Toplines
Russian forces conducted a large-scale strike series against Ukraine on the night of July 29 to 30 that featured a particularly large number of missiles and aimed to exploit Ukraine’s shortage of ballistic missile interceptors. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 284 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[1] Russian forces also launched a total of 74 missiles – four Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship missiles from Kursk Oblast; nine Iskander-M/S-400/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk, Voronezh, and Kursk oblasts; and 61 Kh-101/Kalibr cruise missiles from Vologda Oblast and Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed one ballistic missile, 54 cruise missiles, and 265 drones; that three anti-ship missiles, six ballistic missiles, two cruise missiles, and 17 drones struck 20 locations; and that debris fell at 13 locations. Ukrainian authorities were reportedly clarifying information about eight of the missiles as of 0900 this morning. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on the evening of July 29 that Russia had prepared a massive strike a few days ago, which Russian forces would highly likely launch on the night of July 29-30.[2]
Russian missile strikes targeted a wide swathe of Ukraine’s deep rear and resulted in high civilian casualties. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the large-scale strike series mostly targeted Kyiv and Lviv oblasts and included simultaneous waves from various directions.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, educational, port, and civilian infrastructure in Lviv, Kyiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts.[4] A Russian ballistic missile strike against Radushne, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, destroyed a residential building and killed two parents and four of their children.[5] Zelensky reported that at least eight people died and dozens more were injured in the overnight strikes.[6]
Russian forces continue to increase the number of missiles while decreasing the number of drones in strike packages, likely to exploit Ukraine’s shortage of ballistic missile interceptors, as Ukraine’s drone interception rate remains high. The July 29-30 strike package notably caused significant damage even though the number of strike vehicles and decoys in the package (358 air targets) was not the largest that Russia has launched against Ukraine. Russian forces have launched larger salvos containing over 500 drones and missiles multiple times in recent months.[7] The overnight strike nonetheless had devastating effects due to its use of ballistic missiles that Ukrainian forces have few ways to defend against at the moment. Russian forces have overall been launching fewer drones and more missiles recently, having launched 4,606 drones and 376 missiles so far in July and 5,749 drones and 181 missiles in June. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted on July 30 that Russian forces have been unable to massively deploy Shahed-type drones to strike deep in the Ukrainian rear due to the saturation of Ukrainian air defenses effective against Shahed-type drones and limitations in Russia’s communication capabilities that restrict the drones’ ranges.[8] The milblogger noted that Russian forces primarily used air-to-air missiles to strike western Ukraine on July 29-30 but added that Russia does not have as many of these missiles as it does drones.
Russia also used at least one North Korean-provided ballistic missile for the first time since Summer 2025 following reported recent North Korean missile deliveries to Russia. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of North Korean-provided KN-23 missiles overnight.[9] Zelensky reported that preliminary information indicates that Russian forces used a North Korean missile for the first time in a long time to strike Radushne, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[10] A source told Reuters on July 30 that Russia’s use of North Korean missiles suggests that Russia has compiled a stock of the missiles, and another source reportedly stated that the last Ukrainian-confirmed use of a North Korean missile in a Russian strike package was early August 2025.[11] Zelensky warned on July 25 that North Korea was sending additional ballistic missiles to Russia.[12] North Korea’s provision of more missiles to Russia furthers Russia’s ongoing efforts to move away from massive drone strikes and to instead lean more heavily into its large missile strikes to exploit Ukraine’s current shortage of interceptors capable of intercepting ballistic missiles. Russia’s use of North Korean missiles also provides North Korea with battlefield testing and feedback to further improve the missiles — as Russia and North Korea have done in the past.[13]
A likely Russian Kh-101 cruise missile crashed in eastern Poland during Russia’s large-scale missile strikes against western Ukraine on the night of July 29 to 30. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk reported on July 30 that an armed missile, likely a Russian Kh-101 cruise missile, entered Polish airspace and fell in a field near Tarnawa-Kolonia, Lublin Voivodeship (roughly 90 kilometers from the Polish-Ukrainian border).[14] Tusk noted that there is no reason to think that Polish territory was the intended target of the missile.[15] The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported that Russian long-range aviation was undergoing intense combat observations, and Poland observed at least 12 missiles flying over western Ukraine that potentially posed a threat to Polish airspace.[16]
Russian missile and drone incursions into NATO territory during Russian strikes on Ukraine appear to be a risk the Kremlin has accepted. Russian drones have violated NATO airspace and struck NATO territory or neighboring Moldova before, but this is the first time that a Russian missile has done so.[17] Such Russian behavior, regardless of whether these instances are deliberate or accidental, continues to demonstrate how Russian President Vladimir Putin has adopted a reckless policy that accepts the risk that Russian missile and drone strikes on western Ukraine may also strike neighboring states, including those in NATO.[18] ISW continues to assess that NATO may need to consider negotiating possible air defense agreements with Ukraine as a matter of self-defense against Russian drone strikes against NATO countries, regardless of whether the Russian drone incursions are accidental or intentional.[19]
