Iran Update, August 8, 2023

Aug 8, 2023 - ISW Press





Iran Update, August 8, 2023

Annika Ganzeveld, Ashka Jhaveri, and Andie Parry

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched an interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions.

Key Takeaways

  1. Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah continued to circulate false claims that the US-led International Coalition is preparing to attack Syrian regime-controlled territory in eastern Syria. Their messaging is part of a coordinated Iranian, Russian, and Syrian regime coercion campaign to expel US forces from Syria.
  2. Iran secured a majority stake in a major Syrian telecommunications company. Iran’s assistance could enable the Syrian regime to restrict the Syrian information space through the new telecommunications company.
  3. Iran is trying to convince BRICS members to accept its request to join this organization ahead of the 15th annual BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa on August 22-24. Becoming a BRICS member could help Iran mitigate the impact of Western sanctions.
  4. The Iranian regime has detained a fifth US national. Iran possibly detained the US national to gain leverage against the United States in its efforts to release frozen Iranian assets in Iraq and South Korea.

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah continued to circulate false claims that the US-led International Coalition is preparing to attack Syrian regime-controlled territory in eastern Syria. Their messaging is part of a coordinated Iranian, Russian, and Syrian regime coercion campaign to expel US forces from Syria. Several senior Iranian and Syrian officials, including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani, have traveled to eastern Syria since July 31 to assess military positioning.[1][2]

  • Iranian-state media reported on August 7 that the United States is transferring military equipment from Iraq to Syria to conduct a military operation “in the coming days.”[3] Iran has continued to message that it will defend itself against an International Coalition attack despite receiving multiple assurances that this will not happen demonstrating a failure to deescalate.
  • A Lebanese Hezbollah commander “gave the green light” to forces in Deir ez Zor Province on August 7 to attack the US-led International Coalition if Iranian-backed militias come under attack, according to the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.[4]

Iranian and Syrian regime-affiliated sources have circulated false claims since late June that the United States and allied forces in Syria intend to launch an offensive to retake regime-held towns.[5] The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has stated publicly and to Russian and Syrian regime officials that its operations in eastern Syria are non-emergency operations to eliminate ISIS cells.[6] There are no indications that the United States or SDF have been planning incursions into regime-held territory.

ISW previously warned that Iran, Russia, and the Syrian regime are coordinating a coercive campaign to expel the United States from Syria.[7] This campaign poses a serious risk to US forces in Syria and US interests in the Middle East.[8] The IRGC Quds Force directed militia deployments to Deir ez Zor Province, primarily along lines of control with the SDF in Deir ez Zor City, beginning in early July.[9] The IRGC Quds Force also oversaw Iranian-backed militia deployments to areas in the central Syrian desert near the 55-kilometer exclusion zone around the Al Tanf Garrison.[10] Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and Syrian Republican Guards units, including the Russian-backed SAA 5th Corps, deployed to Deir ez Zor Province from July 7-20 near Iranian-backed forces and along the line of control with the SDF.[11] The Syrian Defense Minister and IRGC Quds Force officials coordinated the deployments in Deir ez Zor City on July 13.[12] Unspecified Russian forces transferred 17 trucks of weapons to Iranian-backed militias in Deir Zor City between June 19-20.[13]

The coordinated Iranian, Russian, and Syrian regime coercion campaign sets the groundwork for Iran to direct a proxy attack against US forces in Syria. CTP is presenting two scenarios in which Iran directs attacks, possibly as part of a compellence campaign to expel US forces from Syria. These scenarios are not mutually exclusive.

  • Iran directs its militants to conduct a drone attack on US forces in Syria. This hypothesis is plausible because Iran has distributed and trained militants on attack drones in eastern Syria.[14] Iran has trained forces from different regions in Syria on using both surveillance and combat drones, allowing it direct attacks on multiple US positions.[15] Iran has already demonstrated its willingness to attack and kill US forces using drones.[16] Indicators that would support this scenario include: 1) Iranian commanders ordering an attack on the US-led International Coalition; 2) Iranian-backed militants deploying drones to forces in the field; 3) Iranian-backed forces conduct small-scale attacks into SDF-controlled territory to assess US reactions.
  • Iran directs or authorizes its militias to use explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) against US forces in Syria. This scenario is plausible because Iran has distributed EFPs to its forces in Syria.[17] Iran has also recruited local Syrians for sleeper cells to identify US positions, plant explosive devices, and spread clan strife in the region.[18] Local tribal leaders have worked with the IRGC QF to recruit Syrians for these purposes.[19] Cultivating an anti-US grassroots resistance movement that conducts attacks on US forces is one component of Iran’s campaign to expel the United States from Syria.[20] Indicators that would support this scenario include: 1) Iranian commanders ordering covert attacks on US forces; 2) Local Syrians surveilling US positions; 3) Iranian-backed militias instigating or amplifying a crisis among clans in SDF-controlled territory.

