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Africa File, February 27, 2025: SAF Advances West Toward Darfur; M23 and DRC Reset as International Pressure Grows on Rwanda; ISSP Poses Clear Transnational Threat; al Shabaab Central Somalia Offensive
Feb 27, 2025 - ISW Press
Africa File, February 27, 2025: SAF Advances West Toward Darfur; M23 and DRC Reset as International Pressure Grows on Rwanda; ISSP Poses Clear Transnational Threat; al Shabaab Central Somalia Offensive
Authors: Yale Ford, Kathryn Tyson, and Liam Karr
Contributors: Nick Markiewicz and John Reece
Data Cutoff: February 27, 2025, at 10 a.m.
Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.
The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.
Key Takeaways:
Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are advancing in south-central Sudan and setting conditions for an offensive into Rapid Support Forces (RSF) strongholds in Darfur. The SAF captured el Obeid—a state capital in south-central Sudan that will likely support SAF offensives into Rapid Support Forces (RSF) strongholds in Darfur—on February 20. The SAF will likely attempt to advance along a major east-west highway toward al Fasher, the capital city of North Darfur, to break the RSF’s hold on Darfur and relieve besieged SAF troops. The SAF has also advanced against the RSF in Khartoum, as the SAF seeks to push the RSF west of the Nile River. SAF control over Khartoum would allow the SAF to consolidate control over the eastern bank of the Nile River and support an offensive against the RSF in Darfur.
Democratic Republic of the Congo. African-led peace initiatives face several obstacles as they continue to pursue short-term ceasefires to halt Rwandan-backed M23’s continued expansion and long-term peace agreements to end the fighting in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The international community has imposed limited sanctions on Rwanda for supporting M23 but remains hesitant to levy stronger sanctions that would make Rwanda more likely to cut its support for M23. M23 likely slowed its expansion in the last week to solidify its control over recently captured areas, reset for further military advances, and possibly decrease international pressure on Rwanda. M23 is setting conditions to justify imminent offensives, including claiming that the Congolese government was behind an alleged assassination attempt on the leader of M23’s political wing on February 27. DRC President Félix Tshisekedi announced planned changes to the DRC government and the Congolese army (FARDC) that likely aim to shore up his fragile power base and increase FARDC’s military effectiveness in preparation for a counteroffensive against M23.
Morocco. IS Sahel Province (ISSP) is conducting a campaign to establish attack capabilities in Morocco and potentially use Morocco as a bridge for attacks in Europe. ISSP has developed a greater external reach in recent years that increases its risk to North Africa, foreign personnel in Africa, and likely Europe as the group continues to demonstrate growing external ambitions and capabilities.
Somalia. Al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate, al Shabaab, is launching a major offensive across central Somalia as the group attempts to overturn landmark, US-backed Somali counterterrorism gains from 2022. Al Shabaab targeted symbolically and militarily important towns in areas that al Shabaab had long controlled before the Somali government launched the 2022 offensive. Al Shabaab seeks to overwhelm Somali forces and link its support zones in central Somalia with its core territories in southern Somalia. The withdrawal of Burundian forces from the African Union mission in Somalia may create gaps for al Shabaab to exploit in central Somalia.
Assessments:
Sudan.
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) captured el Obeid—a state capital in south-central Sudan that will likely support SAF offensives into Rapid Support Forces (RSF) strongholds in Darfur—on February 20.[1] The RSF had besieged the SAF in el Obeid since April 2023.[2] The SAF has advanced westward from positions in White Nile State—around 160 miles south of Khartoum—along an east-west highway that stretches from Khartoum to Darfur via el Obeid since January 2025.[3] El Obeid has an airport with an operational runway, but satellite imagery shows that the most aircraft there are damaged or destroyed.
Figure 1. SAF Advances Against the RSF Toward El Fasher
Source: Kathryn Tyson; John Reece; Thomas van Linge.
