Iran Update, February 25, 2025

 

Iran Update, February 25, 2025

Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

The British ambassador to Israel stated on February 25 that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) has given Iran until the end of June 2025 to conclude a new nuclear deal and prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions. It is very unlikely that Iran will conclude a deal with the E3 and the United States by June 2025, given that such a deal would require Iran to completely change its current policy on negotiations.[1] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.” The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025. The JCPOA itself will also effectively expire in October 2025, which means that Iran and the E3 would essentially have to draft a new agreement from scratch. It is very unlikely that Iran, the E3, and the United States would be able to draft such an agreement by June 2025 given that the negotiations that resulted in the JCPOA lasted for years. A new deal would also require Iran to completely change its stance on negotiations. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected nuclear negotiations with the United States in a speech on February 7.[2] Iranian officials who previously supported and were involved in negotiations with the United States have since then echoed Khamenei’s rejection of negotiations.[3] The conclusion of a nuclear deal by June 2025 would require Khamenei to reverse his policy on negotiations, which he is unlikely to do.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) previously passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[4] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the IAEA report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose snapback sanctions in early March 2025.[5] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated on February 14 that the IAEA Board of Governors will not discuss the “comprehensive report” in its March 2025 meeting, however.[6]

Iran is preparing for a potential Israeli strike on Iran, according to two unspecified senior Iranian officials speaking to The Telegraph on February 25.[7] The officials said that Iran is bolstering its air defenses, but that Iran’s current systems would likely not be able to defend against an Israeli strike. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) rendered Iran’s Russian-made S-300 air defense systems, which were the most advanced air defense systems that Iran operated, in its October 2024 strikes on Iran.[8] The Telegraph reported that the damage to Iran’s S-300 systems has “prompted Iran to pressure Russia” to accelerate the delivery of the S-400 missile system to Iran.[9]

A senior Iranian military commander threatened on February 24 that Iran could attack US and allied interests in the Middle East in response to a potential Israeli attack on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Gholam Ali Rashid warned that Iran could attack facilities and bases that "assist” an Israeli attack on Iran.[10] Rashid was likely referring to US bases in Gulf and Iraq as well as other sites in the Gulf countries. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters is the highest Iranian operational headquarters and is responsible for joint and wartime operations.[11] Iran has previously attacked US bases in response to Israeli attacks because Iranian officials believe that the United States can prevent Israel from conducting airstrikes targeting Iranian assets. Iranian-backed militants targeted al Tanf Garrison with drones and rockets in October 2021 after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck Iranian military targets in central Syria, for example.[12]

Iran retains a large number of short-range ballistic missiles that it could use to strike US bases in the Middle East. The October 2024 IDF strikes on Iran severely degraded Iran’s long-range missile production capabilities and Iranian strikes targeting Israel depleted Iran’s stockpile of long-range ballistic missiles, but Iran still retains very large stockpiles of short-range ballistic missiles.[13] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh recently similarly warned that Iran could attack US bases with short-range missiles in response to an Israeli attack, stating that Iran does not need to increase the range of its missiles because its missiles can already reach all US bases in the region.[14]

The Iranian Artesh and IRGC conducted a joint exercise in the Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman, and the Indian Ocean between February 22 and February 25 that was likely part of Iran’s efforts to project power ahead of a potential Israeli strike on Iran. The Artesh and IRGC concluded the “Zolfaghar 1403” military exercise on February 25.[15] The Artesh Navy and IRGC Aerospace Force conducted their first joint missile operation in which cruise and ballistic missiles ”fully sank” a simulated target in the northern Indian Ocean.[16] This joint effort could help Iran improve its coordination in the event it needs to conduct real-world military operations as part of a retaliation for an Israeli strike. The Artesh reportedly tested the long-range Iranian-made ”Arash” drone, which Iranian officials claim has a range of 1,200 kilometers.[17] The Artesh Navy also displayed its surface and submarine fleet, including destroyers, missile-launching vessels, troop carriers, and Fateh- and Ghadir-class submarines.[18] The focus on missile strikes in this exercise suggests that Iran may have sought to use the exercise to signal that it might respond forcefully to an attack on Iran.

