  The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is also attacking the SDF as the SDF contends with internal dissent.
• Israel in Syria: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to establish a buffer zone in Syria along the Golan Heights on December 9. The IDF Air Force continued conducting airstrikes targeting former SAA and Lebanese Hezbollah sites in Syria on December 9.
• Iraq and Iran in Syria: The fall of the Assad regime has exposed fissures between Iran and Iraq. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi was “surprised” during his visit to Baghdad on December 6 that the Iraqi federal government refused to send forces to Syria to defend the Assad regime.
• Iranian Syria Policy: Iran is attempting to reframe its role in the Syrian Civil War to reestablish influence within the new Syrian government.
• Iranian Reactions to Assad’s Collapse: Members of Iran’s armed forces and Iranian policymakers are increasingly disillusioned with Iran’s handling of the collapse of the Assad Regime.

Iran Update, December 8, 2024

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Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Annika Ganzeveld, and Nick Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Syrian opposition forces toppled the Bashar al Assad regime on December 7 after only 11 days of fighting.[1] Opposition forces declared victory over Assad as they advanced into Damascus.[2] The regime negotiated its surrender as Assad fled to Russia without making any statements to his people to acknowledge the instability.[3] The opposition group led by Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) noted that regime supporters even “laid down [their] weapons” in Sayyidah Zeynab in southern Damascus, where Iran has long held deep influence.[4] HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Julani arrived in Damascus on December 8.[5] Opposition forces separately entered the final remaining regime strongholds of Jableh, Latakia, and Tartus on the Syrian coast on December 8.[6]

HTS under Julani is beginning to consolidate power in Damascus and across formerly regime-controlled territory.[7] The “Military Operations Management” of opposition groups issued orders to protect public and private property in Damascus and issued a curfew in the city.[8] Opposition forces attempted to restore order after a bank heist on the Central Syrian Bank as well.[9] Opposition leaders have visited the former regime stronghold of Latakia as a show of goodwill and religious tolerance toward the Alawite people there.[10] The opposition forces quickly established alternative political and security institutions in Aleppo City, consolidating control and support of the local population and former regime elements after seizing control there on November 30.[11] It remains unclear what government structure will emerge among the opposition groups in the coming weeks; it is not a given that HTS will by default lead the next Syrian government.

All groups in control of Syrian territory have praised the fall of the Syrian regime and articulated a hopeful but unspecific view for the future. HTS’s relationship with other groups that remain in control of Syrian territory remains ambiguous, making the coming days of consolidation and negotiations pivotal. Both the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have capitalized on the HTS-led offensive to expand their territory, including by fighting with each other.[12] Clashes between the SDF and SNA continued on December 8.[13] An SNA-affiliated operations room praised the overthrow of Assad on December 8 and emphasized the importance of preserving state institutions, the need for cooperation, and the “sense of responsibility” shared by the Syrian people.[14] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi called Assad’s fall ”an opportunity to build a new Syria based on democracy and justice“ but without elaborating further.[15] A key Druze leader who holds influence with the southern opposition groups called on December 8 for a transitional administration to create a new, united, and free Syria.[16]

HTS-affiliated forces appear to be taking control of the western bank of the Euphrates River in Deir ez Zor Province, which the SDF had seized from the Syrian regime on December 6.[17] SDF units have reportedly struggled to keep control over the local population in Deir ez Zor Province despite issuing a military curfew.[18] The HTS-affiliated opposition spokesperson said that opposition forces had entered Deir ez Zor City and that hundreds of regime soldiers surrendered.[19] Local sources reported tribal militias joined the HTS-led opposition and seized the Albu Kamal-al Qaim crossing between Iraq and Syria from the SDF on December 8.[20] HTS-affiliated convoys traveled along the Deir ez Zor-Albu Kamal road on December 8.[21] Opposition forces reportedly seized control over the main Damascus-Deir ez Zor road that runs through Sukhnah and Palmyra in Homs Province, which was essential to Iran’s former ground line of communication to Lebanese Hezbollah.[22] Opposition groups, possibly those based in the al Tanf Deconfliction Zone, seized Palmyra on December 7.[23]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) clashed with the SDF in Manbij in eastern Aleppo Province on December 8. An SNA-affiliated operations room claimed to seize all of Manbij on December 8 after days of clashes in the surrounding area.[24] The SDF rejected the claim and stated later in the day that clashes were ongoing in several neighborhoods of Manbij.[25] The SNA claimed that it seized several formerly SDF-controlled towns west of Manbij on December 8.[26] CTP-ISW is not prepared to assess control of Manbij at this time.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) deployed forces to establish a buffer zone in Syria along the Golan Heights.[27] The IDF stated that these deployments are a defensive and temporary operation to protect Israel from possible instability in Syria resulting from the fall of the Syrian regime.[28] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on December 8 that he considers the 1974 disengagement agreement on the Golan Heights to have ”collapsed” with the fall of the Syrian regime.[29] Netanyahu said that he ordered the IDF to take the vacated Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions ”to ensure that no hostile force” took them.[30] IDF activity is concentrated around Khan Arnabeh in the center of the disengagement zone in Quneitra Governorate.[31] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued warnings to residents of Ufaniya, Quneitra, al Hamidiyah, Samdaniya al Gharbiya, and al Qahtaniah in Syria to stay inside on December 8.[32] Israeli Air Force's Shaldag special operations forces unit captured an SAA position at the top of Mt. Hermon without resistance on December 8.[33] The IDF continued building defensive features, such as trenches, along the border.[34] HTS-led opposition forces announced that they took control of Quneitra on December 7.[35]

The IDF Air Force (IAF) conducted airstrikes targeting former SAA sites, including advanced weapons and ammunition depots in Syria to prevent opposition groups from acquiring these materials.[36] The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting a weapons and ammunition depot in Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Province.[37] The IDF hit at least seven military targets in southwestern Syria, including Mezzeh Military Airport and the former SAA 4th Division base at Mount Qasioun outside Damascus.[38] The IDF also struck the former SAA 90th Brigade base near the Israel-Syria border and Khalkhala airbase north of Suwayda City in southwest Syria.[39] The IDF also targeted the Scientific Research Center and a security complex in Damascus, including intelligence and customs administration buildings, which unspecified regional security sources told Reuters had both been used previously by Iran to develop and store missiles as well as sensitive military data and other equipment.[40] Opposition-affiliated sources reported that an IDF airstrike hit the al Qusayr crossing on the Lebanon-Syria border, which Hezbollah has previously used to transport arms into Lebanon.[41] Israel is destroying Iranian military infrastructure in Syria, which will hinder Hezbollah efforts to reconstitute in Lebanon and thus limit the Iranian threat to Israel.

The United States conducted airstrikes against more than 75 ISIS targets in central Syria on December 8.[42] The airstrikes targeted ISIS personnel and sites and caused no civilian casualties.[43] US President Joseph Biden and US Central Command Commander General Michael Kurilla separately emphasized that the United States would prevent ISIS from reconstituting and exploiting instability in Syria.[44] These statements reflect the risk that the collapse of the Syrian regime could enable ISIS to consolidate and expand its position in Syria. Kurilla warned that the United States would hold accountable any actor in Syria that supports or partners with ISIS.[45]

The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a generic statement acknowledging the collapse of the Syrian regime. The ministry stated that the Syrian people should determine the future of their country without foreign interference.[46] The ministry expressed readiness to engage “all influential parties” and “help establish security and stability in Syria.” The ministry also expressed interest in friendly relations with a future Syrian government. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated separately that the Syrian people should determine the future of their country.[47] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi expressed support for UN Security Council Resolution 2254, calling for a political settlement, wherein “all different parties have their role.”[48] An internal Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) memo stated that Iranian leaders “accepted the fall of Assad and…lost the will to resist,” according to the New York Times.[49]

A hardline Iranian parliamentarian stated that Iran should focus on "atomic bomb testing" following the fall of the Syrian regime. Ahmad Naderi posted on X (Twitter) on December 8 that Iran should focus on testing nuclear bombs and reviving the Axis of Resistance.[50] Naderi has previously stated that Iran should acquire a nuclear weapon to restore deterrence.[51] Naderi’s rhetoric is consistent with growing calls from senior Iranian officials encouraging Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to revoke his 2003 fatwa banning the production and use of nuclear weapons.[52] This rhetoric is especially noteworthy given the recent expansion of the Iranian nuclear program, which is making it easier for Iran to build a weapon. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in November 2024 that Iran continues to develop its nuclear program outside the parameters of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[53] Iran notified the IAEA on November 29 that it plans to expand its uranium enrichment capacity significantly by installing over 6,000 additional centrifuges and activating some at the Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities.[54]

Iraqi media reported on December 7 that between 2,500 and 2,700 former SAA soldiers and officers and Syrian regime employees have entered Iraq over the past day.[55] Iraqi media reported that the soldiers and officers handed in their weapons before entering Iraq.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have not commented on the overthrow of the Assad regime at the time of this writing.

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian opposition forces toppled the Bashar al Assad regime after only 11 days of fighting. HTS under Julani is beginning to consolidate power in Damascus and across formerly regime-controlled territory.
• HTS-affiliated forces appear to be taking control of the western bank of Deir ez Zor Province, which the SDF had seized from the Syrian regime. The SDF clashed with the Turkish-backed SNA east of Aleppo City.
• The IDF deployed units to establish a buffer zone in Syria along the Golan Heights. The IDF also conducted airstrikes targeting ammunition depots and advanced weapons to prevent opposition forces from acquiring those materials.
• The United States conducted airstrikes against over 75 ISIS targets in central Syria. US leaders emphasized that they would prevent ISIS from reconstituting and exploiting the instability in Syria amid the collapse of the Syrian regime.

Iran Update, December 5, 2024

click here to read the full report

Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Andie Parry, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-aligned opposition groups have begun a campaign to capture Homs after capturing Hama City on December 5. HTS-aligned forces seized control of Hama City and Hama military airport from Syrian Arab Army (SAA) forces on December 5.[1] Fateh Mubin—a joint operations room led by HTS— announced after it secured Hama that its forces would advance south to secure Homs.[2] Syrian opposition media posted footage reportedly showing a convoy of HTS-aligned fighters prepared to advance south along the M5 highway to Homs.[3] Unverified reports claim that locals in Talbiseh, approximately 8 kilometers north of Homs, have started their own localized effort to liberate the town ahead of the opposition advance.[4] 

Syrian opposition groups are using negotiated settlements with localities to rapidly seize territory without fighting. Locals in two Christian-majority towns north of Hama reportedly negotiated surrender with advancing opposition forces, avoiding any large-scale fighting in the towns.[5] Ismaili Shia officials in Salamiyah, southeast of Hama, also reportedly came to an agreement with opposition forces to avoid fighting.[6] Regime forces reportedly withdrew from Salamiyah on December 5 after opposition forces advanced to the town’s outskirts on December 4.[7] The decision by towns to abandon the regime appears to be a trend across Hama countryside. This trend may help HTS-aligned forces approach Homs within the next day without being slowed down by fighting through country villages.

Opposition groups may also advance rapidly towards Homs due to the rapid collapse of regime forces. The regime does not appear to have established any defensive line between Hama City and the Orontes River. Regime forces appear to be collapsing between Hama City and Homs City. A pro-regime aircraft bombed the Rastan Bridge over the Orontes River after Opposition forces seized the left, north bank of the Orontes.[8] A force retreating in good order and not under significant pressure would have presumably blown the bridge themselves, rather than relying on aircraft. Airstrikes will usually fail to damage a bridge sufficiently to prevent a crossing, making ground-based detonation preferable unless a force is unable to detonate the bridge. The reported low casualties among Regime forces during the collapse around Hama suggest that Regime forces were not under significant pressure.[9] It is also possible that the regime was forced to rely on aircraft due to a lack of combat engineers to detonate the bridge. The regime similarly failed to set up strong defensive lines until well into Hama Governorate after opposition forces seized Aleppo on November 30.[10] There are other intact bridges and likely fords east and west of the Rastan Bridge that opposition forces could use to cross the Orontes, however.

HTS is establishing alternative political and security institutions in Aleppo City, consolidating control and support of the local population and former regime elements.  Fateh Mubin, HTS’ joint operations room, has ordered all Syrian regime army, security, and police defectors to report to one of two designated processing centers in the city.[11] HTS has presumably designed this effort to reintegrate former combatants into civilian life, which in theory ensures stability and security during the post-conflict transition period.[12] Fateh Mubin has also sought to prevent its fighters from harassing civilians or coming into conflict with locals by restricting the activity of fighters in the city.[13] Fateh Mubin ordered the fighters to report to the front lines and continue their advance to secure regime-held towns. The group has also mobilized local quasi-police forces to backfill these military units.[14] Fateh Mubin released the names and contact information for new opposition government ministers, effectively establishing HTS and the HTS-led Syrian Salvation Government as the de facto governing authority of Aleppo.[15] HTS has pursued similar successful government-building approaches in northwestern Syria by incorporating local religious and political figures into the governing body to eliminate rivalry.[16]

HTS is attempting to use diplomacy to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from bolstering Syrian regime forces after regime forces retreated south. HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Jolani asked Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on December 5 to prevent the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) from intervening in the Syrian conflict.[17] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[18] The PMF reports directly to Sudani on paper, but many of the militias that comprise the PMF answer to Iran in reality.[19] Dozens of PMF fighters have reportedly entered Syria in recent days to help defend the Syrian regime against opposition forces.[20] Sudani is likely unable to prevent militias that answer to Iran from intervening in Syria.

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem said on December 5 that Hezbollah is committed to “sheltering and rebuilding” in Lebanon and abiding by the ceasefire deal with Israel.[21] Qassem acknowledged that Hezbollah fighters will withdraw north of the Litani River in exchange for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon, in accordance with the ceasefire deal.[22] Qassem claimed that Israel violated the ceasefire deal ”at least 60 ” times since it went into place on November 26. Qassem stated that it is the responsibility of the Lebanese government—and not Hezbollah—to address these violations. Qassem stated that Hezbollah will provide financial assistance, mainly through Iranian donations, to Lebanese civilians in Beirut to rebuild. Qassem also stated that Hezbollah ”stands by” the Syrian regime amidst the ongoing Syrian opposition offensive.

The IDF conducted an airstrike on December 5 targeting a weapons stockpile southeast of Aleppo, Syria.[23] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent noted that the SAA previously held the targeted area, but that Syrian opposition forces had recently seized the area.[24]

Egypt presented an Israeli-proposed ceasefire-hostage deal to Hamas on December 2.[25] Israel desires to capitalize on Hamas’ ”willingness to be flexible” on implementing a partial deal due to the ceasefire in Lebanon, former Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death, and the incoming Trump Presidency, according to two Israeli officials speaking to Axios. Israel’s updated proposal includes a ceasefire between 42-60 days and the release of all surviving female hostages, men over the age of 50, and hostages in a serious medical condition.[26] Hamas has not commented on this proposal as of the time of this writing. An Israeli official told Ynet on December 2 that Hamas may be willing to compromise on an IDF presence on the Philadelphi Corridor.[27] Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu’s insistence on an Israeli military presence on the Philadelphi Corridor has been one of the most significant sticking points in the negotiations.[28] Netanyahu has said that retaining a presence in the corridor is required to achieve Israeli war aims.[29]

Israeli officials also told Axios that Egypt is now the “main channel” for negotiations with Hamas after Qatar announced on November 9 that it would cease its efforts to mediate a ceasefire-hostage deal until Israel and Hamas showed a “willingness” to resume negotiations.[30] Reuters reported on December 4 that Qatar has resumed its role as a mediator.[31] This news follows reports that Qatari officials had ordered Hamas’ political leadership to relocate from Qatar. [32] Hamas denied on November 18 that it had departed Qatar.[33]

Hamas confirmed that it approved an Egyptian proposal to form a post-war governance committee in the Gaza Strip on December 5.[34] Hamas added in a statement that the committee should help implement the “comprehensive agreements” to “achieve national unity.” This is possibly about the joint declaration Hamas, Fatah, and other unspecified Palestinian political factions signed in July 2024 to form a “temporary national unity government” responsible for governing the Gaza Strip and the West Bank after the war.[35] Hamas said it met with several Palestinian figures during post-war governance and ceasefire-hostage negotiations in Cairo, including the leadership of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).[36] Israeli media reported that Hamas and Fatah agreed to form an independent civilian committee to manage post-war governance on November 3.[37] Hamas will almost certainly attempt to infiltrate or subvert whatever civilian government emerges to manage the post-war Gaza Strip unless Hamas is prevented from doing so by force.

Key Takeaways:

• Hama City-Homs City Axis: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-aligned opposition groups have begun a campaign to capture Homs after capturing Hama City on December 5. Syrian opposition groups are using negotiated settlements with localities to rapidly seize territory without fighting.
• State of Regime Forces: Opposition groups may also advance rapidly towards Homs due to the rapid collapse of regime forces. Regime forces appear to be collapsing between Hama City and Homs City. The regime similarly failed to set up strong defensive lines until well into Hama Governorate after opposition forces seized Aleppo on November 30.
• Aleppo: HTS is establishing alternative political and security institutions in Aleppo City, consolidating control and support of the local population and former regime elements. 
• HTS Diplomacy: HTS is attempting to use diplomacy to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from bolstering Syrian regime forces after regime forces retreated south. HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Jolani asked Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on December 5 to prevent the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) from intervening in the Syrian conflict.
• Lebanese Hezbollah: Secretary General Naim Qassem said on December 5 that Hezbollah is committed to “sheltering and rebuilding” in Lebanon and abiding by the ceasefire deal with Israel.
• Gaza Ceasefire-Hostage Negotiations: Egypt presented an Israeli-proposed ceasefire-hostage deal to Hamas on December 2. Israel desires to capitalize on Hamas’ ”willingness to be flexible” on implementing a partial deal due to the ceasefire in Lebanon, former Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death, and the incoming Trump Presidency, according to two Israeli officials speaking to Axios.

Iran Update, December 4, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)–aligned opposition groups are likely prioritizing the capture of Hama City. Fateh Mubin—a joint operations room led by HTS—is conducting a campaign that appears to have several different subordinate objectives. Fateh Mubin's main effort is focused around the city itself. The main effort aims to isolate Hama City, presumably before assaulting it. The group is supporting its main effort by interdicting regime reinforcements coming from eastern Syria in order to prevent any relief force from reaching the city.

The main effort bypassed key regime defensive positions north of the city and proceeded to cut ground lines of communication (GLOCs) traveling into the city from the east and southeast, thus isolating the city from the east. A second force to the west may be seeking to capture Hama Military Airport. A commander directs their unit to bypass an obstacle in order to maintain the momentum of an operation.[1] The regime has positioned forces on Zain al Abidin Hill, north of the city, and Qomhana town, a key town northwest of the city.[2] The hill is a tactically advantageous position from which a defender has sweeping views northwards up the M5 Highway. Some opposition forces likely fixed these forces while the main western Hama and eastern Hama advances proceeded southwards. Opposition forces east of Hama had proceeded directly south along the M5 Highway before swinging east, bypassing the hill.[3] Opposition forces in the west attacked Qomhana while the remainder continued towards the Hama Military Airport.[4] An unspecified Fateh Mubin military source cited by al Quds al Araby stated that opposition forces plan to "encircle” the city of Hama, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's observation that opposition forces cut two major roads connecting Hama City to areas east of it.[5] Hama is not fully isolated, given major roads moving south.

Fateh Mubin’s supporting effort captured key ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting Hama City to eastern Syria likely in order to interdict resupply and reinforcements from the east. Interdict is defined as a tactical mission task that “prevents, disrupts, or delays the enemy’s use of an area or route ... [to] impact ... an enemy force’s plans and ability to respond to friendly actions.”[6] Opposition forces have captured SAA bases northeast of Hama and cut multiple roads far east of Hama to prevent or delay regime forces from reaching the battlefield in time to support regime forces in Hama.[7] Pro-Syrian regime sources claimed that the SAA has continued to send reinforcements to Hama City from Raqqa and Rusafa, which are connected to Hama by these roads, to counter the expected attack on the city.[8] Opposition forces’ advance into towns surrounding Hama with little SAA resistance suggests that the supporting line of effort has had some success.

Opposition groups retained control of previously seized territory in Aleppo Province, including Aleppo City, on December 4. Social media users posted footage of HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Julani visiting Aleppo Citadel on December 4, emphasizing the extent of control that opposition forces maintain in Aleppo City.[9]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted several self-defense airstrikes targeting weapons systems in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, on December 3.[10] The strikes targeted three truck-mounted Multiple Rocket Launchers, a T-64 tank, and an armored personnel carrier.[11] CENTCOM confirmed that unspecified fighters fired mortars toward US forces at Conoco Mission Support Site before the strikes.[12] The strikes occurred during a Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) offensive into seven regime-controlled villages on the left bank of the Euphrates River.[13] CTP-ISW has not yet observed lasting control-of-terrain changes on the left bank of the Euphrates River as a result of the SDF offensive.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on December 4 that it recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from an unspecified location in the Gaza Strip.[14] The IDF said that Hamas fighters killed the hostage, Itay Svirski, in January 2024 and kept his body in the Gaza Strip.

