Iran Update, January 23, 2025

 

Iran Update, January 23, 2025

Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Annika Ganzeveld, Avery Borens, Victoria Penza, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

CTP-ISW has recorded no verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 22.

Israel and Hamas appear to have agreed to allow Gazans to return from the southern to the northern Gaza Strip. This agreement may prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from moving large quantities of weapons and fighters to the northern Gaza Strip. A multinational consortium led by US and Egyptian contractors will oversee the movement of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip. Unspecified Israeli officials told Axios on January 23 that Israel and Hamas agreed to establish a multinational consortium to oversee vehicle movement through the Netzarim Corridor.[1] The consortium will include two United States-based private security firms and an Egyptian company. The consortium will establish a vehicle checkpoint on Salah al Din Road at the corridor once the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdraws from the area. Hamas will likely try to move materiel and resources to the northern Gaza Strip via Salah al Din Road, which the vehicle checkpoint should prevent. Hamas announced that Gazans can return to the northern Gaza Strip on foot via al Rashid Road — the coastal road that connects the northern and southern Gaza Strip—after the IDF withdraws from there.[2] The ceasefire agreement requires the IDF to withdraw from al Rashid Road by January 25.[3] Hamas will likely try to move fighters and weapons via al Rashid Road to the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas fighters who transit al Rashid Road on foot will not be able to carry large weaponry or large amounts of ammunition, however.

Lebanese Hezbollah called on the Lebanese government to pressure the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon if the IDF remains past January 26, which is the date by which the IDF is required by the ceasefire with Hezbollah to withdraw.[4] Hezbollah emphasized that the IDF must withdraw from Lebanon by January 26 but refrained from explicitly threatening to attack if the IDF does not withdraw. CTP-ISW continues to assess that it is unlikely that Hezbollah will resume attacks targeting Israel at this time. Israeli media reported on January 23, citing an informed source familiar, that Israel submitted a request to the United States to postpone its withdrawal from Lebanon by 30 days. Israeli media reported that members of the ceasefire monitoring committee, including the United States, France, Lebanon, and Israel, discussed the request. Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri met with the chair of the ceasefire monitoring committee, US Army Major General Jasper Jeffers, on January 23, likely to discuss the request.[5] Israeli government spokesperson David Mencer stated on January 23 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UNIFIL have made “positive movements . . . but not fast enough.”[6]

The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or allied interests in the Middle East. The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the security establishment in a way that does not meet these criteria would harm US interests in the region. The presence of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the Iraqi security establishment who answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister would increase Iranian influence and facilitate Iranian capture of the Iraqi security establishment. The Iraqi federal government’s failure to punish militias who conduct attacks without the permission of the state would encourage the militias to conduct further attacks, given that they have no incentive to stop their attacks. The Iraqi federal government has notably previously failed to deter Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from attacking Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria.

The Iraqi federal government has reportedly offered to protect Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from foreign attacks and allow them to keep their weapons in return for the militias integrating into the Iraqi security establishment.[7] These concessions do not guarantee that the militias will answer to the Iraqi prime minister instead of Iran. These concessions also do not guarantee that the militias will not conduct attacks targeting US or allied interests. Granting these concessions and failing to impose other requirements on the militias to join the Iraqi security establishment could therefore harm US security interests in the region.

