Africa File, February 13, 2025: SAF Announces Government Plan and Russian Naval Base; DRC Concedes to Direct Talks with M23; Turkey’s Growing Defense Partnerships in Africa

Africa File, February 13, 2025: SAF Announces Government Plan and Russian Naval Base; DRC Concedes to Direct Talks with M23; Turkey’s Growing Defense Partnerships in Africa

Authors: Kathryn Tyson, Liam Karr, and Yale Ford

Contributors: John Reece, Nick Markiewicz, and Jean-Philip Banane

Data Cutoff: February 13, 2025, at 10 a.m.

Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

• Sudan. The leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) outlined plans for a new government that likely aims to legitimize the SAF as the sole governing power in Sudan after it captures the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. The SAF is advancing on the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) last positions in central Khartoum, and the SAF capture of Khartoum would further support the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. A recent fracture within Sudan’s main civilian coalition will additionally benefit the SAF’s claim to be the only legitimate actor in Sudan because it decreases the threat to the SAF of a rival, unified civilian government. The SAF’s strengthening position in Sudan will benefit its Iranian and Russian partners as Iran and Russia seek Red Sea naval bases in Sudan.
• DRC. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda agreed to a proposed ceasefire and to restart bilateral peace talks and direct negotiations between the DRC and Rwandan-backed M23 rebels. The DRC's agreement to resume dialogue with M23 is a major concession. The DRC is unlikely to accede to M23's and Rwanda’s maximalist demands, however, which means that fighting will likely continue in the coming months. M23 has continued to advance despite Rwanda's agreement to the ceasefire proposal, and CTP continues to assess that M23, Rwanda, and pro-DRC forces will use any ceasefire to reconstitute and set conditions for future offensives.
• Turkey. Turkey is advancing as a leading alternative to Western and Russian security partnerships across West Africa as it moves to backfill recently departed French forces in Chad. Russia’s and Turkey’s efforts to fill the security void left by decreased Western engagement in West Africa are not mutually exclusive and are sometimes complementary. Turkey’s growing role as a leading counterterrorism partner in Africa and Syria could lead to increased Salafi-jihadi attack plots in Turkey.

Assessments:

Sudan

The leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) outlined plans for a new government that likely aims to legitimize the SAF as the sole governing power in Sudan after it captures the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. SAF leader Abdel Fattah al Burhan said during a speech on February 8 that the SAF would form a technocratic government to establish a constitution, prepare for elections, and support the SAF in achieving its military goals of “purging” Sudan of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).[1] Unspecified military sources told Reuters that Burhan’s planned changes to the constitution would remove all references to partnerships with civilians or the RSF and place sole authority with the SAF.[2] The SAF will then appoint a technocratic prime minister who will subsequently appoint a cabinet.[3] The military sources added that Burhan would form this new government after the SAF’s imminent recapture of Khartoum.[4]

The SAF announced similar plans to form a technocratic government with the RSF in 2021, but disagreements over the power-sharing structure led to the current civil war. The SAF and RSF jointly launched a coup and ousted former Sudanese dictator Omar al Bashir following large-scale civilian protests in 2019.[5] The SAF, RSF, and civilian coalition subsequently agreed to create a transitional government headed by Burhan that planned to transfer power to civilian control in November 2021.[6] RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, served as Burhan’s deputy in the council.[7] The SAF and RSF conducted a second coup in October 2021 to dissolve the transitional government and institute their own technocratic government after Burhan and Hemedti demanded reforms that aimed to maintain both leaders’ patronage networks and shield them from accountability for their actions during the Bashir regime.[8] Similar concerns bled into subsequent disagreements between the SAF and RSF, particularly over the timeline and method of how the RSF would integrate into a national military.[9] The RSF began the civil war when it attempted to seize sole power from the SAF due to these disagreements in April 2023.[10]

The SAF’s seemingly imminent capture of Khartoum will further advance the SAF’s grand strategic objective of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. The SAF has recaptured nearly all of northern Khartoum, also known as Khartoum Bahri, from the RSF since it launched a lightning offensive in the city in January 2025.[11] An unspecified former military officer in touch with units on the ground told the Financial Times that the SAF is now within 1.2 miles (2 kilometers) of the presidential palace in central Khartoum.[12] The SAF is advancing on at least three axes toward central Khartoum to expel the remaining RSF forces from the area.[13]

