Iran Update, September 9, 2024

 

Iran Update, September 9, 2024

Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, Kathryn Tyson, Carolyn Moorman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iran recently delivered over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, according to Ukrainian intelligence.[1] An unspecified Ukrainian military source told British media on September 6 that Russia transported the missiles to an unspecified Caspian Sea port on September 4.[2] Iran has previously transferred weapons from its Amirabad and Anzali ports on the Caspian Sea to Astrakhan, Russia, on the Volga River.[3] Iran and Russia previously signed an agreement in December 2023 for Iran to send Fateh-360 missiles and Ababil close-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[4] European intelligence sources told Reuters in August 2024 that Russian military personnel are training in Iran to operate Fateh-360 missiles.[5] Fateh-360 missiles have a range of up to 120 kilometers and can carry a payload of 150 kilograms.[6] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russian forces will likely use the Iranian-supplied missiles to target Ukrainian energy, military, and civilian infrastructure in the coming months.[7]

The Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry summoned the Iranian charge d’affaires in Ukraine, Shahriar Amouzegar, on September 9 following recent reports that Iran delivered hundreds of ballistic missiles to Russia.[8] The Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry harshly warned Amouzegar about the “devastating and irreparable consequences” for Ukrainian-Iranian relations if recent reports about Iran sending ballistic missiles to Russia prove true.[9] Ukraine previously “downgraded” its diplomatic ties with Iran in September 2022 after Iran began supplying Russia with drones for its invasion of Ukraine.[10]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General discussed ongoing increases in Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles and noted that Iran has not resolved outstanding safeguards issues with the IAEA on September 9 in Vienna, Austria.[11] IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi highlighted an ongoing increase in Iran's 20% and 60% enriched uranium reserves, citing the IAEA’s May 2024 report on Iran’s nuclear program.[12] His statements are consistent with an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report which reportedly noted that Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium has increased by 22.6 kilograms (15.90 percent) since the IAEA's last report in May 2024.[13] Grossi added that Iran has taken no steps in the last 15 months to implement an agreement to cooperate with the IAEA and allow the IAEA to "implement further appropriate verification and monitoring activities" on a voluntary basis.[14] Grossi said that "there has been no progress in resolving the outstanding safeguards issues" with Iran and that the IAEA has limited awareness of the current locations of Iran's nuclear material and equipment.[15] Grossi stated that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian agreed to a bilateral meeting to resume "dialogue and cooperation between the [IAEA] and Iran." Grossi previously indicated that the meeting would be in the “near future.”[16]

Iran continues to deny that its nuclear program is violating any agreements.[17] Iran’s representation in the United Nations Office in Vienna called the IAEA’s report on Iran’s undeclared nuclear materials "fake and invalid." The note said the IAEA "did not provide Iran with credible documents" to back its claims and that Iran has no obligation to answer the IAEA's questions.[18]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander said on September 8 that Iran would take “revenge” for Israel’s “evils” in a “different” way. Israel’s “evils” probably refers to the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and other Axis of Resistance leaders.[19] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami said that Israel is "shaken" by the "nightmare of Iran's decisive action" and that "Israelis will taste the bitter taste of revenge."[20] Salami’s comments are notable because he is a senior operational commander in the IRGC chain of command, meaning he and his subordinates would be responsible for the planning and execution of an attack on Israel. Salami’s comments reiterated recent claims from the Iranian military establishment that emphasize that the Iranian delay is intentional for its psychological effect on the Israeli population.[21] Salami also noted that the attack would "definitely be different," which is consistent with statements from other Iranian officials, including IRGC Quds Force officers.[22] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could modify its April 2024 attack model in several ways, including by increasing the volume of projectiles it fires at Israel or changing the number of locations in Israel that it targets, to increase the likelihood of inflicting serious damage on Israel.[23]

The Jordanian truck driver that killed three Israeli civilian at the Allenby Bridge border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8 likely acted alone. The Jordanian truck driver arrived at the Israeli-controlled side of the border crossing, exited his vehicle, and opened fire at Israeli forces working there.[24] The Jordanian Foreign Affairs and Expatriates spokesperson said that initial investigations confirmed the attack “was an individual act.”[25] The attacker was a former Jordanian Armed Forces soldier and a member of a powerful tribe aligned with the Jordanian monarchy. Both of these links suggest that he was not linked to Hamas or Shia militia groups.[26] The attacker’s tribe also released a statement stating that he had no party or political affiliations.[27]

