Iran Update, February 27, 2025

 

Iran Update, February 27, 2025

Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi rejected a call from Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan to disarm and dissolve. Ocalan, who is imprisoned in Turkey, said that “all groups must lay [down] their arms” and called on PKK leaders to hold a conference to dissolve the PKK.[1] Abdi replied that Ocalan’s statement “is only for the PKK [and is not] related to us in Syria.” Abdi stated that peace between the PKK and Turkey would strip Turkey of any justification for continuing attacks against Kurdish groups in Syria, however.[2] The chairperson of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which dominates the SDF, separately stated that “if the reasons for carrying weapons disappear, we will lay them down,” implying that the SDF will not disarm until Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) cease attacks on the SDF in northeastern Syria.[3]

Turkish officials previously signaled that they believed a call to the PKK from Ocalan to disarm and dissolve would pressure the SDF into agreeing to disarm and integrate into the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government.[4] This belief reflects misplaced Turkish thinking that the entire SDF would be responsive to PKK direction. Abdi’s response to Ocalan’s call furthermore suggests that Abdi views himself as a Syrian Kurdish leader, not a transnational Kurdish separatist leader, and that he prioritizes protecting the SDF and Syrian Kurds from human rights abuses and political marginalization over pursuing larger Kurdish separatist goals. Abdi has consistently rejected the idea of SDF-held territory in northeastern Syria seceding from the Syrian state but has advocated for a federalist system.[5]

Abdi likely rejected Ocalan’s call in part because the Syrian interim government has not provided guarantees to the SDF that it would protect SDF territory and Syrian Kurds during the integration of the SDF into the interim government. The interim government has insisted that the SDF completely disarm and join the new Syrian army as individuals. Abdi has emphasized that he would want the SDF to join the new Syrian army as a “military bloc,” however.[6] The integration of the SDF into the Syrian Ministry of Defense as individuals would involve dismantling current SDF formations and building new formations in the Syrian Army that include relatively small numbers of SDF fighters sprinkled among multi-ethnic, theoretically apolitical units loyal to the national army. This process would inevitably force the SDF to halt its operations against Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) in northeastern Syria in order to deconstruct its own forces. The interim government has not provided guarantees to the SDF that it would prevent Turkey or the SNA from advancing into SDF-held territory or committing crimes against Kurds in northeastern Syria while the SDF integrates into the Defense Ministry. Some of the SNA factions that are fighting the SDF are sanctioned for committing serious human rights abuses against Kurds during the Turkish-backed operation to seize Afrin, northwestern Syria, in 2019.[7]

The interim government appears to have double standards for the integration of the SNA and SDF into the Defense Ministry. The SNA has begun integrating its forces into the Defense Ministry in recent weeks.[8] The rate of SNA attacks and activity against the SDF in northeastern Syria has not decreased, however, indicating that either the interim government has not yet integrated the SNA factions as individuals or alternatively has allowed SNA factions to integrate into the Defense Ministry as blocs.[9] The SNA would have to stop fighting, deconstruct its forces, and then rebuild its forces as new, multi-ethnic, theoretically apolitical units loyal to the Defense Ministry chain of command to integrate as individuals and fully dissolve themselves.

The SDF could agree to disarm and integrate into the interim government if the interim government provides security guarantees and additional assurances on decentralization to the SDF and Syrian Kurds. The SDF could become more willing to disarm and dissolve if all armed factions, including the SNA, enter the Syrian Defense Ministry as individuals. The integration of individual SNA fighters into new Syrian army units that are not associated with the SNA could reduce the risk that the SDF currently perceives from the SNA. The interim government has announced the integration of former armed groups into the interim government, but these groups appear to have been integrated in name only.[10] The interim government will likely need to make identical demands for all armed factions and secure some sort of political agreement and ceasefire with the SDF if it wants the SDF to integrate into the interim government.