Figure 1. Area of SAF and RSF Operations in Khartoum

 

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

SAF control over the Sudanese capital would be a political victory that would boost the SAF’s claim to be Sudan’s only legitimate force. SAF Chief General Abdel Fatteh al Burhan has conducted several regional and international tours since 2023 to garner international support. Burhan met with the leaders of Egypt, Qatar, South Sudan, and Turkey in 2023 to boost SAF legitimacy in the international community.[14] Burhan made a diplomatic tour of West Africa in mid-January 2025 for the first time since the war began in 2023 to boost regional support for the SAF.[15] Burhan has simultaneously attempted to delegitimize the RSF and called for the RSF to be designated as a terrorist group during a speech to the UN in September 2024.[16]

SAF control over Khartoum would allow the SAF to consolidate control over the eastern bank of the Nile River and prepare for future offensives that aim to defeat the RSF in its remaining strongholds in western Sudan. The RSF would struggle to recross the Nile River as the SAF controls several key bridges on the river.[17] Drone footage from February 4 shows lines of RSF military vehicles attempting to flee from southwestern Khartoum to western Sudan across the Jebel Awliya Bridge, which is the RSF’s last remaining link to the city.[18] Khartoum also has airports and military infrastructure that are better positioned to support future offensives in western Sudan than the SAF’s current command and logistics hub in Port Sudan, which is over 400 miles northeast of Khartoum on Sudan’s Red Sea coast.

Figure 2. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Civil War

 

Source: Kathryn Tyson; Thomas Van Linge; UNICEF; UNDP.

A recent fracture within Sudan’s main civilian coalition will further benefit the SAF’s claim to be the only legitimate actor in Sudan. The pro-democracy coalition, called Taqaddum (Progress), consists of civilian political groups and smaller rebel groups.[19] Taqaddum has engaged with the African Union, Hemedti, and US officials to push for an end to the war and to support the creation of a civilian-led government.[20]

Taqaddum members have been divided since December 2024 over an internal proposal from Darfuri members of the coalition to form a parallel government in exile to govern areas in RSF control, which are heavily concentrated in Darfur.[21] Taqaddum announced on February 10 that it would split into two factions with separate names based on the divisions over the proposal.[22]

Taqaddum’s split decreases the threat to the SAF of a rival, unified civilian government. The SAF is currently the internationally recognized government of Sudan. Burhan has refused or ignored Taqaddum’s invitations to meet and accused Taqaddum of backing the RSF.[23] Taqaddum’s fracture has undermined the coalition’s legitimacy in the international community. The former US Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello said in December 2024 that the proposal for a parallel government would be “profoundly destabilizing.”[24] The Taqaddum split will also reduce the coalition’s leverage in talks with the warring sides in Sudan and international stakeholders.

The SAF’s strengthening position in Sudan will benefit its Iranian and Russian partners as Iran and Russia seek Red Sea naval bases. SAF officials announced on February 12 that they had reached a “mutual understanding” with Russia for a Russian navy base in Port Sudan.[25] Russia has been attempting for years to implement an agreement it signed with Bashir in 2017 to build a naval base in Sudan and has given military supplies to the SAF since April 2024 in exchange for implementing the 2017 deal.[26] Negotiations had been slow since this initial breakthrough as the sides finalized aspects of the deal and the SAF sought to balance ties with the West.[27] Kremlin-linked milbloggers said that US sanctions against the SAF in October 2024 and Burhan in January 2025 contributed to the SAF’s decision to finalize the deal.[28] The original 2017 deal allowed Russia to station 300 Russian service members and four ships in Port Sudan.[29] A base in Sudan could help offset Russia's reliance on Syria to project power into the Mediterranean and serve as a logistics route for Russian military supplies to Africa since Russia’s positions in Syria are in jeopardy following the fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al Assad in December 2024.[30] Iran has also provided the SAF with drones since late 2023, but the SAF has so far rejected Iran’s overtures for a naval base to avoid alienating its historical allies—Egypt and Saudi Arabia—as well as Western countries.[31]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

