Iran Update, March 6, 2025

 

Iran Update, March 6, 2025

Johanna Moore, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Victoria Penza, Avery Borens, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Small-scale insurgent cells have started to emerge and attack Syrian interim government forces in certain areas of Syria. Former Assad regime members conducted coordinated attacks on Syrian military checkpoints and patrols in Jableh, Beit Ana, and Daliyah in Latakia Province on March 6.[1] Interim government forces deployed to the area and cordoned off the area, presumably ahead of a clearing effort.[2] Interim government forces suppressed fighters in Beit Ana and Daliyah but continue to engage former Assad regime members in the Latakia countryside at the time of this writing.[3] CTP-ISW will continue to monitor this developing situation. Former Assad regime members have killed at least 13 Syrian soldiers on March 6.[4] Former Assad regime loyalists have announced their intent to restore Assad’s rule in Syria. It is unlikely that all of the individuals who participated in the attacks on interim government forces joined in the fighting to topple the government and restore Assad, however.[5]

Former Assad regime members will very likely form the most effective insurgent cells, given their pre-established networks. Former Assad regime members already have preexisting networks that they can leverage to rapidly organize insurgent cells. These networks are military, intelligence, and political networks and criminal syndicates who were regime supporters and lost significant economic and political influence in the aftermath of Assad’s fall. These networks could enable former Assad regime members to coordinate attacks across wider areas. This is particularly true in former regime stronghold areas in coastal Syria.

These hardcore Assadists will likely exploit a variety of grievances against the Syrian interim government to recruit new members who may or may not be initially motivated by a desire to restore Assad. Insurgent groups often attract supporters who hold a range of social, economic, and political grievances.[6] Interim government forces have conducted near-constant raids in former regime strongholds targeting former Assad regime members since coming to power in December 2024.[7] These raids, while resulting in the arrest of many mid- to high-level Assad regime officials, have also fueled reports of revenge-based attacks and harassment, particularly against the Alawite community.[8] Members of the Alawite community have expressed their belief that Alawites are being economically disenfranchised by Sunnis as part of a broader effort to marginalize the Alawite community.[9] This is not true; all of Syria is economically devastated, but Alawites believe they are ”uniquely” experiencing economic issues nonetheless.[10] Former Assad regime members have reportedly used Alawite fears of attacks on the community to mobilize young men to take up arms.[11] Interim government forces have also launched a campaign to interdict drug smuggling in western Syria, cutting off a once-steady revenue stream for some criminal syndicates and their beneficiaries.[12] Insurgent groups can leverage these grievances against the interim government to increase their supporter base, and have already begun to do so.

Poorly executed counter-insurgency operations risk fueling a cycle of violence and increased local support for insurgent groups if not conducted carefully. Insurgent groups seek to exploit insecurity and abuses to establish themselves as the primary security guarantor in a community.[13] Insurgent groups conduct attacks on government security forces to elicit a strong response, which insurgent groups can then frame as government attacks on civilians.[14] Alawite activists have reportedly warned that the attacks on interim government forces in Latakia Province on March 6 aimed to elicit a harsh response from the Syrian government and thereby instigate an insurgency.[15] Former Assad regime members attacked an ambulance that was attempting to evacuate Syrian soldiers from Jableh with the expectation that the interim government would respond to the attack with a large operation.[16] A heavy-handed approach that fails to clearly distinguish between insurgents and civilians undermines government efforts to reestablish control over an area by exacerbating fears within the community that government forces are targeting civilians. This fear can in turn drive popular support for insurgent groups.[17]

Former senior Syrian Arab Army (SAA) Fourth Division officer Brigadier General Gaith Dalah announced the formation of a “military council to liberate Syria” on March 6.[18] Dalah announced that the group’s objectives include the “liberation” of Syrian territory from the “terrorist, jihadist organizations” that control it, in reference to the Hayat Tahrir al Sham-led Syrian interim government.[19] The group also seeks to dismantle the Syrian interim government’s “deeply rooted sectarian structures.” Dalah is a former Fourth Division general.[20] The United States designated Dalah as a specially designated national (SDN) in 2020 for his efforts to prevent a ceasefire in Syria.[21] It is unclear if Dalah actually established this military council or if the group is claiming him as their leader due to his reputation in the Assad regime. It is notable and likely not a coincidence that the group announced its formation on the same day that regime-affiliated clashes broke out in coastal Syria.