The attendees of the two-day Syrian National Dialogue Conference issued a statement consistent with the interim government’s stated goals at the end of the conference on February 25.[19] The statement concluded two days of discussion among hundreds of Syrians who gathered in Damascus and joined the conference virtually to discuss their visions for Syria’s future. Syrian officials have promoted the National Dialogue Conference, and its final statement in particular, as the first step toward drafting a new Syrian constitution.[20] The conference has been viewed as a litmus test for how the HTS-led interim government will respond to minority groups’ demands and represent Syrians in the future government. Syrian media reported that 550 Syrians participated in the conference’s second day.[21] Syrian state media added that 6,000 Syrian expatriates participated in the conference virtually.[22] The final statement said that the Syrian Preparatory Committee will issue a “detailed report” that presents the attendees’ opinions and discussions.[23] This report should provide more information about whether and how the large number of conference attendees reached serious proposals or concepts. The attendees’ reaction to the report may also indicate how accurately the Preparatory Committee renders the opinions and discussions of the attendees.

The conference’s final statement is not significantly different from the interim government's previous rhetoric and stated goals. The final statement outlined 18 non-binding recommendations for the Syrian government.[24] All of the recommendations are consistent with the goals and values that the Syrian interim government has outlined since coming to power in December 2024. Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara highlighted many of the goals that are included in the list of recommendations during his opening speech on the second day of the conference.[25] The non-binding recommendations include:[26]

• Syrian unity and sovereignty over all territory and armed factions. The conference attendees rejected any “division” of “part[s] of the homeland” from the interim government’s control. The attendees also emphasized support for a new national army and the dissolution of all armed groups. The conference notably did not include Kurdish officials affiliated with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD).[27]
• Acceleration of the government formation process. The attendees called on the interim government to accelerate the formation of a constitutional committee and an interim legislative council. The constitutional committee will draft a new Syrian constitution that ensures a balance of power and enshrines justice, freedom, and equality as Syrian values. The interim legislative council will assume temporary legislative duties until Syria holds elections for a permanent legislature. Shara previously implied that the interim government would establish these two bodies soon after the National Dialogue Conference.[28]
• Preservation of and respect for human rights and the rights of minorities. The attendees called on the interim government to respect human rights, including women’s rights, and to reject discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or sect. The statement called for “peaceful coexistence” among Syria’s diverse communities and rejected all forms of sectarian or ethnically motivated violence.
• An immediate Israeli withdrawal from southern Syria. The attendees condemned the Israel Defense Force’s (IDF) incursion into Syrian territory as a violation of Syrian sovereignty and called for an immediate IDF withdrawal. The attendees also called on the international community to pressure Israel to stop its “violations.”

The National Dialogue Conference, and the conference’s final statement, do not appear to impact who will comprise the future constitutional committee. The interim government likely designed the conference and statement to legitimize the constitutional committee and its decisions. The conference’s recommendations have not been designed to be legally binding in any way but are designed to legitimize the political process by allowing the interim government to note that it consulted a broad swath of Syrians. Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara has previously stated that these recommendations will “pave the way” for the “constitutional declaration,” a document that will presumably serve as the legal basis for the transitional period.[29] National Dialogue Conference spokesperson Hassan al Daghim recently stated that Shara expects the recommendations presented during the National Dialogue Conference to inform the drafting of this ”constitution declaration.”[30] The committee is not required to consider the recommendations given that the recommendations are non-binding, however. The Syrian government is expected to appoint a constitutional committee in the near future. It is unclear if this committee will be more representative of Syrian society than the National Dialogue Conference Preparatory Committee, which is mostly comprised of pro-HTS individuals who are loyal to Shara.[31] The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which is the de-facto governing authority of northeastern Syria, criticized the National Dialogue Conference on February 25 for not fairly representing all components of Syrian society. The AANES stated that it will not contribute to the “implementation of [conference’s] outcomes,” presumably referring to the principles outlined in the conference’s final statement.[32]

