Iran Update, February 5, 2025

 

Iran Update, February 5, 2025

Ria Reddy, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Brian Carter, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iran is downplaying the significance of US “maximum pressure” sanctions while signaling some openness to nuclear negotiations with the West. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said that the maximum pressure policy is a “failed experiment” in response to US President Donald Trump’s announcing on February 4 his intent to re-enforce extensive sanctions on Iran.[1] Senior Iranian officials separately expressed willingness to engage in nuclear negotiations, emphasizing the Iranian policy against building and using nuclear weapons. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Director Mohammad Eslami similarly said that Iran has no plans to develop nuclear weapons.[2] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on February 5 that Iran is ready to give the United States a chance to resolve disputes.[3] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ultimately will decide whether Iran negotiates with the West or tries to build a nuclear weapon, however. Trump said on February 5 that he would like to pursue a “verified nuclear peace agreement” with Iran “immediately.”[4]              

Reuters reported on February 5 that Trump ordered his administration to work with allies to "complete the snapback of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran,” likely referring to discussions with the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to trigger snapback sanctions on Iran.[5] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[6] The E3 previously stated that it is prepared to impose snapback sanctions on Iran.[7] The E3 has until October 2025 to do so.[8]

The US Defense Department is preparing plans for the withdrawal of US service members from Syria.[9] No order has been given to proceed with the withdrawal at the time of this writing, however. A US withdrawal would severely undermine the counter-ISIS mission in Iraq and Syria and would create a vacuum that ISIS could exploit to reconstitute. SDF spokesperson Farhad Shami said on February 5 that ISIS is waiting for a US withdrawal to reactivate and restore its physical so-called “caliphate.”[10] Shami confirmed that the SDF had received no warning from the United States about plans to withdraw.[11]

A US withdrawal from Syria would very likely create opportunities for ISIS to rebuild itself in northeastern Syria in particular. The United States provides critical functions that enable the SDF to secure detention facilities in northeastern Syria that hold 10,000 ISIS fighters, whom US Central Command Commander General Michael Kurilla has called “an ISIS army-in-waiting.”[12] A US withdrawal from Syria would significantly increase the likelihood that the SDF would be unable to secure these ISIS fighters due to pressure from Turkey and Turkish-backed forces. The distraction and chaos caused by a US withdrawal from northeastern Syria would provide ISIS an opening to launch a major attack against some of these detention facilities. ISIS attacked al Sinaa Prison—a detention facility in southern Hasakah City—in January 2022 and freed up to 300 ISIS fighters.[13] Some of these fighters infiltrated back to regime-held areas in the central Syrian desert, which likely spurred an increase in attacks in the central Syrian desert in early 2023.[14]

Iraqi Sunni political parties are increasingly vocalizing long-held political demands ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. Former Parliament Speaker and Progress Party leader Mohamed al Halbousi called for “massive demonstrations” on February 4 to protest the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court’s decision to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law.[15] The Federal Supreme Court suspended the implementation of the General Amnesty Law and two other laws that the Iraqi Parliament passed on January 21 in order to determine the constitutionality of the laws.[16] The General Amnesty Law would grant amnesty to many Iraqis, including some who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[17] The Anbar, Salah al Din, and Ninewa provincial governors and Kirkuk Provincial Council chairman suspended work in protest of the court decision.[18] Multiple independent Iraqi parliamentarians urged Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani to ask Parliament to remove the provincial governors due to their “rebellion.”[19] The Sunni Azm Alliance party separately called for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to amend the Iraqi constitution on February 5.[20] The Azm Alliance added that a referendum on unspecified amendments should occur on the same day as the parliamentary elections. The Iraqi constitution stipulates two alternate mechanisms for adding constitutional amendments that both require a vote in Parliament and a public referendum.[21] Azm Alliance head Muthanna al Samarrai is a member of the newly formed United Sunni Leadership Coalition that called for the Sudani administration to implement nine longstanding Sunni demands on January 18.[22]

Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia officials are continuing to use inflammatory and sectarian rhetoric in response to these Sunni demands. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada secretary general, Abu Alaa al Walai, compared the people “attacking” the Federal Supreme Court’s decision to those who “brought down a third of Iraq,” likely referring to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).[23] Walai’s rhetoric mirrors Iranian-backed Iraqi State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki’s anti-Sunni sectarian statements on February 1.[24] Maliki implicitly accused Sunnis of trying to overthrow the Iraqi federal government. The Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework has expressed support for the Federal Supreme Court’s decision to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law.[25]

