Toplines
The PLA is likely aiming to improve its understanding of unmanned systems warfare by training alongside Russian units. The PLA could use this experience to improve its ability to operate in a drone-saturated environment during an invasion of Taiwan. The Economist reported on July 23 that anonymous sources familiar with European intelligence reports claimed that PLA soldiers have undergone combat training at a Russian military complex near Volgograd.[1] The complex is used by the Russian Armed Forces’ 8th Guards Combined Arms Army, which has seen extensive combat in Ukraine.[2] The training reportedly encompassed unmanned systems warfare and urban combat, suggesting that the PLA was seeking to gain Russian expertise in modern drone warfare.[3] The PLAN also conducted joint exercises with elements of the Russian Pacific Fleet that practiced countering an attack from unmanned platforms at sea.[4]
The PLA is likely interested in developing tactics and operating concepts to counter many of the difficulties the Russian Armed Forces have experienced in conducting operational maneuver and establishing sea control during its invasion. The Russian Navy began establishing unmanned systems regiments on July 1 and has extensive experience in the use of drones at the tactical level and in long-range strike campaigns.[5] ISW-CDOT has assessed that the PLA has shown particular interest in Russia’s “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, which supports frontline operations and directs research and development for unmanned platforms.[6] PRC state broadcaster CCTV published footage on July 27 of PLA air defense units practicing the interception of low-flying, slow-moving targets that resembled long-range attack drones, suggesting the PLA has looked at Russia’s experience in attempting to counter such attacks for its own training exercises.[7]
The PLA is unlikely to be completely satisfied with the lessons it can extract from the Russian military’s own experience, however, and will likely seek to develop its own methods of adapting to modern battlefield changes. ISW has assessed that the Russian military has optimized its forces fight a positional war in Ukraine and has temporarily accepted that it is incapable of operational mechanized maneuver.[8] The Russian Navy has likewise not been successful in securing sea control in the face of Ukrainian unmanned systems and is instead focused on mitigating its losses.[9] The PLA is highly unlikely to prevail in an invasion of Taiwan where it is incapable of securing sea control of the Taiwan Strait or is forced to fight a positional battle on Taiwan’s coast. The PLA may therefore seek to integrate select aspects of Russian tactics into its own practices, rather than adopting Russian warfighting methods entirely.
The PLAN has likely improved its surface fleet’s anti-surface warfare capabilities. The PLAN may rely on an asymmetric advantage in anti-ship missile (AShM) technology in a conflict with the United States to make up for relative weakness in other key areas of naval combat. PRC state broadcaster CCTV published footage on July 29 of a PLAN Type 052D guided-missile destroyer launching a YJ-20 AShM ballistic missile.[10] This is the first time an official PRC source has confirmed the Type 052D’s ability to launch the YJ-20.[11] The PRC has previously tested the YJ-20 from the PLAN’s Type 055 guided-missile destroyer.[12] The PLAN operates 10 Type 055s and 37 Type 052Ds.[13] The YJ-20 has a maximum range between 1,500 and 2,000km, can maneuver during the re-entry phase of its flight, and can reach speeds up to Mach 9, making it difficult to intercept.[14]
The PLAN may seek to develop an asymmetric advantage in its AShM missile arsenal to improve its ability to contest sea control beyond the first island chain. The PLAN remains inferior to the United States in undersea warfare, naval aviation, and at-sea replenishment.[15] The PLAN has steadily improved the range and speed of its AShM capabilities, however.[16] The US Navy has traditionally allocated the AShM mission to carrier air wings and does not field long-range AShMs on its surface vessels that can rival the PLAN’s.[17] The PLAN’s advantage in long-range AShMs, particularly hypersonic variants, could allow the PLAN to engage US surface forces beyond the first island chain during a conflict without placing PLAN forces at risk of retaliation.
The PLAN’s development of increasingly long-ranged AShM capabilities could also allow dispersed surface forces to conduct mutually supporting operations, enhancing their effectiveness in a missile and drone saturated environment. The United States Navy, in recognition of how missile salvo combat may change naval warfare, has pursued an operating concept of “Distributed Maritime Operations” (DMO) since 2022.[18] DMO seeks to disperse capabilities across the fleet while concentrating their effects at key points to decrease the vulnerability of surface forces to modern weaponry like AShMs and unmanned systems.[19] The PLA may have observed similar developments in modern naval warfare and is seeking to create weapons systems that support fleet dispersal without diminishing firepower. Long-range hypersonic weapons fired from surface vessels allow dispersed combatants to concentrate on the same targets without providing a larger target to the enemy.[20] The PLAN could leverage this dynamic to ensure its surface fleet stays in the fight for as long as possible while holding US surface forces at risk up to the second island chain.
The Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro Jr. said in a July 24 interview with One News PH that the Philippines cannot remain neutral in a conflict between the PRC and Taiwan, representing one of the strongest Philippine commitments to Taiwan yet. Teodoro stated that his reasoning for this statement was rooted in the fact that many Filipino citizens live in Taiwan and that any PRC action against Taiwan will likely involve the Bashi Channel in the northern Philippines.[21] Teodoro said that the PRC would also try to blockade parts of the Pacific Ocean, which would affect other countries.[22]
Teodoro’s comments are a public assertion of the Philippine government’s stance on “the Taiwan issue” amidst fraying relations with the PRC. Teodoro’s statement follows a May 18 statement by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to Japanese media that the Philippines would likely be involved in a Taiwan conflict, which Marcos later walked back stating that the Philippines would not intervene in the Taiwan issue.[23] Teodoro’s statement is set during a period of heightened tensions between the PRC and Philippines, including a July 20 clash involving China Coast Guard (CCG) personnel injuring a Philippine service member near the Philippine-occupied Second Thomas Shoal.
Key Takeaways
- PRC-Russia Military Cooperation: The Economist reported on July 23 that PLA soldiers have undergone combat training at a Russian military complex. The PLA is likely aiming to improve its ability to conduct unmanned systems warfare and operate in a drone-saturated environment. The PLA is unlikely to wholly adopt what it learns from the Russian military’s experience and instead will likely develop its own methods of adapting to modern warfare.
- PLA Anti-Surface Warfare: The PLAN has likely improved its anti-surface warfare capabilities. The PLAN may seek to develop an asymmetric advantage with its anti-ship missiles to contest sea control beyond the first island chain and ameliorate its other naval combat deficiencies when compared to the US Navy.
- Philippine-Taiwan Relations: Philippine Secretary of Defense Gilbert Teodoro Jr. stated that the Philippines cannot remain neutral in a conflict between the PRC and Taiwan due to the population of Filipino citizens living in Taiwan and the very likely involvement of the Bashi Channel in the scope of the conflict. This statement represents one of the strongest Philippine commitments to Taiwan to date.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
The PLA completed a two-day live-fire drill within PRC territorial waters in the Taiwan Strait from July 23 to July 24, likely showcasing PLA capabilities to Taiwan as an act of intimidation. The live-fire drill was conducted in the waters to the east and south of Dongshan Island, which is located in Zhangzhou, Fujian, PRC, within a 7.4-mile zone off the PRC’s coast.[24] Fujian is the closest PRC province to Taiwan, geographically. The exercise did not appear to exceed the PRC’s declared territorial waters, and the PRC published notices in advance to prohibit entry within these waters and create a no-fly zone.[25] The live-fire drill may have been in response to Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te’s speech at the ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) annual convention on July 19, during which Lai advocated for DPP members to oppose the PRC’s “red terror.”[26] The Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the PRC for destabilizing the Taiwan Strait and putting commercial flights and vessels in danger by conducting the two-day live-fire exercise.[27]
Live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait serve as a PRC coercion tactic, as such operations constitute an important part of the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) preparedness in the event of a Taiwan invasion. This exercise notably happened within the PRC’s territorial waters, however, limiting the PRC’s ability to directly threaten Taiwan and not necessitating significant expenditure of Taiwanese navy resources in response. The PRC may be looking to signal dissatisfaction with Lai’s speech while not jeopardizing any goodwill generated by opposition Kuomintang (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun’s recent visit to the PRC or her argument that the PRC does not threaten Taiwan.[28]