An IDF investigation revealed that Hamas fighters shot and killed six hostages in the Gaza Strip in early 2024.[15] The IDF launched an investigation after recovering the bodies of six hostages and six Hamas fighters from a tunnel in Khan Younis in August 2024.[16] Hamas moved the hostages to the tunnel in January 2024.[17] The IDF conducted an airstrike that struck the tunnel in February 2024. The IDF clarified that it did not have any information on the presence of hostages there during the time of the airstrike, however.[18] The investigation found that the bodies had bullet wounds and assessed with high confidence that Hamas fighters shot and killed the hostages. The IDF could not clarify if the Hamas fighters shot and killed the hostages before or after the IDF struck the tunnel. The IDF investigation determined that if the hostages had been alive at the time of the airstrike, the collapse of the tunnel would have killed them by causing the hostages to suffocate. The forensic investigation revealed that the Hamas fighters likely suffocated to death inside the tunnel after the IDF airstrike.[19]

Lebanese Hezbollah will likely try to reconstitute its forces despite significant Israeli degradation to the organization. Reuters, citing a senior US official, a senior Israeli official, and US lawmakers, reported that Hezbollah has begun recruiting new fighters and trying to find new ways to rearm through domestic production and by smuggling materials through Syria in recent weeks.[20] It is unclear, however, if those efforts have slowed due to the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire deal on November 26. US intelligence agencies assessed that Israel destroyed more than half of Hezbollah’s weapons stockpile and killed “thousands” of Hezbollah fighters. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Hezbollah will almost certainly try to reconstitute its forces despite Israel’s victory in Lebanon.[21]

Hezbollah is likely unable to send its newly recruited fighters to Syria due to the severe losses it suffered in Lebanon and the requirements on the group to train its new fighters. Hezbollah may choose to send these fighters to Syria in the future if the group becomes concerned that it will lose its overland resupply route through Syria due to the Syrian Opposition offensive. Reuters reported that US officials are “concerned” about Hezbollah’s access to Syria following the recent Syrian opposition offensive due to Hezbollah’s previous use of Syria as a safe haven for fighters and a weapons transport corridor.[22] Hezbollah also historically maintained GLOCs in Syria.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Hama Campaign: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-aligned opposition groups are likely prioritizing the capture of Hama City. The main effort bypassed key regime defensive positions north of the city and proceeded to cut ground lines of communication (GLOCs) traveling into the city from the east and southeast, thus isolating the city from the east. Fateh Mubin’s supporting effort captured key GLOCs connecting Hama City to eastern Syria likely in order to interdict resupply and reinforcements from the east.
• Eastern Syria: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted several self-defense airstrikes targeting weapons systems in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, on December 3.
• Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on December 4 that it recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from an unspecified location in the Gaza Strip.
• Hezbollah and Syria: Lebanese Hezbollah will likely try to reconstitute its forces despite significant Israeli degradation to the organization. Hezbollah is likely unable to send its newly recruited fighters to Syria due to the severe losses it suffered in Lebanon and the requirements on the group to train its new fighters.

Iran Update, December 3, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Christina Harward, Anthony Carrillo, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Syrian opposition forces have continued to advance rapidly and pushed through regime defensive lines in the northern Hama countryside on December 3. Opposition forces—led by Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)—advanced through the northern Hama countryside and seized numerous towns that regime force previously secured only two days ago.[1] Opposition forces captured Halfaya, northwest of Hama City, after advancing over the Orontes River possibly using the Mahrada dam. Opposition forces also seized Tayybat al Imam, Souran, and Maardis from regime control in their advance toward Hama City.[2] The opposition seized SAA tanks in at least one of these towns, suggesting that regime forces withdrew in a disorderly fashion.[3] Russian forces conducted several airstrikes targeting the al Ghab plain, about 25 kilometers northeast of Hama City, possibly to interdict reinforcements as opposition forces advanced south and seized towns.[4] Regime and Russian forces continued airstrikes in opposition-controlled areas of northwest Syria on December 3.[5]

Opposition forces have advanced within five kilometers of Hama City and likely seized key defensive terrain in the area.[6] Regime forces withdrew from Qomhana—a village immediately north of Hama City—and Zine al Abdine hill, which overlooks Hama City.[7] The SAA previously established  a first line of defense for Hama City on Zine al Abdine hill, which opposition forces then targeted with drone strikes.[8] The withdrawal of regime forces will almost certainly cede this hill to opposition forces. Opposition forces announced that they also captured the second hill overlooking Hama City, Jabal Kafra.[9] Opposition forces appear to remain outside Hama City at the time of this writing. Opposition forces fired drones targeting SAA tanks near the northern entrance to the city, however.[10] The Syrian Defense Ministry claimed on December 3 that it sent “large reinforcements” to Hama City to counter the expected attack on the city.[11]

Opposition forces’ capture of Hama City would facilitate successive campaigns, such as an effort to take Homs City. The fall of Hama would enable opposition forces to continue to move south into Homs Province. Syrian social media users have reported that pro-regime forces have begun establishing defensive lines in Homs City and forcibly conscripting youths into the SAA.[12] Maintaining regime control of Homs City is vital to Iranian-backed efforts to transport materiel from Iran and Iraq to Lebanese Hezbollah.

Hama City is also a critical node connecting Damascus and southern Syria to regime- and Russian-controlled coastal areas. Tartous and Latakia provinces are long-time Assad strongholds that risk being isolated from the rest of regime-held territory. The Russian evacuation of naval assets from Tartous and the reported deployment of additional Russian forces to Syria suggest that Moscow is worried that opposition forces may advance southward to Hama City and threaten the Tartous base.[13]

Opposition forces simultaneously claimed to seize terrain in as Saan District, located in the desert about 55 kilometers east of Hama City.[14] CTP-ISW cannot verify this advance. As Saan District is located along the 42 Highway, which is a critical ground line of communication reaching Aleppo City. The Syrian Defense Ministry claimed to conduct defensive activities along the nearby Athariya-Aleppo axis.[15]

Opposition groups retained control of previously seized territory in Aleppo Province, including Aleppo City, on December 3. Geolocated footage and local reports posted on December 3 showed SDF elements evacuating Aleppo Province.[16] Opposition forces previously issued a statement on December 1 promising to allow all SDF units safe passage out Aleppo City toward northeastern Syria.[17]

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) launched an offensive to seize Syrian regime-controlled territory in Deir ez Zor Province in eastern Syria. The Deir ez Zor Military Council—an Arab-majority militia in the SDF—mobilized locals from seven villages on the left bank of the Euphrates River on December 2 in an operation to re-claim and expel Iranian-backed militias from the towns.[18] These seven villages are the only areas east of the Euphrates River that the regime controls.[19] Iranian-backed militias and Russian forces maintain positions on behalf of the regime in these seven towns.[20] A Syrian Arab Army (SAA) officer told Reuters that the offensive intended to exploit pro-regime forces’ “weakness,” while Syrian opposition forces fought the regime in northwestern Syria.[21]

The SDF attempted to advance into the Khasham pocket through from the north into al Husseiniya, al Salihiya, and from the east from Jadeed Ekedat into Tabiyah al Jazeera, according to local sources.[22] Syrian sources reported mutual shelling between the SDF and pro-regime forces over the area, and Iranian-backed shelling from Hatla, north of the disputed area, reportedly killed a Syrian woman in al Jalamdeh village.[23] Iranian-backed militias engaged the SDF at the southern point of advance in Taybeh al Jazeera and reportedly fired missiles at an SDF tank advancing into the area from Jadeed Ekedat.[24] Syrian state media reported that the SAA joined Iranian-backed militias in defense of the territory.[25] Local authorities warned residents to stay in their homes in anticipation of further regime shelling over the area.[26] Regime-affiliated media reported that the SDF eventually withdrew from the areas into which it had advanced on December 3.[27]

The fighting in eastern Syria risks further drawing in US forces deployed in the area. Iranian-backed militias launched a rocket from the Khasham area targeting the US Conoco Mission Support Site during the fighting, according to Syrian sources.[28] Iranian-backed militias have repeatedly launched rockets from these seven villages targeting US forces nearby.[29] Syrian opposition sources reported that the United States responded by conducting airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed militias in al Husseiniya, al Salihiya, and Tayibah al Jazeera.[30] Local sources reported that the US airstrikes destroyed a dirt bridge connecting Khasham to Iranian-backed militia-controlled territory on the other side of the Euphrates River.[31] An unspecified US official confirmed to Reuters that the United States conducted at least one self-defense strike overnight and that the strike was unrelated to the SDF offensive.[32]

Iran appears to be trying to coordinate with Iraq and Russia to support the Syrian regime against the Syrian opposition forces. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri held separate phone calls with Iraqi Army Chief of Staff General Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, and SAA Chief of Staff General Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim on December 3.[33] Bagheri said that Iraq and Russia agreed to provide “decisive support” for the Syrian regime and "take the necessary measures" to back the SAA. Bagheri claimed that the surprise opposition offensive was a "coordinated" US-Israeli effort to "weaken" the Axis of Resistance.

Iranian state media outlet al Alam reported that Brigadier General Javad Ghaffari traveled to Damascus with a team of Iranian military advisers to support the Assad regime against the opposition forces. Ghaffari has a long history of supporting pro-regime forces in Syria and had for a time served as the overall Iranian commander in the country. Ghaffari is known as the ‘Butcher of Aleppo’ for his role in the pro-regime campaign to retake Aleppo City in 2016.[34] Syrian President Bashar al Assad expelled Ghaffari in 2021 for his alleged involvement in attacks on US forces as well as deploying Iranian weapons in “unapproved places.”[35] Ghaffari returned to Tehran to head the IRGC Intelligence Organization’s Special Operations division, where he had served until his latest deployment back to Syria.[36]

Senior Iranian officials and state media criticized Turkish policy in Syria amid the ongoing Syrian opposition offensive. Turkey maintains ties with and has historically supported some opposition groups against the Bashar al Assad regime. This dynamic has created tensions between Iran and Turkey throughout the Syrian civil war. Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati accused Turkey of betraying its Islamic roots and siding with the United States and Israel.[37] Velayati claimed that “anti-Islamic” elements in the Turkish government are “committing acts that desecrate Islam.”[38] Media affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) separately warned that Iranian trust in Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan could decrease if the Syrian opposition weakens the Axis of Resistance.[39] The IRGC-affiliated outlet proceeded to suggest that Iran might in turn refrain from supporting Erdogan during future crises.[40] Iranian media also circulated images of Iranians protesting in front of the Turkish Embassy in Tehran on December 1.[41] These statements and reports follow Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Turkey on December 2, where he held “frank” discussions with his Turkish counterpart.[42]

Hamas and Fatah agreed to form an independent civilian committee to manage post-war governance in the Gaza Strip.[43] The Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) will head the committee and thus manage civilian affairs in the Gaza Strip. The committee will appoint 10 to 15 “technocrats,” who are unaffiliated with any Palestinian militia or political group, according to Israeli media.[44] This agreement comes after a Hamas delegation traveled to Cairo on November 29 to discuss post-war governance and ceasefire-hostage negotiations with Egyptian officials.[45] Hamas will almost certainly try to infiltrate or subvert whatever civilian government emerges to manage the post-war Gaza Strip.

The IDF stated that it will conclude its clearing operations in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip in the coming weeks.[46] The IDF 84th Infantry Brigade (162nd Division) commander told Israeli media on December 3 that the IDF has detained and killed around 2,000 Palestinian fighters in Jabalia beginning of clearing operations there in early October 2024.[47] The IDF stated that Hamas in Jabalia maintains a presence of 100 to 200 fighters, who operate in small cells equipped with explosive devices and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).[48] The IDF clearing operation in the Jabalia is designed to pressure Hamas to return Israeli hostages, destroy Hamas infrastructure, and prevent Hamas from reconstituting and rearming there, according to the IDF 84th Infantry Brigade commander.[49] The IDF stated that Palestinian militias have killed at least 30 Israeli soldiers in the northern Gaza Strip since early October 2024.[50]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has conducted over a dozen airstrikes across Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on December 2. The IDF is responding to a Lebanese Hezbollah rocket attack into Israeli-controlled Shebaa Farms.[51] Hezbollah fired two rockets targeting an IDF border site in Shebaa Farms area on December 2 in response to what Hezbollah described as Israeli ceasefire violations.[52] The IDF Air Force responded by striking Hezbollah military infrastructure, including the rocket launch site used for the December 2 rocket attack.[53] Israeli media reported that senior US and French officials, including US Special Envoy Amos Hochstein, told their Israeli counterparts that Israel was violating the ceasefire by conducting military activities in Lebanon and failing to report them to the designated oversight mechanism.[54] Israeli public news outlet Kann reported that Israel will inform the international enforcement mechanism of Hezbollah violations but asserted that it retains the right to unilaterally take action against Hezbollah activity south of the Litani River.[55] Israel retains the “inherent right to self-defense” under the current ceasefire and Israel has justified its military activity in Lebanon since the ceasefire as a response to Hezbollah threats to Israel.[56] Israel and Lebanon both told the White House on December 2 that they are committed to the ceasefire agreement despite recent flare ups, according to unspecified sources cited by Axios.[57]

Key Takeaways:

• Northwestern Syria: Syrian opposition forces have continued to advance rapidly and pushed through regime defensive lines in the northern Hama countryside. Opposition forces have advanced within five kilometers of Hama City and likely seized key defensive terrain in the area.
• Eastern Syria: The US-backed SDF launched an offensive to seize regime-controlled territory in Deir ez Zor Province. The fighting in the area risks drawing in the US forces deployed in the area to fighting the Islamic State.
• Iran: Iran appears to be trying to coordinate with Iraq and Russia to support the Syrian regime against Syrian opposition forces. The most senior Iranian military officer, Mohammad Bagheri, held separate phone calls with Iraqi and Russian officials to discuss supporting Bashar al Assad.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas and Fatah agreed to form an independent civilian committee to manage post-war governance in the Gaza Strip. Hamas will almost certainly try to infiltrate or subvert whatever non-Hamas government emerges in the strip in order to ultimately control it.
• Lebanon: The IDF conducted over a dozen airstrikes across Lebanon in response to Lebanese Hezbollah firing rockets into Israeli-controlled Shebaa Farms. Israel and Hezbollah have accused one another of violating the ceasefire.

Iran Update, December 2, 2024

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Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, Meghan Bracy, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have reportedly deployed to northern Syria to help defend the Bashar al Assad regime against Syrian opposition forces.[1] Kataib Hezbollah, Badr Organization, and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba fighters have deployed from Iraq to northern Syria over the past day, according to a Syrian Arab Army (SAA) source and two Iraqi security sources speaking to Reuters on December 2.[2] The SAA source told Reuters that dozens of Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters crossed into Syria via the Albu Kamal border crossing overnight on December 1 and 2.[3] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[4] The PMF, on paper, reports directly to the Iraqi prime minister, but in reality, many of the militias that comprise the PMF answer to Iran.[5] Social media users published images on December 1 purporting to show Iranian-backed Iraqi fighters heading toward Syria.[6] A local Syrian source denied on December 2 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias entered Syria from Iraq and instead claimed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias redeployed from Palmyra in central Syria and Deir ez Zor in eastern Syria to northern Syria.[7] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may redeploy from other areas in Syria to the north given that these militias have long operated in Syria.

Hezbollah does not appear willing to commit fighters to assist its pro-regime allies in northern Syria, probably as a result of the severe losses it has suffered in Lebanon. Hezbollah has not yet deployed fighters to Syria to support the Syrian regime. An unspecified Hezbollah spokesperson told Newsweek on December 2 that the SAA does not need Hezbollah fighters to assist in the defense of territory seized by Syrian opposition forces.[8] Hezbollah fighters previously deployed thousands of fighters in defense of Assad in 2011 and Hezbollah was an extremely important element of the pro-regime forces.[9] Decisively supporting regime forces would likely require Hezbollah to organize a large-scale re-deployment of fighters to Syria, as numerous Hezbollah fighters left Syria to join the southern front in Lebanon in the past few months.[10]

It is not clear that Hezbollah can currently support a deployment of this size, given post-war commitments to reconstitute its forces. Hezbollah is currently regenerating and reorganizing its forces after a nearly two-month Israeli campaign in southern Lebanon that has severely degraded its command-and-control networks, communications, and weapons stockpiles.[11] Regeneration and reorganization take place out of contact with enemy forces and cannot be undertaken at the same time as large-scale deployments. Regeneration and reorganization would need to occur before any forces can be deployed as units. It is possible, however, that Hezbollah could choose to deploy individuals to Syria to advise regime forces. The pressure on Hezbollah to defend Syrian territory from rebel advances is greater given that a rebel advance towards Hama begins to threaten Hezbollah’s access to Iranian materiel and equipment through its ground line of communication in Homs Province. It does not appear that pro-regime forces, including Iran, have asked Hezbollah to join in on defensive efforts, however.[12]

Iran is coordinating with Syria and Russia to counter the rebel offensive in Syria. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian discussed countering “the spread of terrorism” in a telephone conversation with President Bashar al Assad on December 2.[13] Assad blamed the United States and Israel for their interference in the region. Iranian Parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf also reiterated Iran’s support for Syria in a phone call with Syrian counterpart Hammouda Sabbagh on December 2.[14] Pezeshkian reemphasized regional cohesion to counter “terrorism” in Syria in separate calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani on December 2.[15]

Iran and Turkey continue to hold different desired political goals in Syria, which could cause increased friction as the Syrian opposition offensive continues. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan both agreed on the preservation of Syria’s territorial sovereignty and returning to the Astana process in a joint press conference in Ankara on December 2.[16] Araghchi acknowledged the “differences of opinion” between Iran and Turkey and emphasized Iran's support for Assad’s regime.[17] Fidan said that Turkey believes Assad is ignoring the “legitimate demands“ of the Syrian opposition.[18] Turkey’s ”legitimate demands“ would presumably include some role for Turkey’s allies in Syria because a total Assad takeover of the country, as Assad and Iran desire, would trigger massive refugee flows north towards Turkey.[19]  Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that Turkey will prioritize its national security on December 2.[20] Erdogan almost certainly believes that the collapse of Turkish allies would endanger Turkish national security by increasing refugee flows as well as the threat from Kurdish militants.

Syrian opposition forces appear to be slowing their advance into regime-controlled areas of northwest Syria after encountering Syrian Arab Army (SAA) defensive lines north of Hama City. Fateh Mubin—a joint operations room including Hayat Tahrir al Sham and several other armed opposition factions leading the offensive—did not claim to seize additional towns in northwest Syria on December 2. The Syrian Defense Minister announced on December 1 that it sent large reinforcements to Hama’s northern countryside to bolster the SAA’s defensive operations in the area.[21] Regime forces reportedly deployed from eastern Hama province near Rusafa to Hama City on December 2, demonstrating that the regime continues to reinforce its defensive lines there.[22] The SAA also deployed forces on the left bank of the Orontes River near Hama City on December 1 and 2 after opposition forces initially claimed to seize towns in the area.[23] Fateh Mubin’s spokesperson said that opposition forces were in control of seven unspecified towns in northern Hama and were approaching regime forces from multiple axes on December 2, however.[24] Idlib-based opposition forces also claimed likely drone attacks targeting regime forces, command centers, and other operationally significant assets on December 2.[25] These attacks may reflect the increased ground-based resistance that opposition forces are facing in Hama. The SAA’s defense of northern Hama is the first effective defense that pro-regime forces have mounted against Syrian opposition forces since the offensive began on November 27.