Protests have broken out across Syria in response to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's recent demand to demilitarize southern Syria. Hundreds of Syrians gathered in villages across Daraa and Suwayda provinces on February 25 to protest Netanyahu’s demand.[33] Smaller-scale protests took place in other provinces, including Rif Dimashq, Latakia, Tartous, and Aleppo provinces, and outside the UN headquarters in Mezzeh, Damascus.[34] Several Syrian protestors carried signs that affirmed their support for interim government control over the south and the interim government’s right to ”defend the homeland” against external forces.[35]

These protests may expand because the interim government has few means to satisfy the protesters’ concerns. The expansion of the protests would risk destabilizing the interim government during a very difficult transition. Shara lacks the capacity to seriously counter Israeli operations militarily and risks destabilizing the transition even if he could respond militarily to Israeli operations. Shara recognizes the constraints he operates under and has noted that the interim government does not seek a fight with Israel.[36] These constraints are temporary, to be sure, and do not rule out a military response from forces loyal to Shara in the future, former Assad regime elements he does not control, or other independent actors. The temporary constraints also do not rule out future attacks from Syria against Israel itself. A group of 50 prominent individuals from Quneitra Province and the Golan Heights criticized Shara’s ”disregard” for the IDF’s actions in southern Syria and called on Shara to apply diplomatic and political pressure on Israel to end the IDF presence in Syria.[37] Shara also lacks the diplomatic leverage to pressure the IDF to withdraw, however. Shara’s inability to respond to the Israeli military action means that protests may expand as Damascus fails to accede to the protesters’ demands and Israeli operations continue.

CTP-ISW is monitoring reports that Israel conducted several airstrikes in southern Syria after CTP-ISW’s data cutoff on February 25. CTP-ISW will cover these strikes in the February 26 Iran Update.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: The British ambassador to Israel stated on February 25 that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) has given Iran until the end of June 2025 to conclude a new nuclear deal and prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions. It is very unlikely that Iran will conclude a deal with the E3 and the United States by June 2025, given that such a deal would require Iran to completely change its current policy on negotiations. Iran has continued to prepare for an Israeli strike on Iran.
• Iranian Threats Against the United States: A senior Iranian military commander threatened on February 24 that Iran could attack US and allied interests in the Middle East in response to a potential Israeli attack on Iran. Iran retains a large number of short-range ballistic missiles that it could use to strike US bases in the Middle East. The October 2024 IDF strikes on Iran severely degraded Iran’s long-range missile production capabilities and Iranian strikes targeting Israel depleted Iran’s stockpile of long-range ballistic missiles, but Iran still retains very large stockpiles of short-range ballistic missiles.
• Syrian Constitution: The attendees of the two-day Syrian National Dialogue Conference issued a statement consistent with the interim government’s stated goals at the end of the conference on February 25. The National Dialogue Conference, and the conference’s final statement, do not appear to impact who will comprise the future constitutional committee. The interim government likely designed the conference and statement to legitimize the constitutional committee and its decisions.
• Israel in Syria: Protests have broken out across Syria in response to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's recent demand to demilitarize southern Syria. These protests may expand because the interim government has few means to satisfy the protesters’ concerns. The expansion of the protests would risk destabilizing the interim government during a very difficult transition.

