Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 13, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 13, 2025

Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter

April 13, 2025, 5:50 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on April 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that ongoing US-Russian negotiations are unlikely to result in "lightning-fast results," contrary to US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a general ceasefire and lasting peace agreement in Ukraine in the near future. Peskov told Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on April 13 that "everything is moving very well" regarding US-Russian bilateral talks and discussions about the war in Ukraine but that there will likely not be immediate results.[1] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Second Department of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Director Alexei Polishchuk gave an interview to Russian state media group Rossiya Today (RT) and stated that Russia is willing to engage in negotiations that “take into account the modern realities” of the war and eliminate the “root causes” of Russia’s war in Ukraine.[2] Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that any peace process in Ukraine must address these so-called “root causes."[3] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov previously defined "root causes" as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.[4] These so-called ”root causes” are a reference to Russia’s pre-war demands that effectively amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation and the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine.[5] Peskov's and Polishchuk's comments also reflect the Kremlin's continued rejection of President Trump's stated approach of first establishing a ceasefire and then negotiating a broader peace agreement and the Kremlin's commitment to war aims that are incompatible with President Trump’s goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Any future general ceasefire or peace agreement must include robust monitoring mechanisms, given the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to portray Ukraine as violating the long-range energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire without providing evidence of these strikes and despite the lack of public details about the ceasefire’s terms. It remains unclear what monitoring mechanisms the West could leverage to enforce and monitor a future general ceasefire or if the Kremlin would accept any such mechanisms. Peskov and Polishchuk reiterated ongoing Russian claims on April 13 that Ukraine is violating the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure.[6] Russian officials, led by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), have accused Ukraine of violating the temporary ceasefire almost every day since March 29 but have not provided evidence to substantiate most of these claims.[7] Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that Ukrainian forces are striking energy infrastructure along Ukraine's northern border with Russia, although it remains unclear if strikes with tactical first-person view (FPV) drones or routine shelling would be a violation of the energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire as the terms of the ceasefire are publicly unclear. Russian officials appear to be weaponizing the vague conditions of the ceasefire and exploiting the absence of independent monitoring mechanisms to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims about supposed Ukrainian ceasefire violations.

Russian officials may attempt to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations in the future if a general ceasefire does not include robust independent monitoring mechanisms. Russian forces may conduct false flag attacks along the frontline in the event of a future general ceasefire in order to accuse Ukraine of violating the ceasefire and justify reigniting the conflict. ISW has previously assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin's claims that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate are setting conditions to legitimize future Russian ceasefire violations.[8] The Kremlin is weaponizing the lack of monitoring mechanisms for the temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire, and any future general ceasefire must have more robust monitoring mechanisms to deter, adjudicate, or at least properly record future violations.

It is unclear if Russian officials will agree to any meaningful monitoring mechanisms, however, as Russian officials continue to reject the possible future deployment of a European peacekeeping contingent to Ukraine.[9] Polishchuk responded to a question about whether Russia will agree to sending peacekeepers to Ukraine on April 13 and stated that peacekeeping deployments are "not on the agenda."[10] Polishchuk insinuated that Russia and Ukraine must conclude a peace or ceasefire agreement before considering the issue of peacekeepers and claimed that the French- and British-led "Coalition of the Willing" is attempting to intervene in Ukraine by forming what it is calling a "reassurance force." Polishchuk accused the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine of falsifying reports on Russian violations of the Minsk agreement between 2014 and 2022, despite indications that Russia itself maintained significant influence over the OSCE and seriously hindered the OSCE's monitoring and enforcement mandates during this time.[11] The Kremlin's ongoing refusal to engage with US and European proposals to establish a peacekeeping force in Ukraine and Polishchuk's accusation that the OSCE has previously acted in Ukraine's — and not Russia's — favor underscores the Kremlin's continued unwillingness to accept any kind of monitoring mechanisms that could undermine Russia's ability to attack Ukraine again in the future.