The PRC is continuing to conduct marine research operations in the waters east of Taiwan. These operations are likely intended to establish a more constant PRC presence in the waters, to support PRC jurisdictional claims. The PRC Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs’ (MARA) East China Sea Fisheries Research Institute (ECSFRI) deployed fisheries vessel Lanhai 201 on its first fisheries resources survey in Taiwan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) from July 17 to 23.[29] The Lanhai 201 mission is part of an ongoing PRC gray-zone effort in the waters east of Taiwan. Lanhai 201’s weeklong survey followed PRC research vessel Xiang Yang Hong 22’s June 16 to 18 “marine environmental survey,” which entered Taiwan’s contiguous zone and prompted a Taiwan Coast Guard Administration (CGA) interception.[30] China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels have persistently operated east of Taiwan since June 1, broadcasting instructions to merchant ships and escorting PRC research ships conducting surveys.[31] The PRC MARA said the Lanhai 201’s survey was intended to establish jurisdiction over the waters east of Taiwan.[32] The PRC has conducted several operations to enforce its maritime claims east of Taiwan following Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.’s May 28 agreement to discuss delimiting boundaries between their countries’ EEZs, which overlap east of Taiwan.[33]
Beijing framed Lanhai 201’s voyage as a legitimate fisheries resource survey in “PRC waters” to support conservation and marine science. ECSFRI Deputy Director Zheng Hanfeng said this is Lanhai 201’s “maiden voyage” and that the institute will lead “regular, long-term monitoring and surveys in the years ahead to draw thorough scientific conclusions.”[34] Taiwan’s CGA decried the Lanhai 201 survey as a violation of Taiwan’s sovereignty and a form of cognitive warfare.[35] This incident fits within the PRC’s broader pattern of using civilian and quasi-civilian maritime assets to advance its jurisdictional claims by establishing a more permanent presence in disputed waters while avoiding direct armed confrontation.
Taiwan is likely operationalizing whole-of-society defense preparedness through increasingly integrated civil-military exercises. Taiwan plans to fully integrate its Urban Resilience (All-Out Defense Mobilization) Exercises with its Han Kuang 42 live-fire exercise for the first time during the August 5 to 14 exercises.[36] Taiwan will expand cross-county coordination, medical transport testing, and emergency communications stress testing during this year’s combined exercise. The exercise will include a planned mobile network slowdown on August 10 and August 13 in 14 cities and counties across northern and central Taiwan.[37] The slowdown will test emergency communications and civilian behavior under degraded conditions.[38] Taiwanese officials are presenting the slowdown as a routine preparedness exercise. Taiwanese public commentary on the slowdown appears mixed in terms of approval and is largely focused on whether the exercises will generate measurable after-action improvements.[39] The network slowdown will primarily impact high-data-volume mobile application services, such as video streaming, video calls, and mobile payments. Fixed-line internet and landlines, as well as physical SIM card voice calls and SMS, will remain unaffected.[40] Taiwan’s decision to update its Urban Resilience Exercises to include network slowdowns may be in response to documented PRC-linked vessel involvement in at least four undersea cable sabotage incidents around Taiwan since 2023.[41]
These changes build on Taiwan’s April launch of the Central Joint Emergency Operation Center (CJEOC), which links national defense, public order, shelter and relief, medical expansion, transport control, material distribution, and civil-military support into a single coordination framework. Taiwan first tested the CJEOC during six days of Han Kuang’s tabletop wargame segment, which ran from April 10 to 24.[42] Taiwan appears to be moving beyond ad hoc readiness measures toward repeatable procedures for crisis coordination and managing degraded communications.
