Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 25, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 25, 2025

Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 25, 2025, 4:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on January 25 ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukraine and Moldova continue to offer solutions to Transnistria's energy crisis as Moldovan President Maia Sandu met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on January 25. Zelensky stated at a press conference with Sandu that Ukraine can supply Transnistria with coal at low prices or even free of charge if Transnistria would supply Ukraine with electricity in return.[1] Zelensky also stated that Ukraine is ready to send a team of specialists to help increase the Transnistrian power plant's electricity output such that it would far exceed Transnistria's domestic needs, allowing Transnistria to provide electricity to all of Moldova and Ukraine. Zelensky noted that Transnistria's cooperation with Moldova and Ukraine would help reduce electricity prices throughout all of Moldova by 30 percent. Transnistrian authorities have previously refused Moldovan and Ukrainian offers of help, instead turning to schemes that involve Moscow directly or indirectly providing enough gas to the breakaway republic to cover only its domestic electricity needs.[2] Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have noted that Russia is trying to leverage its manufactured gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion before the Summer 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections.[3] Transnistria's possible acceptance of Ukrainian and Moldovan offers of aid and Transnistria's subsequent supply of cheaper electricity to the rest of Moldova would disrupt Russian efforts to use the energy crisis to strengthen Transnistria's economic dependence on Moscow, to posture Russia as the breakaway republic's savior and benefactor, and to leverage Chisinau's turn to higher priced European electricity as part of Moscow's anti-EU narratives.

The Kremlin is continuing to leverage the prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel to cultivate increased Russian influence in Iraq. The Rybar channel claimed on January 25 that members of the Rybar team – including its founder Mikhail Zvinchuk – visited Iraq over the last week and met with Iraqi officials, including Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia Al Sudani.[4] The channel claimed that Iraqi officials noted their openness to increasing trade and foreign investments with Russian partners and their interest in further developing Russian–Iraqi relations. The channel welcomed Russian businesses, media companies, bloggers, and investors to begin exploring opportunities in Iraq. Member of the Rybar team visited Iraq in August 2024, and ISW noted at the time that this was the first observed report of a Russian milblogger meeting with a senior foreign official.[5] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the US as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the US possibly reducing its military presence there.[6] The recent fall of the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria may be prompting the Kremlin to reconsider the contours of its relations with Iraq.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine and Moldova continue to offer solutions to Transnistria's energy crisis as Moldovan President Maia Sandu met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on January 25.
• The Kremlin is continuing to leverage the prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel to cultivate increased Russian influence in Iraq.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 25 that the Russian government will allow veterans of volunteer formations (dobrovolcheskie formirovaniya) to receive "combat veteran status" without submitting a formal application.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 25 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Nikolayevo-Darino (southeast of Korenevo), north of Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha), and south of Sudzha.[7] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued attacks near Kurilovka (south of Sudzha), Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, and Sverdlikovo (northwest of Sudzha).[8] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked with armored vehicle support near Pogrebki (north of Sudzha).[9] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast, and elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Pogrebki.[10]

 

