Executive Summary
The Kremlin intensified its campaign to dismantle the open internet in Russia in 2025 in an effort to control online narratives, prevent anti-war or anti-regime movements, and prepare the information space for a protracted war in Ukraine or possible confrontation with NATO. The Kremlin has been gradually undertaking efforts to restrict the Russian internet since at least October 2022, after learning from its failure to control the internet before launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and facing significant backlash following Russia’s declaration of partial mobilization in late September 2022. The Kremlin has been pursuing various efforts to dismantle pro-war civil groups that criticized the conduct of Russia’s war, impose physical and cyber control over the internet, and shape the state-controlled internet since.
The recent intensification of this campaign suggests that Russian President Vladimir Putin may not be as confident in his regime’s stability entering the fifth year of his war in Ukraine as he was earlier on. Putin’s mismanagement of the war and Ukraine’s resistance now confront Putin with challenging, uncomfortable, and unpopular decisions about the war’s force generation requirements and the Russian economy.[1] The Kremlin likely aims to secure sufficient control of the open internet in Russia to eliminate or greatly reduce the expression of societal discontent in response to Putin’s demands for more sacrifices for the war effort in Ukraine and possibly a future war against NATO. The Kremlin is also increasingly weaponizing the internet to create a new state-controlled surveillance system, resurrecting the Soviet police state in a new form, as ISW has warned since 2020.[2]
Introduction
The Kremlin escalated its internet censorship campaign starting in 2025 and 2026, reflecting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s waning confidence in his regime’s stability as he must confront increasingly difficult and unpopular tradeoffs to sustain his war effort in Ukraine. The Kremlin has seemingly approached a point where high military, economic, and societal costs from the war in Ukraine are forcing Putin to make difficult decisions, as ISW forecasted in February 2025 would occur.[3] Putin has long been trying to balance the need to prevent societal discontent about the war and general mobilization, the need to maintain the tempo of Russian offensive operations on the battlefield, and the need to maintain a Russian economy strained by Western sanctions and acute labor shortages.[4] It became harder for the Kremlin to balance among these three imperatives in 2025, as military recruitment rates declined amid mounting force generation spending and losses; economic challenges increasingly impacted regular Russian people; and societal pressure to demobilize and properly compensate Russian personnel intensified.[5] The Kremlin tried to restore the balance by tapping into its gold reserves for the first time in November 2025; imposing a higher value-added tax (VAT) on ordinary goods; and imposing stricter regulations on veterans benefits.[6] The Kremlin appears to have intensified its internet censorship campaign around the time that Putin began to make these tradeoffs in 2025, indicating that this campaign derives from Putin’s perception of his increasing vulnerability rather than from confidence in his or Russia’s strength.
The Kremlin may be accelerating its internet censorship campaign now in order to preempt domestic backlash and insulate the regime ahead of future decisions that are likely to be unpopular at home. The internet censorship campaign, if successful, could minimize the risk of noteworthy demonstrations or the formation of new civil society groups outside the Kremlin’s control. Kremlin insider sources speculated in February 2026 that the recent escalation of the internet censorship campaign was in preparation for the September 2026 State Duma elections, as the Kremlin fears a negative domestic reaction to the United Russia Party winning 70 percent of the vote.[7]
The Kremlin is more likely to be intensifying its censorship campaign in order to prepare future involuntary reserve callups to replace the current expensive force generation mechanisms that promise steep compensations to recruits. The timing of the increased internet censorship campaign had negative synergistic effects with Russia’s loss of its ability to use Starlink in Ukraine, a price it does not seem that the Kremlin needed to pay in order to be ready for elections more than six months away.[8] ISW warned in October 2025 that the Kremlin was preparing to conduct rolling partial mobilization without a formal declaration of war or formal announcement.[9] The Kremlin is particularly sensitive to using mobilized personnel and conscripts in combat operations, having witnessed the rise of anti-war civil society groups after the formation and prominence of such groups in response to the Soviet and Russian reliance on conscripts to fight the Afghanistan and Chechen wars.[10] Anti-war civil society organizations galvanized by losses in Afghanistan are regarded as having played a role in the Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, if not the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union.[11] Putin has demonstrated remarkable hesitance to rely on compulsory military service throughout the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and even staged numerous meetings with veterans and their family members to reassure Russian society of his commitment not to declare general mobilization.[12]
The Kremlin may be trying to reinstate a Soviet-style police state ahead of unpopular force generation policy changes in order to suppress anti-war sentiment, reduce civil liberties, and coerce Russian society into supporting the war effort more fully and painfully.