The DRC and Rwanda agreed to a proposed ceasefire and to restart bilateral peace talks and direct negotiations between the DRC and Rwandan-backed M23 rebels. Heads of state and government from 14 member states in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC) met in Tanzania on February 7 and 8 for a joint summit to discuss the security situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).[32] The joint summit took place after M23 forces and Rwandan troops captured the North Kivu provincial capital of Goma, a key economic and trade hub in the eastern DRC, in late January.[33]

Figure 3. M23 Advances in Eastern DRC

 

Note: The UN reports that 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops are fighting alongside M23 in eastern DRC and “de facto control” M23 operations.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The DRC and Rwanda signed onto a post-summit communiqué that called for an “immediate and unconditional ceasefire” to stabilize Goma.[34] The communiqué directed EAC and SADC defense ministers to develop a plan to implement the ceasefire by February 13.[35] Member countries agreed to hold another joint ministerial meeting within one month to discuss the implementation of the ceasefire and “all other residual issues” related to security in the eastern DRC.[36]

The DRC and Rwanda explicitly agreed to resume bilateral peace talks and direct negotiations “with all state and non-state parties (military and non-military) including the M23.”[37] The joint communiqué recommended merging the Angolan-mediated Luanda process between the DRC and Rwanda with the Kenyan-mediated Nairobi peace talks between the DRC and armed groups in the eastern DRC into a single framework to “strengthen” and “enhance” the two processes.[38]

The DRC's agreement to resume dialogue with M23 is a major concession by the Congolese government. Congolese officials have labeled M23 “terrorists” who are a Rwandan tool to expropriate the DRC’s mineral resources and has ruled out direct talks with M23 representatives as a “red line.”[39] The Congolese government had rejected M23’s and Rwanda’s reiterated demands for direct dialogue between M23 and the Congolese government numerous times since the fall of Goma.[40] M23 and Rwanda released statements approving the joint summit’s conclusions.[41]

The DRC’s stance on M23 and Rwanda’s insistence on direct DRC-M23 negotiations has been an insurmountable obstacle to previous peace talks. The Luanda process broke down in December 2024 when Rwanda insisted that the DRC “hold a direct dialogue with the M23” for talks to continue.[42] Talks between the DRC and M23 within the Nairobi process have stalled since 2022 after the DRC lost faith in the process and allied with anti-Rwandan militias following continued M23 advances.[43]

The DRC is unlikely to accede to M23's and Rwanda’s maximalist demands, however, which means that fighting will likely continue in the coming months. M23 and its Rwandan backers likely aim to secure an agreement that legitimizes M23’s de facto control of Goma and parts of the eastern DRC. M23 has demanded that the DRC implement the 2013 Nairobi peace deal, which stipulated that M23 would demilitarize and become a political party and that the Congolese government would facilitate the return of refugees, release prisoners, reintegrate former rebels, and launch a national reconciliation and justice initiative as well as social security and economic reforms.[44]

M23 almost certainly aims to consolidate control over the areas that it has captured and possibly expand its influence in the DRC as a legitimate political party as part of any such agreement. Corneille Nangaa, the head of M23’s political branch Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), said that the AFC-M23 is “here to stay” and “open to dialogue” with the DRC after the rebel coalition captured Goma.[45] The group’s systematic effort to set up “state-like” administrative systems in the parts of eastern DRC that it controls indicates that M23 intends to govern these areas in the long term.[46] A deal that legitimizes M23’s control over eastern DRC would advance Rwanda’s objectives to establish a sphere of influence in the eastern DRC given that Rwanda “de facto controls” M23 according to the UN.

DRC President Félix Tshisekedi is unlikely to follow through on a deal that legitimizes M23’s control of eastern DRC because it would severely undermine his legitimacy and power base in Kinshasa.[47] Tshisekedi heavily leaned into anti-Rwandan rhetoric and promised to declare war on Rwanda during his successful campaign to be re-elected in January 2024.[48] Congolese government officials have sought to mobilize the population against Rwanda and contributed to sometimes violent anti-Rwandan and anti-Western protests, including attacks on several embassies in Kinshasa in late January.[49] Some Congolese officials already blamed Tshisekedi for M23’s capture of Goma and called for his resignation on February 10.[50] Tshisekedi’s political party released a statement on February 11 that rejected the call for direct dialogue with M23 within a merged format and called M23 a “terrorist group in service to Rwanda.”[51] The previous Congolese president initially agreed to the 2013 Nairobi peace deal but never implemented it, which shows that Congolese politicians are willing to agree in principle to negotiations with M23 but are ultimately unwilling to accede to M23’s and Rwanda’s demands due to domestic political constraints.[52]