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is similarly slowing its advance after accomplishing its main goal of seizing Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo, on December 1.[26] The SNA claimed to seize 14 towns north of Aleppo, compared to the more than 30 sites the force seized the day prior.[27] Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and SNA leaders reportedly negotiated a deal to allow civilians and fighters to evacuate east to SDF territory from Tel Rifat and Sheikh Maqsoud, a Kurdish neighborhood of eastern Aleppo.[28] SDF leader Mazloum Abdi confirmed on December 1 that locals were evacuating Tel Rifat through an ”opening a humanitarian corridor.“[29] It remains unclear at this time the extent to which the SNA and Idlib-based opposition groups are coordinating their attacks targeting the Syrian regime.  Social media users circulated footage on December 1 of SNA and HTS fighters joining convoys near the Aleppo International Airport, reportedly to launch an operation northeast of Aleppo City.[30]

A local Syrian source suggested that the SDF may launch an offensive to seize Syrian regime-controlled territory in Deir ez Zor Province.[31] The Deir ez Zor Military Council—an Arab-majority militia within the SDF—reportedly mobilized locals from seven villages on the left bank of the Euphrates River.[32] These seven villages are the only areas east of the Euphrates that the regime controls, making it a strategic holding for the regime and its allies. Both Russia and Iranian-backed militias maintain positions in these seven towns.[33] Iranian-backed militias have repeatedly launched rockets targeting US forces stationed nearby from these seven villages.[34] CTP-ISW is monitoring early rumors about possible clashes between SDF fighters and unspecified militias in Deir ez Zor.[35]

Russian and Syrian regime forces continued a limited airstrike campaign in opposition-occupied areas of northwest Syria on December 2. Pro-regime forces struck sites across Idlib and Aleppo governorates, including hospitals in Idlib.[36] The Syrian Defense Ministry claimed that the air and artillery strikes destroyed five opposition command centers and seven weapons and ammunition depots.[37] The regime said that airstrikes killed at least 400 opposition fighters.[38]

The United States and France reportedly warned Israel that it is violating the terms of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire, according to Israeli media. Israeli media reported on December 2 that senior French and US officials, including US Special Envoy Amos Hochstein, told their Israeli counterparts that Israel was violating terms of the ceasefire agreement by conducting military activities in Lebanese territory and failing to report them to the designated oversight mechanism.[39] The IDF has conducted numerous strikes into Lebanese territory since the ceasefire went into effect on November 27 to thwart what it deemed as Hezbollah’s violations of the ceasefire agreement.[40] Israel and Lebanon are both required to report any possible violations of their obligations to both UNIFIL and the oversight mechanism, according to leaked copies of the agreement published by Israeli Army Radio.[41]

Hezbollah fired two rockets at an IDF border position as a “warning” on December 2 in response to what Hezbollah described as Israeli ceasefire violations.[42] The rockets fell in open areas in the Israeli-controlled Shebaa Farms.[43] Hezbollah has long maintained that Shebaa Farms is Lebanese territory and it has targeted the area repeatedly since October 2023.[44] Hezbollah said in a statement that the “concerned authorities” that reviewed Israel’s violations did not stop them from occurring.”[45] This incident was Hezbollah’s first attack into Israeli territory since the ceasefire went into effect. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to respond “with force” to Hezbollah’s attack and the IDF announced that it began to strike Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.[46] Hezbollah has not conducted any further attacks into Israeli territory at this time.

Israel retains the “inherent right to self-defense” under the current ceasefire agreement and Israel has justified its military activity in Lebanon since the ceasefire as a response to “immediate” Hezbollah threats to Israel.[47] The IDF also struck a rocket launcher at a Hezbollah site near Sidon on November 28 classified as a “non-immediate” threat that the IDF needed to neutralize.[48] This action is reportedly guaranteed by the US, which pledged to support Israel’s right to respond to threats in a side letter.[49]

Senior IDF officials have recommended that Israel propose a temporary ceasefire-hostage deal in response to Hamas’ perceived willingness to concede on some of its maximalist ceasefire demands.[50] Senior IDF officials told Israeli media on December 2 that several factors, including the ceasefire in Lebanon, may pressure Hamas to accept a deal. Hamas expressed its readiness to resume negotiations after the ceasefire began in Lebanon.[51] A senior Israeli cabinet minister reported on November 29 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is also interested in a partial ceasefire-hostage deal to capitalize on Hamas’ “weaker position” after the ceasefire in Lebanon.[52] Egyptian officials discussed a new ceasefire-hostage proposal with Hamas and Israeli officials during the most recent round of negotiations in Cairo that began on November 29.[53]

Hamas and Fatah have made “significant progress” towards the formation of a civilian committee to handle post-war governance in the Gaza Strip.[54] A senior Hamas official told Al Araby al Jadeed on December 2 that Hamas and Fatah had solved major differences during meetings in Cairo, including the management of relief and construction funds.[55] The official added that Hamas and Fatah agreed that unidentified donors would independently supervise the funds.[56] Hamas will almost certainly attempt to gain control over an independent reconstruction agency. Hamas control--or attempts to control--an independent reconstruction agency would make it more difficult to secure donor funding.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian-backed Support to Syria: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have reportedly deployed to northern Syria to help defend the Bashar al Assad regime against Syrian opposition forces.
• Hezbollah Support to Syria: It is not clear that Hezbollah can currently support a deployment of this size, given postwar commitments to reconstitute its forces. Hezbollah is regenerating and reorganizing its forces after a nearly two-month Israeli campaign in southern Lebanon that has severely degraded its command-and-control networks, communications, and weapons stockpiles. Regeneration and reorganization would need to occur before any forces can be deployed as units. It is possible, however, that Hezbollah could choose to deploy individuals to Syria to advise regime forces.
• Iranian Diplomatic Responses: Iran is coordinating with Syria and Russia to counter the rebel offensive in Syria. Iran and Turkey continue to hold different desired political goals in Syria, which could cause increased friction as the Syrian opposition offensive continues.
• Syrian Opposition Operations: Syrian opposition forces appear to be slowing their advance into regime-controlled areas of northwest Syria after encountering Syrian Arab Army (SAA) defensive lines north of Hama City.  The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is similarly slowing its advance after accomplishing its main goal of seizing Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo, on December 1.
• US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces: A local Syrian source suggested that the SDF may launch an offensive to seize Syrian regime-controlled territory in Deir ez Zor Province. The Deir ez Zor Military Council—an Arab-majority militia within the SDF—reportedly mobilized locals from seven villages on the left bank of the Euphrates River. These seven villages are the only areas east of the Euphrates that the regime controls, making it a strategic holding for the regime and its allies.
• Lebanon Ceasefire: The United States and France reportedly warned Israel that it is violating the terms of the ceasefire, according to Israeli media. The IDF has conducted numerous strikes into Lebanese territory since the ceasefire went into effect. Hezbollah fired two rockets at an IDF border position as a “warning” on December 2 in response to what Hezbollah described as Israeli ceasefire violations.
• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Senior IDF officials have recommended that Israel propose a temporary ceasefire-hostage deal in response to Hamas’ perceived willingness to concede on some of its maximalist ceasefire demands.

Iran Update, December 1, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Syrian Arab Army (SAA) reinforcements fortified defensive lines north of Hama City and prevented Syrian opposition forces from advancing into Hama City. The Syrian Defense Minister announced on December 1 that it sent large reinforcements to Hama’s northern countryside to bolster the SAA’s defensive operations in the area.[1] SAA Chief of Staff General Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim arrived to oversee SAA operations in the area.[2] Opposition forces began advancing south from Idlib towards Hama City on November 30.[3] The Syrian Defense Ministry claimed that SAA units expelled opposition fighters from the town of Maardis, about 10 kilometers from Hama City.[4] The SAA 25th Special Mission Forces Division secured and fortified defensive lines in several villages and towns north of Hama, including villages that rebels claimed to seize on November 30, such as Tayyiba al Imam.[5] Local Syrian sources reported that SAA forces pushed opposition fighters north towards the town of Morek.[6] Fateh Mubin—a joint operations room including Hayat Tahrir al Sham and several other armed opposition factions leading the offensive—appears to remain in control of Khan Sheikhoun, a town immediately north of Morek on the other side of the Hama-Idlib border.[7] This suggests that opposition forces remain in control of Idlib Province. Syrian opposition forces conducted a drone strike that killed the commander of Hama’s Military Security in Souran amid clashes in the area.[8] An SAA-affiliated social media account claimed that the Syrian army would advance into Idlib before continuing to Aleppo.[9]

The Syrian regime appears to be concentrating its efforts on securing Hama Province and has not yet attempted to re-capture or send reinforcements towards Aleppo. The SAA’s defense of northern Hama is the first effective defense that pro-regime forces have mounted against Syrian opposition forces since the offensive began on November 27. Russian forces separately conducted multiple airstrikes—some in cooperation with the SAA—targeting opposition forces in Aleppo City and Idlib Province on December 1.[10]

Syrian opposition forces also advanced southeast of Aleppo to the town of Khanasir on December 1, which is probably part of an effort to isolate Aleppo and block resupply and reinforcements. Syrian opposition forces advanced through Safirah and captured the largest group of SAA forces they have captured so far.[11] The opposition forces captured an SAA general in Safirah.[12] A Syria-focused analyst reported that rebels have captured over 150 Syrian regime soldiers so far.[13] Fateh Mubin announced that it took control of the town of Khanasir and the Khanasir-Aleppo highway.[14] Cutting off this highway would prevent regime reinforcements from approaching Aleppo City from the southeast, further isolating the city from regime attacks.

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) announced that it captured Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo City, from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on December 1.[15] The SNA launched a separate operation into regime-controlled territory on November 30 to take territory from the SDF, Syrian regime, and Iranian-backed militias.[16] The SNA seized Deir Jamal and blocked off access to Tal Rifaat before moving into the town.[17] The SNA also seized several towns and military positions north of Aleppo along Highway 214, including the Menagh military airport.[18] Regime-affiliated media reported that SDF forces based in Deir ez Zor mobilized to deploy to Manbij to increase the SDF‘s force presence there.[19]

The SNA continues to retain territory that it seized during the first day of its operation, including the Kuweires military airport, east of Aleppo City.[20] Local sources circulated footage of SNA fighters seizing SAA L-39 fighter jets, a Syrian Pantsir air defense system, and an Iranian drone from the Ababil family at the airport.[21]

Fateh Mubin and the SNA appear to be coordinating operations to seize territory from the Syrian regime and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Social media users circulated footage of SNA and HTS fighters joining convoys near the Aleppo International Airport to launch an operation northeast of Aleppo City reportedly.[22] It is unclear if HTS’s forces were involved in the seizure of Tal Rifaat or any nearby towns. Fateh Mubin and the SNA have both operated in some of the same towns during the ongoing operation, suggesting that they have at least some degree of tactical coordination.[23] It is not immediately clear to what degree Fateh Mubin and the SNA are coordinating to isolate Aleppo.

Fateh Mubin issued a statement addressed to all SDF combat units in Aleppo City.[24] The group said that they would allow SDF units safe passage out of Aleppo city towards northeastern Syria. The group said that Syrian Kurds are ”our people” and that Fateh Mubin is “responsible for protecting [the Kurds] and ensuring a decent life for “them.”[25] It is unclear if SNA forces will follow Fateh Mubin’s calls for safe passage for the SDF. Damascus-based media reported that SDF forces began to evacuate from Aleppo City towards Manbij.[26]

Syrian regime leadership held several diplomatic meetings with regional officials almost certainly to coordinate with allies and other stakeholders amid the opposition offensive. President Bashar al Assad was reportedly in Moscow, Russia on November 30, though the Kremlin spokesperson declined to comment on the matter.[27] Assad met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Damascus on December 1 to discuss Iranian support for Assad’s regime in Syria.[28] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi will meet with Turkish officials in Ankara, Turkey after he visits Damascus on December 1.[29] Assad also spoke with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on November 30.[30] Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Bassem Sabbagh also spoke with his Jordanian counterpart Ayman Safadi in a telephone conversation.[31]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stressed the importance of cohesion among Islamic countries in countering “regional terrorism” in a telephone conversation with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on December 1.[32] The phone conversation focused on northern Syria.

Some of Assad’s allies have already begun assisting the regime. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have reportedly been active in northwestern Syria since Syrian opposition forces began their surprise offensive on November 27. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada’s Secretary General, Abu Alaa al Walai, claimed that Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada helped to defend against Turkish-backed SNA offensives on November 30.[33] A Syrian journalist claimed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia the Badr Organization deployed fighters in an unspecified area in Syria.[34] These militias have long operated in Syria to support the Syrian regime.[35] Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will probably deploy additional forces into Deir ez Zor Province to secure ground lines of communication between Iraq and the frontline areas if Iranian-backed militias continue to fight in northwestern Syria.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly replaced Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel with Colonel General Alexander Chaiko, who will reprise his previous assignment as commander of the Russian force grouping in Syria, though it remains unclear how Russian operations in Syria may change. Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, including the Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel, claimed on November 30 and December 1 that the MoD removed Kisel as Commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria and replaced him with Chaiko.[36] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 1 that Chaiko replaced Kisel and that Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alexander Moiseyev arrived in Tartous, Syria.[37] Chaiko served as chief of staff of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria from 2015 to 2017 and served as overall commander of the Russian force grouping in Syria from September 2019 to November 2020, February to June 2021, and from September to December 2022.[38] It is unclear what position Chaiko held from December 2022 until present. Kisel has reportedly commanded the Russian force grouping in Syria since at least May 2024.[39] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Kisel's removal will not significantly change the situation or Russian operations in Syria because the Russian military command has routinely rotated commanders to positions in Syria after battlefield failures in Ukraine.[40] ISW is unable to independently confirm this reported command change at this time.

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Regime Operations: Syrian Arab Army (SAA) reinforcements fortified defensive lines north of Hama City and prevented Syrian opposition forces from advancing into Hama City. The Syrian regime appears to be concentrating its efforts on securing Hama Province and has not yet attempted to re-capture or send reinforcements towards Aleppo.
• Syrian Opposition Operations in Tel Rifat: The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) announced that it captured Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo City, from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on December 1.
• Syrian Opposition Operations near Aleppo: Syrian opposition forces also advanced southeast of Aleppo to the town of Khanasir on December 1, which is probably part of an effort to isolate Aleppo and block resupply and reinforcements.
• Coordination Between Opposition Groups: Fateh Mubin and the SNA appear to be coordinating operations to seize territory from the Syrian regime and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Fateh Mubin and the SNA have both operated in some of the same towns during the ongoing operation, suggesting that they have at least some degree of tactical coordination. It is not immediately clear to what degree Fateh Mubin and the SNA are coordinating to isolate Aleppo.
• Syrian Regime Diplomatic Response: Syrian regime leadership held several diplomatic meetings with regional officials almost certainly to coordinate with allies and other stakeholders amid the opposition offensive.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias in Syria: Some of Assad’s allies, including Iraqi militias, have already begun assisting the regime. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have reportedly been active in northwestern Syria since Syrian opposition forces began their surprise offensive on November 27.
• Russian Forces in Syria: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly replaced Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel with Colonel General Alexander Chaiko, who will reprise his previous assignment as commander of the Russian force grouping in Syria, though it remains unclear how Russian operations in Syria may change.

Iran Update, November 30, 2024

Click here to read the full report

Syrian opposition forces seized Aleppo City and advanced toward Hama City on November 30.[1] Opposition forces made this progress after launching their surprise offensive only three days prior.[2] The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) acknowledged that its forces have withdrawn from Aleppo City to “strengthen” defensive lines and “prepare for a counterattack.”[3] The SAA also acknowledged that opposition forces have entered “large parts of Aleppo [City].”[4] A pro-Syrian regime social media account reported that the SAA suffered command-and-control problems in Aleppo City, possibly leading to the rapid collapse of SAA defenses.[5] Fateh Mubin—one of the main opposition groups leading the offensive—announced on November 29 that opposition forces had separately taken control of Khan Sheikoun, which is about 20 miles from Hama City.[6] Geolocated footage posted on November 30 similarly showed opposition forces advancing through towns en route to Hama City.[7] CTP-ISW cannot verify whether opposition forces are operating in Hama City at the time of this writing.

Pro-regime forces have failed to mount an effective defense against the surprise offensive by opposition forces. The Syrian regime and affiliated sources claimed that the SAA was preparing defensive lines in northern Hama Province on November 30. It appears that opposition forces have advanced past northern Hama Province at this time, however.[8] Russian forces have separately conducted multiple airstrikes—some in cooperation with the SAA—targeting opposition forces in Aleppo City.[9] Russian and Syrian airstrikes have continued to target opposition positions in the Aleppo, Hama, and Idlib countrysides as well.[10]

Syrian opposition forces have likely captured valuable military equipment that the SAA and other pro-regime forces abandoned amid disorderly withdrawals.[11] Social media accounts claimed that opposition forces have captured armored vehicles and heavy artillery pieces.[12] Opposition forces also entered the Abu al Duhur and Nairab military airports in Idlib Province and Aleppo City, respectively.[13]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched a separate operation into Syrian regime-controlled territory on November 30.[14] The SNA is currently operating northeast of Aleppo City, reportedly with the intent of capturing Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo City, from the joint control of the Syrian regime and Syrian Democratic Forces.[15] The SNA captured Kuweires military airport east of Aleppo City along with several other villages.[16]

The opposition offensive in northern Syria may be inspiring anti-regime activity in other parts of Syria, particularly restive Daraa and Suwayda provinces. Unidentified fighters targeted the Syrian Regime Military Intelligence building in central Suwayda City with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) on November 30.[17] Local groups have historically targeted this symbol of the Syrian regime in Druze-majority Suwayda City during periods of unrest.[18] Local media separately reported small arms engagements between Syrian regime forces and unspecified actors in multiple areas of Daraa Province.[19] The Syrian regime has faced constant opposition in southern Syria since 2011 and especially since August 2023.[20]

The Syrian regime may struggle to rally the same support from the Axis of Resistance and Russia that they previously provided, which will impede any pro-regime counteroffensives. Hezbollah is in the midst of force regeneration and reorganization after a nearly two-month Israeli campaign in southern Lebanon.[21] Israel’s intense monitoring of the Syria-Lebanon ground line of communication could furthermore disrupt Hezbollah efforts to move materiel and personnel to support the Syrian regime.[22] Iran could still send conventional units and Iraqi militias to support the Syrian regime against the opposition forces, however. Russia is separately constrained by its operations in Ukraine, which are a higher priority than operations in Syria. It is unclear to what extent Russia can divert any attention and resources toward Syria. Russia withdrew S-300 air defense systems from Syria back to Russia in 2022, likely to support Russian operations in Ukraine, highlighting the de-prioritization of operations in Syria.[23] Russian air assets are likewise heavily engaged in Ukraine.

A Hamas delegation traveled to Cairo on November 29 for further ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[24] Egyptian officials are separately discussing a new proposal with Hamas and Israeli officials, according to the Wall Street Journal.[25] The proposal involves pausing fighting for at least 60 days, opening the Rafah border crossing, and increasing the flow of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip to 200 trucks entering daily.[26] The Palestinian Authority would assume control of the Gazan side of the Rafah crossing, according to the proposal.[27] The IDF would then monitor traffic through the border crossing. Wall Street Journal added that Egypt and Hamas have indicated that they will drop their demand that the IDF withdraw from the area around the Rafah border crossing.[28] Hamas may be increasingly willing to accept a ceasefire-hostage deal since Israel and Hezbollah reached a ceasefire in Lebanon.  Hamas expressed its readiness to resume negotiations after the ceasefire began in Lebanon.[29] Hamas may calculate that negotiations are necessary to ensure its survival. Yahya Sinwar previously calculated that Hamas could survive if the October 7 War expanded and thus compelled the IDF to reduce military pressure on Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[30] That scenario is less likely since Hezbollah exited the war.

Hamas published on November 30 a video of an American-Israeli hostage giving what appears to be a coerced testimony.[31] The publication of the video is likely meant to pressure the United States and Israel to support a ceasefire-hostage deal in the Gaza Strip. The hostage, Edan Alexander, called on Israeli citizens to demonstrate daily against IDF operations in the Gaza Strip.[32] Alexander also called on US President-elect Donald Trump to cut military support to Israel and to pressure Israel to negotiate with Hamas. This video is the latest of several that Hamas and other Palestinian militias have published of hostages in recent months as part of an information operation meant to degrade Israeli willingness to sustain military operations in the Gaza Strip.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: Syrian opposition forces seized Aleppo City and advanced toward Hama City. Pro-Syrian regime forces have failed to mount an effective defense against the opposition offensive.
• The Turkish-backed SNA launched a separate offensive into Syrian regime-held territory. The SNA captured a military airport from the joint control of the SAA and SDF.
• The opposition offensive in northeastern Syria may be inspiring anti-regime activity in other parts of the country, particularly restive Daraa and Suwayda provinces.
• The Syrian regime may struggle to rally the same support from the Axis of Resistance and Russia that they previously provided, which will impede pro-regime counteroffensives.
• Gaza Strip: A Hamas delegation traveled to Cairo for further ceasefire-hostage negotiations and has indicated that it will drop its demand for the IDF to withdraw from parts of the Gaza Strip.
• Hamas published a video of an American-Israeli hostage giving what appears to be a coerced testimony in order to pressure the United States and Israel to support a ceasefire.

