Key Takeaways
- Russian federal entities, including the Ministry of Defense (MoD), are sponsoring the transfer of youth from occupied Ukraine to participate in the final stage of the “Zarnitsa 2.0” military-patriotic competition in Russia’s Volgograd Oblast.
- Russia continues the practice of deporting Ukrainian prisoners, often held on fabricated or illegal charges, to Russian prisons in violation of international law.
- Russian officials continue efforts to integrate Russian servicemembers and military training into school curricula in advance of the upcoming schoolyear.
- The Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy (DOSAAF) continues to expand its presence in occupied Ukraine.
- The ruling United Russia Party is setting conditions to use the upcoming State Duma elections as a referendum on popular local support for the occupation.
- Inflation rates in occupied Crimea continue to rise as occupation officials struggle to reckon with the economic and financial implications of Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign.
- The Mariupol occupation administration is preparing to deputize civilians to enforce Russian law enforcement objectives.
- Russian state-owned bank Promsvyazbank (PSB) is using its dominance of the financial sphere in occupied Ukraine to generate funds for the Russian military.
Deportation and Forcible Transfer of Ukrainian Citizens, Including Children
Russian federal entities, including the Ministry of Defense (MoD), are sponsoring the transfer of youth from occupied Ukraine to participate in the final stage of the “Zarnitsa 2.0” military-patriotic competition in Russia’s Volgograd Oblast. The Russian “Movement of the First” youth organization announced on August 20 that the “Voin-10ka” cadet team has departed from occupied Donetsk Oblast to Volgograd Oblast for the all-Russian stage of Zarnitsa 2.0.[1] Voin-10ka will compete against other teams of youth from Russia and occupied Ukraine in the final stage of Zarnitsa 2.0, which runs from August 22 to September 7.[2] “Voin-Legion,” another team from occupied Donetsk Oblast in the 11 to 13-year-old category, will also compete in the Zarnitsa 2.0 final.[3] Zarnitsa 2.0 is a revived Soviet-era war game that seeks to prepare children as young as seven to compete in military disciplines such as tactical firearm drills, drone operation, and combat medicine.[4] The Russian MoD, Federal Agency for Youth Affairs, and Ministry of Education all sponsor Zarnitsa 2.0.[5] Zarnitsa 2.0 plays a dual role in Russia’s wider occupation strategy in Ukraine — it simultaneously normalizes and propagates the militarization of children and youth while explicitly preparing Ukrainian teenagers for eventual service in the Russian military.[6]
Russia continues the practice of deporting Ukrainian prisoners, often held on fabricated or illegal charges, to Russian prisons in violation of international law. The Crimean Tatar Resource Center (CTRC) reported on August 19 that Russian authorities have deported Crimean Tatar prisoner of war (POW) Seryan Asanov to the notorious Vladimir Central prison in Russia’s Vladimir Oblast.[7] Asanov is a servicemember of Ukraine’s 48th Separate Assault Battalion (named the Noman Chelebidzikhan Battalion after the historic Crimean Tatar leader and politician) and was captured during combat in August 2024 during fighting near Zolota Nyva, Donetsk Oblast.[8] The Russian Southern District Military Court sentenced Asanov to 20 years in prison in April 2026 for treason due to his affiliation with the Noman Chelebidzikhan Battalion, which is designated as a terrorist organization and banned in Russia.[9] The CTRC reported that Russian authorities moved Asanov between various pre-trial detention centers in occupied Ukraine and Russia while waiting to charge him, and are now deporting him to Vladimir Central.
Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) designated the Noman Chelebidzikhan Battalion as a terrorist organization in 2022 and has since weaponized that designation to persecute Crimean Tatars in occupied Crimea and elsewhere in occupied Ukraine.[10] The terrorist designation for the battalion also allows Russian officials to ignore the fact that the battalion and its servicemembers are part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and are thus protected as lawful combatants under the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of POWs.[11] Asanov’s sentencing under terrorist laws is likely a violation of the Geneva Convention, which prohibits the prosecution of POWs for their activity as lawful combatants. Asanov’s deportation is also likely a violation of international law.[12]
Sociocultural Control
Nothing significant to report.
