Toplines
US Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow suggests that Russia may be preparing to conduct an act of aggression against a NATO member in the relatively near term to invalidate NATO’s Article 5. A near-term Russian attack is highly unlikely to involve a full-scale conventional invasion of a NATO state. Ratcliffe delivered a warning to Russia not to attack NATO countries according to “sources briefed on the matter” cited by the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on August 26.[1] Ratcliffe warned Russian officials not to escalate conflict with the US’ NATO allies, particularly Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, according to two “sources familiar with the matter” cited by Politico on August 26.[2] Ratcliffe’s arrival in Moscow on a C-17 military transport aircraft and his use of an American motorcade suggests that the US regarded the intelligence it had as reasonably urgent and sensitive and not merely warning of a distant threat. Public reports of US intelligence community assessments note only that Russian action is possible “in the next few years,“ but the manner of Ratcliffe’s travel indicates concern about a shorter timeline.[3] A CIA director’s personal visit to deliver a message is unusual and is generally reserved for sensitive matters of the highest importance. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) director Sergey Naryshkin confirmed on August 27 that he met Ratcliffe.[4] Russian insider source VChK-OGPU also claimed on August 26 that two departmental heads from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), including the head of the service department responsible for operations in former Soviet states, were present at the meeting.[5]
The nature of the Russian threat that the US is reportedly attempting to deter in 2026 is significantly different from the threat of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late 2021. The last trip by a CIA director to Moscow was in November 2021 when William Burns made a final effort to deter Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[6] The context of Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow in 2026 is very different, and comparisons between the two visits fail to capture key distinctions. Russian forces were already deep into a significant buildup of equipment, personnel, and other military assets on the border with Ukraine in late 2021 and early 2022 preceding Russia’s full-scale invasion.[7] ISW has collected no specific indicators that Russia is preparing to conduct a large-scale invasion of the Baltic states, and ISW has observed no evidence of a similar large-scale buildup in the Russian border area with the Baltic states. Estonian and Latvian officials noted that their assessment of Russian threats has not changed, suggesting that Baltic states have also not observed a buildup of Russian forces on their borders.[8] Russia could, however, conduct strikes against targets in Baltic states or a limited land incursion with a small force. This sort of attack would not necessarily require a large, visible military buildup and so would not generate the type of indicators that analysts observed in 2021. It remains unclear whether Russian President Vladimir Putin has directed or approved that Russian forces conduct any operations, but Ratcliffe’s visit is noteworthy and itself suggests that the US has indications that Russia is preparing for an act of aggression sooner than simply within “the next few years.”
The Kremlin continues to deflect Western concerns and deny any intention of conducting aggression against NATO, but these statements are part of a larger effort to create ambiguity and to degrade the alliance’s resolve to counter Russian threats. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on August 27 that media reports about Russia’s alleged aggression against NATO countries “have nothing to do with reality” and that Russia is facing an aggressive policy from Europe.[9] Russian State Duma Defense Committee member Andrei Kolesnik claimed on August 27 that Russia will not attack Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia unless they engage in aggressive actions against Russian territories, including Kaliningrad Oblast.[10] Russian official statements are part of Russian cognitive warfare efforts rather than expressions of the Kremlin’s actual position. The Kremlin has also repeatedly made clear that it takes a very broad view of what would constitute NATO aggression, including domestic policies NATO states pursue toward their own citizens of Russian descent or language.[11] The Kremlin notably denied that Russia would invade Ukraine throughout late 2021 and early 2022, mocking such claims right up to the eve of the invasion itself, as part of efforts to retain surprise despite a large and visible military buildup and also to delay and deter Western and Ukrainian preparations to counter the Russian threat.[12] The Kremlin has repeatedly advanced anti-NATO narratives and has explicitly threatened NATO member states since at least 2022.[13] The Kremlin appears to be deliberately creating ambiguity regarding its intention of launching any sort of attack against NATO, likely in order to disseminate fear and paralyze the alliance’s decision-making capabilities about defending itself as well as to deter it from continuing to send armaments to Ukraine.