Iran Update, November 29, 2024

Click here to read the full report

Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Syrian opposition forces continued their offensive into Syrian regime-held territory and advanced into Aleppo City. The opposition forces have continued expanding their offensive eastward since launching the surprise offensive on November 27. Thousands of fighters and armored elements advanced quickly eastward, seizing several villages within a few hours of launching the offensive.[1] Fateh Mubin—an opposition group based in HTS-controlled Idlib Province—announced on November 28 that they had seized control of another 13 villages and achieved the “complete liberation” of the countryside to the west of Aleppo City.[2] Fateh Mubin designated the western Aleppo countryside a ”closed military zone.”[3] Local Syrian sources reported that opposition forces seized armored vehicles and weapons, including anti-tank guided missiles and man-portable air defense systems, belonging to the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).[4] Fateh Mubin claimed that opposition forces also detained over 20 pro-regime fighters.[5] The opposition forces advanced into the western parts of Aleppo City on November 29, marking the first time that the city has been contested since pro-regime forces captured it in late 2016.[6] Opposition forces then advanced into the city center and declared a curfew over the city, according to local reports and geolocated footage.[7] Social media accounts posted videos of opposition fighters entering a military hospital, a police headquarters, and the Aleppo municipal building.[8]

The opposition forces killed an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officer, Brigadier General Kiomars Pour Hashemi, as they advanced.[9] The IRGC acknowledged his death and described him as a military adviser to the Syrian regime.[10] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami attended a ceremony for Pour Hashemi in Tehran on November 29.[11]

Pro-regime forces have failed to mount an effective defense against the surprise offensive by opposition forces. An SAA-affiliated social media account claimed that opposition forces outnumber the SAA forces around Aleppo City and suggested that the SAA may be unable to respond until reinforcements arrive.[12] Other social media users reported that SAA units retreated toward al Safirah, southeast of Aleppo City, although CTP-ISW cannot verify these reports.[13] Russian forces separately conducted multiple airstrikes—some in cooperation with the SAA—targeting opposition forces.[14] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on November 29 that the opposition offensive is a violation of Syrian sovereignty and that Moscow supports Bashar al Assad in reclaiming the territory.[15]

Iranian officials and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias blamed the United States and Israel for the opposition offensive. Iranian leaders called for “coordinated action” to defeat the offensive and accused the United States and Israel of supporting opposition activity against Assad.[16] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and Kataib Sayyida al Shuhada released statements claiming that Israel is responsible for the offensive because the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was defeated in Lebanon.[17] An official from Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada vowed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—will defeat the opposition forces.[18]

The Israel-Lebanese Hezbollah ceasefire has continued to hold since it went into effect on November 26. Hezbollah has not conducted any attacks into Israel and the IDF and Hezbollah have not engaged in any ground combat. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem gave a public speech to acknowledge the end of fighting on November 29, saying that Hezbollah would abide by the ceasefire “with our heads held high.”[19] Qassem emphasized that the ceasefire includes a full IDF withdrawal from Lebanon by January 25, 2025.[20] The IDF still has a force presence in southern Lebanon for now in order to counter any potential violations of the ceasefire by Hezbollah.[21] Qassem also vowed that Hezbollah would retain a role in Lebanese politics and support reconstruction in Lebanon.[22]

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) began post-war operations across Lebanon. The LAF is clearing roads, detonating unexploded ordinance, and installing checkpoints, especially in southern Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon.[23] The LAF began to deploy forces, including armored elements, to southern Lebanon on November 27—one day after the ceasefire into effect.[24] Hezbollah Secretary General Qassem said that Hezbollah will engage in “high-level coordination” with the LAF to implement the ceasefire.[25]

The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in response to militant activity.[26] The IDF struck a rocket launcher at a Hezbollah site in Bisariya, near Sidon, after detecting unspecified activity at the site.[27] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF detected a ”non-immediate threat” at the site that the IDF needed to neutralize.[28] Axios reported that the United States assessed that Hezbollah was trying to relocate rockets to new sites.[29] The IDF separately struck two fighters who had entered a Hezbollah site and began moving rocket launchers.[30] The LAF accused Israel on November 28 of violating the ceasefire.[31]

The IDF continued trying to prevent displaced citizens from returning to their homes in southern Lebanon.[32] The IDF conducted a drone strike as a “warning” to deter individuals in vehicles from approaching Markaba.[33] The IDF similarly shelled targets near al Wazzani likely to deter individuals from approaching the area.[34] A Hezbollah commander told the Wall Street Journal that Hezbollah fighters who live in southern Lebanon will remain in the area and retain their small arms.[35]

A Hamas fighter conducted a shooting attack targeting Israelis in the West Bank, highlighting the threat that Hamas poses outside the Gaza Strip. The Hamas fighter wounded eight Israelis on a bus near Ariel settlement in the northern West Bank on November 29.[36] Israeli forces then killed the fighter and assessed that the fighter acted on behalf of a cell rather than as an individual.[37] The IDF assessed that attacks in the West Bank will increase in the coming weeks. This attack comes after the IDF assessed in September 2024 that it had defeated Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[38]

Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas designated an interim successor should he die or leave office.[39] Abbas, who has been president since 2005 and is 89 years old, designated on November 28 the Palestinian National Council (PNC) chairman to serve as interim president for no more than 90 days after Abbas leaves office. The PNC is the 747-member legislative body under the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and represents Palestinians from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and diaspora.[40] The current PNC chairman is Rawhi Fattouh, who had been PA President for two months after the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004.[41] Fattouh has served as Abbas’ personal representative since 2006.[42]

Iran notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it plans to expand its uranium enrichment capacity significantly. These plans include installing over 6,000 additional centrifuges and activating others at the Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities.[43] This notification is consistent with the Atomic Energy Organization announcing on November 27 that it began injecting gas into "thousands of advanced centrifuges.”[44] Iran is retaliating for the IAEA Board of Governors passing on November 21 a censure resolution proposed by the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom). The resolution condemned Iran for failing to cooperate fully with the IAEA over outstanding questions about the Iranian nuclear program. The activation and installation of additional centrifuges comes as Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons program in early 2024.[45] CTP-ISW is not prepared to assess that Iranian leaders have decided to build a nuclear weapon at this time, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: Syrian opposition forces continued their offensive into Syrian regime-held territory and advanced into Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces have failed to mount an effective defense against the surprise offensive.
• Lebanon: The Israel-Lebanese Hezbollah ceasefire has continued to hold. The LAF began post-war operations, including clearing roads, detonating unexploded ordinance, and installing checkpoints across Lebanon.
• West Bank: A Hamas fighter conducted a shooting attack targeting Israelis in the West Bank, highlighting the threat that Hamas poses outside the Gaza Strip. This threat remains despite the defeat of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
• Iran: Iran notified the IAEA that it plans to expand its uranium enrichment capacity by installing over 6,000 additional centrifuges and activating others at the Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities.

[There was no update on November 28, 2024]

Iran Update, November 27, 2024

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Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Annika Ganzeveld, Avery Borens, Victoria Penza, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Note: ISW will not be releasing an assessment tomorrow, November 28, in celebration of Thanksgiving

The Israel-Lebanese Hezbollah ceasefire has held as it went into effect on November 26. Hezbollah has claimed no attacks into northern Israel nor any against Israeli targets in Lebanon. Hezbollah continues to falsely claim that it defeated the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and that its forces will continue to ensure that the IDF adheres to the ceasefire.[1] The IDF similarly stated on November 27 that it will remain in its positions in Lebanon for multiple weeks to ensure that Hezbollah complies with the agreement.[2] The IDF is required to withdraw from Lebanon by January 25, 2025.

The IDF fired artillery and small arms at unidentified individuals who approached IDF positions around the Israel-Lebanon border after the ceasefire went into effect.[3] The IDF also detained four Hezbollah fighters, including a local commander, who entered a restricted area along the border.[4] Neither Hezbollah or Israeli officials have claimed that these incidents constitute violations of the ceasefire. CTP-ISW assessed on November 12 that Hezbollah would likely experience command-and-control challenges and struggle to immediately enforce widespread compliance with a full ceasefire, withdrawal, and disarmament among its rank-and-file members.[5] These isolated incidents along the Israel-Lebanon border may reflect those command-and-control challenges rather than Hezbollah leaders‘ intent to violate the ceasefire.

The IDF and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) warned Lebanese civilians against returning to villages where the IDF is deployed on November 27.[6] Western and Lebanese media reported a large-scale movement of displaced Lebanese civilians to villages in southern Lebanon.[7] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson announced that the IDF would inform Lebanese civilians when it was safe to return.[8] The LAF similarly told Lebanese residents of towns near the Israel-Lebanon border to delay returning to their homes until after the IDF withdraws.[9] Senior Israeli officials said that the IDF has yet to have a policy regarding how to address civilians returning to these areas.[10]

The LAF began to deploy forces, including armored elements, to southern Lebanon.[11] The LAF announced on November 27 that it had begun to “strengthen its deployment” south of the Litani River in cooperation with UNIFIL. Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Abdallah Bou Habib said on November 26 that the LAF is prepared to deploy at least 5,000 troops to southern Lebanon.[12]  

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias indicated that they would continue to attack Israel despite the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. An unspecified source in the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee told Iraqi media that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will continue to conduct drone and missile attacks targeting Israel despite the ceasefire in Lebanon.[13] The source claimed that Ansar Allah al Awfiya, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Hezbollah, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada will continue to attack Israel until the IDF ends its operations in the Gaza Strip.[14] Kataib Hezbollah similarly released a statement on November 26 claiming that “new parties” will enter the conflict with Israel following Hezbollah’s “break. . . from the Axis of Resistance.”[15] Kataib Hezbollah emphasized that it will not “abandon [its] people in Gaza.”[16]

Syria opposition forces, including Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), seized at least 19 villages and military sites in western Aleppo from the Syrian regime in a surprise offensive on November 27.[17] Thousands of opposition fighters and armored elements have advanced within five kilometers of Aleppo City, seizing territory from the Syrian regime.[18] The frontlines southwest of Aleppo have remained largely stagnant since the 2020 Idlib ceasefire, which ended an offensive by pro-regime forces, including Iranian-backed militias.[19] Fateh Mubin, an opposition group based in Idlib, stated that its forces seized the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) 46th Regiment front line base and called it one of the “largest positions“ of the Syrian regime west of Aleppo.[20] Local reports indicated that the opposition forces have advanced to the M-5 highway south of Aleppo, seizing a crucial ground line of communication to the city.[21] It remains unclear whether HTS and its partner groups can retain control of the territory seized in the past several hours. Syrian regime and Russian forces have attacked HTS command-and-control sites in Idlib and along the lines of advance in response to the offensive.[22] Fateh Mubin stated that its offensive was preemptive and meant to ”deter the enemy, defeat its gathered forces, and keep its fire away from our people.”[23]

Israeli forces interdicted a significant shipment of weapons that Iran sent to Palestinian militias in Jenin in the West Bank.[24] The IDF announced on November 27 that it seized the shipment, which included explosive devices, remote detonators, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, small arms and sniper rifles, and other military equipment.[25] Israeli media reported that the shipment included three 107-millimeter rockets as well.[26] This shipment is especially noteworthy given that it included weapons, such as mortars and rockets, that are more advanced than what Palestinian militias in the West Bank typically use.[27] CTP-ISW has observed no previous instances of Palestinian militias in the West Bank using rockets since the October 7 War began, though this shipment of only three rockets is relatively minor. The interdiction of this shipment comes as Israel has observed renewed Iranian efforts to smuggle materiel into the West Bank in recent months.[28] Israeli forces thwarted two other weapons smuggling attempts into the West Bank in recent days.[29] Iran may be intensifying its efforts to arm proxy and partner militias in the West Bank to compensate for the defeat of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire has held as it went into effect on November 26. The LAF began to deploy forces, including armored elements, to southern Lebanon.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias indicated that they would continue to attack Israel despite the ceasefire in Lebanon.
• Syria: Syrian opposition forces launched a surprise offensive into regime-held territory in northeastern Syria, seizing several military sites and villages around Aleppo.
• West Bank: Israeli forces interdicted a shipment of weapons that Iran sent to Palestinian militias in the West Bank. The shipment included three 107-millimeter rockets.

Iran Update, November 26, 2024

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Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 4:00 pm ET

Israel and Lebanon approved a ceasefire to end the war in Lebanon on November 26. The ceasefire is set to come into effect on November 27 at 2:00 am GMT.[1] The text published by Israeli media requires a full Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal from Lebanon by January 26, 2025.[2] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu supported the deal in a message to his ministers and noted that Israel needs to focus on Iran, the need to rest its forces, and further isolating Hamas.[3] The ceasefire calls for a Hezbollah withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces to dismantle all non-state military infrastructure, prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament, and deploy to southern Lebanon to play a predominant security role there.[4] The ceasefire agreement also contains a self-defense clause that would allow Israel to act against Hezbollah if needed.[5] US President Joe Biden said that the deal is designed to be a permanent cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel.[6] Only Lebanon and Israel are parties to the agreement, and it is the Lebanese state’s responsibility to ensure Hezbollah’s compliance. An independent committee advised by the United States and France, in addition to the current UN observer force in southern Lebanon, will monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement.[7] The exact structure of the monitoring committee is not codified in the ceasefire text. The deal includes a US letter affirming support for any future Israel operations needed to combat Hezbollah violations of the deal.[8]

This ceasefire and its terms are tantamount to a Hezbollah defeat. Hezbollah has abandoned several previously-held ceasefire negotiation positions, reflecting the degree to which IDF military operations have forced Hezbollah to abandon its war aims.[9] Hezbollah initiated its attack campaign targeting Israel in October 2023 to support Hamas, and Hezbollah’s leaders have said repeatedly that it would not end its attacks without a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[10] This ceasefire does not include an end to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Current Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem has also previously expressed opposition to any stipulations giving Israel freedom of action inside Lebanon.[11]

Israel has accomplished its war aim through two months of military operations in Lebanon and this ceasefire. Hezbollah claimed incorrectly that it defeated Israel.[12] Israel began its ground campaign in Lebanon to create safe conditions to return Israelis to their homes in northern Israel.[13] IDF operations in Lebanese border towns have eliminated the threat of an October 7-style offensive attack by Hezbollah into northern Israel, and the Israeli air campaign has killed many commanders and destroyed much of Hezbollah’s munition stockpiles.[14] Destroying Hezbollah’s military organization—which is the only military objective that would prevent all attacks into Israel permanently—was never the stated objective of Israeli military operations.[15] A ceasefire deal, however, will prevent attacks into Israel through diplomatic means.

The ceasefire contains several elements that will prove difficult to implement.[16] The decision to rely on the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UN observers in Lebanon to respectively secure southern Lebanon and monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement makes no serious changes to the same system outlined by UNSC Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War. Neither the LAF nor the UN proved willing or able to prevent Hezbollah from reoccupying southern Lebanon and building new infrastructure. Some LAF sources, for example, have expressed a lack of will to enforce this ceasefire because they believe that any fighting with Hezbollah would risk triggering ”civil war.”[17] Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib said on November 26 that the LAF is prepared to deploy at least 5,000 troops to southern Lebanon, however.[18] LAF units have been in southern Lebanon since 2006, but have failed to prevent Hezbollah from using the area to attack Israel.

The difficulties in implementing this deal mean that Hezbollah and Iran can recover from this setback if the United States and Israel fail to prevent Hezbollah and Iran from doing so. Netanyahu noted that Israeli operations in Lebanon had “pushed [Hezbollah back] decades.”[19] The group retains fighters, weapons, and political control throughout Lebanon, however.[20] Hezbollah will almost certainly attempt to reoccupy southern Lebanon because Hezbollah’s stated raison d’etre is to end Israel’s control over the Shebaa Farms, which it sees as Israeli-occupied Lebanese territory. The group also supports Iran’s efforts to destroy the Israeli state.[21] Hezbollah will be unable to accomplish this task if it is forced to disarm in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah refused to abide by the last disarmament and withdrawal agreement, and it is unlikely that this war has changed Hezbollah leadership’s willingness to abandon its aspirations for southern Lebanon.

The IDF struck approximately 180 Hezbollah targets across Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on November 25 marking its most intense day of airstrikes on Beirut since September 2024.[22] The IDF expanded evacuation orders throughout Beirut ahead of its airstrikes.[23] The IDF Air Force attacked over 20 Hezbollah military and financial targets across Beirut.[24] The IDF struck facilities used by Hezbollah’s Coastal Missile Unit and various Hezbollah military headquarters and infrastructure.[25] The IDF Air Force also destroyed al Qard al Hassan's financial management and storage facilities.[26] Lebanese media has reported approximately 16 separate Israeli airstrikes in Baalbek and the Bekaa Valley since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on November 24.[27] Hezbollah maintains advanced weapons systems, weapons storage, and military infrastructure across the Bekaa Valley. This intensified activity comes as Israel and Lebanon approved a ceasefire agreement to take effect on November 27 at 2:00 am GMT.

Iran is actively violating the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and continues to advance its ability to develop and deploy its chemical weapons capabilities both inside and outside of Iran. The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) published a report on November 26 stating that Iran continues to develop capabilities to produce and deliver pharmaceutical-based chemical agents (PBAs) for offensive purposes.[28] The report cites research conducted from 2005 to 2023 by individuals affiliated with Iran’s defense establishment, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Defense. PBAs are dual-purpose chemicals that can be used in medical settings but also be weaponized for offensive purposes.[29] The ISIS report focuses on research on fentanyl and medetomidine, which are both agents capable of incapacitating victims by targeting the central nervous system. ISIS identified Iranian research in three key areas: developing large-scale cost-effective methods to synthesize these compounds, exploring techniques to aerosolize these agents for propellant purposes, and creating delivery systems to disperse the agents through grenades, bullets, and drones.[30] The report noted that Iran could use its drones to deliver ammunition containing PBAs. Iranian media released a video in June 2023 showing a multirotor drone dropping rounds of smoke grenades and a bomb, likely containing tear gas.[31]

Iran can use its PBA weapons program both internally and externally. Iranian media confirmed that Iran extensively used grenades against civilians during the Mahsa Amini protests in 2022.[32] Civilian reports indicated symptoms consistent with both fentanyl and medetomidine exposure, rather than traditional riot control gases. Iran has also likely supplied its partners and proxy groups with weaponized PBAs, which the Axis of Resistance could deploy in future military conflicts.[33] Member states of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons are meeting in The Hague from November 25 to 29 to discuss CWC implementation and treaty compliance.[34]

Israeli light infantry advanced to the Litani River near Deir Mimas and Arnoun, southeastern Lebanon, on November 26.[35] Israeli forces operated about four kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border in the closest part of the Litani River to Israel. Geolocated footage posted on November 26 shows the IDF 1st Infantry Brigade inside the St. Mema Church in Deir Mimas and Israeli forces operating near Arnoun.[36] Several IDF brigades destroyed thousands of Hezbollah rockets and missiles and engaged Hezbollah fighters at close range in the area.[37] Hezbollah claimed a rocket attack targeting Israeli forces attempting to remove a damaged tank from the outskirts of Deir Mimas on November 24, indicating that Israeli forces have been operating in this general region for the past several days.[38] IDF Northern Command Commander Ori Gordin accompanied Israeli forces to the Litani.[39]

Key Takeaways:

• Ceasefire in Lebanon: Israel and Lebanon approved a ceasefire to end the war in Lebanon on November 26. This ceasefire and its terms are tantamount to a Hezbollah defeat. Hezbollah has abandoned several previously-held ceasefire negotiation positions, reflecting the degree to which IDF military operations have forced Hezbollah to abandon its war aims. Israel has accomplished its war aim through two months of military operations in Lebanon and this ceasefire. Hezbollah claimed incorrectly that it defeated Israel.
• Shortcomings of the Ceasefire: The ceasefire contains several elements that will prove difficult to implement. The decision to rely on the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UN observers in Lebanon to respectively secure southern Lebanon and monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement makes no serious changes to the same system outlined by UNSC Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War. The difficulties in implementing this deal mean that Hezbollah and Iran can recover from this setback if the United States and Israel fail to prevent Hezbollah and Iran from doing so.
• Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon: The IDF struck approximately 180 Hezbollah targets across Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on November 25 marking its most intense day of airstrikes on Beirut since September 2024.
• Iranian Use of Pharmaceutical-based Agents: Iran is actively violating the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and continues to advance its ability to develop and deploy its chemical weapons capabilities both inside and outside of Iran.
• Israeli Ground Campaign in Lebanon: Israeli light infantry advanced to the Litani River near Deir Mimas and Arnoun, southeastern Lebanon, on November 26. The IDF elements also operated about 10km from Israeli territory in Wadi Saluki, making this advance the deepest penetration into Lebanon since Israeli forces began operations in early October 2024.

