The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing two updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.
Key Takeaways
- Iran’s attacks targeting radars and other missile defense equipment in the Gulf have not achieved the regime’s objective of degrading air defenses enough to reliably penetrate them. Interception rates of ballistic missiles have not changed significantly.
- Iran likely seeks to preserve the option to threaten, disrupt, and selectively control traffic through the Strait of Hormuz without fully halting Iranian crude exports that still rely on the waterway by mining it heavily.
- The combined force continues to target several key internal security sites in Tehran City and Kurdish-populated areas in northwestern Iran. An open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst reported that the combined force struck several internal security sites in Marivan City, Kurdistan Province, which is about 10 miles east of the Iran-Iraq border in northwestern Iran. Marivan City and other mountainous cities in Kurdistan Province are hotspots for anti-regime protests and clashes between Iranian security forces and Kurdish anti-regime groups.
- Russia is reportedly sharing advanced drone tactics with Iran to support Iranian attacks against US forces and assets in the Middle East, which highlights deepening cooperation between key US adversaries. The CNN report comes after three unspecified officials told the Washington Post on March 6 that Russia has provided Iran with the locations of US military assets, including warships and aircraft, since the war started on February 28.
- China continues to supply Iran with precursors for solid fuel to support Iran’s ballistic missile program. An OSINT analyst reported on March 11 that the Iranian cargo vessel Barzin departed Gaolan Port in China, likely carrying a shipment of missile fuel precursors, and is now en route to Iran.
- Some elements of Hezbollah’s political support appear to be fracturing due to Hezbollah’s participation in the war. Hezbollah ally, the Amal Movement, recently voted in favor of the Lebanese cabinet’s decision to ban Hezbollah’s military activity. The Amal Movement has been Hezbollah’s key political and strategic ally since 2005.
Toplines
Iran’s attacks targeting radars and other missile defense equipment in the Gulf have not achieved the regime’s objective of degrading air defenses enough to reliably penetrate them with ballistic missiles. Interception rates of ballistic missiles have not changed significantly. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf claimed on March 11 that Iranian strikes on US radar and air defense systems now allow Iran to strike any target with fewer missiles.[1] Western media published satellite images on March 11 that show damage to US and allied air defense systems in the Gulf.[2] The New York Times published a satellite image of a damaged Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) radar in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on March 1.[3] The UAE, which has received the most Iranian attacks since the war began, has intercepted 241 of 262 ballistic missiles as of March 10, which is an interception rate of 92 percent.[4] This interception rate is equivalent to the Israeli ballistic missile interception rates in April 2024, October 2024, June 2025, and during the current war.[5] Only two missiles of the 21 that the UAE did not intercept hit UAE territory; the remainder landed in the sea.[6] Air defense systems usually choose not to engage incoming projectiles that will not hit any target of note. Iran appears to be targeting US radars and air defense assets, but Iran’s missile force is failing to achieve its objectives of degrading or destroying allied air defenses.
Other countries are having similar success, though it is difficult to determine exact interception rates from the available data. The last reported Iranian ballistic missile strike in the Gulf occurred on March 5, when two missiles struck a Bahraini refinery near Mahmeer, Bahrain.[7] There are likely some unreported missile impacts, but citizens in Gulf countries have routinely publicized images of missile strikes on social media. The widespread publication of this proof makes it very unlikely that a substantial number of missile impacts are going unreported.
