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Africa File, December 5, 2024: French Influence in Africa Erodes Further; Syria’s Impact on Russia in Africa and the Mediterranean; Somalia Political Dispute Turns Hot; DRC-Rwanda Peace Plans Move Ahead; Tuareg Setback
Dec 5, 2024 - ISW Press
Africa File, December 5, 2024: French Influence in Africa Erodes Further; Syria’s Impact on Russia in Africa and the Mediterranean; Somalia Political Dispute Turns Hot; DRC-Rwanda Peace Plans Move Ahead; Tuareg Setback
Authors: Liam Karr, Kathryn Tyson, and Yale Ford
Data Cutoff: December 5, 2024, at 10 a.m.
Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.
The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.
Key Takeaways:
Sahel. Chad and Senegal both stated their intentions to end defense accords with France that authorized French deployments to both countries, which would unravel France’s remaining logistics and military footprint in Central and West Africa. Russia is interested in replacing the French military presence in these states as it has in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger but is likely unable to replicate its central Sahel success in the short term due to Russia’s capacity limitations. Chad and Senegal have stated their desire to balance ties with the West, and the West has maintained engagement with both countries. These factors limit the Kremlin’s opportunities in these states.
Russia. Russia may redeploy Africa Corps units to Syria to reinforce the Assad regime in Syria to prevent Assad’s defeat, which would harm the Kremlin’s strategic objectives in Africa and surrounding waterways such as the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Africa Corps may shore up Syrian regime forces in support and advisory roles but likely lacks capacity to send adequate numbers of troops to change the situation fundamentally. It is too soon to say how far the Syrian rebels can advance and whether they will be able to hold their gains. However, a scenario in which the rebels toppled Bashar al Assad would harm the Kremlin’s strategic objectives to project power in the Mediterranean and Red Seas and threaten NATO’s southern flank from Africa and the Mediterranean. Russia will face logistic challenges that will undermine its Africa operations if it loses its footprint in Syria. Assad’s collapse would additionally damage the global perception of Russia as an effective partner and protector, potentially threatening Russia’s partnerships with African autocrats and its resulting economic, military, and political influence in Africa.
Somalia. The ongoing election dispute between Jubbaland and the SFG sparked a brief firefight in late November and continues to pose a heightened threat of further internal political violence and a direct or proxy conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia. Ethiopia could take advantage of the escalating dispute between Jubbaland and the Somali Federal Government (SFG) to increase its presence in the region in the context of Ethiopia’s own disputes with the SFG and Egypt.
DRC. The DRC and Rwanda approved a CONOP for the DRC to dismantle a key rebel group in the eastern DRC in exchange for Rwandan forces withdrawing from the eastern DRC. The concept of operations (CONOP) has unclear benchmarks and a compressed timeline, which could limit its effectiveness. The CONOP and various other peace efforts in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) notably do not involve the M23 rebel group, which is a critical factor in the ongoing violence in the eastern DRC.
Mali. A Malian drone strike killed a prominent non-jihadist Tuareg separatist rebel leader in northern Mali, which may weaken the Tuareg separatist rebel coalition and increase the prominence of hardline separatism and potential collaboration with al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate among the coalition.
Assessments:
Sahel
Chad and Senegal stated their intentions to end defense accords with France that authorized French deployments to both countries, which threatens to unravel France’s remaining logistics and military footprint in Central and West Africa. Chad and Senegal separately signaled their intents to end defense accords authorizing French troop deployments to both countries on November 28.[1] Chadian President Mahamat Déby said in a December 1 speech that the pact no longer aligned with Chad’s security or geopolitical needs and stated that Chad will build a “more autonomous” army.[2] Déby further said that “this agreement was signed in a different era, with distinct actors on both sides and under a completely different context. Over time, this agreement has become obsolete.”[3] Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye said on November 28 that Senegal would ask France to close all military bases in Senegal because they were “incompatible” with Senegalese sovereignty.[4]
France’s base in Chad functions as the center of its logistic network in Africa, and its loss would severely hinder France’s ability to continue supporting other activities in Central and Western Africa. France has 3,000 troops deployed across West Africa, with 1,000 of these forces stationed in Chad.[5] Chad’s strategic location in the central Sahel enabled it to serve as a hub that supported smaller deployments to the west in Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Senegal.[6] France also uses its position in Chad to support efforts to address the civil war in neighboring Sudan to the east.[7] France’s foreign minister had visited Chad and traveled to the Sudanese border hours before Chad announced its decision on November 28.[8]
Chad and Senegal are the latest countries to cut ties with France in response to rising anti-French sentiment across Francophone Africa. Anti-French juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger kicked out French troops between 2022 and 2023.[9] Chad and Senegal are experiencing the same popular anti-French sentiment.[10] Chad expelled a small contingent of fewer than 100 US Special Forces soldiers in April, presumably to appease anti-Western sentiment.[11]
Russia is interested in replacing the French military presence in Chad as it has in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger but is likely unable to replicate its central Sahel success in the short term due to Russia’s capacity limitations. CTP has previously assessed that Russia likely seeks to supplant the West in places such as Chad and Senegal to support Russian operations in neighboring countries and mitigate the effects of Western sanctions imposed because of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[12]