Iran secured a majority stake in a Syrian telecommunications company. The Iran-Syria Joint Economic Committee head Mehrdad Bazarpash acknowledged on July 31 that the Iranian and Syrian Ministries of Communications were collaborating to implement the new Syrian Telecom company Wafa.[21] The Syrian Ministry of Communications and Technology issued Wafa a contract to be Syria’s third telecommunications provider in February 2022.[22] An investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project claimed Azim Monzavi, a US-sanctioned member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is a majority stakeholder in Wafa.[23] Anti-Syrian regime outlet Voice of the Capital uncovered that Iranian companies supply equipment to the network, such as SIM cards and telecommunication towers.[24] Wafa’s CEO stated the network will be operational in early 2024.[25]

Iran will likely reap economic benefits from owning and operating the telecommunication company in Syria. Iran’s involvement in Wafa is part of a large-scale campaign to profit off Syrian reconstruction and revitalize its sanctioned economy. This joint telecom company is one of several joint economic projects Iran and Syria have implemented since Iranian President Raisi’s May 2023 visit to Syria.[26] Raisi and Syrian President Bashar al Assad signed 15 memoranda of understanding on May 3 that covered oil, energy, transportation, reconstruction, and communications technology.[27] Wafa will provide Iranian manufacturing companies a larger market to sell equipment to, and the Iranian state will reap profits through the IRGC’s majority stake in the company.

Iran’s assistance could enable the Syrian regime to restrict the Syrian information space through the new telecommunications company. The Iranian regime frequently disrupts the internet and blocks access to foreign social media platforms in Iran to prevent anti-regime protests and reduce the spread of existing protests.[28] Iran helped develop Yemen‘s telecommunication sector to enable the Houthis to surveil civilians and suppress domestic dissent beginning in 2018, as CTP previously reported.[29]

Iranian Domestic and Political Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

Iran is trying to convince BRICS members to accept its request to join this organization ahead of the 15th annual BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa on August 22-24. Iran organized an ‘Iran and BRICS: Prospects for Partnership and Cooperation’ conference in Tehran on August 8.[30] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian framed Iran as an important intermediary between BRICS members, stating that Iran can connect China to Brazil and South Africa.[31] Abdollahian added that Iran is a “reliable and effective” partner due to its “geostrategic position.” President Ebrahim Raisi similarly emphasized Iran’s efforts to connect Central Asian Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members to open waters following Iran’s accession into the SCO on July 4.[32] Iranian media recently circulated Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov’s August 1 statement that BRICS members will discuss the expansion of this organization at the upcoming summit.[33]

Becoming a BRICS member could help Iran mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. Iranian media and officials have frequently emphasized the role BRICS can play in reducing the dominance of the US dollar in the global economy. Iranian state media reported on July 28 that Brazil and India—two BRICS members—are pursuing de-dollarization, for example.[34] State media also reported on August 2 that BRICS members may discuss “the issue of launching a new BRICS currency” at the August 22-24 summit.[35] Abdollahian separately emphasized that BRICS seeks to reduce the cost of international trade, partly by using national currencies, during the ‘Iran and BRICS: Prospects for Partnership and Cooperation’ conference on August 8.[36] Iran seeks to conduct economic exchanges in local currencies to preserve its dwindling foreign currency reserves.[37]

Iran’s emphasis on joining BRICS is also part of its broader efforts to establish a parallel world order that challenges Western “dominance” and “unilateralism.”[38] Iran held a panel called “BRICS and its Role in an Emerging Multipolar World” at its August 8 conference, underscoring that the Raisi administration regards multilateral organizations such as BRICS as integral to balancing against “American unilateralism.”[39] Abdollahian additionally previously stated that Iran’s main goal for joining the SCO and BRICS is to “develop Iran’s foreign trade and move toward multilateralism.”[40]

