Africa File, December 19, 2024

 

 

Africa File, December 19, 2024: Russia Reinforces Libya amid Syria Withdrawal; DRC-Rwanda Talks Collapse; Ethiopia’s Counter-Fano Campaign; ISSP Strangles Roadways in Niger; Ankara Declaration

Authors: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson

Contributor: Yale Ford

CTP will be pausing the Africa File for the Christmas and New Year’s holidays in the weeks of December 26 and January 2. The next Africa File will publish as usual the week of January 9, 2025.

Data Cutoff: December 19, 2024, at 10 a.m.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

Russia. Russia is reinforcing its positions in Libya and sub-Saharan Africa as it continues to consolidate in and withdraw some of its forces from Syria. Russian shipments from Syria to Libya are likely setting conditions for Russia to mitigate or replace its reliance on its Syrian bases by upgrading Russian positions in Libya and securing permission for a Russian naval base on Libya’s Mediterranean coast. Russia is also drawing from preexisting reserves in Belarus and Russia to reinforce its deployments in Libya and Mali. Russian flights to Bamako via Libya demonstrate that Russia has already turned to Libya as an alternative to its Syrian bases. The Russian flights to Mali are not consistent with the previous pattern of Africa Corps rotations to Bamako.

DRC. Angolan-mediated talks between the DRC and Rwanda broke down due to a long-standing and fundamental disagreement over the role of the Rwandaphone and Rwandan-backed M23 rebel movement. The role of the M23 movement had been a lingering obstacle to the Angolan-mediated peace talks in recent months and limited the longevity and effectiveness of agreed-upon peace measures. The summit was canceled as M23 captured several operationally significant villages in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) after an uptick in clashes with Congolese forces since the beginning of December.

Ethiopia. The Ethiopian military has increased drone strikes and arrests against ethno-nationalist militants in Ethiopia’s northwest Amhara region who are known as Fano since October 2024. The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) measures have decreased Fano attacks but have not decisively degraded Fano’s military capabilities. Turkey has sought to increase its political and economic influence in the Horn of Africa by providing drones to the ENDF in Ethiopia’s conflicts with ethno-nationalist militias in Ethiopia. The Fano conflict risks contributing to a wider regional conflict due to its overlap with other domestic and regional conflicts.

Niger. An IS Sahel Province offensive has highlighted the group’s growing strength outside major government-controlled population centers and undermined the local economies and the national Nigerien economy.

Horn of Africa. Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on December 11 to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea as part of a Turkish-mediated deal that will likely benefit Ethiopia and Turkey and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy. Ethiopia will likely withdraw from or at least pause its controversial naval base agreement with the breakaway Somaliland region because of the new agreement with Somalia, which is known as the Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the Somaliland agreement would likely lead the Somali Federal Government (SFG) to reverse its decision to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new African Union mission in Somalia to combat al Shabaab in 2025. Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea would significantly benefit Ethiopia’s economy by reducing Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti, while the Ankara Declaration benefits Turkey by protecting Turkey’s investments and relationships with Ethiopia and Somalia and bolstering Turkey’s status as an international power broker and key player in the broader Red Sea area. The Ankara Declaration could cause political backlash against the SFG and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy to the benefit of al Shabaab because the deal contradicts the SFG’s earlier stances on Ethiopian access to Somalia’s coast.

Assessments:

Russia

Russia is reinforcing its positions in Libya and sub-Saharan Africa as it continues to consolidate and withdraw some of its forces in Syria. Russia is evacuating some of its land and naval assets from Syria while it continues to negotiate with Syrian transitional authorities to retain its major bases at Hmeimim Air Base and Tartus naval base. Maxar satellite imagery and separate drone imagery showed two Russian An-124 military transport aircraft that were prepared to load cargo at Hmeimim Air Base on December 13, as well as An-72, An-26, and Il-76 transport aircraft present at the air base.[1] Maxar satellite imagery from December 15 to 17 also showed a Russian Il-76 transport aircraft and dozens of military vehicles on the tarmac at Hmeimim Airbase and dozens of Russian military vehicles assembled at the port of Tartus.[2] CNN reported on December 16 that two US officials and one Western official familiar with intelligence on the matter stated that Russia has been withdrawing a large amount of military equipment and soldiers from Syria but that it is unclear whether the Kremlin intends for the “large-scale withdrawal” to be permanent.[3] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Flightradar24 recorded on December 16 that Russian military transport aircraft, including three Il-76MD and two An-124 transport aircraft, flew from Syria to Chkalovsk, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, Russia, and Makhachkla, Republic of Dagestan, Russia.[4]

The two US officials that CNN cited stated that Russia has started to move naval assets from Syria to Libya.[5] Another defense official told CNN that Russia is increasing pressure on Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar to secure Russia’s use of a port in Benghazi.[6] The French magazine Jeune Afrique reported that Russian naval shipments arrived at the port of Tobruk, Libya, as early as December 6, but it is unclear based on the reporting whether these shipments were from Syria.[7] The Institute for the Study of War (ISW)and the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine (SZRU) have reported since December 13 that at least two Russian landing ships and two cargo ships are traveling to the port of Tartus from Russian ports but will likely not reach Syria for weeks.[8] ISW assessed that Russia may be able to evacuate limited military assets with other chartered ships based on an SZRU report on December 16 that stated that Russia has chartered ships that are flagged in unspecified countries to load equipment from the port of Tartus.[9] Open-source analyst MT Anderson reported that satellite imagery captured on December 17 shows that the Russian vessels have remained in a holding pattern roughly 15–20 kilometers off the coast of Tartus.[10]

Figure 1. Reported Control of Terrain in Syria

Source: Critical Threats Project and The Institute for the Study of War.

The assets that Russia is pulling from Syria very likely include assets from smaller Russian bases around Syria that Russian forces have withdrawn from as Russia consolidates its forces in Hmeimim and Tartus. ISW and Ukraine’s GUR reported that a Russian convoy made up of roughly 1,000 Russian personnel moved northwest toward Russia’s bases at Tartus and Hmeimim on December 13 from towns around Homs and Damascus.[11] A Syrian anti-Assad regime media outlet claimed on December 15 that Russian forces withdrew from the Tiyas Air Base, west of Palmyra in Homs Governorate, toward Hmeimim Air Base.[12] CTP, ISW, and Ukraine’s SZRU reported on December 15 and 16 that Russia has recently withdrawn from a series of bases in the Kobani, Manbij, and Qamishli areas in northern Syria amid the ongoing Turkish-backed offensive against the US-backed Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and reports that Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and Turkey were unwilling to allow a continued Russian presence in northern Syria.[13] The GUR stated on December 14 that the Russian Ministry of Defense’s Africa Corps arrived in Syria to protect Russian forces that are moving toward Russia’s bases on the western coast.[14]

Figure 2. Status of Russian Bases in Syria

The progress of Russian negotiations with Syrian transitional authorities continues to remain unclear amid conflicting reports from local and international sources. Ukraine’s GUR reported on December 15 that rumors are circulating among Russian troops that the Kremlin and unspecified Syrian actors agreed to allow Russia to maintain its military presence at the port of Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base in Latakia with up to a total of 3,000 Russian military personnel.[15] The Economist cited an “HTS source familiar with the talks” in a December 16 report that claims that HTS will “probably” allow Russia to keep some or all of its bases and “likely” respect Russia’s lease at Tartus port, and The Guardian reported that discussions were “positive.”[16] The UK-based and Qatari-funded al Araby al Jadid reported on December 16 that a source “close to the [HTS] military operations department” claimed that Russia will withdraw all its military forces within a month, however.[17] ISW assessed that the complex nature of the interim Syrian government and internal schisms within HTS are likely resulting in conflicting reports about Russian negotiations with Syrian transitional authorities.[18]

External actors may influence the trajectory of negotiations as the Syrian transitional authorities seek to maximize their external partnerships. The Economist reported that HTS seeks to prioritize balancing its ties with external powers to ensure that it receives international recognition and prevents potential isolation.[19] The Economist and The Guardian reported that HTS is demanding more in its negotiations with Russia than Russia’s previous offer of continued humanitarian support in exchange for Russia retaining its positions at the naval base at Tartus and the Hmeimim Air Base.[20] Turkey, which is a major backer of HTS, offered on December 15 to “support” Russia’s consolidation at Hmeimim and Tartus.[21] EU officials have said that the EU plans to discuss the closure of Russia’s bases in Syria as a potential precondition to EU recognition of the new Syrian government.[22]

Russian shipments from Syria to Libya are likely setting conditions for Russia to mitigate or replace its reliance on Syria by upgrading Russian positions in Libya and securing permission for a Russian naval base on Libya’s Mediterranean coast. Bloomberg reported in November 2023 that Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar and Russian defense officials were negotiating a defense accord that would grant Russia a naval base in Libya. Haftar wanted air defense systems and upgrades to the military bases hosting Wagner Group forces to enable those bases to host regular rotations of Russian air force pilots and Special Forces. Russia already deployed several hundred Special Forces to Libya in March 2024 and refurbished three air bases in Libya throughout 2024.[23] US officials told The Wall Street Journal on December 18 that Russian cargo planes have flown radars for S-400 and S-300 interceptor systems and other air defense equipment from Syria to Libya.[24]

Russian cargo flights from Syria to Libya are may be arriving at al Jufra Air Base in central Libya. Reuters and the London-based Arabic outlet al Sharq al Awsat reported on December 14 that at least one cargo plane had departed Syria for Libya.[25] CTP has been unable to verify any of the reported Russian cargo flights between Syria and Libya on FlightRadar24. This lack of information suggests that the aircraft had turned off their transponders. Maxar satellite imagery recorded Russian Il-76 cargo planes at al Jufra Air Base in central Libya on December 9, 10, 15, 16, and 17.[26] CTP was unable to verify the flight path of any of the planes that arrived in al Jufra, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that there was no information on the point of origin of the Il-76 that arrived in al Jufra on December 10.[27] The lack of information regarding the points of origin and flight paths of the cargo shipments that arrived in al Jufra most likely indicates that the flight had turned off their transponders. The fact that the reported flights from Syria to Libya and the flights arriving at al Jufra have their transponders off suggests that these are the same aircraft, but there is no conclusive evidence that they are.