Iran Update, November 25, 2024

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Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Anthony Carrillo, Kyle Moran and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Iran Update, November 21, 2024

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Ria Reddy, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Annika Ganzeveld, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passed the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) censure resolution against Iran on November 21.[1] The resolution censured Iran for failing to cooperate with the IAEA and comply with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.[2] The resolution requires that the IAEA to produce a "comprehensive report" on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[3] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran--known as "snapback" sanctions.[4] The censure resolution comes after the IAEA issued a report on November 19 showing that Iran has increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium since August 2024.[5] The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Director Mohammad Eslami responded to the censure resolution by ordering the activation of a ”large collection of new and advanced centrifuges of various types."[6] The AEOI stated that Iran will continue to cooperate with the IAEA, though it remains unclear to what extent. CTP-ISW will provide further assessments and details in the coming days.

The United States and E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), prior to the IAEA Board of Governors vote on the censure resolution, called on Iran to "immediately dispose" of its highly enriched uranium stockpile on November 21. US Ambassador to the IAEA Laura Holgate said that Iran should stop producing uranium enriched up to 60 percent and "downblend its 60 percent [enriched uranium] stockpile entirely."[7] Downblending is the process of converting highly enriched uranium into low-enriched uranium.[8] The E3 issued a joint statement similarly requesting that Iran “immediately dispose of its high enriched uranium stockpile.”[9] Iran previously offered to cap its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent at 185 kilograms in exchange for the IAEA Board of Governors rejecting the censure resolution.[10] The E3 stated that a cap of 185 kilograms would mean Iran still "retain[s] an excessively large stockpile of high enriched uranium as well the capability to resume enrichment to 60 percent at any point," however.[11] 185 kilograms of 60-percent enriched uranium is enough, if enriched further, to produce four nuclear weapons.[12]

Lebanese officials have reportedly proposed several changes to the US-proposed ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah.[13] Unspecified sources speaking to Lebanese media outlet al Akhbar claimed that Lebanese officials requested that the ceasefire agreement refer to the Blue Line—the UN-drawn provisional border—as the official Israel-Lebanon border. Lebanese officials demanded that a date for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to withdraw be announced in conjunction with the ceasefire and that the IDF conduct a “complete, simultaneous, and rapid withdrawal” from Lebanon. The Lebanese officials also demanded that the IDF release all Hezbollah fighters detained in southern Lebanon. Al Akhbar claimed that the language regarding Israel-Lebanon border and clauses on whether Israel would retain the right to respond to ceasefire violations with force in Lebanon remain sticking points between the parties. The US-proposed ceasefire agreement initially allowed Israel to continue to attack Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL or the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) fail to enforce the ceasefire.[14] Hezbollah has rejected the possibility that the IDF retain the right to operate in Lebanon, however.[15]

A senior Israeli security source said that Hamas wants a ceasefire-hostage deal in the Gaza Strip.[16] Israeli military correspondents, citing the source, reported that Hamas is prepared to accept a deal even if it fails to meet Hamas’ repeated demand for a permanent end to the war.[17] The source added that the deal being considered includes a 42-day ceasefire, the release of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, and other “heavy prices that Israel will be required to pay.”[18] This report marks the first suggestion that Hamas may break from the maximalist demands that it has maintained throughout most of the ceasefire-hostage negotiations. Hamas last reiterated its maximalist demands on November 10.[19]

US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin III said on November 20 that the Houthis increasingly see themselves as a partner to Iran rather than a subordinate.[20] This framing is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that the Axis of Resistance is more accurately described as an unconventional, Iran-led alliance rather than a constellation of Iranian proxies and partners across the Middle East. Iran considers itself a core part and the leader of the Axis of Resistance but does not outright command many of the other members. Rather, they often compromise and negotiate with one another. Iran does, however, frequently leverage its materiel support to the Axis of Resistance to leverage the decision-making of other members.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 21 for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the starvation of civilians.[21] ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan submitted an application to the court to obtain arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant in May 2024.[22]

The ICC issued an arrest warrant for deceased Hamas military leader Mohammad Deif on November 21 for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, including extermination, murder, torture, and sexual violence.[23] The ICC stated that it issued this arrest despite reports that Deif died. The IDF has stated that it killed Deif in an airstrike in the southern Gaza Strip in July 2024.[24] ICC Chief Prosecutor Khan submitted an application to obtain arrest warrants for deceased Hamas leaders Deif, Yahya Sinwar, and Ismail Haniyeh in May 2024.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The IAEA Board of Governors approved a censure resolution against Iran for its failure to cooperate fully with international nuclear inspectors. This resolution could lead to the reimposition of international sanctions on Iran. Iran responded to the resolution by ordering the activation of recently installed advanced centrifuges at its nuclear facilities.
• Lebanon: Lebanon reportedly proposed several changes to the US-proposed ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah. Lebanese media reported that one of the main sticking points is whether Israel will retain the right to strike Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon if Hezbollah violates the ceasefire.
• Gaza Strip: A senior Israeli security source told Israeli military correspondents that Hamas wants a ceasefire-hostage agreement in the Gaza Strip. The source added that Hamas is prepared to accept a deal even a guarantee of a permanent ceasefire, which has been a continuous Hamas demand throughout talks.
• Yemen: US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said that the Houthis increasingly view themselves as a partner to Iran rather than a subordinate. This characterization is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that the Axis of Resistance is an unconventional, Iran-led alliance rather than a constellation of Iranian proxies and partners across the Middle East.

Iran Update, November 20, 2024

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Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Buckley DeJardin, Michael Weiner, Kyle Moran, Avery Borens, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem announced in a November 20 speech that Hezbollah would require a permanent ceasefire and the preservation of Lebanese sovereignty in any agreement with Israel.[1] Qassem clarified that maintaining Lebanese sovereignty requires preventing Israel from operating in Lebanon “whenever [Israel] wants” and refuted that Israel could “impose its conditions” on Hezbollah.[2] Qassem is referring to the current US-proposed ceasefire agreement that would allow Israel to continue to attack Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL or the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) fail to enforce the ceasefire.[3] The draft agreement includes a clause that states that Israel retains its right to self-defense, and the United States sent to Israel a side letter that stipulates US support for the Israeli right to respond with force to Hezbollah threats.[4] Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar and Defense Minister Israel Katz reiterated on November 20 that Israel requires that it retain its ability to “act and defend Israeli citizens from Hezbollah” in any agreement.[5]

Removing these clauses from the ceasefire agreement would likely enable Hezbollah to gradually re-arm and re-entrench itself in southern Lebanon. The current ceasefire agreement provides no other sufficient mechanisms to ensure that Hezbollah remains disarmed in southern Lebanon.[6] UNIFIL and the LAF would be the only other parties responsible for observing and enforcing Hezbollah’s withdrawal and disarmament in southern Lebanon. CTP-ISW continues to assess that it is extremely unlikely that UNIFIL or the LAF would be willing or able to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament given their previous failures to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in southern Lebanon since 2006. The LAF, which would be responsible for dismantling Hezbollah infrastructure and enforcing disarmament, is particularly unlikely to directly confront Hezbollah.[7]

US special envoy Amos Hochstein met with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri for a second day in Beirut to discuss the Hezbollah response to the US-proposed agreement.[8] Hochstein returned to Israel and will meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for further consultations on November 21.[9]

Qassem, in his speech, continued trying to project Hezbollah strength and resilience against Israeli operations in Lebanon.[10] Qassem promised to attack “the center of Tel Aviv” in retaliation for recent Israeli airstrikes in northern and central Beirut.[11] Qassem reiterated that Hezbollah is not a regular standing army and that the group will rapidly attack and ambush Israeli forces as they enter Lebanon.[12] Qassem also continued to grossly exaggerate the success of Hezbollah operations in Israel and the number of IDF casualties and material damage.[13] Qassem asserted that Hezbollah would survive politically after the war and work with the LAF and people to rebuild Lebanon.[14]

Iranian officials are continuing to broadcast their enduring support for Hezbollah. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a message of support to the Lebanese people on November 19.[15] Separately, Khamenei’s senior security adviser, Ali Larijani, during his trip to Beirut on November 15 reportedly promised continued Iranian support and a commitment to help the Hezbollah rebuild its forces as they recover from the war.[16]

Documents that the IDF seized from the Gaza Strip highlight Iranian efforts to promote interoperability between Hezbollah and Hamas. An Israeli think tank close to the Israeli defense establishment released a report on November 18 detailing the Iranian role in establishing the "Palestinian project" in Lebanon, citing documents that the IDF seized from the Gaza Strip.[17]  Senior Hamas official Khaled Meshaal met with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force officer responsible for Palestine in May 2022, during which they agreed to begin working to establish a Hamas presence in Lebanon. Two thousand Hamas fighters, according to the plan, would have integrated into Hamas special operations forces (SOF) units that would have participated in any Hezbollah ground assault into Israel. The IRGC and Hamas ultimately sought to expand the number to ten thousand Hamas fighters integrated into Hezbollah SOF. Hamas would be tasked with recruiting fighters from the Sunni population in Lebanon, according to the documents.[18] Iran would be primarily responsible for funding Hamas activities in Lebanon, including armament and training.[19] CTP-ISW cannot confirm whether the 2,000 Hamas fighters ever deployed to Lebanon, but Hamas does have a limited presence in southern Lebanon. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas’ militant wing—has claimed at least 20 attacks into Israel from Lebanon since October 2023.[20]

Hamas still retains small forces outside the Gaza Strip that its external leaders can use as a cadre to rebuild Hamas militarily. Hamas' severely degraded position in the Gaza Strip and the failure of its war against Israel suggest that both Iran and Hamas may recognize that accomplishing their objective of destroying Israel is not feasible from the Gaza Strip.[21] Hamas will want to rebuild after the October 7 war, and it has several potential avenues for doing so. The Iran-Hamas project outlined in the letter indicates that both parties could view Lebanon as a viable option for Hamas’ reconstitution.[22] Iran’s financial support for Hamas in Lebanon and its strong ties with Hezbollah would give Iran significant influence over Hamas’ military wing there. Promoting cohesion between Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon is part of broader Iranian efforts to increase interoperability across the Axis of Resistance.

The United States and E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) submitted a censure resolution against Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on November 19 in response to Iran not fully cooperating with the IAEA.[23] The IAEA Board of Governors is expected to vote on the resolution on November 21.[24] The proposed censure resolution comes after the IAEA issued a report on November 19 showing that Iran has increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium since August 2024.[25] The IAEA reported that Iran possessed 182.3 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent as of late October 2024.[26] This amount marks a 17.6 kilogram increase in the Iranian stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent since August 2024.[27] The IAEA added that Iran possessed a total of 6,604.4 kilograms of enriched uranium, which marks an 852.6 kilogram increase in the Iranian total enriched uranium stockpile since August 2024.[28] A US weapons expert reported on November 19 that Iran’s breakout timelines have thus reduced significantly since August 2024.[29] The expert stated that Iran can make enough weapons-grade uranium, which is uranium that is enriched to 90 percent purity, to produce almost 10 nuclear weapons in a month, 13 in two months, 14 in three months, 15 in four months, and 16 in five months.[30]

Iran is trying to prevent the IAEA Board of Governors from approving the censure resolution by offering to cap its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent and threatening unspecified consequences if the IAEA censures Iran. Iran offered to cap its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent at 185 kilograms in exchange for the IAEA rejecting the censure resolution.[31] Iran notably did not offer to reduce the amount of 60 percent enriched uranium that it currently possesses but instead only offered to not further increase its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile. 185 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce four nuclear weapons.[32] Senior Iranian officials, including Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, have warned that Iran will respond “appropriately and proportionately” if the IAEA censures Iran.[33] An Iranian outlet claimed on November 19 that Iran could retaliate by activating a “significant number” of advanced centrifuges.[34] The outlet may have been referring to the IR-6 centrifuges that Iran has installed at Fordow in recent months.[35] The IAEA confirmed in August 2024 that Iran installed eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow but that the centrifuges were not yet operational.[36] Iran previously installed new centrifuges at its nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow in response to an IAEA censure resolution in June 2024.[37]

The Iraqi federal government is trying to prevent additional Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks against Israel in order to avoid Israeli strikes on Iraq. Saudi media reported on November 20 that an Israeli attack targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militias is “imminent” unless the Iraqi federal government prevents further militia attacks on Israel, citing unspecified sources.[38] Saudi media added that the United States informed the Iraqi federal government that it has “exhausted all levers of pressure” to try to prevent Israel from striking Iraq.[39] This report comes after Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar wrote a letter to the president of the UN Security Council on November 18 in which he emphasized the Israeli right to defend itself against Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks.[40] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani chaired an emergency National Security Ministerial Council meeting on November 19 during which he ordered Iraqi security forces to “prevent and pursue any military activity outside the control of the state.”[41] Iraqi security forces reportedly secured sites used by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to launch drones and missiles at Israel following the meeting.[42] It is unclear whether the Sudani administration can prevent further Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel given that it has thus far failed to reign in these militias. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, increased its rate of attacks by nearly 150 percent between September and October 2024 and has claimed 59 attacks in November 2024 thus far.[43] 

Israel is exploring options to improve the distribution of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip in the wake of increased looting of humanitarian aid trucks by armed groups. Axios reported on November 20 that a US-based national security consulting company, Orbis, has proposed a plan to Israel to securely deliver humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.[44] Orbis outlined a pilot project that includes establishing a humanitarian aid hub in an area cleared of Hamas.[45] The aid hub will be established by a private aid organization, according to Orbis. The project would also involve a third-party private contractor securing the aid hub in coordination with the IDF.[46] The proposed p project is likely aimed at establishing the humanitarian aid hub in Jabalia, in the northern Gaza Strip, where the IDF has been conducting clearing operations since October 6.[47] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz reviewed the proposed plan.[48] The establishment of the aid hub will require additional IDF operations in Jabalia, which could take three months to fully clear the area of Hamas and secure the area.[49] Israel is exploring methods to distribute aid in the northern Gaza Strip following a rise in armed groups looting humanitarian aid trucks in the strip in recent days.[50] The IDF has taken several steps in recent days to increase the flow of aid in the Gaza Strip following pressure from the United States, including plans to reopen the Kissufim border crossing to facilitate the transfer of aid trucks into the northern Gaza Strip.[51]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the Netzarim Corridor to conduct a situational assessment on November 20 and announced a reward of five million US dollars and safe passage out of the Gaza Strip to any individual who frees an Israeli hostage.[52] Netanyahu, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, and IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi met with the commanders of the IDF 99th Division IDF Southern Command in the corridor to review IDF operations in the Gaza Strip.[53]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah is trying to remove a clause in a US-proposed ceasefire agreement that allows Israel to strike Hezbollah targets if Hezbollah violates the ceasefire. Removing these clauses would enable Hezbollah to gradually re-arm and re-entrench in southern Lebanon.
• Lebanon: Documents seized by the IDF in the Gaza Strip highlight Iranian efforts to promote interoperability between Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. The documents depict Iran-Hamas discussions to send thousands of Hamas fighters to Lebanon to integrate into Hezbollah SOF units. These units are trained to conduct ground attacks into Israel.
• Iran: The United States and E3 submitted a censure resolution against Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors in response to Iran's refusal to cooperate fully with the IAEA. Iran is trying to prevent the censure resolution from passing by threatening unspecified retaliation.
• Iraq: The Iraqi federal government is trying to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on Israel in order to prevent Israeli strikes on Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi attacks on Israel increased by almost 150 percent between September and October 2024.
• Gaza Strip: Israel is exploring options to improve the distribution of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip. These considerations come amid an uptick in armed Palestinian gangs interdicting aid convoys and looting them.

Iran Update, November 14, 2024

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Ria Reddy, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, and Nicholas Carl

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Israeli forces have likely disrupted Lebanese Hezbollah’s ability to fire into Israel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported the daily rate of Hezbollah attacks have declined on average over the “past few weeks” and have decreased by half in the past week.[1] The IDF also reported that it is targeting stockpiles of observed and unobserved indirect fire systems that are difficult to reach with airstrikes.[2] The IDF added that approximately 60 percent of Hezbollah indirect fire launches use small single- or triple-barreled launch systems.[3] The stated Israeli war aim of returning displaced citizens safely to their homes in northern Israel requires stopping Hezbollah rocket fire into Israel. The recent relaxation of IDF restrictions for gatherings in northern Israel indicates the reduced threat of Hezbollah rocket fire.[4] The IDF reported that Hezbollah has also struggled to conduct large, coordinated rocket attacks into Israel, suggesting that Hezbollah is cannot easily communicate across tactical units or operational-level headquarters.[5] Israeli forces continue to exploit this disruption and have expanded clearing operations up to five to six kilometers into “second line” of Lebanese towns.[6]

Unknown gunmen shot at a UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) patrol in southern Lebanon after the patrol discovered an ammunition cache on November 14.[7] UNIFIL stated that its forces informed the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and shortly thereafter came under fire from two or three individuals.[8] UNIFIL requested that Lebanese authorities fully investigate the incident.[9] The LAF would be responsible for enforcing the disarmament of Hezbollah during a ceasefire with Israel, according to a leaked US-proposed draft.[10]

The IDF reported that it is facing a severe shortage of soldiers.[11] The IDF published data showing that it is currently has only 83 percent of the combat manpower that it requires. The IDF accordingly urged the government to increase the required time for mandatory IDF regular military service to three years, a jump from the current requirement of two and a half years for men and two years for women.[12] The IDF also urged the government to approve a service extension law. The IDF added that recruitment of ultra-Orthodox soldiers has increased in recent years but that it still fell short of the IDF goal of recruiting 1,300 ultra-Orthodox Israelis in the July-October 2024 recruitment cycle. The IDF reported that combat unit reservists served an average of 136 days in 2024 and are projected to serve an average of 70-72 days in 2025. The IDF data revealed that approximately 40,000 reservists in combat and combat-support roles did not respond to reserve duty call ups during an unspecified period. Senior Israeli officers previously attributed the fall off in participation to burnout after over a year of war.[13] Israeli media reported that the failure of the Israeli government to enact policy to draft the ultra-Orthodox Israeli population contributed to the reduced reservist responses to the call ups.[14]

Iranian leaders appear concerned about the possibility of the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggering international “snapback” sanctions on Iran. Unspecified diplomats told Reuters that the E3 are drafting a resolution to present at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting in Vienna from November 18 to 22 to “pressure Tehran over its poor cooperation” with the IAEA.[15] The resolution would require the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities in addition to its regular quarterly ones. The report would likely lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions because the report would almost certainly confirm--as previous IAEA reports have already--Iranian noncompliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[16] The sanctions would target Iran’s nuclear and missile program and arms transfers.[17] The most recent IAEA report in August 2024 concluded that Iran continues to develop its nuclear program outside the parameters of the JCPOA.[18] The IAEA report stated that Iran possesses 164.7 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, marking a 22.6 kilogram increase in the Iranian stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium since May 2024.[19] The report also verified that Iran has installed eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow and 10 out of 18 planned cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz.[20] Iran also continues to severely limit the ability of the IAEA to conduct various verification and monitoring activities related to the JCPOA.

Iran has continued to expand its nuclear program since the IAEA published its last verification and monitoring report in August 2024. The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on November 14 that high resolution satellite imagery from October 2024 shows new construction at a former Iranian nuclear weapons development site at Golab Dareh.[21] The imagery reveals new trench excavations and cabling that can be used to implement new security measures at the site, including alarms and surveillance cameras. ISIS previously reported renewed activity at another Iranian nuclear site at Sanjarian, citing imagery from September 2024.[22]

Iran’s clear and explicit violations of the JCPOA could prompt the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions against Iran. Telegraph reported on November 2 that the United Kingdom is “prepared” to trigger snapback sanctions against Iran due to Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA.[23] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Director Mohammad Eslami stated that “any resolution on Iran’s nuclear affairs will face Iran’s immediate response” during a press conference with IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi, likely referring to the E3 resolution and sanctions.[24] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters that Tehran would send a message to the E3 through Grossi about Tehran's seriousness to resolve its nuclear standoff, likely to try to convince the E3 not to trigger the snapback mechanism.[25] Senior Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, similarly emphasized Iran’s willingness to cooperate with the IAEA during separate meetings with Grossi on November 14.[26]

The United States sanctioned on November 14 a Syrian network involved in selling oil to the Syrian regime and China and generating revenue for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force and Houthis.[27] The sanctions targeted 26 companies, individuals, and vessels associated with the al Qaterji Company.[28] The company finances and maintains a militia in Syria and is connected to Hezbollah Unit 4400, which is involved in arms smuggling.[29] The IDF killed one of the company’s founders in an airstrike in July 2024.[30] The United States previously designated al Qaterji Company as a terrorist financing entity in 2022 after it facilitated trade between the Syrian regime and Islamic State.[31] The United States stated that al Qaterji Company executives met directly with senior IRGC Quds Force officers as well as a sanctioned Iranian-backed Houthi financial official, Said al Jamal.[32] The United States previously sanctioned al Jamal and affiliated companies facilitating Iranian oil trade to support the funding of Iranian proxy and partner militias.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF has likely disrupted the ability of Lebanese Hezbollah to fire into Israel. Hezbollah is struggling to conduct coordinated, large-scale attacks into Israel, suggesting challenges communicating across tactical units or operational-level headquarters.
• Iran: Iranian leaders appear concerned that the E3 could trigger international “snapback” sanctions on Iran. The E3 has expressed concern, as Iran has continued to expand its nuclear program in violation of the JCPOA.
• Syria: The United States sanctioned a Syrian network involved in selling oil to the Syrian regime and China and generating revenue for the IRGC Quds Force and Houthis. Some of the designated entities are tied to Syria militias and Lebanese Hezbollah arms smuggling.