The United States is considering a plan in which it could ask allies to stop and inspect Iranian oil tankers, according to unspecified sources speaking to Reuters on March 6.[22] Iran could respond to such a plan by attacking or seizing commercial vessels or tankers in the Persian Gulf. The plan is part of the US “maximum pressure” campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero and thereby coerce Iran to negotiate a new nuclear deal.[23] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent emphasized on March 6 that the United States seeks to “shut down” Iran’s oil sector and drone manufacturing capabilities.[24] Iran has developed several ways to evade US sanctions on Iranian oil exports, such as conducting ship-to-ship transfers in Malaysia to obfuscate the origin of Iranian oil shipments to China.[25] Under the plan that Reuters reported on March 6, the United States would ask allies to inspect Iranian tankers transiting chokepoints, such as the Malacca Strait off the coast of Malaysia, to prevent illicit Iranian oil exports.[26] Iran has previously seized commercial tankers in response to Western seizures of Iranian tankers. Iran seized a tanker carrying Chevron oil in the Strait of Hormuz in April 2023 in response to the United States confiscating Iranian oil shipments, for example.[27] This incident resulted in a steep increase in crude oil prices.[28]

Syria has established some degree of economic cooperation with Russia amid negotiations between the Syrian interim government and Russia over Russian basing rights in Syria. A US-sanctioned, Barbados-flagged tanker arrived at the coast of Baniyas, Tartous Province, Syria, on March 6.[29] The United States sanctioned the vessel in January 2025 for transporting Russian oil.[30] Reuters reported that the vessel departed from the Russian port of Primorsk for Syria on February 8 carrying 37,000 metric tons of ultra-low sulphur diesel.[31] It is unclear whether the vessel has offloaded the diesel fuel at the time of this writing. The Syrian interim government has sought to obtain oil since Iran halted oil exports to Syria after the fall of the Assad regime. The Syrian government recently reached a deal with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in February 2025 to transport oil from SDF-controlled oil wells to government territory for refinement and use.[32] Russian oil exports to Syria would suggest that Russia seeks to reestablish its economic relationship with Syria, possibly to gain favor with the interim government and try to secure military basing rights in Syria.

Russian oil exports to Syria come as Syrian officials have expressed interest in developing economic ties with Russia in recent weeks. Russia delivered local Syrian currency to the Syrian central bank on February 12 following a call between Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara and Russian President Vladimir Putin.[33] Unspecified sources told the Wall Street Journal on March 5 that Syrian officials have sought to renegotiate the terms of several contracts that the Assad regime signed with Russia. These contracts cover Russian investments in phosphate mines and oil fields in the central Syrian desert, a fertilizer plant in Homs, and the port of Tartous.[34] A security force would be needed to protect Russian assets at mines and oil fields in the central Syrian desert given that ISIS regularly attacks facilities in this area. It is unclear whether the Syrian interim government would commit to protecting Russian assets or allow some Russian security presence at these sites. Russo-Syrian economic cooperation can take place without an agreement between the interim government and Russia about Russian basing rights in Syria. Russia could try to use its economic support for Syria as leverage to secure a "reduced” military presence in Syria, however.