Ukrainian forces are attempting to help NATO defend its airspace and territory during large Russian missile and drone strikes that threaten NATO members. Tusk stated that Ukrainian fighter pilots attempted to intercept the missiles that were approaching the Polish border.[20]
Ukraine’s continued strike campaign against Wildberries warehouses (the closest Russian equivalent to Amazon) throughout Russia is imposing significant costs on the company’s retailers and consumers. Ukrainian forces have been undertaking a deliberate campaign to strike Wildberries facilities throughout Russia and occupied Ukraine since July 17-18, with Ukrainian officials reporting that the logistics centers supply the Russian military with drone components and navigation equipment.[21] Wildberries reported that Ukrainian forces conducted additional drone strikes against its warehouses on the night of July 29 to 30, hitting facilities in Penza Oblast and the Republic of Udmurt.[22]
ISW recently assessed that intensified Ukrainian strikes against Wildberries facilities will likely increasingly inconvenience Russians who utilize the platform.[23] Many Russian retailers who sell through Wildberries have been complaining about the consequences they are personally facing after strikes have destroyed their merchandise.[24] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed on July 30, for example, that about 1,500 Wildberries sellers in the region lost their goods to fires after recent Ukrainian drone strikes against the company’s warehouses.[25]
Russian authorities appear to be focusing on resolving Wildberries’ supply issues affecting ordinary Russians, as opposed to the more pressing issue of protecting the Russian rear against Ukrainian strikes. Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Economic Minister Alexander Novak chaired a meeting on July 30 of a government subcommittee on enhancing the stability of the financial sector and individual economic sectors to discuss assistance to Wildberries’ partner sellers whose products Ukrainian strikes have damaged.[26] Novak emphasized the Russian government’s need to provide support to affected small and medium-sized businesses. Economic Development Minister Maxim Reshetnikov outlined three key tasks that the Russian government must address soon to ensure stable retailer operations, all of which focused on ensuring supplies to consumers.[27]
Russia was notably unable to cope with its massive air defense requirements even before the start of the Ukrainian campaign against Wildberries in mid-July. Ukraine’s strikes on this new target set will only strain Russian air defenses further. ISW continues to assess that Russia will likely fail to adequately fulfill its growing air defense needs because the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and military will struggle to rapidly strengthen the air defense umbrella to cover both the frontline and its vast rear simultaneously.[28] Ukrainian forces will likely be able to continue — if not intensify — their long-range strike campaign, and increased investment in Ukraine’s ability to conduct strikes in Russia’s vulnerable rear significantly degrades Russia’s ability to continue protracting the war. Russian authorities similarly focused on resolving consequences to consumers — as opposed to issues with air defenses — when Ukrainian strikes caused wide-scale fuel shortages at the start of the summer, further highlighting Russia’s inability to take serious action toward strengthening its air defense umbrella at this time.[29] Russia’s exposed rear areas and continued inability to defend its airspace present a major vulnerability that Ukraine — if supported — can exploit.
Recently appointed Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi is starting to make personnel changes as he takes command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Drapatyi on July 29 relieved Major General Oleksandr Gruzevych as the chief of staff and deputy commander of the Land Forces; relieved Major General Volodymyr Karpenko as the commander of the Logistics Forces; and terminated the secondment of the commander of the Missile Forces and Artillery, Major General Andriy Malinovsky, to the General Staff, where he had been overseeing Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russia since 2024.[30] Ukrainian media organization Babel reported that its source stated that a presidential decree will create a new command to coordinate and optimize the joint work of Ukraine’s long-range strikes.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and government continue to undergo personnel shuffles. The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers approved the appointment of human rights activist Lyubov Galan as the deputy minister of defense overseeing the development and preservation of human capital in the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian state-owned defense enterprise manager Ukroboronprom Acting CEO Serhiy Boev as the deputy minister of defense for European integration.[31] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Economy Minister Oleksiy Sobolev as the deputy head of the Ukrainian presidential office with a focus on the economy, Olena Voronova as the head of the personnel department of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), and former Head of the SBU Center of Command and Control Brigadier General Oleh Fedoriv as the head of the SBU’s Alpha Special Operations Center in place of Acting Defense Minister Yevheniy Khmara.[32]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces conducted a large-scale strike series against Ukraine on the night of July 29 to 30 that featured a particularly large number of missiles and aimed to exploit Ukraine’s shortage of ballistic missile interceptors.
- Russian missile strikes targeted a wide swathe of Ukraine’s deep rear and resulted in high civilian casualties.