Drones continue to pose a threat, but degrading the THAAD system is largely irrelevant to counter-drone operations. The THAAD radar handles target acquisition and engagement for the THAAD missile battery.[8] THAAD missile interceptors do not target drones. Fighter jets and helicopter gunships, such as the UAE’s US-supplied AH-64 Apache helicopter, handle drone interceptions using guns and air-to-air missiles. Ukraine has similarly offered to assist by providing Ukrainian interceptor drones to intercept Iranian Shahed drones and other technologies such as acoustic sensors and electronic warfare, though that assistance will take time to arrive.[9]
Iran continued drone attacks on Gulf states on March 11. The UAE intercepted 39 drones on March 11.[10] Two Iranian drones struck near the Dubai International Airport, which injured four workers, according to a local media report.[11] Iranian drones previously struck the Dubai International Airport on February 28.[12] Iranian strikes on airports and the broader conflict have significantly reduced flight traffic in the region, according to Reuters.[13] An Iranian drone also struck gasoline storage tanks at the Port of Salalah in southern Oman, which set several on fire.[14] Iran likely targeted the same gasoline storage tanks at the Port of Salalah during a previous drone strike on March 3.[15]
Iran likely seeks to preserve the option to threaten, disrupt, and selectively control traffic through the Strait of Hormuz without fully halting Iranian crude exports that still rely on the waterway by mining it heavily. The Wall Street Journal reported on March 10 that Iran exported slightly more oil through the Strait of Hormuz during the war than it did before the war.[16] Tankers loaded a daily average of 2.1 million barrels of Iranian crude over the previous six days, compared with 2 million barrels per day in February.[17] Iran has recently deployed ”less than ten” naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz, but intense mining would prevent Iran from exporting any oil.[18] US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on March 10 that US forces destroyed 16 Iranian minelayers near the Strait, indicating that Iran had begun efforts to mine the waterway.[19] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on March 11 that it received 17 incident reports affecting vessels operating in and around the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman between February 28 and March 11, including 13 attack reports and four reports of suspicious activity.[20] Iran maintains an estimated inventory of more than 5,000 naval mines as of 2019 that it can rapidly deploy in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.[21]
Iran could calculate that the Goreh-Jask pipeline and Jask terminal provide a plausible workaround to preserve some exports. The Goreh-Jask pipeline has the capacity to handle one million barrels of oil per day, so reliance on this facility would cut Iran’s exports in half. The pipeline is also far from secure from airstrikes.[22] The Goreh-Jask pipeline is a major Iranian oil pipeline designed to move crude oil from the oil fields in southwestern Iran to the Jask export terminal on the Gulf of Oman, allowing Iran to export oil without passing through the Strait of Hormuz.[23]
The combined force continues to target several key internal security sites in Tehran City and Kurdish-populated areas in northwestern Iran. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) confirmed that dozens of its fighter jets struck an unspecified number of Basij and internal security sites in Tehran City on March 11.[24] Iranian regime-affiliated media also reported that Israeli drones targeted Basij and internal security checkpoints in District 1 in northern Tehran City and Districts 14, 15, and 16 in southwestern Tehran City on March 11, killing at least ten Basij and security personnel.[25] The IAF also confirmed that it struck an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) intelligence building in northwestern Iran on March 11.[26] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst reported that the combined force struck several internal security sites in Marivan City, Kurdistan Province, which is about 10 miles east of the Iran-Iraq border in northwestern Iran.[27] These sites included an IRGC intelligence building and a border guard headquarters in Marivan City and three observation points surrounding the city.[28] The combined force previously conducted airstrikes on IRGC and Law Enforcement Command (LEC) sites in Marivan City on March 3.[29] Marivan City and other mountainous cities in Kurdistan Province are hotspots for anti-regime protests and clashes between Iranian security forces and Kurdish anti-regime groups.[30]
Russia is reportedly sharing advanced drone tactics with Iran to support Iranian attacks against US forces and assets in the Middle East, which highlights deepening cooperation between key US adversaries. An unspecified Western intelligence official told CNN on March 11 that Russia is helping Iran develop advanced drone tactics based on its experience from its war in Ukraine.[31] The CNN report comes after three unspecified officials told the Washington Post on March 6 that Russia has provided Iran with the locations of US military assets, including warships and aircraft, since the war started on February 28.[32] Iran and Russia signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in January 2025 that outlines bilateral knowledge and technology transfers, among other forms of cooperation.[33]
China continues to supply Iran with precursors for solid fuel to support Iran’s ballistic missile program.[34] An OSINT analyst reported on March 11 that the Iranian cargo vessel Barzin departed Gaolan Port in China, likely carrying a shipment of missile fuel precursors, and is now en route to Iran.[35] Gaolan Port is a Chinese port that loads chemicals, including sodium perchlorate, a key precursor for solid missile propellant. The Barzin has completed several trips between China and Bandar Abbas in southern Iran in the past year, according to Starboard Maritime Intelligence. The Barzin most recently left Gaolan Port on March 1. China has previously supplied sodium perchlorate to support Iran’s ballistic missile program.[36] These shipments follow a March 6 report that China may be preparing to provide Iran with financial assistance and missile components.[37]
The combined force continues to conduct airstrikes targeting missile and drone facilities on March 11.[38] US CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper stated on March 11 that US forces have struck 5,500 targets in Iran, including an Iranian ballistic missile and drone facility.[39] The combined force separately targeted the Jey industrial site in Esfahan Province, which was linked to optical and drone-related production.[40] Commercially available satellite imagery from March 9 shows damage at the Shahroud missile complex’s solid-fuel production lines, damage to Hormozgan Khorgu missile site, the IRGC Kerman missile site, and the Darab missile site.[41] The Shahroud missile facility supports Iran’s solid-fuel ballistic missile development and production infrastructure, which conducts solid propellant mixing and casting for missile motors, including those used in advanced Iranian ballistic missiles, such as the Kheibar Shekan and Fattah-1.[42] Damage to these facilities likely constrains Iran’s ability to manufacture solid-fuel ballistic missiles. The facility previously sustained strike damage during the June 2025 Israel–Iran War, but Iran repaired it and returned it to operation within months.[43] An Israeli journalist reported that more than two-thirds of the Iranian missiles capable of reaching Israel are no longer operational.[44] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated on March 11 that it had destroyed more than 300 Iranian ballistic missile launchers, or around 60 percent of Iran’s total launcher stockpile.[45] US officials separately told lawmakers on March 10 that Iran still retains as many as 50 percent of its missiles and launchers.[46] There is insufficient evidence to determine why these inconsistencies in reported launcher attrition exist.
