Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 10, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 10, 2025

Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter

February 10, 2025, 5:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on February 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced the Ukrainian "Drone Line" project on February 10 as part of ongoing Ukrainian efforts to integrate drone and ground operations. Umerov stated that the Ukrainian military will "scale up" five existing drone regiments and brigades in the Ukrainian military and border guard service and will integrate infantry and drones into a single strike system, which will enable Ukrainian forces to create kill zones 10 to 15 kilometers deep, will provide constant aerial support and infantry cover, and will detect and destroy Russian forces before they can approach Ukrainian positions.[1] Ukraine's Ground Forces reported that the expansion of five such existing drone units is only the first stage of the Drone Line project.[2] This project likely formalizes and provides additional support to ongoing Ukrainian efforts to expand drone units and increase their coordination with regiments and brigades, while keeping regular units and drone units separate in order to support drone units' more rapid combat and technological adaptations and innovations.

Ukraine's efforts to integrate drone operations with ground operations significantly differ from Russian efforts to centralize drone units. Russian efforts to centralize drone units have attempted to augment Russian drone capabilities by expanding state control over drone operators and developers and increasing their incorporation into the Russian military bureaucracy.[3] The Russian military began efforts to centralize drone operators and developers in Fall 2024, disbanding informal Russian drone detachments and removing drone specialists from regular military units, then selectively reorganizing them to form new Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-controlled drone units and centralizing their assets. The Russian MoD also reportedly established its first separate unmanned systems regiment at the military district level in January 2024, further highlighting ongoing efforts to centralize and bureaucratize control over drone operations.[4] ISW continues to assess that the Russian MoD's efforts to centralize and reorganize drone units and monopolize drone production and procurement processes may complicate Russian forces' ability to rapidly innovate and adapt new technologies and combat techniques in the short- to medium-term.[5]

Ukrainian forces continue to target oil refineries in Russia as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko implied on February 10 that Ukrainian drones struck Krasnodar City and the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Neftekachka, Krasnodar Krai just south of Krasnodar City.[6] Kovalenko noted that the Afipsky refinery has a production capacity of 6.25 million tons of oil per year and plays a vital role in providing fuel to the Russian military, particularly in southern Ukraine. Kovalenko highlighted that the refinery's location in Krasnodar Krai makes it a significant logistical hub supplying diesel fuel and jet fuel to Russian forces. The Afipsky Oil Refinery notably borders the base of the Russian 90th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), which has previously been armed with Buk-M2 and Buk-M3 air defense systems, although the base's current air defense capabilities are unknown.[7] Geolocated footage published on February 9 shows an explosion near Krasnodar City.[8] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev claimed on February 10 that Russian forces downed a Ukrainian drone over Krasnodar City, damaging a residential building.[9] Kondratyev claimed that Russian forces also downed a drone over Afipsky and that debris damaged a private residence.[10] Krasnodar City Mayor Evgeny Naumov claimed on February 10 that drone debris fell near a market.[11]

Russian authorities reportedly authorized the systematic torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) held in Russian prisons as early as March 2022. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on February 10 that accounts from two former Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) prison guards and a prison medical professional, official documents, interviews with Ukrainian POWs, and a person who has helped the Russian prison officials defect show that Russian authorities have instructed Russian prison authorities to engage in widespread torture of Ukrainian POWs in Russian prisons since March 2022.[12] The WSJ stated that Major General Igor Potapenko, the head of the FSIN in St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast, told elite prison "special forces" in March 2022 to "be cruel" to Ukrainian POWs and that there would be no restrictions on violence against the POWs. (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty assessed that these "special forces" were likely the FSIN's special forces — as opposed to the Russian Main Directorate [GRU] Spetsnaz forces.[13]) The WSJ reported that other prison authorities across Russia received similar instructions in the first weeks of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[14] One of the former prison guards stated that they believed they had permission from their leadership to "push their mistreatment of Ukrainians to a new level." Russian forces have increasingly executed Ukrainian POWs on the battlefield, and ISW continues to assess that Russian battlefield commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to execute Ukrainian POWs.[15] Reports that Russian authorities authorized the torture of Ukrainian POWs in Russian prisons as early as March 2022 also demonstrate the degree to which Russian authorities are complicit in these war crimes. Russian authorities notably appointed Potapenko as Vice Governor of St. Petersburg for Security and Migration Policy in 2024.[16] Russian authorities' complicity in these crimes and the promotion of war crime perpetrators to high-level positions within the Russian government further demonstrate the atrocities that Russian occupation inflicts on the Ukrainian people.