SAF advances are setting conditions for an offensive against the RSF center of gravity in western Sudan. The RSF has historical bases of support among primarily Arab tribes in Darfur and maintains strong socioeconomic relations in the region, which help the RSF generate income and recruits.[4] The RSF controls airports and supply lines throughout western Sudan, through which it moves weapons, fuel, and other matériel. The United Arab Emirates has sent weapons to the RSF via an airstrip in eastern Chad that crosses into western Sudan since the civil war began in April 2023, according to the United Nations.[5]
Figure 2. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Civil War
Source: Kathryn Tyson; Thomas van Linge.
The SAF will likely try to advance further west along the highway toward al Fasher—the capital city of North Darfur—to break the RSF hold on western Sudan and relieve besieged SAF troops. The SAF has continued its westward advance from el Obeid toward al Nahud, where the RSF has encircled another SAF base.[6] Local Sudanese sources posted videos of Sudanese tribesmen entering al Nahud from the west to reportedly meet SAF units approaching from the east.[7] The SAF seeks to eventually merge with SAF elements in al Fasher, where ongoing fighting in the town has killed over 700 civilians since the RSF began besieging the SAF there in April 2024.[8] RSF attacks on el Fasher have repeatedly killed refugees in the nearby Zamzam camp, which has over 400,000 internally displaced persons.[9] SAF leader Abdel Fatteh al Burhan on February 9 that the SAF refuses to negotiate with the RSF until the RSF ends its siege on el Fasher, among other conditions.[10]
The SAF has also advanced south from el Obeid to relieve another besieged SAF position and secure its southern flank. The RSF-aligned rebel group known as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) controls large swathes of terrain south of el Obeid in South Kordofan State and has besieged SAF positions in al Dilling—the second-largest city in the state.[11] The SAF broke through the SPLN-M and RSF siege on al Dilling on February 24 and then captured areas around the city.[12] The recent SAF advances in Kordofan extend SAF control over the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline—a key energy artery that runs from South Sudan to Port Sudan via Kordofan and Khartoum.[13]
The SAF has advanced against the RSF in Khartoum, as the SAF seeks to push the RSF west of the Nile River. The SAF captured Soba Bridge on February 24—a key bridge on the Blue Nile River that gives the SAF an additional route into RSF-controlled central Khartoum.[14] The SAF has recaptured nearly all of northern Khartoum, also known as Khartoum Bahri, from the RSF since it launched an offensive into the city in January 2025.[15] The SAF is advancing on at least three axes toward central Khartoum to expel the remaining RSF units from the area.[16]
Figure 3. Area of SAF and RSF Operations in Khartoum
Source: Kathryn Tyson; John Reece; Thomas van Linge.
SAF control over Khartoum would allow the SAF to consolidate control over the eastern bank of the Nile River and support SAF offensives into western Sudan. The RSF would struggle to recross the Nile River given SAF control of key bridges on the river.[17] Drone footage from February 4 shows lines of RSF military vehicles trying to flee from southwestern Khartoum to western Sudan across the Jebel Awliya Bridge, which is the RSF’s last remaining link to the city.[18] Khartoum also has airports and military infrastructure that are better positioned to support future offensives in western Sudan than the SAF’s current command and logistics hub in Port Sudan, which is over 400 miles northeast of Khartoum on Sudan’s Red Sea coast.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
African-led peace initiatives face several obstacles as they continue to pursue short-term ceasefires to halt Rwandan-backed M23’s continued expansion and long-term peace agreements to end the fighting in the eastern DRC. Defense ministers from East African Community (EAC) and South African Development Community (SADC) member states met in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on February 24.[19] The meeting is a follow-up on a joint summit of the EAC-SADC heads of state in early February.[20] The ministers reiterated demands for a ceasefire and outlined several supporting measures to implement a ceasefire. These measures included the immediate deployment of a small EAC-SADC technical team to monitor a ceasefire and a proposal to review the feasibility of a UN-backed EAC-SADC military force that would secure M23-occupied areas in order to help implement a ceasefire.[21] A joint summit between EAC-SADC foreign ministers is tentatively scheduled for February 28 to review details of the ceasefire proposal.[22]