Taiwan is likely improving its ability to conduct a sea denial campaign in the Taiwan Strait. A Taiwanese sea denial campaign could significantly undermine PLA attempts to seize the island by force. Taiwanese media reported on July 24 that Taiwan has produced over 1,000 Hsiung Feng AShMs since 2022, bringing Taiwan’s total AShM inventory to over 1,800.[43] The Hsiung Feng II has a maximum range of 120km, with an extended range variant reaching 250km, and the Hsiung Feng III has a maximum range of 150km, with an extended range variant reaching a maximum range of 400km.[44] Taiwan also possesses a large inventory of Harpoon AShMs with ranges of 120km.[45] Taiwan’s large AShM inventory is dispersed across several ground platforms, air platforms, and surface vessels. Taiwan commissioned its eighth Tuo Chiang-class corvette on July 24 which can carry 12 Hsiung Feng AShMs.[46]
Taiwan’s development of a robust AShM inventory could allow it to conduct an extended sea denial campaign in the Taiwan Strait to prevent a successful PLA amphibious invasion. The Taiwanese Navy created the Littoral Combat Command on July 1, placing Taiwan’s ground-launched AShMs, coastal and mobile radars, and unmanned surface vessels under one headquarters.[47] Taiwan could use mobile ground launchers to saturate the Taiwan Strait with AShMs, preventing the PLA from securing sea control of the area ahead of an amphibious invasion. A PLA amphibious invasion is very unlikely to succeed without securing temporary sea control over the Strait to facilitate the movement of forces and supplies across it.[48]
Taiwanese efforts to execute an enduring sea denial campaign in the Taiwan Strait would likely be significantly enhanced by the widespread use of unmanned surface vessels (USV) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Ukraine has successfully denied the Russian Black Sea Fleet control of the Black Sea since the opening months of the War in Ukraine and sank the Black Sea Fleet flagship Moskva on April 14, 2022, using drone reconnaissance and land-based AShMs.[49] Ukrainian forces have since used USVs to strike Russian vessels at sea and at port, forcing the Russian Black Sea Fleet to relocate vessels based in Sevastopol, Crimea, to Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, and deploy less frequently.[50] Ukrainian forces struck 136 Russian vessels with UAVs around Crimea in an effort to isolate the Peninsula between July 6 and 15.[51] Taiwan could similarly combine its AShM inventory with a large number of unmanned systems to prevent the PLA from maintaining an enduring presence in the Taiwan Strait during a conflict, significantly limiting the PLA’s ability to support major combat operations on Taiwan. USVs and UAVs would improve Taiwan’s ability to execute this mission because the PLA’s fleet defense capabilities are primarily designed to counter conventional and hypersonic AShMs rather than small drones that are difficult to detect and counter.[52] The Lai administration has proposed a NT$ 210 billion special budget that includes funding for 2,000 USVs and over 200,000 UAVs but is currently facing a legislative deadlock.[53]
Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Deputy Minister Shen Yu-chung warned that a heavily subsidized eight-day trip to Xinjiang, PRC for young Taiwanese teachers could expose participants to Beijing’s united front influence operations. Shen said PRC authorities may be targeting teachers to build influence “nodes” on Taiwanese campuses that could later help draw more young people into similar programs.[54] The trip, scheduled for August 14 through 21, will take up to 25 Taiwanese teachers under 45, with participants paying for flights and a NT$4,000 registration fee, and the organizer covering food and accommodation. [55] The PRC will also launch similar trips aimed at Taiwanese youth in August including the “Cross-Strait Student Youth Northern Xinjiang Day School” activity aimed at Taiwanese university students.[56] Shen said MAC will work with the Taiwanese Ministry of Education to alert schools and the public about the risks of going on such trips, though Shen did not say whether authorities would investigate the organizer or try to stop the trip.[57]
This trip reflects a broader PRC effort to mollify Taiwanese public opinion towards the PRC and its new ethnic unity law implemented on July 1. The Taiwanese government has previously warned of the potential impact the ethnic unity law could have on Taiwanese politicians, overseas Chinese, and Taiwanese independence activists.[58] The PRC’s selection of Xinjiang as the location of these trips is notable. The PRC is likely attempting to influence Taiwanese youth and youth educations to have a positive view of the PRC’s control of Xinjiang, which is home to the Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities most heavily impacted by the ethnic unity law.[59] Taiwanese indigenous peoples are also at risk of being impacted by the ethnic unity law and have been consistently targeted by PRC United Front Work operations.[60] PRC victories in terms of ameliorating Taiwanese public opinion toward PRC treatment of ethnic minorities could lead to a drop in concern for the safety of Taiwanese indigenous peoples, among other targeted groups. This PRC campaign to improve Taiwanese public opinion towards Xinjiang may reflect broader PRC concerns about the implementation of its ethnic unity law.