Baltic state officials and government-affiliated analysts emphasized that NATO should take the Russian threat seriously but that their immediate threat assessment has not changed. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna stated August 27 that the “threat emanating from Russia and possible provocations against NATO must be taken seriously,” as NATO allies do, but emphasized that Estonia’s threat assessment regarding Russia has not changed.[14] Latvian presidential advisor Martins Dregeris stated on behalf of Latvia’s President Edgars Rinkevics on August 27 that Latvia’s assessment of a military threat has not changed and that the risk of a conventional Russian invasion is low.[15] Latvia’s Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs emphasized that Latvian citizens should not be concerned about Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow.[16] The Estonian Ministry of Defense amplified statements from the director of Estonian think tank the International Centre for Defense and Security, Kristi Raik, that there is “no ground” to compare the situation in Ukraine in late 2021 and the Baltic states now, as there was clear intelligence in 2021 that Russia was preparing to invade but no such intelligence now.[17] Raik argued that Western countries should not let the fear of escalation limit their support for Ukraine and implicitly framed warnings of a Russian action against NATO as intended to deter European support for Ukraine, which any such Russian action would partly aim to achieve.[18]
Baltic governments have repeatedly warned of an increased risk of Russian actions, including drone incursions, sabotage, and other limited military actions, and are arguing that Ratcliffe’s visit does not indicate that their already heightened risk assessment has further increased into warnings of an imminent large-scale Russian invasion.[19] ISW concurs with such an assessment. The recent statements from Baltic officials indicate that Baltic countries are currently primarily focused on reassuring their populations that there is little risk of a full-scale Russian invasion of the Baltic states. The near-term Russian threat that Ratcliffe may have been communicating is not solely limited to a full-scale invasion, however, and Russia could limit its actions in scope to achieve other objectives beyond immediate territorial gains.
Russia may conduct air, missile, or drone strikes or a limited incursion against one or more Baltic states to test and seek to break NATO’s resolve to invoke and respond under Article 5. A limited Russian attack against NATO’s eastern flank would aim to invalidate Article 5 by creating a situation in which the North Atlantic Council, which must vote unanimously to honor the Article 5 mutual defense clause of the NATO charter, is unable to agree about whether or how to respond to a Russian attack. The Kremlin would likely choose an operation that it believes will maximize the possibility that NATO states would fail to unify on a decisive response and thus fail to send military assistance as an alliance to the member that had been attacked. NATO’s failure to agree to invoke Article 5 or to implement a unified and decisive response would significantly damage NATO’s credibility and severely erode the credibility of Article 5 in particular – one of Putin’s major longstanding strategic objectives beyond Ukraine.[20]
Several unidentified drones entered Moldovan airspace on the night of August 26 to 27, demonstrating that the Kremlin continues to accept the risk that Russia’s war against Ukraine can cause damage to other states, including Moldova and NATO states bordering Ukraine. The Moldovan Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 27 that five unidentified drones entered Moldovan airspace from various locations along the Moldovan-Ukrainian border area in Odesa Oblast on the evening of August 26 and the morning of August 27 during regular Russian strikes against Ukraine.[21] ISW continues to assess that such incidents demonstrate that Putin continues to normalize the threat that its strike campaign against the westernmost parts of Ukraine poses to European states, including Moldova and eastern NATO members.[22]
Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continues to make greatly exaggerated claims of Russian advances that do not match battlefield realities in order to construct a narrative of pervasive Russian military success. Gerasimov conducted a choreographed inspection of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces on August 27 and made a speech in which he presented an assessment of Russian advances in the Fortress Belt that are exaggerated far beyond current battlefield realities.[23]
Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces achieved several successes in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk direction.[24] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized Pyskunivka (east of Slovyansk), Pershomarivka, and Orikhuvatkha (both southeast of Slovyansk); are only four kilometers from the eastern outskirts of Slovyansk; and are actively fighting three kilometers from Kramatorsk. ISW has not observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have a presence (either through advances or infiltrations) in Pyskunivka, Pershomarivka, or Orikhuvatkha, and that Russian forces have advanced to roughly 14 kilometers from both Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. Russian Southern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Sergey Medvedev comparatively claimed on July 3 that Russian forces were eight kilometers from Slovyansk, indirectly implying that Russian forces have only advanced four kilometers over the last two months.[25] Gerasimov and the Russian military command’s pattern of exaggerated claims remain divorced from reality, but even these exaggerated claims have Russian forces advancing no faster than footpace.
Gerasimov claimed that the Russian forces occupy almost half of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (between Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka), are fighting for Kurtivka (north of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka) and Virolyubivka (east of Kurtivka), and are 1.5 kilometers from Druzhkivka.[26] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces are fighting at an airfield near Kramatorsk, likely referring to the Kramatorsk military airfield, but ISW has not observed any evidence to support this claim. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced to roughly six kilometers from Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, nine kilometers from Kurtivka, and three kilometers from Virolyubivka. Gerasimov further claimed that Russian forces seized more than 100 square kilometers of territory in the “Druzhkivka area” alone in July and August 2026.[27] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized 52.23 square kilometers in all of Donetsk Oblast during that time period.