Russia has increased its outreach to Chad and Senegal throughout 2024 to set conditions to establish its own military footprint and influence networks in Chad and Senegal. Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted Déby at the Kremlin in January 2024, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Déby in Chad in June 2024.[13] French media reported that Russia has been pushing for a new military cooperation deal with Senegal for over a year that would enable Russian ships to stop over in Senegalese ports and reduce Russia’s reliance on air links when resupplying its forces in the central Sahel.[14]
Chad may be particularly receptive to Russian outreach due to the fragile Chadian junta’s need for the regime security that Russia has offered to other African partners. Déby faces internal tensions with Chadian elites related to his handling of the civil war in neighboring Sudan that experts have warned have heightened the risk of an elite coup.[15] Déby decided to allow the United Arab Emirates to use an airport in eastern Chad as a logistics hub for its weapons shipments and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in exchange for Emirati financial aid.[16] This move has drawn growing pressure from Chad’s military and political elite that hail from the area and view the RSF as a threat due to a history of cross-border ethnic tensions and violence involving the militia groups that now compose the RSF.[17] Déby plans to travel to the Central African Republic (CAR) in early December, which will create opportunities to meet with the numerous Russian defense officials based in the country.[18]
Russia faces capacity limitations that will likely prevent it from significantly expanding its military footprint into Chad and Senegal as it juggles higher-priority theaters in Ukraine, Syria, and the central Sahel. CTP has previously assessed that the Kremlin faced manpower shortages because it redeployed Africa Corps units to Ukraine and because recruiting shortfalls are inhibiting it from scaling up its presence in the central Sahelian countries.[19] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 3 that the Kremlin planned to redeploy Africa Corps units to Syria to protect the allied Bashar al Assad regime from collapse and protect Russia’s naval and airbases in Syria. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov, who oversees the Africa Corps, promised to scale up its presence in Burkina Faso and Niger when on a tour of the three central Sahel countries and Libya in late November.[20] Such troop increases in the central Sahel would further deplete resources for Chad or Senegal.
Chad and Senegal have both stated their intentions to balance ties with the West, and the West has maintained engagement with both countries. These factors limit the opportunities for the Kremlin. The Chadian foreign minister said in his original remarks on November 28 that “this decision in no way calls into question . . . the bonds of friendship between” Chad and France and later clarified that “this is not a break with France like Niger or elsewhere.”[21] Déby said in his follow-up speech that Chad is “in no way in a logic of replacing one power with another, even less in an approach of changing masters.”[22] Chadian authorities detained a prominent Wagner Group–linked operative, Maxim Shugalei, in September on charges of espionage and foreign influence activities and only released him in November after direct overtures from the Kremlin. [23] The arrest highlights Chad’s limits and Chad’s wariness surrounding its relationship with Russia.[24]
President Faye framed his remarks much like his Chadian counterparts by saying that the move does not represent a break in ties with France. Faye equated Senegal’s ties to France to its partnership with China and said that “sovereignty does not accept the presence of military bases in a sovereign country.”[25] This framing posits France as a critical Senegalese partner and implies that Senegal does not wish to swap French bases for Russian bases.[26] Faye has continued to try to balance ties with the West and new partners more broadly despite coming to power on a generally anti-French platform.[27]
France had already planned to scale back its presence in both countries to comply with host government requests and popular anti-French sentiment.[28] France’s “special envoy” to reconfigure the French military footprint in Africa recently submitted his recommendation to reduce troops across the four countries where French troops remain: Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Senegal.[29] The special envoy considered multiple options, but French media reported in previous months that the most popular option was to reduce the 3,000 French troops currently deployed across West Africa to 600.[30] Chad would host 300 of these soldiers as part of this plan, and the remaining three countries would each host 100.[31]
The move to revoke the old military agreements is not mutually exclusive with the new arrangements France was discussing with Chad and Senegal. A key objective of France’s drawdown was to reduce its visibility and comply with the demands of its African partners to appease anti-French sentiment. Chad and Senegal publicly annulling the deals that were designed for a larger French presence allows them to gain popular support while leaving room for a renegotiated arrangement that fits both France’s and the host governments’ aims. Chad has similarly repeated its openness to US Special Forces returning under a renegotiated agreement and continued cooperation on training and logistics even with US forces stationed outside of the country.[32] Multiple outlets reported that France was surprised by Chad’s announcement, however, which indicates that the decisions were not a part of France’s plan.[33]
Russia
The following text is from the November 4 Africa File Special Edition “Syria’s Potential Impact on Russia’s Africa and Mediterranean Ambitions.”[34]
Russia may redeploy Africa Corps units to Syria to reinforce the Assad regime in Syria. The Ukrainian GUR claimed on December 3 that the Kremlin had decided to redeploy “private military contractors, probably Africa Corps” units to Syria in response to the surprise Syrian rebel offensive in late November.[35] The claim did not elaborate on the number of forces or where they would come from. Russia has two military facilities in Syria’s Latakia province that could receive reinforcements: Hmeimim Air Base near Latakia and the Russian Navy base at Tartus. Syrian rebels captured Syria’s second-largest city, Aleppo, on December 1 and advanced south toward Hama City by December 3.[36] Hama is less than 30 miles north of Homs, Syria’s third-largest city; a gateway to the Mediterranean coast; and 90 miles north of the Syrian capital, Damascus.