Russian officials continue to weaponize the vague terms of the current ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure and ongoing ceasefire negotiations in an effort to falsely portray Ukraine- and not Russia- as unwilling to engage in constructive dialogue. Peskov claimed on April 13 that Ukraine is "either unable or unwilling to" honor the terms of the moratorium on energy strikes between Russia and Ukraine.[12] Polishchuk also claimed without evidence that Ukrainian forces have violated the moratorium on energy strikes over 60 times since Russia asserted that the agreement entered into force on March 18 and are striking or attempting to strike Russian energy facilities "several times a day."[13] Polischuk claimed that Ukrainian authorities have either failed to order Ukrainian forces to halt strikes against Russian energy facilities or that Ukrainian forces are simply ignoring such an order and insinuated that the Ukrainian government may not be in full control of the Ukrainian military. Polischuk's and Peskov's statements reinforce the Kremlin's effort to portray Russia as open to negotiations and committed to honoring agreements, while portraying Ukraine as the intransigent party. ISW continues to observe instances in which Russian actions and official statements contradict this professed willingness to engage in good faith negotiations, even as Ukrainian officials consistently emphasize their openness to dialogue and their readiness to offer compromises in future peace agreements.[14]

Russian forces conducted a devastating ballistic missile strike against Sumy City on April 13, causing more than 100 casualties. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck the center of Sumy City with two missiles on the morning of April 13, killing at least 34 civilians and injuring at least 118.[15] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov reported that elements of the Russian 112th Missile Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 448th Missile Brigade (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) launched the two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles that struck Sumy City from near Liski, Voronezh Oblast and Lezhenki, Kursk Oblast.[16] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that the Russian missiles were equipped with cluster warheads.[17] Images and footage of the aftermath show fires, casualties, and extensive damage in central Sumy City.[18] The BBC Russian Service reported that Russian forces struck the Sumy State University’s Congress Center and noted that locals reported that the Congress Center hosts various classes and clubs, including classes for children.[19]

US Special Envoy for Ukraine and retired General Keith Kellogg condemned the Russian ballistic missile strike against Sumy City and stated that the strike “crosses any line of decency.”[20] US Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink acknowledged that Russian forces used ballistic missiles equipped with cluster warheads against Sumy City and expressed condolences.[21] UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, European Council President Antonio Costa, European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas, EU Ambassador to Ukraine Katarina Maternova, French President Emmanuel Macron, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics, Moldovan President Maia Sandu, Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna, Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen, Spanish Ambassador to Ukraine Ricardo Lopex-Aranda, the Irish Embassy in Ukraine, and the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and a host of other Western officials condemned the Russian strike against Sumy City.[22]