The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions to justify an influx of North Korean citizens arriving in Russia to join either the Russian workforce or the Russian military. Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora claimed that North Korea and Russia are increasing educational cooperation and that professors from North Korean universities will travel to Moscow, Kazan, Novosibirsk, and Vladivostok cities "for a long period of time" to teach Korean in Russian universities and that Russian universities are preparing three-month internships for North Korean students.[17] Matsegora's statement follows South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) report on February 9 that North Koreans are increasingly entering Russia on student visas to take construction jobs.[18] UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2397, which Russia voted for in 2017, prohibits North Korea from sending its citizens abroad for work and mandated that all UN member states expel all North Koreans "earning income" abroad by December 2019.[19] Matsegora's statement that North Korean professors are coming to Russia for work would likely violate UNSC Resolution 2397. Russia vetoed in March 2024 an annual UNSC resolution extending a monitoring panel tracking adherence to UN sanctions against North Korea.[20]

A Russian official claimed that Russia is sending experienced Russian military personnel to North Korea for medical treatment. Matsegora claimed that Russia has sent "hundreds" of wounded soldiers who fought against Ukraine to North Korea for rehabilitation and medical care and that North Korea refused Russia's offer of financial compensation for the medical care, food, and other expenses related to the Russians' stay in North Korea.[21] The Russian military command has reportedly been sending wounded personnel back into assault groups without treatment, demonstrating a general disregard for soldiers' health in the Russian military and calling into question official Russian claims to be sending Russian soldiers abroad for treatment, particularly to North Korea.[22] The arrival of combat experienced Russian soldiers, particularly if they include officers or non-commissioned officers, to North Korea may allow the Russian military to work with North Korean forces and disseminate lessons from the war in Ukraine while ostensibly recuperating.

The pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway republic of Transnistria refused aid from the EU to resolve its gas crisis, demonstrating Russia's continued economic influence over Transnistria and the Kremlin's prioritization of the region. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean stated on February 10 that Transnistria rejected 60 million euros (about $61.8 million) in EU aid to support continued gas deliveries to the breakaway republic, refusing to accept the aid's condition that Tiraspol gradually increase tariffs for consumers.[23] Recean outlined the scheme through which Transnistria will receive gas from the European market starting February 13. MET Gas and Energy Marketing, a Hungarian natural gas trader on the European market, signed a contract with Moldovagaz to transport gas for Transnistria to the Moldovan border; Dubai-based JNX General Trading LLC will pay for the gas; Moldovagaz and Tiraspoltransgaz reached an agreement to transit the gas through Moldova to Transnistria; and Transnistria will pay the transit costs in advance. Recean noted that Moldovan authorities have vetted both companies and did not find any violations of international or Moldovan law. Transnistria will reportedly undertake measures to demonstrate its "openness" in return, including releasing political prisoners, continuing to air Moldovan public television, and removing 11 checkpoints that Tiraspol installed in 2022. Recean stated that Tiraspol refused the EU offer of aid under pressure from Moscow, and a senior Moldovan government official told Politico that Russia blocked the EU-proposed solution.[24] Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky claimed on February 10 that Russian "credit and functional support" made the Hungarian supply scheme possible and thanked the Russian Ministry of Energy for its assistance.[25] Russia's allocation of funds for Transnistria's purchase of European gas demonstrates that influence over Transnistria remains a priority for the Kremlin, despite Russia's ongoing economic strains at home.[26] Russia's role in financing the gas purchases indicates that Russia will continue to be the sole economic backer of the breakaway republic, despite select Transnistrian authorities' Western-leaning political and economic interests.[27]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced the Ukrainian "Drone Line" project on February 10 as part of ongoing Ukrainian efforts to integrate drone and ground operations.
• Ukraine's efforts to integrate drone operations with ground operations significantly differ from Russian efforts to centralize drone units.
• Ukrainian forces continue to target oil refineries in Russia as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
• Russian authorities reportedly authorized the systematic torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) held in Russian prisons as early as March 2022.
• The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions to justify an influx of North Korean citizens arriving in Russia to join either the Russian workforce or the Russian military.
• A Russian official claimed that Russia is sending experienced Russian military personnel to North Korea for medical treatment.
• The pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway republic of Transnistria refused aid from the EU to resolve its gas crisis, demonstrating Russia's continued economic influence over Transnistria and the Kremlin's prioritization of the region.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk.
• Russian milbloggers continue to complain about the systemic issue of Russian forces submitting false reports to Russian military authorities and of high-level Russian officers micromanaging tactical-level units on the battlefield.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently advanced in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting in the area on February 10. Fighting continued northwest of Sudzha near Pogrebki and Viktorovka, west of Sudzha near Sverdlikovo, and southeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka.[28] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked towards Ulanok (southeast of Sudzha).[29]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the northwestern outskirts of Sverdlikovo.[30] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on February 10 that Ukrainian forces entered Sverdlikovo again.[31]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Fanaseyevka and advanced near Cherkasskaya Konopelka and within Pogrebki.[32] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 7 that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast forced the Russian military command to redeploy forces from southern Ukraine to Kursk Oblast, preventing Russian forces from launching the attack on Zaporizhzhia City they had been planning.[33] Ukrainian military officials warned in November 2024 that Russian forces may renew offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast in 2025.[34] Zelensky also stated that the incursion prevented Russian forces from launching new attacks in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts from Russia. Ukrainian State Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has prevented Russian forces from conducting raids along the Ukrainian-Russian international border.[35] Demchenko stated that Russian shelling of areas where Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations near the border has decreased because Russian forces cannot actively use artillery.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division, 83rd VDV Brigade, 11th VDV Brigade, and 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[36]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on February 10 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 9 and 10.[37]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian force advanced in eastern Vovchansk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 10 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka and Dvorichna; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and Holubivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on February 9 and 10.[39]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to western and southeastern Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk and along the international border) and southwest of Zapadne, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[40]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 347th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Kupyansk direction.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 10 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka, Zahryzove, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Zeleny Hai; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka on February 9 and 10.[42]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction stated on February 10 that up to 90 percent of Russian personnel suffered casualties during recent assaults near Kruhlyakivka and Kolysnikivka (both northeast of Borova).[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 10 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Novolyubivka, Terny, and Kolodyazi and east of Lyman near Torske on February 9 and 10.[44]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Siversk direction on February 10 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault involving at least 30 Russian soldiers on an unspecified recent date.[45]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within eastern Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) and north of the settlement.[46] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue striking Ukrainian forces near Siversk.[47]