It is notable that the attacker likely operated alone given that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah congratulated the “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” on September 8 for the shooting attack at Allenby Bridge.[28] Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Hussein Moanes, also known as Abu Ali al Askari, said in April 2024 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed militias—has prepared to “equip” 12,000 “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with a significant supply of weapons.[29] CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that supports the idea that the ”Islamic Resistance in Jordan” exists and operates in Jordan. CTP-ISW assessed in April that Moanes’ declaration was likely aspirational and did not accurately represent Kataib Hezbollah’s reach in Jordan.[30] Other Axis of Resistance groups and anti-Israel factions in Jordan also attempted to capitalize on the Allenby Bridge border crossing attack. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad both called the attack a confirmation of the Arab world’s rejection of Israeli ”crimes” and ”massacres.”[31] A Jordanian civil society group that organized protests in spring 2024 held a demonstration attended by thousands of Jordanians in Amman celebrating the attack.[32] The civil society group also released a statement in response to the attack that called on the Jordanian monarchy to end normalization with Israel and withdraw from the 1994 Wadi Araba Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan.[33]

The Biden administration is reportedly re-examining its ceasefire-hostage proposal amid Israeli and US pessimism over the feasibility of a ceasefire-hostage deal. Unspecified US officials said Hamas’ execution of six hostages and demands to release 100 more Palestinian prisoners led to “significant pessimism” within the White House over the feasibility of Hamas and Israel agreeing to a new proposal.[34] US officials said that President Biden does not want to “reward” Hamas with concessions after it killed the hostages and pushed for more demands.[35] A senior Israeli official told Israeli media that the US is re-considering whether its negotiators will introduce another bridging proposal at all.[36] Four unspecified senior Israeli officials said that the US and Israel recently attempted to organize another round of negotiations in Cairo but Egypt did not allow talks to move forward after expressing displeasure with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after Netanyahu said that Egypt enabled weapons smuggling along the Philadelphi Corridor.[37] The Biden administration’s focus has reportedly shifted to encouraging the Egyptian and Qatari mediators to pressure Sinwar to concede some of Hamas’ demands.[38]

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a major Syrian weapons facility as part of the Israeli campaign to interdict weapons and supplies flowing to Lebanese Hezbollah. The IDF likely conducted several airstrikes into Syria on September 8, including one targeting a Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) site in Masyaf, Hama Governorate, used to produce advanced weapons including precision guided munitions.[39] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent called the strike “exceptional” and large, adding that the strike hit an underground weapons facility at the SSRC site. FIRMS data showed significant fires in southern Masyaf and in a valley southwest of Masyaf that holds an underground facility and tunnel network.[40] The airstrikes killed 16 people and injured 43 others.[41] Iran reportedly uses the SSRC site in Masyaf to develop weapons for the members of the Axis of Resistance, including the Lebanese Hezbollah.[42] The Iranian Foreign Ministry condemned the airstrikes but denied the presence of any Iran-operated military site in the area.[43]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Russia: Iran recently delivered over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, according to Ukrainian intelligence. An unspecified Ukrainian military source told British media on September 6 that Russia transported the missiles to an unspecified Caspian Sea port on September 4. Iran has previously transferred weapons to Russia from its Amirabad and Anzali ports on the Caspian Sea to Astrakhan, Russia, on the Volga River.
• Jordan: The Jordanian truck driver that killed three Israeli civilian at the Allenby Bridge border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8 likely acted alone. It is notable that the attacker likely operated alone given that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah congratulated the “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” on September 8 for the shooting attack at Allenby Bridge.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General discussed ongoing increases in Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles and noted that Iran has not resolved outstanding safeguards issues with the IAEA on September 9 in Vienna, Austria.
• Iranian Retaliation: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander said on September 8 that Iran would take “revenge” for Israel’s “evils” in a “different” way. Israel’s “evils” probably refers to the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and other Axis of Resistance leaders.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: The Biden administration is reportedly re-examining its ceasefire-hostage proposal amid Israeli and US pessimism over the feasibility of a ceasefire-hostage deal.
• Syria: The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a major Syrian weapons facility as part of the Israeli campaign to interdict weapons and supplies flowing to Lebanese Hezbollah.
• Lebanon: A veteran Israeli war correspondent said that Israeli deliberations over an offensive in southern Lebanon are “mainly in relation to [the] scope” of the operation, though the “political and security echelon” has not decided to conduct an operation.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF 252nd Division continued operations around the Netzarim Corridor on September 9. The IDF said that the 16th Jerusalem Brigade (Res.) continued to operate in Zaytoun, in southern Gaza City north of the Netzarim Corridor.[44] The 16th Brigade raided militia targets, killed dozens of fighters, and destroyed militia infrastructure, including a tunnel shaft used by fighters in the area.[45] Israeli forces also located machinery for manufacturing weapons.[46] CTP-ISW assessed in June 2024 that Hamas was establishing small weapons manufacturing sites across the Gaza Strip in an effort to rebuild its weapons production capacity and reconstitute its military forces.[47] It is unclear if this weapons manufacturing site was currently in operation, but the destruction of these facilities disrupts Hamas’ ability to reconstitute.

