The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Note: ISW-CTP will pause publishing weekend updates starting on August 15, 2026. ISW-CTP may publish special updates on Saturdays and Sundays if events warrant, however.
Key Takeaways
- US President Donald Trump and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent warned that the United States will intensify its maximum pressure campaign against Iran in the coming days. Bessent announced on August 20 that the United States will announce further economic measures against Iran and entities with commercial ties to Iran on August 24.
- The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is preparing to implement phased trade and financial restrictions in parallel with upcoming US economic measures. The UAE reportedly plans to phase its reduction of trade and financial engagement with Iran, adopting initial measures to restrict cargo and trade flows.
- Iranian officials are acknowledging the mounting economic pressures that Iran faces and are pursuing alternative trade, banking, and financial arrangements designed to reduce the impact of these pressures. Iran is seeking to invest in alternative routes and destinations for its oil exports to alleviate this economic pressure.
Toplines
US President Donald Trump and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent warned that the United States will intensify the US economic pressure campaign against Iran in the coming days to exploit growing Iranian economic vulnerabilities and deter further Iranian aggression in the war. Trump warned that countries will face “tremendous” economic consequences if their financial institutions, businesses, airports, or government entities provide any type of “lifeline” to Iran on August 19.[1] Trump reiterated his support for his maximum pressure campaign.[2] The US maximum pressure campaign, which the Trump administration first employed in 2018 and reinstated in 2025, sought to levy economic sanctions and other coercive economic measures to isolate Iran and change Iranian decisionmakers’ behavior.[3] Bessent announced on August 20 that the United States will announce additional economic measures against Iran and entities with commercial ties to Iran on August 24.[4] Bessent added that the United States would pair the existing blockade with the “toughest sanctions in history” to further constrain Iran’s economy, curtail its ability to “project power through its proxies,” reduce its capacity to fund its military forces, and increase economic pressure on Iran through inflation and financial isolation.[5] Bessent stated that US economic pressure will ”collapse [the Iranian] regime.”[6]
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is preparing to implement phased trade and financial restrictions in parallel with upcoming US economic measures.[7] The UAE announced on August 19 that it would cut off all trade and financial transactions with Iran after recent Iranian missile attacks against Emirati maritime targets.[8] Sources familiar with the matter told the Wall Street Journal that the UAE plans to phase its reduction of trade and financial engagement with Iran by adopting initial measures to restrict cargo and trade flows.[9] The UAE is a major trade partner for Iran, and Emirati imports account for nearly a third of Iranian imports, including basic goods.[10] The UAE wants to preserve diplomatic channels in case the US economic pressure campaign fails, according to unspecified sources, however.[11] An unspecified source familiar with the matter warned that the UAE could pursue Iranian-affiliated entities based in the UAE if Iran attacks the UAE again.[12]
Iranian officials are acknowledging the mounting economic pressures that Iran faces and are pursuing alternative trade, banking, and financial arrangements designed to reduce the impact of these pressures. Iran is not currently exporting any oil, according to Iranian Central Bank Governor Abdol Nasser Hemmati on August19.[13] Hemmati admitted that Iran is facing foreign currency reserve shortages, rising youth unemployment, and reconstruction costs.[14] Hemmati also acknowledged that sanctions will only worsen these conditions.[15] Iranian Energy Optimization and Strategic Management Organization Deputy Head Yaser Mirzaei said that Iran’s domestic gasoline situation has become a “critical issue” requiring an immediate solution, noting that the lack of access to foreign exchange, logistics, and restrictions on foreign supply routes have limited imports.[16] Additional UAE restrictions will likely worsen Iran’s foreign-exchange and trade challenges by limiting Iran’s access to a hub for Iran’s shadow-banking and sanctions evasion networks.[17] Approximately 80 percent of Iran’s imported foreign exchange reportedly comes through the UAE, for example.[18]
Iran is seeking to invest in alternative routes and destinations for its oil exports to alleviate this economic pressure. Iran signed a deal to export oil to Tajikistan on August 15.[19] Hemmati and Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf met with Iraqi officials and economic experts in Iraq between August 16 and 20.[20] Hemmati announced that the existing banking and financial obstacles between Iran and Iraq will be resolved in the coming weeks. Hemmati also noted that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi agreed to provide guarantees for Iranian contractors backed by Iranian assets in Iraqi banks.[21] Hemmati also stated that he advocated for the creation of financial corridors that create independence from Western-controlled financial systems in recent discussions with BRICS partners, indicating Iran’s interest in diversifying its economic partnerships outside of the region.[22]
US and Partner Military Operations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Strike Campaign
Assessed Iranian War Aims:
- Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
- Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
- Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
- Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states
See topline section.
US-Iran Negotiations
See topline section.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
See topline section.
Lebanon
Nothing significant to report.