Figures 3–7. Russian Il-76 Transport Aircraft on the Runway at al Jufra Air Base on December 9–10 and 15–17, 2024

Source: Satellite image ©2024 Maxar Technologies.

Source: Satellite image ©2024 Maxar Technologies.

Source: Satellite image ©2024 Maxar Technologies.

Source: Satellite image ©2024 Maxar Technologies.

Source: Satellite image ©2024 Maxar Technologies.

Russia likely seeks to use Libya to replace the role of its Syrian bases in supporting Russian military logistics in Africa and boosting Russia’s power projection into the Mediterranean. Tartus is Russia’s only formal overseas naval base, and Russia has historically used it to link its Black Sea assets to the Mediterranean and project power into the Mediterranean against NATO.[28] Tartus became even more important in the support of Russian operations in the Mediterranean after Ankara closed the Turkish Straits to Russian naval vessels in accord with the Montreux Convention following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia also used Tartus and the Hmeimim Air Base as logistics nodes for its military operations in Africa.[29] A Russian naval base in Libya would help offset the negative logistics and strategic impact of Russia’s loss of Tartus. Libya is crucially the only country with a Russian military presence in Africa that Russian cargo planes can directly reach from Russia without refueling, and CTP has previously noted that the Kremlin had already increased Libya’s role as a logistics hub for its various Africa Corps deployments in sub-Saharan Africa throughout 2024.[30]

Figure 8. Africa Corps Network in Libya

Source: Liam Karr.

Russia is also almost certainly drawing from preexisting reserves in Belarus and Russia to reinforce its deployments in Libya and Mali. The Telegraph and Flightradar24 recorded that the Russian military–linked and US specially-designated Belarusian cargo company Rubystar Airways flew at least three Il-76 cargo shipments between Belarus and al Khadim Air Base near Benghazi, Libya, between December 8 and 14.[31] Flightradar24 recorded that the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations flew at least another four Il-76 flights between southern Russia, near Krasnodar city, and al Khadim between December 12 and 15.[32] Two of these flights to al Khadim flew to Bamako after nearly 24-hour layovers at al Khadim on December 15 and 16.[33] A third Russian Emergency Ministry Il-76 flew to Bamako after a short refueling stop at al Khadim on December 17.[34]

The Russian resupply flights to Libya and Mali coming from Russia are almost certainly drawing from preexisting reserves in Belarus and Russia, not from repatriated assets from Syria. Russia has repatriated some of its assets from Syria to Chkalovsk and Makhachkhla, Russia. This fact means that Russian flights carrying repatriated supplies that had been in Syria would likely come from Chkalovsk and Makhachkhla. All of the Russian Emergency Situations Ministry flights that CTP has tracked from Russia to Libya and Mali have originated from Krasnodar Krai, however. Kremlin-linked milbloggers have previously indicated that Africa Corps reserves are based in Krasnodar Krai.[35] Africa Corps lists Krasnodar Krai as its main recruitment point, and Wagner had a base in Molinko, Krasnodar Krai, that has since become an Africa Corps base after the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the rise of Africa Corps in 2023.[36] The Telegraph cited unspecified experts who said that the Rubystar Airways shipments from Belarus contain elements of preexisting Russian weapon stockpiles.[37]

Russian flights to Bamako via Libya demonstrate that Russia has already turned to Libya as an alternative to its Syrian bases. Most Russian government flights to Libya and Mali previously flew to Africa via Hmeimim, Syria.[38] These flights included Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations resupply flights to Bamako in 2023 and Russian Air Force planes carrying Russian defense ministry officials in 2024. Russian flights from Russia to Libya are flying through Turkish airspace to reach Libya more directly and maximize the amount of cargo they can hold. A former Russian air force officer confirmed to The Wall Street Journal that Russian cargo flights are still unable to carry as much equipment using Libya as a refueling point as opposed to Syria even when flying through Turkish airspace.[39]

Figure 9. Africa Corps Logistics Network in Africa

Source: Liam Karr; Grey Dynamics; Jules Duhamel; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The Russian flights to Mali are not consistent with the previous pattern of Africa Corps rotations to Bamako. Belarusian and Russian third-party contractors have been the primary facilitators of Russian cargo shipments to Bamako since Prigozhin’s death and the rise of Africa Corps in 2023.[40] The Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations had not flown to Bamako since the immediate aftermath of Prigozhin’s death in August 2023.[41] Flightradar24 data shows that a combination of the Russian companies Abakan Air and Aviacon Zitotrans and Belarusian company Rada Airlines had collectively flown to Bamako several times in January, March, June, August, and September 2024. The United States sanctioned Aviacon Zitotrans and Abakan Air in 2023 and 2024, respectively, for their ties to the Wagner Group and the Russian military.[42] These third-party contractors always flew through non-Syrian airfields such as Cairo, Egypt, or Port Sudan, Sudan, unlike the Russian government flights.

DRC

Angolan-mediated talks between the DRC and Rwanda broke down due to a long-standing and fundamental disagreement over the role of the Rwandaphone and Rwandan-backed M23 rebel movement. All parties called off a planned summit for December 15 between Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President Félix Tshisekedi, Rwandan President Paul Kagame, and Angolan President João Lourenço after lower-level officials failed to agree on fundamental aspects of negotiations. The DRC presidential spokesperson said that talks reached an impasse due to Rwanda’s insistence that the DRC “hold a direct dialogue with the M23.”[43] Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe had said on December 13 that Rwanda wanted “a firm commitment from the DRC to resume direct talks with the M23 within a well-defined framework and timeframe.”[44] Nduhungirehe accused the Congolese of reneging on this commitment in a phone interview with the French magazine Jeune Afrique on December 15.[45] Nduhungirehe also said that the scheduled talks were “no longer relevant” and implied that the talks were a waste of time due to the “intransigence” of Congolese negotiators.[46]

Figure 10. FDLR and M23 Areas of Operation in Eastern DRC

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The M23 rebel movement has made significant gains against the Congolese army (FARDC) and consolidated control over significant portions of eastern DRC’s North Kivu region since M23 reemerged with Rwandan support in 2021.[47] M23’s stated demands mirror the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan government’s public concerns around ending violence against Tutsi communities in the eastern DRC.[48] Kinshasa has labeled the Rwandan-backed M23 as “terrorists” and refuses to negotiate directly with its representatives.[49] The DRC claims that Rwanda uses the narrative of violence against Tutsi communities as a pretext to support the M23 insurgency and expropriate the eastern DRC’s mineral resources.[50]

The role of the M23 movement had been a lingering obstacle to the Angolan-mediated peace talks in recent months and limited the longevity and effectiveness of agreed-upon peace measures. The DRC and Rwanda signed an Angolan-mediated ceasefire agreement on July 30 that came into effect on August 4.[51] Angola, the DRC, Rwanda, and the UN agreed in November to support a verification and arbitration mechanism under Angolan oversight to monitor sporadic skirmishes with the support of intelligence officials and UN-information sharing.[52] The DRC and Rwanda then approved a concept of operations in November to dismantle the predominantly Rwandan Hutu Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) rebel group that is based in the eastern DRC and subsequent terms for Rwanda to disengage its forces from the eastern DRC.[53] The Tutsi-dominated Rwandan government views the FDLR as a latent threat and has backed M23 to counter the FDLR due to the FDLR’s ties to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the FDLR’s targeted hate speech against Rwandaphone communities in the eastern DRC, and the FDLR’s relationship with the DRC government as an anti-Rwandan proxy.[54] These advances in the peace process notably did not include M23, presumably due to the DRC’s and Rwanda’s irreconcilable stances on the group.

M23’s exclusion from these measures has led to continued violence despite the partial successes of the peace process. The August ceasefire agreement led to a sharp decrease in direct confrontations between the FARDC and M23 despite the fact that M23 insists that it was never included in the discussions.[55] Pro-government militias and M23 began fighting again in late August before a sweeping M23 offensive against these militias in late October, however.[56] Clashes between FARDC and M23 broke out again on December 2, which marked a further deterioration of the August ceasefire.[57] The anti-FDLR concept of operations also excluded M23 but did acknowledge the risk of FDLR reprisals against Tutsi communities in the eastern DRC.[58] Such reprisals would almost certainly inflame the M23 insurgency.