US President Donald Trump hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington, DC, on February 4 in order to discuss Iran, Israeli–Saudi normalization, and the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[26] Trump later said in a joint press conference that the United States would “take over” and “own” the Gaza Strip and rebuild it.[27] Trump added that the United States will clear destroyed infrastructure and remove unexploded ordinance. Trump also suggested that Egypt and Jordan could accept Palestinian refugees, despite the two countries previously rejecting the possibility.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Senior Iranian officials are downplaying the significance of US “maximum pressure” sanctions while signaling some openness to nuclear negotiations with the West.
• Syria: The United States is drafting plans to withdraw its forces from Syria, which ISIS would exploit to resurge in Syria.
• Iraq: Iraqi Sunni political parties are increasingly vocalizing long-held demands ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025.
• Gaza Strip: US President Donald Trump hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington, DC, in order to discuss Iran, the Gaza Strip, and Israeli-Saudi normalization.

Syria

Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) conducted air and artillery strikes targeting the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) near Tishreen Dam on February 5.[29] Anti-SDF media reported that the SNA and SDF engaged in mutual shelling near the dam.[30] Turkish aircraft also struck several SDF sites near the Tishreen Dam.[31] Turkey has consistently struck SDF positions near the dam since December 2024.[32]

Turkey and the SNA continued to target SDF assets near Peace Spring territory on February 5. Anti-SDF media reported that Turkish drones struck an SDF vehicle near Twal Abaa, south of the M4 Highway in Raqqa.[33] Anti-SDF media also reported that the SNA shelled SDF positions near Tal Tamr and Abu Rasin, north of Hasakah.[34]

Anti-SDF media reported on February 5 that interim government-affiliated Public Security forces deployed to checkpoints near the entrances to Manbij, Aleppo Province.[35] Several Syrian sources previously posted photos of Public Security officers that deployed to Manbij on January 26.[36] Anti-SDF media claimed on February 5 that Public Security forces’ deployments near the entrances to Manbij follow residents’ demands that police monitor vehicles entering and exiting the city.[37] Unknown actors detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) outside of Manbij and killed at least 19 people on February 3.[38]

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reiterated Turkish threats against the SDF on February 5.[39] Fidan called for the “Syrian state” to either repatriate or kill all foreign national “PKK” members to ensure Syrian national unity.[40] Turkey often conflates the SDF and the PKK-linked Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) with the PKK and uses “PKK” to refer to the entire SDF. This statement comes a day after Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara discussed Syrian-Turkish defense coordination with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, Turkey.[41] Turkey has repeatedly threatened to conduct a military offensive into northern Syria in order to “eliminate” the SDF but has refrained from doing so while HTS negotiates with the SDF.

The Kurdish National Council in Syria (KNC) intends to establish a “unified Kurdish delegation” to negotiate with the Syrian interim government in Damascus.[42] KNC Executive Member and spokesperson Faisal Youssef said on February 5 that Kurdish political groups are working toward establishing a “unified Kurdish delegation” to engage with the Syrian interim government.[43] The Kurdish National Council is a coalition of Syrian Kurdish political parties. SDF commander Mazloum Abid’s recent meetings with KNC officials suggest that this delegation may include elements from the SDF. Abdi met with prominent Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (KDP-S)—a member party of the KNC—leader Mustafa Juma on February 5 to discuss efforts to form a “unified” delegation to negotiate with Damascus.[44] Abdi also previously met with KNC officials on January 28.[45] Abdi’s potential coordination with KNC officials follows recent efforts by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) to pressure the SDF to cooperate with minority Syrian Kurdish political parties in negotiations with the HTS-led interim government.[46]

A likely Axis of Resistance-affiliated group that identified itself as Kataib Awlia al Haq (Guardians of the Truth Brigades) announced that it would begin unspecified operations in a video statement on February 4.[47] Group members in the video carried small arms and held portraits of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani, his top Iraqi lieutenant, Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, and former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, suggesting that the group is affiliated with the Axis of Resistance.[48]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

US President Donald Trump signed an executive order on February 4 to “modify or rescind” existing sanctions waivers that provide Iran with financial and economic relief.[49] The United States has repeatedly extended a sanctions waver since 2018 that allows Iraq to import electricity from Iran.[50] The United States most recently extended the waiver for 120 days in November 2024. The waiver will expire in March 2025. Iranian gas and electricity exports to Iraq account for around 40 percent of Iraq’s power supply.[51] Iraq and Turkey accounted for 87 percent of Iran’s natural gas exports in 2023.[52]

Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov met with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad on February 5. Bogdanov discussed the situation in Syria and energy cooperation with Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani.[53] Mashhadani said that Iraq does not seek to interfere in Syrian affairs. Bogdanov recently met with HTS-led interim government officials in Syria on January 28.[54] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani separately agreed to attend the upcoming Arab-Russian summit in Moscow during a meeting with Bogdanov.[55]