Figure 1. Syrian Civil War
Source: Institute for the Study of War; Critical Threats Project.
Russia previously redeployed Africa Corps units away from African theaters during Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk Oblast in August 2024, establishing a precedent for using Africa Corps personnel to plug manpower gaps in higher-priority theaters.[37] It is unclear how many Africa Corps personnel deployed to Kursk, which countries the Kremlin pulled them from, and whether they have returned to Africa since. The Africa Corps-affiliated “Bear Brigade,” a 100-strong detachment, had redeployed from Burkina Faso to Kursk Oblast as of late August.[38] Some Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers referred to other reinforcements as Africa Corps “reserves” who were still based in Russia and had not yet deployed to Africa.[39]
Figure 2. Africa Corps Deployments in Africa
Source: Liam Karr.
Africa Corps units are the best-positioned Russian assets to redeploy to Syria and reinforce Russian efforts there. Russia has stopped sending supplies through the Black Sea to reach Syria due to the proliferation of Ukrainian air and naval drones, forcing them to take a much longer voyage around Europe via the Baltic.[40] Libya serves as a hub for Africa Corps personnel and heavy equipment, which can reach Syria via the Mediterranean Sea.[41] Russia reinforced the estimated 800 soldiers who were in Libya at the beginning of 2024 with over 1,800 regular Africa Corps units and several hundred special forces by March.[42] The Kremlin sent several shipments from Syria to Libya during this period, amounting to tens of thousands of tons of military equipment.[43] Russia has presumably deployed some of these soldiers and equipment to sub-Saharan Africa or Ukraine throughout 2024, but the remaining assets are best positioned to reach Syria quickly and without drawing resources away from Ukraine or, potentially, the Sahel. The equipment shipments included T-72 tanks and artillery systems that CTP has not recorded appearing in other sub-Saharan theaters and are presumably still in Libya, and the Polish Institute of International Affairs reported that Russia had roughly 1,800 troops across Libya as of May 2024.[44]
Africa Corps may help shore up Syrian regime forces in support and advisory roles but likely lacks the capacity to send adequate numbers of troops to change the situation in Syria fundamentally. Africa Corps units in Mali and Russian veterans who served in Libya in 2019 have experience with the kinds of administrative command support and tactical-level advising that Russian forces have previously provided to help augment regime forces in Syria.[45] Several Africa Corps commanders in Libya even served in Syria before deploying to Libya in 2024.[46]
The Kremlin will likely face capacity and logistic challenges in redeploying sufficient Africa Corps troops to Syria and sustaining its operations in Africa. Russia previously deployed thousands of ground forces to help shore up the Syrian regime after 2015, but CTP has recently assessed that Africa Corps is overstretched after redeploying some units to Ukraine and suffering from recruiting shortfalls.[47] The roughly 2,000 Russian troops in Mali are trying to protect the Malian capital, Bamako, while supporting counterinsurgency operations hundreds of miles away in central and northern Mali.[48] Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov recently traveled to Burkina Faso and Niger in late November, promising to expand Russia’s small local contingents of 100–300 soldiers.[49] The 4,000 Wagner Group veterans operating in the CAR have not yet signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense and are not integrated into the broader Africa Corps structure.[50] Syrian rebel advances south toward Homs threaten to cut off any Russian reinforcements or supplies sent to Tartus or the Hmeimim Air Base, although it is too soon to say how far the rebels can advance and whether they will be able to hold their gains.
