Publications

Iran Crisis Update, October 7

October 7, 2022 - ISW Press

Regime disinformation about protester deaths may further stoke anti-regime sentiment and even revitalize anti-regime demonstrations. The regime released a report on October 8 alleging that Mahsa Amini died from an underlying illness, refuting evidence that she died from police brutality. Iranian authorities are trying to deflect blame for Amini’s death. Regime-affiliated media outlets and officials similarly claimed that Sarina Esmail Zadeh and Nika Shakarami—two teenage protestors brutally killed by security forces--committed suicide. Iranian social media users are increasingly commemorating Esmail Zadeh and Shakarami, who are serving as secular martyrs around whom protesters can rally.

Addressing the New Era of Deterrence and Warfare: Visualizing the Information Domain - Part II

October 7, 2022 - ISW Press

The Institute for the Study of War and the IBM Center for The Business of Government have launched a three-event series, “Addressing the New Era of Deterrence and Warfare: Visualizing the Information Domain.” This post reflects the second roundtable discussion held in Brussels in September with a focus on Russia.

Iran Crisis Update, October 6

October 6, 2022 - ISW Press

Iran may attack the US, Israeli, and/or Saudi targets in retaliation for the role Iranian officials claim those countries have played in stoking the ongoing, anti-regime protests. This assessment is based on rhetoric from Iranian military leaders on October 6. Senior Iranian military officers released a statement accusing the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia of coopting and stoking the protests and vowed to retaliate. The content and nature of the statement suggests that the heads of each major military and security body approved its release. The statement did not list the names of these officers but noted that they are from the following military bodies:

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 6

October 6, 2022 - ISW Press

Russia’s use of Iranian-made drones is not generating asymmetric effects the way the Ukrainian use of US-provided HIMARS systems has done and is unlikely to affect the course of the war significantly. The deputy chief of the Main Operational Department of the Ukrainian General Staff, Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov, stated on October 6 that Russian forces have used a total of 86 Iranian Shahed-136 drones against Ukraine, 60% of which Ukrainian forces have already destroyed. As ISW reported yesterday, Russian forces do not appear to be focusing these drones on asymmetric nodes near the battlefield. They have used many drones against civilian targets in rear areas, likely hoping to generate nonlinear effects through terror. Such efforts are not succeeding. Ukrainian Air Force Command Spokesperson Yuri Ignat stated that the Russian army is increasingly using the Iranian-made drones to conserve its stock of high-precision missiles. Russian forces have likely used a non-trivial percentage of the Shahed-136 supply so far if the claims of an anonymous US intelligence official at the end of August were correct that Iran would likely provide ”hundreds” of drones to Russia.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 5

October 5, 2022 - ISW Press

Ukraine’s northern Kharkiv counteroffensive has not yet culminated after one month of successful operations and is now advancing into western Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian forces captured Hrekivka and Makiivka in western Luhansk Oblast (approximately 20 km southwest of Svatove) on October 5.[1] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai reported that Ukrainian forces have begun liberating unspecified villages in Luhansk Oblast on October 5.[2] Ukrainian forces began the maneuver phase of their counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast— which has now reached Luhansk Oblast—on September 6.[3] Russian forces have failed to hold the banks of the Oskil and Siverskyi Donets rivers and leverage them as natural boundaries to prevent Ukrainian forces from projecting into vulnerable sections of Russian-occupied northeast Ukraine. The terrain in western Luhansk is suitable for the kind of rapid maneuver warfare that Ukrainian forces used effectively in eastern Kharkiv Oblast in early September, and there are no indications from open sources that the Russian military has substantially reinforced western Luhansk Oblast. Ukraine’s ongoing northern and southern counteroffensives are likely forcing the Kremlin to prioritize the defense of one area of operations at the expense of another, potentially increasing the likelihood of Ukrainian success in both.

Iran Crisis Update, October 5

October 5, 2022 - ISW Press

Anti-regime protests seemingly subsided in extent and size on October 5. October 5 marks the death of a prominent Shia Imam and is a national holiday in Iran, possibly explaining the decrease in protest activity in Iranian high schools. The regime’s ongoing internet and telecommunication restrictions are likely limiting the open-source information available on anti-regime demonstrations.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 4

October 4, 2022 - ISW Press

Ukrainian forces continued to make significant gains in Kherson Oblast while simultaneously continuing advances in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts on October 4. Ukrainian forces liberated several settlements on the eastern bank of the Inhulets River along the T2207 highway, forcing Russian forces to retreat to the south toward Kherson City. Ukrainian forces also continued to push south along the Dnipro River and the T0403 highway, severing two Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in northern Kherson Oblast and forcing Russians south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border toward the Beryslav area. Ukrainian military officials noted that the Ukrainian interdiction campaign is crippling Russian attempts to transfer additional ammunition, reserves, mobilized men, and means of defense to frontline positions. Ukrainian forces also continued to advance east of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast, and Russian sources claimed that battles are ongoing near the R66 Svatove-Kreminna highway.

Iran Crisis Update, October 4

October 4, 2022 - ISW Press

University and high school students have begun largely leading the ongoing protest movement in Iran—at least for the moment. Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 17 cities in 14 provinces on October 4, primarily around universities and high schools. Students expressed frustration with the regime and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 3

October 3, 2022 - ISW Press

Ukrainian forces continued to make substantial gains around Lyman and in Kherson Oblast in the last 48 hours. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian troops made significant breakthroughs in northern Kherson Oblast between October 2 and 3. Geolocated footage corroborates Russian claims that Ukrainian troops are continuing to push east of Lyman and may have broken through the Luhansk Oblast border in the direction of Kreminna. As ISW has previously reported, the Russian groupings in northern Kherson Oblast and on the Lyman front were largely comprised of units that had been regarded as among Russia’s premier conventional fighting forces before the war. Elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army reportedly withdrew from Lyman to rear positions near Kreminna before October 2. Russian sources previously reported that elements of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV), especially the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, are active in Kherson Oblast. Both the 144th Motorized Rifle Division and the 76th Guards Air Assault Division were previously lauded as some of Russia’s most elite forces, and their apparent failures to hold territory against major Ukrainian counter-offensive actions is consistent with ISW’s previous assessment that even the most elite Russian military forces are becoming increasingly degraded as the war continues. This phenomenon was also visible in the collapse of the 4th Tank Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army earlier in the Kharkiv counter-offensive.

Iran Crisis Update, October 3

October 3, 2022 - ISW Press

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei made his first public appearance since September 21. He spoke at a military officer graduation ceremony alongside the regime’s most senior military leaders. Khamenei appeared in stable condition during his speech. Khamenei condemned the ongoing, anti-regime protests during his speech—his first public acknowledgment of the protests. Khamenei accused the US and Israel of stoking the protests and said that the greatest victims were the state security services “and the Iranian nation.” Khamenei honored the security personnel killed in the protests.

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