The Iranian regime has detained a fifth US national.[41] Iranian media announced on August 8 that the regime detained an Iranian-American female “in recent weeks.”[42] This announcement follows the regime’s detainment of another US national on July 21.[43] The announcement also follows a flurry of Raisi administration diplomatic engagement with Oman, which has facilitated prisoner swap negotiations between Iran and the US in recent months.[44] President Ebrahim Raisi held a phone call with Omani Sultan Haitham bin Tarik on August 1, after which Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani traveled to Muscat, Oman on August 3.[45] Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian separately held a phone call with his Omani counterpart Sayyid Badr Al Busaidi on August 8.[46] Abdollahian separately stated on August 8 that Iran has been discussing prisoner swaps with the United States via Oman and Qatar for months and that Iran has announced its readiness to conduct prisoner exchanges “to intermediary parties.”[47]

Iran possibly detained the US national to gain leverage against the United States in its efforts to release frozen Iranian assets in Iraq and South Korea. Iranian and Western media have reported that one of Iran’s demands for releasing US prisoners is the release of Iranian funds frozen in foreign banks.[48] The US State Department announced on August 2 that Iraq will repay “hundreds of millions of dollars” of its electricity debt to Iran via Oman.[49] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani reiterated on August 7 that part of Iran’s “financial demands” from Iraq have been transferred to a “third country.”[50] Iran has seemingly made less progress in releasing its frozen assets from South Korea. Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Fada Hossein Maleki warned South Korea on August 8 that if it does not release Iran’s 7 billion dollars' worth of frozen assets, Iran “has many options that will be detrimental to South Korea.”[51]

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials have reasserted Iran’s tit-for-tat policy with respect to seizing commercial tankers in the Persian Gulf in recent days. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami stated on August 5 that Iran’s enemies are unable to confront and control the IRGC’s power.[52] Salami made this statement during an event to equip the IRGC Navy with new drones and 1,000-kilometer range missiles. IRGC spokesperson Brigadier General Ramazan Sharif separately warned on August 7 that “US mischief,” including the seizure of Iranian vessels, will be met with a “reciprocal response.”[53] The IRGC statements come amid rising tensions between the United States and Iran in the Persian Gulf and the US Navy’s deployment of more than 3,000 sailors and Marines to the Red Sea on August 6.[54] Iranian state media described the deployment as “Washington’s newest provocative action.”[55]

[1] https://www.syriahr.com/en/306136/; https://alalamsyria (dot) ir/news/41724; https://eyeofeuphrates (dot) com/index.php/ar/news/2023/08/07/9352

[2] https://t.me/jbt313/23195; https://t.me/mihwar_almuqawama/30555; https://www.almanar (dot) com.lb/10842713; https://alalamsyria (dot) ir/news/41724; https://twitter.com/VivaRevolt/status/1687519809846571008

[3] https://www.irna (dot) ir/news/85192206/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA

[4] https://www.syriahr.com/%d9%82%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%af%d9%8a-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%ad%d9%80-%d9%80%d8%b2%d8%a8-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%84%d9%87-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%8a-%d9%8a%d8%b9%d8%b7%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b6%d9%88/673327/

[5] https://deirezzor24 dot net/en/a-local-militia-holds-a-military-parade-in-al-bukamal/ ; https://nahermedia dot net/%d8%a7%d8%ac%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%af%d8%a9-%d9%85%d9%86-%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%86%d8%b8%d8%a7%d9%85-%d8%a8%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b2%d9%88%d8%b1-%d8%a8/ ; https://www.tasnimnews (dot) com/fa/media/1402/04/25/2926706/%D8%A2%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B4-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D9%88-%D9%87%D9%85-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A2%D8%AA%D8%B4-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%87;

[6] https://sdf-press (dot) com/?p=40138; https://nahermedia (dot) net/%d8%a7%d8%ac%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%af%d8%a9-%d9%85%d9%86-%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%86%d8%b8%d8%a7%d9%85-%d8%a8%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b2%d9%88%d8%b1-%d8%a8/; https://twitter.com/thesyrianlions/status/1680260894851211264