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on January 24 and 25 but did not advance.[11] Ukrainian sources reported on January 25 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack with armored vehicle support near Tykhe and destroyed four infantry fighting vehicles.[12] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction stated that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are attempting to find and exploit vulnerabilities in Ukraine's defensive lines.[13] Elements of the Russian ”Vakha” Battalion of Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz and 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Kharkiv direction.[14]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian sources speculated on Russian offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction amid ongoing Russian assaults in this direction on January 25. The commander of a Ukrainian anti-tank battalion operating in the Kupyansk and Borova directions stated that Russian forces are attempting to envelop Kupyansk and Kupyansk-Vuzhlovyi (just south of Kupyansk) from the north and south.[15] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 9th Artillery Brigade (6th CAA), 45th Engineer-Camouflage Regiment, and other elements mainly of the 6th CAA are currently operating near Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk) and are attempting to expand their bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River near the settlement.[16] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 12th Tank Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st GTA) are unsuccessfully attacking east of Kupyansk near Kotlyarivka.[17] Mashovets suggested that the Russian military command may redeploy elements of the 6th CAA, including the 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 69th Motorized Rifle Division, from the Vovchansk area (northeast of Kharkiv City) to Dvorichna if Russian forces begin to make substantial advances north of Kupyansk. The Russian military command may intend to use these forces to expand the Russian salient north of Kupyansk as part of Russian efforts to envelop Kupyansk to avoid a frontal assault on the settlement. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Zapadne (north of Kupyansk and south of Dvorichna), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[18] Russian forces continued assaults north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna and Hlushkivka, northeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and east of Kupyansk near Pishchane on January 24 and 25.[19] Drone operators of the Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[20]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 25 but did not advance. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 400 meters near Zahryzove (north of Borova), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[21] The commander of the Ukrainian anti-tank battalion operating in the Kupyansk and Borova directions stated that Russian forces are attempting to seize Kopanky (east of Borova) and are attacking with a large number of infantry.[22] The commander estimated that the Russian military command has staffed the 1st GTA and 20th CAA (MMD) - both of which are attacking in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions - to 80 percent of their doctrinal end strength. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are attacking towards Borova from the north and northeast near Lozova, Zelenyi Hai, and Pershotravneve.[23] Russian forces continued assaults north of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove; northeast of Borova near Lozova and Zelenyi Hai; east of Borova near Kopanky and Pershotravneve; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka, Tverdokhlibove, Novoyehorivka, Hrekivka, and Makiivka and towards Shiykivka and Druzhelyubivka on January 24 and 25.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zahryzove and Zelenyi Hai.[25]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka and Torske and in the direction of Zelena Dolyna on January 24 and 25 but did not advance.[26]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations southwest of Siversk near Vasyukivka on January 25 but did not advance.[27]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 25 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Chasiv Yar and are clearing Novopivnichnyi Microraion in western Chasiv Yar.[28] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on January 25 that Ukrainian forces destroyed four Russian airborne infantry fighting vehicles (BMDs) during a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault in Chasiv Yar.[29] The spokesperson of the Ukrainian brigade added that Russian forces are taking advantage of foggy weather and decreased Ukrainian drone operations to conduct assaults.[30] The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on January 25 that Ukrainian forces recently damaged and destroyed a total of eight Russian BMDs in Chasiv Yar.[31] Russian forces continued attacking near Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and towards Novomarkove and Markove; and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne, Stupochky, and Bila Hora on January 24 and 25.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in southern Chasiv Yar.[33] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[34]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on January 25. Geolocated footage published on January 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Mykhaila Hrushevskoho, and Pyrohova streets in northern Toretsk.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Krymske (north of Toretsk) and half of the Toretska mine in northern Toretsk and advanced one and a half kilometers west of Niu York (south of Toretsk), near Leonidivka (southwest of Toretsk), and near Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[36] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued ground attacks within Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Krymske and Dyliivka; and west of Toretsk near Leonidivka and Shcherbynivka on January 24 and 25.[37] Drone operators of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are reportedly operating in Toretsk.[38]

 

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued fighting in the area on January 25. Geolocated footage published on January 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk).[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Novoandriivka and about half of Nadiivka (both southwest of Pokrovsk) and advanced to Novooleksandrivka (southwest of Pokrovsk); near Uspenivka, Udachne, Nadiivka, Novoyelyzavetivka (all southwest of Pokrovsk), Vozdvyzhenka, and Baranivka (both east of Pokrovsk); and on the outskirts of Kotlyne (west of Pokrovsk), Zelene Pole and Yelyzavetivka (both east of Pokrovsk).[40] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe; east of Pokrovsk near Baranivka, Promin, Yelyzavetivka, Myrolyubivka, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Zelene, and Novoukrainka; west of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Kotlyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Novoyelyzavetivka, Uspenivka, Sribne, Nadiivka, and Bohdanivka on January 24 and 25.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have become more active near Kalynove (east of Pokrovsk) and will increase pressure on Oleksandropil (northwest of Kalynove) after Russian forces seize Toretsk.[42] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Kotlyne and that Ukrainian forces still hold positions in Kotlyne, Lysivka, and about half of Yelyzavetivka.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that the area near the T-0504 highway junction east of Malynivka (east of Pokrovsk) is a contested "gray zone."[44] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are moving in small assault squads.[45] The chief of staff of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are actively using fiber optic cable drones and that Ukrainian forces are using shotguns or other small arms to repel the drones.[46] The chief of staff noted that Russian forces are using the same tactics in which Russian forces advance in small infantry groups to a concentration point and then attack together as a larger group of more than 10 people. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are moving forward in teams of one to two people under the cover of fog while using drones to divert Ukrainian forces' attention.[47]

 