A scenario in which the rebels toppled Assad would harm the Kremlin’s strategic objectives involving Africa and surrounding waterways, such as projecting power in the Mediterranean and Red Seas and threatening NATO’s southern flank. Russia’s activity in Libya and the Sahel supports its objectives of securing access in the Mediterranean and Red Sea, an undertaking that is heavily dependent upon Russia maintaining its naval base in Tartus. Tartus is Russia’s only formal overseas naval base, which it uses to project power into the Mediterranean for various purposes including ostensibly to counter NATO. Russia built up its presence in Tartus before it invaded Ukraine in 2022 to counter, deter, and monitor any NATO threats emanating from the Mediterranean, particularly aircraft carriers, among other things.[51] The base also links Russia’s Black Sea assets to the Mediterranean, although Turkey has severed this link for military vessels by closing the Turkish Straits under the Montreux Convention following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[52]
Russia has been attempting to secure a naval base in Libya to expand its footprint and power projection around the Mediterranean. The Russian Ministry of Defense has intensified discussions for a Russian naval base in Libya, specifically Tobruk, since assuming control of the Wagner Group’s operations after the death of former Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023.[53] Russia reportedly offered air defense systems and pilot training to Libya in exchange for the base, according to a 2023 Bloomberg report.[54] A Russian naval base in Libya would threaten Europe’s and NATO’s southern flank by helping support Russian activity in the Mediterranean Sea and potentially positioning a standing Russian force able to threaten NATO critical infrastructure with long-range cruise missile strikes from the sea.[55]
NATO has increasingly taken note of the unconventional and indirect threats that Russia has created along NATO’s southern flank through its efforts to replace the West in the Sahel. Russia lacks the capability and possibly the intent to immediately capitalize on these opportunities, however.[56] Russia has directly contributed to the drivers of trans-Saharan migration flows to Europe by displacing the West in the Sahel without effectively backfilling Western security assistance. Russia’s growing footprint in the Sahel has positioned it along key nodes on trans-Saharan migration routes.[57] Russian personnel in Africa have contact with traffickers but lack the capacity to heavily impact and weaponize these sprawling and decentralized networks beyond continuing to feed the instability that lies at the root of migration.[58]
Figure 3. Growing Russian Presence on Trans-Saharan Migration Routes in West Africa
Source: Liam Karr; Clingendael; Norwegian Center for Global Analyses.
Local affiliates of transnational terror organizations al Qaeda and the Islamic State have capitalized on the security vacuum to strengthen, increasing the latent threat these groups pose to Europe.[59] The strengthening of these groups is likely an unintended consequence of Russia’s strategy and not an objective of it, since these groups threaten Russia as well.[60]
Russia has long pursued a Red Sea port to protect its economic interests in the region and improve its military posture vis-à-vis the West in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, but the loss of Tartus would diminish the utility of such a base.[61] The Kremlin increased support for Sudanese Armed Forces in 2024 in exchange for promises to revive a stalled 2017 deal for a Red Sea naval base capable of hosting 300 Russian service members and four ships.[62] Russian media has reported that a base in Sudan would primarily serve as a resupply and stopover hub to enable Tartus to transition from a resupply base to a multipurpose naval base, a goal Russia has previously outlined as a key element of its effort to bolster its Mediterranean power projection.[63] The Royal United Services Institute assessed that a naval base in Sudan would also help position Russia as a bulwark against maritime security threats in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean and serve as a logistics hub for its activity in Sudan.[64] The loss of Tartus would significantly limit the bandwidth of any future Sudan base to fill these various objectives, especially if it assumes Tartus’s role of projecting power into the Mediterranean.
Russia will face logistic challenges that will temporarily undermine its Africa operations if it loses its footprint in Syria. Russia’s bases in Syria have served as the primary staging ground for shipments from Russia that then go on to Libya and eventually sub-Saharan Africa.[65] Syria would presumably serve a similar purpose for any base in Sudan. The loss of Syria would immediately interrupt Africa Corps rotations and resupply efforts. Russia could seek to use its positions in Libya or Sudan as replacements, but it currently lacks formal agreements and facilities in both countries to adequately fill Tartus’s role. Domestic and international political backlash pose obstacles to Russia establishing another highly visible base in the short term in either country.[66]
Figure 4. Africa Corps Logistics Network in Africa
Source: Liam Karr; Grey Dynamics; Jules Duhamel; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.