Russian forces recently advanced south of Chasiv Yar amid continued fighting in the area on February 10. Russian forces continued ground attacks in Chasiv Yar and northeast of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka.[48]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in fields east of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[49]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and west of Chasiv Yar and further west towards Stupochky, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[50]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) and the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue striking targets near Chasiv Yar.[51] Elements of the Russian 78th "Sever-Akhmat" Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 13th "Rusich” Detachment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC) also reportedly continue operating near Chasiv Yar.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on February 10 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued assaults within Toretsk, west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, and east of Toretsk near Krymske on February 9 and 10.[53]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on February 10. Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Vodyane Druhe, Novooleksandrivka, Myrnohrad, Baranivka, Myrolyubivka, Novotoretske, and Zelene Pole; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Novopavlivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, Uspenivka, Nadiivka, Yasenove, Kotlyarivka, Preobrazhenka, and Zaporizhzhia on February 9 and 10.[54] Ukrainian and  Russian sources reported on February 10 that Ukrainian forces cleared the industrial zone in Vodyane Druhe and pushed Russian forces out of part of Dachenske.[55] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in western Lysivka and near Pokrovsk itself, Kotlyne, Dachenske, Vodyane Druhe, and Preobrazhenka.[56]

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 5 and 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced to southwestern Pishchane and likely seized most of the settlement.[57]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 10 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in eastern Udachne.[58]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 10 that Russian forces advanced 1.5 kilometers toward Novopavlivka, two kilometers southwest of Nadiivka, near Uspenivka,  northwest and northeast of Kotlyne, south of Udachne, and northwest of Sribne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[59] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the northern outskirts of Preobrazhenka.[60] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in Uspenivka, and elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA) are reportedly operating near Kotlyne.[61] Drone operators of the "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and artillery elements of the Russian "Grom" Battalion of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 10 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Ulakly, Andriivka, Bahatyr, and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Zelenivka and Rozlyv on February 9 and 10.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces still maintain limited positions in Dachne.[64]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced towards Ulakly and Kostyantynopil, west and southwest of Dachne, in central and northern Andriivka, northeast of Andriivka, east of Zelenivka, and south of Rozylv.[65]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near and within Dachne – further contradicting recent unverified reports that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction.[66]

Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Vremivka on February 10 but did not advance.[67]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported activity in the Polohy direction on February 10.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking targets in the Polohy direction.[68]

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 10, but Russian forces did not advance.[69]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[70]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported activity in the Kherson direction on February 10.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 9 to 10. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 83 Shahed and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk oblasts.[71] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 61 drones over Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Khmelnytskyi, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts and that 22 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that drones damaged infrastructure in Kyiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, and Kirovohrad oblasts.[72]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian milbloggers continue to complain about the systemic issue of Russian forces submitting false reports to Russian military authorities and of high-level Russian officers micromanaging tactical-level units on the battlefield. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have been falsifying reports about the battlefield situation since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, leading commanders to mistrust their subordinates and feel the need to control the situation themselves.[73] The milblogger complained that commanders often take control of lower echelon units in "acute" situations but do not take small details, such as details related to the unit's force composition or the soldiers' strengths, into consideration. The milblogger further complained that this issue is keeping junior commanders from gaining combat experience. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian generals do not understand theories of war or how to manage at their appropriate level.[74] The milblogger complained that there are not enough tasks for the many generals in the Russian military, so the generals turn to lower-level tasks to justify their role in the military. A third milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor reiterated that Russian forces in the Siversk direction have been submitting inaccurate reports about alleged Russian battlefield successes since falsely claiming the seizure of Bilohorivka in May 2024.[75] The milblogger called for reforms to the Russian military such that commanders at the brigade level and higher are only working on solving operational-tactical and operational-level issues.