Palestinian sources reported that Israeli forces also continued to operate south of the Netzarim Corridor on September 9.[48] A Palestinian journalist reported that Israeli armor made a “limited incursion” on Salah ad Din Street northeast of Nuseirat camp.[49] The journalist also reported small arms fire and shelling in the area.[50] The IDF has operated around the Netzarim Corridor in recent weeks in order to expand IDF control over territory along the corridor.

CTP-ISW has not observed any claimed Palestinian militia attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip since its last data cutoff on September 8.

The IDF issued evacuation orders for the northern Gaza Strip on September 9 following rocket fire from the area.[51] PIJ launched two rockets from the northern Gaza Strip targeting Ashkelon and its surrounding towns on September 8.[52] The IDF intercepted one rocket and said that the other landed off the coast of Ashkelon.[53] The IDF issued evacuation orders for the Beit Lahia, as Salateen, and Atatra areas on September 9 and told residents that the area is considered “dangerous combat zone.”[54] Israeli media recently reported that the IDF’s recent approach of immediately evacuating Gazan residents in areas from which rockets are fired before targeting the rocket launch sites has led to a significant decrease in the rate of Palestinian militia rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip.[55] CTP-ISW has observed rocket launches from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory decrease significantly since June 2024, which is consistent with the reporting of this new Israeli approach.[56]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli security forces disrupted a Palestinian militia attack plot on September 9.[57] Israeli security forces detained three Palestinian fighters in Israel and the West Bank planning the attack.[58] Israeli police forces intercepted a vehicle carrying 13 Palestinians on Route 6 in central Israel and detained one Palestinian passenger who had entered Israel illegally. The Israeli security forces reported that the detainee was planning an attack inside Israel alongside two other Palestinians who were detained by the IDF in Hebron.[59] The IDF acted on intelligence from the interrogation of the first detainee to detain the two additional cell members.[60] The IDF also confiscated at least one M4/M16-type rifle during the raid in Hebron that the cell likely planned to use in an attack inside Israel.[61]

The Israeli security forces conducted overnight raids in five locations in the West Bank on September 8 and 9.[62] The IDF detained one wanted person and captured small arms (including an M16 rifle), ammunition, and other military equipment in raids in two towns near Ramallah.[63] The IDF separately conducted raids in Deir Abu Mashal, Baqa, and Hebron to detain three wanted persons and confiscate an unspecified amount of ammunition.[64]

The IDF thwarted a car ramming attack targeting the IDF in Kharsa, near Hebron, on September 8.[65] The IDF fired small arms targeting the suspects in the vehicle and detained them. The IDF did not sustain any casualties during the attempted attack.[66]

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in two locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 8.[67] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting Israeli forces in Tulkarm refugee camp.[68] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades engaged Israeli forces in Balata refugee camp in Nablus.[69]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least nine attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 8.[70] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on September 9 that a Hezbollah drone struck a residential building in Nahariya.[71] IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said that the attack on Nahariya is a “serious incident“ and that the IDF is “ready for any mission required.“[72] Jamaa al Islamiya, a Sunni Muslim Brotherhood-linked group in southern Lebanon, claimed a rocket attack targeting Israeli forces in a barracks near Kiryat Shmona on September 9.[73]

US CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla met with IDF commanders on September 8 to discuss the threats from Iran and Lebanon against northern Israel.[74] Kurilla met separately with IDF Chief of Staff Major General Herzi Halevi and Northern Command Commander Uri Gordin.[75] Gordin presented the IDF’s operational plans in Lebanon to Kurilla.[76] The IDF said that it will continue to work with the US Army to strengthen coordination in the region.[77]

A veteran Israeli war correspondent said that Israeli deliberations over an offensive in southern Lebanon are “mainly in relation to [the] scope” of the operation, though the “political and security echelon” has not decided to conduct an operation.[78] The correspondent reported that there are currently two main considerations facing Israeli decisionmakers. First, Israeli decisionmakers remain concerned that Hezbollah can target Israeli infrastructure and civilian sites deep into Israel in the event of a large operation. Second, the Israeli decisionmakers remain concerned about the possibility that Iran will support Hezbollah in a war. A security official told the correspondent that Israel will require US support in order to conduct either a military operation or successful diplomatic negotiations.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias reiterated their willingness to target US forces in Iraq and Syria despite the US and Iraqi governments reportedly agreeing to a plan for all US-led coalition troops to withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2026.[79] US, coalition, and Iraqi officials told Reuters on September 6 that “hundreds” of coalition forces will withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and remaining troops will withdraw by the end of 2026.[80] A leader within the Islamic Resistance of Iraq told Lebanese outlet al Akhbar that the United States only understands “the language of weapons,” and that withdrawal plans are ”lies” by the United States.[81] This statement echoes previous militia threats to target US forces in Iraq and Syria over US ”procrastination” in negotiating the withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq.[82] Unidentified Iranian-backed militias last attacked US forces in Syria on August 13, while an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia last attacked US forces in Iraq on August 5.[83] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq attacked US forces over 170 times between October 2023 and January 2024, but it has not claimed an attack targeting US forces in Syria or Iraq since February 4.[84] These militias may attack at a lower rate or with less sophistication than they did prior to the pause in attacks in early February. Such a model would allow the groups to signal their resistance laurels to their supporters while avoiding any serious risk.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with new Houthi Foreign Affairs Minister Jamal Amer to discuss regional tensions and cooperation between Iran and the Houthis on September 7.[85] Amer stressed the Houthis’ continued support for Palestine and Araghchi praised the Houthis for their actions “defending” Palestine. Araghchi and Amer also discussed the expansion of bilateral ties between Iran and the Houthis in "economic and development fields." Araghchi invited Amer to visit Tehran. Amer, who was appointed as foreign affairs minister in the new Houthi government in mid-August, reportedly “has the ear” of Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi.[86]

Iranian Ambassador to Armenia Mehdi Sobhani met with Armenian National Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan to discuss Iran's concerns regarding the Zangezur corridor on September 7.[87] Grigoryan stated that "no force can cut off the territorial connection between Iran and Armenia." He stressed that the Iran-Armenia border is a border of peace and friendship. This meeting follows comments from senior Iranian officials criticizing efforts to redraw borders, likely responding to a statement by Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov in which Lavrov stated his support of Azerbaijan and Turkey‘s Zangezur corridor project.[88] The Iranian regime has historically opposed Azerbaijani and Turkish efforts to establish the Zangezur corridor between Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic because such a corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia.[89]

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami appointed Brigadier General Second Class Sebahan Tavar as commander of the 16th Quds Operational Division on September 8.[90] The 16th Quds Operational Division is headquartered in Rasht, Gilan Province, and operates under the Ghadir Operational Base.[91] Tavar previously commanded the Mirza Kuchek Khan Special Forces Brigade, which is headquartered in Langaroud, Gilan Province.[92] Colonel Seyyed Hadi Mousavi replaced Tavar as commander of the Mirza Kuchek Khan Special Forces Brigade.[93] IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Pak Pour claimed that Israel supports “sabotage teams” along Iran’s borders during an inauguration ceremony for Mousavi on September 8.[94] Pak Pour also claimed that foreign intelligence services backed recent terrorist attacks in southern Iran. CTP-ISW has previously noted an uptick in anti-regime militancy and unrest in southeastern Iran since December 2023.[95]