The combined force has continued to degrade Iranian air force capabilities to maintain air superiority over Iran. Satellite imagery from March 9 shows damage to an Iranian F-14 Tomcat fighter aircraft at the Iranian Artesh Air Force 8th Tactical Air Base (TAB) in Esfahan Province.[47] Israel previously targeted Iranian F-14 Tomcats at the same air base during the June 2025 Israel–Iran War.[48] US CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper stated on March 11 that the combined force is exercising air superiority over “vast swathes of Iran” after striking thousands of targets across Iran since the start of the campaign.[49]
The IRGC forced through the selection of Mojtaba Khamenei as Iran’s new supreme leader, according to senior Iranian sources speaking to Reuters on March 10.[50] This is consistent with ISW-CTP’s assessment that Mojtaba’s selection represents a victory for hardliners over more pragmatic factions within the regime.[51] Senior Iranian sources told Reuters that the IRGC “forced through” Mojtaba’s appointment because they saw him as more easily influenced than Ali Khamenei and would support IRGC hardline policies, despite the concerns of pragmatists.[52] The sources added that the IRGC overpowered senior political and clerical figures who opposed the choice and delayed the decision.[53] ISW-CTP also assessed that Mojtaba will likely pursue similar domestic and foreign policies that are similar to those of Ali Khamenei.[54] Three of the senior Iranian sources, including a reformist former official, added that Khamenei’s selection may lead to an even more oppressive domestic policy and aggressive foreign policy.[55] Iranian LEC Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan stated on March 11 that any Iranian who tries to protest will be treated as an enemy, and that security forces ”have their fingers on the trigger.”[56] One official told Reuters that Mojtaba has built close ties to the IRGC, particularly second-tier commanders who have replaced top generals killed in the war.[57] Mojtaba fought during the Iran-Iraq War and formed many relationships that he later used to cement his role in Iran’s security apparatus.[58] Mojtaba reportedly played a leading role in securing former hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory in 2009 and subsequently took control of the Basij to crush the protests over Ahmadinejad’s election, for example.[59]
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated on March 11 that the US-Israeli campaign against Iran will continue until “all objectives” are accomplished.[60] Katz stated that one of Israel’s aims is to “allow the Iranian people to rise, act, and overthrow [the Iranian] regime.”[61]
Iranian Retaliation
Iran continued missile attacks on the UAE on March 11. The Emirati Defense Ministry said its air defense systems engaged six Iranian ballistic missiles and seven cruise missiles.[62]
Israeli media reported on March 11 that over two-thirds of Iran’s medium-range ballistic missiles are combat ineffective, which likely explains the continued decrease in the number of ballistic missiles that Iran is firing at Israel.”[63] Iran launched at least five missile barrages at Israel between 3:00 PM ET on March 10 and 3:00 PM ET on March 11.[64] ISW-CTP did not observe any Iranian ballistic missile impacts in Israel on March 11.