The cancellation of the Angola summit occurred as M23 captured several operationally significant villages after an uptick in fighting since the beginning of December. M23 launched an offensive against the FARDC and pro-government militias along the RN2 highway in the Lubero territory in early December and is now threatening to cut off some FARDC units and advance toward Lubero-Centre.[59] M23 captured Matembe village, which is 20 miles south of Lubero-Centre, on December 15.[60] Congolese media reported on December 17 that M23 had captured several additional villages north of Matembe on December 16 and that pro-government forces had retreated as far north as Kitsombiro, a village less than 10 miles south of Lubero-Centre.[61] The FARDC military administrator of the Lubero territory called for calm on December 16 and denied that M23 had advanced past Matembe on December 17.[62] The M23 advance has caused a wave of refugee flows north on the RN2 toward Lubero-Centre.[63]

Figure 12. M23 December Offensive

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The M23 advance has set conditions for M23 to consolidate major gains that it has made since June by cutting off FARDC and pro-government militias that are contesting operationally significant M23 positions south of Matembe in Kaseghe and Luofo villages.[64] Congolese military officials claimed that the hills on the east side of the RN2 around Matembe and Kaseghe are operationally significant and that control of this geographically advantageous area will allow either M23 to continue its offensive along the RN2 toward Lubero town or enable the FARDC to launch a counterattack to retake the key towns of Kanyabonga and Kirumba.[65] M23 captured Kanyabonga and Kirumba during an offensive in June.[66] Kirumba is the most populous town in the Lubero territory, and Congolese experts regarded Kanyabonga and Kirumba as key choke points to contain M23 before M23 captured the towns.[67] Congolese media said that the M23 gains on December 16 included Alimbongo, an operationally significant crossroads town that connects to Luofo.[68] Luofo is an operationally significant crossroads town on the west side of the RN2 less than 10 miles from Kaseghe, Kanyabonga, Kirumba, and Matembe.[69]

Ethiopia

The Ethiopian military has increased drone strikes and arrests against ethno-nationalist militants in Ethiopia’s northwest Amhara region who are known as Fano since October 2024. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) recorded that the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) carried out 25 drone strikes targeting Fano fighters between October and December 2024.[70] ACLED reported two ENDF drone strikes targeting Fano between July and September 2024.[71] The ENDF has also initiated a major arrest campaign targeting suspected Fano fighters, as well as civilians and government officials suspected of supporting or collaborating with Fano. Amnesty International reported in October that the Ethiopian military and police forces have arbitrarily arrested hundreds of people across the Amhara region since September.[72] Amnesty reported in November that Ethiopian authorities filled four makeshift detention camps with thousands of suspected Fano supporters.[73]

Figure 12. ENDF Increases Drone Strikes amid Counteroffensive Against Fano

Source: Kathtryn Tyson; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Fano is a group of loosely aligned Amhara militias that are mostly small and operate autonomously.[74] Fano and the ENDF have been in direct conflict since April 2023, when the Ethiopian government attempted to dissolve regional special forces.[75] Fano and Amhara ethno-nationalists said that this government effort was an attempt to leave Amhara defenseless against threats from rival ethno-nationalist militias.[76] Fano has waged a mostly low-level insurgency in northern Ethiopia’s Amhara region since an ENDF counteroffensive against the group following Fano attacks on major cities in Amhara in August 2023.[77] Fano expanded control over several key roadways and attacked Ethiopia’s second-largest city in September as part of a resurgence that began in July 2024.[78]

Figure 13. Fano Launches Offensive Across the Amhara Region

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The ENDF crackdown in 2024 began as part of a wider ENDF counteroffensive against Fano in the Amhara region in October.[79] CTP previously assessed that the ENDF launched the counteroffensive to retake territory from Fano, degrade Fano’s military capabilities, and target support networks that could help Fano reconstitute itself in the future.[80] The ENDF is also using the counteroffensive to push Fano to peace talks. The ENDF spokesperson said that “for peace to prevail, they [Fano] need to be met with force.”[81]

The ENDF counteroffensive has decreased Fano attacks but failed to decisively degrade Fano’s military capabilities. ACLED recorded 168 Fano attacks against the Ethiopian security forces, local government officials, and civilians since the ENDF launched the counteroffensive on October 1, compared with 234 Fano attacks between July and September. This amounts to nearly a 30 percent decrease in Fano attacks, but Fano can recover from these strikes by retreating to rural areas in the Amhara region. The ENDF said on October 1 that Fano’s “urban cells are relocating to rural areas” to help the group establish “escape routes,” presumably referring to rear support areas Fano fighters can retreat to.[82]

The drone strikes and arbitrary arrests risk exacerbating the insurgency by killing and detaining large numbers of civilians.[83] Ethiopia’s military leadership has denied targeting civilians and said that the ENDF conducts strikes in a “selected and planned manner.”[84] Western media and human rights groups reported that the strikes have killed hundreds of civilians since October.[85] CTP previously warned that a heavy-handed and military-focused counterinsurgency strategy would likely exacerbate the grievances that drive the insurgency in the long term.[86]

Turkey has sought to expand its geopolitical and economic influence in the Horn of Africa by sending drones to Ethiopia since 2021 that are now supporting the ENDF’s campaign against Fano. Turkey sent Ethiopia Bayraktar TB2 drones in late 2021 to aid the Ethiopian government’s fight against Tigrayan rebels in northern Ethiopia during the Tigray war from 2020 to 2022.[87] Turkey sent more advanced Bayraktar Akıncı drones to Ethiopia in November 2023.[88] There is currently no evidence that Ethiopia has used the Akıncı drones against Fano, but the ENDF has used the TB2 multiple times to strike targets in Amhara in 2024.[89] Ethiopia’s drone arsenal also includes Chinese-made Wing Loong II drones from the United Arab Emirates and Iranian Mohajer-6 drones. Western security experts assess that the Bayraktar TB2 is the ENDF’s most effective of these options.[90] The TB2’s low-cost, strike efficiency, and long range compared with other drones in Ethiopia’s arsenal make the TB2 a more attractive option for strikes against Fano.

Turkey seeks to grow its influence in the Horn of Africa to expand economic cooperation, secure access to the Red Sea, and achieve energy independence. Turkish military support, including drone exports, helps Turkey build partnerships to advance Turkish geopolitical interests and bolster the Turkish defense sector.[91] Turkey has an economic stake in protecting Abiy and the Ethiopian federal government due to the estimated $2.5 billion Turkey had invested in projects in Ethiopia at the end of 2021.[92]

The Fano insurgency risks contributing to a wider regional conflict due to its overlap with other domestic and regional conflicts. Tensions between the Amhara and Oromo regions have significantly grown since Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took office in 2018 on the back of a coordinated alliance between Amhara and Oromo opposition. Anti-Amhara pogroms in Oromia region and insurgent attacks against Amhara civilians by ethno-nationalist Oromo Liberation Army insurgents have stoked anti-Oromo resentment in the Amhara community.[93] Fano has engaged in several battles with regional security forces and attacked Oromo civilians as part of a campaign to forcibly take territory in the Oromo region, which has increased anti-Amhara resentment among the Oromo community.[94] The growing grievances have led to a split within the Amhara and Oromo factions of the ruling government. Party elites in the regional governments regularly contest each other’s narratives and reflect the popular polarization of their communities to maintain the legitimacy of the factions.[95] Abiy’s counterinsurgency campaign would further inflame popular grievances that Abiy, an Oromo, is anti-Amhara and increase the potential of deadly ethnically motivated violence or fighting between Amhara militias and federal forces with Oromo militia support.[96]

Figure 14. Ethno-Nationalist Militias Area of Operations in Northern Ethiopia

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Fano’s 2024 offensive risked causing increased ethnic conflict between Amharas and Tigrayans by attempting to set military conditions that would prevent political or military efforts to resolve a territorial dispute in the Tigray regional borders. Fano fought against Tigrayan militias alongside the ENDF during the Tigray war and has controlled the disputed areas since the end of the Tigray war.[97] Tigrayan militia forces mobilized in February 2024 to retake the disputed areas, leading to several clashes with Fano.[98] The Tigray administration has demanded that all non-Tigrayan forces withdraw from the disputed areas before a potential referendum, while the current Amhara administrations have rejected referenda outright.[99] The Tigrayan administration claimed in May that it reached an agreement with the federal government to return the thousands of displaced Tigrayans to the disputed areas, disarm combatants in the area, and create new local administrations.[100] Fano commanders called the announcement a provocation and accused the Tigrayan administration of “beating a war drum,” threatening to respond to any “invasion.”[101]

Insecurity in Ethiopia risks exacerbating refugee crises and ethnic violence in war-torn Sudan. ACLED recorded five Fano attacks in 2024 against Sudanese refugees at a refugee camp in Metema, near the border with Sudan. A clash between Fano and the ENDF in Metema on December 7 caused a humanitarian organization responsible for food distribution to halt deliveries to the camp.[102] Ethiopian officials have privately noted their concern that Fano could use its presence along the Sudanese border to establish ties with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).[103] Officials aired these concerns around the time Abiy met with the opposing Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) head in Sudan in early July 2024, shortly after the RSF established a presence near the Ethiopian border with an offensive in June 2024.[104] Fano and the RSF both have grievances against shared enemies—the SAF and Tigrayan militias.[105] The SAF’s successful campaign against the RSF has made potential collaboration between the RSF and Fano, however, by clearing the RSF from areas along the Ethiopian border.[106]

Niger

An ISSP offensive has highlighted the group’s growing strength outside major government-controlled population centers and undermined the local economies and the national Nigerien economy. The Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) has increased the rate and severity of its attacks as part of the offensive near the district capital Tera. ISSP carried out at least five attacks in Niger’s Tera department along the border with Burkina Faso since late November after a lull in attacks across the country since August. The attacks may be in response to Nigerien counterterrorism operations in the area. French media and local reports on Twitter claimed that Nigerien security forces began operations north of Tera on December 2, but that an ISSP ambush on December 6 halted the campaign.[107] Local sources said that the ambush and ensuing firefight killed at least 43 soldiers and 16 ISSP militants.[108] ISSP conducted another major attack on December 10 against security forces protecting a local market in the village of Chatoumane, which is roughly 15 miles west of Tera town.[109] The France-based magazine Jeune Afrique cited anonymous security sources claiming that the attack killed at least 130 soldiers and up to 200 people in total, while the Nigerien junta claimed that security forces repelled the attack.[110] The Nigerien junta has not acknowledged most of the ISSP attacks and suspended BBC radio for three months for reporting on the Chatoumane attack.[111]

Figure 15. ISSP Pressures Key Roadways in Western Niger

Source: Liam Kar; ACLED.