The Iraqi federal government and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) reached an agreement on February 3 for the federal government to resume salary payments for KRG employees.[56] The KRG Finance and Economy Ministry announced that the Iraqi federal government transferred around 958 billion Iraqi dinars (around 731 million US dollars) to the KRG and that the KRG would begin distributing salaries for January 2025 on February 5.[57] The KRG Council of Ministers also reportedly agreed to “begin procedures” to resume oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan, according to a source in the KRG Council of Ministers speaking to Kurdish media on February 5.[58] These reports come after the Iraqi parliament passed a budget amendment on February 2 to provide salaries for KRG employees and resume oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan.[59]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

Nothing significant to report.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The Gaza Strip

US President Donald Trump signed an executive order on February 4 to halt US funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).[60] The United States, under Joe Biden, previously stopped funding UNRWA after Israel accused UNRWA staffers of participating in the Hamas-led October 7 attacks.[61] The Biden administration-imposed hold on UNRWA funding was meant to remain in effect until March 2025. Israel suspended UNRWA operation in Israel and the West Bank in January 2025.[62]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will convene a security cabinet meeting in the coming days to discuss the second phase of the ceasefire with Hamas.[63] An Israeli delegation will travel to Doha on February 8 and 9 to negotiate the second phase.[64]

Lebanon

Lebanese media reported on February 5 that the IDF conducted operations around Kfar Chouba, southeastern Lebanon. Lebanese media reported that Israeli vehicles advanced northeast from Kfar Chouba toward Jabal al Sadana.[65] Lebanese media separately reported that the IDF advanced northwestward from Kfar Chouba into Kfar Hamam and conducted search operations before returning to Kfar Chouba.[66]

Lebanese media reported on February 5 that the IDF operated in three locations in Marjaayoun District. Lebanese media reported the IDF established a position in Mays al Jabal.[67] Lebanese media separately reported that the IDF detonated explosives in Kfar Kila and Rab al Thalatheen.[68]

Lebanese media reported on February 5 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) 5th Infantry Brigade cleared roads in Aita al Shaab, southwestern Lebanon.[69] The LAF deployed to Aita al Shaab on January 26.[70] Lebanese media separately reported that the LAF advanced toward and established positions around Ramyeh.[71] The LAF deployed to Marwahin, west of Ramyeh, on January 28, and Aita al Shaab, east of Ramyeh, on January 26.[72] The LAF has not confirmed its presence in Ramyeh at the time of this writing.

West Bank

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert to discuss the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire in Tehran on February 4.[73] Araghchi stated that the United Nations should pressure Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon. The United States announced that the ceasefire has been extended to February 18.[74]

The Iranian Artesh Air Defense Force claimed the successful test of the Iranian-made Bavar-373 air defense system during the final phase of the “Eghtedar 1403” exercise on February 4.[75] The Bavar-373 reportedly detected and destroyed a high-altitude target after receiving data from the integrated air defense network. The Sayyad 4-B missile was used in the interception. The Bavar-373 system reportedly can track 60 targets and engage six simultaneously.[76] This test came shortly after Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reviewed the Iranian air defense system during his visit to Iran’s aerospace defense industries on February 2.[77]

Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Majid Takht Ravanchi met with Turkish officials in Ankara on February 4 to address political issues and economic cooperation.[78] Ravanchi held separate talks with Deputy Foreign Minister Nuh Yilmaz, Presidential Adviser Akif Cagatay Kilic, and Turkish media on bilateral cooperation and regional developments.[79]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei affirmed his support for Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem by naming Qassem his “representative” in Lebanon on February 5.[80] Former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah previously held this title. Qassem will handle “non-litigious matters” and religious affairs for Khamenei in Lebanon, according to Iranian media.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Vahid Jalal Zadeh met with the new Kuwaiti Ambassador to Iran Meshal Ahmed Mohammad al Mansour in Tehran on February 5.[81] The officials discussed the implementation of the 21-article agreement, which the two states signed at their sixth joint consular committee meeting in December 2024, covering political, legal, and maritime affairs as well as the prisoner transfers.[82]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-says-trumps-concern-about-nuclear-weapons-can-be-resolved-2025-02-05/

[2] https://farsnews dot ir/Qaysar/1738753514324810661/AEOI-Chief%3A-Iran-Not-Seeking-Nuclear-Weapons

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-is-willing-give-trump-diplomacy-another-chance-senior-iranian-official-says-2025-02-05/

[4] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/113950996936674770

[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-set-reimpose-maximum-pressure-iran-official-says-2025-02-04/