Gerasimov’s exaggerated claims of advance are part of a broader cognitive warfare effort to falsely portray Russian advances as sweeping across the battlefield such that Ukraine and its Western partners should capitulate to Russia’s demands in negotiations. Gerasimov and other military commanders have heavily exaggerated Russian advances across different sectors of the theater in publicized formats at least once a month since January 2026.[28] The Kremlin likely uses these meetings as part of a targeted information campaign to convince the United States and other Western states that Russia’s war is going so well that the West should accept Russian demands for a ceasefire, which would require Ukraine to surrender its heavily fortified Fortress Belt. The Russian war effort is failing to achieve its operational and strategic objectives as Russia’s recruitment numbers have decreased and Russian officials are setting conditions for possible involuntary reserve call-ups after Russia’s September 2026 State Duma elections. Russian officials must also contend with pervasive economic issues, fuel shortages, and censorship campaigns that have generated increasing discontent among Russian society.[29] The Kremlin has undertaken great effort to disguise these issues both from its populace and from the Western governments it seeks to influence, and aggrandized claims of advance – including those which Russian officials repeat directly to Western leaders – are part of this facade.
Key Takeaways
- US Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow suggests that Russia may be preparing to conduct an act of aggression against a NATO member in the relatively near term to invalidate NATO’s Article 5. A near-term Russian attack is highly unlikely to involve a full-scale conventional invasion of a NATO state.
- The nature of the Russian threat that the US is reportedly attempting to deter in 2026 is significantly different from the threat of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late 2021.
- The Kremlin continues to deflect Western concerns and deny any intention of conducting aggression against NATO, but these statements are part of a larger effort to create ambiguity and to degrade the alliance’s resolve to counter Russian threats.
- Baltic state officials and government-affiliated analysts emphasized that NATO should take the Russian threat seriously but that their immediate threat assessment has not changed.
- Russia may conduct air, missile, or drone strikes or a limited incursion against one or more Baltic states to test and seek to break NATO’s resolve to invoke and respond under Article 5.
- Several unidentified drones entered Moldovan airspace on the night of August 26 to 27, demonstrating that the Kremlin continues to accept the risk that Russia’s war against Ukraine can cause damage to other states, including Moldova and NATO states bordering Ukraine.
- Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continues to make greatly exaggerated claims of Russian advances that do not match battlefield realities in order to construct a narrative of pervasive Russian military success.
- Gerasimov’s exaggerated claims of advance are part of a broader cognitive warfare effort to falsely portray Russian advances as sweeping across the battlefield such that Ukraine and its Western partners should capitulate to Russia’s demands in negotiations.
- Russia launched two Onyx anti-ship missiles, an unspecified number of Iskander-M and KN-23 ballistic missiles, and 258 drones against Ukraine overnight.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and Ozon (another Russian analogue to Amazon and Wildberries’ main competitor) logistics facilities in Russia.
- Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and Ozon (another Russian analogue to Amazon and Wildberries’ main competitor) logistics facilities in Russia. A Ukrainian unmanned systems brigade reported on August 27 that Ukrainian forces struck a Nebo-U radar system at the Millerovo airfield west of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[30] Ukrainian drones struck an Ozon warehouse in Blagoveshchensk, Bashkortostan Republic (roughly 1,200 kilometers from the international border), according to geolocated footage published on August 27.[31] The Ozon Headquarters press service acknowledged on August 27 that Ukrainian drones struck and damaged an Ozon logistics facility in Ufa, Bashkortostan Republic (just south of Blagoveshchensk) and that a missile alert in Orenburg City (roughly 1,100 kilometers from the international border) forced Ozon to evacuate its facility in the city.[32]
Ukrainian and open sources provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against oil infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai and Nizhny Novgorod Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that an August 25 Ukrainian strike against the Afipsky oil refinery in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai, (roughly 375 kilometers from the frontline) damaged an ELOU-AT processing unit, a gas fractionation unit, and a pipeline section.[33] Reuters confirmed on August 26, citing three industry sources, that an August 26 Ukrainian drone strike against Lukoil‘s NORSI oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast (roughly 775 kilometers from the frontline) damaged several processing units, inter-unit infrastructure, and general plant facilities, forcing the refinery to indefinitely suspend crude oil processing.[34] Reuters noted that all of Lukoil’s major Russian refineries have suspended operations.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Sumy City. Russian forces recently advanced east of Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City) according to geolocated footage published on August 26.[35]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 26 and 27 but did not advance as Russian forces counterattacked.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 27 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Izbytske and Starytsya (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[37]
Russian forces are reportedly using fewer tanks in the Vovchansk direction (northeast of Kharkiv City) compared to other areas of the frontline. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade reported that Russian forces are using fewer tanks and armored vehicles in the Vovchansk direction compared to the Kupyansk direction.[38]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 27.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 26 and 27 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[39] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on August 27 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk).[40]
A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces managed to advance southeast of Borova on August 27.[41] The source claimed that Ukrainian forces managed to seize several strongholds and expand the contested “gray zone” near Ridkodub, Katerynivka, and Nove (southeast of Borova) as they counterattacked in the area. ISW has observed geolocated evidence of Ukrainian forces advancing near Ridkodub, Katerynivka, and Nove in Summer 2026 and has adjusted its assessment of the front lines conservatively in accordance with available open evidence.