An EAC-SADC force deployment capable of enforcing a ceasefire and securing M23-held areas is likely politically unviable for all parties involved. The EAC deployed a force in November 2022 that had a similar mandate to secure humanitarian zones and parts of M23-controlled areas in the eastern DRC.[23] The mission failed after DRC President Félix Tshisekedi accused EAC forces of being too soft toward M23 and forced them to withdraw in December 2023.[24] Tshisekedi has since criticized Kenyan President William Ruto for mismanaging the Nairobi process and “taking up Rwanda’s cause” after Ruto entered office in 2022.[25] French media reported that the DRC prefers the FARDC to guarantee the ceasefire’s implementation over a joint force.[26]
Rwanda and M23 have criticized the SADC repeatedly and warned against external involvement in the eastern DRC. Rwanda has accused SADC forces, who have an offensive mandate against M23 in the eastern DRC, of cooperating with the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR)—a Rwandan Hutu rebel group associated with the 1994 Rwandan genocide and anti-Tutsi ethnic violence.[27] M23 has expressed hostility toward multilateral deployments and is unlikely to turn captured areas over to a multilateral force as it did to EAC forces in early 2023.[28] The DRC launched counteroffensives to recapture the areas that M23 handed over after the Congolese government invited the SADC to replace EAC forces.[29] M23 has built sophisticated “state-like” administrations in parts of the eastern DRC, further signaling that it intends to control these areas in the long term. [30]
The EAC and SADC may lack the will to intervene forcefully. The SADC has confined most of its forces to their bases and has not sent reinforcements since SADC troops suffered casualties when M23 captured Goma—the provincial capital of North Kivu—in late January.[31] Several SADC troop-contributing countries have called to withdraw the 1,300-strong SADC force altogether.[32] The SADC defense ministers acknowledged that SADC forces in the DRC are “unable to fight” and that a new mission would require a significant overhaul to the current mandate.[33]
The EAC-SADC bloc moved ahead with plans to merge the Kenyan-mediated Nairobi peace process and the Angolan-mediated Luanda peace process, but these efforts face various challenges. The Nairobi process aims to facilitate dialogue between the DRC and armed groups in the eastern DRC, while the Luanda process seeks to broker a peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda. The EAC and SADC named three facilitators for a merged peace process: former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, and former Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn.[34]
The facilitators face various obstacles in merging and reviving the two peace processes.[35] Talks between the DRC and M23 within the Nairobi process have stalled since 2022 after the DRC lost faith in the process and allied with anti-Rwandan militias following continued M23 advances.[36] The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported on February 20 that tensions between Kenyan President William Ruto and his predecessor Uhuru Kenyata have “complicated a sluggish” Nairobi process.[37] The Luanda process collapsed in December 2024 after Rwanda insisted that the DRC “hold a direct dialogue with the M23” for talks to continue.[38] The Luanda process also lacks a lead mediator after the Angolan president said that he will “pass the baton” to another African leader after he assumed the rotating presidency of the African Union (AU) at the beginning of 2025.[39] DRC President Félix Tshisekedi told The New York Times that he has skipped several regional peace meetings since M23 took Goma in late January because Rwanda has continued to demand direct dialogue with M23 in an interview on February 22.[40] Tshisekedi called M23 a Rwandan “puppet” and an “empty shell” in the interview.[41]
The international community has imposed limited sanctions on Rwanda for supporting M23 but remains hesitant to levy stronger sanctions that would make Rwanda more likely to cut its support for M23. The UN Security Council adopted a unanimous resolution on February 21 that condemned M23’s recent gains in the eastern DRC and called on Rwanda to cut its support to M23 and withdraw its troops from the eastern DRC.[42] The UN resolution represents the first time that the UN Security Council has condemned Rwanda unanimously and by name for its support to M23 since the rebel group resurged in 2021.[43] The resolution refrained from sanctioning Rwanda but threatened “additional measures” on Rwanda and “those who contribute to the continuation of the conflict in the eastern DRC” if M23 does not cease hostilities.[44] The resolution called on M23 to reopen humanitarian corridors in the eastern DRC and “fully reverse the establishment of illegitimate parallel administrations” in the eastern DRC, including in Goma and Bukavu—the provincial capital of South Kivu.[45]
