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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 12, 2025
Feb 12, 2025 - ISW Press
Download the PDFRussian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 12, 2025
Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan
February 12, 2025, 6pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on February 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
US President Donald Trump held bilateral phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 12. Trump stated on February 12 that he discussed the war in Ukraine with Putin and that he and Putin agreed that their administrations will "immediately" begin negotiations.[1] Trump added that he planned to "inform [Zelensky] of the conversation" after his call with Putin. The official Kremlin readout of the call claimed that Putin emphasized the need to "eliminate the root causes" of the war and that Putin "agreed with" Trump that "a long-term settlement could be achieved through peaceful negotiations."[2] Russian officials have explicitly defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward in areas near Russia's border, which indicates that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this demand.[3] Trump confirmed his phone call with Zelensky and stated that they discussed the war and the upcoming February 14 meeting between Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Munich Security Conference.[4] Zelensky stated that he and Trump discussed opportunities to achieve peace, readiness to work together, and Ukraine's technological capabilities — including drones.[5] Zelensky stated that Trump shared the details of his conversation with Putin and that he and Trump agreed to plan future bilateral meetings.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposal to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for territory held by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast during future peace negotiations.[6] Medvedev stated that it would be "nonsense" to swap Russian and Ukrainian territory, and Peskov stated that Russia will "never discuss" exchanging its territory. Medvedev's and Peskov's statements further support ISW's assessment that Russian President Vladimir Putin is uninterested in making any compromises during future peace negotiations and will only comply with a peace agreement that fulfills all of Putin's maximalist demands in Ukraine.[7]
Denmark's Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to launch a full-scale war against NATO in the next five years, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term. The DDIS published a declassified intelligence assessment on February 11 detailing the growing Russian threat to Denmark and NATO members.[8] The intelligence assessment notes that Russia is rebuilding its military to fight NATO on an equal footing, aided by financial and material support from the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran. The intelligence assessment states that Russia's willingness to risk war with NATO may increase if European countries do not simultaneously build up their military capabilities in response to Russian capacity building efforts. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) reported on February 12 that Europe spent $457 billion on defense in 2024, while Russia by itself spent $462 billion on defense in last year.[9] The DDIS intelligence assessment notes that Russia has not yet decided to launch a full-scale war against NATO but is expanding its military capabilities to maintain that option.[10] Russia is currently avoiding actions that could trigger NATO's Article 5 — the commitment to mutual self-defense — but may take greater risks if it perceives a shift in the balance of power in its favor. The DDIS assessment states that if Russia deems NATO weakened either militarily or politically it could be more willing to attack a European NATO member, particularly if Russia doubts US military support to Europe. The intelligence assessment notably warns that a cessation or freeze of the war in Ukraine on terms favorable to Russia will free up significant Russian military resources for their involvement in another future conventional conflict — consistent with ISW's long-standing assessment. The DDIS assessment outlines a timeline for Russia's growing military threat in the event of an end of hostilities in Ukraine: Russia could wage a local war against a neighboring state other than Ukraine within six months; Russia could credibly threaten NATO countries in the Baltic region in two years; and Russia could be prepared for a large-scale war in Europe, assuming NATO does not rearm at the same pace as Russia, in five years. ISW previously assessed that Russia's efforts to restructure the Russian military, revive the Moscow and Leningrad military districts, and create long-term mechanisms to militarize and radicalize Russian society against Western ideals and values indicate that Russia is preparing for a future conflict with NATO.[11]
Russian forces conducted a missile and drone strike mainly targeting Kyiv City and Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the night of February 11 and 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-400 air defense missiles from Bryansk Oblast and occupied Crimea and 123 Shahed and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts.[12] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian missiles targeted Kyiv City and Kryvyi Rih. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed six missiles and 71 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts and that 71 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported on February 12 that Russian missiles damaged buildings in the Obolonskyi, Svyatoshynskyi, Darnytskyi, and Holosiivskyi raions of Kyiv City and Boryspil, Kyiv Oblast, and caused five casualties.[13] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on February 12 that Russian ballistic missiles and drones damaged civilian infrastructure and killed at least one person in Kyiv City.[14] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on February 12 that a Russian missile struck central Kryvyi Rih and damaged civilian infrastructure.[15] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat emphasized that Ukraine needs US-provided Patriot air defense missile systems to counter ballistic missile strikes.[16]
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently launched the "Contract 18-24" voluntary recruitment program aimed a recruiting 18 to 24-year-old Ukrainians into the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[17] The Ukrainian MoD officially launched the program on February 11 and noted that the program offers 18- to 24-year-olds the ability to join the military under a one-year contract and the option to either reenlist after one year or return to civilian life. The Ukrainian MoD will pay volunteers 200,000 UAH ($4,700) upon signing a one-year contract and an additional 800,000 UAH ($19,120) during their service in addition to a monthly salary of 120,000 UAH ($2,870). Volunteers will receive three months of training before deploying to the frontline. The Ukrainian government will subsidize future mortgages, education, and medical care for volunteers and will permit volunteers to travel abroad after their one year of service. The program also exempts volunteers from mobilization for 12 months after their one-year contract ends. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated that the "Contract 18-24" program is part of Ukraine's ongoing efforts to create a professional military. Ukrainian MoD Spokesperson Dmytro Lazutkin stated that the MoD will pay one million UAH (about $23,900) to any Ukrainian servicemembers who were under the age of 25 when they signed a voluntary military service contract.[18]
Russian President Vladimir Putin held his first official call with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara on February 12 since the fall of Russian-backed former Syrian President Bashar al Assad. Putin affirmed Russia's support for Syria's unity and territorial integrity and emphasized the need for a dialogue among political and ethno-religious groups within Syria. Putin pledged continued socio-economic aid to, and economic cooperation with Syria, and Putin and al Shara discussed recent negotiations between the interim Syrian government and the Russian delegation that visited Damascus on January 28.[19] This delegation failed to reach an agreement with the Syrian government on Russian military basing rights at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus, however.[20] Russia likely continues to engage with the interim Syrian government in an effort to secure its presence at these bases.