Iran is likely pressuring the Iraqi federal government to avoid normalizing ties with the Syrian interim government. Unidentified political sources told Iraqi media on February 27 that Iraq has not normalized relations with the Syrian interim government due to Iranian opposition.[11] Turkey maintains close ties to the Syrian interim government and has closely coordinated its pressure campaign on the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces in northeastern Syria with the interim government.[12] Iran views Turkey’s influence in Syria as a threat to its long-standing strategic objectives. The fall of Assad marked the end of the greater Iranian project in the Levant for the foreseeable future and will make it extremely difficult for Iran to transfer resources to reconstitute Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas.[13] Iran previously relied on ground lines of communication in Syria to transfer funds and materiel to Hezbollah. The fall of Assad disrupted these routes. Iranian officials have also expressed concern in recent weeks that the fall of Assad created a vacuum for ISIS to exploit and spread instability to Iran.[14] Iranian officials have also previously expressed concern about Turkey’s alleged pan-Turkic aspirations and the spread of Turkish and NATO influence in the region.[15]

Some Iranian-aligned Iraqi actors oppose normalization between Iraq and Syria and Turkish influence in Syria for their own reasons. Some of these reasons align with Iranian interests. Iraqi media reported on February 27 that State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki and Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri view the fall of the Assad regime in Syria as a “Turkish conspiracy.”[16] This report comes after Iraqi Sunni political parties have increasingly vocalized long-standing political demands in recent weeks, including by calling for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to amend the Iraqi constitution.[17] Maliki and Ameri may be concerned that Turkey could work with these Sunni parties to challenge Shia power in Iraq, just as Maliki and Ameri believe Turkey worked with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) to overthrow Assad. Turkey has previously worked with Iraqi Sunni parties to increase its own influence in Iraq, often at Iran’s expense..[18] Maliki and Ameri, like some Iranian officials, also view Hayat Tahrir al Sham and its leader, Ahmed al Shara, as “terrorists“ and a threat to stability..[19] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including the Badr Organization, fought al Qaeda in Iraq in the 2000s and presumably view Shara as an al Qaeda in Iraq ideologue.

Key Takeaways:

• PKK and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF): US-backed SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi rejected a call from PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to disarm and dissolve. Turkish officials previously signaled that they believed a call to the PKK from Ocalan to disarm and dissolve would pressure the SDF into agreeing to disarm and integrate into the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government.
• SDF-Damascus Negotiations: The SDF commander likely rejected Ocalan’s call in part because the Syrian interim government has not provided guarantees to the SDF that it would protect SDF territory and Syrian Kurds during the integration of the SDF into the interim government. The SDF could agree to disarm and integrate into the interim government if the interim government provides security guarantees and additional assurances on decentralization to the SDF and Syrian Kurds.
• Iran and Iraqi Views on Syria: Iran is likely pressuring the Iraqi federal government to avoid normalizing ties with the Syrian interim government. Some Iranian-aligned Iraqi actors oppose normalization between Iraq and Syria and Turkish influence in Syria for their own reasons. Some of these reasons align with Iranian interests.

Syria

The SDF repelled an SNA attack on an SDF position near the Tishreen Dam east of Aleppo on February 26.[20] The SDF said on February 27 that the SDF Martyr Haroun Unit destroyed two SNA military vehicles during the engagement. The SDF said that the SNA attacked the SDF’s positions while Turkey struck other SDF positions around the dam.[21] Geolocated footage shows an SDF one-way attack drone striking SNA positions on the western bank of the Tishreen Dam.[22]

The SDF repelled an SNA attack on an SDF position near the Qara Qozak Bridge east of Aleppo on February 26.[23] The SDF said that the SNA attacked SDF positions with artillery and rocket support.[24]

Turkey struck three SDF positions on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River in Aleppo Province on February 27.[25]

Anti-SDF media reported on February 27 that SNA fighters attacked an SDF position near Deir Hafer.[26]

Anti-SDF media reported on February 27 that Turkish artillery shelled SDF positions near Ain Issa, north of Raqqa.[27] SNA artillery separately shelled SDF positions near Tal Abyad.[28