The Kremlin may be setting conditions to raise cash for the war by imposing additional taxes and increasingly nationalizing property from Kremlin-affiliated businessmen. A Just Russia Party Head Sergey Mironov announced on February 18 that the party is proposing a new luxury goods tax and accused Russian businessmen of disregarding Russia’s war needs.[13] Russian State Duma officials previously made similar proposals to impose a “military tax” on Russian citizens.[14] Putin has repeatedly implied that the Kremlin is against nationalization of property in a likely effort to appeal to the elite who supported the rise of his regime.[15] The Kremlin, however, has been gradually accelerating nationalization efforts during the full-scale invasion.[16] The internet censorship campaign may help to neutralize disgruntled businessmen, who could try to resist the Kremlin by weaponizing the information space.
The Kremlin may be trying to advance other unpopular policies, such as lowering veterans compensations or payments to Russian servicemen, for example. The Kremlin notably faced some backlash online after trying to force remaining mobilized servicemen to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in Spring 2025, which some commentators interpreted as an attempt to avoid paying mobilized servicemen directly from the Russian Presidential Fund.[17] The Russian government similarly deprived prisoners who volunteer to fight in Ukraine of one-time enlistment bonuses starting January 1, 2025, and modified policies guaranteeing a one-time payment to all wounded servicemembers.[18]
The Kremlin has recently ramped up its internet censorship campaign by undertaking more decisive measures to restrict physical and cyber internet infrastructure and imposing stricter censorship regulations in 2025 and 2026. The Kremlin has been increasingly advancing this campaign by testing and legalizing mechanisms to shut down the mobile internet; throttling and blocking major messaging platforms such as Telegram and WhatsApp; trying to replace these platforms with a state-monitored messaging app; adopting restrictions on the use of virtual private networks (VPNs); systematically silencing and coopting social media creators and milbloggers; and strengthening general censorship laws and measures online. These individual efforts support the larger aim of restricting the flow of information within, into, and out of Russia; to promote self-censorship out of fear of retribution or loss of financial profit; and to create an information environment for a new, militarized state ideology.
Internet Censorship Efforts Since 2025
The Kremlin throttled Telegram on February 9 and 10, marking a significant intensification of Russia’s yearslong campaign to reassert control over the Russian online information space.[19] Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor confirmed on February 10 that it had restricted Telegram’s operations.[20] Roskomnadzor claimed that the move was necessary to force Telegram to comply with Russian laws and accused Telegram of not protecting Russian citizens from fraud, extremism, and terrorism. A Moscow City court has filed eight cases against Telegram since the start of 2026 for failing to restrict or delete information prohibited by Russian law and for failing to fulfill the duties of a social network owner operating in Russia.[21]
The Kremlin is increasingly targeting other foreign platforms as well. YouTube has experienced mass outages and slowdowns in Russia since Summer 2025, with the Kremlin reportedly planning to slow down and then ultimately block the site.[22] WhatsApp reported on February 11 that the Russian government tried to fully block access to the app.[23] The Kremlin confirmed the restrictions and accused Meta (WhatsApp’s parent company) of not complying with Russian laws.[24] Roskomnadzor reportedly blocked WhatsApp, YouTube, Facebook, Facebook Messenger, Instagram, the Tor browser, the BBC, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), RFE/RL’s Systema investigative project, Deutsche Welle, the Moscow Times, and a site for installing applications onto Android smartphones to bypass application stores on February 11.[25] Roskomnadzor reportedly removed these sites from Russia’s National Domain Name System (NDNS), part of Russia’s sovereign “RuNet” internet system that uses state-controlled domain name servers (DNS) to match IP addresses with domain IP addresses and connect users with websites.[26] The Kremlin has long been trying to make Telegram and WhatsApp unreliable for Russian users, blocking calls on these platforms and slowing down or limiting access to the apps, but the February 2026 efforts mark a significant intensification.[27]
The Kremlin is trying to replace foreign platforms with its state messaging app, Max. Putin signed a law in June 2025 creating a single “national messenger” app that would include Russian government, financial, and commercial digital services.[28] Russian social media platform VK (led by Vladimir Kiriyenko, the son of Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko) released the Max app in March 2025.[29] The Kremlin began pre-installing Max on all phones and tablets sold in Russia in September 2025.[30] Users cannot anonymously register on Max but must use a Russian or Belarusian SIM card.[31]
Max likely also serves as a platform to surveil Russian citizens’ online behavior. Russian opposition outlet Astra noted that Max’s privacy policy states that the app collects user data and can share it with third parties and government agencies.[32] The app reportedly can track users’ location, collect search history, record audio and video, and take screenshots in the background.[33] The app can also track user behavior in other apps – allowing Russian authorities to link accounts on other social media outlets to the registered Max user.[34] The Kremlin likely aims to use this surveillance to punish anonymous critics, control the dominant narratives in the information space, and prevent foreign influence.