- Russian forces continue to increase the number of missiles while decreasing the number of drones in strike packages, likely to exploit Ukraine’s shortage of ballistic missile interceptors, while Ukraine’s drone interception rate remains high.
- Russia also used at least one North Korean-provided ballistic missile for the first time since Summer 2025 following reported recent North Korean missile deliveries to Russia.
- A likely Russian Kh-101 cruise missile crashed in eastern Poland during Russia’s large-scale missile strikes against western Ukraine on the night of July 29 to 30.
- Russian missile and drone incursions into NATO territory during Russian strikes on Ukraine appear to be a risk the Kremlin has accepted.
- Ukrainian forces are attempting to help NATO defend its airspace and territory during large Russian missile and drone strikes that threaten NATO members.
- Ukraine’s continued strike campaign against Wildberries warehouses (the closest Russian equivalent to Amazon) throughout Russia is imposing significant costs on the company’s retailers and consumers.
- Russian authorities appear to be focusing on resolving Wildberries’ supply issues affecting ordinary Russians, as opposed to the more pressing issue of protecting the Russian rear against Ukrainian strikes.
- Recently appointed Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi is starting to make personnel changes as he takes command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
- The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and government continue to undergo personnel shuffles.
- Russian forces continued their campaigns against Ukrainian port infrastructure and merchant ships.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian port and oil infrastructure on the night of July 29 to 30.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on July 30.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian port and oil infrastructure on the night of July 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Centre for Strategic Communication and Information Security and other open-source intelligence sources posted imagery and footage showing fire and smoke at the port of Taman, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 260 kilometers from the frontline) after Ukrainian strikes on the night of January 29 to 30, including at the Tamanneftegaz seaborne oil export terminal.[33] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from July 30 shows heat anomalies at the port of Taman.[34]
Ukrainian strikes are causing lasting damage to Russian oil refineries. The Financial Times (FT) reported on July 30 that it reviewed photographs, satellite images, thermal infrared data, and refinery layouts indicating that Ukrainian strikes against major Russian oil facilities have caused damage lasting for weeks and sometimes months after the original strike.[35] FT assessed that Ukrainian forces have disabled over 30 percent of Russian actual refining capacity and 45 percent of Russian nominal refining capacity. FT reported that it observed the most signs of Ukrainian strikes at Russia’s ten largest refineries, including in Omsk and Moscow cities and Tuapse, and that it observed damage at these locations on satellite imagery taken weeks or months after Ukrainian strikes. FT reported that smaller refineries are also largely inoperative and are visibly damaged. Researcher at Sapienza University of Rome Fabio Sabatini told FT that night-time radiance around 29 large Russian refineries indicates that the refineries slowed activity even after coming back online following Ukrainian drone strikes.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on July 29 and 30 but did not make confirmed advances.[36] The Russian MoD claimed on July 30 that Russian forces seized Mohrytsya (northeast of Sumy City) and Mala Slobidka (northwest of Sumy City).[37] The Russian MoD credited elements of the 22nd and 41st motorized rifle regiments (both of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the claimed seizure of Mohrytsya.[38] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces implied on July 30 that Russian forces have not seized Mohrytsya or Mala Slobidka, however.[39] The source claimed to have observed rumors that Russian forces replaced the commander of the 127th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Motorized Rifle Division, 14th AC, LMD) and the regiment’s 1st battalion commander, possibly because the commanders were implicated in an episode in which AI-altered footage purportedly showing a Russian servicemember raising a flag in Bilyi Kolodyaz was published. The Ukrainian Kursk Group of Forces refuted on July 30 the Russian MoD’s July 29 claim that Russian forces seized Nova Sich (northeast of Sumy City), stating that Ukrainian forces fully control the settlement.[40]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 29 and 30 but did not make confirmed advances.[41] The Russian MoD claimed on July 30 that Russian forces seized Yurchenkove (southeast of Kharkiv City), and a Russian milblogger claimed on July 30 that Russian forces seized Bilyi Kolodyaz (southeast of Vovchansk).[42] Russian sources credited elements of the 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army, LMD) and 71st Motorized Rifle Division (14th AC, LMD) with the claimed seizure of Yurchenkove.[43] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces implied that Russian forces have not seized Yurchenkove, however.[44] A Ukrainian brigade spokesperson operating in the Vovchansk direction reported that Russian forces continue conducting flag raisings to exaggerate the extent of their advances in the Vovchansk direction.[45]
Elements of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly scaling up drone strikes in Kharkiv Oblast. Ukrainian Forces Center for Unmanned Systems Head Dmytro Batinov stated on July 30 that drone operators of the Rubikon Center have been increasing operations in northern and eastern Kharkiv Oblast since the end of March 2026.[46] Batinov stated that the Rubikon drone operators are well-trained but few in number, especially compared to the total number of Russian drone operators, and that Ukrainian forces are striking Rubikon drone operators.