Axis of Resistance Response
Hezbollah claimed 14 attacks targeting IDF forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon between 3:00 PM ET on March 10 and 3:00 PM ET on March 11.[65] Hezbollah claimed several rocket and mortar attacks targeting IDF forces and positions along both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border.[66] Hezbollah also launched several rocket barrages targeting several areas of northern Israel.[67] One of Hezbollah’s rocket barrages reportedly contained over 100 rockets.[68] OSINT analysts reported over 12 impacts across northern Israel, including in Haifa, Binaa, and an unspecified area of the Galilee region.[69] Israeli media reported that Hezbollah’s attacks wounded at least five individuals.[70] Israeli media reported that Hezbollah almost certainly coordinated the timing of its rocket barrages with Iran.[71] Axis-affiliated media confirmed that Iran and Hezbollah launched coordinated attacks.[72] This is the first time that Iran and Hezbollah have coordinated attacks since the war began on February 28. Two Israeli sources ”familiar with the matter” told CNN on March 11 that Israel is preparing for a potential ”significant expansion” of Hezbollah and Iranian attacks.[73] Hezbollah announced a new operation at 2:26 ET on March 11.[74]
The rate of Hezbollah attacks has varied since the group joined the war on March 1, as illustrated below. Hezbollah has also employed a variety of weapons in its attacks against Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon (see below).
Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem sent a message to Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei on March 11, in which Qassem renewed Hezbollah’s pledge to the Iranian supreme leader.[75] Qassem stated that Hezbollah looks forward to Mojtaba’s “promising leadership.”[76] Qassem also issued a video statement on March 11, in which he reaffirmed Hezbollah’s readiness to confront ”any aggression against our country and our dear people.”[77] Qassem called on Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers to ”stand” with Hezbollah against Israel.[78]
The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah across Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah’s ability to launch attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. The IAF reported on March 11 that it had conducted 200 strikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure in Beirut since February 28.[79] The IDF has targeted Hezbollah infrastructure, weapons depots, central command centers, 50 high-rise buildings that Hezbollah used, and the IRGC Aerospace Headquarters in Beirut.[80] The IDF continued its large-scale airstrikes in Beirut and Beirut’s southern suburbs on March 11.[81] The IDF also struck launchers and additional Hezbollah infrastructure across Lebanon.[82]
The IDF has continued to conduct ground operations and deploy forces to southern Lebanon since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff at 8:00 AM ET on March 11. The IDF reported that the IDF 36th Division is conducting “focused raids” in southern Lebanon.[83] The IDF 36th Division directed an IAF airstrike on Hezbollah fighters and uncovered large quantities of combat equipment, including rifles, ammunition, and combat vests, during its raids.[84] The IDF has also continued to deploy forces to northern Israel and southern Lebanon. IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir ordered that the IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade move from the Southern Command to the Northern Command and ordered unspecified reinforcements for the Northern Command on March 11.[85] The New York Times also reported on March 11 that the IDF sent an additional infantry battalion to Israel’s northern border with Lebanon.[86]
The IDF issued more evacuation warnings for Lebanese residents on March 11. The IDF issued evacuation warnings for seven areas in Beirut’s southern suburbs, which called on Lebanese residents to evacuate and not return to the area.[87] The IDF also issued evacuation warnings for residents in 12 southern Lebanese villages.[88]
An unspecified senior Israeli official told Israeli media on March 11 that Israel is conducting indirect talks with the Lebanese government.[89] The Israeli official noted that Israel is demanding that the LAF begin acting against Hezbollah immediately. Israel also reportedly threatened to strike the national infrastructure in Lebanon. This Israeli media report follows a March 9 Axios report that the Lebanese government proposed immediate direct negotiations with Israel under US auspices to reach a peace agreement.[90]
The Lebanese Parliament has extended its term by two years due to the ongoing war.[91] The Lebanese government was previously expected to hold parliamentary elections in May 2026. Hezbollah’s 13-member Loyalty to the Resistance bloc voted in favor of the extension.[92] Hezbollah likely voted in favor to prevent a new election that could have further weakened its political position.
Some elements of Hezbollah’s political support appear to be fracturing due to Hezbollah’s participation in the war. Hezbollah ally, the Amal Movement, recently voted in favor of the Lebanese cabinet’s decision to ban Hezbollah’s military activity.[93] The Amal Movement has been Hezbollah’s key political and strategic ally since 2005.[94] Amal Chairman and Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri is also reportedly ”furious” over Hezbollah’s decision to attack Israel.[95] Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel have previously caused the group to lose a political ally. The Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), a Lebanese political party, ended its two-decade alliance with Hezbollah in October 2024 after Israel began its campaign against Hezbollah, for example.[96] There is also reportedly growing frustration among Hezbollah’s popular support base.[97] Several Lebanese residents in Hezbollah strongholds have told Western media that they are against Hezbollah’s decision to enter the war.[98] Other Lebanese civilians have noted that they could not tolerate Israeli airstrikes anymore and that the result would have been the same even if Hezbollah did not attack first, however.[99] These reports are anecdotal and should not be over-generalized, but they do represent real sentiment among the Lebanese people.