[6] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf p 20

[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/europeans-tell-un-ready-snap-back-iran-sanctions-if-needed-2024-12-11/

[8] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf

[9] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/dod-drafting-plans-withdraw-us-troops-syria-recent-trump-comments-rcna190726

[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-sdf-says-it-has-not-received-any-plans-us-forces-withdraw-2025-02-05/

[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-sdf-says-it-has-not-received-any-plans-us-forces-withdraw-2025-02-05/

[12] https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kurilla%20APQ%20responses.pdf

[13] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/03/syria-hasakah-isis-prison-attack/

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-april-19-2023

[15] https://x.com/AlHaLboosii/status/1886773790987763821

[16] https://almadapaper dot net/395212/

[17] https://www.newarab dot com/news/iraqi-parliament-debates-controversial-amendment-amnesty-law

[18] https://almadapaper dot net/395220/ ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/823206/%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A9-%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%88%D9%83-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9

[19] https://baghdadtoday dot news/267357-%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%88%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A5%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-3-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%85.html

[20] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/823339/%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B2%D9%85-%D9%86%D8%A4%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B6%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%82%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%81%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85

[21] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqs-constitutional-moment

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-8-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-18-2025

[23] https://x.com/aboalaa_alwalae/status/1886908906062123310

[24] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/010220253

[25] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/040220254

[26] https://www.axios.com/2025/02/05/trump-gaza-takeover-palestinians-israel ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/04/us/politics/trump-gaza-strip-netanyahu.html

[27] https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/04/politics/netanyahu-trump-white-house-meeting/index.html

[28] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/01/world/middleeast/arab-nations-reject-trump-evacuate-gaza.html

[29] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135085 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135061

[30] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135043; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1887174185702543522

[31] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135061; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1887063820981403785

[32] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-4-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-2-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-1-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-31-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-27-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-30-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-16-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-20-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-25-2025

[33] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1887098042001633441

[34] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135063; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1887048497569968638; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135094

[35] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135086

[36] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1883484184066584686; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1883467098128568559

[37] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135086

[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-3-2025

[39] https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7/%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9/3472491

[40] https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7/%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9/3472491

[41] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate020425

[42] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/823207/kncs-urges-syrian-leadership-to-guarantee-kurdish-rights-in-the-new-syria

[43] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/823207/kncs-urges-syrian-leadership-to-guarantee-kurdish-rights-in-the-new-syria

[44] www dot npasyria.com/krd/34670; https://knc-geneva.ezks dot org/?page_id=49&lang=en

[45] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/736411/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B8%D9%84%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%8A/

[46] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-16-2025

[47] https://t.me/katayib_awlia_alhaqi/1165

[48] https://t.me/katayib_awlia_alhaqi/1165

[49] https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/national-security-presidential-memorandum-nspm-2/

[50] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/biden-admin-extends-10b-iran-sanctions-waiver-2-days-after-trump-election-win

[51] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/iraq-trade-crude-oil-iranian-gas-resolve-power-debt-pm-2023-07-11/ ;

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqs-power-problem-part-2-implications-new-oil-gas-deal-iran

[52] https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/irn

[53] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1183996

[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-28-2025

[55] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9

[56] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/823154/%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B8%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1-%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A

[57] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/823154/%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B8%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1-%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A

[58] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/823281/%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A1-%D8%A8%D8%A5%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7

[59] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-2-2025

[60] https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-withdraws-from-anti-american-un-organizations/

[61] https://www.axios.com/2025/02/03/trump-united-nations-human-rights-withdraw

[62] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/30/world/middleeast/israel-ban-unrwa-palestinians.html

[63] https://apnews.com/article/trump-netanyahu-washington-ceasefire-1c8deec4dd46177e08e07d669d595ed3

[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-4-2025

[65] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113282

[66] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113282

[67] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113289

[68] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/129171 ;

https://t.me/dahieh4all/49610

[69] https://nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/justice-law/757177/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%83%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%82-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%A7-%D8%A7

[70] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1883439041577718111

[71] https://nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/justice-law/757149/%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AB%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A9

 

[72] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1884269615003619489 ; https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1883439041577718111

 

[73] https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/760871

[74] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-27-2025

[75] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/724561

[76] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/14/3249556 ;

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-2-2025

[77] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/14/3249468 ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/14/3249476;

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-2-2025

[78] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/211654 ;

https://x.com/TakhtRavanchi/status/1886904660398653768

[79] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/211654

[80] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/ar/news/2025/02/05/3251783

[81] https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/760886

[82] https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/760886; https://en.mfa dot gov.ir/portal/newsview/758303#:~:text=The%20Sixth%20Joint%20Consular%20Commission,December%2016%E2%80%9317%2C%202024