[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-russia-and-syrian-regime-are-coordinating-expel-us-forces-syria

[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-russia-and-syrian-regime-are-coordinating-expel-us-forces-syria

[9] https://www.syriahr.com/en/303717/ ;   https://twitter.com/DeirEzzore/status/1676971647918829576

[10] https://qasioun-news.com/ar/articles/264520  ; https://www.syriahr.com

[11] https://www.syriahr.com/en/303990/ ; https://eyeofeuphrates.com/ar/news/2023/07/20/9181; https://www.syriahr (dot) com/ar/news/2023/07/11/9094 ; https://twitter.com/Sharqya_reporte/status/1679226202693812224 ; https://twitter.com/DeirEzzore/status/1677279431654531074 ; https://www.syriahr.com/en/304467/

[12] https://www.alaraby.co.uk/node/6822245; https://eyeofeuphrates (dot) com/ar/news/2023/07/13/9120

[13] https://twitter.com/Sada_AlSharqieh/status/1671105381676851203

[14] https://www.syriahr.com/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d8%b1%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ab%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%8a-%d9%8a%d8%b3%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%af%d9%85-%d9%85%d8%b3%d9%8a%d9%91%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%aa/672435/; https://eyeofeuphrates (dot) com/ar/news/2023/08/03/9325; https://eyeofeuphrates (dot) com/ar/news/2023/08/03/9325

[15] https://eyeofeuphrates (dot) com/ar/news/2023/08/03/9325

[16] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3339691/us-conducts-airstrikes-in-syria-in-response-to-deadly-uav-attack/

[17] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/01/discord-leaks-iran-russia-syria/

[18] https://deirezzor24 (dot) net/en/the-iranian-revolutionary-guard-militia-is-planting-and-operating-cells-in-sdf-held-areas/

[19] https://deirezzor24 (dot) net/en/the-iranian-revolutionary-guard-militia-is-planting-and-operating-cells-in-sdf-held-areas/

[20] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/01/discord-leaks-iran-russia-syria/

[21] https://www[dot]isna.ir/news/1402050905394/%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%85-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%87

[22] https://sana[dot]sy/?p=1585988 ; https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/syria-awards-third-mobile-telecoms-licence-wafa-state-media-2022-02-21/

[23] https://www.opensyr.com/en/pages/p-17

[24]  https://damascusv[dot]com/archives/53067

[25] https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/syria-awards-third-mobile-telecoms-licence-wafa-state-media-2022-02-21/

[26] https://www[dot]isna.ir/news/1402050905394/%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%85-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%87

[27] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85100772

[28] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/22/iran-blocks-capitals-internet-access-as-amini-protests-grow ; https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/11/iran-internet-deliberately-shut-down-during-november-2019-killings-new-investigation/

[29] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-supports-houthi-control-over-yemen-telecommunications-sector

[30] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/08/08/2937525

[31] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85193219

[32] https://president dot ir/fa/145208

[33] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85186979

[34] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85182768

[35] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85187580

[36] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85193219

[37] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-5-2023

[38] https://www.irna dot ir/news/84859472 ;

https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14020206000898

[39] https://www.irna dot ir/news/84488650

[40] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85174158

[41] https://english.aawsat dot com/world/4476191-tehran-detains-fifth-us-citizen

[42] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/736589

[43] https://www.semafor.com/article/07/20/2023/iran-detains-a-fourth-american-complicating-prisoner-talks#jays-view

[44] https://www.al-monitor dot com/originals/2023/06/oman-fm-says-us-iran-close-prisoner-deal

[45] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/05/10/2934525 ;

https://www.irna dot ir/news/85188293

[46] https://twitter.com/IranNuances/status/1688904172777635840

[47] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/736817

[48] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/biden-dilemma-us-iran-negotiate-prisoner-swap-nuclear-deal-rcna89784 ;

 https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1186825

[49] https://www.dawn dot com/news/1766620

[50] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85191621

[51] https://www.etemadonline dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-9/626565-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%BE%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%87%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%A7

[52] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/736203

[53] https://www.yjc dot ir/fa/amp/news/8514934

[54] https://thehill.com/policy/international/4141596-more-than-3000-us-troops-reach-red-sea-amid-iran-tensions/

[55] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85191938

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