Syria

Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have continued to target SDF positions near the Tishreen Dam east of Aleppo since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 24. Turkey and the SNA targeted several SDF positions near the Tishreen Dam with airstrikes and artillery.[38] The SDF said that it repelled an SNA attack and intercepted four SNA attack drones near the dam on February 24.[39]

Turkey and the SNA have continued to target the SDF near the Qara Qozak Bridge east of Aleppo since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 24. The SDF reported on February 24 that Turkish and SNA artillery shelled several villages along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River, including al Tineh, Jaada, Bir Hasso, Sana, and Ghasq.[40] The SDF also reported that SDF fighters engaged SNA fighters at several points near the Qara Qozak Bridge, including northwest of the bridge.[41] Turkey and the SNA have concentrated recent attacks on SDF positions east of the Qara Qozak Bridge, likely to isolate SDF units operating at the bridgehead west of the bridge.[42]

Turkey and the SNA attacked the SDF along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River on February 25. The SDF reported that Turkey and the SNA struck al Shuyoukh, east of Jarabulus, with unidentified heavy weapons.[43]

The SDF reported on February 24 that it repelled an SNA infiltration attempt and detained two SNA fighters near Deir Hafer.[44] The SDF destroyed an SNA vehicle.

Anti-SDF media reported on February 24 that the SNA shelled SDF positions near Tarwazia, north of Raqqa.[45]

The Syrian Interim Foreign Affairs Ministry praised the European Union’s (EU) decision to lift some sanctions on Syria on February 24.[46] The EU lifted restrictions on Syria’s energy, transportation, banking, and reconstruction sectors on February 24 but retained other sanctions that it previously imposed on the Assad regime.[47] The Interim Foreign Affairs Ministry called on “international partners” to lift all remaining sanctions on Syria to facilitate Syria’s economic development.[48] Syrian Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani said on February 25 that the remaining sanctions have no “legal or ethical” basis.[49] The Syrian interim government has prioritized securing sanctions relief since its formation in December 2024.[50]

Syrian media reported that the US-led international coalition conducted a drone strike on February 25 that killed an unspecified individual in eastern Aleppo Province.[51] US Central Command (CENTCOM) has not confirmed the strike at the time of this writing.

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet al Abbasi stated on February 25 that Iraq has presented the United States with a new “sustainable” security agreement that includes “extensive intelligence cooperation.”[52] Abbasi stated that Iraq is concerned about the security situation in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime and warned that the withdrawal of US forces from northeastern Syria could create a security vacuum along the Iraq-Syria border. Abbasi added that Iraq wants the United States to remain in Syria until either a strong “fighting force” is developed or the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reaches an agreement with the Syrian interim government.[53] The US Defense Department has begun drafting plans for a potential US withdrawal from northeastern Syria, according to two US defense officials cited by NBC on February 5.[54] The US government has not ordered a military withdrawal from northeastern Syria at the time of this writing, however. The United States and Iraq have agreed to withdraw US-led international coalition forces from Iraq by the end of 2026.[55] The international coalition in Iraq supports coalition counter-ISIS operations in Syria.[56] It is unclear if the Iraqi government’s interest in preserving the US presence in Syria will impact the expected coalition withdrawal from Iraq.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

Nothing significant to report.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and the public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Multiple Lebanese parliamentarians called on Lebanese Hezbollah to disarm during a parliament session on February 25.[57] The Lebanese parliament will vote on a draft ministerial statement on February 26 that does not include language that justifies Hezbollah’s armed presence outside of the state.[58] The absence of this kind of language is notable given that previous ministerial statements have justified Hezbollah’s armed presence outside of the state. Hezbollah parliamentarian Mohammad Raad called on the Lebanese government to include sections in the ministerial statement about confronting Israel and allowing Iranian planes to land at Rafik Hariri International Airport.[59] Raad claimed that Hezbollah is “recovering rapidly.” CTP-ISW previously assessed on February 24 that Hezbollah is severely degraded and is prioritizing reconstitution.[60]