Russian forces continue using Shahed-type drones against near-rear targets in the Kharkiv direction. The Russian MoD claimed on July 30 that Russian Geran (Russian version of Shahed) drone operators struck a Ukrainian warehouse near Kharkiv City in Andriivka (likely referring to one of two settlements each about 50 kilometers from Kharkiv City from the northwest and southeast).[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 30 but did not make a confirmed advance.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 30 that Russian forces advanced north of Anyskyne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[49]
Geolocated footage posted on July 30 shows Russian forces striking a claimed Ukrainian observation post west of Ivashchyne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) with five FAB-250 glide bombs.[50]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 29 and 30 but did not advance.[51] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on July 30 that Ukrainian forces are conducting remote mining operations at depths of 15 to 20 kilometers from the frontline to disrupt Russian near-rear logistics and supply lines to frontline units in the Kupyansk direction.[52]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 29 and 30 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[53] A Russian milblogger and the source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on July 20 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ridkodub, Nove, Katerynivka, and Karpivka (all southeast of Borova).[54]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian personnel concentration in occupied western Lysychansk (approximately 38 kilometers from the frontline) with a GBU-64 precision bomb.[55] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) source reported on July 29 that the strike killed at least 18 Russian military personnel, including the commander, deputy commander for logistics, and medical company commander of an unspecified regiment, and wounded dozens of officers.[56]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations near and within Lyman and east of Slovyansk on July 29 to 30 but did not make confirmed advances.[57] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 30 that Russian forces advanced south of Pyskunivka.[58] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces still hold positions in eastern and southern Lyman and Kalenyky (east of Slovyansk).[59] Another milblogger argued on July 29 that Russian forces will not seize Slovyansk in 2026, contrary to the Russian military command’s reported deadline to seize all of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026.[60]
Russian forces continue conducting intensified glide bomb strikes to support their offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on July 30 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in Raihorodok (northeast of Slovyansk) with five FAB-250 glide bombs.[61] Russian forces have been increasingly leveraging their superior aviation capabilities to conduct glide bomb strikes that physically destroy Ukrainian cities and strongholds and enable Russian infiltrators to enter and eventually seize and consolidate positions.[62] A degradation of Russia’s aviation capabilities would hinder Russian forces’ ability to use glide bomb strikes and the resulting rubble to conceal infantry, likely slowing Russian advances on the ground.
Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operations are reportedly hindering the Russian rate of advance within and near Kostyantynivka. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are infiltrating into Dovha Balka (west of Kostyantynivka) from Mykolaipillya (northwest of Dovha Balka) and acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Chervone (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[63] The milblogger claimed that numerous Ukrainian drone operators are providing cover and supplies to infiltrating Ukrainian forces, complicating Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces from Dovha Balka in particular. The milblogger claimed that some unspecified sources misreported footage showing Russian infiltrators on the southern outskirts of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka) as showing Russian forces near Druzhkivka, consistent with mixed reports that Russian forces reached the outskirts of Druzhkivka and Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka on July 29.[64]
Russian sources are characterizing Russian attacks in the Dobropillya tactical area as preparation for a wide envelopment of the Fortress Belt from the west and southwest, although Russian forces remain extremely unlikely to conduct any such rapid operational maneuver given the nature of the kill zone and Russian forces’ persistent challenges with restoring maneuver to the battlefield. A Russian milblogger assessed that Russian forces aim to begin an offensive against Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk from the west after seizing Dobropillya.[65] The milblogger’s statement implies that Russian forces aim to conduct a wide envelopment of Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast Fortress Belt, an ambitious undertaking that Russian forces are unlikely to be able to achieve in the near to medium term given their inability to use mechanized equipment, use of slow infiltration tactics, and overall slow rate of advance in the area.[66] Russian forces have been trying to seize Dobropillya since launching attacks in that direction in August 2025.[67] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced to within about 8.2 kilometers of Dobropillya’s southeastern border and that Russian infiltrators are operating about four kilometers from the settlement.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction as Russian sources made unsubstantiated claims that Russian forces recently advanced north of Pokrovsk.[68] The Russian MoD claimed on July 30 that Russian forces seized Chernihivka (north of Pokrovsk).[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Vodyanske (just south of Chernihivka).[70] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Myrne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and between Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk) and Svitle (west of Bilytske).[71]
Ukrainian forces are striking Russian armored and motorized vehicles in the Russian near rear before they can reach the frontline. A Ukrainian unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 30 that Ukrainian forces defeated a Russian column (strength unspecified) including infantry fighting vehicles and motorized vehicles near Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk roughly 20 kilometers in the Russian rear).[72]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself on July 29 and 30 but did not advance.[73]
Russian forces continued limited infiltration missions in the Oleksandrivka direction on July 29 and 30.[74] Geolocated footage published on July 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember northwest of Kalynivske (southeast of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[75]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian air defenses, drone infrastructure, and gas stations in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi stated on July 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system in occupied Snizhne (about 98 kilometers from the frontline) and a drone storage and launch site in occupied Donetsk City (about 57 kilometers from the frontline).[76] The occupation Mayor of Horlivka (about 31 kilometers from the frontline), Ivan Prikhodko, claimed that Ukrainian strikes damaged a gas station in Horlivka.[77]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces likely completed the seizure of Hulyaipole sometime after April 2026. Russian forces continue infiltration missions west of Hulyaipole. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 27 that Russian forces are infiltrating near Novoselivka, Hulyaipilske, Charivne, and Vozdvyzhivka — all northwest to southwest of Hulyaipole, suggesting that Russian forces have likely consolidated their positions within Hulyaipole and are now operating further west.[78] Mashovets also reported that Ukrainian forces hold positions north of Myrne (southwest of Hulyaipole). ISW last observed evidence of Ukrainian forces operating in Hulyaipole’s city limits and within Myrne in April 2026.[79] Mashovets’ statements and the lack of evidence of observed Ukrainian positions within Hulyaipole or Myrne since April indicate that Russian forces have likely seized Hulyaipole and Myrne at some point since late April 2026.