China
PRC Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu visited the United States and met with US officials from July 22 to 23. The PRC is likely concerned about potential US controls on PRC artificial intelligence (AI) models that could disrupt PRC efforts to dominate global AI development. PRC state media CCTV reported that Ma met with US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, National Security Council senior director for Asia Ivan Kanapathy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, and members of the House and Senate.[61] CCTV stated that Ma’s meetings focused on promoting a “relationship of constructive strategic stability” between the United States and the PRC.[62] CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping introduced “constructive strategic stability” as the “new positioning” and current framework of relations between the PRC and the United States after meeting with US President Donald Trump in Beijing in May.[63] PRC media and commentators describe the framework as emphasizing cooperation and limiting competition between the two powers.[64]
Bloomberg reported that Ma likely met with US officials to seek clarification on what issues the upcoming US-PRC AI dialogue in September will cover, and the expected outcomes of the dialogue, citing anonymous sources familiar with the matter.[65] The PRC seeks to become the global leader in advanced AI technology development and shape global AI governance to suit its interests.[66] Potential US measures to ban or control PRC AI models or sanction PRC AI developers could disrupt the PRC’s efforts to dominate global AI development.[67] The PRC is likely emphasizing “constructive strategic stability” in its preparations for the US-PRC AI dialogue to steer the dialogue away from potential regulation or sanctions on PRC AI models and firms. The PLAN may be improving its ability to support vessel-launched air assaults during an amphibious invasion. An improved air assault capability could provide the PLA with greater flexibility during an invasion of Taiwan. PRC state broadcaster CCTV released footage on July 25 showing the use of several naval variants of the Z-20 utility helicopter.[68] The footage displayed the naval transport Z-20J and the Z-20F specialized in anti-submarine warfare operating from a Type 075 landing helicopter dock (LHD) designed to support amphibious operations.[69] The PLA’s official social media account also published images on July 27 of the Z-20J operating from a Type 071 landing platform dock in support of amphibious exercises.[70] Previous open-source reporting had only confirmed two Z-20Js and two Z-20Fs in service with the PLAN. [71] The presence of several Z-20 naval variants deployed across different vessels suggests that the PLAN has expanded its inventory of the Z-20 and is deploying it on its principal amphibious assault platforms.
The Z-20J could improve the PLAN’s ability to support air assault operations from its amphibious assault vessels. PLA doctrine emphasizes executing a “three-dimensional landing” during amphibious assault operations that involve both a direct beach assault and aerial landings at key points behind enemy lines to support the main effort at the beach.[72] The PLAN has previously relied on the older Z-18 transport helicopter, which is inferior to the Z-20J in speed and maneuverability, for its sea-based airlift capability .[73] The Z-18’s size also limits the number of platforms that can be carried on surface vessels.[74] The PLA may have practiced conducting air assault operations from a Type 075 LHD during its December 2025 Justice Mission exercises.[75] An expanded fleet of sea-launched Z-20s could improve the PLA’s ability to insert air assault forces in contested environments. Conducting an air assault in Taiwan would likely be an extremely risky mission, however, and Russian failures during the 2022 Battle of Hostomel illustrate the vulnerability of air assault forces that are not rapidly relieved.[76]
UK media outlet The Telegraph reported on July 15 that the PLA is building exact replicas of American and Taiwanese military aircraft and naval vessels, naval bases and aircraft runways, and Taiwanese presidential and key government buildings for live-fire, maritime, and ground invasion drills. The PLA appears to be sending a clear message about PRC military preparation to intimidate Taiwan and the United States. These structures included full-size 3D models of a US Arleigh-Burke class destroyer, two mock-ups of the USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier, an F-22 model aircraft, an F-16 model aircraft, an F-35 model aircraft, a US Kidd-class destroyer, the American Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan, and Taiwan’s Su’ao Naval Base in the Taklamakan desert in Xinjiang, PRC and Inner Mongolia, PRC.[77] The structures additionally include models of the Taiwanese presidential office and two models of Taipei’s Bo’ai Special Zone where key Taiwanese government offices are located. These models were likely used for training to seize Taiwan’s key government buildings and related decapitation exercises.[78] These Taipei government building models have been actively used in training as early as 2014 according to satellite imagery and footage released by the PLA.[79] Many of these models show damage from live-fire tests and ballistic missiles from satellite imagery dating as early as 2021.[80] The Telegraph reported that the PLA is using these models to test its long-range weapons stockpile, including AShM ballistic missiles and AI systems, in preparation for a potential war with Taiwan.[81] The report also detailed a 280km-long tunnel connecting different replicas of Taiwan’s government buildings to prepare for a situation in which Taiwanese leaders attempted to flee underground.[82] The report further detailed a 37km railway carrying moving mock warships along a railway track to recreate the way ships move at sea for maritime training of gunners and missile crews.[83]