The US and Israeli air forces conducted a joint exercise on March 4 to strengthen interoperability and prepare for "a range of scenarios.”[35] The drill involved Israeli F-15Is, F-35Is, and a US B-52 bomber.[36] The exercise comes after senior Iranian military commanders have resurfaced threats to conduct a direct attack on Israel. These threats likely aim to shape Israeli decision making and deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran.[37]

Prominent Druze militias and the Syrian government agreed to establish Suwaydawi-led security forces under interim Syrian government control in Suwayda Province. The Men of Dignity Movement announced on March 6 that it and other prominent Druze groups, including Mudafa al Karama and Ahrar Jabal al Arab Gathering, reached an agreement with the interim Syrian Interior Ministry.[38] The Men of Dignity said that Suwaydawi-led security forces will oversee security and fight criminal activity and drug trafficking in Suwayda with logistical support from the Interior Ministry.[39] The Interior Ministry sent eight police vehicles to Suwayda for the new security force to use and pledged to provide further support in the coming days.[40]

The Druze militias and interim government agreed that local leaders and residents from Suwayda would comprise the province’s security units, although it is unclear if Suwaydawis will have a majority presence in the units or if the units will only be comprised of Suwaydawis.[41] The Syrian government has not reached a similar security arrangement with any other minority group in Syria. The Men of Dignity have called for a decentralized system of government from Damascus since the fall of the Assad regime.[42] Shara has, for the most part, rejected minority groups’ calls for any type of federalist system. His acquiescence to the presumably Druze demand that security forces in Suwayda Province be comprised of Suwaydawis—likely Druze militia members—suggests that Shara is willing to relax his position under certain conditions. Shara could seek to make a similar agreement with the Kurds in northeastern Syria, who have similarly called for a decentralized governance system.

The Men of Dignity Movement’s agreement with the Syrian government is a departure from its previous position, in which the group prevented the entry of government forces into Suwayda Province. The HTS-led Department of Military Operations briefly deployed to western Suwayda Province for the first time on February 12 to contain tensions surrounding the murder of a local man, but it is unclear if government forces remained in the area or if they coordinated their operations with Druze militias.[43] The Syrian government has not forcibly deployed security forces to areas in Suwayda Province and has prioritized negotiations with local Druze authorities, likely to cultivate goodwill among Suwayda residents and the Druze community. A delegation of Druze officials, including Ahrar al Arab Gathering leader Sheikh Suleiman Abdul Baqi and former Men of Dignity member Laith al Balous, met with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on February 24 to discuss security cooperation in southern Syria.[44] Rising tensions in Suwayda over Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s demand to ”demilitarize” southern Syria may have contributed to the Men of Dignity’s willingness to cooperate with the Syrian government.[45]

Key Takeaways:

• Emerging Syrian Insurgency: Small-scale insurgent cells have started to emerge and attack Syrian interim government forces in certain areas of Syria. Former Assad regime members will very likely form the most effective insurgent cells, given their pre-established networks. These hardcore Assadists will likely exploit a variety of grievances against the Syrian interim government to recruit new members who may or may not be initially motivated by a desire to restore Assad.
• Iranian Sanctions Evasion: The United States is considering a plan in which it could ask allies to stop and inspect Iranian oil tankers, according to unspecified sources speaking to Reuters on March 6. Iran could respond to such a plan by attacking or seizing commercial vessels or tankers in the Persian Gulf.
• Russia in Syria: Syria has established some degree of economic cooperation with Russia amid negotiations between the Syrian interim government and Russia over Russian basing rights in Syria. Russian oil exports to Syria come as Syrian officials have expressed interest in developing economic ties with Russia in recent weeks.
• US-Israeli Exercises: The US and Israeli air forces conducted a joint exercise on March 4 to strengthen interoperability and prepare for "a range of scenarios.”
• Druze in Syria: Prominent Druze militias and the Syrian government agreed to establish Suwaydawi-led security forces under interim Syrian government control in Suwayda Province. The Druze militias and interim government agreed that local leaders and residents from Suwayda would comprise the province’s security units, although it is unclear if Suwaydawis will have a majority presence in the units or if the units will only be comprised of Suwaydawis.