The European Union and United Kingdom have started to take more concrete action to increase pressure on Rwanda after weeks of warnings.[46] The European Union suspended defense talks with Rwanda and ordered a review of the EU agreements on mineral supply chains with Rwanda on February 24.[47] Germany summoned the Rwandan ambassador to condemn M23’s offensive on February 20.[48] The United Kingdom announced a series of measures to pressure Rwanda to cut support for M23 and withdraw its troops from the eastern DRC on February 25. The UK sanctions included halting a portion of $32 million in bilateral aid and suspending defense training assistance.[49] The EU and UK measures came after the United States sanctioned retired Rwandan General James Kabarebe, who is “central” to M23’s military and economic operations, and the M23 spokesperson on February 21.[50]
The European Union is debating more severe measures against Rwandan leaders. EU leaders are weighing additional sanctions on Rwandan entities, personal asset freezes, and travel restrictions on Rwandan officials if M23 continues to seize territory in the eastern DRC.[51] French media reported on February 24 that the “tone has now changed” within the EU and that there is widespread agreement on sanctions against Rwanda among the 27 members.[52] Some EU members remain reluctant to impose further economic and defense-related sanctions on Rwanda, however.[53] Luxembourg vetoed a second round of EU sanctions on Rwanda on February 25.[54] Rwandan officials have denounced the recent EU and UK restrictive measures and claimed that the DRC will use international sanctions on Rwanda as a cover to refuse negotiations with M23.[55]
The international community has not yet targeted Rwanda’s aid budget as it did in 2012, when coordinated sanctions forced Rwanda to cut its support for M23. Rwanda cut its support for M23 in 2012 after the international community suspended $240 million in aid to Rwanda.[56] At least a third of Rwanda’s current-day budget comes from foreign aid, and World Bank figures from 2021 show that the $1.25 billion that Rwanda received in official development assistance was equal to 74 percent of central government spending that year.[57] Rwandan President Paul Kagame said in an interview with the French magazine Jeune Afrique that Rwanda will not be “intimidated” by sanctions on February 12, and Rwanda’s foreign minister recently said that Rwanda would not be “afraid” of sanctions or diplomatic isolation.[58]
Decreased Rwandan military support for M23 would severely undermine M23 military capabilities and capacity. M23 quickly collapsed under pressure from UN and FARDC forces in 2012 and 2013 after Rwanda cut its support.[59] The United Nations reported in December 2024 that advanced Rwandan military equipment and the thousands of Rwandan troops in the eastern DRC are still key to M23’s “superior combat strength.”[60] International experts estimate that Rwandan troops comprise a significant portion of the M23-Rwandan forces in the eastern DRC. M23 has roughly 8,000 fighters, and the UN and other sources estimate that Rwanda has 4,000 troops in the eastern DRC.[61] French and local sources report that this number may have grown since M23 took Goma in January.[62] M23 is likely much more self-sufficient now than it was in 2012, however, as the group controls much more territory and resources.
M23 likely slowed its expansion in the last week to solidify its control over recently captured areas, reset for further military advances, and possibly decrease international pressure on Rwanda. M23 declared a unilateral ceasefire on February 3 but then advanced roughly 68 miles along the RN2 and RN5 roadways in four days in mid-February. The group has slowed its advance since it captured Kamanyola—the southernmost town on the DRC-Rwanda border—on February 18 and released a statement reaffirming its commitment to the unilateral ceasefire on February 25.[63] This timing loosely aligns with the international community escalating pressure against Rwanda.[64]
Figure 4. M23 Advances Southward in South Kivu Province
Source: Liam Karr; Nick Markiewicz; Yale Ford.