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction on January 25 amid continued offensive operations in the area. Geolocated footage published on January 25 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced east and south of Slovyanka and up to the northeastern outskirts of Andriivka (northwest of Kurakhove).[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered northeastern Dachne (west of Kurakhove) and advanced north and northeast of Sukhi Yaly (southwest of Kurakhove).[49] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko and Andriivka; southwest of Kurakhove near Yantarne and Kostyantynopolske; and west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Kostyantynopil, and Ulakly on January 24 and 25.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 25 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking west of Kurakhove along the Zelenivka-Ulakly line.[51] Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction; drone operators of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Ulakly; and drone operators of the Russian ”Vizantiya” detachment and the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in Dachne.[52]

Russian forces recently advanced within Velyka Novosilka amid continued fighting in the area on January 25. Geolocated footage published on January 25 shows elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) raising a flag in eastern Velyka Novosilka, indicating that Russian forces recently advanced to Zarichna Street in northeastern Velyka Novosilka and seized the fields north and northeast of the settlement.[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade are advancing towards central Velyka Novosilka from the north and northeast and that Russian forces have seized over 65 percent of the settlement.[54] ISW has observed geolocated footage to assess that Russian forces have seized 72 percent of Velyka Novosilka. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced southwest of Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[55] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated on January 24 that Russian forces are publishing manipulated footage to create the false impression that Russian forces have seized all of Velyka Novosilka.[56] The Ukrainian source stated that Russian forces are advancing on the eastern outskirts of the settlement and seized a small part of the center of the settlement. Russian forces continued ground attacks near Velyka Novosilka itself, southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 24 and 25.[57] Snipers and drone operators of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue operating and clearing Ukrainian positions in the southern part of Velyka Novosilka.[58]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued ground assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast, including northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka, on January 24 and 25 but did not make any confirmed advances.[59] Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, the "Sharman" Detachment of the 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), and the "Batyr" Detachment of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[60]

 

Russian forces continued assaults in the Kherson direction, including on Zabych and Kozatskyi islands (southwest and east of Kherson City, respectively) in the Dnipro River Delta, on January 24 and 25 but did not advance.[61]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from the airspace over the Black Sea and 61 Shahed and decoy drones from Oryol and Kursk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[62] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed two Kh-59/69 missiles and 46 drones over Odesa, Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Khmelnytskyi, and Kirovohrad oblasts; that 15 decoy drones were "lost" in location, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that debris from Russian drones damaged buildings in Kyiv, Cherkasy, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones also damaged energy infrastructure in Cherkasy Oblast and buildings in Kharkiv Oblast.[63]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on January 24 that Russian forces used domestically produced Shahed drones during the drone strike against Ukraine on the night of January 23 to 24.[64]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 25 that the Russian government will allow veterans of volunteer formations (dobrovolcheskie formirovaniya) to receive "combat veteran status" without submitting a formal application.[65] The decision applies to veterans who served in volunteer formations that Russian authorities created to support the Russian military in the war in Ukraine and requires that the formations submit paperwork and documentation to military registration and enlistment offices on behalf of the veterans.[66] The Russian government previously required veterans of volunteer formations to submit their own paperwork and documentation.

Russian milbloggers continue to complain about Russia's insufficient quantities of drones and inefficient use of drone strikes. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 20 that Russian forces need "fighter drones" to destroy Ukrainian strike and reconnaissance drones.[67] Another Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor responded on January 25 that Russian forces have an insufficient quantity of material resources and trained personnel to counter Ukraine's quantitatively superior drones. The milblogger complained that the Russian military leadership is not making efforts to fix these issues. The milblogger called for Russian forces to focus on striking priority targets, such as Ukrainian reconnaissance drones that guide drone and artillery strikes, instead of striking Ukrainian infantry.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian defense manufacturer Kalashnikov Concern announced on January 21 that it will unveil its new "Kub-2-E" reconnaissance and strike drone equipped with guided munitions at the IDEX-2025 exhibition in Abu Dhabi in late February 2025.[68] Russian forces will reportedly use launchers attached to armored vehicles to launch the "Kub-2-E" drones, and Kalashnikov reportedly designed the drones to destroy lightly armored military equipment, air defense systems, helicopter basing sites and additional military equipment.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian officials are likely restricting internet access in Belarus as early voting for the January 26 Belarusian presidential election is currently underway. Belarus’s largest internet provider, Hoster, reported on January 25 that Belarusian authorities will restrict access to Belarusian sites from abroad from January 25 to 27 due to “threats to information infrastructure facilities and the information that the facilities process.”[69] Russian and Belarusian opposition outlets reported that Belarusian users reported issues using VPN services.[70]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://suspilne dot media/933245-prezidentka-moldovi-sandu-pribula-do-kieva/; https://www.rbc dot ua/ukr/news/ukrayina-gotova-nadati-moldovi-vugillya-i-1737809779.html