Syria

Interim government forces concluded operations in al Sanamayn, north of Daraa, on March 6 after they engaged a militia in the area that collaborated with the Syrian regime.[46] Interim government forces deployed to al Sanamayn on March 5 after a militia led by Mohsen al Haymed killed two interim government security personnel.[47] Haymed’s faction has operated in al Sanamayn since at least 2018, when the group reconciled with the Assad regime and began collaborating with the regime Military Intelligence, according to Syrian opposition media.[48] Syrian media reported that clashes between interim government forces and Haymed’s faction killed eight interim government security personnel.[49] The Syrian Interim Defense Ministry reported on March 6 that it has arrested more than 60 members of Haymed’s faction and killed nine others.[50] It is unclear if Haymed remains at-large.[51]

Jordanian Border Guard forces thwarted a drug and weapons smuggling attempt along the Jordan-Syria border on March 6.[52] Jordanian border forces engaged the smugglers, killing four of them, while the remaining smugglers fled back into Syrian territory. Jordanian authorities recovered a large drug shipment and a Kalashnikov-style rifle from the smugglers.[53]

Israeli forces continued to operate in southern Quneitra Province on March 5 and 6. Israeli armored vehicles reportedly entered the village of Kudna and operated near a hill south of Kudna.[54]

The co-chairman of the Turkish pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party, Keskin Bayindir, called for the release of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan on March 6.[55] Bayindir said that Ocalan’s release is “necessary” to advance negotiations between the PKK and the Turkish government. Bayindir’s call comes after Ocalan urged the PKK to disarm and dissolve on February 27.[56] Multiple PKK leaders have expressed support for Ocalan's call.[57]

Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have continued to attack US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) positions in Aleppo and Raqqa provinces since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 5. Turkey and the SNA struck SDF positions near the Qara Qozak Bridge in eastern Aleppo Province.[58] The SDF reported that Turkish aircraft also struck an SDF position south of Kobani.[59] The SDF said that it shelled Turkish or Turkish-backed fighters near the Qara Qozak Bridge in response, killing one fighter.[60] Turkish drones struck SDF positions along the M4 highway on March 6.[61] The SNA shelled SDF positions near the Tishreen Dam on March 6.[62]

The Turkish Defense Ministry announced that Turkey has killed 26 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters in northern Iraq and Syria in the past week.[63] Turkey often conflates the SDF and the PKK-linked Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) with the PKK and uses “PKK” to refer to the entire SDF.

The United Kingdom (UK) suspended sanctions and asset freezes on 24 Syrian entities in the Syrian energy, banking, and transportation sectors on March 6.[64] The UK announced a plan to ease sanctions on Syria’s energy, transport, and financial sectors in February 2025.[65] The UK will maintain sanctions on members of the Assad regime and individuals involved in drug smuggling.[66] The UK stated on March 6 that it will continue to judge the interim government “by their actions, not their words.”[67] Shara and his allies have prioritized securing sanctions relief from the West since it formed the interim government in December 2024.[68]

Syrian Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani attended an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) meeting in The Hague on March 5.[69] Shaibani stated that his participation in the meeting reflected Syria’s commitment to international security and achieving justice for victims of the Assad regime’s chemical weapons attacks. Shaibani held meetings with International Criminal Court Prosecutor Karim Khan and Director General of the International Commission on Missing Persons Kathryne Bomberger.[70] Shaibani and Khan discussed efforts to strengthen transitional justice in Syria. Shaibani and Bomberger discussed increasing cooperation to search for individuals who disappeared under the Assad regime. Shaibani’s participation in the OPCW meeting is the latest in a series of international engagements that are designed to distance the Syrian interim government from the Assad regime’s crimes and portray the interim government as a moderate governing institution.