The combined force has continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia positions in Iraq to limit the ability of the militias to target the United States and Israel. The combined force separately struck 30th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade positions and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada positions in Ninewa Province, according to Iraqi media and open source intelligence accounts.[100] The PMF includes multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[101] The 30th PMF Brigade is primarily composed of Shabak fighters and is closely tied to multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[102] An Iraq analyst posted a video that purportedly shows secondary explosions after a strike on PMF rocket storage in Wasit Province, which reportedly belongs to Asaib Ahl al Haq.[103] A security source in Ninewa Province told Iraqi media on March 11 that two airstrikes struck the headquarters of the 24th Regiment of the 59th PMF Brigade. The Ninewa Guards, which Turkey and the United States helped train after former Ninewa Governor Atheel al Nujaifi formed the group to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in 2024, integrated into the 59th PMF Brigade in 2017.[104] Security sources separately told Iraqi media on March 11 that airstrikes targeted a PMF base in al Qaim, Anbar Province, and killed one fighter and injured five others. Another strike targeted a PMF base in Musayyib, Babil Province.[105]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continued to attack US forces in Iraq. Unidentified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched at least six drones targeting the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center at Baghdad International Airport on March 11.[106] US air defenses intercepted five of the drones, while one hit a “guard tower,” according to the US State Department.[107] No militia has claimed responsibility for this attack as of ISW-CTP’s data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 11. Iraqi air defenses also intercepted a drone that targeted Erbil International Airport on March 11.[108] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba head Akram al Kaabi called on March 11 for the population of Arab countries hosting US troops to follow the example of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and form armed groups to liberate their countries.[109] Kaabi offered Iraqi militia “expertise and capabilities” in support of this effort.[110]
The PMF reportedly prevented the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS) from inspecting a PMF building in Baghdad City on March 10.[111] An Iraq news account reported that CTS forces dispatched for the inspection of a PMF building on Palestine Street in Baghdad on Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s orders due to a suspicion that the site stored drones and missiles.[112] The Iraq analyst reported that the PMF blocked CTS forces from entering the compound.[113] The PMF denied on March 11 that any federal security agencies searched its headquarters.[114] Sudani’s reported orders for CTS to search a PMF facility follow a phone call between Sudani and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on March 9, during which Rubio reiterated the importance of the Iraqi federal government protecting US diplomatic personnel and facilities.[115] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias under the PMF have routinely blocked Iraqi government access to areas under PMF control in recent years.[116] The Iraqi government is unable to access certain parts of Babil Province, such as Jurf al Sakhar, due to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, primarily Kataib Hezbollah, maintaining a stronghold in the area.[117]
Kataib Hezbollah threatened on March 11 to attack Syria if Syrian President Ahmed al Shara makes any “hostile move[s]” towards Lebanon or attempts to interfere with Lebanese Hezbollah activity.[118] Kataib Hezbollah, like other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, has a close relationship with Hezbollah because Hezbollah helped Iran train and arm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias after the US invasion of Iraq.[119] Kataib Hezbollah’s statement follows Hezbollah reportedly shelling a Syrian town on the Syria-Lebanon border on March 10.[120] The Syrian Army told Syrian state media on March 10 that it has observed Hezbollah reinforcements arriving on the border, is assessing next steps, and is in contact with the LAF.[121]
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[9] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-qatar-discuss-acquiring-ukrainian-drones-down-irans-shaheds-source-says-2026-03-05/
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[14] https://x.com/sentdefender/status/2031738287216263350
[15] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2028781603527291213
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[17] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/irans-control-of-hormuz-means-its-exporting-more-oil-today-than-before-the-war-ede3cd91?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos4
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[20] https://www.ukmto.org/recent-incidents
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https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2031700131687379148?s=20
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[46] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/10/us/politics/iran-military-tactics.html
[47] https://x.com/Shayan86/status/2031595710949273721?s=20
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[62] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2031837588127138255
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[77] https://almanar dot com.lb/article/628237/
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[110] https://t.me/Al_Nojaba/1335
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[114] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/security/558479/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A3%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87
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[116] https://nirij dot org/en/2024/07/10/displaced-people-from-salah-al-din-are-banned-from-returning/ ; https://alhurra dot com/en/14420
[117] https://alhurra dot com/en/14420
[118] https://t.me/centerkaf/5588
[119] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hezbollah-iraq-little-help-can-go-long-way
[120] https://sana dot sy/en/syria/2301565/
[121] https://sana dot sy/en/syria/2301565/
