Publications

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 9, 2024

January 9, 2024 - ISW Press

A Ukrainian public opinion survey on Ukrainian attitudes towards the Ukrainian government and military indicates that Ukrainian society overwhelmingly supports Ukraine’s military and its leadership while experiencing tensions typical in a society fighting an existential defensive war. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KMIS) published a survey on December 18, 2023, that it conducted between November 29 and December 9, 2023, that shows that 96 percent of respondents support the Ukrainian Armed Forces, 88 percent trust Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, and 66 percent trust Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. 84 percent of respondents in a previous KMIS poll conducted in December 2022 expressed trust in Zelensky, and trust in many Ukrainian institutions experienced a similar decline between December 2022 and 2023 – an unsurprising development given the protracted war. The Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), the Ukrainian National Police, and Ukrainian volunteers did not see similar decreases in polled public trust during this time.

Iran Update, January 8, 2024

January 8, 2024 - ISW Press

Palestinian militias are continuing to report attacks in the northern Gaza Strip to their higher headquarters after their fighters return to rear areas. The delays in reporting may indicate a loss of command and control over some units that are engaged with Israeli forces, as CTP-ISW previously assessed. Hamas’ military wing, the al Qassem Brigades, claimed on January 8 that its fighters “returned from the [frontlines in northwest Gaza City]” and reported that they fired anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Engineering Corps armored personnel carrier. These fighters' inability to communicate with higher headquarters until returning to rear areas means that their commanders may be unable to transmit orders to fighters engaged with the IDF. These possible difficulties in command and control extend to other Palestinian militia groups fighting in the northern Gaza Strip. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s (PFLP) military wing, the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, claimed on January 8 that it reestablished ”contact with combat units” and confirmed that its fighters targeted three IDF vehicles with unspecified weapons in Tuffah in the northern Gaza Strip.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 8, 2024

January 8, 2024 - ISW Press

Ukrainian officials highlighted the need for more air defense systems after another large series of Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 7 to 8. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched a total of 59 missiles and drones against Ukraine including: eight Shahed-136/-131 drones; seven S-300/400 missiles; four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles; 24 Kh-101/555/55 and eight Kh-22 cruise missiles; six Iskander-M ballistic missiles; and two Kh-31P air guided missiles. Ukrainian military officials reported that the Russian strikes targeted critical and civilian infrastructure, and military facilities in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts and that Ukrainian forces downed all eight Shaheds and 18 Kh-101/555/55 cruise missiles. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that the percentage of Russian air targets that Ukrainian forces shot down on the night of January 7 to 8 did not change in comparison to previous, more intense Russian strikes, but that Ukraine needs to intercept more Russian missiles and drones given the large number of such systems that Russia regularly launches.

Iran Update, January 7, 2024

January 7, 2024 - ISW Press

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on January 6 that it “dismantled” the 12 Hamas battalions in the northern Gaza Strip. IDF officials added that they have dismantled Hamas’ “military framework” in the northern Gaza Strip. An Israeli Army Radio defense correspondent reported on January 6 that Israeli forces no longer permanently operate in the entire area of the northern strip and have moved to the border with Israel. IDF spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari said on January 6 that the IDF would focus on the central and southern parts of the Gaza Strip and strengthen defenses along the Israel-Gaza Strip border fence. These announcements are consistent with the IDF stating that it would establish a security buffer zone in the northern Gaza Strip in the third phase of its operations. This third phase also involved Israeli forces conducting raids against Hamas compounds, destroying tunnels, killing remaining fighters, and seizing intelligence and military equipment. CTP-ISW assessed on December 22 that, in Hamas’ Northern Strip Brigade and Gaza City Brigade, three battalions are combat ineffective, eight are degraded, and one is combat effective. CTP-ISW assesses that the al Qassem Brigades’ Radwan Battalion is degraded but not combat ineffective. Israeli forces captured a Hamas compound in Sheikh Radwan neighborhood of Gaza City on January 2. The militia has not claimed attacks in the neighborhood since December 30, 2023.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 7, 2024

January 7, 2024 - ISW Press

Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to court Russian servicemen and their families ahead of the March 2024 presidential election during a meeting with family members of deceased Russian servicemen on January 6. Putin met with family members of Russian servicemen who died in Ukraine at his residence in Novo-Ogaryovo to celebrate Orthodox Christmas. Putin highlighted the heroism of the deceased Russian servicemen who “defend[ed] the interests of [Russia].” Putin repeatedly reiterated the Russian government’s support for the families of Russian servicemen and delegated responsibility for the continuous support of these families to Russian officials at all levels throughout Russia. Putin has recently attended similar events during which he presented himself as a gracious leader who cares about the well-being of Russian military personnel and paraded his power to fulfill servicemen's requests and deal with issues. Putin is likely using these recurring, publicized meetings as part of his election campaign, as Russian servicemen and their family members comprise a sizable constituency, and their public support for Putin is vital for the Kremlin’s ability to present the Russian population as largely in support of the war in Ukraine.