M23 will benefit from a pause in fighting to engage in multilateral peace efforts while it consolidates control over the areas that it has captured and reconstitutes its forces. M23 has said that it remains open to the EAC-SADC initiative despite continuing to expand its territory since early February.[65] M23 has called for a “return to normal” in Goma, appointed a new city government, and tried to restore basic services such as banking, electricity, and water.[66] M23 has touted its governance efforts in Bukavu since it captured the city on February 16.[67] Corneille Nangaa, the leader of M23’s political branch, Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), made a public appearance in Bukavu on February 25 and held a citywide rally on February 27.[68] Nangaa said during the February 27 rally that AFC-M23 will appoint a new governor of South Kivu, two vice-governors, and a new mayor of Bukavu in the next two days.[69] M23 has lacked the law enforcement personnel to fully secure Bukavu and Goma, however, and has sought to absorb FARDC and local police units in both cities to address spikes in homicide, looting, and other crime.[70] M23’s capture of Bukavu and Kamanyola has boosted M23’s and Rwanda’s ability to reconstitute and reinforce its law enforcement, military, and political personnel from Rwanda by extending the group’s control over the entire DRC-Rwanda border.
M23 is setting conditions to justify imminent offensives, including claiming that the Congolese government was behind an alleged assassination attempt on Nangaa during the February 27 Bukavu rally.[71] Locals witnessed two successive explosions near the speaking podium about two minutes after Nangaa finished speaking that failed to injure AFC-M23 personnel but killed at least 11 people and caused widespread tension in the city.[72] Nangaa claimed in a phone interview with Reuters that Tshisekedi “ordered the attack.”[73] The group had separately said that it would not observe ceasefire agreements or the recommendations of regional peace processes to which it is not a party.[74] M23 stated on February 25 it would respond if FARDC continued “targeting civilian populations” in two towns in South Kivu.[75] The group used this same pretext to justify its advances in mid-February despite its unilateral ceasefire.[76] Nangaa more explicitly warned during the February 27 rally that M23 will take Uvira, Fizi, Kamituga, and Shabunda in the “coming days.”[77] M23 and Rwandan troops continue to maintain a significant military advantage over mostly combat ineffective Congolese forces, but AFC-M23 likely lacks the capacity to keep its governance efforts on pace with its military advances given the ongoing government challenges in Bukavu and Goma.[78]
DRC President Félix Tshisekedi announced planned changes to the Congolese army (FARDC) that likely aim to increase FARDC’s military effectiveness in preparation for a counteroffensive against M23. Tshisekedi announced that he will reshuffle FARDC during a meeting with Congolese government leaders and officials from his ruling Sacred Union coalition on February 22.[79] Tshisekedi promised an overhaul of FARDC’s military structure to build a “professional and well-supported army” against M23.[80] Tshisekedi called to increase already-existing pay bonuses and public benefits to FARDC soldiers on the front lines in the eastern DRC.[81] FARDC units around Lake Kivu have been combat ineffective against M23’s advances since January and have abandoned their positions repeatedly without a fight.[82]
Increased pay for FARDC soldiers in the eastern DRC is likely an effort to strengthen morale and decrease FARDC defections to M23.[83] FARDC soldiers’ salaries have been low since its formation in 2003, and political elites in Kinshasa have insulated themselves from insubordination or defections to M23 by increasing discretionary income and bonuses to soldiers deployed in the eastern DRC.[84]
Tshisekedi’s restructuring of FARDC leadership likely aims to purge ineffective or compromised military personnel. Tshisekedi claimed FARDC had suffered from “treason” and been “betrayed from within” during the February 22 meeting.[85] Tshisekedi said that some FARDC soldiers fighting against M23 went “for a week without command or supplies” and that he personally “ordered measures to improve logistics and supplies” and is “exchanging directly with certain [FARDC] units.”[86]
FARDC units in the eastern DRC historically have been ineffective because the Congolese government has prioritized loyalty over competency to preserve patronage networks and coup-proof the FARDC. Congolese government efforts to integrate former rebel fighters have compromised FARDC units in eastern DRC historically with personnel who have ties to various rebel groups.[87] These “divided and privatized loyalties” led to numerous conflicts of interest that rendered FARDC units combat ineffective during M23’s previous iteration in 2012 after commanders ordered Congolese forces not to engage with rebels as they advanced.[88] FARDC’s poor combat performance against M23 in 2012 mirrors its recent combat performance in 2025.