Assad’s collapse would damage the global perception of Russia as an effective partner and protector, potentially threatening Russia’s partnerships with African autocrats and its resulting economic, military, and political influence in Africa. Syria has served as the blueprint for the Russian “regime survival package.”[67] Russia offers military and population control support, economic engagement, information operations, and political cover in international bodies to keep autocrats in power and shield them from international pressure as part of this strategy.[68] Russia expands its military footprint and increases its economic and political hold over target governments as a result. This influence helps the Kremlin gain preferential economic access to mitigate sanctions and add allies in international institutions like the UN.[69] This support undermines democracy more broadly by insulating coup regimes from efforts to encourage a return to civilian rule, which erodes democratic values globally and thereby strengthens the Kremlin’s autocratic narrative.
Russia has offered this package to several African allies, including the central Sahelian juntas that are facing an existential threat from strengthening Salafi-jihadi insurgencies. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate, Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), attacked the Malian capital, including an air base that houses Africa Corps personnel, for the first time in nearly a decade in September.[70] JNIM also attacked the suburbs of the Nigerien capital, Niamey, in October and is slowly encircling Burkina Faso’s capital.[71] A JNIM spokesperson gave a speech in November warning that JNIM had entered the “second stage” of its jihad and would soon begin capturing city centers.[72] CTP and others have assessed for over a year that JNIM and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) are capable of attacking and overrunning major population centers across the Sahel but have decided not to do so in favor of siege-like tactics.[73]
Figure 5. Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel
Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.
Mali
A Malian drone strike killed a prominent non-jihadist Tuareg separatist rebel leader in northern Mali, which may weaken the Tuareg separatist rebel coalition and increase the prominence of hardline separatism and potential collaboration with JNIM among the coalition. Mali launched a drone strike near the town of Tinzaouten, close to the Algerian border, targeting a grouping of suspected rebel leaders that killed at least eight people.[74] Prominent Tuareg leader Fahad ag Almahmoud was among the dead. Almahmoud served as secretary-general of the rebel group Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (GATIA) and vice president of the larger rebel coalition, the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security, and Development (CSP).[75]
Almahmoud was a key interlocutor between pro-government and pro-separatist rebel groups. The CSP was initially an umbrella coalition of both pro-separatist and pro-government Tuareg rebel groups when it originated in 2021, but the outbreak of fighting between the pro-separatist constituents and the government in 2023 led the coalition to split.[76] Almahmoud critically helped bridge the rival pro-separatist and pro-government wings, which also mapped onto intra-ethnic tensions between the Kel Adagh [noble] clans and Imghad [vassal] clans, respectively.[77] Almahmoud also represented the CSP in conversations with the government due his historically pro-government ties.[78] Almahmoud sided with the pro-separatist groups during the 2023 schism despite his previous pro-government stance.[79] This background made Almahmoud a relative moderate and potentially critical figure in any future reconciliation efforts among the various rebel groups or government.[80]
The strike occurred days after the antigovernment rebel groups created a new coalition, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA).[81] The FLA aims to re-create an effective umbrella coalition by building a new organization made up of the remaining antigovernment CSP constituents.[82] The FLA’s aims differ from the CSP’s due to the different circumstances in which both formed. The CSP formed at a time when French and UN troops were still present in Mali to attempt to help facilitate a 2015 peace and reconciliation agreement between the Malian government and various rebel groups. However, the rebel groups founded the FLA amid renewed armed conflict with the government and its new Russian auxiliaries. The movement specifically cited security force abuses as a key rationale for its armed struggle for a free “Azawad.”[83] The coalition plans to pool military resources to fight Malian forces to this end and engage regional and international leaders on the diplomatic level to gain legitimacy.[84]
Almahmoud’s death removes a relatively moderate voice from the FLA coalition, which could increase the appeal of hardline separatism and potential collaboration with JNIM. The historically pro-separatist rebels have significant historical ties to JNIM dating back to the 1990s, and in recent years, they have made informal ceasefire agreements in their shared support areas, maintained significant areas of operation and membership overlap, and operationally coordinated against ISSP.[85] CTP, The Associated Press, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty also reported that fighters with ties to both CSP and JNIM participated in an ambush near Tinzaouten in July 2024 that killed over 100 Malian and Russian soldiers.[86]
Almahmoud’s death may degrade the cohesion of the FLA. Almahmoud was a respected leader among Tuareg rebels, especially among those who shared his more moderate views on Tuareg nationalism or shared his Imghad clan ties. Fighters in either of these categories may leave the FLA without Almahmoud’s leadership championing these positions among the FLA. These fighters presumably have ties to the other armed actors in northern Mali, including JNIM- and GATIA-linked fighters that sided with the pro-government groups in the 2023 schism.
Figure 6. Malian and Russian Forces Battle Tuareg Insurgents in Northern Mali
Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.