ISSP’s activity around Tera highlights the group’s growing capabilities and control along key roadways. Locals reported that ISSP had taken control of the N5 road that links Tera to the district capital Bankilare, 40 miles north, in recent months. The group began running checkpoints on the road, encircled Bankilare, and carried out several deadly ambushes in August.[112] Local reports on social media said that ISSP checkpoints were as close as two miles from Tera in October.[113] ISSP required support zones in this area to stage the early December ambush that stalled Niger’s counterinsurgency campaign in the area in less than a week.[114] Militants were already back to operating with impunity by December 6, when they raided a local village and retreated to an area roughly 15 miles north of Tera without retaliation from security forces.[115] ISSP required even stronger support zones in the vicinity of Tera along the N23 road that enabled it to amass the 250 fighters that French media and local social media accounts claim participated in the December 10 attack on Chatoumane. [116] The N23 connects eastern Burkina Faso to western Niger via Tera.

Most of ISSP’s attacks are along key local and national transit corridors. The attack at Chatoumane was the latest ISSP attack along the N23, which turns into the RN4 east of Tera. The N23 is one of the major transit corridors for goods coming to Niger from the Togolese port of Lome.[117] Niger is heavily dependent on these corridors from Burkina Faso due to the closure of its border with Benin since the Niger coup in July 2023. The transport workers union in Niger released a statement in early November that condemned escalating violence against truckers in eastern Burkina Faso and Niger.[118] The N5 is also a crucial artery of a network of smaller roads that connect villages in the northwestern corner of Niger and run into Burkina Faso.

ISSP has targeted local markets that are critical to the surrounding rural population. At least two of its attacks in December, including the Chatoumane attack, targeted civilians attending weekly markets. ISSP ambushed a civilian convoy returning to Bankilare from the weekly market in Tera on December 5 and executed 21 people.[119] This attack campaign mirrors a similar campaign in northeastern Mali in 2022 and 2023 that allowed ISSP to exert control over the movement of the local population and the local economy. ISSP attacks in northeastern Mali forced local markets to close for several months until ISSP re-opened the markets under ISSP control and offered security escorts for those traveling to markets from nearby villages.[120]

Horn of Africa.

Note: The following text is from CTP’s December 18 Africa File Special Edition, “Ankara Declaration Reduces Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions but Leaves Unresolved Gaps”

Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on December 11 to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea as part of the Turkish-mediated Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to finalize “mutually advantageous commercial arrangements” that will allow Ethiopia to “enjoy reliable, secure, and sustainable access to and from the sea” as part of the agreement.[121] Ethiopia and Somalia signed the Ankara Declaration after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held separate talks with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Ankara, Turkey, on December 11.[122] Turkey mediated two previous rounds of negotiations between Ethiopia’s and Somalia’s foreign ministers in July and August 2024.[123]

Ethiopia will likely withdraw from or at least pause its controversial naval base agreement with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region as a result of the Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia signed an agreement with Somaliland in January 2024 that granted Ethiopia land for a naval base on Somaliland’s Red Sea coast in return for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence.[124] Ethiopian officials also said the deal included commercial aspects, but Somaliland officials maintained that the deal was naval only.[125] The Somali Federal Government (SFG) rejected the deal as an illegal violation of its sovereignty—as the SFG considers Somaliland to be part of its territory—and called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from the country.[126] Ethiopia has deployed approximately 10,000 troops in Somalia as part of the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia and through other bilateral agreements to fight al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate, al Shabaab.[127] Abiy and Mohamud implied that the discussions in Ankara addressed the nearly yearlong political dispute between over the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal even though the Ankara Declaration does not directly mention the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal.[128]

Figure 16. Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute: 2024 Timeline

Source: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson.

Ethiopia has little room to balance between the SFG and Somaliland and their competing deals after it agreed to the Ankara Declaration due to the zero-sum positions of the SFG and Somaliland on Somaliland’s sovereignty. Somali officials insisted that Ethiopia withdraw from its deal with Somaliland in previous Turkish-mediated discussions and called the Somaliland agreement a violation of Somali “territorial integrity.”[129] The Ankara Declaration implicitly acknowledges the SFG’s position without directly mentioning Somaliland when the text says that Ethiopia and Somalia “reaffirmed their respect and commitment to one another’s sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity.”[130] Somaliland officials have insisted that Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland is required if Somaliland is to follow through on its agreement to lease Ethiopia land for a naval base.[131]

The Ankara Declaration gives Ethiopia an alternative to the Somaliland deal because the agreement theoretically provides Ethiopia access to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Ethiopia has sought to acquire sea access since it became landlocked, after Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993.[132] The Ankara Declaration recognized the “potential benefits” of Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea and stipulated that Ethiopia and Somalia will hold technical talks in February to ensure this access no later than June 2025.[133]

Officials from Somalia and Somaliland have made contradictory statements about whether Ethiopia will follow through on the Somaliland deal. Somali officials said on December 12 that Ethiopia retracted its agreement with Somaliland as part of the Ankara talks.[134] Somaliland officials said that the Ankara Declaration “does not concern” Somaliland and that Ethiopia has insisted privately that it will not withdraw from the Somaliland deal.[135]

Future international recognition of Somaliland’s statehood would give Ethiopia greater political cover and legitimacy to resume talks on a port deal with Somaliland. No countries currently recognize Somaliland, although many countries have consulates and diplomatic relations with Somaliland. US policymakers are increasingly contemplating giving US recognition to Somaliland’s independence, however. US State Department officials who worked on Africa policy during US President-elect Donald Trump’s first term have voiced public support for the US to recognize Somaliland.[136] US Republican House Representative Scott Perry introduced a bill on December 12 for US recognition of Somaliland independence.[137] The US news outlet Semafor reported in December that Trump advisers and US congressional Republicans plan to encourage Trump to recognize Somaliland’s independence when he takes office, in January 2025.[138] US recognition of Somaliland could encourage other countries, including Ethiopia, to extend recognition to Somaliland.

Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the Somaliland agreement would likely lead the SFG to reverse its decision to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new AU mission in Somalia in 2025. Somali officials in June ordered Ethiopian forces to withdraw from Somalia at the end of the current AU mission at the end of 2024 if Ethiopia followed through on its deal with Somaliland.[139] Somalia shifted its tone in the Ankara Declaration, however, and acknowledged “the sacrifices of Ethiopian soldiers within the African Union Missions.”[140] The Somali national security adviser said on December 15 that the SFG is reviewing the decision to exclude Ethiopian forces from the new AU mission.[141]

Ethiopia’s continued military presence in Somalia as part of the new AU mission would allow Ethiopia to continue fighting al Shabaab. Ethiopia seeks to maintain troops in Somalia to counter al Shabaab and create a buffer zone to prevent cross-border incursions. Al Shabaab demonstrated its strength near the Ethiopian border and threat to Ethiopia when it conducted a multiday campaign inside Ethiopia for the first time in July 2022.[142] Several hundred militants from the 2022 offensive established a rear base along Ethiopia’s southeastern border with Kenya.[143] Al Shabaab also regularly attacks Ethiopian forces in Somalia and uses anti-Ethiopian propaganda as a recruiting tool.[144] Local politicians in Somalia and Somalia’s international partners had signaled their support for Ethiopia’s continued participation in the new AU mission, and CTP previously assessed that Ethiopia would likely remain in Somalia despite the SFG’s demands.[145]

Figure 17. Ethiopian Forces and Bases in Somalia

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

It is unclear how the Ankara Declaration and subsequent agreements between Ethiopia and Somalia will affect Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt. Somalia signed defense deals with Egypt in August 2024 for nearly 10,000 Egyptian troops to replace Ethiopian forces in Somalia, ostensibly to combat al Shabaab.[146] Egypt has also sent three shipments of weapons to Somalia since August.[147] Egypt sought to threaten Ethiopia over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, while the SFG aimed to retaliate against Ethiopia and counter Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland.[148] Ethiopia views Egypt’s military presence on its border in Somalia as a national security risk and has warned against Egyptian military participation in the new AU mission.[149] The presidents of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia formalized a de facto anti-Ethiopian alliance during a trilateral summit on October 10 and agreed to strengthen Somalia to “confront various internal and external challenges.”[150] The Egyptian and Somali foreign ministers discussed the Ankara Declaration on December 15 and agreed to continue joint coordination and to hold a trilateral ministerial meeting with Eritrea at an unspecified date.[151]

Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea through Somalia would significantly benefit Ethiopia’s economy and reduce Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti. Ethiopia relies on Djibouti’s main port for approximately 95 percent of its international trade and pays at least $1 billion in annual port fees to Djibouti.[152] Ethiopia previously sought to gain Red Sea access to decrease this reliance through an agreement with the SFG in 2018 to invest in ports and accompanying road links between Ethiopia and Somalia.[153] Abiy also attempted to secure a stake in the Emirati-owned and operated Berbera port in Somaliland in 2019.[154] Both efforts collapsed, however, after Ethiopia and the SFG failed to follow through on their deal and Ethiopia failed to make the necessary payments to secure its stake in the Berbera port.[155] Abiy continued to highlight Ethiopia’s landlocked status as a problem and framed Red Sea access as an existential issue and “natural right” in 2023.[156]

The Ankara Declaration does not address Ethiopia’s naval ambitions. The Ankara Declaration does not refer to any Ethiopian naval access, contrary to the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal. Ethiopia signed an agreement with France to develop Ethiopia’s navy in 2019, but France withdrew from the deal in 2021 due to human rights concerns related to the Ethiopian civil war in Tigray.[157] However, French President Emmanuel Macron is traveling to Ethiopia in late December and is reportedly prepared to reengage with the deal.[158]

Turkey benefits from its role in the Ankara Declaration as Turkey seeks to strengthen its economic, military, and political footprint in the Horn of Africa. The Ankara Declaration protects Turkey’s investments and relationships with Ethiopia and Somalia by keeping its two partners from an open conflict. Turkey has been a major defense and economic partner in Somalia since the early 2010s and signed a maritime and defense deal with the SFG in February 2024 to reconstruct the Somali Navy in exchange for 30 percent of the revenue from the Somali’s offshore economic zone.[159] Somalia and Turkey also signed an oil and gas cooperation agreement in March 2024 that allows Turkey to engage in oil and natural gas exploration in Somalia’s offshore waters.[160] Turkey is simultaneously the second-largest foreign investor in Ethiopia, with an estimated $2.5 billion in projects in the country at the end of 2021.[161] Turkey sent drones to Ethiopia to help turn the tide in the federal government’s favor during the Ethiopian civil war in 2021 and 2022.[162]

The Ankara Declaration and Turkey’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa bolster Turkey’s status as an international powerbroker and key player in the greater Red Sea area. The AU, European Union, and United States praised Turkey for its role in mediating the Ankara Declaration.[163] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan offered to mediate an agreement in Sudan’s civil war between the United Arab Emirates—which backs the opposing Rapid Support Forces—and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) during a phone call with the SAF head on December 13.[164] Turkey has also framed its naval presence in the broader Horn of Africa–Red Sea region as an opportunity to combat piracy, illegal fishing, and other multilateral issues in the area.[165]

The Ankara Declaration could cause political backlash against the SFG and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy to the benefit of al Shabaab because the agreement contradicts the SFG’s earlier stances on Ethiopian access to Somalia’s coast. The SFG played upon anti-Ethiopian sentiment to turn popular Somali sentiment against the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal as part of its strategy to undermine the deal. Mohamud said in January that “not an inch of Somalia can or will be signed away by anybody,” and the Somali foreign minister led thousands of Somali civilians in protest against the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal in Mogadishu in January 2024.[166] Al Shabaab has attempted to exploit anti-Ethiopian sentiment repeatedly to gain recruits and accuses Ethiopia of “occupying” Somalia.[167] Al Shabaab rejected the Somalia-Ethiopia deal on December 12 and reiterated that Ethiopia seeks to “dominate Somalia.”[168] There is no immediate evidence that the Somali public or Somali government officials are widely dissatisfied with the Ankara Declaration, but protests against the SFG’s decision to mend ties with Ethiopia would indicate public dissatisfaction with the SFG.

The Ankara Declaration does not address the feasibility of ensuring safe passage for Ethiopian access to the Red Sea through Somalia. Ethiopia would presumably secure preferential access to a commercial port near or in the existing major ports in Mogadishu or Kismayo in southern Somalia. Al Shabaab maintains extortion networks in both ports, regularly carries out attacks in both cities, and also controls or heavily contests the areas and roads between both ports and the Ethiopian border.[169] These challenges previously contributed to the failure of Ethiopia’s 2018 deal with the SFG. The SFG launched an offensive in central Somalia in 2022 that cleared one of the main roadways between Mogadishu and central Somalia that runs to Ethiopia.[170] However, the SFG was unable to completely clear al Shabaab from central Somalia and failed to expand the offensive to al Shabaab’s main havens in southern Somalia due to clan rivalries and al Shabaab counterattacks.[171] A lack of security across these regions would pose significant challenges to secure any overland route for Ethiopia to transport goods to a Somali port.

Figure 18. Al Shabaab’s Area of Operations in Southern Somalia

Source: Kathryn Tyson and Liam Karr.

 

[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2024; https://mil.in dot ua/en/news/russian-aircraft-and-armored-vehicles-remain-blocked-in-syria; https://x.com/BabakTaghvaee1/status/1867242403746160938 ; https://x.com/yarotrof/status/1867241875674927304

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2024

[3] https://www.cnn.com/2024/12/16/politics/russia-military-syria-withdrawal/index.html

[4] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/na-makhachkalu-vidstup-rosii-iz-syrii-tryvaie.html; available by subscription at www.flightradar24.com https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/ra-78818#385d2d7f; https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/ra-78840 https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/ra-78847; https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/ra-78850; https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/ra-82040

[5] https://www.cnn.com/2024/12/16/politics/russia-military-syria-withdrawal/index.html

[6] https://www.cnn.com/2024/12/16/politics/russia-military-syria-withdrawal/index.html

[7] https://www.j euneafrique.com/1641373/politique/la-russie-est-elle-en-train-de-rapatrier-du-materiel-militaire-de-syrie-vers-la-libye

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-12-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2024

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16-2024; https://szru.gov dot ua/news-media/news/rf-ne-v-zmozi-heopolitychno-vplyvaty-na-dekilkokh-frontakh-odnochasno

[10] https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/1869020733080588755

[11] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5022; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2024

[12] https://x.com/ALBADIA24/status/1868321680831189235

[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-15-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2024; https://szru.gov dot ua/news-media/news/rf-ne-v-zmozi-heopolitychno-vplyvaty-na-dekilkokh-frontakh-odnochasno

[14] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5022

[15] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5025; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/u-syrii-rosiiskym-viiskam-brakuie-pytnoi-vody-ta-prodovolstva.html

[16] https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/12/16/the-secret-talks-between-syrias-new-leaders-and-the-kremlin; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/16/this-is-not-a-peaceful-country-russian-military-forms-fragile-truce-with-syrian-rebels-it-used-to-bomb

[17] https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%91%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2024

[19] https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/12/16/the-secret-talks-between-syrias-new-leaders-and-the-kremlin

[20] https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/12/16/the-secret-talks-between-syrias-new-leaders-and-the-kremlin; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/16/this-is-not-a-peaceful-country-russian-military-forms-fragile-truce-with-syrian-rebels-it-used-to-bomb

[21] https://x.com/tcsavunma/status/1868243974588367331

[22] https://www.politico.eu/article/syria-rebels-russia-bases-brussels-kaja-kallas-bashar-assad

[23] https://alleyesonwagner.org/2024/05/10/mediterranean-sea-objective-for-the-african-corps; https://www.svoboda.org/a/gotovitsya-boljshaya-zavarushka-voennaya-ekspansiya-rossii-v-livii/32939757.html; https://verstka.media/rossiya-naraschivaet-voennoe-prisutstvie-v-livii; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/12/03/russia-expands-military-presence-libya-pictures

[24] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-air-defense-bases-syria-libya-25810db0

[25] https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5091539-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D8%AD%D9%86-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/russian-cargo-plane-departs-syria-libya-more-flights-expected-official-says-2024-12-14

[26] https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-syria-air-base-withdrawal/33239917.html; https://x.com/joankelincuba/status/1868033937165189194; https://inews.co.uk/news/world/russia-navy-seeks-port-libya-syria-base-attack-3434418

[27] https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-syria-air-base-withdrawal/33239917.html

[28] https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/12/first-sign-russian-navy-evacuating-naval-vessels-from-tartus-syria; https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/march/turkey-montreux-convention-and-russian-navy-transits-turkish

[29] https://www.voanews.com/a/middle-east_russia-expands-military-facilities-syria/6205742.html; https://alleyesonwagner.org/2024/05/10/mediterranean-sea-objective-for-the-african-corps; https://www.svoboda.org/a/gotovitsya-boljshaya-zavarushka-voennaya-ekspansiya-rossii-v-livii/32939757.html; https://verstka.media/rossiya-naraschivaet-voennoe-prisutstvie-v-livii; https://www.pism.pl/webroot/upload/files/Raport/PISM%20Report%20Africa%20Corps_.pdf

[30] https://t.me/rybar/66186; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-december-12-2024-kremlin-pivot-to-libya-or-sudan-post-syria-turkey-mediates-ethiopia-somalia-deal#Russia

[31] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/12/16/russia-scrambles-to-reinforce-libya-assad-syria-collapse; https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240809

[32] Available by subscription at https://www.flightradar24.com

[33] Available by subscription at https://www.flightradar24.com

[34] Available by subscription at https://www.flightradar24.com

[35] https://www.pism.pl/webroot/upload/files/Raport/PISM%20Report%20Africa%20Corps_.pdf; https://t.me/rybar/62587; https://t.me/dva_majors/49167

[36] https://www.newsweek.com/russia-wagner-fire-molkino-krasnodar-1957301

[37] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/12/16/russia-scrambles-to-reinforce-libya-assad-syria-collapse

[38] https://x.com/fabsenbln/status/1673029926780391424; https://x.com/fabsenbln/status/1692799507036078577; https://x.com/fabsenbln/status/1638854734961360896