Enterprises in St. Petersburg are reportedly collecting funds for the Russian military from employees, suggesting that Russia continues to try to cut the mounting short- and long-term costs of Russia's war effort. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s northwestern Russia service Sever Realii reported that the "TEK" Joint Stock Company, the main shareholder of which is St. Petersburg City's administration, is coercing its employees to transfer part of their salaries to the Russian military via the Suvorov Charitable Foundation, which has been funding purchases of drones and other aid for the Russian military.[76] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov is notably the chairperson of the Suvorov Charitable Foundation's board of trustees. TEK authorities are reportedly threatening to deny bonuses, which can amount to up to half of an employee's salary, to employees who refuse. The Russian government deprived prisoners who volunteer to fight in Ukraine of one-time enlistment bonuses starting January 1, 2025, and modified policies guaranteeing a one-time payment to all wounded servicemembers - further indications that the Kremlin is trying to cut spending on its war effort.[77]

The Russian government will further index military pensions starting October 1, 2025, in response to growing Russia inflation. Kartapolov stated on February 10 that the Russian federal budget for 2025-2027 includes stipulations to index pensions for veteran retirees by 4.5 percent starting October 1 – in addition to the 9.5 percent indexation that the Russian government implemented on January 1.[78] Kremlin newswire TASS noted that the bill on the additional indexation for military pensions is a response to inflation levels. Kremlin officials have claimed that inflation in Russia reached over nine percent in 2025, but Russia's true inflation is likely closer to 20 percent.[79]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Kremlin newswire TASS claimed on February 10, citing a senior instructor at the BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) drone school, that Russian military personnel are using new technical solutions to counter Ukrainian drones, including "pocket" electronic warfare (EW) systems.[80]

Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestiya reported on February 10 that the Kizlyar Electromechanical Plant has developed the "Solist" (Soloist) hybrid drone and guided munition — a single-use corrected rocket munition with first-person control and the ability to strike targets from above.[81] The Solist reportedly has a course camera that allows Russian forces to correct its flight during free fall. Russian forces can reportedly use the Solist when terrain deprives Russian forces of direct visibility of the target and complicates the use of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) or when Russian forces cannot correct mortar strikes. The Solist reportedly has a firing range of 10 kilometers and uses standard ammunition from common types of grenade launcher rounds.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid02fvZ5A88rm6SXW263gJEWSBzyQzPvE5PU9nRvMMJmQAXCdYzHPnGkg63BctrdT9Zkl?rdid=XA7OttKDM1GBpvRn

[2] https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/22608

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2025

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2025

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations

[6] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8788

[7]  https://defence-ua dot com/news/u_rf_ne_mozhut_prikriti_npz_scho_stojit_za_parkanom_zenitnoji_brigadi-17943.html

[8] https://x.com/markito0171/status/1888742970980975002 ; https://x.com/markito0171/status/1888743324833755399 ; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1888759656727605598

[9] https://t.me/kondratyevvi/8452

[10] https://t.me/kondratyevvi/8453 

[11] https://t.me/emnaumov/4763

[12] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-prisons-ukranian-pow-torture-52df7908 ; https://www.svoboda dot org/a/wsj-fsin-posle-nachala-voyny-poruchili-pytatj-ukrainskih-plennyh/33309379.html

[13] https://www.svoboda dot org/a/wsj-fsin-posle-nachala-voyny-poruchili-pytatj-ukrainskih-plennyh/33309379.html

[14] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-prisons-ukranian-pow-torture-52df7908

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-23-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010925 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120324; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090624; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022524; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2024

[16] https://www.svoboda dot org/a/wsj-fsin-posle-nachala-voyny-poruchili-pytatj-ukrainskih-plennyh/33309379.html

[17] https://rg dot ru/2025/02/09/rossiian-vstrechaiut-s-ulybkami-posol-rf-v-kndr-rasskazal-kak-zhivet-severnaia-koreia.html?tgm

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2025

[19] https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/s/res/2397-%282017%29; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2025

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2024

[21] https://rg dot ru/2025/02/09/rossiian-vstrechaiut-s-ulybkami-posol-rf-v-kndr-rasskazal-kak-zhivet-severnaia-koreia.html?tgm

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025; https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2025/01/21/what-the-f--a-russian-soldier-mutters-as-his-wounded-comrades-are-ordered-to-limp-into-battle-on-crutches/