Somalia
Jubbaland and the SFG clashed over disputed elections on November 25.[87] The dispute poses an increased risk of further internal political violence and a direct or proxy conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia. Jubbaland and the Somali Federal Government (SFG) have been at odds over the format of elections in 2025 since October. The SFG and three of the five federal member states agreed on a one-person, one-vote election system in October after monthlong talks under the National Consultative Council (NCC).[88] Jubbaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam, also known as Madobe, withdrew from the NCC meetings, saying that the new system would undermine Jubbaland’s regional autonomy.[89] Jubbaland reelected Madobe for a third term on November 25 after the Jubbaland parliament abolished term limits in July 2024.[90] The SFG earlier said on November 18 that it would not recognize the results of the elections in Jubbaland and accused Madobe of overstaying his term.[91]
The SFG deployed additional troops to Ras Kamboni, an area in Jubbaland near the border with Kenya, on November 25.[92] SFG troops and Jubbaland forces exchanged gunfire briefly in the area on November 25, according to Somali media.[93] The SFG ostensibly said that the deployment was to fight al Shabaab, but the timing indicates that it was in response to the Jubbaland elections.[94]
Figure 7. Jubbaland–Somali Federal Government Dispute: 2024 Timeline
Source: Kathryn Tyson.
Jubbaland and the SFG may engage in further limited clashes in the coming weeks. The SFG sent several hundred additional soldiers to Ras Kamboni on December 4.[95] Both sides have warned of the potential for continued violence in Ras Kamboni. Madobe gave a 15-day deadline on November 29 for all SFG forces to withdraw from Ras Kamboni and said that the SFG would “pay the price” for any military presence in the area after the deadline.[96] Jubbaland’s state minister for transport and aviation issued a warning against any airlines landing in Ras Kamboni and said that there is a “major security threat” in the area.”[97] The SFG’s defense minister said that the SFG would hold Jubbaland accountable for any further clashes in Lower Jubba, where Ras Kamboni is located.[98]
Mediation efforts to resolve the dispute have stalled or failed. A Kenyan delegation met separately with Jubbaland leadership and Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre in November, but the delegation did not announce any future plans for talks.[99] The UN mission in Somalia and the current African Union (AU) mission in the country called for a resolution to the conflict on November 20 and 24, respectively, without a response from Jubbaland or the SFG.[100]
Ethiopia could take advantage of the worsening conflict to increase its military presence in Somalia and gain leverage over the SFG. Ethiopia, like Jubbaland, is in conflict with the SFG. Ethiopia signed a naval port deal with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region in January 2024, which granted Ethiopia land in Somaliland for a naval base in return for recognizing Somaliland’s independence.[101] The SFG rejected the deal as unlawful and a violation of its territorial integrity, as it considers Somaliland to be part of its territory.[102] Somalia has said Ethiopia would not be included in the new AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) scheduled to begin in January 2025, called for the expulsion of Ethiopian forces from Somalia, and signed deals with Egypt in August for Egyptian troops to replace Ethiopian forces in Somalia.[103]
Figure 8. Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute
Source: Kathryn Tyson.
Ethiopia likely intends to remain in Somalia past the current AU Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) deadline in December 2024. Ethiopia’s positions in Somalia include some in Jubbaland, which shares a border with Ethiopia. Ethiopian officials have said that Ethiopian troops will stay in Somalia past 2024 if Ethiopia has international and local support regardless of the SFG’s actions.[104] Ethiopia seeks to counter al Shabaab in Somalia and create a buffer zone to prevent future cross-border incursions by al Shabaab or Egypt. Al Shabaab conducted a multiday campaign inside Ethiopia for the first time in July 2022, demonstrating al Shabaab’s threat to the Ethiopian border.[105] Ethiopia also seeks to buffer against Egyptian influence in Somalia. Ethiopia has warned that Egypt’s growing military presence in Somalia poses a national security threat due to long-standing Egyptian threats over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.[106] Ethiopia warned Egypt and the international community against including Egypt in the AUSSOM mission.[107]
Ethiopia has local political support to remain in Somalia. Officials from South West State and Jubbaland have voiced opposition to the expulsion of Ethiopian forces and introduction of Egyptian troops in the region, saying that the decision to expel Ethiopian forces should not be made by a “single party.”[108] Ethiopian forces have operated in both states for more than a decade. Ethiopian military officials have sought to build on this support by meeting with local elders in South West State and Jubbaland in September 2024.[109]
Ethiopia also has support from regional and international partners. Regional troop-contributing countries have criticized Egypt’s potential participation in the mission, warning that Egypt’s inclusion would undermine the main objective of the mission to counter al Shabaab.[110] The US has expressed tacit support for the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia. The US assistant secretary of state for African affairs said in September 2024 that “all of Somalia’s neighbors—Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia—as well as important contributions by Uganda and Burundi have been important over the years as they’ve worked collectively together shoulder to shoulder to help the Somali people.”[111]
The overlapping local and regional disputes risk sparking a direct or proxy conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia with Egyptian backing. Egypt has sent weapons and deployed troops to Somalia since signing defense deals with the SFG in August 2024 and has said it would contribute troops to AUSSOM.[112] Egyptian-Somali military cooperation is meant to combat al Shabaab while threatening Ethiopia. CTP has previously noted that some of the arms Egypt has sent, particularly heavy weaponry such as anti-tank and antiaircraft artillery, could be meant for use against Ethiopia, as al Shabaab lacks the capabilities that would require such weaponry.[113] If Ethiopia remains in Somalia past the ATMIS deadline, that would provide a pretext for Somali or Egyptian action against Ethiopian forces.