Anti-Israeli militias using iconography consistent with Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-backed militias announced that they have begun organizing military forces to resist Israeli forces in southern Syria. Anti-Israel militia, the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria-the First of the Brave, said on February 27 that it has begun to form military cells in southern Syria.[29] The group’s iconography is consistent with the IRGC and other Iranian-backed groups that are part of the Axis of Resistance, including Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq and Lebanese Hezbollah. The use of the fist-and-Kalashnikov iconography is usually a very strong indicator that a group is aligned with or backed by the IRGC. The IDF Air Force launched a series of airstrikes on February 25 against various military targets in southern Syria.[30] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on February 27 that Israel struck to prevent the Syrian interim government from deploying forces in southern Syria.[31] Small-scale protests continued in Quintera Province on February 27 in response to the strikes.[32]

Lebanese media reported on February 27 that HTS-led interim government forces fired mortars at “Lebanese militants” in Qusayr, Lebanon.[33] Qusayr is in northeastern Lebanon along the Syria-Lebanon border.

HTS-led interim government forces engaged former Assad regime members in multiple locations across Syria on February 26 and 27. Internal Security Forces deployed to Qardaha, Latakia Province, on February 26 after likely former Assad regime members attacked a local police station and demanded the withdrawal of Internal Security Forces from the city.[34] Internal Security Forces subsequently launched a security campaign in Qardaha targeting individuals who had attacked government buildings and chanted sectarian slogans.[35]

Former regime members separately fired small arms at an Internal Security Forces checkpoint in Jdeidet al Fadl, Rif Dimashq Province, on February 27.[36] Internal Security Forces subsequently conducted a security campaign in Jdeidet al Fadl that targeted drug and arms dealers and former regime members.[37] Security forces separately pursued wanted individuals and former regime members in Maysaf, Hama Province, on February 27.[38] Maysaf previously hosted a Hezbollah missile facility that made solid fuel.[39] HTS-allied Jaysh al Izza spokesperson Mustafa Bakkour criticized the HTS-led interim government’s approach toward former Assad regime members, arguing on February 27 that “amnesty and forgiveness does not work.”[40] Jaysh al Izza agreed in January 2025 to dissolve itself and integrate in the Syrian interim government.[41]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

Nothing significant to report.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Former Iranian reformist presidents Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Khatami expressed support for nuclear negotiations on February 26 and 27, respectively.[42] Rouhani argued that there “is nothing wrong with negotiation” and noted that Iran’s economy grew under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Khatami said Iran should try to “lift sanctions,” which is a reference to nuclear negotiations.[43] These statements contrast with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s recent rejection of negotiations with the United States.[44] Rouhani and Khatami are important politicians in the Iranian domestic political sphere, but they hold no decision-making authority.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy added Heydar 110 fast attack craft (FAC) to its fleet on February 27.[45] Heydar 110 FAC can launch anti-ship cruise missiles and reach 110 knots per hour or 204 kilometers per hour (kmh), making it the fastest IRGC Navy FAC.[46] Other Iranian FACs, including the Zolfaghar, Azarakhsh, and Seraj, can only travel up to 60 knots per hour (112 kmh).[47] The IRGC uses FACs as attritable vessels capable of quick attacks as part of its asymmetric naval warfare strategy that aims to counter larger naval forces by leveraging speed and short-range missiles.[48] The IRGC Navy also unveiled the Shahid Rais Ali Delvari warship in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on February 27.[49] The warship can carry helicopters, reach 32 knots, operate in a 5,000-mile range, and is equipped with 300 kilometer-range missiles. [50]

The Iranian Artesh Navy 100th Naval Fleet, which includes the IRIS Bushehr replenishment ship and IRIS Lavan landing ship, docked in Mumbai, India, on February 27.[51] Iranian and Indian naval commanders will hold high-level meetings and visit educational centers.