[23] https://point dot md/ru/novosti/politika/tiraspol-otkazalsia-ot-pomoshchi-es-i-granta-v-razmere-60-mln-evro-gaz-postavit-kompaniia-iz-vengrii/; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1662412888038314; https://www.facebook.com/recean.md/posts/pfbid0S1vrfgCj6W6fnFuxfGMMhJHdTXJvLs5aQVhPC26ZqgTdoGfAuw85h6kQZGZRrixAl

[24] https://x.com/DorinRecean/status/1888903240181231920; https://www.politico.eu/article/moldova-russia-backed-breakaway-region-strikes-deal-end-energy-crisis-transnistria/

[25] https://t.me/VadimKrasnoselsky/575

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020725

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections

[28]https://t.me/dva_majors/64240; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23665; https://t.me/rusich_army/20735; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154142; https://t.me/yurasumy/21054

[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/24731

[30] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1888682614430769430; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1888675709289476606; https:// t.me/CHIMERA_V/133; https:// t.me/creamy_caprice/8352

[31] https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0i69UHecwf5h41VDsHdkEUQnCJ2yQmz6AxaXZvnomdr673ciWCi86knZgMZ1dkPaLl

[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23665; https://t.me/dva_majors/64240; https://t.me/rusich_army/20735; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154142; https://t.me/yurasumy/21054

[33] https://suspilne dot media/944659-zelenskij-kurska-operacia-ne-dala-vijskam-rf-provesti-sirokomasstabni-operacii-na-pivdni-ukraini/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r6ZnlEVhd1A&ab_channel=ITVNews

[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2024;  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2024;

[35] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/10/kurska-operacziya-zavazhaye-nabigam-odnak-sumshhyna-strazhdaye-vid-artyleriyi-ta-aviaudariv/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/48742; https://t.me/mod_russia/48745; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85979; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86017; https://t.me/voin_dv/13322; https://t.me/epoddubny/22411; https://t.me/rusich_army/20741; https://t.me/yurasumy/21054

[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20795; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EzPrxrUWZbKQtjzVbYsvAXyohUbQ5ExAd4uiCGtNdphgQbhUCZkhJEQNDbzM9fqJl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u87oXHNFuGZf8iig2Bv6uy6FGjeCfrEgeFL6zVdBFgmC8SpXaJPoS8FDRybbGUHml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5128

[38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23670

[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20795 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EzPrxrUWZbKQtjzVbYsvAXyohUbQ5ExAd4uiCGtNdphgQbhUCZkhJEQNDbzM9fqJl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u87oXHNFuGZf8iig2Bv6uy6FGjeCfrEgeFL6zVdBFgmC8SpXaJPoS8FDRybbGUHml ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5128 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154145 ; https://suspilne dot media/944639-tramp-hoce-uklasti-ugodu-z-ukrainou-sodo-ridkisnozemelnih-metaliv-rf-atakuvala-sumi-1083-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1739195807&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/945105-rf-moze-sprobuvati-zahoditi-do-kupanska-z-insoi-storoni-spivzasnovnik-deepstate/

[40] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30816

[41] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/49236; https://t.me/dva_majors/64236

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20795 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EzPrxrUWZbKQtjzVbYsvAXyohUbQ5ExAd4uiCGtNdphgQbhUCZkhJEQNDbzM9fqJl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u87oXHNFuGZf8iig2Bv6uy6FGjeCfrEgeFL6zVdBFgmC8SpXaJPoS8FDRybbGUHml ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5128 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/10/vtrachaly-90-osobovogo-skladu-syly-oborony-peremelyuyut-rosiyan-pivdennishe-kupyanska/

[43] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/10/vtrachaly-90-osobovogo-skladu-syly-oborony-peremelyuyut-rosiyan-pivdennishe-kupyanska/

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EzPrxrUWZbKQtjzVbYsvAXyohUbQ5ExAd4uiCGtNdphgQbhUCZkhJEQNDbzM9fqJl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u87oXHNFuGZf8iig2Bv6uy6FGjeCfrEgeFL6zVdBFgmC8SpXaJPoS8FDRybbGUHml ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5128