Egyptian or Somali deployments in areas bordering Ethiopia also risk sparking direct conflict. Ethiopian and Somali forces have already engaged in direct if limited skirmishes in 2024. Somalia’s ambassador to the UN accused Ethiopian troops of making illegal incursions across their shared border in June 2024, leading to brief clashes with local security forces.[114] Ethiopian forces have also reportedly already intervened in Jubbaland. Somali media reported that Ethiopian forces detained six Somali National Army soldiers in Gedo, Jubbaland, on November 19 over the election dispute.[115]
Ethiopia and Somalia have reportedly sent or threatened to send weapons to local actors. Somali officials have accused Ethiopia of delivering weapons to Somali states at odds with the SFG at least twice in 2024 without specifying the deliveries’ time frame.[116] Somali officials said in September that Ethiopia shipped weapons to Baidoa, the de facto political capital of South West state, and to the semiautonomous Puntland region in Somalia.[117] Ethiopia established a new military base in Baidoa in September, according to Somali media.[118] Somalia’s foreign minister threatened in September to establish contact with insurgents in Ethiopia if Ethiopia followed through on its port deal with Somaliland.[119]
Figure 9. Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute Threatens to Spark Proxy Conflicts
Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.
DRC
The DRC and Rwanda approved a concept of operations plan for the DRC to dismantle a key rebel group in eastern DRC in exchange for the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from the region. The France-based magazine Jeune Afrique reported that the concept of operations (CONOP) objectives are centered on fundamental commitments from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to dismantle the predominantly Rwandan Hutu Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and ensure the repatriation of the group to Rwanda and other displaced persons to their “places of origin.”[120] Rwanda agreed to “disengage its forces” and reintegrate ex-FDLR fighters into Rwanda in exchange for the DRC’s commitments.[121]
Figure 10. FDLR and M23 Areas of Operation in Eastern DRC
Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.
Rwanda has deployed troops and provided material support to back the Rwandaphone M23 rebels in the eastern DRC in part to combat the FDLR, which it views as a national security threat.[122] Rwanda’s Tutsi-dominated government views the FDLR as a latent threat due the FDLR’s ties to the 1994 Rwandan genocide and targeted hate speech against Rwandaphone communities in the eastern DRC.[123] Kigali has accused the Congolese government of using the FDLR as a proxy to destabilize or overthrow the Rwandan government.[124] The DRC has had ties to the FDLR since the early 2000s as a proxy force to counter Rwanda and Rwandan-backed rebels operating in the eastern DRC.[125]
The newly approved CONOP contains a four-stage plan to occur across three months. Military officials will conduct a threat analysis of the FDLR’s current area of operations, fighting capability, and known affiliate groups in the first stage.[126] Rwanda is required to cease “ad hoc cross-border operations” and provide information on the scaling back of its defensive posture during this first phase.[127] The Congolese army (FARDC) will attack the FDLR and its “auxiliaries,” and Rwanda will undertake the “lifting of its defensive measures” across the second phase.[128] Both military actions in the second phase have no reported timeline according to French media, but the DRC and Rwanda will jointly assess its outcome as part of the third phase, a general review of the plan’s execution.[129] The fourth phase concerns the repatriation and reintegration of demobilized FDLR fighters to Rwanda.[130]
The CONOP has unclear benchmarks and a compressed timeline, which could create obstacles to its successful execution. The lack of clarity of the timing and measures of success in the first and second phases risks sparking disagreements between the stakeholders. The Rwandan foreign minister refuted claims in October that Rwanda had agreed to withdraw its estimated 4,000 troops from the eastern DRC in exchange for the DRC’s parallel commitment to attack the FDLR.[131] The Rwandan foreign minister reiterated Kigali’s position after the parties signed the CONOP. The foreign minister said that Rwanda’s military posture in the eastern DRC will remain unchanged until the FARDC implements the agreement on the ground to degrade the FDLR.[132] French media reported in October that there are no predefined benchmarks for the phases and that Rwanda will not fulfill its obligations to reduce its military presence until Kigali judges that the FARDC’s action against the FDLR has reached a “satisfactory” level.[133]