The Armenian National Assembly approved a draft law in the first reading on February 12 to commence the process of joining the European Union (EU).[21] Several Armenian civic organizations initiated the bill via a petition that garnered enough support (at least 50,000 signatures) for parliamentary consideration.[22] The legislation calls on Armenian authorities to launch EU accession talks in accordance with the will of the Armenian people.[23] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged Armenia’s “sovereign right” to pursue EU membership but urged Armenians to consider whether the EU shares this goal.[24] Peskov also emphasized the "benefits" Armenia gains as a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).[25] Russian officials and information space commentators previously claimed that Armenia’s move toward EU membership signaled its withdrawal from the EAEU.[26] Armenia continues to strengthen its ties with the EU and the broader West amid escalating tensions with Russia and concerns that Russia is an unreliable security partner to Armenia.
Key Takeaways:
- US President Donald Trump held bilateral phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 12.
- Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposal to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for territory held by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast during future peace negotiations.
- Denmark's Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to launch a full-scale war against NATO in the next five years, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.
- The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently launched the "Contract 18-24" voluntary recruitment program aimed a recruiting 18 to 24-year-old Ukrainians into the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin held his first official call with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara on February 12 since the fall of Russian-backed former Syrian President Bashar al Assad.
- The Armenian National Assembly approved a draft law in the first reading on February 12 to commence the process of joining the European Union (EU).
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova, Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
- Russia's Shahed drone production rate may be declining.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued northwest of Sudzha near Nikolskyi; east of Sudzha near Russkaya Konopelka; and southeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled five Ukrainian attacks near Kurilovka (south of Sudzha).[28] A Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk Oblast posted footage on February 12 showing the brigade repelling a platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in an unspecified area in Kursk Oblast.[29]
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest and northeast of Fanaseyevka (southeast of Sudzha) during a platoon-sized mechanized assault in the area.[30]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates that Russian forces advanced into western Sverdlikovo (west of Sudzha) on the west (right) bank of the Loknya River.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division advanced in Sverdlikovo.[32]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced along the western edge of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast west of Sudzha near Nikolayevo-Darino, Nizhnyi Klin, and Sverdlikovo, and northwest of Sudzha near Aleksandriya and Viktorovka.[33]
A Ukrainian platoon commander operating in Kursk Oblast stated that North Korean troops recently began attacking in groups of 15 to 20 personnel instead of larger groups of 50 personnel but continue to suffer significant losses.[34]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Kursk Oblast.[35] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating near Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha).[36]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported Russian ground attacks in the Kharkiv direction on February 12. Russian sources claimed on February 11 and 12 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) and Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[37]
A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on February 12 that Russian forces have increased drone operations in this direction, including the use of fiber-optic drones, since mid-December 2024.[38]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 12 but did not advance. Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on February 11 and 12.[39]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction. Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Zeleny Hai, Novoyehoriivka, and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka and Novomykhailivka on February 11 and 12.[40] A Ukrainian commander operating in the Borova direction reported on February 12 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon in this direction.[41]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[42]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 12 but did not advance. Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Lyman towards Nove; and northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka on February 11 and 12.[43]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces expanded their bridgehead on the western bank of the Zherebets River and advanced southwest of Kreminna (northeast of Lyman).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced on the outskirts of Yampolivka and south of Ivanivka (northeast of Lyman).[45]
Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on February 11 that Ukrainian forces repelled a roughly platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in the Lyman direction.[46] Ukrainian forces destroyed at least two Russian armored personnel carriers.