Ongoing milblogger complaints about the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine reinforce ISW’s assessment that Russian tactics will degrade Russia’s manpower and materiel resources and contribute to slowing Russian advances along the frontline. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed on April 12 that the Russian military command is using a "thousand cuts" tactic against Ukraine to the detriment of Russian forces and complained that deploying poorly equipped and poorly trained Russian infantry to attack Ukrainian defensive positions only results in marginal gains and heavy losses.[23] The milblogger argued that the Russian military command is attempting to present high manpower and materiel losses as necessary by falsely portraying the preceding combat engagements as evidence of Russia‘s coordinated "grinding" down of Ukrainian defenses.[24] The milblogger claimed on April 12 and 13 that the Russian military command is ignoring the fact that Russian forces are facing shortages of materiel necessary for offensive operations, which contributes to issues conducting assaults and to the failure of small group assaults along the frontline in Ukraine.[25] The milblogger claimed that frontline Russian commanders are under significant pressure from their superiors to conduct more infantry assaults, do not have sufficient time to plan new assault routes, and that some frontline commanders order assaults simply to be able to report something back to their superiors. ISW previously assessed that these grinding assaults will likely degrade available Russian manpower and materiel significantly enough that Russian forces will have to decrease offensive tempo on lower-priority sectors of the front.[26] The milblogger speculated that Russian forces are in a self-perpetuating cycle, where poorly trained infantry killed or injured in failed assault attempts are replaced with similarly poorly trained infantry, who are again sent into doomed assaults.[27] The milblogger’s claims reflect the general trend of slowing Russian advances along the frontline recently and highlight some of the critical issues that Russian forces will have to address if they intend to make significant territorial gains or conduct more sophisticated offensive operations in Ukraine in the future.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that ongoing US-Russian negotiations are unlikely to result in "lightning-fast results," contrary to US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a general ceasefire and lasting peace agreement in Ukraine in the near future.
• Any future general ceasefire or peace agreement must include robust monitoring mechanisms, given the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to portray Ukraine as violating the long-range energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire without providing evidence of these strikes and despite the lack of public details about the ceasefire’s terms. It remains unclear what monitoring mechanisms the West could leverage to enforce and monitor a future general ceasefire or if the Kremlin would accept any such mechanisms.
• Russian officials continue to weaponize the vague terms of the current ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure and ongoing ceasefire negotiations in an effort to falsely portray Ukraine- and not Russia- as unwilling to engage in constructive dialogue.
• Russian forces conducted a devastating ballistic missile strike against Sumy City on April 13, causing more than 100 casualties.
• Ongoing milblogger complaints about the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine reinforce ISW’s assessment that Russian tactics will degrade Russia’s manpower and materiel resources and contribute to slowing Russian advances along the frontline.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Kharkiv City, Borova, and Chasiv Yar.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Alleged Ceasefire Violation
• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed without evidence on April 13 that Ukrainian forces shelled and damaged two power facilities in Belgorod Oblast.[29]

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continue efforts to push Ukrainian forces from remaining positions in Kursk Oblast on April 13, but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 12 that Russian forces are advancing toward Gornal (southwest of Sudzha near the international border).[30]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz "Kashtan" Detachment and the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast's border area.[31]

Fighting continued in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on April 13, but Russian forces did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are clearing Ukrainian forces from Demidovka and Popovka (northwest of Belgorod City) while one Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have completely seized Demidovka.[32]

Russian sources claimed that fighting continued northwest of Belgorod City near Demidovka and Popovka.[33]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on April 13 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 13 that Russian forces have completely seized Zhuravka (north of Sumy City).[34] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Loknya (north of Sumy City).[35]

Russian forces attacked near Zhuravka, west of Zhuravka near Veselivka, east of Zhuravka near Basivka, and southeast of Zhuravka near Loknya on April 13.[36]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Kharkiv City.

 

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City).[37] 

Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on April 13, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled two Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups along the international border northwest of Kharkiv City near Ridne (formerly Perovske) and northeast of Kharkiv City near Tykhe.[38]

The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces published footage on April 12 of Ukrainian drone strikes destroying a Russian Starlink terminal in an unspecified area of Kharkiv Oblast.[39]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz "Vakha" Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Hraniv (north of Kharkiv City), and drone operators of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 13 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on April 13.[41]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Ukrainian forces repelled five Russian mechanized assaults with light armored vehicles from April 4 to 12.[42] The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces published footage of Ukrainian forces repelling a roughly reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction on April 11, potentially the mechanized assault previously reported near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Lozova (northeast of Borova) - although the footage only shows isolated strikes against Russian armored vehicles.[43] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on April 13 that the brigade repelled another Russian reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault with five tanks in the Kupyansk direction.[44] Russian milbloggers amplified a complaint from a Russian soldier purportedly of the Russian 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) claiming that Russian forces have not been able to advance more than five kilometers from Kotlyarivka (southeast of Kupyansk) since about May 2024 due to Ukrainian drone and artillery strikes.[45]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[46]

Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Tverdokhlibove, Novoserhiivka, Olhivka, Makiivka, and Hrekivka on April 12 and 13.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Novomykhailivka and west of Zelena Dolyna and interdicted Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Nove (all northeast of Lyman).[48]

Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Lyman near Hlushchenkove, Novomykhailivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Nove and east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske on April 12 and 13.[49]

An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces have intensified assaults in the Lyman direction and ultimately aim to advance on Slovyansk (southwest of Lyman).[50] The spokesperson of the same Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian infantry are attempting to advance in Ukrainian near-rear areas to create chaos and that Russian forces conduct either infantry or mechanized assaults daily.[51] The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are attacking with one to three poor quality vehicles to distract Ukrainian forces and enable infantry to advance.[52] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces continue assaulting with poorly trained infantry, including personnel who only joined the Russian military in February or March 2025.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka on April 12 and 13 but did not advance.[53]

 

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) toward Siversk.[54]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on April 12 that Russian forces intensified shelling in the Siversk direction and are mainly attacking on motorcycles in the area.[55]

Russian forces recently advanced south of Chasiv Yar.

 

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 12 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced east of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[56]

Russian forces continued assaults in Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar from Andriivka and in the direction of Predtechyne on April 12 and 13.[57]

A senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian battalion stated on April 13 that Russian forces have marginally intensified infantry assaults over the last month in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction.[58] Zaporozhets noted on April 12 that Russian forces recently began using more armored vehicles during assaults in the Kramatorsk and Toretsk directions and have also intensified shelling in the Kramatorsk direction.[59]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including the 215th Reconnaissance Battalion and 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on April 13 but did not advance.

 

Assessed Ukrainian advances: ISW recessed Russian advances along the T-05-16 highway toward Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk) based on a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger’s claim on April 12 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups temporarily advanced to the area in an effort to sever Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Nelipivka and do not maintain enduring positions near Nelipivka.[61] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk direction reported on April 11 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a Russian assault west of Toretsk, likely referring to the recent Russian assault northeast of Nelipivka.[62] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely advanced near Nelipivka as part of a Russian push that reached anomalously far ahead of the main Russian line and that Russian forces did not maintain a sustained presence in the area.[63]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 12 and 13 that elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) advanced west of Panteleymonivka (southwest of Toretsk) and seized a section of the Donetsk City-Kostyantynopil H-20 highway in the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk.[64] Russian forces appear to be attempting to rapidly collapse this pocket following a recent advance into Kalynove (east of Pokrovsk).[65]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; northeast of Toretsk near Ozaryanivka and Druzhba; southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka, Panteleymonivka, Valentynivka, and Oleksandropil; and west of Toretsk near Leonidivka and Shcherbynivka on April 12 and 13.[66]

Zaporozhets stated on April 13 that Russian forces have intensified assaults in southern and northern Toretsk and are concentrating equipment in central Toretsk in an attempt to draw Ukrainian attention from the center of the town and prevent Ukrainian forces from destroying the equipment.[67]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Toretsk, and elements of a battalion of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kleban-Byk (northwest of Toretsk).[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

 

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 12 and 13 that Russian forces advanced northeast and southeast of Zelene Pole (east of Pokrovsk), in northern Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk), and south of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and seized Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk).[69]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and Kalynove, east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka and Vodyane Druhe, southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka, and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on April 12 and 13.[70]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on April 13 that Russian forces have increased the frequency of attacks in the Pokrovsk direction and are modifying old armored vehicles to transport infantry in the area.[71]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kalynove.[72] Elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) reportedly participated in the recent seizure of Kalynove.[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 13 but did not make confirmed advances. 