Iranian media reported on September 8 that the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan evacuated its headquarters in Iraq near the Iranian border as part of the March 2023 security agreement between Iran and Iraq.[96] The March 2023 agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Kurdish opposition groups away from the Iran-Iraq border.[97] Iranian media reported that the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan moved its headquarters to the city of Dokan in Sulaymaniyah Province, Iraqi Kurdistan Region.[98] Iran has historically accused anti-regime Kurdish militant groups and Israel of jointly using Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate operations into Iran.[99] Iranian media also claimed on September 9 that the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan has come under the “full supervision” of the Iraqi federal government.[100] These reports come ahead of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s first foreign visit to Iraq on September 11.[101] Iranian media reported that Pezeshkian will sign security cooperations agreements with Iraqi officials during his visit.[102]

Tehran Mayor Ali Zakani traveled to Damascus on September 4 to attend the annual Syrian Exports Exhibition.[103] Approximately 600 companies participated in the exhibition, which took place between September 4 and 8.[104] Zakani discussed provincial cooperation in the fields of transportation, tourism, and renewable energy with Syrian Prime Minister Hussein Arnous on September 5.[105] Zakani also met with Damascus Governor Mohammad Tariq Kreishati on the sidelines of the exhibition.[106]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed three Houthi drones and two Houthi missile launchers in Yemen on September 8.[107]

[1] https://www.thetimes.com/uk/defence/article/ballistic-clmpm3d7m

[2] https://www.thetimes.com/uk/defence/article/ballistic-clmpm3d7m

[3] https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/26/europe/iran-russia-shipments-caspian-sea-intl-cmd/index.html

[4] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/iran-deliver-hundreds-ballistic-missiles-russia-soon-intel-sources-say-2024-08-09/

[5] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/iran-deliver-hundreds-ballistic-missiles-russia-soon-intel-sources-say-2024-08-09/

[6] https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-export-ballistic-missile-russia/33080369.html

[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2024

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-summons-uks-charge-daffaires-tehran-over-recent-sanctions-isna-says-2024-09-03/

[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-summons-uks-charge-daffaires-tehran-over-recent-sanctions-isna-says-2024-09-03/

[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-regrets-ukraines-downgrading-ties-over-reported-supply-drones-2022-09-24/

[11] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-9-september-2024

[12] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-9-september-2024 ; https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/06/gov2024-26.pdf

[13] https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-enriched-uranium-stockpile-9c86e5788a8bb45eab1337d5f6c10121

[14] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-9-september-2024 ; https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/joint-statement-by-the-atomic-energy-organization-of-iran-aeoi-and-the-international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea

[15] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-9-september-2024

[16] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/186789/

[17] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/815662/

[18] https://www.iranintl dot com/202409083876

[19] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/689528

[20] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/689528/ ; https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/20609/

[21] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate090224 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate082224 ;

[22] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate090424 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3155224 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/689528

[23] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-4-2024

[24] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1832687907473064206 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1832676392053375075 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/13579

[25] https://twitter.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1832888267600957606

[26] https://www dot alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B0-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%81%D8%B9%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/two-wounded-shooting-attack-near-jordan-border-israeli-authorities-say-2024-09-08/

[27] https://twitter.com/zaeem16064429/status/1833059644744290796 ; https://www dot alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B0-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%81%D8%B9%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84

[28] https://t.me/centerkaf/4565

[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-2-2024

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-2-2024

[31] https://t.me/mihwar_almuqawama/64094 ; https://t.me/mihwar_almuqawama/64087

[32] https://twitter.com/tajammo3_jo/status/1832781145148359060 ; https://twitter.com/tajammo3_jo/status/1833041143199625481 ; https://twitter.com/tajammo3_jo/status/1832886305199689996 ; https://twitter.com/tajammo3_jo/status/1832880879183524141

[33] https://twitter.com/tajammo3_jo/status/1832743348958093381

[34] https://www.axios.com/2024/09/08/us-gaza-hostage-ceasefire-deal-israel-hamas-skepticism

[35] https://www.axios.com/2024/09/08/us-gaza-hostage-ceasefire-deal-israel-hamas-skepticism

[36] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13617

[37] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13617

[38] https://www.axios.com/2024/09/08/us-gaza-hostage-ceasefire-deal-israel-hamas-skepticism

[39] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13594 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-says-israeli-strikes-killed-16-amid-widening-tensions-b8b31c80

[40] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1833078464724783156

[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-air-defences-confront-aggression-central-region-2024-09-08/