Militarization of Occupied Areas
Russian officials continue efforts to integrate Russian servicemembers and military training into school curricula in advance of the upcoming schoolyear. The Russian Ministry of Education told Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti on August 23 that it commissioned research into the potential role that Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine can play in the educational system.[13] The study concluded that Russian veterans “possess unique teaching potential for patriotic work with children,” noting that they are particularly suited to teach mandatory “Life Safety” and “Basic Military Training” courses. Life Safety and Basic Military Training are constituent courses of the broader mandatory “Fundamentals of Security and Protection of the Motherland” curricula, which will be required in schools throughout Russia and occupied Ukraine starting on September 1.[14] The increased prevalence of Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine in teaching positions in occupied areas further militarizes the school system, while also normalizing the occupation. Donetsk Oblast occupation authorities estimated in February 2026 that up to 622 Russian veterans were working as teachers in occupied Donetsk Oblast, with approximately 8,000 veterans participating in extracurricular programming.[15] Hundreds of thousands of children are set to enter this hyper-militarized school system in occupied Ukraine as of September 1, 2026.[16]
The Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy (DOSAAF) continues to expand its presence in occupied Ukraine. Occupied Kherson Oblast-based news outlet Kherson News Agency reported on August 18 that a regional DOSAAF branch has begun the registration process in occupied Skadovsk.[17] DOSAAF Kherson branch head Andrey Grigoriev claimed that the branch will train conscripts in military specialties including driving, drone operation, and paratrooper tactics. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration has been transferring infrastructure, including water sports clubs and aeronautic facilities, to DOSAAF since at least July 2025.[18] DOSAAF has solidified its influence in the youth space in occupied Crimea since 2014, and has since been expanding its presence elsewhere in occupied Ukraine.[19] DOSAAF operates alongside other youth-focused military-patriotic organizations and institutions in occupied Ukraine to train youth in basic military disciplines, creating a future mobilization and conscription pipeline for the Russian military.[20]
Administrative and Bureaucratic Control
The ruling United Russia Party is setting conditions to use the upcoming State Duma elections as a referendum on popular local support for the occupation. The ruling United Russia Party presented an updated version of its “People’s Program” — a long-term planning document built on citizen proposals and appeals on which United Russia candidates campaign — in February 2026.[21] The People’s Program articulates both structural and ideological goals, particularly focusing on quality of life improvements through targeted development projects.[22] One section of the People’s Program is notably devoted to the “development of Donbas and Novorossiya” (the Russian name for occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts).[23] The plan notes that United Russia will strive to ensure that occupied Ukraine will match the Russian standard “across all key socio-economic indicators” by 2032, which will be implemented via housing and utility construction projects, gasification programs, infrastructure improvements, and the continuation of the Russian patronage system under which Russian federal subjects sponsor occupied towns and villages. Occupation and United Russia officials responded to the People’s Program by claiming that residents of occupied areas submitted tens of thousands of proposals to the program and emphasized the construction projects that United Russia has already implemented throughout occupied areas.[24]
United Russia is all-but guaranteed victory in the upcoming September 18 to 20 State Duma elections and will maintain its hold over the Russian-controlled political system in occupied Ukraine.[25] ISW recently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will use United Russia’s inevitable electoral victory as a referendum on the protraction of the war in Ukraine and the solidification of a pro-war stance as central to Russia’s informal state ideology.[26] These ideological consequences of United Russia’s victory will similarly have a bearing in occupied Ukraine, as United Russia candidates have already set conditions to win outright in occupied areas.[27] United Russia’s People’s Program also sets the party up to take credit for widespread Russian infrastructure programs in occupied Ukraine, effectively tying the physical implementation of the occupation to their victory. Russia has historically used the conduct of sham elections in occupied Ukraine to cloak its actions under a thin veneer of electoral and grassroots legitimacy.[28] The Kremlin, via United Russia’s victory, is likely to use the results of the election as evidence that there is widespread support for the occupation within occupied areas.
Occupation Administration Mismanagement and Internal Dynamics
Inflation rates in occupied Crimea continue to rise as occupation officials struggle to reckon with the economic and financial implications of Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign. Russian investigative opposition source The Insider reported on August 24, citing Russian Federal State Statistics Service data, that the inflation rate in occupied Crimea has reached 15.79 percent, 2.5 times higher than the claimed Russian average of 5.98 percent.[29] The Insider stated that a main driver of inflation is logistical and fuel supply challenges, which have caused a 211 percent increase in gasoline prices in Crimea over the past year. Higher gas prices have caused higher overall prices for other consumer goods. Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind reported in July 2026 that food and medication prices increased significantly between June and July.[30] Crimea’s summer tourist economy has also suffered over the past few months, leading to a decrease in the price of hotels, hostels, and sanatoria and a decrease in the revenues generated from these assets.[31] Rising prices are in large part due to the occupation administration’s inability to properly address or remedy the impacts of Ukraine’s strike campaign to isolate the occupied peninsula and highlight the overall weakness in Russia’s wider occupation apparatus.
Physical and Legal Repressions
The Mariupol occupation administration is preparing to deputize civilians to enforce Russian law enforcement objectives. Mariupol occupation head Anton Koltsov claimed on August 20 that his administration is working to form a volunteer “people’s militia” (народная дружина/narodnaya druzhina) to “unite concerned Mariupol residents to assist law enforcement.”[32] Volunteers will patrol public space to prevent minor offenses. Russian occupation authorities have used such volunteer people’s militia groupings in occupied areas since 2022 as recruited auxiliary forces that support law enforcement and security services, extend surveillance over occupied populations, and serve as repressive instruments against any perceived dissent.[33]
Economic and Financial Control
Russian state-owned bank Promsvyazbank (PSB) is using its dominance of the financial sphere in occupied Ukraine to generate funds for the Russian military. PSB announced on August 19 the launch of its “Victory Deposit” charity campaign, which allows customers to open a special PSB deposit account with a 14 percent annual return rate.[34] PSB will donate 3,000 rubles ($35) to a fund that supports the Russian military and civilians affiliated with “ensuring security measures” per each Victory Deposit account opened. Occupied Donetsk and Zaporizhia Oblast-based news outlets have so far advertised the Victory Deposit initiative, which PSB is advertising as available to all Russian regions (including occupied Ukraine).[35] PSB has aggressively expanded into occupied Ukraine since 2022, and now enjoys significant dominance over the banking sphere.[36] Residents of occupied areas are now largely reliant on PSB for all financial services including currency exchange, bank cards, salary and pension payments, loans, mortgages, and deposits.[37] PSB appears to be using the Victory Deposit accounts to incentivize even further financial involvement in the PSB system while also funding aspects of the Russian military — effectively forcing residents of occupied areas to fund the continuation of their own belligerent occupation.