The Kremlin began mobile internet outages across Russia and occupied Ukraine in 2025. Russian authorities intensified these outages on May 9, 2025, for Victory Day (Russia’s largest holiday that commemorates the Soviet Union’s contributions to the Second World War), citing alleged security concerns.[35] These outages have become even more widespread and common since then. Subsequent deliberate internet outages have affected almost all regions of Russia, even reaching as far as Sakhalin Oblast and Kamchatka Krai in eastern Russia.[36] Russian officials have attempted to justify the outages as necessary to protect against Ukrainian drone strikes.[37] This claim is only partially true. Ukraine does indeed use Russian SIM cards in its drones to access the Russian mobile network for navigation, and there was a sharp increase in outages following Ukraine’s successful June 1 Operation Spiderweb that used the mobile internet to remotely control drones to strike deep into Russia.[38] This justification does not explain all the outages, however. Some regions that are often targets of Ukrainian drone strikes or are home to major Russian defense industrial enterprises, airbases, and military infrastructure have suffered outages, but Russian authorities have not shut down the internet in all such regions at the same rate. The Kremlin is more likely using this problem as a pretext to establish a system that enables it to take all or part of Russia offline at times of its choosing.
Kremlin efforts to shut down access to the mobile internet are part of a wider initiative to control physical and cyber internet infrastructure and access. The Kremlin is trying to disincentivize the use of VPNs to access restricted content, passing laws that prohibit advertisements for VPNs and making the use of a VPN an aggravating circumstance in criminal cases.[39] Roskomnadzor also reportedly blocked VPN service Windscribe on February 11.[40] Russian authorities have been testing since November 2025 mechanisms to introduce a “cooling-off” period, such that foreign SIM cards that arrive in Russia from abroad will not work for 72 hours after crossing the border.[41] The Kremlin claimed that such measures are necessary to protect against drones that might be using Russian SIM cards, but such efforts also aim to prevent Russians from using foreign SIM cards to access content banned in Russia and to disincentivize foreign travel.
Putin signed in February 2025 a bill requiring mobile operators to disconnect cellular communications and landline internet services whenever the Federal Security Service (FSB) demands.[42] Earlier drafts of the bill stated that mobile operators would need to comply with FSB “requests” that aim to protect citizens and the Russian state from “emerging security threats.” The final version of the law removed such language, however, giving the FSB wide freedoms to shut down the internet without needing to give any legal or security justifications.
The Kremlin is creating new legal mechanisms to control what Russians can say on the internet. The Kremlin is deanonymizing Russian Telegram channels, legally requiring social media channels with over 10,000 subscribers to register with Roskomnadzor since January 2025.[43] The Kremlin designated the act of searching for and accessing material that the Russian government has labeled “extremist” as a misdemeanor criminal offense in July 2025.[44] The Kremlin, for example, has deemed Meta (the parent company of Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp) an “extremist” organization.[45]
The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading in February 2025 that would strengthen measures to prevent the “distortion of historical truth” and “evasion of the duty to defend the Fatherland.”[46] A Duma deputy stated that the bill’s primary objective is to shape the Russian public consciousness to think of evading service to the Russian “Motherland” as “socially unacceptable.”[47] The bill likely aims to provide the Kremlin with a legal justification to further punish Russians who criticize Kremlin actions related to the war in Ukraine.