[39] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-air-defense-bases-syria-libya-25810db0

[40] Available by subscription at https://www.flightradar24.com

[41] https://x.com/fabsenbln/status/1694624770141081752; https://x.com/fabsenbln/status/1695614699948192052

[42] https://www.state.gov/taking-additional-measures-to-degrade-russias-wartime-economy; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1220

[43] https://www.voanews.com/a/dr-congo-rwanda-peace-talks-canceled-/7901906.html

[44] https://www.voanews.com/a/dr-congo-rwanda-peace-talks-canceled-/7901906.html

[45] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1641230/politique/le-sommet-de-luanda-entre-kagame-et-tshisekedi-netait-plus-pertinent-estime-kigali

[46] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1641230/politique/le-sommet-de-luanda-entre-kagame-et-tshisekedi-netait-plus-pertinent-estime-kigali

[47] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/118/80/pdf/n2411880.pdf; https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n22/757/86/pdf/n2275786.pdf?OpenElement; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/democratic-republic-congo/forgotten-war-congo; https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2023-03-06/statement-attributable-the-spokesperson-for-the-secretary-general-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-scroll-down-for-french-version%C2%A0%C2%A0; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1487345/politique/dans-lest-de-la-rdc-fragile-cessez-le-feu-entre-les-fardc-et-le-m23; https://www.africanews dot com/2023/10/23/eastern-drc-fighting-again-shifts-the-balance-in-north-kivu; https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/09/26/dr-congo-rwandan-forces-m23-rebels-shell-civilians; https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/unhcr-sounds-alarm-worsening-humanitarian-situation-dr-congo

[48] https://www.newtimes.co dot rw/article/19007/news/africa/m23-rebels-want-ongoing-ceasefire-to-open-door-to-dialogue; https://www.voaafrica.com/a/m23-political-spokesperson-talks-eac-drc-ceasefire-dialogue-/6843842.html; https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-144937_apres_la_neutralisation_des_fdlr_il_faut_un_dialogue_direct_entre_la_rdc_et_le_m23_rwanda.html; https://x.com/rbarwanda/status/1862746645508903035; https://www.newtimes.co dot rw/article/20951/news/security/nduhungirehe-lays-out-three-steps-to-end-dr-congo-security-crisis; https://thegreatlakeseye dot com/post?s=DRC--justice--minister--incites--violence--against--Rwandophones--_1611; https://x.com/Delphino12/status/1863719608860938374

[49] https://www.africanews.com/2023/12/11/drc-incumbent-president-tshisekedi-vows-to-rid-country-of-m23-rebels-at-goma-campaign-rall; https://trtafrika dot com/africa/drc-government-rejects-talks-with-m23-rebels-13468982

[50] https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-143779_agression_les_fdlr_sont_des_minerais.html; https://ipisresearch.be/weekly-briefing/why-the-dr-congo-is-putting-apple-on-the-spot; https://www.ft.com/content/ecf89818-949b-4de7-9e8a-89f119c23a69; https://greatlakescrisis dot org/is-peace-possible-without-dialogue

[51] https://x.com/angola_Mirex/status/1818436276996968860; https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2024-09/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-27.php

[52] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241105-rdc-goma-lancement-officiel-m%C3%A9canisme-de-suivi-de-la-crise-s%C3%A9curitaire-dans-l-est; https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/245/84/pdf/n2424584.pdf; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2024/11/24/actualite/securite/est-de-la-rdc-langola-et-la-monusco-saccordent-sur-le-soutien-au; https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2024/11/25/rdc-m23-langola-et-la-monusco-signent-un-protocole-daccord-sur-le-mecanisme-de-verification-ad-hoc-renforce

[53] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1634705/politique/exclusif-ce-que-prevoit-laccord-signe-par-la-rdc-et-le-rwanda

[54] https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=s%2F2022%2F967&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False; https://press.un.org/en/2012/sc10836.doc.htm; https://apnews.com/article/congo-rwanda-m23-us-troop-withdrawal-971e0c1a162598cfcf84934c163a7a67; https://www.minaffet.gov dot rw/updates/news-details/rwanda-clarifies-security-posture; https://www.newtimes.co dot rw/article/20561/news/security/dr-congos-support-for-fdlr-direct-threat-to-rwanda-says-envoy

https://www.newtimes.co dot rw/article/14962/news/crime/the-former-rwandan-armed-forces-central-role-in-preparation-of-1994-genocide-against-the-tutsi; https://www.newtimes.co dot rw/article/20561/news/security/dr-congos-support-for-fdlr-direct-threat-to-rwanda-says-envoy; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/dans-lest-du-congo-la-guerre-regionale-est-deja-la; https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/foreign-armed-groups; https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n04/419/80/pdf/n0441980.pdf; https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n06/391/16/pdf/n0639116.pdf; https://usun.usmission.gov/un-security-briefing-on-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-and-the-un-stabilization-mission-in-the-dr-congo

[55] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241022-rdc-nouvelle-offensive-entre-les-forces-rebelles-et-les-milices-wazalendo-dans-le-nord-kivu; https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/19007/news/africa/m23-rebels-want-ongoing-ceasefire-to-open-door-to-dialogue; https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2024/10/23/nord-kivu-des-combats-violents-signales-a-nouveau-a-kalembe-entre-le-m23-et-les-wazalendo

[56] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/245/84/pdf/n2424584.pdf; https://www.theeastafrican.co dot ke/tea/news/east-africa/drc-army-m23-rebels-clash-near-eastern-towns-4738626; https://www.news24 dot com/news24/africa/news/fardc-m23-rebels-trade-blame-for-fighting-that-disrupted-drc-peace-talks-20240826; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-october-24-2024#DRC; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1625906/politique/en-rdc-la-reprise-des-combats-dans-lest-compromet-elle-le-processus-de-luanda

[57] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/fighting-resumes-eastern-congo-army-m23-say-2024-12-03; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2024/12/03/actualite/securite/poursuite-des-combats-entre-les-fardc-et-le-m23-lubero; https://actualite dot cd/2024/12/03/rdc-lubero-deplacements-massifs-des-populations-de-kaseghe-hutwe-et-mathembe-les-combats; https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2024/12/04/lubero-offensives-de-larmee-contre-le-m23-situation-tendue-a-kirumba

[58] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/dans-lest-du-congo-la-guerre-regionale-est-deja-la

[59] https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2024/12/05/lubero-de-nouveaux-combats-sur-laxe-matembe-kaseghe-entre-larmee-et-le-m23; https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2024/12/14/lubero-le-m23-sempare-de-matembe

[60] https://www.theafricareport.com/371588/clashes-in-eastern-drc-day-after-aborted-peace-summit; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1641604/politique/est-de-la-rdc-retour-a-la-case-depart-entre-felix-tshisekedi-et-paul-kagame; https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2024/12/12/lubero-fardc-et-m23-saffrontent-a-luofu-et-matembe

[61] https://www.radiookapi dot net/2024/12/17/actualite/securite/lavancee-du-m23-pousse-des-milliers-dhabitants-affluer-vers-lubero; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2024/12/17/actualite/securite/lubero-alimbongo-occupee-par-les-rebelles-du-m23; https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-145422_lubero_alimbongo_occupee_par_les_rebelles_du_m23.html; https://actualite dot cd/2024/12/17/rdc-m23-pourquoi-alimbongo-etait-strategique https://actualite dot cd/2024/12/16/rdc-le-m23-atteint-alimbongo-le-grand-verrou-des-fardc-depuis-le-debut-du-cessez-le-0

[62] https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2024/12/14/lubero-ladministrateur-militaire-appelle-au-calme; https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-145461_lubero_pour_l_armee_la_localite_d_alimbongo_n_est_pas_passee_sous_le_controle_de_la_coalition_rdf_m23_mise_au_point.html

[63] https://buniaactualite dot cd/avancee-du-m23-vague-de-panique-et-de-deplacements-a-kipese-et-ses-environs

[64] https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2024/12/13/lubero-les-combats-se-poursuivent-a-kaseghe; https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2024/12/11/lubero-les-affrontements-se-concentrent-a-kaseghe; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2024/12/12/actualite/securite/lubero-larmee-et-le-m23-se-disputent-le-controle-de-kaseghe

[65] https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2024/12/11/lubero-les-affrontements-se-concentrent-a-kaseghe; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2024/12/12/actualite/securite/lubero-larmee-et-le-m23-se-disputent-le-controle-de-kaseghe

[66] https://www.dw.com/en/congo-fears-escalation-as-m23-seizes-key-towns/a-69549332

[67] https://www.dw.com/en/congo-fears-escalation-as-m23-seizes-key-towns/a-69549332

[68] https://actualite dot cd/2024/12/17/rdc-m23-pourquoi-alimbongo-etait-strategique; https://actualite dot cd/2024/12/16/rdc-le-m23-atteint-alimbongo-le-grand-verrou-des-fardc-depuis-le-debut-du-cessez-le-0; https://laprunellerdc dot com/guerre-du-m23-chute-dalimbongo-un-verrou-strategique-des-fardc-en-territoire-de-lubero

[69] https://www.radiookapi dot net/2024/12/09/actualite/securite/combats-contre-les-m23-lubero-les-fardc-reprennent-le-controle-de; https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2024/12/14/lubero-12-civils-executes-par-les-rebelles-du-m23-rdf-en-lespace-dune-semaine-a-luofu; https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2024/12/14/nord-kivu-au-moins-15-rebelles-du-m23-rdf-neutralises-par-les-fardc-a-luofu