Iran Update, November 13, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Siddhant Kishore, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

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The damage caused by Israel’s October 25 strike targeting Iran’s ballistic missile production facilities combined with Iran’s decreased missile stockpile makes another Iranian large-scale ballistic missile attack targeting Israel unlikely. Iran could use a smaller number of long-range systems combined with a larger number of shorter-range systems fired from Iraq, however. Iran conducted two major strikes on Israel on April 13 and October 1.[1] Iran used 30 ballistic missiles in the April 13 strike and 180 ballistic missiles on October 1. Israel’s October 25 strikes targeting Iranian ballistic missile production facilities severely damaged Iran’s ability to produce long-range ballistic missiles, according to an Israeli intelligence assessment quoted by a Netanyahu-leaning Israeli outlet.[2]  These Israeli assessments are consistent with previous reports that the IDF destroyed mixing equipment used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[3] The assessments also estimate that Iran still has “several hundred long-range missiles” and that Iran is “unlikely to launch all of the missiles at Israel simultaneously.[4] Iran will likely seek to preserve the remainder of its diminishing ballistic missile stockpile rather than further depleting this stockpile by launching another large-scale missile attack on Israel, assuming the Israeli assessments are accurate.

US and Israeli officials are in the "final stages” of drafting language for a ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon, according to unspecified US and Israeli officials.[5] Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer recently met with US Special Envoy for Lebanon Amos Hochstein and US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan.[6] An unspecified US official said that Dermer’s meetings with Hochstein and Sullivan were “productive” and narrowed the gaps between US and Israel on the language of the ceasefire proposal and a “side letter” that would guarantee US support for Israeli freedom of military action against threats from Hezbollah.[7] Hochstein told Axios on November 12 that he believes "there is a shot" of securing a ceasefire deal in Lebanon soon.[8]  Hochstein is expected to travel to Beirut to discuss the proposal draft with Lebanese officials once US and Israeli negotiators have finalized the proposal and side letter’s language.[9]

Israel will likely need to compel Hezbollah to agree to the US-Israeli proposal. Hezbollah may outright reject Israel’s terms or refuse to join negotiations altogether. Hezbollah’s ceasefire demands are directly at odds with Israel’s insistence that the IDF retains the ability to act militarily in Lebanon to thwart Hezbollah threats. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem recently said that Israel would have to end operations in Lebanon before Hezbollah would agree to indirect ceasefire talks and stated that Hezbollah would require the “full protection of Lebanese sovereignty without any reduction” in negotiations.[10] This suggests that Hezbollah will not permit foreign forces to operate in southern Lebanon in any way that is beyond UNIFIL’s current mandate. If indirect negotiations between Hezbollah and Israel break down, the IDF is likely to continue its air and ground campaign, as Israeli military and political officials have indicated in recent days.[11]

Hezbollah may choose accept Israel’s ceasefire terms in order to preserve its forces north of the Litani River, given the damage Hezbollah has suffered throughout Lebanon since the Israeli campaign began. The ceasefire terms, if consistent with current US and Israeli discussions, would allow Israel to continue to attack Hezbollah fighters and targets in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL or the LAF fail to enforce the ceasefire’s terms.[12] Hezbollah may calculate, however, that agreeing to a ceasefire soon would allow it to preserve its forces and infrastructure north of the Litani, enabling it to rebuild its forces and ensure its survival in the long term. It is extremely unlikely that UNIFIL or the LAF would be willing to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament in the south, given their failure to enforce UNSCR 1701 in southern Lebanon since 2006. The details of the speed of the LAF’s deployment to southern Lebanon following a ceasefire are reportedly still up for discussion, with Lebanese sources indicating that the LAF may not be able to deploy as quickly as the US would prefer.[13] Slow LAF deployment would only make it more difficult for the LAF and UNIFIL to support any ceasefire.

Russia refused to block the transit of Iranian supplies to Hezbollah via Syria. The Russian Presidential Special Envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentyev, told Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti on November 13 that Russia could not guarantee that it would block the transit of Iranian materiel to Hezbollah through Syria.[14] Lavrentyev said that monitoring Iranian-backed efforts to transfer materiel is the responsibility of Lebanese and Syrian authorities.[15] These authorities are fully unwilling and unable to block these Iranian-backed and Hezbollah-enabled efforts. Lavrentyev’s comments follow Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer’s recent visit to Russia to discuss a ceasefire agreement in Lebanon.[16] Israeli Army Radio reported on November 12 that Israel is seeking for Russia to guarantee that the Syrian regime will prevent Iranian-backed networks from transferring weapons through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon.[17] It is unclear why Russia would prevent Hezbollah from rearming given that Russian forces in Syria have enabled Hezbollah to arm up to this point by allowing Iranian material transfers through Syria to Lebanon.[18]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published a video of an Israeli hostage giving coerced testimony to degrade Israeli public support for IDF operations in the Gaza Strip. Israeli Russian hostage Alexander “Sasha” Turbanov urged Israelis to demonstrate weekly against IDF operations in the Gaza Strip in the video that was filmed under PIJ coercion.[19] The video is almost certainly timed to exploit Israeli domestic discontent after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5 for Gallant’s support of a ceasefire with Hamas.[20] Gallant identified his support for a ceasefire deal that would return the hostages as one of three reasons that caused Netanyahu to dismiss him. Gallant‘s firing caused an initial, short wave of protests, and 55% of Israelis opposed Netanyahu’s move to fire Gallant.[21] An earlier Netanyahu attempt to fire Gallant during the 2023 Judicial Protests failed after protesters demonstrated in support of Gallant. Hamas has previously released propaganda videos of hostages to trigger domestic Israeli pressure on Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire with Hamas by reinforcing that Israel can only secure the release of living hostages through negotiations rather than military operations.[22] PIJ is likely releasing this video now to capitalize on the renewed Israeli domestic discontent over the lack of a ceasefire-hostage deal after Netanyahu’s dismissal of Gallant.[23]

An IDF spokesperson said that Israel is digging berms along the demilitarized zone between the Golan Heights and Syria to protect Israel against Iranian-backed infiltration attempts from Syria.[24] The IDF spokesperson was responding to statements from the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). UNDOF’s Chief Mission Support Bernard Lee told the BBC on November 12 that Israel had dug two major lines of trenches along the Israeli border with the demilitarized zone.[25] UNDOF said that some of the trenches cross into the demilitarized zone and that Israeli armor and personnel had crossed into the zone during the construction of the trenches.[26] Commercially available satellite imagery confirms UNDOF’s characterizations of the Israeli construction. Syrian media claimed on October 15 that four Israeli tanks, excavators, and about 50 IDF personnel have been operating within the demilitarized zone near al Asbah and al Rafid in Quneitra Province since October 2024.[27]

Israeli media reported in September 2024 that Israeli defense officials were concerned about a potential Iranian-backed attempt to launch a ground attack into Israel from Syria.[28] Iranian-backed groups have previously shown interest in conducting such attacks.  The IDF recently captured a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border arrangements during a ground raid in southern Syria.[29] This Iranian-led intelligence effort was likely an attempt to gather information on Israeli border security that Iranian-backed militias could use to conduct small-scale infiltrations into the Golan Heights.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Retaliation Against Israel: The damage caused by Israel’s October 25 strike targeting Iran’s ballistic missile production facilities combined with Iran’s decreased missile stockpile makes another Iranian large-scale ballistic missile attack targeting Israel unlikely. Iran could use a smaller number of long-range systems combined with a larger number of shorter-range systems fired from Iraq, however.
• Lebanon Ceasefire Talks: US and Israeli officials are in the "final stages” of drafting language for a ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon, according to unspecified US and Israeli officials. Israel will likely need to compel Hezbollah to agree to the US-Israeli proposal.
• Hezbollah’s Ceasefire Considerations: Hezbollah may outright reject Israel’s terms or refuse to join negotiations altogether. Hezbollah’s ceasefire demands are directly at odds with Israel’s insistence that the IDF retains the ability to act militarily in Lebanon to thwart Hezbollah threats. Hezbollah may choose to accept Israel’s ceasefire terms to preserve its forces north of the Litani River, given the damage Hezbollah has suffered throughout Lebanon since the Israeli campaign began.
• Russia in the Middle East: Russia refused to block the transit of Iranian supplies to Hezbollah via Syria. The Russian Presidential Special Envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentyev, told Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti on November 13 that Russia could not guarantee that it would block the transit of Iranian materiel to Hezbollah through Syria.
• Ceasefire-Hostage Negotiations in the Gaza Strip: Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published a video of an Israeli hostage giving coerced testimony to degrade Israeli public support for IDF operations in the Gaza Strip. The video is almost certainly timed to exploit Israeli domestic discontent after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5 for Gallant’s support of a ceasefire with Hamas.
• Syria: An IDF spokesperson said that Israel is digging berms along the demilitarized zone between the Golan Heights and Syria to protect Israel against Iranian-backed infiltration attempts from Syria. Iranian-backed groups have previously shown interest in conducting ground attacks into Israel, and a recent Israeli raid captured a Syrian man who had been collecting intelligence on Israeli border security along the Israeli-Syrian border.

Iran Update, November 12, 2024

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Katherine Wells, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Alexandra Braverman and Brian Carter

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Newly-appointed Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reaffirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will continue its operation in Lebanon until it accomplishes its mission.[1] Katz made these comments during a meeting with the IDF General Staff. Katz replaced Yoav Gallant as defense minister on November 8 and was formerly foreign minister.[2] Katz affirmed that Israel would “continue to hit Hezbollah with full force” to capitalize on past successes like the killing of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and “realize the fruits of victory.”[3] He stressed that Israel would not agree to any ceasefire agreement that does not “guarantee Israel’s right to enforce and prevent terrorism on its own,” in addition to other war aims of disarming Hezbollah, forcing a Hezbollah withdrawal north of the Litani River, and returning northern Israeli residents safely home.[4]  Katz’s vision is largely consistent with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has said that Israel needs to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River “with or without an agreement” and that any agreement must include measures to prevent Hezbollah’s reorganization and rearmament.[5]

Israel’s limited operation in frontline border towns of southern Lebanon will not alone accomplish Katz’s outlined goals. The IDF has especially focused on degrading the Hezbollah Radwan special operations forces during the clearing operations.[6] Eliminating the threat of ground attacks is critical to achieving the stated Israeli war aim of returning displaced civilians safely to their homes in northern Israel. Eliminating the threat of ground attacks will not move Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River or prevent rocket attacks from longer-range systems, however. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on November 6 that the IDF will prepare plans to expand military operations in Lebanon.[7] An Israeli journalist reported that Israel recently informed the United States that its operation in southern Lebanon is “coming to an end” and that Israel is interested in reaching an agreement within a few weeks.[8]  US special envoy to Lebanon Amos Hochstein also said on November 12 that "there is a chance to reach a ceasefire in Lebanon soon."[9] Hezbollah does not yet appear willing to agree to a ceasefire on terms desirable to Israel, however. Hezbollah leadership would moreover likely experience command and control challenges and struggle to enforce a full ceasefire, withdrawal, and disarmament terms among its rank-and-file members—many of whom live south of the Litani River.[10]

A likely Hezbollah drone struck a kindergarten in the Haifa suburb of Nesher on November 12. The drone struck outside the kindergarten while the children were in a bomb shelter and did not cause casualties.[11] Israeli journalists reported that the IDF alert system did not sound in Nesher but did activate in neighboring areas.[12] Hezbollah did not claim a drone attack at the same time or area as the strike, nor did it explicitly acknowledge the strike. Hezbollah similarly did not claim its rocket attack that struck a soccer field of Druze children in Majdal al Shams on July 27.[13] It is more likely that Hezbollah’s Majdal al Shams strike was unintentional and caused by technical failures inherent to rockets. One-way-attack drones, however, are much more accurate than rockets. Drones can still suffer failures and miss their intended targets as a result of electronic warfare or a partial interception. Hezbollah’s decision in early 2024 to transition from less-sophisticated rocket and anti-tank guided missile systems to more advanced and deadly rockets, one-way attack drones, and anti-tank guided missile systems increased the risk that a Hezbollah attack would cause significant Israeli casualties, either intentionally or due to a miscalculation.[14]

Iran and Russia have taken the first steps to create a banking network that circumvents international sanctions. Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin announced on November 11 that Iran and Russia have implemented a new interbank network to circumvent the SWIFT system, which is based on the US dollar.[15] Iran’s Shetab interbank network now works with Russia’s Mir system, which means Iranians can now use Iranian bank cards and withdraw money in Russia.[16] The Shetab-Mir network will also enable Iranians to make online purchases in Russia. Iranian state television channel IRINN stated that this plan will be implemented in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey as well.[17] The creation of this network and its emphasis on reducing dependence on the US dollar is part of a broader Iranian effort to mitigate sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy by building relations with regional and international states.

Growing Russo-Iranian tensions in the Caucasus represent fissures in the bilateral relationship, but both states will likely attempt to prevent the Caucasus issue from derailing wider Iranian or Russian policy objectives. The New York Times published an article on growing Russo-Iranian tensions in the Caucasus that included an interview with the Iranian ambassador to Armenia.[18] The ambassador argued that Iran and Russia ”are not allies” and that they have ”some differences” and  ”some mutual interests.” This is in part a reference to the disagreements between Russia and Iran over the Zangezur Corridor project, which is a Turkish project that seeks to connect Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.[19] Such a corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia at a time when Iran hopes to expand trade with Armenia and Europe.[20] This disagreement is unlikely to derail broader Iranian and Russian efforts to deepen bilateral ties, however. Iran would certainly prioritize sanctions mitigation over secondary policy objectives like the Zangezur Corridor. Iran views sanctions mitigation as a way to enhance regime security by improving its economy.

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli War Aims in Lebanon: Newly-appointed Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reaffirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will continue its operation in Lebanon until it accomplishes its mission. Katz said that Israel would not agree to any ceasefire agreement that does not “guarantee Israel’s right to enforce and prevent terrorism on its own.” Israel’s currently limited operation in frontline border towns of southern Lebanon will not alone accomplish Katz’s vision.
• Iran-Russia Relations: Iran and Russia have taken the first steps to create a banking network that circumvents international sanctions. The creation of this network and its emphasis on reducing dependence on the US dollar is part of a broader Iranian effort to mitigate sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy by building relations with regional and international states.
• Iran and Russia in the Caucasus: Growing Russo-Iranian tensions in the Caucasus represent fissures in the bilateral relationship, but both states will likely attempt to prevent the Caucasus issue from derailing wider Iranian or Russian policy objectives. The disagreements between the two countries over the Caucasus is unlikely to derail broader Iranian and Russian efforts to deepen bilateral ties. Iran would certainly prioritize sanctions mitigation through a stronger Russo-Iranian relationship over secondary policy objectives like the Zangezur Corridor. Iran views sanctions mitigation as a way to enhance regime security by improving its economy.
• Hezbollah Attack Campaign in Israel: A likely Hezbollah drone struck a kindergarten in the Haifa suburb of Nesher on November 12. The drone struck outside the kindergarten while the children were in a bomb shelter and did not cause casualties. One-way-attack drones are much more accurate than rockets. Drones can still suffer failures and miss their intended targets as a result of electronic warfare or a partial interception.

Iran Update, November 11, 2024

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Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, and Brian Carter

Iran Update, November 7, 2024

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Annika Ganzeveld, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Victoria Penza, and Brian Carter

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Hezbollah executed a prepared but limited defense of Khiam in southeastern Lebanon against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from October 28 to 31.[1] Hezbollah’s Operations Room claimed that the group prevented an Israeli force from seizing and controlling terrain in Khiam by executing a “fire defense,“ which likely refers to a prepared but limited defense that involved pre-registering targets for indirect fire while committing only a small amount of infantry.[2] This requires a certain level of preparation by Hezbollah but it is limited because a small amount of infantry could not hope to hold Khiam against an Israeli mechanized assault. Hezbollah fighters conducted 70 attacks over the IDF’s three-day advance towards Khiam. Most of these attacks were indirect fire attacks using rockets, thus supporting the theory that Hezbollah planned a defense centering on indirect fire.[3] Hezbollah did not claim small arms engagements with Israeli forces during this period, suggesting that Hezbollah commanders used light infantry fighters sparingly, if at all. Lebanese sources reported small arms engagements between Hezbollah fighters and the IDF but did not specify at what range the engagements occurred.[4] The low number of small arms engagements suggests that Hezbollah commanders were either unwilling or unable to deploy many infantrymen during the IDF advance into Khiam and preferred to deplete stocks of rockets, anti-tank guided missiles, and mortar shells.

Hezbollah’s prepared fire-heavy defense also suggests that Hezbollah commanders were focused on inflicting casualties rather than holding ground. This would be consistent with a defense that prioritizes the attrition of enemy forces and thus the enemy’s will to fight over holding ground. The IDF advanced at least five kilometers from Israel towards and into Khiam during the three-day operation. Hezbollah claimed that the IDF withdrew into northern Israel from Khiam on October 31 but did not provide additional evidence.[5]

Hezbollah’s defense of Khiam has been the most organized defense of a southern Lebanon village since the IDF began its ground operation in Lebanon in early October. Hezbollah commanders may have chosen to defend this area given that Khiam is located on high ground from which Hezbollah could fire into northern Israel. Khiam, moreover, grants Hezbollah a vantage point from which it could observe Israeli forces and other targets around the Galilee Panhandle. The IDF never confirmed that it operated in Khiam and did not publicize Hezbollah equipment or infrastructure seized there. Geolocated footage posted on November 6 showed the IDF 8th Armored Brigade (res.) (91st Division) operating in Khiam in recent days, however.[6]  Israeli forces destroyed firing points aimed toward northern Israeli towns and located and destroyed weapons, including Kornet missiles, grenades, and explosives in Khiam.[7] The IDF killed the commander of Hezbollah’s local unit in Khiam unit on November 3 after the IDF withdrew from the town.[8] The IDF continued artillery shelling of Khiam and its outskirts post-withdrawal.[9]  The fact that Hezbollah’s tactical command echelons near Khiam managed to execute a defense is not a strong indicator that Hezbollah’s higher command echelons have recovered from the severe degradation caused by Israeli air and ground operations. The defense of Khiam could be planned and executed at a relatively low echelon of command.

Recent statements by senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders suggest that the IRGC may conduct a direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory in response to the October 25 Israeli strike targeting Iran. These IRGC commanders have warned in recent days that Iran will conduct a third “True Promise Operation” against Israel. “True Promise Operation” refers to the previous large-scale Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel in April and October 2024, which Iranian officials refer to as True Promise Operation 1 and True Promise Operation 2, respectively.[10] Senior IRGC commanders, including IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi and IRGC Second Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Ali Fazli, have recently warned that Iran will “certainly” launch a third “True Promise Operation” against Israel.[11]

Iran may conduct a smaller-scale direct attack on Israel than it did in April and October 2024 in order to preserve its diminishing long-range missile stockpile. Iran used a total of around 300 long-range ballistic missiles in its attacks on Israel earlier this year.[12] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) damaged mixing equipment and facilities used to produce long-range ballistic missiles in its strikes into Iran on October 25, which will likely disrupt Iran’s ability to manufacture ballistic missiles.[13] This disruption could cause the Iranian regime to refrain from conducting a large-scale missile attack on Israel since it might currently lack the capability to readily replace the missiles it would use in such an attack. Iran could conduct a joint attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Israel in order to preserve its long-range missile stockpile, however. Unspecified US and Israeli officials told Axios on November 5 that the IRGC has been transferring drones and ballistic missiles to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias since the Israeli strikes on October 25.[14]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described the features a future supreme leader should embody during his first public meeting with the Assembly of Experts on November 7.[15] Khamenei stated that the Assembly should select a leader who embodies the revolution and carries it forward to maintain the revolution’s “main goal” of “implementing the religion of Islam in the country and in people‘s lives.”[16] Khamenei notably did not reveal any specific details about his successor. The Assembly of Experts is the regime body constitutionally responsible for monitoring and selecting the supreme leader. The newest Assembly was elected in March 2024 and will serve until 2032.[17] This iteration of the Assembly will likely be the Assembly that chooses the next Supreme Leader following Khamenei’s death.