[42] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-says-israeli-strikes-killed-16-amid-widening-tensions-b8b31c80

[43] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-air-defences-confront-aggression-central-region-2024-09-08/ ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-says-israeli-strikes-killed-16-amid-widening-tensions-b8b31c80v

[44] www dot idf.il/229420

[45] www dot idf.il/229420

[46] www dot idf.il/229420

[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-24-2024

[48] https://t.me/hamza20300/291290; https://t.me/hamza20300/291321; https://t.me/hamza20300/291225

[49] https://t.me/hamza20300/291225

[50] https://t.me/hamza20300/291290; https://t.me/hamza20300/291321; https://t.me/hamza20300/291225

[51] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1833079119011078357

[52] https://t.me/sarayaps/18573; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1832847952781709784; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1832842275317043383

[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1832847952781709784

[54] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1833079119011078357

[55] https://www.mako dot co.il/news-military/2024_q3/Article-8352552d2e2c191026.htm; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-6-2024; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1827971103131685255; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1825059706374701182; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1824713305090400293; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1824330194594750598

[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-6-2024

[57] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1833210823021322253

[58] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1833210823021322253

[59] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13605

[60] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13605

[61] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1833210823021322253

[62] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833090043465900212 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833090054027145421

[63] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833090043465900212

[64] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833090054027145421

[65] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1832869368050471173

[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1832869368050471173

[67] https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/665 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7479

[68] https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/665 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/666

[69] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7479

[70] https://t.me/mmirleb/6696; https://t.me/mmirleb/6694; https://t.me/mmirleb/6699; https://t.me/mmirleb/6701; https://t.me/mmirleb/6703; https://t.me/mmirleb/6705; https://t.me/mmirleb/6706; https://t.me/mmirleb/6708; https://t.me/mmirleb/6710

[71] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13599; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833062108201984454

[72] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1833148568229544323

[73] https://t.me/mihwar_almuqawama/64196

[74] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/s1qtmshna; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833077465826140300

[75] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833077465826140300; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833077473816281568

[76] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833077473816281568

[77] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833077473816281568

[78] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/bklkqffnr#autoplay

[79] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/Palestine/386691/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D9%82-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/

[80] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/

[81] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/Palestine/386691/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D9%82-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7

[82] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-20-2024

[83] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-14-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-6-2024

[84] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/954 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-28-2024; https://apnews.com/article/iraq-kataib-hezbollah-us-strikes-militias-e2d31a579001f62a12b55b4cbf16ab48

[85] https://mfa.gov dot ir/portal/newsview/752931

[86] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1823731188554424465

[87] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/815641/

[88] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-5-2024#_ednf22783afc1d30864c02f01cb44000eb119 ; https://x.com/araghchi/status/1831683974684389824 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-30-2024#_edn580b870071224cb93cd8cb4a6daa806037 ; https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/489741/Tehran-strongly-opposes-proposed-Zangezur-corridor-Raisi-says

[89] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-5-2024#_ednf22783afc1d30864c02f01cb44000eb119 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-30-2024#_edn580b870071224cb93cd8cb4a6daa806037 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-3-2024

[90] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6218484 ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3154780

[91] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Irans-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf?x85095, Page 16

[92] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3154780

https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Irans-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf?x85095, Page 16

[93] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3154780

[94] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3154780

[95] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-2-2024 ;

https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-14-2024

[96] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3155004

[97] https://almadapaper dot net/view.php?cat=299491; https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/deep-dive-iran-inks-security-accord-with-iraq-as-regional-diplomacy-revved-up

[98] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3155004

[99] https://amwaj.media/article/deep-dive-inside-iran-s-move-to-subdue-kurdish-foes-in-iraq

[100] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/19/3155509

[101] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3154847

[102] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3154847

[103] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/220680/Tehran-mayor-visits-Damascus-to-boost-coop-with-Damascus

[104] https://syrianobserver dot com/society/expo-syria-2024-a-showcase-of-resilience-and-economic-revival.html ;

https://iranpress dot com/iran-s-ambassador--tehran-s-envoy-visit-syria-expo-2024

[105] http://syriatimes dot sy/arnous-and-tehran-mayor-hold-talks-on-cooperation-between-sy-ria-and-iranian-provinces/

[106] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3155175

[107] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1832856726846030143