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are interdicting Ukrainian logistics along the T-0808 Orikhiv-Novomykolaivka highway between Omelnyk and Mykilske (both northeast of Orikhiv and west to northwest of Hulyaipole).[80] The milblogger’s report, if accurate, may indicate that Russian forces are attempting to degrade Ukrainian forces’ ability to defend amid the slow Russian forces rate of advance west from Hulyaipole.
Ukrainian forces recently cleared Russian servicemembers in Western Zaporizhia oblast as Russian forces infiltrated on a prior date. Geolocated footage published on July 28 shows Ukrainian forces clearing a Russian forces position in a windbreak northeast of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[81] Mashovets reported on July 30 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Lobkove (southeast of Stepnohirsk), indicating that Ukrainian and Russian positions are likely intermixed in and near the settlement.[82] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces attempted to counterattack in southern Stepnohirsk and southern Prymorske (southeast of Stepnohirsk) to unblock Russian forces there, indicating that Russian forces previously infiltrated southern Stepnohirsk and southern Prymorske.
Ukrainian counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast and in the Orikhiv direction have allowed Ukrainian forces to seize the tactical initiative in this sector of the theater, halt the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army’s (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) advances, and force the 58th CAA to shift to an active defense. Mashovets reported on July 30 that the 58th CAA and its attached elements from the 18th CAA (SMD) and Russian Airborne Forces have failed to make meaningful gains either along the Dnipro River or toward Orikhiv, and that the 58th CAA and supporting elements are attempting to conduct an active defense along the 58th CAA’s western flank along the Dnipro river near Plavni (west of Orikhiv) to prevent Ukrainian forces from advancing further towards Kamyanske (south of Plavni).[83] Mashovets reported that Russian forces are attempting to establish better tactical positions north of Kamyanske with limited success, after previous Ukrainian counterattacks in the area. Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces advanced along the Stepnohirsk – Plavni (west of Orikhiv) vector and that Russian forces attempted unsuccessfully to counterattack with infiltrators in southern Stepnohirsk and southern Prymorske.[84] Mashovets assessed that the Russian military command in this area is worried about its increasingly difficult situation as Ukrainian forces attack toward Kamyanske.
Elements of the Russian 5th and 35th CAAs (both Eastern Military District) immediately west of the 58th CAA’s area of responsibility continue conducting offensive operations towards Orikhiv, however. Mashovets reported that Russian forces are attempting to encircle Orikhiv on the 58th CAA’s eastern flank, in combination with the 5th and 35th CAAs’ effort from Hulyaipole toward Orikhiv. Mashovets reported that Russian forces regularly attempt to advance toward Pavlivka (northwest of Orikhiv) and Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv) as part of an effort to reach high ground near Novooleksandrivka (southeast of Zaporizhzhia City along the H-08 Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia City highway) and to establish fire control over Ukrainian forces’ main ground line of communication to Orikhiv.[85] Mashovets reported that Russian forces have had limited success infiltrating from Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv) and Nesteryanka (southwest of Orikhiv) toward Novoandriivka (north of Nesteryanka and east of Shcherbaky) but have not reached Novoandriivka itself, further reporting that Ukrainian forces blocked Russian infiltrators south of Pavlivka.