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continued to debate their strategy for the October 2025 parliamentary elections. Iraqi media reported on March 6 that several militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, may form a political alliance called the “Iraqi Resistance.”[71] The militias may join smaller alliances or ally with the Shia Coordination Framework in the upcoming elections. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which are backed by Iran. This report is consistent with recent reports that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ political wings may “join alliances” and form a political bloc “inspired by the Iraqi resistance,” possibly in reference to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.[72] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, that frequently targeted Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria during the October 7 War.[73] A well-organized political alliance could increase the militias’ representation in parliament and therefore increase Iranian influence in the Iraqi political sphere.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

Nothing significant to report.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian rial depreciated from 887,900 rials to one US dollar on March 5 to 891,700 rials to one US dollar on March 6.[74]

The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) issued a statement condemning Iranian noncompliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on March 5.[75] UK Ambassador to the IAEA Corinne Kitsell said that the United States and the E3 do not have “unlimited patience” and warned that the “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities could show that Iran is “in non-compliance with its safeguards agreements.” The IAEA passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[76] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose snapback sanctions in early March 2025.[77] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[78] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025.

The Iranian foreign affairs minister appointed former Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Reza Najafi as the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations (UN) in Vienna and the IAEA.[79] Najafi replaced Mohsen Naziri Asl who served in the role since 2022. Najafi previously served as the Iranian ambassador to the UN in Vienna and the IAEA between 2013 and 2018.[80] Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia and Germany) signed the JCPOA in 2015.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1897637704239562763 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1897666350115377632 ; https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1897716682300268686

[2] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1897666350115377632 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1897682953574261037

[3] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1897716682300268686 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1897777644520829401 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1897682953574261037

[4] https://t.me/nahermedia/45465

[5] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1897706473612099639

[6] https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf ; https://www.mei.edu/publications/mullah-omar-wants-you-taliban-mobilization-strategies-or-motivations-joining ; https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/psychology-of-participation-in-insurgency

[7] https://t.me/ALBADIA_24/3878 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1883109082300883054 ; https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1879091411045474646

[8] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1892243574315520505 ; https://www.mei.edu/publications/security-alawite-regions-post-assad-syria

[9] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1892119268881277373

[10] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1892119268881277373

[11] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1897710423195156853 ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/16/constant-fear-alawites-syria-homs-terrified-reprisals ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1897712035192094841

[12] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135799 ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/07/drug-captagon-turning-syria-into-narco-state

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/jaysh-al-mahdi ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-27-2023

[14] https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/61/Docs/Al-AnbarAwakeningVolII%5B1%5D.pdf ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1897723421955703278

[15] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1897706473612099639

[16] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1897723421955703278

[17] https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/61/Docs/Al-AnbarAwakeningVolII%5B1%5D.pdf

[18] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1897710698550972678; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1897764296358088933

[19] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1897710698550972678

[20] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1897764296358088933

[21] https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20200820 ; https://2017-2021.state.gov/syria-sanctions-designations-2/

[22] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-mulls-plan-disrupt-irans-oil-by-halting-vessels-sea-2025-03-06/

[23] https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/national-security-presidential-memorandum-nspm-2/

[24] https://www.cnbc.com/2025/03/06/us-will-collapse-irans-economy-by-shutting-down-its-oil-industry-treasury-secretary-says.html

[25] https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-iran-south-china-sea-oil-trade/ ; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russian-iranian-oil-supply-china-rebounds-new-vessels-cash-trade-2025-02-28/

[26] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-mulls-plan-disrupt-irans-oil-by-halting-vessels-sea-2025-03-06/

[27] https://x.com/US5thFleet/status/1651560354265145344 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/tanker-involved-us-seizure-iran-oil-cargo-changes-name-2023-09-20/

[28] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-mulls-plan-disrupt-irans-oil-by-halting-vessels-sea-2025-03-06/

[29] https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:753736/mmsi:314982000/imo:9322956/vessel:PROSPERITY

[30] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2777; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-ships-diesel-syria-tanker-under-us-sanctions-data-shows-2025-03-06/

[31] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-ships-diesel-syria-tanker-under-us-sanctions-data-shows-2025-03-06/