[45] https://t.me/sylasvobody/97; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/10/majzhe-30-mertvyh-rosiyan-naczgvardijczi-vidbyly-navalu-na-siverskomu-napryamku/

[46] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154098; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85989

[47] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154110

[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20795; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EzPrxrUWZbKQtjzVbYsvAXyohUbQ5ExAd4uiCGtNdphgQbhUCZkhJEQNDbzM9fqJl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u87oXHNFuGZf8iig2Bv6uy6FGjeCfrEgeFL6zVdBFgmC8SpXaJPoS8FDRybbGUHml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5128; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154145

[49] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1888724059174670672; https://t.me/Phoenix_ORKOhub/149

[50] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30825

[51]  https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23664; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23674 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13317

[52] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5481; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154082

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20795; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EzPrxrUWZbKQtjzVbYsvAXyohUbQ5ExAd4uiCGtNdphgQbhUCZkhJEQNDbzM9fqJl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u87oXHNFuGZf8iig2Bv6uy6FGjeCfrEgeFL6zVdBFgmC8SpXaJPoS8FDRybbGUHml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5128;   https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5135; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154145

[54] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5128 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u87oXHNFuGZf8iig2Bv6uy6FGjeCfrEgeFL6zVdBFgmC8SpXaJPoS8FDRybbGUHml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EzPrxrUWZbKQtjzVbYsvAXyohUbQ5ExAd4uiCGtNdphgQbhUCZkhJEQNDbzM9fqJl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20795 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62005 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/64240 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21059 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21062 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154145 ; https://t.me/jagers68/747  ; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21245 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62029 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21060

[55] https://t.me/jagers68/747  ; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21245 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62026

[56] https://t.me/dva_majors/64240 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23667 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21059 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21062 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62026 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24731

[57] https://t.me/urga_74/3484 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/836 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8299?single

[58] https://x.com/CinC_AFU/status/1888989013630959969; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8363

[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62029 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21060 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154093 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154145 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/64240 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21060  ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154093

[60] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62029

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31996 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31997

[62] https://t.me/mod_russia/48732 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24743

[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20795; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EzPrxrUWZbKQtjzVbYsvAXyohUbQ5ExAd4uiCGtNdphgQbhUCZkhJEQNDbzM9fqJl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u87oXHNFuGZf8iig2Bv6uy6FGjeCfrEgeFL6zVdBFgmC8SpXaJPoS8FDRybbGUHml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5128; https://t.me/rybar/67871; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62004; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62020; https://t.me/wargonzo/24731; https://t.me/dva_majors/64240; https://t.me/yurasumy/21058;

[64] https://t.me/sashakots/51833

[65] https://t.me/yurasumy/21058; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62020; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86011

[66] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13367; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86011; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020825

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20795

[68] https://t.me/voin_dv/13310 

[69] https://t.me/wargonzo/24731  

[70] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85984

[71] https://t.me/kpszsu/28448

[72] https://t.me/kpszsu/28448 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/25189; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4106 ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/945065-poculi-so-ludi-kricat-ocevidci-rozpovili-pro-vlucanna-saheda-v-avtostoanku-v-sumah/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/38051 ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/33566

[73] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1985; https://t.me/tretyakov_n/1500

[74] https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/13003; https://t.me/philologist_zov/1986

[75] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1987

[76] https://www.severreal dot org/a/ya-ne-hochu-pomogat-armii-peterburzhtsev-zastavlyayut-perevodit-chast-zarplaty-na-voynu/33304615.html

[77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024

[78] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/23101567

[79] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020725

[80] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23095071

[81] https://iz dot ru/1836567/dmitrii-astrahan/vyhod-solista-v-zone-svo-ispytyvaetsa-novyi-kompleks-dla-pehoty