Mashovets assessed that the current tactical situation in western Zaporizhia Oblast has persisted for about two weeks, with Russian forces failing to significantly increase their efforts along several vectors.[86] Mashovets forecasted that Russian forces will concentrate on holding the area north of the Yanchekrak River near the Dnipro River going forward, will seek to dislodge Ukrainian forces north and northeast of the Stepnohirsk-Mali Shcherbaky line, and will continue counterattacks in Plavni and Stepnohirsk.[87] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces may choose to focus the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division’s (58th CAA) efforts east and southeast of Orikhiv in combination with the 5th and 35th CAAs’ efforts from Dobropillya, or may focus the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division west and southwest of Orikhiv to make an attempt on the heights west of Orikhiv, therefore leaving the 5th and 35th CAAs without support. Mashovets also noted that Ukrainian forces are attempting to push Russian forces farther from the Zaporizhzhia City limits, as Russian forces are currently within 22-23 kilometers of the city limits, allowing them to strike Zaporizhzhia City with a diverse array of weapon systems.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 30.
Ukrainian forces continued their campaign to degrade Russian air defense assets and other military assets in occupied Crimea as Crimean occupation authorities struggle to counter Ukrainian strikes. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian unmanned sea vehicles base in Snizhne (about 116 kilometers from the frontline) and radiotransparent shelters for radar station antennas in Okhotnyche (about 261 kilometers from the frontline).[88] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Murmansk-BM electronic warfare system, which can reportedly intercept and jam signals at a range of up to 5,000 kilometers, in Cape Fiolent (about 240 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of July 26 to 27.[89] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)’s Crimea service reported on July 30, citing an insider source, that Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov approved a plan sloughing the responsibility of air defenses on local Crimean occupation authorities, as the regional-level BARS-Crimea formation is incapable of protecting infrastructure in occupied Crimea.[90]
Ukrainian forces continued strikes against Russian tankers conducting logistics to occupied Crimea overnight on July 29 to 30. Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck four additional Russian tankers overnight, presumably in the Black or Azov seas, for a total of 205 tankers struck since July 6.[91]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
See topline text for Russia’s large drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight.
Russian forces continued their campaigns against Ukrainian port infrastructure and merchant ships. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Council Head Mykola Lukashuk stated that Russian strikes against cargo ships forced the Pivdennyi Iron and Steel Plant in Kryvyi Rih to partially suspend operations and the Poltava Iron and Steel Plant to suspend operations starting August 3 and lasting for about ten to 20 days (until about August 13 to 23).[92] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck a fuel and lubricants tank in the port of Odesa City, two dry cargo ships in the port of Yuzhnyi, Odesa Oblast, and a cargo ship near Snake Island with Geran-4 jet-powered drones during the day on July 29.[93] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck fuel infrastructure near Novyi Bilyary, Odesa Oblast, and four dry cargo ships, including one each in the ports of Odesa City and Yuzhnyi and two at sea south of Odesa City, during the day on July 30.[94] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces may have used two low-altitude Kh-35 missiles launched from a Bal coastal air defense launcher to strike storage facilities in the port of Odesa.[95]
Russian forces also continue their campaign against Ukrainian gas stations, particularly along major rear area ground lines of communication (GLOCs). The Russian MoD claimed on July 30 that Russian forces are striking Ukrainian gas stations “nonstop,” and Russian security forces claimed to Russian media outlets that Russian forces destroyed all the main gas stations along the M-03 Poltava-Kharkiv, M-18 Kharkiv-Dnipro, P-51 Kharkiv-Pavlohrad, and M-30 Dnipro-Pavlohrad highways as of July 28.[96]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/70754
[2] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20228
[3] https://t.me/kpszsu/70754
[4] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20229; https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/1364066-vibuhi-poblizu-cerkas-so-vidomo-pro-ataku-rf-u-nic-na-30-lipna/; https://t.me/vilkul/17343; https://meduza dot io/feature/2026/07/30/pod-krivym-rogom-rossiyskaya-raketa-popala-v-dom-gde-zhila-mnogodetnaya-semya; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/70106; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/07/30/dvoye-ditej-buly-vbyti-rosiyanamy-vnaslidok-raketnogo-udaru-po-dniprovshhyni/; https://www.facebook.com/SvitlIana.Onyshchuk/posts/pfbid027Nimby4bgP4kiLgB8UiYwY6LuL6K5xNwsd4SabpLF3kz1UmC7WztNz4EzhKiT6QZl; https://suspilne dot media/ivano-frankivsk/1310548-raketna-ataka-rf-na-ivano-frankivsini-bulo-cutno-zvuki-vibuhiv/; https://t.me/synegubov/24338 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1367260-armia-rf-vdarila-raketami-po-zolocevu-poranena-86-ricna-zinka/; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4398 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4399 ; https://www.facebook.com/andriy.raykovich/posts/pfbid0ZG9DsU4LLWew7x7PF4F6wWCsnrzhc2dvzTbBVMetyNEVj2AYUG9nRfho3Qnq3k2fl?rdid=DoNUuxZW0gwxXzL2# ; https://suspilne dot