Publications

Africa File Special Edition: M23 March Threatens Expanded Conflict in DR Congo and Regional War in the Great Lakes

January 31, 2025 - ISW Press

Rwandan-backed M23 rebels captured Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu, which marks the most significant escalation in the conflict in the eastern DRC since the group last seized Goma in 2012. The group will seek to consolidate control over Goma, nearby mineral-rich areas, and the surrounding supply lines. The war in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) will likely continue to escalate in the short term because M23’s military gains have not forced the DRC to agree to negotiations with M23, and Rwanda is better positioned to deter potential sanctions that caused it to cut its vital support for M23 in 2012.

Iran Update, January 30, 2025

January 30, 2025 - ISW Press

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) released three Israeli hostages during the third hostage release on January 30. Hamas released a female soldier hostage in the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas transferred her to the International Committee of the Red Cross in the eastern Jabalia refugee camp. PIJ released two Israeli civilian hostages in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip. Hamas also released five Thai hostages on January 30. Israel released 110 Palestinian prisoners in exchange.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 30, 2025

January 30, 2025 - ISW Press

Kremlin newswire TASS published an interview with Valdai Discussion Club Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov on January 30 entitled "Don't count on big agreements," highlighting the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to shape domestic and global expectations about future negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump.... Lukyanov's statements are yet another indication that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this goal.

Africa File, January 30, 2025

January 30, 2025 - ISW Press

The Rwandan-backed M23 rebels seized control of Goma for the first time since 2012 and are continuing their advance southward toward the South Kivu provincial capital of Bukavu. 

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 30, 2025

January 30, 2025 - ISW Press

The Taiwanese government has created a blacklist of 52 PRC-owned ships that warrant greater scrutiny to keep track of the PRC’s growing “shadow fleet” of ostensibly commercial vessels that act on behalf of the PRC. The Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), an inter-governmental co-operative organization in the Asia-Pacific devoted to ensuring effective port state control, passed on a list of “problematic” ships to Taiwan, which the Taiwanese government later narrowed down to certain ships owned by PRC individuals or entities. The list focuses on cargo ships that are registered in Cameroon, Tanzania, Mongolia, Togo, and Sierra Leone. These five countries have the largest number of ships with problematic documentation, violations of maritime safety and labor regulations, or evasion of sanctions, according to Tokyo MOU.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 29, 2025

January 29, 2025 - ISW Press

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's ability to maintain its defense against Russian aggression. Putin gave an interview to Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published on January 28 in which he claimed that the war in Ukraine could be over within two months if the West stops providing Ukraine with military assistance and that Ukraine's dependence on Western military aid indicates that Ukraine has "no sovereignty." Putin's claims about how quickly the war will end without further Western military assistance and his explicit rejection of Ukrainian sovereignty are a part of long-term Kremlin information operations aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and deterring additional Western military assistance.

Iran Update, January 29, 2025

January 29, 2025 - ISW Press

The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim Syrian government held a “victory conference” on January 29, during which it formalized much of its consolidation of power since the fall of Bashar al Assad. The conference announced the appointment of HTS leader Ahmed al Shara as the transitional president, though has informally been the de-factor of the interim government for months. Shara is now responsible for forming an interim legislative council until a new constitution is drafted and approved, according to the conference

Iran Update, January 28, 2025

January 28, 2025 - ISW Press

Turkish officials appear to believe that a planned call by imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm would pressure the SDF into an agreement to disarm and integrate into the HTS-led interim government. Turkey and Ocalan have reportedly reached an agreement in which Ocalan will publicly call on the PKK to “lay down arms” on February 15. Unspecified Turkish officials told regional media on January 27 that Ocalan's announcement would "easily" pressure the SDF to integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 28, 2025

January 28, 2025 - ISW Press

The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria. The Russian delegation includes Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Presidential Special Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev. Reuters reported that two Syrian sources stated that the delegation will meet with the new Syrian government sometime this week. Bogdanov told Russian state media outlet RT that the visit aims to strengthen Russian-Syrian historical relations based on common interests.

The Russia-Iran Coalition Deepens

January 28, 2025 - ISW Press

Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally shifted and intensified the Russo-Iranian relationship. Tehran has leveraged Moscow’s growing material and financial requirements to sustain its war effort to support Tehran’s own domestic and foreign policy objectives. The core of the Russo-Iranian relationship is a mutually binding interest in challenging and eventually overturning the US-led world order. This shared ideological core allowed the Russo-Iranian relationship to weather and survive tensions and challenges that have arisen since 2022, and the United States should not expect this ideological core to weaken in the years ahead.

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