A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian drones are increasingly striking Russian logistics on the frontline in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The source claimed that Ukrainian forces struck several fuel and cargo vehicles near Novopokrovka (roughly 63 kilometers from the frontline), two vehicles beyond Aidar (roughly 80 kilometers from the frontline), one vehicle near Starobilsk (roughly 67 kilometers from the frontline), and two trucks near Yamy (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline) and beyond Nyzhnia Duvanka (roughly 35 kilometers from the frontline) in the past several days.[42] The source claimed that Russian vehicles cannot travel safely within 40 kilometers of the frontline due to continued Ukrainian strikes.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on August 26 and 27 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked around Lyman.[43] A Russian milblogger and a source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking around Lyman and expanding their control within the contested “gray zone.”[44] The source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces noted that Ukrainian forces are attempting to expand operations from Dibrova (south of Lyman) toward Yampil (northeast of Dibrova), while Russian forces are primarily focusing on Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk) and Raihorodok (northeast of Slovyansk).[45] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Rai-Oleksandrivka (southeast of Mykolaivka).[46]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces advanced in western Kostyantynivka according to geolocated footage published on August 26.[47] Ukrainian forces struck a single Russian servicemember west of Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission, according to geolocated footage published on August 27.[48]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on August 26 and 27 but did not advance.[49]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 26 and 27 but did not advance.[50]
Russian forces continued limited attacks near Novopavlivka itself and northeast and south of Oleksandrivka on August 26 and 27 but did not make confirmed advances.[51]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources appear to be leaning into a cognitive warfare campaign aimed at inflating Russian claimed advances and downplaying the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Oleksandrivka direction. The Russian MoD claimed on August 27 that Russian seized Shevchenkivske (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[52] Russian sources posted footage claiming to show elements of the Russian 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) waving flags in Shevchenkivske to bolster the Russian military command’s claim.[53] ISW has not been able to verify the veracity of the footage and has reason to assess that the footage is likely AI-altered. Shevchenkivske is about 15 kilometers from the closest observed Russian infiltration zone and about 18 kilometers from the closest assessed Russian advance. Russian sources are more frequently claiming that Russian forces have seized settlements that either Ukrainian forces have recently declared liberated or that are far from the current frontline.[54]
The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed an August 26 strike against Russian military command posts in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 27 that Ukrainian air-to-surface missiles struck the main and reserve command posts of unspecified Russian formations in occupied Donetsk Oblast on August 26.[55] Russian and occupation sources accused Ukrainian forces of striking a shopping mall in occupied Donetsk City (about 66 kilometers from the frontline) on August 26, but Ukrainian sources indicated that Ukrainian forces may have struck the headquarters of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps, Southern Military District) in Donetsk City.[56] Russian news agency Izvestia reportedly published on its Telegram channel that the strike may have killed Russian soldiers before quickly deleting the post.[57] Russian opposition media outlet Astra reported that the strike did not hit the shopping mall but rather abandoned buildings nearby, around which Russian forces had parked military vehicles.[58]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continue to conduct infiltration missions in the Hulyaipole direction. Russian forces recently infiltrated in central Dobropillya (northwest of Hulyaipole), according to geolocated footage published on August 26.[59]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 26 and 27 but did not advance.[60]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 27 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian personnel concentration near Novopetrivka (one of two settlements roughly 44 or 103 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of August 26 to 27.[61]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 27.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 27 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian repair base near Chonhar (roughly 150 kilometers from the frontline) on August 26 and 27.[62]
Russian forces continue their “human safari” tactics, targeting civilians in Kherson City. Russian forces struck a civilian bus, reportedly injuring three people, and a civilian on a bicycle in Kherson City, according to geolocated footage published on August 27.[63] Kherson Oblast Military Administration head Yaroslav Shanko confirmed on August 27 that the latter Russian strike killed the civilian on the bicycle.[64]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 27 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone command post in occupied Olenivka (one of multiple settlements between 120 and 248 kilometers from the frontline) and a Russian manpower concentration near occupied Voskhod (roughly 165 kilometers from the frontline).[65]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[66]
