Iran Project

Iranian leadership dismissed several economic officials and emphasized fighting corruption between April 27 and May 1 to improve Iran’s economy, which is very unlikely to precipitate the meaningful economic change necessary to curb inflation and stabilize the Iranian rial. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called on parliament and the Raisi administration to fight economic corruption during a meeting with workers, labor organization members, and Raisi administration officials on April 29. President Ebrahim Raisi has engaged in numerous symbolic economic engagements in recent days. Raisi dismissed 15 unspecified managers in Khuzestan Province to demonstrate his administration’s “intolerance” of corruption during a two-day trip to this province on April 27-28. Raisi additionally ordered the formation of a working group on April 30 to “follow up on the issues” raised by Khamenei in his April 29 meeting with workers without providing further details. Raisi called on his administration to address the needs of contract workers and retirees—who have organized widespread strikes and protests in recent weeks—during a MAPNA Company event for International Workers’ Day on May 1.

President Ebrahim Raisi will visit Damascus on April 3 to initiate several economic projects, possibly to reinvigorate Iran’s economy by securing resources outside of Iran. Reuters reported on April 28 that Raisi will visit Syria on May 3 for a two-day trip, citing an informed source. An Iranian president has not visited Syria since 2011, when the Syrian civil war commenced. The source stated that the recent Iran-Saudi rapprochement and dialogue between Syria and other Arab states prompted the visit. The Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)-affiliated news outlet Al Akhbar reported that Raisi’s two-day visit would result in several economic agreements. An unidentified source cited by Al Akhbar claimed that Raisi’s visit is a part of a larger effort to broaden the Axis of Resistance’s activities beyond its current military activity. Iranian Roads and Urban Development Minister Mehrdad Bazarpash announced on April 25 that Iran intends to connect trade through Iran, Iraq, and Syria via a rail link to reduce tariffs and facilitate banking exchanges during a multi-day visit to Damascus. Bazarpash reported on April 26 that the Iranian-Syrian Joint Economic Forum established eight new committees focused on Iranian investment, energy, and electricity. Iran has cancelled previous economic projects in Syria, including the construction of two power stations on March 13, because the Assad regime sought to pay for the project in raw phosphate.

The domestic Iranian information space is currently shaped such that violence against religious figures is being viewed as part of escalating tensions between the public and Iranian regime. Iranian social media users circulated a video of an unidentified car driver seemingly trying to run over a cleric in Tehran City, Tehran Province on April 27. This incident follows a bank security guard killing Assembly of Experts member Ayatollah Abbas Ali Soleimani in Babolsar, Mazandaran Province on April 26. Many social media users have connected these incidents, arguing that the relationship between regime dissidents and loyalists has become more tense and sensitive in recent months. The driver’s motive for attempting to run over the cleric on April 27 remains unclear. It is possible that the driver deliberately attempted to harm the cleric out of frustration toward the regime. The driver’s decision to attack the cleric is noteworthy regardless of the motive given the extent to which the killing of Ali Soleimani captured the national attention the day prior.

An unidentified man shot and killed Shia cleric and Assembly of Experts member Ayatollah Abbas Ali Soleimani in a bank in Babolsar, Mazandaran Province on April 26. The assailant was a bank security guard who intentionally targeted Soleimani, although his motive remains unclear. Soleimani most recently represented Sistan and Baluchistan in the Assembly of Experts--the regime body responsible for selecting the supreme leader. Soleimani previously served as the Friday prayer leader of Kashan, Esfahan Province and Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province between 2001 and 2022. Soleimani oversaw Sunni affairs during his tenure as Zahedan Friday Prayer Leader. Soleimani’s connections to the historically restive Sistan and Baluchistan Province are noteworthy following heightened tensions between Iranian officials and Sistan and Baluchistan residents in recent months.