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stated on November 7 that the reelection of former US President Donald Trump does not impact the Houthis’ campaign against shipping or Israel.[18] Abdulmalik said that Houthi fighters will continue to attack merchant vessels and US and Royal (UK) Navy vessels transiting through the Red Sea.[19] He also said that the Houthis would continue direct attacks on Israel. Abdulmalik added that they have experienced Trump before.[20] CTP-ISW has observed over 270 Houthi attacks targeting commercial vessels since November 2023.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Operations in Lebanon: Hezbollah executed a prepared but limited defense of Khiam in southeastern Lebanon against the IDF from October 28 to 31. The group said that it prevented an Israeli force from seizing and controlling terrain in Khiam by executing a “fire defense,“ which likely refers to a prepared but limited defense that involved pre-registering targets for indirect fire while committing only a small amount of infantry.
• Iranian Retaliation Against Israel: Recent statements by senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders suggest that the IRGC may conduct a direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory in response to the October 25 Israeli strike targeting Iran. Iran may conduct a smaller-scale direct attack on Israel than it did in April and October 2024 to preserve its diminishing long-range missile stockpile.
• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described the features a future supreme leader should embody during his first public meeting with the Assembly of Experts on November 7.
• Houthi Response to US Election: Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stated on November 7 that the reelection of former US President Donald Trump does not impact the Houthis’ campaign against shipping or Israel. Abdulmalik said that Houthi fighters will continue to attack merchant vessels, US and Royal (UK) Navy vessels transiting through the Red Sea, and Israel itself.

Iran Update, November 6, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, Victoria Penza, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

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Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem claimed that Hezbollah would outlast Israel in a “war of attrition” in a speech on November 6.[1] Qassem said that Hezbollah was “ready” for a war of attrition and that Israel would “not win, even if it takes a long time.”[2] The speech marked the 40-day death anniversary of former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and was Qassem’s second public statement since taking over as head of Hezbollah.[3]

Qassem did not tie a Lebanon ceasefire to Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip, a notable shift from Nasrallah’s position before the ground operation.[4] Qassem said that Israel would have to end operations in Lebanon before Hezbollah would agree to indirect ceasefire talks through Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabhi Berri, who is a Hezbollah ally.[5] Qassem said that the ”ceiling” for negotiation would be the ”full protection of Lebanese sovereignty without any reduction,” suggesting that Hezbollah will not permit foreign forces to operate in southern Lebanon in any way that is beyond UNIFIL’s current mandate.[6]

Qassem implicitly threatened the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) against collaboration with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).[7] Qassem implied that LAF allowed an Israeli naval raid into Batroun, north of Beirut by saying that “today I will not accuse” but ”demand” an answer.[8] Qassem further demanded that the LAF protect Lebanese maritime borders.[9] Qassem appears to be implying that Hezbollah would not sit idle while the LAF coordinates with the IDF and could set the tone for LAF activities in southern Lebanon after the end of the Israeli ground operation. Israeli Army Radio reported that senior Hezbollah naval official Imad Amhaz surrendered without resistance to Israeli naval special operations forces in Batroun on November 1.[10] Qassem’s comments are notable given that the LAF is the security force responsible for enforcing Hezbollah’s withdrawal and disarmament in southern Lebanon, according to leaked copies of a late October ceasefire proposal.[11] The leaked text stipulates that LAF would deploy 10,000 troops to southern Lebanon, monitor the Israel-Lebanon border and all land, sea, and air crossings, and dismantle all non-state military infrastructure while confiscating arms.[12] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the success of this proposal depends fully on Hezbollah’s agreement and cooperation with the LAF, making Qassem’s threats notable.[13]

Qassem grossly exaggerated the number of IDF injuries, deaths, and material damage caused by Hezbollah.[14] He falsely claimed that Hezbollah has killed and wounded over a thousand Israeli soldiers over the last 40 days.[15] The IDF has announced that it has suffered 38 soldiers killed in action in southern Lebanon and northern Israel since the start of the ground operation.[16]

Qassem continued to extol Hezbollah’s strength after Israeli operations without providing any evidence. Qassem said that Hezbollah’s weapons stockpiles are not low.[17] The IDF has seized tens of thousands of anti-tank guided munitions from Hezbollah warehouses near the Israel-Lebanon border.[18] The IDF said that it had destroyed 70 percent of Hezbollah drones and 80 percent of Hezbollah rockets through its ground and air campaign.[19] Qassem also claimed that Hezbollah has tens of thousands of fighters in reserve who are ready to engage the IDF.[20] The IDF assessed that it has killed at least 3,000 Hezbollah fighters since October 7, 2023.[21] Israeli operations, including the pager and radio attacks, have injured thousands of additional Hezbollah fighters.[22] Western estimates of Hezbollah’s fighting force range from 20,000 to 50,000 fighters.[23] 

IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on November 6 that the IDF will prepare plans to expand military operations in Lebanon.[24] Halevi said that the IDF will develop plans to “expand and deepen” ground operations and activate those plans as needed.[25] Halevi noted that these plans will be formulated alongside efforts to pursue a diplomatic agreement in Lebanon.[26]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba threatened to target US bases in Iraq and Syria on November 4, likely to pressure the US to prevent potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Political Council leader Sheikh Ali al Asadi threatened that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—would target US bases in Iraq and Syria if the Iraqi government discovered that Israel used Iraqi airspace to attack Iran on October 25.[27] The IDF struck several locations in Iraq and Syria on October 25 before launching strikes into Iran.[28] The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias falsely believe that the United States can control Israeli actions and have often attacked US bases in Iraq and Syria as a retaliation against Israeli action. Both Israel and the United States have reportedly warned Iraq that Israel may strike targets in Iraq if Iranian-backed Iraqi groups target Israel from Iraqi territory.[29] These Israeli threats may have led Iraqi militias to attempt to deter Israel, including by pressuring the United States under the false assumption that the United States can prevent Israeli strikes on Iraq.

The Biden Administration has conveyed to the Iraqi government that the United States will not be able to prevent an Israeli strike in Iraq if Iran attacks Israel from Iraqi territory. The US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan told the Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani that Israel will almost certainly strike in Iraq if Iran attacks Israel from Iraqi territory, according to Axios.[30] Sullivan and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken also pressured Sudani to limit Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria, something Sudani has so far failed to prevent.[31]  Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Ansar Allah al Awfiya leader Ali al Fatlawi also told Lebanese outlet al Akhbar on November 5 that the Iraqi militias have the right to support the Iranian response against Israel, further underscoring Sudani’s failure to prevent militia attacks.[32]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is reportedly transferring ballistic missiles and drones and planning a joint attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Israel, further suggesting Iran will retaliate for Israel’s October 25 strikes in Iran from Iraqi territory. Two unspecified Israeli sources told Axios on October 1 that Iraqi militias may soon attack Israel using ballistic missiles and drones.[33] The IRGC has probably shipped some of these missiles and drones in components to Iraqi militias, allowing the groups to assemble the systems themselves possibly with Houthi support, as CTP-ISW suggested on November 5. This collaboration could have also extended into rudimentary drone production.

Iranian media claimed that Iran and Pakistan conducted a joint airstrike attack against Jaish al Adl, a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia on November 5.[34] Jaish al Adl acknowledged that two high-ranking commanders and 12 fighters were killed in what it said was a joint Iranian-Pakistani airstrike.[35] The Pakistani officials have not confirmed the joint military action with Iran, however. The IRGC conducted drone and missile strikes in January 2024 on two Jaish al Adl headquarters in Koh Sabz, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan, on January 16 without Pakistan's permission. Pakistan responded by launching combination of drones, rockets, and air-launched standoff munitions targeting Baloch separatists in three locations near Saravan, Iran, on January 17.[36] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Pakistan on November 4 to meet with high-ranking Pakistani officials. Araghchi's trip likely aimed, in part, to express Iran's concerns regarding border security.[37]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba threatened to target US bases in Iraq and Syria on November 4, likely to compel the US to prevent potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. The Biden Administration has conveyed to the Iraqi government that the United States will not be able to prevent an Israeli strike in Iraq if Iran attacks Israel from Iraqi territory.
• Iran in Iraq: The IRGC is reportedly transferring ballistic missiles and drones and planning a joint attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Israel, further suggesting Iran will retaliate for Israel’s October 25 strikes in Iran from Iraqi territory.
• Hezbollah: Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem claimed that Hezbollah would outlast Israel in a “war of attrition” in a speech on November 6. Qassem did not tie a Lebanon ceasefire to Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip, a notable shift from Nasrallah’s position before the ground operation.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on November 6 that the IDF will prepare plans to expand military operations in Lebanon.
• Anti-Regime Militancy in Iran: Iranian media claimed that Iran and Pakistan conducted a joint airstrike attack against Jaish al Adl, a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia on November 5.

Iran Update, November 5, 2024

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Carolyn Moorman, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Kelly Campa, Victoria Penza, and Brian Carter

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Fatah is attempting to extend its control over the Gaza Strip after the October 7 War, but Fatah’s lack of pro-Fatah Palestinian Authority (PA)-affiliated military forces in the Gaza Strip will make this extremely difficult. Fatah and Hamas have met in Cairo for the past several days to discuss post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and reportedly agreed in principle to form an administrative committee to manage civil affairs, including humanitarian aid.[1] Hamas reportedly demanded that the committees only include PA civilian employees and remain independent of the PA itself.[2] Fatah Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas demanded in response to Hamas that the committee must be administratively and financially subordinate to the PA or Fatah would not agree to a deal.[3] Either plan will not lead to renewed PA control in the Gaza Strip, however. Hamas guerrilla cells remain active across the Strip, and these cells would attack any attempt by the PA to replace Hamas’ political control with Fatah-affiliated or -dominated PA political control. Hamas likely continues to believe that controlling these committees would enable it to preserve its influence in the Strip.

Fatah likely views the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and Hamas’ weakened military position as an opportunity to confront Hamas over Hamas efforts to maintain control in the Gaza Strip. An anonymous PA official noted that the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on October 16 has created an opening for further discussions with Hamas or alternative governance plans for the post-war Gaza Strip.[4] It does not appear that Hamas has altered its position vis-a-vis political control in the Gaza Strip since Sinwar’s death.[5] Hamas has long attempted to maintain control or influence over any post-war political organization in the Gaza Strip.[6]

Israeli forces are conducting a major clearing operation across the northern Gaza Strip to disrupt militia reconstitution efforts. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on November 5 that the IDF has stationed forces along two separate corridors north and south of Gaza City, isolating North Gaza Governorate from the rest of the Gaza Strip, and Gaza City from the southern Gaza Strip and the North Gaza Governorate.[7] The 162nd Division has reportedly stationed forces along a corridor running from the Black Arrow monument, west of Mefalsim, Israel, to the Gazan coast.[8] The corridor separates Beit Hanoun, Beit Lahia, and Jabalia from Gaza City. The IDF stated that it intends to completely clear the northern Gaza Strip of all Palestinian fighters above and below ground. The 162nd Division reported it has evacuated approximately 60,000 Palestinians from the northern Gaza Strip. Approximately 1,000-1,300 Palestinians remain in Beit Lahia, “a few hundred” remain in Beit Hanoun, and “a few hundred” remain in Jabalia. The IDF plans to evacuate the remaining Palestinians in the northern Gaza Strip to the south in the coming days.

The IDF has conducted two previous clearing operations in Jabalia, where it faced some of the most intense fighting between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters during the war.[9] The IDF stated during its May 2024 clearing operation that Hamas turned civilian infrastructure in Jabalia into a “fortified combat complex.”[10] Palestinian fighters also maintained an unusually high rate of attacks targeting Israeli forces throughout IDF clearing operations in Jabalia.[11] Palestinian militia elements could continue attacks in Jabalia after the IDF withdrew in May 2024, though it was unclear how effective the Hamas military organization in Jabalia would continue to function. Hamas’ military wing has probably attempted to rebuild itself where possible in Jabalia since May 2024. It is unclear how successful these efforts would have been, however, given Hamas’ inability to resupply its fighters and attrition during Israeli operations in May.[12]

Palestinian militias have claimed near-daily attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in the northern Gaza Strip since October 6.[13] The IDF reported it has killed approximately 1,000 Palestinian fighters and detained approximately 700 since the latest clearing operation began on October 6.[14] The IDF reported its fighters also located and destroyed approximately 200 buildings rigged with explosives during this time.

The commander of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada boasted about Iranian-backed Iraqi militia ballistic missile capabilities on November 5, likely to deter potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada commander and Popular Mobilization Forces official Abbas al Zaidi said that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have “underground factories” for an advanced ballistic missile industry during an interview with an Iraqi television program on November 5, in response to a political analyst who said that Iraq does not have defense capabilities like Iran.[15] Iranian officials, Iraqi intelligence sources, and Western intelligence sources told Reuters in 2018 that Iran was helping Iranian-backed Iraqi militias start to “make their own” short-range ballistic missiles. This insight was likely a reference to an Iranian effort designed to improve the ability of the militias to assemble the technical components of the missiles rather than manufacture them completely.[16] UK-based Saudi outlet Elaph reported on November 2 that Israel warned the Iraqi government that if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to attack Israel from Iraqi territory, Israel may strike predetermined targets in Iraq.[17] These Israeli threats may have led Iraqi groups to attempt to deter the Israelis. The Elaph report followed an earlier Axios report that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attack Israel in response to Israel’s recent October 25 strikes targeting Iran.[18]

Zaidi and the other Iranian-backed Iraqi groups probably also seek to message their strength to gain more influence within the Axis of Resistance amid the severe weakening of the Axis’ previous crown jewel, Hezbollah. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has increased its rate of attacks, in particular drone attacks, targeting Israel since mid-September 2024.[19] Zaidi’s comments about the militias’ missile production are also likely meant to fulfill a dual effect of emphasizing the militias’ ability to produce more missiles if needed, while also highlighting the militias’ perceived closeness with Iran to develop this capability. Zaidi’s comments have the added effect of illustrating the defiance of the Iraqi groups in the face of Israel. Only the Houthis have withstood Israeli attacks while maintaining a defiant face to date, and the Iraqi groups have presumably observed the regional legitimacy this has brought the Houthis in certain pro-Iran circles.

The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deepened collaboration with the Houthis since October 7, 2023, which could give Iraqi militias access to the knowledge necessary to do rudimentary ballistic missile production.[20] A Houthi drone expert responsible for training Iranian-backed Iraqi militants in drone tactics died in a US self-defense strike on an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia facility in Iraq in July 2024.[21] The Houthis have learned to locally assemble drones and ballistic missiles from key components smuggled into Yemen by the IRGC.[22] Increased cooperation between the Houthis and the Iraqi militias, combined with the Houthis’ ability to locally assemble missiles, suggests that the Houthis may have had a role in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias learning to assemble ballistic missiles.

Russia launched the Iranian Kowsar high-resolution sensing satellite and Hodhod communications satellite into orbit using a Russian Soyuz rocket on November 5, which Iran could use to collect imagery on US and Israeli assets and bases in the region.[23] Iranian media claimed that a “private” company—Omid Faza—designed and built the satellites.[24] The head of the Iranian Space Agency, which operates under the Iranian Information and Communications Technology Ministry, stated on November 5 that the agency signed a contract with the Omid Faza Company to buy satellite images.[25] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media previously reported in July 2020 that the IRGC uses satellites to collect intelligence on US military positions in the region, underscoring the importance of satellites to Iran’s military forces.[26]

Omid Faza’s founder, Hossein Shahrabi Farahani, who previously headed US-sanctioned Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) Space Group, created the company in 2018 with several unspecified Amir Kabir University students.[27] The United States sanctioned IEI in 2008 for being “owned or controlled” by the Iranian Defense Ministry.[28] IEI produces electronic warfare equipment, military tactical communication systems, and missile launchers, among other equipment.[29] The launch of the Kowsar satellite into orbit is particularly noteworthy as Iranian officials continue to emphasize that Iran will respond to the recent IDF strikes into Iran.[30]

This launch also highlights how Iran and Russia are continuing to deepen space cooperation.[31] Russia previously launched Iranian satellites into orbit in August 2022 and February 2024.[32]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5.[33] Netanyahu explained his decision by citing a "crisis of trust” that had emerged between him and Gallant.[34] Netanyahu and Gallant, who served on Netanyahu's war cabinet, have publicly disagreed on numerous issues since October 7, 2023, including Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip and Israel‘s approach to negotiating a ceasefire-hostage deal.[35] Gallant’s positions—and particularly the positions that put him at odds with Netanyahu—frequently aligned with those of the IDF.[36] Netanyahu appointed Foreign Minister Israel Katz to replace Gallant as defense minister.[37] Katz lacks significant security or defense experience and previously led several non-defense portfolios in the Israeli government, including transportation, foreign affairs, and intelligence.[38] Katz is seen as a ”long-time ally” to Netanyahu.[39] Minister without a portfolio Gideon Sa’ar will succeed Katz as the new Israeli Foreign Minister.[40]

Gazans protested price gouging of humanitarian aid and goods in Deir al Balah, central Gaza Strip, on November 4 and 5.[41] A Palestinian journalist claimed that the Hamas-run Ministry of Economy implemented a 35% tax on goods entering Gaza, though CTP-ISW has not observed proof of a tax and cannot confirm whether this is an official tax or merely Hamas-guided price gouging.[42] The journalist and protesters claimed that local merchants and Hamas have coordinated to control the price of goods.[43] CTP-ISW observed over 100 Palestinian protesters demonstrating against the price gouging in Deir al Balah on November 4 and 5.[44] It is notable that Palestinian civilians are protesting in Deir al Balah given that it remains a Hamas stronghold. These protests suggest that some Gazans are no longer fearing Hamas’ internal security apparatus and willing to break previous taboos by protesting. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated during a briefing on September 4 that Hamas often steals humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip, hoards goods, and gouges prices to raise funds to support its operations.[45]

Key Takeaways:

• Post-War Control in the Gaza Strip: Fatah is attempting to extend its control over the Gaza Strip after the October 7 War, but Fatah’s lack of pro-Fatah Palestinian Authority (PA)-affiliated military forces in the Gaza Strip will make this extremely difficult. Fatah likely views the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and Hamas’ weakened military position as an opportunity to confront Hamas over Hamas efforts to maintain control in the Gaza Strip.
• Israeli Military Operations in the Gaza Strip: Israeli forces are conducting a major clearing operation across the northern Gaza Strip to disrupt militia reconstitution efforts. Palestinian militia elements could continue attacks in Jabalia after the IDF withdrew there in May 2024, though it was unclear how effective the Hamas military organization in Jabalia would continue to function. Hamas’ military wing has probably attempted to rebuild itself where possible in Jabalia since May 2024. It is unclear how successful these efforts would have been, however, given Hamas’ inability to resupply its fighters and attrition during Israeli operations in May.
• Iraqi Militias and Ballistic Missiles: The commander of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada boasted about Iranian-backed Iraqi militia ballistic missile capabilities on November 5, likely to deter potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. The Iranian-backed Iraqi groups probably also seek to message their strength to gain more influence within the Axis of Resistance amid the severe weakening of the Axis’ previous crown jewel, Hezbollah. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deepened collaboration with the Houthis since October 7, 2023, which could give Iraqi militias access to the knowledge necessary to do rudimentary ballistic missile production.
• Russia Launches Iranian Satellites: Russia launched the Iranian Kowsar high-resolution sensing satellite and Hodhod communications satellite into orbit using a Russian Soyuz rocket on November 5, which Iran could use to collect imagery on US and Israeli assets and bases in the region. Omid Faza’s founder, Hossein Shahrabi Farahani, who previously headed US-sanctioned Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) Space Group, created the company in 2018 with several unspecified Amir Kabir University students.
• Israeli Defense Minister Fired: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5. Netanyahu explained his decision by citing a "crisis of trust” that had emerged between him and Gallant.
• Hamas Price Gouging Aid in the Gaza Strip: Gazans protested price gouging of humanitarian aid and goods in Deir al Balah, central Gaza Strip, on November 4 and 5. It is notable that Palestinian civilians are protesting in Deir al Balah given that it remains a Hamas stronghold.