[32] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-northeast-begins-supplying-oil-damascus-oil-ministry-says-2025-02-22/

[33] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1890343048099303916 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-14-2025

[34] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/russia-is-chasing-a-deal-to-keep-its-military-bases-in-syria-f9f6ca6e?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1 ; https://www.ft.com/content/30ddfdd0-b83e-11e9-96bd-8e884d3ea203

[35] https://x.com/IDF/status/1897590213855068601; https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1897605258685071534

[36] https://x.com/IDF/status/1897590213855068601

[37] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-20-2025

[38] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1181914033301593&id=100044490217016

[39] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1181914033301593&id=100044490217016

[40] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1181914033301593&id=100044490217016

[41] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1181914033301593&id=100044490217016

[42] https://www.wsj.com/opinion/syria-has-a-new-governmentor-does-it-al-sharaa-hts-islamist-0f938cc5?mod=opinion_lead_pos12

[43] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1889625860702900324; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1889630059318649280

[44] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1894139731728109813

[45] https://www.yahoo.com/news/israel-wants-demilitarization-parts-southern-204817731.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-3-2025

[46] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/120539 ; https://t.me/Free_Daraa_city/1358 ;

[47] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1897223940709433548

[48] www dot npasyria.com/en/120576

[49] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1897393573915713627

[50] https://t.me/Free_Daraa_city/1358 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1897627238704521339

[51] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1897393573915713627

[52] https://www.hala dot jo/2025/03/06/%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%83-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9/

[53] https://www.hala dot jo/2025/03/06/%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%83-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9/

[54] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1897719477586084097 ; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1897361665601183861

[55] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/turkey/060320251

[56] https://x.com/ragipsoylu/status/1895120510109000176

[57] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/kurdistan/050320252 ; https://www.turkishminute dot com/2025/03/03/senior-pkk-figure-says-turkish-officials-engaged-in-talks-with-ocalan-for-a-year-before-his-historic-call/

[58] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/137231 ; https://npasyria dot com/206983/

[59] https://npasyria dot com/206983/

[60] https://npasyria dot com/206983/

[61] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/137246

[62] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/137259

[63] hhttps://x.com/tcsavunma/status/1897576112487612769

[64] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/update-on-syria-lifting-asset-freezes-on-24-entities

[65] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/update-on-uk-syria-sanctions-regime-minister-doughty-statement; https://www.barrons.com/articles/uk-plans-to-ease-syria-sanctionsafter-assad-fall-govt-8b5e25f5

[66] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/update-on-syria-lifting-asset-freezes-on-24-entities

[67] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/update-on-syria-lifting-asset-freezes-on-24-entities

[68] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/after-assad-navigating-syria-policy-part-1; https://english dot alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2024/12/29/syria-s-new-elections-and-draft-constitution-al-sharaa-outlines-timeline ; https://www.voanews.com/a/syrian-ministers-urge-lifting-of-us-sanctions-in-first-visit-to-doha/7924928.html ; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/16/world/middleeast/syria-al-shara-al-assad.html

[69] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1897171591223726453

[70] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/120550; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1897356929003085848

[71] https://almadapaper dot net/398044/

[72] https://almadapaper dot net/397373/

[73] https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2024/06/04/the-islamic-resistance-in-iraq-increases-its-drone-attacks-on-israel/

[74] https://www.tgju dot org/currency; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-5-2025

[75] https://ir.usembassy.gov/quad-statement-iaea-board-of-governors-meeting/

[76] https://ir.usembassy.gov/quad-statement-iaea-board-of-governors-meeting/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-nuclear-watchdogs-35-nation-board-passes-resolution-against-iran-2024-11-21/

[77] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-14-2024

[78] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf

[79] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/229297/Najafi-appointed-Iran-s-envoy-to-Vienna-based-intl-bodies

[80] https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2025/03/06/iran-appoints-new-envoy-to-un-nuclear-watchdog-