Qom Provincial Governor Mohammad Taghi Shah Cheraghi stated that the provincial government should take “negative measures” against unveiled women “in accordance with the law” during a 19 Dey Headquarters meeting on April 25. The 19 Dey Headquarters is an organization dedicated to preserving Qom’s status as Iran’s religious and revolutionary heartland. This organization met on April 25 to discuss the actions it has taken in the field of chastity and hijab. Regime officials have increasingly discussed using “positive” and “negative” measures to enforce the mandatory hijab law in recent weeks, although it is unclear what they mean exactly when using these terms.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei briefly lost control of his audience during a speech to Basij students on April 18, indicating the degree to which dissatisfaction has spread among parts of the Iranian regime’s most loyal factions. Western Persian-language outlets circulated leaked footage of the speech on April 22. The footage showed a Basij university student in the audience interrupting Khamenei’s speech, shouting “[regime officials] do not listen to the people’s voice.” Khamenei appeared to dismiss the student, leading the other audience members to reportedly protest Khamenei’s response. These audience members called on Khamenei to respond to the student’s grievances, after which Khamenei abruptly ended the speech. The outbursts from the audience are remarkable given that the regime likely vetted each participant thoroughly beforehand, permitting only individuals who ardently support the regime to attend the speech.

Former President Hassan Rouhani has made national referenda the focus of the Iranian political discourse, forcing the regime into a complicated public discussion over acceptable versus unacceptable referenda—the latter of which would pose an existential threat to the regime. Rouhani has repeatedly called for a national referendum on the regime’s domestic, economic, and foreign policies. Numerous regime officials and state news outlets have responded to Rouhani’s calls in recent days by discussing referenda, entrenching this issue in the domestic political discourse. Former Parliament Speaker and hardline politician Gholam Ali Haddad Adel stated that a referendum would create sedition during a political. Regime news outlets have argued that referenda are meant only to establish a new political system and not. These outlets make this distinction because rejecting all referenda would delegitimize the Islamic Republic, which was founded via a referendum in 1979. Many of these outlets acknowledged that the Iranian constitution allows the regime to hold referenda on “extremely important economic, political, social, and cultural matters.”

The IRGC is conducting a media campaign against former President Hassan Rouhani likely to alienate him further from the political establishment. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency published an article on April 20 asserting that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s speech on April 18 was directed at Rouhani, which is consistent with the assessment that CTP previously published on the speech. Khamenei stated during the speech that “the issues of the country cannot be solved by a referendum.” Khamenei was responding to repeated calls from Rouhani in recent weeks for a referendum on the regime’s domestic, economic, and foreign policies. The Tasnim News Agency article emphasized Khamenei’s disapproval of Rouhani and stated that audience members “made fun of Rouhani” during the speech. Tasnim News Agency has also published articles criticizing the idea of a referendum in recent days.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei shut down growing calls for a referendum on substantial political reform from within and outside the regime during a meeting with student activists on April 18. Khamenei stated that “the issues of the country are not subject to referendum,” following weeks of statements referencing referendums from prominent officials and leaders across Iran’s political spectrum. Former President Hassan Rouhani called for a referendum on the regime’s domestic, economic, and foreign policies during a meeting with former members of his administration on April 4, as CTP previously reported. Rouhani’s website subsequently published a video and analysis of Rouhani’s April 4 statements on April 9 and 17, respectively. Although Rouhani claims that the referendum he proposes is compatible with Iran’s current constitution, reforming Iran’s domestic, economic, and foreign policies would fundamentally alter the Islamic Republic that Khamenei has built since becoming supreme leader in 1989. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has also issued calls for limited governmental change. Ghalibaf met with Nategh Nouri, an associate of Rouhani, on April 18, as CTP previously reported, which indicates he may seek to cooperate with the former president. Khamenei previously dismissed reformist politician Mir Hossein Mousavi’s calls for “foundational change” in his March 21 Nowrouz address, claiming that Iran’s enemies seek to transform Iran by “changing the constitution or the structure of the regime.”

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf met with several key regime powerbrokers on April 18, possibly to promote a pragmatic hardliner political agenda in Iran. Ghalibaf held an iftar dinner with Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri, Ali Larijani, and Gholam Ali Haddad Adel—all of whom were previously parliament speakers at various points. Nategh Nouri is a moderate politician affiliated with former President Hassan Rouhani. Rouhani’s former chief of staff—Mahmoud Vaezi—described Rouhani and Nouri as having a “very good relationship” and stated that “they see each other all the time” during an interview in January 2023. Ali Larijani comes from the wealthy and historically influential Larijani family, which Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has politically marginalized in recent years. Larijani frequently cooperated with Rouhani when they were both in power to promote a moderate agenda. Haddad Adel is a hardline politician and the father-in-law of Mojtaba Khamenei—the son of Ali Khamenei. All the individuals in the meeting represent important factions across the Iranian political spectrum.