The Kremlin has imprisoned a number of prominent, critical voices in the past year. Russian authorities detained employees of the state-owned Ural regional information agency Ura.ru, which had reported on several Russian military command changes ahead of official announcements, in Summer 2025.[48] Russian authorities in July 2025 also detained Gleb Trifonov, the editor-in-chief of Baza, a Russian outlet reportedly affiliated with Russian law enforcement that published a transcript of a conversation between the pilots and ground controllers during the December 2024 downing of the Azerbaijan Airlines plane that refuted the Kremlin’s official claims about the incident.[49] Russian authorities tried to shut down the Russian insider source VChK-OGPU, which often shares insider information about the Kremlin and Russian security services, in late October 2025.[50] Russian authorities reportedly filed a case in February 2025 against former pro-Russian separatist leader and self-proclaimed “People’s Governor of Donetsk Oblast” Pavel Gubarev for “discrediting the Russian Armed Forces.”[51] Gubarev, who was a prominent leader of pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk Oblast in 2014, has been critical of Russian military commanders and occupation administration officials on his Telegram channel. The Kremlin declared milblogger Roman Alekhin a “foreign agent” in September 2025 following a claimed corruption scandal surrounding his crowdfunding efforts.[52] Alekhin notably criticized the Kremlin for failing to repel Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[53]
The Kremlin also signaled its intent to insulate Russian society by restricting its access to foreign artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots. Putin stated on October 23, 2025, that he wants to create a sovereign AI model that would rely on Russian culture, worldview, and values.[54] Putin notably warned that Russia should not copy “other people’s solutions” and should avoid “technological and ideological dependence.” Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin, who is reportedly one of the Kremlin’s main ideologues, similarly called on the Kremlin to develop a Russian version of AI in line with state views, including Russian territorial claims over Odesa, Kyiv, and Kharkiv cities.[55]
The Kremlin’s Gradual Internet Censorship Campaign Since 2022
The Kremlin has perceived tight control over Russia’s domestic information space as a vital tool for regime stability and its war efforts since the 2000s, but was slow to take control over the open internet. Putin quickly worked to establish state control over traditional forms of media, such as television and radio, upon coming to power in 2000 and successfully established such control by 2003.[56] The Kremlin has introduced new forms of information control every year since 2000. State control over traditional media had largely quashed anti-government protest sentiment in Russia (barring a few major exceptions). The Kremlin did not establish the same type of control over the internet in Russia as in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), however, likely because the Kremlin thought that the control Putin had over traditional means of media was sufficient.
The open internet emerged as a major threat to the Kremlin’s control over the information space after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, particularly in late 2022 through mid-2023 as Russian military failures mounted. Russia’s February 2022 invasion exposed the degree to which insufficient internet controls were a significant vulnerability for the Kremlin, especially as Russia’s military failures grew. The Kremlin had some censorship laws in place, such as the vague law from March 2022 against “defaming” the military, but did not prevent pro-war, Telegram-based Russian milbloggers from criticizing the Russian conduct of the war, nor did it prevent their quasi-independence and popularity in Russia.[57] A massive wave of criticism among Russian milbloggers emerged online after Russian forces attempted a failed river crossing in May 2022, with the milbloggers amplifying Western and Ukrainian analysis of the failure.[58] The successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kharkiv Oblast and later Kherson Oblast then forced Putin to declare the partial reserve call-up on September 21, 2022, which resulted in numerous appeals and significant online backlash.[59] The Kremlin simultaneously faced growing backlash from veterans whom Russian authorities had denied compensation, rotations, and state benefits.[60]
Select Russian officials and Kremlin factions began to exploit Russia’s military, bureaucratic, and mobilization failures to rile up parts of Russian society online in pursuit of their personal objectives in 2022 and early 2023. Deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov used the internet, particularly Telegram, to criticize the way the Russian MoD was overseeing the war effort in an effort to blackmail the Kremlin into appointing MoD officials and military commanders that would favor Prigozhin and Kadyrov.[61] Former Russian officers who covertly fought for Russia in Donbas and Crimea, such as Gubarev, prominent ultranationalist Igor Girkin, and administrator of the “Moscow Calling” Russian ultranationalist Telegram channel Andrey Kurshin, began actively complaining about the mistreatment of Russian troops and rallying veterans and active elements of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics’ militias against the Russian MoD.[62] Russian commanders, like former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov and current Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Lieutenant General Mikhail Teplinsky, similarly used Telegram to try to reverse their dismissals by garnering public support, particularly in early 2023.[63]