The Iranian rial appreciated from 926,900 rials to one US dollar on February 26 to 925,200 rials to one US dollar on February 27.[52]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://x.com/ragipsoylu/status/1895120510109000176

[2] https://www.alhurra dot com/syria/2025/02/27/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%AD-%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7 ; https://x.com/ragipsoylu/status/1895156237425119540 ; https://www.alhurra dot com/syria/2025/02/27/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%AD-%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7

[3] https://x.com/ragipsoylu/status/1895127326960295991 ; https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/2025/02/27/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%8A-%D9%86%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%B1

[4] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A/%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%85-%D8%B3%D8%B3-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B2%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%87-%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE%D9%8A ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate012825

[5] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/822841/sdf-leader-calls-for-a-secular-decentralized-syria-after-assads-ouster ; https://www.barrons.com/news/kurdish-administration-says-adopts-syria-s-independence-flag-371f475e

[6] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate011525

[7] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1699 ; https://www.yalejournal.org/publications/voices-from-afrin-first-hand-accounts-of-turkish-crimes-against-the-kurds-and-policy-proposals-from-those-affected

[8] https://syrianobserver.com/security/sharaa-meets-leaders-of-military-factions-agree-to-integrate-them-under-ministry-of-defense.html ; https://x.com/AljawhariS25970/status/1873682886261391599 ; https://t.me/Aleppo_sh/2320

[9] See consistent reporting of frontline activity since December 2024 at https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-updates-oct-7-war

[10] https://syrianobserver.com/security/sharaa-meets-leaders-of-military-factions-agree-to-integrate-them-under-ministry-of-defense.html

[11] https://almadapaper dot net/397476/

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-4-2025

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-9-2025

[14] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/16/3232253

[15] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-turkey-and-future-south-caucasus ; https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-and-turkey-power-dynamics-south-caucasus

[16] https://almadapaper dot net/397476/

[17] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate020525

[18] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/turkeys-foray-fertile-crescent ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20-%20A%20Forecast.pdf

[19] https://almadapaper dot net/397476/

[20] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1895053849947218103

[21] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1895053849947218103

[22] https://x.com/RojavaNetwork/status/1894799709086073310 ; https://x.com/ghost_watcher1/status/1894848280065912946

[23] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1895053849947218103 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1895083664368664953

[24] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1895083664368664953

[25] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136801 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136793

[26] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136761

[27] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136793

[28] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1895169645902221369

[29] https://t.me/almkaomasy/234 ; https://t.me/almkaomasy/211

[30] https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1894501468683866520; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1894506300689535329

[31] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/katz-hamas-plotting-attacks-against-troops-israeli-towns-during-ceasefire/

[32] https://t.me/Free_Kenitra_city/655

[33] https://www.annahar dot com/Lebanon/Politics/198176/اشتباكات-مسلحة-بين-الإدارة-السورية-الجديدة-ومسلحين-لبنانيين-عند-الحدود

[34] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1894796290908733891 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1894830460381077771 ; https://t.me/mzmgr_syria/26892

[35] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1894826344711671816

[36] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1895005613509218807

[37] https://t.me/damascusv011/29151 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1895110858088260077

[38] https://t.me/syrianmoi/23027 ; https://t.me/syrianmoi/23028

[39] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rjshezmikx

[40] https://x.com/mostafabakkour6/status/1894986067314364617

[41] https://x.com/jamelalsaleh0/status/1882884111796510729 ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/122157 ; https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2025/02/19/profiles-of-foreign-commanders-in-the-new-syrian-army/

[42] https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1040673/; https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2031098/

[43] https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1040673/;

[44] https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1040673/; https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2031098/; https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27964

[45] https://www.yjc dot ir/fa/news/7286761

[46] https://www.yjc dot ir/fa/news/7286761

[47] https://www.yjc dot ir/fa/news/7286761

[48] https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/2602152/unsafe-and-unprofessional-interaction-with-irgcn-fiac-in-strait-of-hormuz/ ; https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/2602152/unsafe-and-unprofessional-interaction-with-irgcn-fiac-in-strait-of-hormuz/

[49] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2030988/

[50] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/729646

[51] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6392381/

[52] https://www.tgju dot org/profile/price_dollar_rl; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-26-2025