The infrastructure and military equipment mock-ups show clear intent by the PRC to conduct in-depth preparations for a Taiwan conflict, including direct decapitation strikes on senior Taiwanese leadership and strikes targeting US military assets and personnel in the region. Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson Major General Sun Li-fang responded on July 27 to these reports saying that the MND is closely monitoring the construction of these mock-ups and that the Taiwanese military has developed “a comprehensive understanding” of the PLA’s construction of these models.[84]
Northeast Asia
Japan
The PRC Foreign Ministry rejected Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu’s claims that he spoke with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Foreign Ministers meeting in Manila. Motegi told reporters that he briefly spoke with Wang between separate meetings on July 22, during which they discussed PRC-Japan bilateral ties.[85] Japanese media outlet Yomiuri Shimbun reported that a Foreign Ministry official responsible for PRC affairs and an interpreter had accompanied Motegi in preparation for spontaneous encounters as the PRC repeatedly refused to hold talks with Japan.[86] PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian rejected Motegi’s claim that he spoke with Wang in the July 27 press conference, however.[87]
Motegi stated that “Japan is open to dialogue at all levels” and spoke about the importance of PRC-Japanese dialogue.[88] Motegi also stated at the ASEAN summit regarding PRC aggression that Japan would work closer with ASEAN countries and assist in their defense, with closer cooperation in areas including critical mineral supply chains and artificial intelligence.[89] A Motegi-Wang exchange would have been the first PRC-Japan diplomatic interaction since November 2025, when Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae angered the PRC with her statement that a Taiwan contingency could be a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan.[90] The PRC’s rejection that such a meeting occurred indicates no potential reconciliation in PRC-Japan relations at this time.
North Korea
Nothing significant to report.
South Korea
Nothing significant to report.
Southeast Asia
Philippines
United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio met Philippine President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. in Malacañang on July 22, reaffirming United States-Philippines ties. US and Philippine press readouts highlighted that Rubio and Marcos discussed the South China Sea in relation to the PRC, with the Philippines specifically mentioning continued PRC-Philippine tensions in the South China Sea.[91]
The meeting between Rubio and Marcos appears to have been a fairly routine high-level exchange between the United States and the Philippines during a period of heightened tensions between the PRC and the Philippines. Recent inflections include a July 20 clash between CCG personnel and a Philippine service member which resulted in injury to the Philippine service member near the Philippine-occupied Second Thomas Shoal.[92]
The CCG fired water cannons at Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessels around Scarborough Shoal on July 23 and 24, marking three days of physical altercations between the PRC and Philippines in the South China Sea within a four-day period. PCG Rear Admiral Jay Tarriela stated that a CCG vessel fired a water cannon at a PCG and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) vessel, and a different CCG ship executed a dangerous maneuver around another BFAR vessel shortly after, during a resupply mission to Philippines fishermen.[93] CCG Spokesperson Jiang Lue framed the encounter as a Philippine intrusion into PRC waters, where the CCG conducted “law enforcement” activities.[94]
The Philippines stated that a CCG ship approached 23 feet away from a BFAR vessel, a dangerously close distance risking collision, and fired water cannons at the BFAR vessel on July 24. Jiang reiterated claims that Scarborough Shoal is under PRC jurisdiction and stated that the CCG issued verbal warnings to the Philippine vessel, used interception measures, and fired water cannons to expel Philippine ships from the area.[95] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Lin Jian called CCG actions “necessary, lawful, and professionally conducted.”[96]