The Kremlin launched its internet censorship campaign in Fall 2022 to try to address these vulnerabilities, but this campaign was deliberately gradual and careful. The Kremlin likely understood that the interconnectedness of the internet is a chief Russian vulnerability by at least October-November 2022, as it could allow for protest narratives to quickly spread across the country and for movements to become more organized. The Kremlin issued Prigozhin an indirect warning in early October 2022 using an odd allusion to the Pugachev Rebellion that challenged Catherine the Great’s authority in the mid-1770s.[64] The Kremlin, however, did not attempt major crackdowns against Russian ultranationalist groups on Telegram at that time.[65] Some Russian milbloggers and Telegram channels accused the Russian MoD of targeting them in October 2022, but the effort was not widespread, and these creators ultimately did not lose their platforms.[66] Putin even doubled down on supporting the quasi-independence of milbloggers, likely because he saw retaining the support of such influential figures as crucial for his war effort.[67] Milbloggers supported numerous crowdfunding, training, veterans support, and recruitment efforts.[68] Putin decided to court milbloggers by promoting some to official positions within the Kremlin, most notably prominent Russian milblogger and correspondent for Komsomolskaya Pravda, Alexander (Sasha) Kots, whom Putin made a member of the Russian Human Rights Council in late November 2022.[69]
The Kremlin’s internet censorship campaign ramped up in mid-Summer 2023 after Putin’s regime survived a mutiny. Prigozhin launched a mutiny against the Russian MoD on June 23, 2023, and unsuccessfully tried to use Telegram to rally Russian conventional forces to join the armed rebellion.[70] The Kremlin subsequently began cracking down on critical Telegram channels by mid-July 2023. The Kremlin has arrested multiple milbloggers and administrators of Telegram channels, including former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer Mikhail Polyakov of the “Kremlin Laundress” channel and Kurshin of the “Moscow Calling” channel.[71] The Kremlin also relieved Popov of his command, arrested Girkin in July 2023, and dismantled Prigozhin’s media empire and Wagner forces following Prigozhin’s death in August 2023.[72]
The Kremlin resumed a more gradual internet censorship campaign throughout late 2023 and 2024, primarily focusing on eliminating independent veterans civil society groups, coopting milbloggers, and establishing legal frameworks to expand restrictions on the use of the open internet in the future. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree in November 2023 allowing Roskomnadzor to block sites that publish information about methods to bypass sites that the Russian government has blocked.[73] The Russian Federation Council passed a law in February 2024 allowing the Russian government to confiscate property from citizens who spread “fake information” about the Russian military.[74] The Russian State Duma considered a bill in February 2024 that would prohibit actors whom the Russian government designates as “undesirable” from entering Russia, likely as part of ongoing efforts to censor opposition media outlets and dismantle ties between Russia and foreign and international non-governmental organizations.[75] In July 2024, Russian lawmakers reportedly began discussing the legislation that would force social media account owners with at least 10,000 subscribers to transfer personal identification data to the Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor, which Putin later signed into law starting in 2025.[76] The Russian MoD, particularly under current Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, has held exclusive meetings with carefully selected milbloggers.[77] The Kremlin also launched four state initiatives to coopt veterans and veterans civil society groups in late 2023 and 2024: the Defenders of the Fatherland State Fund in April 2023; the “Time of Heroes” Higher School of Public Administration in February 2024; the Association of ”Special Military Operation” (“SVO” — a Kremlin term for its 2022 invasion of Ukraine) Veterans in November 2023; and the “SVOi” Military Brotherhood movement in October 2024.[78] Many of these initiatives then became the foundation for the Kremlin’s intensified internet censorship campaign in 2025 and 2026.
Successes and Failures in the Kremlin’s Internet Censorship Campaign
The Kremlin, aware of the potential for significant domestic backlash, has been trying to disguise its intensified censorship since at least December 2024. Putin used his annual Direct Line press conference in December 2024 to repeatedly reference fraud schemes on social media platforms that had allegedly become widespread in Russia.[79] Putin uses Direct Line to answer Russian citizens’ questions in what are pre-planned and staged interactions that allow the Kremlin to promote its messaging and policies about chosen topics. Putin’s repeated discussions about these fraud schemes between answers about the war in Ukraine and the Russian economy were bizarre. The fraud narratives were gaining traction in the Russian information space prior to Putin’s 2024 Direct Line, but Putin’s mentions of the issue during the press conference put forward the official pretext that the Kremlin has since used to pursue its intensified internet censorship campaign. This pretext has become particularly important in the Kremlin’s efforts to go after individual social media platforms, such as Telegram.[80] Russian officials are apparently afraid of outlining the purpose of their efforts to control the internet more explicitly, relying on pretexts like fraudsters instead.