Iran Update, November 4, 2024

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Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, Anthony Carrillo, and Nicholas Carl

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Iran reportedly warned some Arab countries that it will conduct a complex attack on Israel in retaliation for the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes on Iran.[1] Unspecified Arab and Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal that the upcoming Iranian attack will include drones and missiles and that some will have heavier payloads than those which Iran has previously fired at Israel. Western and Iranian analysts have noted that Iran could use the Khorramshahr-4 liquid-fueled, medium-range ballistic missile, which purportedly carries a payload of 1,500 kilograms and has a range of 2,000 kilometers.[2] The Arab and Iranian officials also told the Wall Street Journal that Iran will use other weapons beyond drones and missiles and will include the conventional Iranian military, known as the Artesh, in the attack. The inclusion of the Artesh would mark the first time that it has attacked Israel; the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has taken lead on attacking Israel up until this point. The Artesh would participate presumably because the IDF killed four Artesh officers in its recent strikes on Iran.[3] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly told senior regime officials that the IDF strikes were ”too large to ignore.”[4] The Artesh has some means of supporting an attack on Israel, such as one-way attack drones, decades-old combat aircraft, and ship-launched missiles, though it remains far from clear that these systems would perform well against Israeli defenses.[5]

Hamas and Fatah officials met in Cairo on November 2 to discuss post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and agreed to form an administrative committee to manage borders and other civil affairs.[6] Hamas in the meeting reportedly presented a detailed blueprint for organizing the committee and comprising it of technocrats.[7] Fatah reportedly agreed in principle and asked to review the plan further, particularly who would lead the committee. This meeting comes as Hamas and Fatah have negotiated for months over establishing a national unity government in the Gaza Strip. A Palestinian source told Reuters in October 2024 that Hamas and Fatah may explore the possibility of forming a committee to govern the Gaza Strip if they failed to agree on a national unity government.[8] Hamas seeks to establish an intra-Palestinian government in the Gaza Strip as an alternative to an Emirati-proposed plan that would exclude Hamas from post-war governance. Hamas likely calculates that it could subvert, infiltrate, and ultimately control a national unity government and thus allow Hamas to remain politically dominant in the Gaza Strip. That Hamas developed the plan for an administrative committee indicates that Hamas still this approach as viable toward preserving its influence in the strip. This Cairo meeting notably comes after Hamas asked Russia to pressure the Palestinian Authority (PA) into negotiating further over a national unity government.[9]

A female Iranian student removed some of her clothing in protest after being reportedly harassed and assaulted by regime security forces on campus.[10] The student, named Ahoo Daryaei, was targeted for improperly adhering to the mandatory hijab law. Some Iranian sources stated that Daryaei removed her clothing after security forces tore it.[11] Security forces arrested Daryaei, and Iranian media later reported that she has been hospitalized for being mentally ill.[12] This incident is one of several in which the regime has labeled women mentally ill for protesting the hijab requirement.[13] Human rights organizations called for the immediate and unconditional release of Daryaei.[14] She has rapidly become an online symbol of the Iranian protest movement standing against regime oppression and efforts to enforce behavioral standards on the Iranian population. This protest movement has a long legacy of strong female icons, especially following the regime killing Mahsa Amini in September 2022.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Israel conflict: Iran reportedly warned some Arab countries that it will conduct a complex attack in retaliation for the recent IDF strikes on Iran. Tehran reportedly plans to use drones and missiles, some of which will have heavier payloads than what Iran has previously fired at Israel. The upcoming attack will reportedly include the IRGC and conventional Iranian military.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas and Fatah officials met in Cairo to discuss post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and agreed to form an administrative committee to manage borders and other civil affairs. Hamas seeks to establish an intra-Palestinian government that Hamas can ultimately control as an alternative to a UAE plan that would exclude Hamas from post-war governance in the strip.
• Iran: A female Iranian student removed some of her clothing in protest after being reportedly harassed and assaulted by regime security forces. She has rapidly become an online symbol of the Iranian protest movement standing against regime oppression and efforts to enforce behavioral standards on the Iranian population.

Iran Update, November 3, 2024

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Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Israeli Defense Minister emphasized that Iran is “pouring everything [it] can” into the West Bank, indicating that Iran will very likely attempt to pursue a different strategy when rebuilding Palestinian militias to fight Israel again.[1] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Iran is looking for additional routes to destabilize Israel and incite terrorism, particularly utilizing the West Bank, due to the IDF's degradation of Iran’s Axis of Resistance. Iran and Hamas have observed the military degradation of Hamas’ units in the Gaza Strip. Hamas, however, is likely trying to reconstitute regardless of how badly the IDF defeated it as defeat is a temporary condition.[2] It does not follow that Iran and Hamas will decide to rebuild Hamas and other Palestinian militias in the same way again. Iran and Hamas have almost certainly learned many lessons from the October 7 War, including the difficulty of rearming and rebuilding militias in an area that can be easily isolated, such as the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ severe degradation in the Gaza Strip and the difficulty in rebuilding Hamas’ military wing isolated there could cause Iran and Hamas to redouble their efforts to strengthen Hamas and Palestinian military organizations elsewhere, including in the West Bank. Iran has increased its efforts to smuggle weapons and other materiel into the West Bank in recent years.[3] Iran’s efforts have so far had only limited success.

The IDF captured a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border arrangements during a ground raid in southern Syria. This Iranian-led intelligence effort is likely an attempt to gather information on Israeli border security that Iranian-backed militias could use to undertake small-scale infiltrations into the Golan Heights.[4] The IDF said on November 3 that the Egoz Unit captured Ali Suleiman al Asi in Saida, Daraa Province, in recent months.[5] The IDF said that al Asi collected intelligence on Israeli operations along the Syrian border with the Golan Heights for “future terror activity” on behalf of Iran.[6] The IDF “closely monitor[ed]” al Asi before his capture.[7] The IDF did not specify when the raids took place, but Israeli special operations forces (SOF) have conducted numerous covert raids into Lebanon to disrupt Hezbollah border infrastructure since October 2023.[8] The IDF said that Aadi’s capture prevented a future attack and exposed Iranian attempts to gather intelligence on the Syria-Golan Heights border.[9]

Iran’s intelligence collection about Israeli border movements on the Syrian-Golan Heights border is consistent with previous Iranian-backed efforts to gather intelligence to inform future ground attacks. Hamas undertook similar intelligence-gathering exercises ahead of the October 7 attacks.[10] Hezbollah observers on the Israel-Lebanon border likely monitored Israeli border patrols and movements in planning Hezbollah’s ground infiltration into Israel.[11] The intelligence collection effort on the Syrian border could support future ground attacks or small-scale incursions, including the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel needs to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River “with or without an agreement” to achieve Israel's stated war aims.[12] Israel’s stated war aim is to return residents of northern Israel to their homes under safe conditions.[13] Current Israeli operations in southern Lebanon are unlikely to achieve these war aims, though it does not follow that future Israeli operations will fail to achieve the Israeli objectives. Netanyahu made these remarks during a visit to the Israel-Lebanon border on November 3 to meet with IDF commanders.[14] Israel has designed its current ground operations to dismantle border infrastructure and prevent Hezbollah from conducting direct fire and ground attacks into Israel.[15] These operations do not seek to physically push Hezbollah fighters north of the Litani River and have not done so.

Israel is currently engaged in indirect negotiations with Hezbollah to obtain a ceasefire deal that may require Hezbollah military forces to withdraw north of the Litani.[16] The language of the deal from a recently leaked draft stipulates that Lebanese army “forces, infrastructure and weapons will be the only armed groups and assets deployed” south of the Litani River following the ceasefire.[17] It is unclear if Hezbollah will accept a deal that would call for its forces to move north. Hezbollah has not fulfilled its obligations under UNSC Resolution 1701, which required its forces to withdraw from areas south of the Litani River. The implementation of a large-scale Hezbollah withdrawal is extremely complicated, particularly given that many Hezbollah fighters were born and raised in the area that they would then need to leave.

UK-based Saudi outlet Elaph reported that Israel warned the Iraqi government that if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to attack Israel from Iraqi territory, Israel may strike predetermined targets in Iraq.[18] Unspecified Israeli sources stated that the IDF has identified more than thirty “legitimate targets” in Iraq should Israel decide to launch an attack against the militias. Unspecified Israeli sources told Axios on October 31 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attack Israel in response to Israel’s recent strikes on Iran using a large volume of drones and ballistic missiles in the coming days.[19] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has increased its rate of attacks, in particular drone attacks, targeting Israel since mid-September 2024.[20] CTP-ISW recorded that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq increased its rate of attacks by approximately 106 percent between September and October 2024.[21]

Unspecified military officials told Elaph that Israel and the United States have been using satellites to monitor Iranian attempts to transfer ballistic missiles and other unspecified but related equipment from Iran to Iraqi territory.[22] Iran began supplying Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with short-range ballistic missiles, including Zelzal, Fateh-110, and Zolfaghar missiles, in 2018, but the militias have not used ballistic missiles to attack Israel in the October 7 War thus far.[23]

The United States warned Iran against launching another attack on Israel in retaliation for Israel’s strikes into Iran on October 25 because the United States would not be able to restrain Israel’s response.[24] An anonymous US official told Axios that the United States sent this message to Tehran through the Swiss diplomats, adding that the United States cannot confirm that Israel’s next attack will be as ”calibrated and targeted” as before. The Iranian regime is continuing to signal that it will respond to the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25, although the regime does not appear to have decided how it will respond.[25]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that B-52 strategic bombers arrived in the Middle East on November 3.[26] This is part of a larger US military effort to increase its presence in the Middle East ahead of the departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group from the region in the next few months.[27]

US CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla met with IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi in Israel between November 2 and November 3.[28] The IDF stated that the assessment focused on joint preparations against regional threats, especially against threats from Iran. Kurilla toured the US THAAD missile defense system battery during his trip to Israel.

Key Takeaways:

• West Bank: The Israeli Defense Minister emphasized that Iran is “pouring everything [it] can” into the West Bank, indicating that Iran will very likely attempt to pursue a different strategy when rebuilding Hamas to fight Israel again.
• Syria: The IDF captured a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border arrangements during a ground raid in southern Syria. This Iranian-led intelligence effort is likely an attempt to gather information on Israeli border security that Iranian-backed militias could use to undertake small-scale infiltrations into the Golan Heights.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The Israeli prime minister stated that Israel needs to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River “with or without an agreement” to achieve Israel's stated war aims, which is to return residents of northern Israel to their homes under safe conditions. Current Israeli operations in southern Lebanon are unlikely to achieve these war aims, though it does not follow that future Israeli operations will fail to achieve the Israeli objectives
• Iranian Retaliation against Israel: UK-based Saudi outlet Elaph reported that Israel warned the Iraqi government that if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to attack Israel from Iraqi territory, Israel may strike predetermined targets in Iraq.
• US Diplomatic Efforts: The United States warned Iran against launching another attack on Israel in retaliation for Israel’s strikes into Iran on October 25 because the United States will not be able to restrain Israel’s response.
• US Posture in the Middle East: US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that B-52 strategic bombers arrived in the Middle East on November 3. US CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla met with IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi in Israel between November 2 and November 3.
• Saudi Arabia: The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, an Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia, claimed its second attack since announcing its existence.

Iran Update, November 2, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Rezaei, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iranian regime is continuing to signal that it will respond to the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25, although the regime does not appear to have decided how it will respond. Western officials believe that the regime is debating how and whether it should respond to the strikes, according to the Wall Street Journal.[1] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned on November 2 that Iran will give a “tooth-breaking response” to Israel and the United States.[2] This warning comes after Khamenei issued an order on October 29 to the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which is Iran’s highest defense and foreign policy body, instructing the SNSC to prepare a retaliatory attack on Israel, according to the New York Times.[3] Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officer and Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Esmail Kowsari claimed on November 2 that the SNSC agreed on a “military response” to Israel that will involve Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[4] It is more likely that Kowsari would have insight into the SNSC’s decision-making due to his deep personal relationships with top IRGC commanders rather than due to his position in the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee.[5] Kowsari’s claim is consistent with Western media reports that Iran’s retaliation could include Iranian-backed Iraqi militia drone and ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel.[6] Unspecified Iranian sources speaking to Qatari-owned, London-based al Araby al Jadeed denied on November 2 that Iran will launch an attack from Iraq, instead insisting that Iran will respond from Iranian territory.[7] These differing statements from Iranian officials likely reflect current debates within the regime about how the regime should respond to the Israeli strikes.

The United States military is increasing its presence in the Middle East ahead of the departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group from the region in the next few months.[8] US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ordered the deployment of an unspecified number of additional ballistic missile defense destroyers, fighter squadron and tanker aircraft, and several U.S. Air Force B-52 bombers to the Middle East. AP reported, citing unspecified US officials, that the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group is scheduled to leave the Middle East in the middle of November and return to its home port in San Diego.[9] The United States will still maintain the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in Israel and the Amphibious Ready Group Marine Expeditionary Unit in the eastern Mediterranean area despite the imminent departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln.[10] Pentagon Press Secretary Major General Pat Ryder stated that these new deployments demonstrate the “flexible nature of U.S. global defense posture” to deploy world-wide on short notice.[11]

The IDF deployed an additional brigade to Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip, on November 2.[12] The IDF 900th Infantry Brigade started clearing operations in Jabalia on November 2. The IDF 900th Infantry Brigade is the IDF’s largest infantry brigade, consisting of five battalions.[13] The 900th Infantry Brigade specializes in operations in urban environments against ”guerilla” cells in the West Bank.[14] This is notable because Hamas’ military wing in the Gaza Strip has been reduced to operating in small, independent guerilla cells. This makes the 900th Infantry Brigade well-suited to the task of destroying these cells, particularly within Jabalia City and Refugee Camp.

The IDF is sending small units far ahead of the main Israeli force. That the IDF has the confidence to operate regular units in this way is a reflection is Hezbollah’s relatively ineffective defense in these areas. Israeli forces killed the commander of Hezbollah’s coastal sector Mein Musa Az al Din and the commander of Hezbollah’s Coastal Sector Artillery forces Hassan Majed Diab around Tyre on November 1.[15] Hezbollah previously claimed on November 1 that it blocked an Israeli reconnaissance force advancing through the Wadi Hamoul area, north of Alma al Shaab.[16] Commanders may choose to assign reconnaissance units to penetrate deeper into enemy territory due to ”a decision to accept risk due to a low threat level.”[17] CTP-ISW has previously observed that Hezbollah has mounted a disorganized and ineffective defense across southern Lebanon.[18]
Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Retaliation against Israel: The Iranian regime is continuing to signal that it will respond to the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25, although the regime does not appear to have decided how it will respond.
• US Posture in the Middle East: The United States military is increasing its presence in the Middle East ahead of the departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group from the region in the next few months.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF deployed the 900th Infantry Brigade to Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip, on November 2. This brigade, which specializes in operations against “guerilla” cells in the West Bank’s urban environments, would be well-suited to operations in Jabalia’s urban environment, where Hamas has been reduced to operating in small, independent guerilla cells.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The IDF is sending small units far ahead of the main Israeli force. That the IDF has the confidence to operate regular units in this way is a reflection is Hezbollah’s relatively ineffective defense in these areas.
• Israeli Raids in Lebanon: Israeli naval special operations forces captured a senior member of Hezbollah’s naval forces in Batroun, central Lebanon, according to an unspecified Israeli official.

Iran Update, November 1, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Western media reported that Iran will retaliate for the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes around Iran, possibly by launching one-way attack drones and ballistic missiles from Iraq.[1] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the Iranian Supreme National Security Council on October 29 to plan a retaliatory attack on Israel, according to the New York Times.[2] Unspecified Israeli sources told Axios that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attack Israel using a large volume of drones and ballistic missiles in the coming days.[3] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, has repeatedly attacked Israel in recent months, primarily using the following weapons systems:

• Shahed-101 drone. The Iranian-made Shahed-101 has a range of around 600 kilometers.[4]
• Shahed-136 drone. The Iranian-made Shahed-136 reportedly has a range of 2,500 kilometers.[5]
• KAS-04 drone. The KAS-04 is a variant of the Iranian-designed, long-range Samad drone.[6]
• Al Arfad drone. The al Arfad is a variant of the KAS-04 drone.[7]
• Arqab cruise missile. These are Iranian Paveh missiles with a range of around 1,650 kilometers.[8]

Iran also began supplying Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with short-range ballistic missiles, including Zelzal, Fateh-110, and Zolfaghar missiles in 2018, but the militias have not used ballistic missiles to attack Israel in the October 7 War thus far.[9]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has increased its rate of attacks, in particular drone attacks, targeting Israel since mid-September 2024.[10] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed nine drone attacks targeting unspecified locations across Israel on October 31 and November 1.[11] A source close to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq recently warned that the group plans to double its rate of attacks targeting Israel in November 2024.[12] The recent Islamic Resistance in Iraq drone attacks likely served in part as reconnaissance-in-force operations, which are “designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information.”[13] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq could use these attacks to test and learn how to better bypass Israeli air defenses. An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack against Israel, as opposed to a direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory, would benefit Iran by allowing Tehran to preserve its dwindling long-range missile stockpile. Iran launched over 400 cruise and ballistic missiles at Israel in its April and October 2024 attacks.[14]

That Khamenei ordered retaliation against Israel corroborates CTP-ISW's assessment that the recent IDF strikes on Iran inflicted significant damage to Iranian military and defense infrastructure. Three Iranian officials told the New York Times on November 1 that Khamenei ordered retaliation after he reviewed a “detailed report. . . on the extent of the damage” of the IDF strikes.[15] The sources added that Khamenei determined that the scope of the strikes was “too large to ignore” and that failing to retaliate “would mean admitting defeat.”[16] Senior US and Israeli officials recently confirmed that the IDF strikes rendered Iran's S-300 air defense systems inoperable.[17] The S-300 is Russian-made and the most advanced air defense system that Iran operates. The IDF strikes also successfully targeted two Iranian Ghadir passive array detection radar sites, advertised as being capable of detecting ballistic missiles and stealth aircraft.[18] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the damage to the air defenses has likely seriously degraded the Iranian ability to defend against further Israeli attacks.[19] The IDF strikes also inflicted significant damage on facilities tied to the Iranian drone and missile programs, which CTP-ISW previously assessed could disrupt Iran’s ability to manufacture drones and ballistic missiles for itself and its partners, such as Russia.[20]

That Iran could direct an attack against Israel via its proxies in Iraq highlights the extent to which Iran has increased its military and political control over federal Iraq. Iran has increasingly infiltrated Iraqi military and political institutions—such as the Popular Mobilization Forces and the Iraqi Judiciary—in recent years.[21] The most recent example of Iran’s growing influence in Iraq was the election of Shia Coordination Framework-backed politician Mahmoud al Mashhadani as Parliament Speaker on October 31.[22] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties. Mashhadani received 181 votes, which is 16 votes more than the absolute majority required to become parliament speaker.[23] Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri emphasized after Mashhadani’s election that all Shia Coordination Framework leaders, including State of Law Coalition leader Nouri al Maliki, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali, back Mashhadani.[24]

Iran’s growing military and political control over federal Iraq appears to be part of a broader Iranian strategy to turn the country into a base of operations from which Iran and its Axis of Resistance can conduct future operations and attacks against Israel. Iraq has increasingly become a focal point for cooperation and coordination among Axis of Resistance groups in recent months. A Houthi drone expert responsible for training Iranian-backed Iraqi militants died in a US self-defense strike in Iraq in July 2024, highlighting increased cooperation between the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi groups.[25] The Houthis and Hamas have separately opened political offices in Iraq in recent months, and Emirati media reported in June 2024 that Hamas was planning to relocate its political leadership to Baghdad.[26] Growing Iranian influence in Iraq will threaten US and Israeli security and interests in the region, particularly as the United States is considering withdrawing its forces from Iraq.[27]

Israeli forces engaged Lebanese Hezbollah while advancing around the tactically significant town of Khiam in southern Lebanon.[28] Israeli forces began advancing toward Khiam on October 28. Hezbollah claimed two rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces in the area on November 1.[29] Lebanese media reported small arms combat there as well.[30] Khiam is located on high ground from which Hezbollah could fire into northern Israel. Khiam, moreover, grants Hezbollah a vantage point from which it could observe Israeli forces and other targets around the Galilee panhandle. Despite the tactical significance of Khiam, Hezbollah does not appear to be mounting a particularly effective defense of the area. This behavior is consistent with CTP-ISW’s observation that Hezbollah has mounted a disorganized and ineffective defense across southern Lebanon.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran will reportedly retaliate for the recent IDF strikes across Iran. Iran would be responding to the significant damage that the IDF inflicted upon Iranian air defenses and missile production facilities.
• Iraq: Iran may retaliate by ordering its Iraqi militias to fire a large volume of drones and missiles at Israel. That Iran is considering this option highlights the extent to which Iran has expanded its military and political influence in Iraq.
• Lebanon: The IDF engaged Lebanese Hezbollah while advancing around the tactically significant town of Khiam in southeastern Lebanon. The town is on high ground from which Hezbollah could fire into Israel and observe the IDF and other targets in the area.