Order of Battle: Elements of the "Shrama" Detachment of Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[47]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Siversk.[48]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates Russian forces recently advanced along Tsentralna street on the western outskirts of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[49]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[50]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 12 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking near and within Chasiv Yar; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka and Hryhorivka; north of Chasiv Yar toward Minkivka and Mayske; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on February 11 and 12.[51]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields north of Chasiv Yar.[52]
Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk. Russian forces continued attacking near and within Toretsk; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and north of Toretsk near Dyliivka on February 11 and 12.[53]
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretska Mine area (northern Toretsk).[54]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk.[55]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[56]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces continued attacking east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe, Tarasivka, Yelyazvetivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Pishchane and Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, Nadiivka and Uspenivka.[57] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces published footage on February 12 showing Russian forces conducting at least a platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Pokrovsk direction.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked the eastern outskirts of Vovkove (south of Pokrovsk and west of Pishchane), presumably from Pishchane, and that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces back to the outskirts of Kotlyne.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking near Pishchane, Zvirove, and Vodyane Druhe.[60]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Vodyane Druhe and in eastern Pishchane.[61]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and southwest of Nadiivka, east of Myrne (northeast of Pokrovsk), and south of Berezivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[62]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction. Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko and Andriivka and west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, and Bahatyr.[63]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Dachne.[64]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer north of Andriivka, near Petropavlivka (northwest of Kurakhove), and towards Kostyantynopil.[65]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Dachne.[66]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on February 12 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking northwest of Velyka Novosilka towards Burlatske; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil on February 11 and 12.[67]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Vremivka (just west of Velyka Novosilka).[68]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 12 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked near Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne) and Charivne (northeast of Robotyne) on February 12.[69]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported on ground activity in the Kherson direction on February 12.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russia's Shahed drone production rate may be declining. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on February 12 that Russia's Shahed drone production facility in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan produced over 6,000 Shahed drones and "thousands" of decoy drones in 2024.[70] ISW previously reported that the production facility had produced 5,760 Shahed drones between January and September 2024, and Kovalenko's report suggests that the facility failed to produce many more drones from October 2024 through December 2024.[71] The facility may be struggling to source enough materials to maintain high Shahed production rates, as Russia either still relies on Iran to provide components for the drones or is attempting to source high-tech components from abroad by circumventing Western sanctions. The Russian defense industrial base could also be struggling to figure out how to produce drone components domestically using Iranian production licenses. Russia may alternatively be prioritizing production of decoy drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses instead of focusing on more costly Shahed strike drones.[72]
The Russian Armed Forces are intensifying efforts to coerce mobilized personnel to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on February 12 that Russian commanders are forcing personnel mobilized in 2022 to sign contracts with the MoD, but that it is unclear if the MoD will honor the end-dates provided in such contracts.[73] Commanders are threatening subordinates who refuse to sign the contracts with redeployment to separate assault companies for highly-attritional infantry-led "meat assaults." Verstka reported that one mobilized soldier emphasized that the Russian command is aware of high rates of demoralization and fatigue among personnel and is concerned that large numbers of mobilized personnel will leave service without a contract mechanism in place.
Russian regional occupation officials continue to support the Kremlin-directed mandate of expanding programs to prepare Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine for government positions. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev announced on February 12 the "Sevastopol – City of Heroes" educational program that is designed to prepare Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine for leadership positions in local government and state-owned enterprises.[74] The "Sevastopol - City of Heroes" program is likely an analogue to Russia's "Time of Heroes" program, which also works to install Kremlin-selected veterans of the war into positions of power within the Russian government and business sector.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/113991956474899296
[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76259
[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013025
[4] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/113992264519415084
[5] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1889737480892719552
[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/300317 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/300349 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/300350 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/300351 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/300353
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425
[8] https://www.fe-ddis dot dk/globalassets/fe/dokumenter/2025/trusselsvurderinger/-20250209_opdateret_vurdering_af_truslen_fra_rusland_mod--.pdf ; https://www.fe-ddis dot dk/da/produkter/situations--og-trusselsvurderinger2/trusselsvurderinger/opdateret-vurdering-af-truslen-fra-rusland/
[9] https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/02/global-defence-spending-soars-to-new-high/