Iran Update, January 6, 2024

January 6, 2024 - ISW Press

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued conducting clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip on January 6. The IDF said that the 179th Armored Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) conducted an intelligence-driven raid in an unspecified area in Gaza City. The brigade captured Hamas military equipment in UNRWA bags in a UNRWA clinic. The brigade also captured RPGs, Kalashnikovs, and small arms ammunition in a nearby building. The Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) engaged several Hamas fighters in Beit Lahia on January 5. Artillery units from the 215th Artillery Brigade and the 143rd (Gaza) Division’s artillery units provided fire support to the Nahal Brigade in Beit Lahia.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 6, 2024

January 6, 2024 - ISW Press

Ukrainian forces are conducting a multi-day strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea and have successfully struck several targets throughout the peninsula. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck an administrative building at the Russian airfield in occupied Saky, Crimea with up to four Storm Shadow cruise missiles on the night of January 5 to 6. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed five Ukrainian drones and four missiles over the Black Sea and Crimea on the night of January 5 to 6 and six Ukrainian Neptune missiles over the northwestern Black Sea on January 6. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk thanked Ukrainian pilots for successfully striking targets at the Saky airfield but did not specify if he was referring to Ukrainian strikes on January 4, 5, or 6. Oleshchuk posted satellite imagery showing the target of the reported successful Ukrainian strike at the Saky airfield, although ISW is currently unable to identify what the target was. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on January 6 that the GUR, Ukrainian Air Force, and Ukrainian forces conducted a complex special operation that struck Russian radar positions at the Saky airfield and an equipment depot near Hryshyne (60km northeast of Yevpatoria) on January 4. GUR posted satellite imagery showing damage to the Russian ammunition depot near Hryshyne. Ukrainian officials and sources have reported that Ukrainian forces have also struck an air defense radar system and a communications center in Yevpatoria responsible for coordinating Russian air defense operations in occupied Crimea, ammunition warehouses near Pervomaiske (82km north of Simferopol), and a Russian command post near Sevastopol in strikes since January 4. Ukrainian and Russian reporting indicates that Ukrainian missiles and drones are penetrating Russian air defenses in occupied Crimea and have successfully struck some intended targets.

Iran Update, January 5, 2024

January 5, 2024 - ISW Press

Iran and its proxies—not the United States—are driving escalation in the region to advance their long-held strategic objectives. An end to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip will not on its own stop Iranian escalation because Iran’s effort to expel the United States from the region and decrease US influence transcends the war.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment: January 5, 2024

January 5, 2024 - ISW Press

Russian forces may intensify efforts to capture Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, in the coming weeks and have a grouping of forces in the area that appears to be less degraded than Russian groupings responsible for offensive efforts elsewhere in eastern Ukraine. Russian forces appear to have conditions conducive to intensifying operations in the Kupyansk direction (Kharkiv-Luhansk oblast area) with the intent of making territorial gains in areas that are more operationally significant than other areas that Russian forces are currently attempting to seize,

Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, January 4, 2024: Ethiopia-Somaliland Port Deal and al Qaeda Offensive in Central Mali

January 5, 2024 - ISW Press

Horn of Africa. Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with the de facto independent Somaliland Republic, a breakaway region of Somalia, to lease a naval port that will give it Red Sea access in exchange for formally recognizing Somaliland. The port deal has severely strained Somali-Ethiopian relations and increased anti-Ethiopian sentiment in southern Somalia, which will likely weaken regional counterterrorism cooperation and energize al Shabaab. Ethiopia’s African Red Sea neighbors in Djibouti, Egypt, and Eritrea will likely view an Ethiopian base as a threat, while the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) strong ties with the Ethiopian government will strengthen the Emiratis’ position in its regional rivalry with other Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

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