These confrontations around Scarborough Shoal follow a physical confrontation around Second Thomas Shoal on July 20, where the CCG injured a Philippine sailor.[97] PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Philippine Foreign Minister Maria Theresa Lazaro had talks during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting on July 22, where both sides lodged “strong” protests over the incident.[98] The PRC claims Scarborough Shoal along with most of the South China Sea as its territory under its nine-dashed line map.[99] The Permanent Court of Arbitration rejected much of the PRC’s territorial claims in a 2016 ruling, however.[100] The PRC nonetheless has continued to assert claims over the region and has significantly increased CCG presence around Scarborough Shoal over the last three years.[101]
Europe
The PRC is likely holding a Czech citizen in detention to pressure Czech authorities into releasing suspected Ministry of State Security (MSS) spy Yang Yiming. Czech police arrested Yang, a journalist for CCP media outlet Guangming Daily on January 24 for allegedly gathering information for PRC intelligence to use as blackmail on European politicians with links to Taiwan.[102] The MSS often uses Guangming Daily’s overseas operations as a cover for MSS spies abroad.[103]
The Municipal Court in Prague ruled on June 12 that Yang should be released from custody while his case undergoes further police investigation.[104] Czech prosecutors filed a complaint against the ruling, and Yang is still in custody while a higher court rules on the complaint.[105]
PRC authorities subsequently arrested a Czech citizen in the PRC in late June on unspecified national security charges.[106] PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian confirmed the detention of the Czech citizen in a press conference on July 16.[107] Lin also called the charges against Yang Yiming unfounded and demanded Yang’s immediate release.[108] Czech media outlet Seznam Zprávy, citing anonymous sources, reported that Czech security services assume that the PRC will attempt to use the arbitrary detention of Czech citizens to pressure Czechia into releasing Yang.[109]
The PRC has used similar “hostage diplomacy” to pressure democracies to release convicted PRC spies from custody. The PRC detained a Canadian couple on espionage charges in 2014 to pressure Canada into refusing the United States’ request to extradite Stephen Su Bin, a PRC national who directed a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) cyberespionage operation targeting US defense contractors.[110] The PRC also arbitrarily detained and imprisoned American businessmen Mark Swidan and Kai Li in 2012 and 2016, releasing them in 2024 as part of a prisoner swap that reportedly included two convicted MSS spies, Xu Yanjun and Ji Chaoqun.[111]
[1] https://www.economist.com/briefing/2026/07/23/china-is-gaining-troubling-military-know-how-from-russia?giftId=YjMwNDBmYTMtODNiOS00M2I0LThlYzAtOTdkZGFmZGNhNjFm&utm_campaign=gifted_article
[2] https://www.economist.com/briefing/2026/07/23/china-is-gaining-troubling-military-know-how-from-russia; https://eng.mil dot ru/news/cd871d6a-ccb7-4442-a1e6-30870ef02f39
[3] https://www.economist.com/briefing/2026/07/23/china-is-gaining-troubling-military-know-how-from-russia
[4] https://www.economist.com/briefing/2026/07/23/china-is-gaining-troubling-military-know-how-from-russia; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-russia-navies-hold-drills-off-china-coast-2026-07-05/; https://english.news dot cn/20260713/9379d756304e40088458553afd2c8264/c.html
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quest-to-intensify-the-theater-wide-battlefield-air-interdiction-campaign-against-ukraines-logistics/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-march-6-2026/
[7] https://tv.cctv dot cn/2026/07/27/VIDEuqb1O1sQO9EuRhwuiSkD260727.shtml?spm=C96370.PPDB2vhvSivD.ELsTxcxAYRgI.3
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-forecasting-the-threat/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2026/
[10] https://military.cctv dot cn/2026/07/29/ARTIn8yq4dI3VcSOmBf98XQI260729.shtml
[11] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202607/1367091.shtml
[12] https://news.usni.org/2025/12/29/chinese-navy-destroyer-tests-hypersonic-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-at-sea
[13] https://www.admiraltytrilogy.com/mcmf.php
[14] https://news.usni.org/2025/12/29/chinese-navy-destroyer-tests-hypersonic-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-at-sea; https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3352554/does-chinas-yj-20-hypersonic-sea-based-missile-give-beijing-edge-over-us-carriers?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article
[15] https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/challenges-to-chinese-blue-water-operations/; https://cimsec.org/fighting-dmo-pt-8-chinas-anti-ship-firepower-and-mass-firing-schemes/; https://cimsec.org/exposed-undersea-pla-navy-officer-reflections-on-chinas-not-so-silent-service/
[16] https://cimsec.org/fighting-dmo-pt-8-chinas-anti-ship-firepower-and-mass-firing-schemes/
[17] https://cimsec.org/fighting-dmo-pt-2-anti-ship-firepower-and-the-major-limits-of-the-american-naval-arsenal/
[18] https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12599
[19] https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12599
[20] https://cimsec.org/fighting-dmo-pt-8-chinas-anti-ship-firepower-and-mass-firing-schemes/
[21] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7gz6OkOXVxw&t=413s; https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6408688
[22] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7gz6OkOXVxw&t=413s; https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6408688
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