Figure 4. Short-Lived Ceasefires in the Eastern DRC

 

Note: Wazalendo are pro-government militias in the eastern DRC.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

M23 has continued to advance despite Rwandas’ agreement to the ceasefire proposal, and CTP continues to assess that M23, Rwanda, and pro-DRC forces will use any ceasefire to reset and set conditions for future offensives.^[53] Security sources in South Kivu reported that pro-DRC forces and M23 already reinforced their positions and that skirmishes between M23 and pro-DRC troops resumed on February 10.^[54] M23 warned on February 11 that it would attack Bukavu to “eradicate the threat” of a military buildup and attacks by pro-DRC forces in the area.^[55]M23 captured the district capital Kalehe on the RN2 road on February 12 and captured smaller villages further south on February 13.^[56] Kalehe is 20 miles north of Kavumu, the FARDC‘s last major defense point along the RN2 before the regional capital Bukavu, which is another 20 miles south via the RN2. French media reported that M23 and Rwandan troops aim to take control of the RN2 road and elevated areas around the South Kivu provincial capital of Bukavu in order to cut off FARDC’s supply lines.^[57]

Figure 5. M23 Advances Southward Toward Bukavu

 

Note: The UN reports that 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops are fighting alongside M23 in eastern DRC and “de facto control” M23 operations.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Turkey

Turkey is advancing as a leading alternative to Western and Russian security partnerships across West Africa as it moves to backfill recently departed French forces in Chad. The French state-owned outlet Radio France Internationale reported on January 31 that Chad planned to base Turkish drones and Turkish drone technicians at the Faya-Largeau air base in north-central Chad and Abéché air base in eastern Chad.[58] Multiple outlets reported in early February that Chad and Turkey signed an agreement in mid-January that granted Turkey “control” of the Abéché air base.[59] Other reports only noted that Chad agreed to host Turkish personnel at Abéché to train the Chadian Air Force.[60] Chadian and Turkish officials have not publicly discussed any formal basing agreements. France withdrew from Faya-Largeau and Abéché on December 26, 2024 and January 11, 2025, respectively, as part of its total withdrawal from Chad after Chad annulled its defense agreements with France on November 28, 2024.[61]

Turkish advisers and trainers are present in many other francophone African countries that are diversifying their partnerships away from the West while simultaneously facing worsening Salafi-jihadi insurgencies. An attack by al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate, Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), in October 2024 killed two Turkish soldiers near the Burkinabe border, confirming reports that Turkish trainers were present in northern Togo.[62] Turkish personnel instruct Togolese forces, help clear mines, and pilot helicopters to improve border security in northern Togo.[63] Turkey sought to expand preexisting training efforts in Mali and Niger in 2024 that had been in place for several years.[64]

Turkey is a leading provider of drones in Africa. Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Togo all use Turkish drones in their counterterrorism operations.[65] Turkish drones have an optimal price-to-performance ratio for many African countries as they are more affordable than similar Western models but perform better than cheaper Chinese or Iranian drones.[66] Turkish drone diplomacy has built on preexisting defense ties in places such as Nigeria and created defense ties that Turkey has expanded on in francophone West Africa.[67]

Turkey reportedly sent more than a thousand Syrian mercenaries to Burkina Faso and Niger in 2024. The UK-based human rights watchdog Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported in January 2024 that an initial batch of 300 Turkish-recruited, Turkish-trained, salaried Syrian mercenaries from the Sadat International Defense Consultancy deployed in Burkina Faso and Niger in December 2023.[68] SOHR claimed in May that this number had risen to at least 1,100 in Niger.[69] CTP cannot verify the figures in this claim, although the BBC and France 24 have spoken with Syrian recruits.[70] The mercenaries are reportedly primarily responsible for protecting crucial economic sites where the Turkish government has a shared stake, such as mines.[71] Sadat is a Turkish private military company run by a former intelligence officer with close ties to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.[72]