[70] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com

[71] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com

[72] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/10/ethiopia-mass-arbitrary-detentions-in-amhara-region-deepen-erosion-of-rule-of-law

[73] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/11/ethiopia-end-the-month-long-arbitrary-detention-of-thousands-in-amhara-region

[74] https://riftvalley.net/publication/understanding-the-fano-insurgency-in-ethiopias-amhara-region

[75] https://epo.acleddata.com/amhara-conflict-fano-insurgency; https://epo.acleddata.com/amhara-conflict-fano-insurgency; https://epo.acleddata.com/2021/05/13/epo-monthly-april-2021; https://epo.acleddata.com/2022/07/26/epo-monthly-june-2022

[76] https://epo.acleddata.com/amhara-conflict-fano-insurgency; https://epo.acleddata.com/amhara-conflict-fano-insurgency; https://epo.acleddata.com/2021/05/13/epo-monthly-april-2021; https://epo.acleddata.com/2022/07/26/epo-monthly-june-2022

[77] https://epo.acleddata.com/amhara-conflict-fano-insurgency

[78] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-september-26-2024-fano-offensive-in-ethiopias-amhara-egypt-arms-somalia-rebel-drones-in-mali-burkina-thwarts-another-coup

[79] https://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopian-military-boosts-operations-in-amhara-region/7809375.html; https://addisstandard dot com/endf-amhara-admin-vow-to-intensify-operations-against-armed-groups-figures-embedded-within-govt

[80] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-october-10-2024-aussom-challenges-fano-counteroffensive-drc-attacks-fdlr-malis-northern-challenges-togo-border-pressure#Ethiopia

[81] https://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopian-military-boosts-operations-in-amhara-region/7809375.html

[82] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-october-10-2024-aussom-challenges-fano-counteroffensive-drc-attacks-fdlr-malis-northern-challenges-togo-border-pressure

[83] https://addisstandard dot com/endf-amhara-admin-vow-to-intensify-operations-against-armed-groups-figures-embedded-within-govt

[84] https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-civilian-deaths-mount-from-drone-strikes-in-amhara/a-70946525

[85] https://thehill.com/opinion/4962268-ethiopian-civilians-targeted-drones/

[86] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-september-26-2024-fano-offensive-in-ethiopias-amhara-egypt-arms-somalia-rebel-drones-in-mali-burkina-thwarts-another-coup#Ethiopia

[87] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-us-concerned-over-turkeys-drone-sales-conflict-hit-ethiopia-2021-12-22/

[88] https://thedefensepost.com/2024/01/19/ethiopia-akinci-uav-sukhoi/; https://baykartech.com/en/uav/bayraktar-akinci/

[89] https://x.com/Dachronica/status/1793561586441101430; https://x.com/BashirHashiysf/status/1848176849576194085

[90] https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-civilian-deaths-mount-from-drone-strikes-in-amhara/a-70946525; https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2024/03/05/horrific-civilian-toll-ethiopia-combat-drones-local-insurgencies; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/airpower-after-ukraine/the-tb2-the-value-of-a-cheap-and-good-enough-drone/; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2022/nov/16/explainer-iran%E2%80%99s-drone-exports-worldwide

[91] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/dark-days-turks-erdogan-atones-economic-errors-2024-07-18/

[92] https://www.theafricareport.com/141761/ethiopia-turkey-ankaras-ongoing-economic-and-military-support; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/africa/turkey-eyeing-more-investments-in-ethiopia-envoy/2144828

[93] https://www.amharaamerica.org/post/war-on-the-amhara-report-on-international-human-rights-violations; https://eclj.org/geopolitics/un/the-silent-suffering-of-the-amhara-people-in-ethiopia

[94] https://addisstandard dot com/news-amhara-oromo-states-scramble-with-conflicting-accounts-after-armed-men-gunned-down-26-oromia-militiamen-police; https://epo.acleddata.com/2022/04/06/epo-weekly-26-march-1-april-2022

[95] https://epo.acleddata.com/2022/04/06/epo-weekly-26-march-1-april-2022; https://epo.acleddata.com/2023/04/12/epo-weekly-1-7-april-2023; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b194-ethiopias-ominous-new-war-amhara; https://www.facebook.com/AmharaCommunications/posts/5284794291596007;%20https://www.bbc.com/amharic/news-56506556

[96] https://epo.acleddata.com/2022/04/06/epo-weekly-26-march-1-april-2022

[97] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-september-26-2024-fano-offensive-in-ethiopias-amhara-egypt-arms-somalia-rebel-drones-in-mali-burkina-thwarts-another-coup#Ethiopia; https://epo.acleddata.com/amhara-conflict-fano-insurgency

[98] https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/02/21/epo-weekly-update-20-february-2024; https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/04/24/epo-weekly-update-23-april-2024

[99] https://www.bbc.com/amharic/articles/c4n15p13eeko

[100] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopias-amhara-militia-says-resettlement-plan-beats-war-drum-2024-05-03; https://www.dw.com/am/%E1%8B%A8%E1%89%B5%E1%8C%8D%E1%88%AB%E1%8B%AD-%E1%89%B0%E1%8D%88%E1%8A%93%E1%89%83%E1%8B%AE%E1%89%BD-%E1%88%98%E1%88%98%E1%88%88%E1%88%B5/a-68972442?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR0YRIaNw088F3Z4IfAA6J2OsXeXw6KabNBk4fA96fPcjBpqcV3pI1NndNc_aem_AbExPE706M3HBZBNZrtrLoQPSDGMqSxfmw15paYQ-FX-2JI0zKK1fnqz8U93qP2_8yfJDQW5cuKoDuUuV8orUlsD

[101] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopias-amhara-militia-says-resettlement-plan-beats-war-drum-2024-05-03

[102] https://www.dabangasudan dot org/ar/all-news/article/%D9%87%D9%84%D8%B9-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A

[103] https://www.theeastafrican dot co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/ethiopia-sudan-inch-closer-to-face-common-problem-4689248; https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7/5038971-%D9%87%D9%84-%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%AD-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%9F; https://acleddata.com/2024/07/12/sudan-situation-update-july-2024-the-rsf-marches-on-sennar-and-west-kordofan; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/battle-begins-for-eastern-sudanese

[104] https://www.theeastafrican dot co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/ethiopia-sudan-inch-closer-to-face-common-problem-4689248; https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7/5038971-%D9%87%D9%84-%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%AD-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%9F; https://acleddata.com/2024/07/12/sudan-situation-update-july-2024-the-rsf-marches-on-sennar-and-west-kordofan; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/battle-begins-for-eastern-sudanese; https://addisstandard dot com/tigray-interim-admin-refutes-rsf-allegations-of-tplf-forces-involvement-in-sudan-conflict-criticizes-move-as-aimed-at-garnering-support-by-internationalizing-the-war; https://addisstandard dot com/rights-group-warns-of-extreme-distress-and-danger-for-tigrayan-refugees-in-sudan

[105] https://addisstandard dot com/tigray-interim-admin-refutes-rsf-allegations-of-tplf-forces-involvement-in-sudan-conflict-criticizes-move-as-aimed-at-garnering-support-by-internationalizing-the-war; https://addisstandard dot com/rights-group-warns-of-extreme-distress-and-danger-for-tigrayan-refugees-in-sudan

[106] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/map-sennar-jazira-offensive

[107] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241208-niger-21-morts-dans-l-attaque-d-un-v%C3%A9hicule-de-transport-de-passagers-dans-l-ouest-du-pays; https://x.com/WerbCharlie/status/1865085918039732362; https://x.com/ighazer/status/1865072623190966556

[108] https://x.com/WerbCharlie/status/1865085918039732362; https://x.com/ighazer/status/1865072623190966556

[109] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241211-niger-lourd-bilan-attaque-jihadiste-la-plus-meurtri%C3%A8re-dans-le-pays-depuis-six-mois; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1640075/politique/au-niger-au-moins-une-centaine-de-soldats-tues-dans-la-region-de-tillaberi; https://x.com/ighazer/status/1866875185053253833; https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1866762213437927726

[110] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1640075/politique/au-niger-au-moins-une-centaine-de-soldats-tues-dans-la-region-de-tillaberi

[111] https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20241212-niger-soldiers-killed-in-terrorist-attack-near-burkina-faso; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg6p2d55zko

[112] https://www.barrons.com/amp/news/niger-says-at-least-15-soldiers-killed-near-burkina-border-26ea9f61; https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1815756431322194079; https://x.com/ZagazOlaMakama/status/1828078412553920970; https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1830623095964442675

[113] https://x.com/ighazer/status/1848690573714043320

[114] https://x.com/WerbCharlie/status/1865085918039732362; https://x.com/ighazer/status/1865072623190966556

[115] https://x.com/ighazer/status/1866109007947059679

[116] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241211-niger-lourd-bilan-attaque-jihadiste-la-plus-meurtri%C3%A8re-dans-le-pays-depuis-six-mois; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1640075/politique/au-niger-au-moins-une-centaine-de-soldats-tues-dans-la-region-de-tillaberi; https://x.com/ighazer/status/1866875185053253833; https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1866762213437927726

[117] https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00JBZW.pdf; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241102-niger-un-convoi-de-camions-transportant-des-marchandises-attaqu%C3%A9-pr%C3%A8s-de-t%C3%A9ra; https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/12084638_02.pdf; https://mapafrica.afdb.org/en/projects/46002-P-Z1-DB0-035