Over 130 unspecified Iraqi parliamentarians signed a petition to remove Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, possibly because he recently helped establish a new Sunni political alliance and pass the General Amnesty Law. Parliament passed three “controversial” laws — including the General Amnesty Law — on January 21.[8] The General Amnesty Law will grant amnesty to a large number of Iraqis who were previously wrongfully imprisoned. The law is a long-standing demand for Sunni political parties in Iraq. The State of Law Coalition, which is headed by former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and part of the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework, and some independent parliamentarians have challenged the constitutionality of the January 21 parliament session in the Iraqi Federal Court.[9] A petition to remove the parliament speaker requires 109 signatures. An absolute majority vote of 165 parliamentarians is subsequently required to remove the parliament speaker.[10] Mashhadani’s deputy, Shia Coordination Framework member Mohsen al Mandalawi, would become the temporary parliament speaker if Mashhadani was removed.[11] Mandalawi previously served as interim parliament speaker between November 2023 and October 2024, while Parliament struggled to elect a new speaker.[12] The petition to remove Mashhadani comes after he helped form the United Sunni Leadership Coalition in early January 2024. The coalition called on the Sudani administration to implement nine long-standing Sunni demands — including passing the General Amnesty Law — on January 18.[13]

Turkey has reportedly made an agreement with imprisoned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan to disarm the PKK. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Nationalist Movement Party leader Devlet Bahçeli have recently held talks with Ocalan.[14] Ocalan will reportedly publicly call on the PKK to “lay down arms” on February 15, according to the director of the Washington DC-based Middle East Institute’s Turkey Program.[15] The Turkish government will reportedly release Ocalan from prison and draft a new constitution that includes Kurdish rights and other unspecified changes in return.[16] "PKK-linked groups" will reportedly share power with the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and integrate some forces into the new Syrian armed forces as part of the agreement.[17] It is unclear whether “PKK-linked groups” includes the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Turkey often conflates the SDF and the PKK-linked Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) with the PKK and uses “PKK” to refer to the entire SDF. PKK groups in Qandil, northern Iraq, have reportedly agreed to the terms of the agreement.[18] CTP-ISW cannot verify this report. The demand for “PKK-linked groups” to share authority with the KNC is consistent with Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani’s efforts to pressure the SDF to work with minority Kurdish parties and avoid a full-scale conflict with Turkey.[19] It remains unclear whether the PKK would heed calls from Ocalan to disarm. The disarmament of the PKK would also likely not satisfy Turkey’s demand to “eliminate” the SDF.[20]

Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra warned that the Syrian interim government is “ready” to use force against the SDF if needed as part of the government effort to integrate the SDF into the new Syrian armed forces.[21] Qasra told reporters on January 22 that the interim government is continuing to negotiate with the SDF but that “if we have to use force, we will be ready.”[22] Qasra's comment is the most explicit threat an interim government official has made to use military action against the SDF. The SDF has so far refused to disarm and integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry and has instead called for a “decentralized” system that would allow the SDF to join the new Syrian armed forces as a “bloc” and remain deployed in northeastern Syria.[23] The interim government is currently pursuing a two-pronged strategy to coerce the SDF to disarm: it is actively negotiating with the SDF while simultaneously coordinating with Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). Turkey and the SNA are both actively fighting the SDF in northern Syria. A Syrian government decision to deploy forces to SDF frontlines would mark a significant departure from the government’s current strategy. Syrian government leadership, such as Shara and Qasra, may calculate that HTS military involvement would sufficiently coerce the SDF to disarm, which it has so far been unwilling to do through negotiations with HTS alone.

The HTS-led Department of Military Operations seized a swath of strategically significant territory near the Zamla oil field, south of Raqqa, in the Syrian Badia on January 23. Geolocated footage shows a Department of Military Operations convoy arriving in Zamla, a town around 12 kilometers south of Rusafa, on January 23.[24] Syrian media reported that HTS-led forces took control of several oil fields near Zamla and several towns in the desert west of Zamla.[25] The commander of the SDF-affiliated Northern Democratic Brigade said on January 23 that the SDF recently warned the international coalition about the threat of ISIS in the “significant security vacuum” between SDF-held territory and Syrian interim government-held territory.[26] Assad regime forces and Iranian-backed militias formerly controlled Zamla and its oil fields, and the withdrawal of regime-affiliated forces could allow ISIS to resurge in those areas.[27] The commander said that the SDF, Department of Military Operations, and international coalition recently held a meeting near Rusafa and that Department of Military Operations forces subsequently deployed to the area.[28] This meeting and subsequent deployment is consistent with likely HTS objectives to consolidate control over areas of the Syrian Badia, particularly in areas where ISIS could grow and resurge.