[10] https://www.fe-ddis dot dk/globalassets/fe/dokumenter/2025/trusselsvurderinger/-20250209_opdateret_vurdering_af_truslen_fra_rusland_mod--.pdf ; https://www.fe-ddis dot dk/da/produkter/situations--og-trusselsvurderinger2/trusselsvurderinger/opdateret-vurdering-af-truslen-fra-rusland/
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-ukraine-war ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123124
[12] https://t.me/kpszsu/28631
[13] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/38157 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/38193 ; https://kyivcity.gov dot ua/news/unaslidok_raketno_ataki_u_stolitsi_odin_zagibliy_i_troye_postrazhdalikh_pozhezhi_v_riznikh_rayonakh_mista/ ; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/4460
[14] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13290
[15] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12061
[16] https://www.facebook.com/yuriy.ignat/posts/pfbid03zAxAAitgsg4T5ypaiCMLf26P6NqxYNAoZojUdxS1vBpy32ZNPMu45aA3tDoiPYzl?__cft__[0]=AZWy0cQ357BEQlZw2DW8xa_ynwQrYTiF2q6zExMnBg7kUMp-5eWFar1ApYZA5o8AkxvuZ6ve8D1tWaLEVkX3N3LXKKbm5-UfEIxe6KsP5xV-TO7fTvE2GCVNfl4MIsw9yqg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
[17] https://mod.gov dot ua/news/kontrakt-18-24-minoboroni-zapuskaye-novij-format-dobrovilnoyi-sluzhbi ; https://18-24.army.gov dot ua/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR1vDp2LJvsl6ScxgXiElzsXKbDNTTDCHn1KCzUpMaEaNflqW4n5vyfJ4ss_aem_8MjcYdtnRZdB3NX9LG4y5A
[18] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/12/molodi-dobrovolczi-zsu-yaki-vzhe-sluzhat-takozh-mozhut-otrymaty-miljon-minoborony/ ; https://youtu.be/mnh10nvHqyA
[19] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76258; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2025
[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-29-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2025
[21] https://www.politico.eu/article/armenia-european-union-membership-accession-nikol-pashinyan/; http://www.parliament dot am/news.php?cat_id=2&NewsID=21730&year=2025&month=02&day=12&lang=eng; https://oc-media dot org/armenian-eu-membership-bill-passes-first-reading/; https://x.com/alensimonyan/status/1889604138159227251
[22] https://radar dot am/en/news/social-2658583656/
[23] https://www.politico.eu/article/armenia-european-union-membership-accession-nikol-pashinyan/; http://www.parliament dot am/news.php?cat_id=2&NewsID=21730&year=2025&month=02&day=12&lang=eng; https://oc-media dot org/armenian-eu-membership-bill-passes-first-reading/
[24] https://t.me/tass_agency/300353
[25] https://news dot am/eng/news/866327.html
[26] https://tass dot com/politics/1899005; https://t.me/tass_agency/296126
[27] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32128 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23725 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86090
[28] https://t.me/dva_majors/64368
[29] https://t.me/stepova_61/831
[30] https://x.com/klinger66/status/1889476164952936448; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=605904372291589
[31] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8377; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/2696
[32] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62082 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86090
[33] https://t.me/dva_majors/64368 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24760 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86090
[34] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/12/korejczi-zminyly-svoyu-taktyku-na-kurshhyni-soldaty-z-kndr-lizut-na-pozycziyi-syl-oborony-yak-targany/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg
[35] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86091
[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/64356
[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23724; https://t.me/tass_agency/300248
[38] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/946635-prikordonna-brigada-gart-pro-rosijski-droni-na-optovolokni/
[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl ; https://t.me/synegubov/13062.
[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl
[41] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/12/pyhalychi-shtovhayut-pihotu-vpered-na-harkivshhyni-same-vony-zakydayut-targanamy-ukrayinski-pozycziyi/
[42] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8376; https://t.me/ombr66/1532
[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23741
[44] https://t.me/yurasumy/21094
[45] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23741
[46] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5195
[47] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5486
[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25562 ; https://t.me/OTU_Luhansk/451 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8369 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1889397744957091945
[49] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25562 ; https://t.me/OTU_Luhansk/451 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8369 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1889397744957091945
[50] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62083
[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24760 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23759 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62083 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62083 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23768 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154367
[52] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62083
[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/64368 ;
[54] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1889583650355737038; https://t.me/operator_ak12/8485
[55] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1889576307731657167; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1889576538166735205
[56] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154267
[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl
[58] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5224
[59] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32140 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21092
[60] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154282 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62073 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/64368
[61] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1889414000959693280 ; https://t.me/tankova_brugada/2473 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1889372185103352134 ; https://t.me/sokoly_foksa_47/160
[62] https://t.me/yurasumy/21093 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21092
[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21090 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/64368
[64] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8378; https://t.me/wargonzo/24766
[65] https://t.me/wargonzo/24760 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23764 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13363
[66] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154284
[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13363 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21089
[68] https://t.me/wargonzo/24760; https://t.me/yurasumy/21089
[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl
[70] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8804
[71] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2024
[72] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024
[73] https://verstka dot media/peace_negotiation_perpetual-contract_svo_news
[74] https://t.me/razvozhaev/10151