[118] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1626958/politique/au-niger-des-routiers-denoncent-des-attaques-jihadistes-sur-la-route-du-burkina

[119] https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/niger-21-morts-tues-dans-l-attaque-d-un-convoi-dans-l-ouest-20241207; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241208-niger-21-morts-dans-l-attaque-d-un-v%C3%A9hicule-de-transport-de-passagers-dans-l-ouest-du-pays; https://x.com/ighazer/status/1865697817538199793; https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1867511259924742270

[120] https://afriquexxi.info/Dans-le-nord-est-du-Mali-l-Etat-islamique-en-voie-de-normalisation

[121] https://x.com/MOFASomalia/status/1867120512822022244

[122] https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1866956708297179388; https://www.reuters.com/world/erdogan-meets-somalia-ethiopia-leaders-separately-amid-somaliland-dispute-2024-12-11

[123] https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-mediating-somalia-ethiopia-talks-port-deal-officials-2024-07-01/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/second-round-somalia-ethiopia-talks-turkey-ends-with-no-deal-progress-made-2024-08-13

[124] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalias-cabinet-calls-emergency-meet-ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal-2024-01-02

[125] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia-somaliland/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal

[126] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-insists-ethiopia-not-be-part-of-new-au-mission-/7858887.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-accuses-ethiopian-troops-illegal-incursion-2024-06-24

[127] https://ecfr.eu/article/threes-a-crowd-why-egypts-and-somalias-row-with-ethiopia-can-embolden-al-shabaab/

[128] https://www.barrons.com/news/turkey-says-ethiopia-somalia-reach-compromise-deal-to-end-feud-51034d60; https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/a-port-deal-puts-the-horn-of-africa-on-the-brink

[129] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgr7v1evvgo; https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240927-ethiopian-actions-flagrantly-violate-somali-territorial-integrity-somali-pm

[130] https://www.mfa.gov dot tr/etiyopya-federal-demokratik-cumhuriyeti-ve-somali-federal-cumhuriyeti-nin-ankara-bildirisi.en.mfa#:~:text=The%20Leaders%20of%20Somalia%20and,Act%20of%20the%20African%20Union

[131] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/01/ethiopia-and-somaliland-reach-historic-agreement-over-access-to-red-sea-ports

[132] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/what-the-ethiopia-somaliland-deal-means-for-washingtons-strategy-in-the-red-sea/

[133] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/12/11/turkey-somalia-ethiopia-joint-declaration/3a2759fa-b80f-11ef-8afa-452ab71fe261_story.html; https://x.com/TheVillaSomalia/status/1866984029347803525

[134] https://x.com/TomGardner18/status/1867114091816550709; https://www.bbc.com/somali/articles/cp9n1dn2v7zo

[135] https://x.com/Ismail_Shirwac/status/1866972545712259467; https://x.com/RAbdiAnalyst/status/1867811339789271403; https://www.bbc.com/somali/articles/cp9n1dn2v7zo

[136] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somaliland-votes-with-leaders-seeing-international-recognition-reach-2024-11-13/

[137] https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/10402

[138] https://www.semafor.com/article/12/10/2024/somaliland-trump-white-house-looks-set-to-recognize-the-region

[139] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-wants-all-ethiopian-troops-to-leave-by-december/7641135.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03

[140] https://x.com/TheVillaSomalia/status/1866984029347803525

[141] https://www.alaraby.co dot uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A9

[142] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-al-shabaab-attacks-ethiopia

[143] https://www.hudson.org/terrorism/faltering-lion-analyzing-progress-setbacks-somalia-war-against-al-shabaab-james-barnett; https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-al-shabaab-attacks-ethiopia

[144] https://jamestown.org/program/al-shabaab-threatens-ethiopian-security-ahead-of-atmis-withdrawal-from-somalia/; https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-attacks-ethiopian-military-convoys-in-somalia-/7271962.html; https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/al-shabaab-militants-launch-attack-on-ethiopian-military-base-in-somalia

[145] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-november-21-2024-russian-mining-in-the-sahel-sudan-ceasefire-still-unlikely-au-mission-in-somalia-uncertainty-is-postelection-offensive-in-mozambique#Somalia

[146] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-insists-ethiopia-not-be-part-of-new-au-mission-/7858887.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-accuses-ethiopian-troops-illegal-incursion-2024-06-24; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-september-5-2024-egypt-ethiopia-and-somalia-conflict-looms-is-gains-in-niger-russia-aids-burkina-fasos-nuclear-energy-push#Horn

[147] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cglk038p1d3o; https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/egyptian-warship-docks-in-mogadishu-with-third-arms-shipment-amidst-regional-tensions

[148] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa#Somalia

[149] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa

[150] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdje7pkv1zxo; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/10/somalia-eritera-and-egypt-pledge-to-bloster-security-ties; https://www.barrons.com/news/leaders-of-egypt-eritrea-somalia-meet-amid-regional-tensions-7eccc9a9

[151] https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/1868315060172640515; https://x.com/mahmouedgamal44/status/1868346810068357217; https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1868352708610043990

[152] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/07/20/addis-djibouti-corridor-to-get-major-upgrade-that-is-key-to-unlocking-connectivity-and-trade-for-ethiopia-afe-hoa; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/02/world/africa/ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal.html; https://www.mei.edu/publications/djibouti-needs-plan-b-post-guelleh-era; https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2023/11/7/is-landlocked-ethiopia-starting-another-war-over-ports-in-horn-of-africa

[153] https://www.middleeastmonitor dot com/20180616-somalia-ethiopia-to-jointly-invest-in-four-seaports-on-the-red-sea/; https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/ethiopia-seeks-to-legitimise-port-deals-with-somalia-55700; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/somalia-ethiopia-to-jointly-invest-in-four-seaports-on-the-red-sea-idUSKBN1JC0JK

[154] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/1/6/why-is-somalia-angry-about-neighbouring-ethiopias-new-port-deal

[155] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia-somaliland/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal

[156] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67332811; https://www.aljazeera dot com/program/inside-story/2023/7/26/how-will-landlocked-ethiopia-get-direct-access-to-a-port

[157] https://somaliguardian dot com/news/africa/france-suspends-military-cooperation-agreement-with-ethiopia/; https://www.state.gov/war-crimes-crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-in-ethiopia/; https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/06/crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-ethiopias-western-tigray-zone; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/ethiopia-france-sign-military-navy-deal-turn-new-page-in-ties-idUSKBN1QT2VZ/

[158] https://x.com/Tuuryare_Africa/status/1867637502854803907; https://x.com/martinplaut/status/1866904409726206462

[159] https://www.mei.edu/publications/far-benefactor-turkish-government-exploiting-somalias-fragility; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkey-signed-two-major-deals-with-somalia-will-it-be-able-to-implement-them

[160] https://apnews.com/article/turkey-somalia-sign-oil-gas-agreements-312fcdf58789767f94b6c36a3444faec

[161] https://www.theafricareport.com/141761/ethiopia-turkey-ankaras-ongoing-economic-and-military-support; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/africa/turkey-eyeing-more-investments-in-ethiopia-envoy/2144828

[162] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-us-concerned-over-turkeys-drone-sales-conflict-hit-ethiopia-2021-12-22; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/ethiopia-tigray-dedebit-drone-strike/

[163] https://www.aa.com dot tr/en/africa/african-union-welcomes-somalia-ethiopia-pact-praises-mediation-by-turkish-president-erdogan/3422654; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ethiopiasomalia-statement-spokesperson-ankara-declaration_en; https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-welcomes-the-ankara-declaration-by-ethiopia-and-somalia

[164] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-can-step-resolve-sudan-uae-disputes-erdogan-tells-burhan-2024-12-13/; https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/1867562489627517116

[165] https://www.newarab.com/news/turkey-leads-anti-piracy-maritime-mission-gulf-aden

[166] https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2024/1/4/ambiguous-ethiopia-port-deal-fuels-uncertainty-over-somaliland-statehood; https://www.ftlsomalia dot com/fiqi-addresses-huge-anti-ethiopia-protest-in-mogadishu/; https://www.aa.com dot tr/en/africa/protest-against-ethiopia-s-red-sea-access-deal-rocks-somali-capital/3106328; https://x.com/SONNALIVE/status/1742661068760006984

[167] https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2007-01-06-voa9-66763232/563779.html; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/anti-ethiopian-protests-erupt-in-mogadishu-idUSL06725344/; SITE Intelligence Group, ”Shabaab Video Raises Alarm Over Ethiopian Ambitions in Somalia, Documents Major Ambush on Convoy Leaving 284 Dead,” April 4, 2024, available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com

[168] https://x.com/Tuuryare_Africa/status/1867261152075325683

[169] https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-attacks-somali-base-handed-over-by-au-forces/7179521.html; https://acleddata.com/2023/09/01/special-report-kenya-somalia-border-rising-al-shabaab-threat-in-the-wake-of-atmis-drawdown/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/scores-killed-clashes-between-somali-forces-al-shabaab-2024-07-22/; https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/al-shabaab-remains-active-in-southern-somalia/

[170] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/somalias-stalled-offensive-against-al-shabaab-taking-stock-of-obstacles/

[171] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-somali-national-army-versus-al-shabaab-a-net-assessment/; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-february-1-2024; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-8-2023#:~:text=Source%3A%20Kathryn%20Tyson.-,Somalia.,-The%20SFG%20will; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-8-2023#:~:text=Source%3A%20Kathryn%20Tyson.-,Somalia.,-The%20SFG%20will