Russia’s and Turkey’s efforts to fill the security void left by decreased Western engagement in West Africa are not mutually exclusive and are sometimes complementary. Russia has deployed personnel from the Russian Ministry of Defense–controlled Africa Corps to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger and has courted a stronger defense partnership with Chad since the beginning of 2024.[73] Turkish and Russian officials frame themselves as non-colonial alternatives that put fewer conditions on their assistance than their Western counterparts. France and Turkey have been rivals for influence in Africa for over a decade, and Turkey repeatedly criticized France’s decade-long military intervention in the Sahel as neocolonial.[74] Turkish outreach leverages Turkey’s shared Muslim roots and cultural values with the majority-Muslim Sahelian countries as a comparative advantage over the West and Russia.[75]

Russia’s and Turkey’s defense partnerships with African countries often address different partner-country needs and sometimes complement each other. The Malian junta leverages Turkish drones and trainers to augment its forces while over 1,000 Russian personnel are engaged in a direct combat capacity alongside the Malian army.[76] Turkish mercenaries in Burkina Faso and Niger protect high-value economic targets, whereas the small Russian contingents in these countries primarily focus on training and on protecting the junta leaders.[77] BBC and the French outlet Le Monde reported that Sadat put some mercenaries under the command of Russian advisers in Niger, while Wagner Group–linked sources claimed that Sadat-linked technicians in Mali operate and maintain Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones that support Malian and Russian forces.[78]

Russian and Turkish overlap in Africa could give Russia insight into the Turkish drone systems used by African partner governments. The Ukrainian military noted in 2023 that Malian and Russian forces use Bayraktar TB2 drones in their joint operations and that Russian personnel were stationed at the same bases as TB2s in Mali.[79] Malian and Russian forces heavily relied on Turkish drones in their 2023 offensive to recapture the Malian regional capital of Kidal from separatist rebels in northern Mali, and a lack of air support directly contributed to the deadliest attack against Russian personnel in Mali in July 2024.[80] The presence of Sadat operators indicates that Russian personnel are likely not trained to use the drones, however.[81] TB2s and higher-end Turkish drones that Sahelian militaries use are more sophisticated than the Iranian-style Shahed suicide drones that Russia uses in Ukraine. Russia is unlikely to replicate a Bayraktar model in Ukraine due to the relative expensiveness of the Bayraktar and Ukraine’s anti-drone systems, but the Kremlin could still leverage these insights in future conflicts and share its knowledge with partners such as Iran.

Figure 6. Russian and Turkish Defense Partnerships in Africa

 

Source: Liam Karr.

Turkey’s growing role as a leading counterterrorism partner in Africa and Syria could lead to increased attack plots in Turkey. Turkey is helping its African partners combat Salafi-jihadi affiliates in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin.[82] Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate has condemned and threatened Turkey for its activity in its media, but IS has been less vocal.[83] Turkey is poised to take a leading role in countering IS in Syria after supporting a Syrian rebel offensive against US-partnered, anti-ISIS, Kurdish forces following the fall of longtime Syrian dictator Bashar al Assad in December 2024.[84] US defense officials also told NBC in late January 2025 that US President Donald Trump plans to withdraw US forces from Syria.[85] Turkey’s foreign minister proposed creating a regional counter-IS force in Syria to replace the US-Kurdish partnership.[86]

Figure 7. Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation Across West Africa

 

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

IS can retaliate against Turkey using IS Turkey Province, which is small but plays an outsized role in IS global attack plotting. IS Turkey Province claimed responsibility for a small arms attack on a Catholic church in Turkey in January 2024.[87] The attack was IS’s first claimed attack in Turkey since 2017 and indicates that the group already has some local attack capabilities that IS could scale up to carry out larger attacks inside of Turkey.

Figure 8. Islamic State Attack Claims in 2024

 

Source: Liam Karr; Aaron Y. Zelin, Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

IS may avoid high-visibility operations in Turkey, however, to avoid heightened counterterrorism pressure on its cells in Turkey that primarily help to facilitate and finance IS external activity. Several IS militants linked to attack plots in Germany and Russia in 2023 and 2024 traveled to Turkey before their attacks.[88] US sanctions on IS networks in Turkey indicate that IS Turkey Province is also involved in financing and smuggling schemes that support IS external operations.[89]

[1] https://www.alarabiya.net/amp/arab-and-world/2025/02/08/%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B2%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87-

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudan-form-new-government-after-regaining-khartoum-say-military-sources-2025-02-09/