The Department of Military Operations forces deployed to a strategically significant position, from which they could pressure the SDF salient south of Lake Assad. The deployment of these forces comes after Qasra warned that the Syrian government is ready for a potential military operation against the SDF. The interim government's deployment of forces to Rusafa may set conditions for a potential operation. The current HTS position in the Rusafa desert is located at the crossroads of government-held territory to the west and SDF-held territory to the north. Such a position would allow HTS-led forces to advance north and potentially cut off the SDF’s southern salient along the southwestern bank of Lake Assad from the rear, disrupting an SDF defense of Raqqa. The Rusafa position is furthermore located south of Ain Issa, where SNA forces are currently deployed. The HTS-led forces and SNA could possibly coordinate to envelope Raqqa City from the north and south. CTP-ISW has not observed any indicators that HTS is planning a military operation targeting the SDF at the time of this writing, however.

Anti-SDF media reported that the Department of Military Operations reportedly clashed with SDF-affiliated gunmen in the village of Amala, west of Zamla, and captured several men.[29] The SDF denied that its forces clashed with Syrian government forces in the area and blamed “Turkish-run media” for spreading false narratives.[30]

The HTS-led interim government appears to be forming a police force that is centered on Islamic principles.[31] Members of the HTS police force in Idlib have traveled to Damascus to recruit police officers. The HTS police has asked applicants a series of questions about their beliefs and training for new recruits is focused on Sharia Law. Unspecified Syrian officers cited by Reuters stated that the Islamic teaching is intended to instill morality in the new Syrian police force. Reuters cited Syrian civilians who expressed apprehension toward a police force based on religious doctrine. Minority Syrian communities have expressed distrust toward the Sunni majority HTS-led interim government following reports of sectarian motivated attacks by HTS-affiliated fighters.[32]

Key Takeaways:

• Turkey and Syria: Turkey has reportedly made an agreement with imprisoned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan to disarm the PKK. Ocalan will reportedly publicly call on the PKK to “lay down arms” on February 15.
• SDF Negotiations: The Syrian Interim Defense Minister said that the interim government is continuing to negotiate with the SDF but that “if we have to use force, we will be ready.” His comment is the most explicit threat an interim government official has made to use military action against the SDF.
• HTS Deployment: The HTS-led Department of Military Operations seized a swath of strategically significant territory near the Zamla oil field, south of Raqqa, in the Syrian Badia on January 23. The Department of Military Operations forces deployed to a strategically significant position, from which they could pressure the SDF salient south of Lake Assad.
• Iraq: The integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or allied interests in the Middle East.

Syria

Syrian Chief of Staff Ali al Nassan and Lebanese Armed Forces Cooperation and Coordination Office Director Michel Boutros discussed mechanisms to strengthen security along the Syria-Lebanon border on January 23.[33] Syrian government forces have recently clashed with alleged regime remnants and Hezbollah fighters along the Syria-Lebanon border on multiple occasions.[34]

HTS leader Ahmed al Shara and interim Intelligence Chief Anas Khattab met with a senior Belarusian delegation in Damascus on January 23.[35] Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov headed the delegation. Ryzhenkov expressed support for lifting sanctions on Syria.[36] The Belarusian delegation’s visit to Syria comes amid HTS-Russian negotiations over the evacuation of Russian military assets from Syria and Russian basing rights in Syria.[37]

HTS leader Ahmed al Shara told Turkish media on January 23 that HTS opposes IDF operations in southern Syria but will not confront Israel.[38] Shara claimed that Israel has used the presence of Hezbollah and Iranian-backed groups in Syria to justify its operations in southern Syria. Shara added that the next Syrian government should prioritize lifting sanctions and bringing Syria out of the current war.