The CONOP is only part of the ongoing peace and mediation efforts to end the violence in eastern DRC. The DRC and Rwanda signed a ceasefire agreement under Angolan mediation on July 30 which came into effect on August 4.[134] Angola, the DRC, Rwanda, and the UN agreed in November to support a verification and arbitration mechanism under Angolan oversight to monitor sporadic skirmishes with the support of intelligence officials and UN-information sharing.[135] Angola is still seeking to mediate a broader peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda. Angolan President João Lourenço announced that he has proposed a path to a “definitive” peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda in late September following a previous unsuccessful attempt in late August to reach an agreement.[136] Foreign officials met in late November to continue resolving outstanding security concerns in the draft peace agreement.[137] Angolan media reported that Rwandan President Paul Kagame and DRC President Félix Tshisekedi are expected to meet for a tripartite summit with Lourenço on December 15 to discuss the conflict.[138]
The various peace efforts notably do not involve the Rwanda-backed and predominantly Rwandaphone M23 rebellion, which is a critical contributor to the ongoing violence in the eastern DRC and to normalizing ties between the DRC and Rwanda.[139] M23 has made significant gains against the FARDC and consolidated control over significant portions of eastern DRC’s North Kivu region since Rwanda began backing the group in 2021.[140] M23’s stated demands mirror Kigali’s public concerns around ending violence against Tutsi communities in the eastern DRC.[141] Kinshasa has labeled the Rwandan-backed M23 as “terrorists” and refuses to negotiate directly with its representatives.[142] The DRC claims that Rwanda uses the narrative of violence against Tutsi communities as a pretext to support the M23 insurgency as a pretext to expropriate the eastern DRC’s mineral resources.[143]
M23’s absence from peace talks has led to continued violence despite the procedural success of multilateral peace efforts.[144] The August ceasefire agreement led to a sharp decrease in direct confrontations between the FARDC and M23 despite the fact that M23 insists that it was never included in the discussions.[145] However, sporadic fighting resumed between pro-government militias and M23 beginning in late August before a sweeping M23 offensive against these militias in late October.[146] Clashes between FARDC and M23 broke out again on December 2, marking a further deterioration of the August ceasefire.[147]
The CONOP does not involve M23, but it acknowledges the risk of FDLR reprisals against Tutsi communities in the eastern DRC, which would likely inflame the M23 insurgency. M23 leaders have demanded that the Congolese government use military force to repress FDLR militants that threaten Tutsi populations in the east.[148] M23 has consistently framed its actions as protection against “Rwandan rebels [i.e., the FDLR] peddling the ideology of genocide.”[149]
[1] https://www.dw.com/en/chad-to-end-security-cooperation-with-france/a-70914205
[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/chads-deby-says-military-pact-with-france-was-outdated-2024-12-02
[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/chads-deby-says-military-pact-with-france-was-outdated-2024-12-02
[4] https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20241129-senegal-s-leader-says-france-should-close-all-army-bases-in-country
[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/france-back-foot-africa-after-chadian-snub-2024-11-29
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[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/france-back-foot-africa-after-chadian-snub-2024-11-29/
[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/france-back-foot-africa-after-chadian-snub-2024-11-29
[9] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2022/08/15/france-completes-military-pullout-from-mali_5993649_5.html; https://www.africanews.com/2023/01/24/burkina-faso-to-expell-french-troops; https://apnews.com/article/niger-france-sahel-coup-troops-security-macron-97c8ccfe880169832965c33e96d7befe
[10] https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_several-hundred-protest-chad-junta/6208918.html; https://www.voanews.com/a/chad-s-opposition-civil-society-ask-french-troops-to-leave/7380337.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/chadian-police-fire-tear-gas-disperse-anti-french-protest-2022-05-14; https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/anti-western-sentiment-growing-in-senegal-we-must-free-ourselves-from-france-s-stranglehold-a-2e087190-2cf1-46b9-9229-077716e0f9b5
[11] https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2024/04/25/us-to-withdraw-from-chad-niger-amid-counterterrorism-role-questions/
[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-april-18-2024-chad-is-the-kremlins-next-target-in-the-sahel-al-qaedas-sahelian-affiliate-weaponizes-drones#Chad; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-russian-diplomatic-blitz-advances-the-kremlins-strategic-aims-in-africa
[13] https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/eye-on-africa/20240606-russia-s-lavrov-wraps-up-africa-tour-in-chad
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