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on August 27 that Russian forces launched two Onyx anti-ship missiles from occupied Crimea, an unspecified number of Iskander-M or KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk and Kursk oblasts, and 258 Shahed- and Gerbera-type strike drones, Banderol loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[67] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted seven Iskander-M or KN-23 ballistic missiles, one Onyx anti-ship missile, three Banderol loitering munitions, and 222 drones; that an unspecified number of air vehicles struck 15 locations; and that drone debris fell on 11 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, critical, agricultural, educational, commercial, logistical, industrial, gas, and energy infrastructure in Poltava, Sumy, Kherson, Kharkiv, Odesa, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[68] A Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada member reported that Russian forces launched five North Korean missiles against the Zaporizhstal steel plant in Zaporizhzhia City on the night of August 27.[69] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported on August 27 that Russian strikes caused power outages in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Kharkiv, Poltava, and Sumy oblasts.[70]
Russian forces recently deployed an upgraded ballistic missile system in their strikes against Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 27 that Russian forces used the 9M723-2 Iskander-1000 ballistic missile, an updated version of the Iskander-M, for the first time during an unspecified missile strike against Kyiv in Summer 2026.[71] The GUR noted that the Iskander-1000 missile is part of the new Bora-M system and has a larger engine and launcher compared to the Iskander-M, allowing it to strike targets at a distance of up to 550 kilometers.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko arrived in Russia on August 27 for direct talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Lukashenko reportedly arrived in Russia on August 27 for a working visit which would include a meeting with Putin to discuss key areas of cooperation, regional and international issues, and other security matters.[72] Lukashenko will reportedly also meet with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin to discuss bilateral trade, economic, investment, and other areas of industrial cooperation.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/cia-chiefs-surprise-moscow-trip-was-to-warn-russia-not-to-attack-nato-c2d997f3
[2] https://www.politico.com/news/2026/08/26/cia-russia-nato-moscow-ratcliffe-01051848
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2025/; https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/u-s-intel-finds-putin-could-test-natos-resolve-with-limited-incursion-e3b02e2c
[4] https://t.me/tass_agency/392249 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/392250; https://t.me/tass_agency/392251
[5] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2334
[6] https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/05/politics/bill-burns-moscow-ukraine
[7] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/indicators-and-thresholds-for-russian-military-operations-in-ukraine-and-or-belarus; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-military-movements-unlikely/
[8] https://vm dot ee/en/news/foreign-minister-tsahkna-estonias-threat-assessment-has-not-changed ; https://www.delfi dot ee/artikkel/120606361/lati-kaitsevae-juhataja-cia-juhi-venemaa-reisist-kui-oleks-marke-ohust-siis-ma-ei-istuks-siin
[9] https://tass dot ru/politika/28049731 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/392261
[10] https://news dot ru/vlast/nazvany-tri-strany-kotorye-rossiya-tochno-ne-budet-atakovat
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_17-10/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-10/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_11-6/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_16-10/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_19-10/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_17-10/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_28-8/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_14-4/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_22-22/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_17-10/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_20-10/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_20-10/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-10/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_89/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2025/ ;
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[17] https://www.err dot ee/1610121007/raik-ukraina-2021-aastal-ja-balti-riigid-praegu-pole-vorreldavas-olukorras; https://x dot com/MoD_Estonia/status/2092954411869798400?s=20; https://x dot com/KristiRaik/status/2092905676699803972?s=20
[18] https://x.com/KristiRaik/status/2092905676699803972
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/; https://www.lrt dot lt/ru/novosti/17/2975116/razvedka-net-priznakov-napadeniia-rf-na-baltiiu-no-ugroza-diversii-velika; https://www.dw dot com/uk/golovnokomanduvac-zs-latvii-u-rf-e-vikno-dla-agresii-do-2030-roku/a-77014632
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/denying-russias-only-strategy-for-success-2/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/confronting-the-russian-challenge/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-high-price-of-losing-ukraine-part-2/;
[21] https://www.army dot md/ro/comunicate-de-presa/informeaza-8 ; https://newsmaker dot md/ru/pyat-bespilotnikov-proleteli-nad-moldovoi-vo-vremya-ataki-rossii-na-ukrainu ; https://www.army dot md/index.php/ro/comunicate-de-presa/informeaza-9
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[23] https://t.me/mod_russia/66801
[24] https://t.me/mod_russia/66801
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/
[26] https://t.me/mod_russia/66801
[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/66801
[28] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/
[29] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/;
[30] https://x.com/achilles_429/status/2092929960872669455
[31] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8098 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/29886 ; https://x.com/GarbuzYe/status/209293564 ; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2092914672391303549
[32] https://t.me/ozonhq/1491
[33]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42041 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2026/