Al Qard al Hassan, which is one of Hezbollah’s main banking and financial arms, has reportedly frozen compensation payments to Lebanese residents.[61] Hezbollah previously provided compensation to individuals whose property was damaged during fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. An unidentified al Qard al Hassan official claimed that Hezbollah-run committees have inspected tens of thousands of Lebanese homes since late November 2024 and have issued $630 million in compensation. Several Lebanese civilians told the Wall Street Journal on February 23 that they have not received any compensation from Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s lack of financial support to Lebanese civilians who were affected by the October 7 War could reduce the group’s popularity.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi discussed meeting with Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov in Tehran on February 25.[62] Lavrov discussed the situation in Syria, the South Caucasus, and Afghanistan with Pezeshkian and Araghchi.[63] Lavrov‘s visit to Iran comes one day after he met and discussed the situation in Syria with Turkish officials in Ankara.[64]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Operational Base and Iranian Intelligence and Security Ministry arrested six Jaish al Adl fighters and killed one fighter in Chabahar, Sistan, and Baluchistan Province, on February 25.[65] Jaish al Adl, which is a Baloch Salafi-jihadi militia, conducted two separate attacks in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on February 22.[66] The Quds Operational Base seized a quantity of weapons and ammunition from fighters.[67] CTP-ISW has observed an uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023.

The Iranian rial depreciated from 912,900 rials to one US dollar on February 24 to 918,300 rials to one US dollar on February 25. [68]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://jewishinsider dot com/2025/02/uk-ambassador-israel-simon-walters-inss-iran-nuclear-talks-sanctions/

[2] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27964

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-10-2025 ; https://www.tasnimnewsdot com/fa/news/1403/12/07/3264996

[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-nuclear-watchdogs-35-nation-board-passes-resolution-against-iran-2024-11-21/

[5] https://www.iaea.org/events/evt2302123; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-14-2024

[6] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iaea-chief-sees-time-running-out-revive-iran-nuclear-deal-2025-02-14/

[7] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/02/25/iran-missile-defences-high-alert-attack-fears-us-israel/?ICID=continue_without_subscribing_reg_first

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran

[9] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/02/25/iran-missile-defences-high-alert-attack-fears-us-israel/?ICID=continue_without_subscribing_reg_first

[10] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/06/3264097

[11] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran-Is-Adapting-for-Modern-Conflict-and-Warfare.pdf pp. 4.

[12] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/18/world/middleeast/iran-drone-al-tanf-syria.html

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran

[14] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/851548/

[15] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6390785/

[16] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6390547

[17] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6390316

[18] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/07/3265174 ;
https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/728542 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/728864

[19] https://x.com/syriandc/status/1894423507640910077

[20] https://www.syria dot tv/نظام-جمهوري-وانتخابات-الرئيس-السوري-يكشف-لتلفزيون-سوريا-ملامح-المرحلة-المقبلة; https://www.sana dot sy/?p=2189747

[21] www dot npasyria.com/206099

[22] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1894358494502957432

[23] https://x.com/syriandc/status/1894423507640910077

[24] https://x.com/syriandc/status/1894423507640910077

[25] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fsPrne8uTPQ ; https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/548

[26] https://x.com/syriandc/status/1894423507640910077

[27] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate021925 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-hold-dialogue-conference-amid-criticism-over-inclusivity-2025-02-24/ ; https://npasyria dot com/205828/

[28] https://www.syria dot tv/نظام-جمهوري-وانتخابات-الرئيس-السوري-يكشف-لتلفزيون-سوريا-ملامح-المرحلة-المقبلة; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/122256

[29] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/122252; https://www.syria dot tv/نظام-جمهوري-وانتخابات-الرئيس-السوري-يكشف-لتلفزيون-سوريا-ملامح-المرحلة-المقبلة

[30] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/122961

[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-12-2025

[32] https://www.facebook.com/aanes.official/posts/pfbid0273D2cU87RFpw2gjR4Ufg31AqRfCaYdSmL71ARbQ251Rib5sbzqcvzVkFZoEntEgkl; https://uk.news.yahoo.com/syria-leader-vows-state-monopoly-101243295.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYmluZy5jb20v&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAA1AojpB8MVAO2VcHPvWJC_Pol6npfP-f-tbSOT-qU77IENCemY9K3-SkvDst6poeLPhOA_GYcnAZlt1x8wUALv94hEStqpnDkjHs6Iyb52eKEzR9R91vk5vTY4S4pCyLwhoxwvWySUEjxciHX9fAuupTbD5SXF7Xf9DE7Zzf8Eb