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010225

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012225

[4] https://t.me/rybar/67450

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2024

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-21-2024

[7]https://t.me/dva_majors/63117 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22907

[8]https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22887 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63117 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/20370

[9] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152381; https://t.me/wargonzo/24440

[10] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/25/bukovynski-desantnyky-znyshhyly-rosijskyh-morpihiv-zi-155-brygady-na-kurshhyni/; https://www.facebook.com/dshv82odshbr?ref=embed_video ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85070 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85096

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0t6b9ktbyJxN3yW2hnEzDkYtFEws9GG4W6g1AzQb5xnKyyQL72HFFbbnnCuCBGa1Sl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20218; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4446; https://t.me/otukharkiv/3848    

[12] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4446; https://t.me/otukharkiv/3848

[13] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/25/riznobarvnyh-gartuyut-poblyzu-vovchanska-tryvayut-zhorstki-artylerijski-dueli/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc

[14] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5444

[15] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/25/sto-mercziv-na-desyat-kilometriv-jduchy-na-shturm-rosijski-shturmovyky-rahuyut-poperednykiv/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[16] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2512 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02QR6CF1hv5WNchoPiJoGunAc9FcJRDroS2sk2TRiWxkzcywHS674ABhsF8nAZXrcdl ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2513

[17] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2514

[18] https://t.me/dva_majors/63117 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22888

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0t6b9ktbyJxN3yW2hnEzDkYtFEws9GG4W6g1AzQb5xnKyyQL72HFFbbnnCuCBGa1Sl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20218 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033uMXwAN4pyBPLsjAYx4XjJZsoyV3tCqw3LLF4CL6ZHcXjjhQFeLWupFbn26ViGkWl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4446

[20] https://t.me/mod_russia/48217

[21] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22888

[22] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/25/sto-mercziv-na-desyat-kilometriv-jduchy-na-shturm-rosijski-shturmovyky-rahuyut-poperednykiv/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[23] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2514

[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0t6b9ktbyJxN3yW2hnEzDkYtFEws9GG4W6g1AzQb5xnKyyQL72HFFbbnnCuCBGa1Sl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20218 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033uMXwAN4pyBPLsjAYx4XjJZsoyV3tCqw3LLF4CL6ZHcXjjhQFeLWupFbn26ViGkWl ; https://t.me/tass_agency/297575

[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22888 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/297575

[26] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4446

[27] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4446

[28] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22904 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24440

[29] https://t.me/official24ombr/867 ; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/v-chasovomu-yaru-znyshhyly-4-rosijskyh-bmd-4/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/24/nakopychyly-bronyu-i-dochekalysya-tumaniv-vorog-sprobuvav-atakuvaty-chasiv-yar/

[30] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/24/nakopychyly-bronyu-i-dochekalysya-tumaniv-vorog-sprobuvav-atakuvaty-chasiv-yar/

[31] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4446

[32]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033uMXwAN4pyBPLsjAYx4XjJZsoyV3tCqw3LLF4CL6ZHcXjjhQFeLWupFbn26ViGkWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0t6b9ktbyJxN3yW2hnEzDkYtFEws9GG4W6g1AzQb5xnKyyQL72HFFbbnnCuCBGa1Sl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20218 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4446

[33] https://t.me/dva_majors/63117

[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22892 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152394

[35] https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/583; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8216; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1883098935239290978; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1883099198138273795

[36]https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22909 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152367 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152434 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20769

[37]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033uMXwAN4pyBPLsjAYx4XjJZsoyV3tCqw3LLF4CL6ZHcXjjhQFeLWupFbn26ViGkWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0t6b9ktbyJxN3yW2hnEzDkYtFEws9GG4W6g1AzQb5xnKyyQL72HFFbbnnCuCBGa1Sl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20218 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4446 ; https://t.me/rybar/67467

[38] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13302

[39] https://t.me/moment_war/301; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8219

[40] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61653; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61656; https://t.me/rybar/67464; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152367; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152434; https://t.me/yurasumy/20762 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61654