Information Space Control
Nothing significant to report.
Infrastructure and Development Projects
Nothing significant to report.
[1] https://dan-news dot ru/obschestvo/uchastniki-iz-dnr-otpravilis-v-volgograd-na-vserossijskij-etap-zarnicy-2.0/
[2] https://xn--80aatfyr8b dot xn--90acagbhgpca7c8c7f.xn--p1ai/season-stages/15/tournaments/
[3] https://dan-news dot ru/obschestvo/dve-komandy-iz-dnr-poedut-na-vserossijskij-etap-zarnicy-2.0/; https://xn--80aatfyr8b dot xn--90acagbhgpca7c8c7f.xn--p1ai/teams/80777/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-10-2025/; https://xn--80aatfyr8b.xn--90acagbhgpca7c8c7f dot xn--p1ai/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-march-19-2026/
[5] https://dan-news dot ru/obschestvo/uchastniki-iz-dnr-otpravilis-v-volgograd-na-vserossijskij-etap-zarnicy-2.0/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-june-4-2026/
[7] https://ctrcenter dot org/uk/krymskogo-tataryna-syejrana-asanova-perevezly-do-volodymyrskogo-czentralu-dlya-vidbuvannya-nezakonnogo-pokarannya-krcz
[8] https://ctrcenter dot org/uk/krymskogo-tataryna-syejrana-asanova-perevezly-do-volodymyrskogo-czentralu-dlya-vidbuvannya-nezakonnogo-pokarannya-krcz
[9] https://www.zap dot kp.ru/online/news/6899803/
[10] https://www.radiosvoboda dot org/a/news-rosiiski-zmi-zatrymannia-khersonshchyna/32880142.html; https://ru.krymr dot com/a/news-fsb-ukraina-batalion-krym/32363863.html
[11] https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-convention-relative-treatment-prisoners-war
[12] https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/EUR-50.9046.2025-A-deafening-silence-2.pdf
[13] https://ria dot ru/20260823/svo-2112594724.html
[14] https://ria dot ru/20260821/shkoly-2112343395.html?in=t; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-july-2-2026/
[15] https://dan-news dot ru/obschestvo/tolstykina-rasskazala-skolko-veteranov-svo-prepodajut-v-shkolah/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-february-19-2026/
[16] https://dan-news dot ru/exclusive/svyshe-142-tys.-shkolnikov-dnr-sjadut-za-party-1-sentjabrja/
[17] https://xonews dot ru/news/uchebnyj-centr-dosaaf-otkrojut-v-hersonskoj-oblasti/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-july-21-2025/
[19] https://almenda.org/en/rol-yaltinskogo-oseredku-dtsaaf-u-militarizacii-ditej-na-timchasovo-okupovanij-teritorii/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_30-17/
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-july-21-2025/
[21] https://lenta dot ru/articles/2026/08/24/programma-edinoy-rossii-na-vyborah-2026/; https://tass dot ru/info/28034885; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8906812
[22] https://er dot ru/party/program
[23] https://er dot ru/media/documents/np_2026.pdf
[24] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/28035449; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/28035497; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/28035497; https://dan-news dot ru/politics/akcent-na-vosstanovlenii-donbass-i-novorossija-v-narodnoj-programme-er/
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-june-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_8-23/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_3-12/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-march-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-june-25-2026/
[28] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/24-210-0120ISW20Occupation20playbook.pdf
[29] https://theins dot ru/news/296360
[30] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/106143
[31] https://theins dot ru/news/296360; https://theins dot ru/ekonomika/294575
[32] https://t.me/KoltsovAnton/3990
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_9-17/; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/24611
[34] https://dan-news dot ru/obschestvo/psb-zapustil-blagotvoritelnuju-akciju-vklad-v-pobedu-dlja-zhitelej-dnr/; https://www.psbank dot ru/personal/saving/vklad-v-pobedu?ysclid=mszr7lllbx785918372; https://zonews dot ru/news/psb-zapustil-blagotvoritelnuju-akciju-vklad-v-pobedu-dlja-zhitelej-zaporozhskoj/
[35] https://dan-news dot ru/obschestvo/psb-zapustil-blagotvoritelnuju-akciju-vklad-v-pobedu-dlja-zhitelej-dnr/; https://zonews dot ru/news/psb-zapustil-blagotvoritelnuju-akciju-vklad-v-pobedu-dlja-zhitelej-zaporozhskoj/
[36] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-june-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-november-13-2025/
[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-november-13-2025/;