[33] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-wont-allow-hts-forces-southern-syria-netanyahu-says-2025-02-23/ ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136555 ; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1893996222400053632 ; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1894025226888843375 ; https://x.com/NPA_Arabic/status/1894338800895025570 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1894367793992098239

https://t.me/damascusv011/29085 ; https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1894386697783091610 ; https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1894379252792905911 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1894394274977861891 ; https://t.me/damascusv011/29087

[35] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1894367793992098239 ; https://x.com/abdalhadealani/status/1894041192045711587

[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-23-2025 ; https://www.ahaber.com dot tr/gundem/2025/01/23/a-haberden-tarihi-roportaj-suriyenin-yeni-lideri-el-saradan-turkiye-mesaji

[37] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/25/israel-strikes-targets-in-southern-syria-after-demanding-demilitarisation

[38] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1894342872771490024

[39] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1894342872771490024

[40] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1894342872771490024

[41] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1894342872771490024

[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-20-2025

[43] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1894342872771490024

[44] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1894342872771490024

[45] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1894125254831755381

[46] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/429

[47] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/eu-suspends-sanctions-against-syria-including-those-energy-banking-2025-02-24 ; https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6227-2025-ADD-1/en/pdf

[48] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/429

[49] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iyrd_E3kq1g

[50] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/after-assad-navigating-syria-policy-part-1; https://english dot alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2024/12/29/syria-s-new-elections-and-draft-constitution-al-sharaa-outlines-timeline ; https://www.voanews.com/a/syrian-ministers-urge-lifting-of-us-sanctions-in-first-visit-to-doha/7924928.html ; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/16/world/middleeast/syria-al-shara-al-assad.html

[51] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1894401703199621304 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136647

[52] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A8

[53] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-21-2025

[54] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/dod-drafting-plans-withdraw-us-troops-syria-recent-trump-comments-rcna190726

[55] https://apnews.com/article/iraq-us-troops-military-withdrawal-iran-a79aa83dca8f776f87a138bfe5697fa3

[56]  https://www.lorientlejour dot com/article/1449235/le-parlement-libanais-reuni-pour-voter-la-confiance-au-gouvernement-salam-suivez-notre-direct.html ; https://nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/

[57] 

https://www.lorientlejour dot com/article/1449235/le-parlement-libanais-reuni-pour-voter-la-confiance-au-gouvernement-salam-suivez-notre-direct.html ; https://nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/سياسة/761956/الكتائب-على-حزب-الله-العمل-على-جدولة-تسليم-سلاحه-و

[58]] https://www.newarab dot com/news/lebanon-scraps-armed-resistance-new-govt-policy-statement ; https://nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/سياسة/761783/النهار-نصف-المجلس-في-منبريات-الثقة

[59]http://al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/824510/-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9--%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9---%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%AF--%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%89

[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-24-2025

[61] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-once-dominant-in-lebanon-shows-new-signs-of-weakness-5ecfc9bf?msockid=31724c4845486561027c583141486b0b

[62] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/07/3265326; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/07/3264989 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/07/3264996; https://t.me/MID_Russia/52962

[63] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/07/3264996; https://t.me/MID_Russia/52962

[64] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/02/lavrov-turkey-praises-trump-ankara-offers-host-russia-ukraine-talks; https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/02/24/turkey-eyes-ukraine-russia-mediation-role-as-lavrov-visits-ankara/

[65] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/07/3265223

[66 ]https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6387543;
https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6389080

[67] https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/24023

[68] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-24-2025 ;
https://www.tgju dot org/profile/price_dollar_rl