The Kremlin’s effort to establish physical and cyber control over internet infrastructure is inconveniencing Russians but has yet to generate significant societal backlash. Russians are reporting that internet-based services, like delivery, taxi, and banking systems, have become unreliable, impacting some people’s work and income.[81] Russians are increasingly returning to cash and non-internet solutions, which are likely impacting modern ways of living. Some Russians say that they are okay with these shifts because such measures are necessary for security, indicating that the Kremlin’s justifications may be effective.[82]
Parts of the Kremlin’s censorship campaign have proven more successful than others in the past year. Many Russian milbloggers have complied with Roskomnadzor’s deanonymization regulations, and criticism of more recent high-profile arrests and the restrictions on WhatsApp and YouTube has been limited, for example.[83] The Kremlin’s arrests of some ultranationalists such as Girkin and Gubarev have also been relatively successful, as they have not generated significant backlash in Russian society. Some milbloggers have been self-censoring their criticisms of the Kremlin and Russian MoD since Summer 2023.[84] The Kremlin has also been relatively successful in preventing the rise of independent veterans-based civil society groups since 2024.[85]
Parts of the Kremlin censorship campaign have been less successful, however, particularly the effort to make Max the leading messenger app in Russia. The Max platform has remained largely unpopular among Russians.[86] Russian milbloggers have criticized Max as a surveillance system, and this negative branding is likely impacting the signup rate.[87] The Kremlin is using bots on other social media platforms to try to promote Max, including by inundating polls on Telegram inquiring about Russians’ use of Max to make the state platform appear very popular.[88] The Kremlin is also using Russian propagandists and influencers to promote Max.[89] The Kremlin tried to leverage the February 9 to 10 throttling of Telegram to increase Max’s popularity, with Max reportedly recommending that its channel administrators “remind” their audiences about the app and encourage them to subscribe.[90] Kremlin officials often emphasize how droves of people are allegedly signing up for Max in order to incentivize more Russians to join.[91]
The Kremlin is trying to push Russians to voluntarily move to Max in order to avoid the domestic unrest that would likely follow any efforts to forcefully move them. ISW continues to assess that the recent throttling of Telegram likely aimed to push more Russians to move to Max.[92] Guests on Kremlin-affiliated propaganda show Solovyov Live have called on the Kremlin to boost the popularity of Max by slowing down Telegram since at least Summer 2025.[93] Russian opposition outlet Verstka further reported in August 2025 that sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the Kremlin decided to restrict calls on Telegram and WhatsApp in order to “test the public’s reaction” and encourage people to move to Max before permanently blocking these foreign messengers.[94]
The Kremlin is moving vital everyday functions to Max such that Russians have almost no choice but to sign up. Russian authorities are moving many services for veterans and the relatives of servicemembers to Max, and Russian citizens searching for relatives who have gone missing in Ukraine must now send all requests about DNA testing results through Max.[95] Russian authorities are working to integrate Max with the Russian Unified Public Services Portal (Gosuslugi), connecting users to civil services and government platforms.[96] Russian authorities are integrating housing management chats and platforms connecting parents with their children’s teachers into the platform.[97] The Kremlin reportedly plans to promote the app by targeting parents who are “young” and do not have “established habits” yet.[98] Many Russian officials are also moving to Max so that Russians have to use the app to retain access to important government announcements like drone strike threats.[99] Deputy Chairperson of the Duma Committee on Information Policy, Information Technology, and Communications Andrei Svintsov stated in August 2025 that Max would still operate during drone strikes — an attempt to use guarantees of undisrupted access to incentivize Russians to move to Max on their own.[100]
The Kremlin is trying to balance its efforts to push Russians to Max with the need to avoid widespread backlash, however. The Kremlin has reportedly instructed deputy governors, who are responsible for domestic policy, to not “overdo” their efforts to push Russians to join Max after the throttling of Telegram “because you cannot force users into [Max] with a stick.”[101] Kremlin efforts to push Russians to use Max in order to access everyday services are not inherently problematic. These efforts, when coupled with restrictions and blocks on Russians’ preferred platforms for which Max is not a viable alternative, however, will likely be unpopular. Any possible Kremlin decisions to fully block Telegram in the future will have to take into account Max’s popularity level and Russians’ views of Max as an alternative to other platforms.
The February 2026 throttling of Telegram generated widespread criticism in the Russian milblogger community, and the Kremlin appears not to have expected such a reaction. Russian milbloggers began to complain about the Telegram restrictions on February 10, particularly about the consequences for Russian command and control (C2) on the battlefield.[102] Kremlin officials claimed on February 11 that Russian forces are not using Telegram for frontline communications, sparking even more backlash from the Russian milblogger community.[103] The Kremlin then began to backtrack on these statements, with Russian Minister of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media Maksut Shadayev acknowledging on February 18 that Russian forces indeed began using Telegram at the start of the full-scale invasion and claiming that Russian authorities had not made a decision to restrict Telegram in the war zone in Ukraine at that time.[104] The Kremlin did not start to acknowledge Russian forces’ use of Telegram until one week after the initial throttling.[105] The disjointed Kremlin messaging indicates that it did not expect such backlash, did not prepare talking points to immediately address the issue, and had to take time to formulate a unified response.
