Publications

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 11, 2023

May 11, 2023 - ISW Press

Ukrainian forces likely broke through some Russian lines in localized counterattacks near Bakhmut, prompting responses from Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces retreated up to two kilometers behind Russian lines in unspecified sectors of the Bakhmut front. Syrskyi’s confirmation of Ukrainian gains prompted a response from Prigozhin, who claimed that Ukrainian forces have started the counteroffensive and recaptured three kilometers of ground in and around Bakhmut. The Russian MoD acknowledged the Ukrainian counterattacks uncharacteristically quickly, claiming that Russian forces repelled eight ground attacks and three reconnaissance-in-force efforts in the Donetsk direction but denied reports that Ukrainian forces broke through the Russian defensive lines. Prigozhin’s and the MoD’s responses are reflective of increased panic in the Russian information space over speculations about planned Ukrainian counteroffensives and indicate increased concern among Wagner and Russian MoD leadership as well as reflecting Kremlin guidance to avoid downplaying Ukrainian successes.

Salafi-Jihadi Movement Update Special Edition: Protests in Pakistan, May 11, 2023

May 11, 2023 - ISW Press

Unrest may continue in Pakistan despite efforts by the Pakistani government and former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan to deescalate the protests. The Pakistani Supreme Court ruled on May 11 that the government’s arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan on May 9 was illegal, while Khan separately urged calm from his supporters on May 11. CTP observed two protests in Pakistan on May 11, down from 24 protests on May 10, but the Pakistani government continued to target former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehrek-e Insaf (PTI) to suppress its protest movement. Pakistan has also arrested thousands of PTI supporters and several senior PTI leaders, and clashes between the PTI and Pakistani security forces have killed and injured dozens of protestors. An anonymous senior Pakistani official told CBS News that at least eight people had been killed in the protests, but the PTI says the number of killed is in the dozens, which could fuel continued or renewed protests. The poor economic and political conditions that led to the current crisis persist and may worsen as Pakistan begins to prepare for elections in October. Khan and his PTI supporters and the Pakistani security establishment remain at odds, and the recent round of protests will exacerbate this situation.

Salafi-Jihadi Movement Update Special Edition: Protests in Pakistan, May 10, 2023

May 10, 2023 - ISW Press

The crisis resulting from the arrest of former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan and the eruption of violent protests against the Pakistani military is deepening. Hostility between Khan’s Tehrik-e-Insaf Party (PTI) and the Pakistani military is causing PTI protesters to deliberately target military and police infrastructure across Pakistan. Demonstrators set fire to multiple police stations in Islamabad and exchanged small arms fire with Pakistani security forces outside the Frontier Corps’ headquarters in Peshawar on May 10. Relations between Imran Khan and the Pakistani military have deteriorated since at least late 2021 when Imran Khan refused to approve senior Pakistani military appointments. Khan claimed that the Pakistani military and United States helped to remove him from office after an April 2022 vote of no-confidence, and separately accused Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Major General Faisal Naseer of an assassination attempt against Khan in November 2022. PTI supporters burned down Naseer’s home on May 10.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 10, 2023

May 10, 2023 - ISW Press

Ukrainian forces conducted successful limited counterattacks around Bakhmut on May 9. Geolocated footage published on May 9 and 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely conducted successful limited counterattacks north of Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut) and northwest of Bila Hora (14km southwest of Bakhmut) and made marginal advances in these areas. Ukrainian sources claimed on May 9 that Ukrainian forces destroyed the 6th and 8th companies of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 3rd Army Corps near Bakhmut and advanced 2.6km along a 3km frontline in the area, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these reported wider Ukrainian advances. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on May 10 that the Ukrainian forces tried to advance further in the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade’s zone of responsibility in the Bakhmut area following Ukrainian counterattacks on May 9 but that formations of an unspecified Russian paramilitary company (PMC) prevented a Ukrainian breakthrough. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) are constraining the actions of Ukrainian forces on the flanks around Bakhmut. ISW has previously assessed that reports of Ukrainian counterattacks throughout Donetsk Oblast appear to be a part of an ongoing pattern of localized and limited counterattacks.

Managing the New Era of Deterrence and Warfare: Visualizing the Information Domain

May 10, 2023 - ISW Press

The Institute for the Study of War and the IBM Center for The Business of Government in 2022 launched a three-event series, “Addressing the New Era of Deterrence and Warfare: Visualizing the Information Domain.” This report is the capstone of a series that our two organizations led over the past year, which convened leaders from allied, partnered, and U.S. militaries, governments, academia, and industry to envision and shape future strategic advantages through visualizing information operations.