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 13 that Russian forces, including elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), seized Troitske (east of Novopavlivka).[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Uspenivka and toward Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, Preobrazhenka, Sribne, and Troitske; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on April 12 and 13.[75]

The commander of Ukrainian company operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on April 13 that Russian forces have changed tactics and are no longer attacking in large groups using tanks or infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) in the area.[76] The company commander stated that Russian forces are instead attacking in groups of three to four personnel on foot or on motorcycles or buggies and that these groups are quieter and harder to detect.[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 12 and 13 that Russian forces advanced near Andriivka and toward Bahatyr (both west of Kurakhove).[78]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove toward Oleksiivka and near Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on April 12 and 13.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rozlyv.[80]

Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[81]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 13 that Russian forces advanced near Odradne (north of Velyka Novosilka).[82]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske and Vesele; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole, Pryvilne, and Shevchenko; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on April 12 and 13.[83]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations northwest of Robotyne near Shcherbaky, Mali Shcherbaky, and Stepove on April 12 and 13 but did not advance.[84]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction on April 12 and 13 but did not advance.[85]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for information on the Russian ballistic missile strike against Sumy City on April 13.

Russian forces conducted another series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 55 Shahed long range strike drones and decoy drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and Oryol and Kursk cities.[86] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 43 drones, and that the remaining 12 drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW).

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

ISW is suspending Russian mobilization and force generation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW will be introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization and force generation efforts in the coming days.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine

Russian forces continue efforts to counter Ukrainian drones. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian engineers designed a rocket-like weapon equipped with two first-person view (FPV) drones integrated onto stabilizers and an optical-electronic guidance system to intercept Ukrainian drones.[87] The milblogger claimed that the interception weapon has thermal imaging and a homing head.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. Click here to read the Russian Occupation Update.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/67fb81259a794798c0cc6be5

[2] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2008794/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/55452

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040125

[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025  

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025

[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/310389 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/310391 ; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3840 ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2008794/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/55452

[7] https://t.me/mod_russia/51240 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/51049; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2025; https://t.me/mod_russia/50824; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2025

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033025

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725

[10] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2008794/

[11] https://jamestown.org/program/osce-in-russias-tight-grip-at-year-end-meeting/ ; https://www.rferl.org/a/32693816.html ;

[12] https://t.me/tass_agency/310389 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/310391 ; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3840

[13] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2008794/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/55452

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025

[15] https://t.me/prokuraturasumy/4147; https://t.me/kobzarartemsn/4503 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/41113; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/41118; https://suspilne dot media/993711-zelenskij-pro-raketnij-udar-rf-po-sumah-desatki-zagiblih-ta-poranenih-mirnih-ziteliv-tilki-svolota-tak-moze-diati/; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13853;

[16] https://t.me/ChiefUkrDIU/185; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1XfY5BZ9Tp/; https://t.me/DIUkraine/5701

[17] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9098 ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9099

[18] Warning: graphic and disturbing content
https://t.me/istories_media/9362 ; https://t.me/Klymenko_MVS/1384; https://t.me/bbcrussian/78935; https://t.me/andriyshTime/35935 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/35936 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/35937 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/35940 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/35944 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/35946; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1911334974097064312

[19] https://t.me/bbcrussian/78935

[20] https://x.com/generalkellogg/status/1911397989274239450

[21] https://www.facebook.com/usdos.ukraine/posts/1092153402955082?ref=embed_post

[22] https://x.com/Keir_Starmer/status/1911404868595523593; https://x.com/kajakallas/status/1911357795691081838; https://x.com/sandumaiamd/status/1911357574512857298; https://x.com/Tsahkna/status/1911358167067341225; https://x.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/1911380883489141039; https://x.com/elinavaltonen/status/1911384367940649317; https://x.com/MAERomania/status/1911364685686858170; https://x.com/edgarsrinkevics/status/1911377394557997323; https://x.com/donaldtusk/status/1911403007096332482; https://x.com/eucopresident/status/1911376240142860684; https://suspilne dot media/993777-posol-es-v-ukraini-nazvala-voennim-zlocinom-raketnij-udar-rf-po-sumah/; https://x.com/IrlEmbUkraine/status/1911351814319992938; https://x.com/RLAranda/status/1911355860825022547