The HTS-led Department of Military Operations imposed a curfew in Inkhil, Daraa Province, on January 23 after alleged looters attacked a security patrol at an abandoned military facility.[39] Syrian media reported that clashes broke out between two local groups, including one affiliated with the Department of Military Operations, after the attack, killing two people.[40] A Department of Military Operations Convoy reportedly deployed to Inkhil and restored calm, according to Syrian media.[41]

Unspecified gunmen killed the newly appointed police chief of Sheikh Maskin, Daraa Province, on January 23.[42] The gunmen killed Mohamed al Safadi in his vehicle on the road between Sheikh Maskin and Izraa.[43] Safadi was reportedly involved in weapons collection and the settlement of former regime members.[44] Syrian media claimed that the gunmen attacked Safadi due to personal disputes.[45] This attack marks the first attack targeting a transitional government official in Daraa Province.[46]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) spokesperson Bishawa Hawrami said on January 23 that the Iraqi federal government submitted a new budget proposal to the Iraqi parliament without KRG approval.[47] Hawrami said that the Iraqi federal government did not present the new budget proposal to the Federal Council of Ministers for a vote. A Parliamentary Economic Committee member told Iraqi media on January 23 that the proposal mandates the KRG to submit all revenues from oil, gas, and petroleum sales to the federal treasury.[48] The new proposal comes after parliament did not vote on a previous budget amendment on January 21, despite the amendment appearing on the parliamentary agenda.[49] This amendment would have benefited the KRG by increasing compensation for oil production in Iraqi Kurdistan.[50]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

The Houthis condemned US President Donald Trump on January 23 for designating the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization.[51]

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The Gaza Strip

The IDF killed a PIJ fighter who threatened Israeli forces in the southern Gaza Strip on January 22.[52] The IDF fired warning shots at Gazans in several areas across the Gaza Strip on January 22 and 23.[53] The IDF said that many of these Gazans were armed. The IDF added that it acted in accordance with the ceasefire agreement.[54] The IDF warned Gazans on January 19 to avoid approaching Israeli forces in designated areas.[55]

Lebanon

The IDF 7th Armored Brigade (91st Division) destroyed Hezbollah weapons and infrastructure in unspecified areas of southern Lebanon on January 23.[56] The IDF destroyed underground Hezbollah shelters and weapons depots that contained anti-tank missiles, mortars, RPGs, rockets, and other military equipment.[57]

The IDF 300th Territorial Brigade (146th Division) destroyed Hezbollah weapons and infrastructure in Aita al Shaab, southwestern Lebanon, on January 23.[58] Israeli forces destroyed over 30 weapons depots that contained hundreds of rockets, rocket launchers, missiles, charges, RPG launchers, and other military equipment.[59] The IDF reported that Hezbollah used Aita al Shaab to “arm itself and prepare for numerous” attacks.[60] The IDF has operated in Aita al Shaab since early October 2024.[61]

Lebanese media reported on January 23 that the LAF moved to the entrance of Aita al Shaab.[62] The LAF is likely preparing to backfill the IDF position there.

The LAF seized weapons during a raid to arrest a man in Kouakh, near the Lebanon-Syria border, on January 23.[63] The LAF seized rockets, an RPG, and other unspecified weapons in a weapons warehouse. Lebanese media reported on January 23 that Israeli forces moved toward the Ras al Dhahr neighborhood, west of Mays al Jabal.[64] Lebanese media reported that the IDF detonated explosives in Mays al Jabal on January 22.[65]