[34] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-norsi-refinery-halts-oil-processing-after-drone-attack-sources-say-2026-08-26/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/
[35] https://t.me/shadow_strike_27/1400 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12811
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42036 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42038 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98054 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9151
[37] https://t.me/wargonzo/36485
[38] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/27/polyuvaly-na-artyleriyu-a-znajshly-tank-yak-znyshhyly-rosijskyj-t-72-na-byelgorodshhyni/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-kremlins-pyrrhic-victory-in-bakhmut-a-retrospective-on-the-battle-for-bakhmut/
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42036 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42038 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36485
[40] https://t.me/grvZapad/19587
[41] https://t.me/grvZapad/19587
[42] https://t.me/grvZapad/19588
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42036 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42038 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98054 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36485 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19587
[44] https://t.me/grvZapad/19587 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98054
[45] https://t.me/grvZapad/19587
[46] https://tme/motopatriot78/55521
[47] https://www.instagram.com/reel/Dcge2WMI7wI/; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2092792019684855906
[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12810; https://www.instagram.com/reel/Dcge2WMI7wI
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42036 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42038 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36485 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/55525
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42036; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42038; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121986
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42036 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42038; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46946
[52] https://t.me/mod_russia/66805
[53] https://t.me/Osintpen/3406; https://t.me/voin_dv/20861; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12814; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2092902811553927290?s=20
[54] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42041
[56] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/
[57] https://t.me/astrapress/123377
[58] https://t.me/astrapress/123377
[59] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2092648603604988182 ; https://x.com/davinci_army/status/2092590370185937132
[60]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42036 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42038 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36485 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/55520
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42041
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42041
[63] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2092868937289494874; https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/33727 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2092926274490577360
[64] https://www.facebook.com/yaroslav.shanko/posts/28385224721113152?ref=embed_post
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42041
[66] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[67] https://t.me/kpszsu/74748
[68] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20609; https://www.facebook.com/shaslyvekurcha/posts/pfbid021twEB96G2eGVACKQT1paZFrRoUP1xMYkCdHaAwggzceobhvwraJC7BD3x8wW268Xl; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31393; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28341; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31666; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31667; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31669; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31669; https://t.me/synegubov/25203; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1388638-u-zolocivskij-gromadi-zgorila-budivla-skoli-pisla-udaru-fpv-drona/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/72899?single; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/30417; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/14811; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/14812; https://x.com/NaftogazUkraine/status/2092935435391586333; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/14811; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/14812; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2731; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/72869; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7326; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7331; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7334; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7335; https://t.me/kyivoda/54987; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34489; https://www.facebook.com/DSNSODE/posts/pfbid0wQuWHMRmjyfHHzR4YbR13GTEts56mMdkV9Xz5KvXfBSSrDLar2jmqefVKBx6kso8l; https://www.facebook.com/oda.odesa/posts/pfbid02zXDDFyEctSsFhstSrKfjw4SmHnThthKqeQMEzvqv2jUDaMr5Eb3VPfir9hULMHRUl; https://t.me/odeskaODA/19162; https://t.me/odeskaODA/19170; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3095; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1395721612698906&id=100067832415814&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=94G0SlAcbVPU6uLw; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/46983; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/46994; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/47007; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/47018; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/47026
[69] https://t.me/magomedov_mus/3425 ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1388852-armia-rf-atakuvala-patma-korejskimi-balisticnimi-raketami-zavod-zaporizstal-musa-magomedov/
[70] https://t.me/energyofukraine/7705
[71] https://t.me/DIUkraine/9250
[72] https://eng dot belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-off-to-russia-on-working-visit-185179-2026/