The Kremlin has since been giving different excuses to justify its throttling of Telegram in order to diminish the milblogger backlash. Roskomnadzor initially claimed on February 10 that it restricted Telegram to force it to comply with Russian laws and to protect Russians from fraud, extremism, and terrorism.[106] Shadayev claimed on February 18, however, that foreign intelligence agencies are now “systematically” accessing Russian troops’ Telegram correspondence in order to gain information to use against Russian forces.[107] The FSB further claimed on February 21 that Ukrainian forces and intelligence services can rapidly obtain data posted in Telegram and are using this information “for military purposes.”[108] The FSB claimed that Russian forces’ use of Telegram has threatened the lives of Russian servicemembers over the past three months. In the span of just two weeks, the Kremlin went from denying that Russian forces even use Telegram to exploiting its use on the battlefield to retroactively justify the decision to throttle the platform.
The initial denials of Russian forces’ use of Telegram show that the Kremlin continues to be unaware of the realities on the ground. Kremlin officials may have believed that the information space would largely ignore its lies about Telegram’s use on the battlefield, but the throttling of Telegram just days after SpaceX blocked Russian forces’ access to their Starlink terminals suggests that the Kremlin was actually unaware of how Russian forces used Telegram.[109] It is unlikely the Kremlin would have made its decision about Telegram so soon after the Starlink shutdown if the Kremlin had understood that Russian forces would be without two of the systems they use for battlefield communications. The pervasive culture of lying in the Russian military likely decreased the Kremlin’s overall situational awareness.[110]
The Kremlin continues to be sensitive to milblogger complaints and will likely continue to restrict and punish independent critics. The sudden turnaround in Kremlin claims about whether Russian forces use Telegram or not demonstrates that the Kremlin is aware of the importance of Russian milbloggers, a key pro-war community that often promotes the Kremlin’s propaganda and justifications for the war in Ukraine and a possible future conflict with NATO. The Kremlin may have specifically hoped that its more recent claims that foreign intelligence services are exploiting Telegram to harm Russian forces would appeal to this pro-war, ultranationalist community and bring it to the Kremlin’s side. The complaints the milbloggers made after the Telegram throttling, however, likely further reinforced not only how difficult a full block on Telegram may be in the future but also the importance of gaining full control over this community and the internet writ large.
Forecasts
The Kremlin will likely be unable to centralize control over the entire Russian open internet in the short to medium term, in part due to ongoing bureaucratic limitations and internal resistance. The Russian censorship campaign has faced some setbacks in recent months, such as the widespread milblogger backlash to the increased restrictions on Telegram. The Kremlin will likely need to reevaluate its plans for further censorship efforts and the risks of sparking domestic discontent, particularly if the Kremlin wants to ban more major platforms while Max remains an unpopular alternative. Russians are not like citizens of the PRC. They have experienced the open internet for decades and are unlikely to accept full state regulation over the internet calmly. Russia banned Facebook and Instagram shortly after the start of the full-scale invasion, but many Russians continue to regularly use those platforms through VPNs.[111] The Kremlin will need significant resources, particularly law enforcement resources, to go after the millions of Russians who will likely refuse to switch to Max or stop using VPNs. Russia’s ability to deploy such resources to this purpose are limited. Russia has been facing labor shortages in its IT sector, particularly after the “brain drain” when thousands of Russians fled the country following the announcement of the partial involuntary callup in September 2022.[112] Kremlin officials have also acknowledged key labor shortages. Russian Minister of Internal Affairs Vladimir Kolokoltsev, for example, complained in May 2024 about a shortage of over 150,000 police officers and underfunding of the ministry.[113] Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) Head Arkady Gostev similarly reported in March 2024 that 19 percent of FSIN positions are vacant.[114]
Putin’s inner circle is reportedly split on how far to extend the Kremlin’s internet censorship efforts, which may slow down decision-making and implementation. A Russian insider source claimed on February 10 that many in Putin’s inner circle are against a full block of Telegram.[115] The source claimed that Putin himself is against a full block, alongside Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikov, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev, Rosgvardia Director Viktor Zolotov, State Council Secretary Alexsei Dyumin, and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev. The source claimed that the minority group that supports a full block includes Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko, Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina, and Putin’s “personal banker” Yuri Kovalchuk. Reports that Putin himself is against a full ban on Telegram are noteworthy, and Putin may stop short of permanent full blocks out of fear of significant domestic backlash. It is noteworthy that many heads of security services are reportedly against a full block, as they likely fear unrest. The majority bloc against the move, including Putin, could change positions in the future; however, should the Kremlin’s censorship campaign prove more successful in the coming months, and should the Kremlin find a way to handle the ongoing criticisms in the information space against restricting Telegram.