media/kropyvnytskiy/1367198-rosijska-raketno-dronova-ataka-na-kirovogradsini-poskodzene-privatne-podvira/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7169; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7171; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7169; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1367170-rosia-atakue-kiiv-balisticnimi-raketami/; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/31890; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/31903; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/31905; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/31906; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/70111; https://t.me/andriysadovyi/3715; https://t.me/andriysadovyi/3718; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid02XECHqqKmwpWShut3PLJgLTjUVQVPzcfYHvk1SjDrb9A3ov3inmuZPNvGySZ6K3qgl?cft[0]=AZbBjsaU7bMiaXUtnLp_Y4tTPszKly3nKpxj2bFSUofuaC5ze_ghatGow-QuuLlhBY6UVIPYnPREsrahXnvuYAeFlryHfIwCjR1ZCUIBVJDhU7o0Rnu-s-CUyfRlS3Swdkoq16bOsc78eGDmy2SMzzv-i8580aWOdTqbhMx5VRKvag&tn=%2CO%2CP-R; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1367210-poskodzeno-budinki-avtivku-svidkoi-traktor-armia-rf-zavdala-kombinovanoi-ataki-po-mikolaivsini/; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34126; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1367184-na-poltavsini-vnaslidok-ataki-rf-zaginula-ludina-poskodzeni-pidpriemstvo-ta-terminal-novoi-posti/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/70167;
[5] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20229; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20244; https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/30/europe/russian-missile-kills-ukraine-family-intl
[6] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20229
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/
[8] https://t.me/rybar/82083
[9] https://t.me/kpszsu/70754
[10] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/po-radushnomu-rosiyani-zastosuvali-vpershe-za-dovgij-chas-ra-105645
[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russia-likely-used-nkorean-missile-deadly-ukraine-strike-first-time-this-year-2026-07-30/
[12] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20161
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2025/
[14] https://wiadomosci dot onet.pl/lublin/donald-tusk-bylismy-przygotowani-do-zestrzelenia-rakiety/s3qy25w; https://x.com/donaldtusk/status/2082826810052558935; https://x.com/donaldtusk/status/2082785036936384778
[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/polish-police-find-crater-debris-unidentified-object-russia-strikes-ukraine-2026-07-30/
[16] https://x.com/DowOperSZ/status/2082694512682389553
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/; https://www.dw dot com/en/russian-drones-fly-undeterred-over-moldova-and-romania/a-74944321; https://www.euronews dot com/my-europe/2026/05/07/two-drones-from-russia-crash-in-latvia-with-one-causing-oil-depot-fire-army-says; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2026/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2026/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2026/
[20] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/polish-police-find-crater-debris-unidentified-object-russia-strikes-ukraine-2026-07-30/
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2026/; https://kyivindependent dot com/wildberries-warehouse-major-oil-refinery-burn-as-ukraine-strikes-russias-ryazan-oblast-media-reports/
[22] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/07/30/sklady-wildberries-v-penzenskoy-oblasti-i-udmurtii-zagorelis-posle-udara-ukrainskih-bespilotnikov; https://t.me/rwb_press_service/1665
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/
[24] https://www.kyivpost.com/post/80833; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg9n2y61w6o; https://verstka dot media/prodavczy-wildberries-pozhalovalis-na-padenie-vykupov-tovarov-posle-atak
[25] https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/11326
[26] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8848535
[27] https://amp.rbc dot ru/rbcnews/business/30/07/2026/6a6b673f9a7947ceb6729b65
[28] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-strike-campaigns-will-likely-continue-to-hurt-russias-economy-and-military-operations-in-ukraine/
[29] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-strike-campaigns-will-likely-continue-to-hurt-russias-economy-and-military-operations-in-ukraine/
[30] https://hromadske dot ua/viyskovi/268525-drapatyy-zniav-nachshtabu-sukhoputnykh-viysk; https://hromadske dot ua/viyskovi/268477-drapatyy-zakinchyv-vidriadzennia-do-henshtabu-heneralu-malinovskomu-iakyy-zapysuvav-zvernennia-na-pidtrymku-syrskoho; https://babel dot ua/texts/128959-pershi-kadrovi-rishennya-mihayla-drapatogo-u-komanduvanni-suhoputnih-viysk-sil-logistiki-ta-v-93-ombr-babel-zibrav-podrobici
[31] https://t.me/tmelnychuk/7494; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/29/kabmin-pryznachyv-dvoh-zastupnykiv-ministra-oborony-ukrayiny/; https://t.me/sotaproject/116576; https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/15965; https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/15964
[32] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20245; https://www.president dot gov.ua/documents/6742026-60581; https://www.president dot gov.ua/documents/6732026-60661; https://www.president dot gov.ua/documents/6722026-60657; https://suspilne dot media/1367932-zelenskij-priznaciv-kerivnika-centru-specoperacij-a-sbu/
[33] https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2082723202082767068; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2082805273417158762; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2082704663514673363 ; https://t.me/falconintel/355
[34] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@36.684,45.129,14.172z
[35] https://www.ft.com/content/3990cbf0-e783-4445-a32f-19a345c0cc6f?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[36]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41633 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41612 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41610 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35865 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/8862 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/96751
[37] https://t.me/mod_russia/66106 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/66111
[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/66114
[39] https://t.me/severnnyi/8864