Tshisekedi likely plans to launch a counteroffensive to regain negotiating leverage. The DRC has continued to seek external military assistance. An unspecified number of Burundian troops redeployed south of M23 positions in Kamanyola on the RN5 on February 25 after Tshisekedi and Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye met for a private meeting on February 23.[89] Tshisekedi has continually refused to negotiate with M23 and said that FARDC will take back Goma from M23 “either through dialogue or military reconquest” during the New York Times interview on February 22.[90] French media quoted a Congolese official close to Tshisekedi who said that the DRC seeks to restore “a certain [military] balance” and that “if there must be a dialogue, it will not be in a situation where we are on our knees.”[91]
Figure 5. M23 Advances in Eastern DRC
Source: Liam Karr; Nick Markiewicz; Yale Ford.
The DRC government historically reshuffled military leadership before launching counteroffensives. Former DRC President Joseph Kabila reshuffled senior military officers in FARDC in 2013.[92] These changes contributed to FARDC’s battlefield success against M23.[93] M23 has more territory now than it did in 2013, however, and a UN-backed intervention force fighting alongside FARDC was decisive to M23’s defeat in 2013. Tshisekedi previously reshuffled top military leadership in FARDC before FARDC launched a failed counteroffensive against M23 in December 2024.[94]
Tshisekedi may be attempting to strengthen his fragile power base with plans to reorganize the DRC government. Tshisekedi said that he will reorganize his ruling coalition’s leadership and will form a new “government of national unity.”[95] Tshisekedi’s leadership has been increasingly questioned since M23 captured Goma in January. Tshisekedi’s justice minister pushed back against rumors of a possible coup on social media on February 16, saying “Tshisekedi was elected by the Congolese people for a five-year term.”[96] Reuters reported on February 18 that there has been “open talk in Kinshasa of a possible coup” against Tshisekedi after the fall of Bukavu in mid-February.[97] A source in Tshisekedi’s circle told French media on February 20 that there has been “palpable concern within the presidency” and “an end-of-reign atmosphere” in recent days.[98]
Tshisekedi’s moves are likely an attempt to co-opt opposition figures who have been critical of his management of the M23 crisis. Some Congolese officials, such as opposition figures and Kabila, have blamed Tshisekedi for M23’s recent military gains and called for new leadership.[99] Tshisekedi said during the February 22 meeting with his ruling coalition that he “must reach out to everyone including the opposition.”[100] The Congolese news outlet Le Potential said Tshisekedi’s moves to restructure the government “mark a significant step in Congolese politics” that “aims to bring together Congolese political forces” after the DRC’s back-to-back loses with M23’s takeover of Goma and Bukavu.[101] Tshisekedi said the DRC must refrain from being “distracted” by internal divisions before he called for a united government during his February 22 meeting.[102] Jeune Afrique quoted several opposition party leaders outright rejecting Tshisekedi’s offer or demanding greater concessions in a February 26 publication.[103]
Read CTP’s new weekday briefing series, the Congo War Security Review, for daily updates on and maps of the fighting in the eastern DRC between M23 and its Rwandan backers and pro-Congolese government forces: https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review.