The Kremlin has been successful at pushing Russians into self-censorship in recent years and will likely continue to push this part of its censorship campaign. The Kremlin has significantly reduced the milblogger community since 2023, and many milbloggers have subsequently engaged in self-censorship out of self-preservation. The Kremlin will likely continue these efforts by making it difficult for critical voices to use their channels for profit, especially by making money from advertisements on their pages. Verstka reported on February 10 that a source in a major pro-government media outlet stated that Russian authorities may block Telegram by the end of 2026 but will, for now, resort to limiting advertising on the app to only those channels that officially register with Roskomnadzor.[116] This effort aims to weed out critical channels that rely on the profits from their channels. The Kremlin is also pushing anonymous channels to cease their criticisms of the Kremlin and register with Roskomnadzor in return for the restoration of their advertising rights. The Kremlin has successfully used similar measures targeting advertising profits to go after independent television media since the 2000s.[117]
The internet censorship campaign may empower Putin to conduct limited, rolling involuntary callups in the near future, confident that he will not face the same level of open domestic backlash as he did in September 2022. Russian forces have repeatedly failed to achieve Putin’s strategic objectives in Ukraine, and fighting has been slow-moving for much of the war. Putin has nevertheless refrained from conducting another partial call-up since September 2022 out of fear for his regime’s stability. Putin signed a tacit social contract with the Russian population after September 2022, implicitly agreeing not to force more Russians to fight but to rely rather on volunteers who are compensated well financially. Putin now has in place significant internet censorship mechanisms that he did not have in September 2022. Putin may be confident that he can now safely break this social contract by conducting limited, rolling involuntary callups of reservists without facing significant pushback organized in the information space. Increased throttling or full blocks of channels such as Telegram could embolden the Kremlin to undertake decisions that were previously politically riskier.
The internet censorship campaign may allow Putin to intensify his efforts to nationalize property to continue funding the war in Ukraine. Putin made an agreement in 2000 with Russian oligarchs: businessmen would stay out of politics, and the government would allow them to keep their businesses.[118] Putin appears to be increasingly turning to nationalizing more businesses in recent years, however, as the Kremlin’s struggles to maintain its unsustainably high war spending. Russian business leaders are reportedly unhappy with Putin’s growing nationalization efforts.[119] A group of business leaders reportedly expressed concern to Putin in December 2025 about the Kremlin’s unchecked freedom to nationalize any asset it chooses by simply alleging the business is violating citizens’ rights to a decent life, even when no one has claimed personal harm. The Kremlin’s internet censorship campaign will support these nationalization efforts, eradicating problematic information space voices, like sources that often report insider information about shady businesspeople and deals, and limiting businessmen’s ability to rally support in the information space against the Kremlin. The censorship campaign would also likely increase the Kremlin’s legal powers to punish any Russian businesspeople who fight Putin’s nationalization efforts.
The Kremlin is developing the infrastructure and practices it needs to reestablish a police state and Iron Curtain-like physical shield against the West. Putin is transforming Russia into a Soviet-style police state by increasingly censoring anti-war and anti-regime media and punishing and surveilling Russian citizens.[120] Kremlin efforts to restrict VPNs and SIM cards, shut down the mobile internet, punish Russians for alleged cooperation with foreign states, and target foreign platforms are trying to close Russia off from the West. The Kremlin will likely be unable to fully restrict information flows from abroad into Russia, just as the Soviet Union was unable to gain such complete control. Russians will likely continue to find technological workarounds to access foreign content. The Kremlin may be more successful in restricting the flow of information out of Russia to the West, including by banning the remaining platforms popular among Russians that Westerners can also access, allowing Russia to take advantage of the difficulties outsiders will face in assessing Russian weaknesses.
The Kremlin is learning from its past mistakes and may have a functioning mechanism to fully control the Russian internet in place ahead of a possible confrontation with NATO. Efforts taken now during the war in Ukraine to solidify the Kremlin’s control over the internet will likely be in place, or at a minimum, be much stronger, by the time a possible future war with NATO begins. Such capabilities will prevent repeats of the problems the Kremlin experienced within the information space in the early years of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin will be better placed to control the narratives justifying the war in the first place, limit the spread of information about any Russian military failures, and prevent dissent within the Russian military ranks. Russia’s ongoing censorship measures are also starting to indoctrinate Russians into an informal state ideology that is, at its foundation, anti-Western and sharply anti-NATO. The Kremlin likely sees societal conformity to this ideology as necessary in order to rally the Russian people — fatigued after years of the war in Ukraine — and ask them to make the continued sacrifices that will be required during another difficult war.
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