West Bank

Israeli forces continued the “Iron Wall” counterterrorism operation in Jenin for the third consecutive day on January 23.[66] The IDF killed two Hamas fighters who were involved in the January 6 shooting attack that killed three Israeli civilians in al Funduq.[67] The IDF has killed 11 additional fighters and arrested “numerous” others in Jenin since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on January 22.[68] PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting Israeli forces in Jenin on January 23.[69] CTP-ISW did not observe any combined attacks by the newly-created joint operations room, which is comprised of PIJ, Hamas, and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, on January 23.[70] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi stated that the IDF is “preparing to continue [operations] in the Jenin [refugee] camp” during a situational assessment with Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar in Jenin on January 22.[71]

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iran is continuing to try to expand economic and transportation cooperation with Azerbaijan. Iranian Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadegh signed a memorandum of understanding covering transportation, energy, and finance cooperation with Azerbaijani Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev in Tehran on January 22.[72] Sadegh stated that bilateral trade between Iran and Azerbaijan reached 580 million US dollars in 2024, a 20 percent increase from 2023.[73] Mustafayev stated that the Aghband Bridge, which is part of the International North-South Transit Corridor, will open by the end of 2025. This bridge is meant to increase trade through the East-West Aras corridor along Iran’s northwestern border.[74] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported that the Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters will be responsible for the expansion of the Aras corridor over the next two years.[75] The Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters is an IRGC-controlled civil engineering and construction firm that dominates broad swaths of the Iranian economy. The Iranian and Azerbaijani delegations also discussed energy and water cooperation as well as efforts to integrate the Iranian and Azerbaijani electricity grids.[76]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://www.axios.com/2025/01/23/us-private-security-contractors-will-operate-key-gaza-checkpoint

[2] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rksmptyoje ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gazans-ready-tent-camps-families-returning-north-after-ceasefire-2025-01-23/

[3] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rksmptyoje

[4] https://t.me/mmirleb/9650

[5] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/111898

[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-voices-concerns-about-implementation-ceasefire-with-hezbollah-ahead-2025-01-23/

[7] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B7-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%85-%D8%B3%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9

[8] https://almadapaper dot net/393859/

[9] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1181645 ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9 ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%82%D9%89-%D8%B7%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9

[10] https://almadapaper dot net/393859/

[11] https://iq.parliament dot iq/en/category/presidency/first-deputy/

[12] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraq-s-Acting-Parliament-Speaker-urges-full-MP-participation-in-today-s-Speaker-election ; https://apnews.com/article/iraq-parliament-speaker-mashhadani-halbousi-d2f914397971c244a8421914c85fcedd

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-18-2025

[14] https://x.com/gonultol/status/1882126703339991391; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-pro-kurdish-party-meet-jailed-pkk-leader-again-wednesday-2025-01-22/; https://x.com/gonultol/status/1848743755102179623?s=46&t=4RGn_HtvqC3-_Uk3TbHSRA

[15] https://x.com/gonultol/status/1882126703339991391; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-pro-kurdish-party-meet-jailed-pkk-leader-again-wednesday-2025-01-22/

[16] https://x.com/gonultol/status/1882126703339991391

[17] https://x.com/gonultol/status/1882126703339991391

[18] https://x.com/gonultol/status/1882126703339991391

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-16-2025

[20] https://en dot apa.az/asia/pkk-elements-in-syria-must-leave-country-turkish-fm-455547

[21] https://www.barrons.com/news/syria-defence-minister-says-open-to-talks-with-kurds-but-ready-to-use-force-391bb745 

[22] https://www.barrons.com/news/syria-defence-minister-says-open-to-talks-with-kurds-but-ready-to-use-force-391bb745

[23] https://asharq dot com/politics/113001/قسد-اللامركزية-الخيار-الأنسب-سوريا/ ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/820456

[24] https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/1882420128526332088; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1882394828807545164

[25] https://x.com/ALBADIA24/status/1882395221927051517; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1882167486960861417

[26] https://x.com/abo_omar_idleb/status/1882506605385703518; https://x.com/vvanwilgenburg/status/1882519049823011261?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syria%20and%20Western%20Iraq%20Map%20-%2025%20FEB%202019.pdf; https://www.syria dot tv/ميليشيا-حزب-الله-تنقل-شاحنات-بترول-من-حقل-الزملة-إلى-مناطق-سيطرتها-في-لبنان