Morocco
Moroccan authorities thwarted another attack cell linked to IS Sahel Province (ISSP), highlighting a concerted ISSP campaign to establish attack capabilities in Morocco and potentially use Morocco as a bridge for attacks in Europe. Moroccan security forces arrested 12 people who were planning an “imminent” bombing plot.[104] The cell members were based across the country, including major cities such as Casablanca, Fez, and Tangier.[105] Moroccan officials said that the cell took direction from Islamic State Sahel Province commanders.[106]
Morocco’s General Directorate for Territorial Surveillance claimed in February 2025 that ISSP is making a concerted effort to “recruit, arm, and direct sympathizers to carry out attacks in Morocco.”[107] Moroccan security officials police foiled another IS attack cell with “direct ties” to an ISSP leader in January 2025.[108] The UN reported in July 2023 that IS recruiters and facilitators in the Sahel had established transit corridors between southern Europe and the Sahel and established a thwarted attack cell that operated out of Morocco and Spain.[109]
ISSP has developed a greater external reach in recent years that increases its threat to North Africa, foreign personnel across Africa, and likely Europe as the group continues to demonstrate growing external ambitions. ISSP has become more regionally connected and evolved into a hub for IS activity in West Africa as it has strengthened. Multiple UN reports since 2023 have highlighted that ISSP has grown its ties with IS West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Lake Chad Basin, which hosts the regional IS office for West Africa, al Furqan.[110] The al Furqan office is part of the General Directorate of Provinces, the IS institution that coordinates external activity across multiple provinces through regional offices.[111] Moroccan security forces disrupted three IS cells that facilitated foreign fighters’ travel to ISSP in Mali between October 2023 and February 2024.[112] The presence of foreign fighters has led to an increase in Salafi-jihadi groups’ external attack plots historically since foreign fighters are usually more hardened ideologues than local recruits and often aim to eventually return to their homeland to organize attacks.[113] The Associated Press reported that the ISSP external operations leader is Libyan, which further highlights the group’s transnational links.[114]
African security officials have connected ISSP to an increasing number of attack plots outside the group’s typical areas of operation as its regional connections have expanded. CTP previously assessed that ISSP was likely connected to a terror cell in Angola that had ties to Burkina Faso and planned to conduct attacks when then-US President Joe Biden visited Angola in December 2024.[115] The attack cells in Angola and Morocco have consisted entirely of nationals from those countries, but security officials’ statements indicate that ISSP played a training and advisory role for the plots.[116] ISSP and ISWAP have coordinated a kidnapping-for-ransom campaign against foreigners in Algeria and Niger throughout 2025 that further indicates that the groups are expanding their areas of operation further away from their core areas in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, respectively.[117]
Figure 6. Islamic State Kidnapping Campaign in West Africa
Source: Liam Karr.
Somalia.
Al Shabaab is launching a major offensive across central Somalia as the group attempts to overturn landmark, US-backed Somali counterterrorism gains from 2022. Al Shabaab launched the largest and most complex attacks since at least April 2024 against Somali National Army (SNA) and Somali clan militia forces in Middle Shabelle, central Somalia, on February 20.[118] The attacks targeted forward operating bases in seven towns in contested areas on opposite sides of Middle Shabelle that Somali forces previously cleared during a counterterrorism offensive in 2022. The offensive included suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices in at least one of the attacks.[119] The SNA said that it killed 130 al Shabaab fighters, and al Shabaab said that it killed over 90 Somali soldiers during the clashes.[120] Al Shabaab temporarily seized at least three towns overnight until Somali forces expelled the fighters on February 21.[121] US AFRICOM conducted ”self-defense airstrikes on February 25 targeting one of the towns that al Shabaab attacked on February 20 and 25.[122] Local reports suggest that al Shabaab withdrew from some areas before Somali forces reentered the towns.[123]
Al Shabaab launched another series of multifront attacks on Somali forces in central Somalia on February 25 and 26. Al Shabaab conducted attacks on at least three towns in the Hiraan region, north of Middle Shabelle on February 25.[124] The attacks once again occurred on opposite sides of the region. Al Shabaab temporarily seized Bal’ad, a district capital in Middle Shabelle that lies 15 miles (23 kilometers) from the Mogadishu district limits, on February 26.[125] The attackers freed al Shabaab prisoners from the local prison before Burundian African Union troops and Somali forces retook the town.[126] The freed prisoners will boost al Shabaab’s manpower and further support the group’s ongoing offensive.