Salafi-Jihadi Movement Update Special Edition: Protests in Pakistan, May 9, 2023

May 10, 2023 - ISW Press

Violent protests erupted across Pakistan after the arrest of former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan on May 9. These protests targeted Pakistani military facilities and institutions across Pakistan. Protesters stormed the Pakistani Army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi and the regional parliament building for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province in Peshawar. Protesters also burned the IV Corps commander’s residence inside the military cantonment in Lahore. Protests against the Pakistani military are uncommon and represent a decline in public trust in the Pakistani military and state institutions. Khan accused the United States and Pakistan military of a conspiracy to remove him from office after the Pakistani parliament voted him out of office in April 2022. Khan and his Tehrik-e-Insaf Party (PTI) led several large-scale marches across Pakistan against the government to protest the vote of no confidence in 2022. Unknown attackers attempted to assassinate Khan in November 2022, leading to three weeks of widespread protests by PTI supporters who demonstrated outside military and government sites. Protesters did not storm military and government sites during the unrest in November 2022.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 9, 2023

May 9, 2023 - ISW Press

Russian President Vladimir Putin declined to use his Victory Day address to make any significant rhetorical changes and reiterated existing narratives, preparing for a protracted war and framing Russia as successfully resisting the entire West. Putin stated in his annual address marking the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany on May 9 that “a real war has been unleashed against Russia” and that Russia has repelled international terrorism and will continue to “defend” residents in Donbas. Putin has previously claimed the West is waging a global “war” against Russia.” Putin has previously referred to the Russian military campaign in Ukraine as a ”war” but this rhetoric, whether an intentional acknowledgement of the scale of the fighting or not, has not corresponded with any changes in the Kremlin’s approach to the “special military operation.” Putin similarly declined to use recent notable events such as his annual New Year’s Eve address or his February 2023 address to the Federal Assembly to offer any concrete vision on how to reverse the Russian military’s setbacks in Ukraine or reframe the war. Putin has instead used these events to reinforce long-standing rhetorical lines aimed at preparing the Russian public for a protracted war in Ukraine by evoking the memory of World War Two without calling on Russian society to support full mobilization.

Iran Update, May 8, 2023

May 8, 2023 - ISW Press

Iran is maneuvering to economically benefit from Syria’s reintegration into the region, which may enable Iran to circumvent US and international sanctions, as well as support Iranian-backed militias operating in Syria. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi signed 15 cooperative agreements with Syria on May 3 in a push to be the primary provider of reconstruction projects in Syria. CTP previously assessed that Iran may use the Iranian para-statal organization Khatam al Anbia or Iranian-backed proxy companies to oversee such reconstruction projects. Iranian Free Trade, Industrial, and Special Economic Zones Supreme Council Secretary Hojatollah Abdol Maleki stated on May 6 that plans to establish a free trade zone between Iran, Iraq, and Syria have entered a “technical and implementation stage.” Maleki suggested the free trade zone may extend to the Latakia port and the Al Qaim Iraq-Syria border crossing. A free trade zone through Syria, Iraq, and Iran would allow Iran to move materiel across borders without oversight that would normally enforce sanctions on trade with Syria and Iran. The Arab League voted on May 7 to readmit Syria, after which an unidentified Jordanian official claimed that the Arab League will lobby to lift Western sanctions on Syria if the Assad regime agrees to a political solution to end the crisis. The end of sanctions on Syria with the establishment of a free trade zone and Iranian reconstruction projects would enable Iran to circumvent Western sanctions on Iran.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 8, 2023

May 8, 2023 - ISW Press

Russian forces conducted another large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of May 7 to 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 8 that Russian forces launched 16 missiles at Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts, and that Ukrainian forces shot down all 35 launched Shahed drones. Kyiv Mayor Vitaly Klitschko stated that Ukrainian forces shot down 36 Russian drones targeting Kyiv out of a 60 total launched against Ukraine, however. Klitschko did not specify how many total drones Ukrainian forces shot down elsewhere in Ukraine. Klitschko’s report is more likely accurate as it was posted nearly four hours after the initial round of Ukrainian reporting on the Shahed strike. The Ukrainian Red Cross stated that one Russian missile destroyed an entire Red Cross warehouse in Odesa Oblast. Russian milbloggers celebrated claims that Russian forces intensified strikes against Kyiv, with one milblogger claiming that Russian forces conducted the largest strike campaign against Kyiv since the start of the war. Russian sources are likely overcompensating for ineffectiveness of the drone strikes by playing up the size and scale of the effort.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 7, 2023

May 7, 2023 - ISW Press

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov may have compelled the Russian theater commander in Ukraine, Army General Valery Gerasimov, to resume artillery ammunition distribution to the Wagner forces in Bakhmut despite Gerasimov’s desired de-prioritization of that effort. Prigozhin announced on May 7 that he had obtained a document from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that promised to supply Wagner forces with the ammunition and weapons necessary to maintain offensive operations in Bakhmut. Prigozhin has not published the official document and ISW cannot verify Prigozhin’s claims at this time. The Russian MoD likely has not fundamentally changed its intention of deprioritizing offensive operations and conserving munitions across the theater, as ISW has recently assessed. Prigozhin and Kadyrov likely effectively blackmailed the Russian MoD into allocating resources to Wagner forces in Bakhmut by threatening to pull Kadyrov’s Chechen forces from other parts of the theater to relieve Wagner forces in Bakhmut. Prigozhin also claimed that the MoD gave Wagner complete freedom of operations in Bakhmut and appointed Army General Sergey Surovikin as an intermediary between the MoD and Wagner, actions that would indicate that Gerasimov and possibly Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu lack the ability to command Prigozhin and Kadyrov as subordinates but must instead negotiate with them as peers. This assessment assumes that Prigozhin’s claims that the MoD was withholding shells but has now agreed to supply them are true—the MoD has made no official statements regarding those claims—and Ukrainian officials report that they have not observed a decline in Wagner shelling during this period (see below).

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