Sinwar’s Death Will Not End Israeli Operations in the Gaza Strip

Sinwar’s Death Will Not End Israeli Operations in the Gaza Strip

By Brian Carter

October 18, 2024

The death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar will not end the operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Sinwar’s death is unlikely to trigger a rethink within Hamas about its basic strategy, which is to survive the war and secure a ceasefire that results in a total Israeli withdrawal.[1] Sinwar will be replaced by capable military commanders in the Gaza Strip and equally extreme political leaders abroad. A total Israeli withdrawal would be akin to Israel’s surrender in this war and would enable Sinwar’s capable successors to rebuild Hamas’ military organization over the next decade to threaten Israel once more.

Sinwar’s brother Mohammad Sinwar is the most likely candidate to officially take over the group’s military wing and guide the rebuilding of Hamas. Mohammad joined Hamas’ earliest cells in the 1980s, later rising to lead Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade.[2] Mohammad has more recently served as Hamas’ head for logistics and manpower and as a top war planner within Yahya’s inner circle.[3] These roles would have exposed him to Sinwar’s intent and vision for the group after the war and provided him with a strong understanding of Hamas’ logistical and manpower requirements to rebuild if Israel were to withdraw from the Gaza Strip.

Mohammad would very likely initially share his leadership role with other top Hamas military commanders, particularly Gaza City Brigade Commander Izz al Din al Haddad. Haddad is the most senior surviving Hamas military commander in the northern Strip, and he has fought in every major war against Israel.[4] He also served as the logistics officer for all Hamas forces in the southern Strip in 2021.[5] Israeli operations have segmented the Gaza Strip into two halves that are inaccessible to each other.[6] Israeli forces have destroyed underground tunnel networks between the two halves that would have allowed the movement of military personnel and supplies, therefore requiring a second Hamas commander to run the day-to-day activities in the northern Strip.[7] Both Mohammad Sinwar and Haddad will lack sufficient command-and-control even within the southern and northern Strip respectively because Israeli operations have dismantled much of Hamas’ conventional military command structure, however.[8] Sinwar and Haddad will be unable to guide military operations meaningfully while Israeli pressure persists.

Hamas Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya is Sinwar’s most likely successor as Hamas political leader. Hayya was reportedly one of only a few exiled leaders whom Sinwar trusted, and he has played a key role in ceasefire negotiations.[9] Hayya has a much stronger relationship with Hezbollah and Iran than other options for the top Hamas leadership role, like Khaled Meshaal.[10] Hayya also presumably took over many of Haniyeh’s duties—such as engaging with foreign partners—that Sinwar could not perform due to his physical position in the Gaza Strip. Meshaal was also the leader of Hamas during the early 2010s, when Hamas’ political wing split the Iranian regime over Tehran’s support for Syrian President Bashar al Assad.[11] The relationship with Iran is likely a top priority for Hamas, making Meshaal less desirable. Recent Hamas leadership appointments—including Yahya Sinwar’s August appointment—indicate that Hamas is deepening its descent into Iran’s orbit.[12]

Hamas recognizes that it will not win on the battlefield. The group instead seeks to exploit the hostages it still holds for political gain. Hamas executed six hostages in late August in an attempt to trigger protests within Israel that would force Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to concede to Hamas’ ceasefire demands.[13] The execution of the hostages triggered massive protests on a scale not seen since the 2023 Judiciary Protests.[14] The 2023 protests were one of the immediate triggers that led Hamas to believe that the October 7 attacks—in combination with attacks from Iran and Hezbollah—would cause the collapse of Israel.[15] Hamas believes that Israeli society is inherently weak and that triggering domestic protests is one way to pressure Netanyahu to concede to Hamas’ ceasefire demands.

It is extremely unlikely Mohammad Sinwar or Izz al Din al Haddad would release the hostages even if Hamas’ exiled leadership chose to pursue a new strategy and secure a ceasefire under Israel’s terms. Mohammad Sinwar and Haddad will have an outsized role in Hamas because they are the individuals who control the hostages on the ground and therefore would hold a veto over any ceasefire. Mohammad—given his closeness to his brother in the planning of this war—very likely holds similar views to Yahya on a ceasefire. The diminished command-and-control situation within Hamas will also make gathering and conducting an accurate count of the living hostages extremely difficult, further complicating negotiations.

Hamas’ strategy is unlikely to change, given Hamas’ current organizational trajectory. Sinwar’s selection as the head of Hamas in August 2024 demonstrated the ascendance of Hamas’ most extreme, pro-Iranian wing at the expense of relatively less pro-Iran factions. Hayya confirmed on October 18 that Israel had killed Yahya Sinwar, but Hayya added that Sinwar’s death did not change Hamas’ negotiating position: a full Israeli withdrawal and an end to the war in return for the hostages.[16]

A ceasefire under Hamas’ terms is entirely unacceptable because it will allow the highly skilled military leadership of Hamas to rebuild and threaten Israel again in the next decade. The rebuilding process may be slow, but a ceasefire that enables Hamas to rebuild by removing Israeli forces that would prevent smuggling between Egypt and Gaza will condemn Israel to fight this war again. A ceasefire under Israeli terms, which include the maintenance of the Philadelphi Corridor, would enable Israeli forces to ensure that Hamas cannot resupply itself and rebuild the capabilities it has used in the past to threaten Israel.

[1] https://www.aei.org/research-products/one-pager/hamass-view-of-the-october-7-war/

[2]  https://www.jns.org/after-deif-killed-is-mohammed-sinwar-hamass-next-terror-master/; https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/muhammad-sinwar; https://www.jpost dot com/israel-hamas-war/article-819111

[3] https://www.jns.org/after-deif-killed-is-mohammed-sinwar-hamass-next-terror-master/; https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/muhammad-sinwar; https://www.jpost dot com/israel-hamas-war/article-819111

[4] https://mail.alkhanadeq dot com/post/7258/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%B4%D8%A8%D8%AD-%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85

[5] https://mail.alkhanadeq dot com/post/7258/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%B4%D8%A8%D8%AD-%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85

[6] https://www.aei.org/research-products/one-pager/hamass-view-of-the-october-7-war/

[7] https://www.aei.org/research-products/one-pager/hamass-view-of-the-october-7-war/

[8] https://www.aei.org/research-products/one-pager/hamass-view-of-the-october-7-war/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/israel-defeating-hamas-destroying-hamas-will-require-post-war-vision

[9] https://www.timesofisrael.com/whos-next-speculation-whirls-on-who-will-take-over-hamas-from-slain-sinwar/

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-8-2024

[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/khaled-meshaal-who-survived-israeli-assassination-attempt-tipped-be-new-hamas-2024-07-31/

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-6-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-8-2024

[13] https://www.aei.org/research-products/one-pager/hamass-view-of-the-october-7-war/

[14] https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-war-hostages-hersh-netanyahu-29496f50a9b1740bd3905035ffd23052

[15] https://www.aei.org/research-products/one-pager/hamass-view-of-the-october-7-war/

[16] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/senior-hamas-official-khalil-al-hayya-confirms-sinwar-killed-in-combat-in-gaza/