[23] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2293

[24] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2294

[25] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2304

[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101624

[27] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2304

[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040625

[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/51240

[30] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161140

[31] https://t.me/milinfolive/146021; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/45048

[32] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63482; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12920; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/7547

[33] https://t.me/dva_majors/68982; https://t.me/wargonzo/25888

[34] https://t.me/dva_majors/68982

[35] https://t.me/https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12920/63482

[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161200 ; https://t.me/https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12920/63482

[37] https://x.com/p6060083/status/1911376732214514075; https://t.me/fpv_for_zsu/687

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/otukharkiv/5543

[39] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7890

[40] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161161; https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/7822; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5645

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076

[42] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/12/syly-oborony-na-kupyanskomu-vidtynku-vidbyly-5-shturmiv-z-vykorystannyam-vorogom-bronetehniky-voyin-zsu/

[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7888; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025

[44] https://t.me/oaembr77/743

[45] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63481; https://tlgrm dot ru/channels/@NotForAir_All/2151

[46] https://x.com/blinzka/status/1911109155680628800; https://www.instagram.com/rota_favorit/reel/DINmq3riWka/

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7926

[48] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31313; https://t.me/yurasumy/22400

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31313

[50] https://youtu.be/j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/pragnut-zahopyty-slovyansk-okupanty-aktyvizuvalys-na-lymanskomu-napryamku/

[51] https://youtu.be/uLfYqmBq8X8 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/zabigty-za-liniyu-frontu-i-pomerty-rosiyany-vdayutsya-do-novoyi-taktyky/

[52] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/banzaj-ataky-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-vorog-shturmuye-na-bagi-ta-golfkarah/

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7926

[54] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31319

[55] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/na-toreczkomu-i-kramatorskomu-napryamkah-vorog-ponovyv-shturmy-na-bronetehniczi/

[56] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8880; https://t.me/Phoenix_ORKOhub/160; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1911156295832305958

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7926 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68982

[58] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/za-taktykoyu-vagnera-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-vorog-ne-shkoduye-pihoty/ ; https://suspilne dot media/993571-zagibel-pilota-f-16-tramp-prodovziv-sankcii-proti-kremla-se-na-rik-1144-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1744529952&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[59] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/na-toreczkomu-i-kramatorskomu-napryamkah-vorog-ponovyv-shturmy-na-bronetehniczi/

[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26881

[61] https://t.me/rybar/69609

[62] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/11/na-toreczkomu-napryamku-vluchnyj-postril-z-granatometa-zupynyv-ataku-vazhkoyi-tehniky/

[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2025

[64] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63491; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89862; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161204

[65] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025

[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7926; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89862; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161200

[67] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/na-toreczkomu-i-kramatorskomu-napryamkah-vorog-ponovyv-shturmy-na-bronetehniczi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/u-toreczku-vorog-perenis-shturmy-na-flangy-v-otu-lugansk-poyasnyly-prychynu/

[68] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13679; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13680

[69] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161170; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63483; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63490; https://t.me/wargonzo/25893; https://t.me/mod_russia/51241 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/51242; https://t.me/sashakots/53033

[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7926; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63483; https://t.me/yurasumy/22384

[71] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/ataky-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-posylyuyutsya-vorog-zastosovuye-bronetehniku/

[72] https://t.me/yurasumy/22385

[73] https://t.me/milinfolive/146017

[74] https://t.me/yurasumy/22384

[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7926; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/16121

[76] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/uriznobich-rozchepirenymy-palczyamy-na-novopavlivskomu-vorog-atakuye-malymy-grupamy/

[77] https://t.me/yurasumy/22384

[78] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/16121; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161110; https://t.me/yurasumy/22383

[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7926; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161110; https://t.me/wargonzo/25888

[80] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161110

[81] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161153

[82] https://t.me/yurasumy/22383

[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/16121

[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048

[85] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048

[86] https://t.me/kpszsu/32430

[87] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26898