 |
 |
The West Must Offer Syria's Interim Government Tightly Conditioned Aid against an Emerging Assadist Insurgency
Mar 7, 2025 - ISW Press
The West Must Offer Syria's Interim Government Tightly Conditioned Aid against an Emerging Assadist Insurgency
Brian Carter
An Assadist insurgency has emerged in western Syria and stands to help US adversaries expand their influence there. The insurgency has developed slowly since early January 2025. Insurgent activity involved hit-and-run attacks at first and has evolved gradually into overt civil conflict.[1] This insurgency is still at a relatively low level for the moment. But its expansion risks distracting the interim government that is still forming and thus creating opportunities for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to resurge. Iran and Russia could exploit worsening security conditions to re-entrench themselves in Syria as well. The interim government is contributing to Alawite and minority grievances that are fueling the insurgency in various ways, and the international community must not offer blanket and unconditional support to the government. The international community should rather offer significant aid with strong conditions requiring the interim government to proceed in a transparent and inclusive manner.
This insurgency is driven by Assadist regime remnants and a mounting sense among Syrian Alawites that the government is suppressing and marginalizing them.[2] Pro-Assad elements have leveraged local frustrations, especially among Alawites, to form the basis for the insurgency.[3] The insurgency drew public attention on March 5 and 6, when Syria experienced some of its worst violence since the fall of Assad.[4] Pro-Assad insurgents attacked interim government forces across Latakia Province, killing dozens of pro-government soldiers.[5] The insurgent attacks appeared coordinated, which prompted the interim government to launch a major operation supported by tanks and helicopters with barrel bombs.[6]
The violence has already driven sectarian reprisals against the Alawites, which will likely empower Assadist elements, as they are the best organized and could rapidly strengthen the insurgency. Interim government forces killed 30 people in Mukhtariya, Latakia Province, on March 7, after insurgents ambushed government forces nearby.[7] Other massacres that the interim government has committed have been widely reported.[8] Assadists will attempt to use these killings to mobilize minority groups by arguing that Damascus seeks to destroy minorities and institute Sunni Arab domination over Syria. Assadist remnants could function like cadres in insurgent military formations to improve coordination among local fighters, who lack military networks and experience. Assadists could also use their remnant networks to coordinate across Syria and into Lebanon or Iraq, where they could access outside funding and weapons to rapidly strengthen the insurgency.
An expanded Assadist insurgency in Syria only helps America’s enemies and hurts the United States and its partners. Interim government redeployments from the central Syrian desert, where ISIS is resurging, to western Syria will create an opportunity for ISIS to create sanctuaries that it can use to launch sectarian attacks or plan external attacks.[9] A pro-Assad insurgency will also likely seek support from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah to strengthen itself if it has not yet done so. Some pro-Assad insurgents near the Lebanese border may have coordinated with Hezbollah smugglers already.[10] These efforts are only a preamble; Hezbollah and Iran will attempt to rebuild their supply lines through Syria using this insurgency. Iranian leaders have already explicitly called for an armed uprising in Syria and will attempt to take advantage of the current violence.[11] These events would spell the end for any opportunity the United States currently has to create a stable Syria free from ISIS, Russia, or Iranian influence.
The burgeoning insurgency highlights the need for an international community-backed reconciliation and political process that will assuage the concerns of Syrian minorities and transparently bring Assadists to justice for their crimes. The Damascus government has so far failed to hold Assadists accountable transparently, causing hardline interim government supporters to claim that the government is soft on Assadists, while prompting some Alawites to believe they are under genocidal attack and “uniquely” experiencing post-Assad issues.[12] Some Sunni sectarians have already murdered Alawites for perceived or actual crimes.[13]
The international community should not offer blanket or unconstrained assistance to the interim government. It should, rather, offer substantial economic aid on conditions requiring transparent, accountable, international community-supported reconciliation efforts that will fairly prosecute war criminals of all creeds and sects. This conditioned aid would reduce economic grievances that also fuel support for insurgency while reconciliation efforts would assuage sectarian fears, but economic aid alone will not solve the issues plaguing Syria. The international community should also continue to insist as a condition of aid on a political process to integrate anti-Assad leaders from minority groups into government at every level. The Damascus government has so far given senior positions to loyalists of interim President Ahmed al Shara who will determine the future of Syria.[14] The international community must use a combination of support and pressure to help Damascus contain the insurgency, or else fueling it to the detriment of the US and its allies and the region.
[1] https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5561 https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5569; https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5754;
https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5772; https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119138 ; https://t.me/ALBADIA_24/3469; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132631
[2] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1897721661946053101; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1892119268881277373; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1897712035192094841; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1892119271322321152
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-6-2025
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-6-2025; https://x.com/VeSyria/status/1898107590896160969; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-imposes-curfew-latakia-tartous-after-clashes-2025-03-07/
[5] https://x.com/VeSyria/status/1898107590896160969
[6] https://x.com/HKaaman/status/1898023222895165916; https://www.newarab.com/news/syria-sends-troops-coastal-cities-after-70-killed-clashes
[7] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1897748585632108909; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1897934299225374937
[8] https://x.com/VeSyria/status/1898107590896160969
[9] https://x.com/ALBADIA24/status/1897752703666995235; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/137422; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1897776281179013183; https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1897774638819578327; https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/120581
[10] https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5826; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1888915633649160364
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-11-2024
[12] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1898117655703494816; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1897721661946053101; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1892119268881277373; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1897712035192094841; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1892119271322321152
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-5-2025
[14] https://www.nidaalwatan dot com/article/297846-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A4%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%A9; https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/Lead_IG_OIR_Q1_FY25_Final.pdf; https://www.newarab dot com/news/who-asaad-al-shibani-syrias-new-foreign-minister; https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/ar/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/anas-hasan-khattab; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate021225