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudan-form-new-government-after-regaining-khartoum-say-military-sources-2025-02-09/

[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudan-form-new-government-after-regaining-khartoum-say-military-sources-2025-02-09/

[5] https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan

[6] https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan

[7] https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan

[8] https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2021/10/the-military-has-taken-power-in-sudan-and-dissolved-its-transitional-government?lang=en

[9] https://acleddata.com/2023/04/14/sudan-situation-update-april-2023-political-process-to-form-a-transitional-civilian-government-and-the-shift-in-disorder-trends/

[10] https://sudantribune.com/article279569/; https://sudantribune.com/article279023/; https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan

[11] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/map-saf-offensive-surrounds-khartoum

[12] https://www.ft.com/content/d17251fe-9d2e-466f-8320-cd42b8c5f9ce

[13] https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1888227518760489021; https://www.barrons.com/news/sudan-army-says-retakes-key-district-in-khartoum-north-eed7ebd7; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1887805460377473046; https://x.com/VistaMaps/status/1888183774950678922; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/map-saf-offensive-surrounds-khartoum

[14] https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230907-sudan-s-general-burhan-seeks-rapid-political-solution-on-diplomatic-tour; https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/2023/09/13/sudans-al-burhan-visits-turkey-for-talks-with-president-erdogan/

[15] https://sudantribune dot com/article296058

[16] https://www.dw.com/en/sudan-fierce-clashes-in-khartoum-as-army-launches-offensive/a-70330464

[17] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/11/sudan-army-says-its-forces-enter-wad-madani-in-push-to-retake-city-from-rsf; https://sudantribune.com/article286704/l; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/drone-strike-targets-eastern-sudanese-base-during-visit-by-army-chief-witnesses-2024-07-31/

[18] https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1886835869698679029; https://www.madamasr.com/en/2025/01/11/news/u/sudanese-military-captures-wad-madani-begins-multi-front-push-toward-khartoum

[19] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-political-factions-meet-cairo-with-little-prospect-peace-2024-07-06/; https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/06/strong-civilian-coalition-vital-avert-sudans-disintegration

[20] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-political-factions-meet-cairo-with-little-prospect-peace-2024-07-06/; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/sudans-anti-war-bloc-to-study-formation

[21] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/sudans-anti-war-bloc-to-study-formation; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-rsf-fighters-say-they-plan-work-with-new-government-raising-partition-2024-12-20/; https://sudantribune.net/article294226/

[22] https://www.facebook.com/share/12HVfpGbSR7/

[23] https://issafrica.org/iss-today/after-a-glimmer-of-hope-sudans-peace-effort-fades; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/high-level-diplomatic-activity-amidst

[24] https://x.com/USSESudan/status/1865145156707455245

[25] https://t.me/tass_agency/300357

[26] https://sudantribune.com/article285164

[27] https://sudantribune.com/article288335; https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2024/12/18/sudan-otkazalsya-razmeschat-bazu-voennogo-flota-rossii-a150862; https://www.dw.com/ru/sudan-otkazalsa-razmesat-u-seba-voennomorskuu-bazu-rossii/a-71102415

[28] https://t.me/rybar/67949; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2672; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2789; https://2021-2025.state.gov/office-of-the-spokesperson/releases/2025/01/sanctioning-sudanese-armed-forces-leader-and-weapons-supplier

[29] https://jamestown.org/program/will-khartoums-appeal-putin-arms-protection-bring-russian-naval-bases-red-sea; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/15/russia-sudan-putin-east-africa-port-red-sea-naval-base-scuttled; https://jamestown.org/program/russia-in-the-red-sea-converging-wars-obstruct-russian-plans-for-naval-port-in-sudan-part-three

[30] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-december-12-2024-kremlin-pivot-to-libya-or-sudan-post-syria-turkey-mediates-ethiopia-somalia-deal#Russia

[31] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-tried-to-persuade-sudan-to-allow-naval-base-on-its-red-sea-coast-77ca3922; https://sudantribune.com/article288335

[32] https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2025/02/08/africa/eastern-southern-african-leaders-unprecedented-summit-congo-intl; https://www.eac.int/communique/3302-communiqu%C3%A9-of-the-joint-eac-sadc-summit-of-heads-of-state-and-government

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