[40] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/30/informacziya-rosiyan-pro-zahoplennya-sela-nova-sich-na-sumshhyni-ne-vidpovidaye-dijsnosti-uv-kursk/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41633 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41612 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41610 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35865 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/96751 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/8862 ; https://t.me/rybar/82088
[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/66111 ; https://t.me/divgen/82756
[43] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20733 ; https://t.me/sashakots/63434 ;
[44] https://t.me/severnnyi/8864
[45] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/30/dopovidayut-pro-zahoplennya-naselenogo-punktu-hocha-yihnij-pihotynecz-lezhyt-mertvyj-yak-rosiyany-vykorystovuyut-flagovtyk/
[46] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1366938-rosijskij-rubikon-aktivizuvavsa-na-harkivsini-batinov/
[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/66116
[48] https://t.me/dva_majors/96751 ; https://t.me/rybar/82088; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41633 ; tps://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41612 ; tps://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41610
[49] https://t.me/divgen/82761
[50] https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30255
[51]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41612 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41610 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35865 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19288
[52] https://t.me/grvZapad/19288
[53]https://t.me/RVvoenkor/120229 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19288 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41633 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41612 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41610 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35865
[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/120229; https://t.me/grvZapad/19288
[55] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/37343
[56] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/37343
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41633; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41612; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41610; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45922; https://t.me/wargonzo/35865; https://t.me/dva_majors/96751; https://t.me/grvZapad/19288
[58] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45922
[59] https://t.me/grvZapad/19288; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45922; https://t.me/wargonzo/35865; https://t.me/dva_majors/96751
[60] https://t.me/motopatriot78/54491; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2026/
[61] https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30255; https://t.me/Osintpen/3261
[62] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/
[63] https://t.me/rybar/82067
[64] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/
[65] https://t.me/sashakots/63434
[66] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/
[67] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2025/
[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41633 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41612 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41610 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35865
[69] https://t.me/mod_russia/66109
[70] https://t.me/motopatriot78/54493; https://t.me/motopatriot78/54494
[71] https://t.me/motopatriot78/54493; https://t.me/divgen/82767
[72] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/30/kolona-vorozhoyi-tehniky-potrapyla-pid-udar-ukrayinskyh-bpla/; https://t.me/Centr_omega_NGU/10257
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41633; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41612; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41610
[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41633; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41612; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41610
[75] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2082491507047809125; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23691
[76] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2677
[77] https://t.me/tass_agency/387777; https://t.me/Ivan_Sergeevich_Prikhodko/24600 ; https://t.me/Prikhodko1970/30608
[78] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3529
[79] https://t.me/mod_russia/62531; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2042732191432814656?s=20; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2049501793982263302; https://t.me/voin_dv/19375
[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/20443
[81] https://x.com/Danspiun/status/2082499599474831667; https://t.me/revanche_tactical_group/1729
[82] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3534
[83] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3533; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3534
[84] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3534
[85] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3534
[86] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3535
[87] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3536
[88] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2677
[89] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/30/spalyly-murmansk-u-krymu-piloty-gur-vpolyuvaly-vartisnu-stancziyu-reb-okupantiv/; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/spalyly-murmansk-u-krymu-maistry-hur-vpoliuvaly-dorohovartisnu-stantsiiu-reb-okupantiv.html; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1367454-bijci-gur-urazili-stanciu-kompleksu-reb-murmansk-bn-rosijskih-vijskovih-u-krimu/; https://www.facebook.com/reel/909987578236103/?s=single_unit; https://t.me/DIUkraine/9013
[90] https://ru.krymr dot com/a/news-krym-lokal-nyye-mobil-nyye-ognevyye-gruppy-/33818245.html; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/106082
[91] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2677
[92] https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/27828
[93] https://t.me/mod_russia/66085; https://t.me/mod_russia/66103;
[94] https://t.me/mod_russia/66119
[95] https://t.me/rybar/82077
[96] https://t.me/mod_russia/66115; https://lenta dot ru/news/2026/07/29/stalo-izvestno-ob-unichtozhenii-vseh-azs-vsu-ot-harkova-do-poltavy/