[41] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4446; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20218; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0t6b9ktbyJxN3yW2hnEzDkYtFEws9GG4W6g1AzQb5xnKyyQL72HFFbbnnCuCBGa1Sl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033uMXwAN4pyBPLsjAYx4XjJZsoyV3tCqw3LLF4CL6ZHcXjjhQFeLWupFbn26ViGkWl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61653; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61656; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85092; https://t.me/dva_majors/63117

[42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152367; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152434

[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85092; https://t.me/rybar/67464

[44] https://t.me/rybar/67464

[45] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/24/ustylayut-polya-pihotoyu-tilky-na-odnij-dilyanczi-pid-pokrovskom-rosiyany-vtratyly-blyzko-90-soldativ-za-den/; https://youtu.be/mswYHhGXhW4

[46] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/25/v-pavutynni-optovolokna-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-fiksuyut-masovi-ataky-bpla-na-drotah/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[47] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/25/pryrecheni-yizhaky-u-tumani-rosiyany-odyn-za-odnym-vmyrayut-v-imli-poblyzu-pokrovska/

[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8220; https://t.me/osirskiy/1046; https://t.me/raid_413/96; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8221

[49] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61662; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152434  

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0t6b9ktbyJxN3yW2hnEzDkYtFEws9GG4W6g1AzQb5xnKyyQL72HFFbbnnCuCBGa1Sl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20218; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4446; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0t6b9ktbyJxN3yW2hnEzDkYtFEws9GG4W6g1AzQb5xnKyyQL72HFFbbnnCuCBGa1Sl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20218; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033uMXwAN4pyBPLsjAYx4XjJZsoyV3tCqw3LLF4CL6ZHcXjjhQFeLWupFbn26ViGkWl;  https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61662 

[51] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61662

[52] https://t.me/dva_majors/63105; https://t.me/voin_dv/12989; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22884

[53] https://t.me/voin_dv/12986; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8214 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85099; https://t.me/dva_majors/63117

[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152430; https://t.me/voin_dv/12994

[55] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152367

[56] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21138

[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033uMXwAN4pyBPLsjAYx4XjJZsoyV3tCqw3LLF4CL6ZHcXjjhQFeLWupFbn26ViGkWl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4446

[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/63103; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152403; https://t.me/voin_dv/12994; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18653  

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0t6b9ktbyJxN3yW2hnEzDkYtFEws9GG4W6g1AzQb5xnKyyQL72HFFbbnnCuCBGa1Sl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20218 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24440

[60]  https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22888 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85085 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85104 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22892

[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0t6b9ktbyJxN3yW2hnEzDkYtFEws9GG4W6g1AzQb5xnKyyQL72HFFbbnnCuCBGa1Sl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20218 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11989 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid07HArEzQJFsrzsQaufYS3upZBL943KgniYe4Dj4iKjaSCxWqJG3rFZ3WtEtRRAjeJl

[62] https://t.me/kpszsu/27508

[63] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/37428 ; https://suspilne dot media/933135-umerov-zvilniv-kerivnicu-agencii-oboronnih-zakupivel-usaid-prizupinae-dopomogu-ukraini1067-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1737814579&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/cherkaskaODA/12148; https://t.me/astrapress/73173 ; https://t.me/police_kh_region/35400

[64] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13072 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/24/kozhen-shahed-yak-i-kozhna-rosijska-raketa-robytsya-na-osnovi-inozemnyh-komponentiv-prezydent/

[65] https://t.me/mod_russia/48216

[66] http://government dot ru/news/54053/

[67] https://t.me/vault8pro/52320

[68] https://военное dot рф/2025/Калашников5/ ; https://kalashnikovgroup dot ru/news/kalashnikov-vpervye_predstavit_noveyshie_udarnye-kuby-_v_abu-dabi

[69] https://t.me/astrapress/73212; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/25/v-belarusi-pered-vyborami-nachalis-sboi-v-rabote-vpn-chast-belorusskih-saytov-stala-nedostupna-dlya-polzovateley-iz-za-granitsy; https://news.zerkalo. dot io/life/89461.html

[70] https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/25/v-belarusi-pered-vyborami-nachalis-sboi-v-rabote-vpn-chast-belorusskih-saytov-stala-nedostupna-dlya-polzovateley-iz-za-granitsy; https://news.zerkalo dot io/life/89461.html; https://t.me/astrapress/73212