Al Shabaab targeted symbolically and militarily important towns in areas that al Shabaab had long controlled before local clan militias and the Somali Federal Government (SFG) launched the 2022 offensive. Al Shabaab on February 20 attacked a town 18 miles (29 kilometers) away from the district capital Adan Yabal, which was al Shabaab’s regional center of operations in Middle Shabelle from 2016 until 2022.[127] Al Shabaab attacked El Baraf on the same day, which serves as a transportation hub at the junction of several roads that al Shabaab controlled until 2016.[128] Al Shabaab has not attacked El Baraf since 2022.[129] Al Shabaab contested control in and around Adan Yabal intermittently in 2023 and 2024 but had not launched an attack of this scale or sophistication during this period.[130] The attacks in eastern Hiraan on February 25 occurred in Bulo Burde district, where al Shabaab first attempted to cross the Shabelle River and reinfiltrate central Somalia in early January.[131]
Al Shabaab may have timed this offensive to coincide with the start of Ramadan on February 28 or to conclude before Somalia’s rainy season begins in April. Al Shabaab and other Salafi-jihadi groups also regularly conduct offensives during Ramadan.[132] Al Shabaab activity typically decreases during the rainy season, as the terrain becomes difficult to navigate and their ability to control local populations through access to water is reduced.[133]
Figure 7. Al Shabaab’s Area of Operations in Central Somalia
Source: Kathryn Tyson; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.
Al Shabaab seeks to overwhelm Somali forces and link its support zones in central Somalia with its core territories in southern Somalia. Al Shabaab already launched an offensive in January 2025 in central Somalia to reestablish itself on the east bank of the Shabelle River north of Middle Shabelle in the Hiraan region.[134] Expanded al Shabaab support zones in central Somalia that reestablish its presence across Hiraan and Middle Shabelle would strengthen the lines of communication between al Shabaab's center of gravity in the south and its fighters in central Somalia.[135] Al Shabaab’s expanded presence would allow it to threaten major government-controlled administrative centers and a major highway that runs between Ethiopia and Mogadishu.[136] Somali forces cleared this highway that connects Mogadishu, central Somalia, and Ethiopia during its offensive in 2022.[137] Control over the road is a major revenue generation opportunity for al Shabaab, clan militias, and the local and federal Somali government given the numerous taxation checkpoints on the road that affect local trade and trucks traveling between the port of Mogadishu and Ethiopia.[138] Al Shabaab failed to secure these objectives in similar offensives in 2023 and 2024.[139]
The withdrawal of Burundian forces from the African Union (AU) mission in Somalia may create further gaps for al Shabaab to exploit in central Somalia. Burundian forces have been deployed in Somalia since 2007 and were based in Middle Shabelle under the former AU mission.[140] Burundi stated its intention to withdraw from the new AU mission in Somalia days before the mission officially began on January 1, 2025, after the SFG allocated Burundi 1,000 soldiers to the mission, a figure that Burundian officials said was half of what was necessary to ensure adequate force protection.[141] An unclear number Burundian forces remained in Somalia and have been directly involved in efforts to repel the al Shabaab incursions into central Somalia, however, while the two countries have tried to negotiate a solution.[142] Burundi and SFG confirmed on February 25 that Burundian forces will not be part of the new mission, and the SFG has not given a timetable for the withdrawal of Burundian forces or indicated how it aims to replace Burundian troops.[143]
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