[28] https://x.com/abo_omar_idleb/status/1882506605385703518 ; https://x.com/vvanwilgenburg/status/1882519049823011261?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q

[29] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119517; https://t.me/ALBADIA_24/3571; https://t.me/rda_al_adoan/2872;  https://t.me/rda_al_adoan/2873

[30] https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1882497423085310248

[31] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-new-leaders-turn-islamic-law-effort-rebuild-assads-police-2025-01-23/

[32] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-28-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-2-2025

[33] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1882500223052005791

[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-21-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-13-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-7-2025

[35] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1882357245046063157; https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/328

[36] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119506

[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-21-2025

[38] https://www.ahaber.com dot tr/gundem/2025/01/23/a-haberden-tarihi-roportaj-suriyenin-yeni-lideri-el-saradan-turkiye-mesaji

[39] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1882437564407419192

[40] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1882440846693339453 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1882493220934041610

[41] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1882493220934041610 ; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1882474097583804435

[42] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1882434206724435971; https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119510

[43] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1882434206724435971; https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119510

[44] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1882434206724435971

[45] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119518

[46] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1882412591915704346

[47] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA-%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%82-%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%B2-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AD-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7

[48] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/kurdistan/230120254

[49] https://baghdadtoday dot news/266367-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D8%A3%D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%A9.html

[50] https://channel8 dot com/english/29180 ; https://enablingpeace dot org/ishm477/

[51] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1882462105171001534 ; https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/designation-of-ansar-allah-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization/

[52] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1882153107188310086

[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1882153107188310086 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1882153110585606297 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1882489332671586788 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1882489335913869818

[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1882489332671586788

[55] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1880836728677970062

[56] https://t dot co/Wv3TGnoM1L

[57] https://t dot co/Wv3TGnoM1L

https://www.idf dot il/%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%99%D7%97%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94/%D7%9B%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%94%D7%A4%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%93%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%97%D7%93%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%9E%D7%A4%D7%A2%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%91-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%97%D7%98%D7%99%D7%91%D7%94-300-%D7%91%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%93-%D7%94%D7%A6%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%9F/

[58]

[59] https://www.idf dot il/%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%99%D7%97%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94/%D7%9B%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%94%D7%A4%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%93%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%97%D7%93%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%9E%D7%A4%D7%A2%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%91-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%97%D7%98%D7%99%D7%91%D7%94-300-%D7%91%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%93-%D7%94%D7%A6%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%9F/

[60] https://www.idf dot il/%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%99%D7%97%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94/%D7%9B%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%94%D7%A4%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%93%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%97%D7%93%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%9E%D7%A4%D7%A2%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%91-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%97%D7%98%D7%99%D7%91%D7%94-300-%D7%91%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%93-%D7%94%D7%A6%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%9F/

[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-13-2024

[62] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/128084

[63] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1882320709302558954

[64] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/128082

[65] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/111874

[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1882316358035361995

[67] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/in-jenin-idf-kills-2-gunmen-who-shot-3-israelis-dead-in-terror-attack-this-month/

[68] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-838849

[69] https://t.me/sarayajneen/2021 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8194 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/2025

[70] https://t.me/sarayaps/19079

[71] https://www.idf dot il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/january-25-pr/the-chief-of-the-general-staff-and-the-director-of-the-isa-held-a-situational-assessment-in-jenin/

[72] http://news.mrud dot ir/news/186896

[73] http://news.mrud dot ir/news/186889

[74] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85727393 ; https://www.railfreight dot com/beltandroad/2025/01/23/azerbaijan-and-iran-deepen-instc-cooperation/?gdpr=accept

[75] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/02/3242749/

[76] http://news.mrud dot ir/news/186889