Iraq
Several regional officials told Al Monitor on August 19 that Saudi Arabia wants the Iraqi federal government to take “punitive action” against the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that have launched attacks targeting Saudi territory.[23] One regional official stated that Saudi Arabia wants the Iraqi government to arrest and prosecute the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders responsible for ordering attacks on Saudi territory.[24] The Iraqi government has taken limited steps since late July to prevent further Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Saudi Arabia and other regional states in order to avoid possible future rounds of US or Saudi strikes in Iraq.[25] US and Saudi forces struck several Iraqi militia positions on July 28 in response to Iraqi militia attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure and US interests in Iraq and the region.[26]
Three informed sources also told Al Monitor that Saudi Arabia decided to refrain from striking Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province, as part of its July 28 strikes in Iraq after Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi asked for “time to deal with the area himself.”[27] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah has repeatedly refused to allow the Iraqi government to exercise sovereignty over Jurf al Sakhr for over a decade and has used the area to store weapons and launch attacks against US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region, including in March and April.[28] It remains unclear as of this writing how Zaydi intends to “deal” with Jurf al Sakhr, however. Qatari-owned regional media reported on August 19 that Zaydi plans to increase security measures and deploy a special Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service unit near Jurf al Sakhr to ”monitor” militia movements, but the report specified that this plan would not lead to raids on militia positions or a military incursion into the area.[29] This plan contradicts previous reporting, which claimed that Zaydi was preparing for Iraqi security forces to encircle Jurf al Sakhr.[30] ISW-CTP noted on August 19 that this reversal suggests that Zaydi is responding to Iranian-backed Iraqi groups’ pressure to limit Zaydi’s disarmament efforts.[31]
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani warned unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against conducting additional attacks against Saudi Arabia during his August 10 visit to Baghdad, according to a regional official speaking to Al Monitor on August 19.[32] The source said that Ghaani was concerned about growing Saudi-Turkish ties, which almost certainly refers to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan’s recent signing of a joint defense agreement.[33] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have previously heeded Ghaani’s calls for restraint.[34] ISW-CTP has not recorded any additional Iraqi militia attacks on Saudi territory since July 28.
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf continued to meet with senior Iraqi officials on August 20.[35] Ghalibaf met with Iraqi National Security Advisor Qassem al Aboudi, during which Ghalibaf affirmed support for Iraqi government measures to “regulate” Iraqi militia weapons.[36] Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zaidan also met with Ghalibaf on August 20 to discuss bilateral judicial and legal cooperation.[37] These meetings come after Ghalibaf reportedly met with unspecified Iraqi officials on August 19 to relay Iran’s proposal for disarming the militias in a way that avoids a confrontation between the Iraqi federal government and the militias.[38] Iran has also reportedly proposed “freezing” or hiding the militias’ heavy weapons or transferring them to Iran until the militias reach a political settlement with the Iraqi government.[39] Iran has recently dispatched several senior officials to Iraq, such as Ghaani, to discourage militia disarmament while avoiding conflict between the Iraqi government and Iran-backed militias operating in Iraq.[40]
Arabian Peninsula
The Houthis claimed to launch drones targeting a “sensitive target” at the Najran Regional Airport and an unspecified oil facility in Najran, Saudi Arabia, on August 20.[41] The Houthis claimed to conduct these strikes in response to Saudi overflights in Houthi-controlled areas of Saada Governorate in northwestern Yemen.[42] Saudi officials have not confirmed either strike at the time of this writing. The Houthis have previously attacked the regional airport and an oil facility in Najran on August 4 and 14, respectively.[43] ISW-CTP continues to assess that the Houthis are attacking Saudi oil infrastructure primarily to raise Saudi political and economic costs to an untenable level and compel Saudi leaders to terminate military operations against the Houthis in Yemen.[44] IRGC spokesperson Brigadier General Hossein Mohebbi warned IRGC-affiliated media on August 20 that the Houthis’ military capabilities are improving and that Saudi Arabia will not be able to defend against future Houthi attacks.[45]
Three unspecified Houthi military sources and Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) Information Minister Moammar al Eryani told Western media on August 19 that the Houthis are preparing to seize control of the Bab al Mandeb Strait.[46] The Houthi sources stated that 2,000 Houthi fighters recently deployed to “front lines” along Yemen’s western coast in Taiz and Hudaydah governorates.[47] The sources also said that the Houthis aim to set conditions for an assault on the strait through recent Houthi-claimed attacks on ROYG naval assets.[48]
[1] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117124650907675461
[2] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117124650907675461
[3] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117124650907675461 ; https://2017-2021.state.gov/maximum-pressure-campaign-on-the-regime-in-iran/; https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-restores-maximum-pressure-on-iran/
[4] https://nypost.com/2026/08/20/us-news/bessent-tells-us-allies-youre-either-with-us-or-against-us-on-iran-sanctions/
[5] https://nypost.com/2026/08/20/us-news/bessent-tells-us-allies-youre-either-with-us-or-against-us-on-iran-sanctions/
[6] https://nypost.com/2026/08/20/us-news/bessent-tells-us-allies-youre-either-with-us-or-against-us-on-iran-sanctions/
[7] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trumps-plan-to-squeeze-irans-economy-will-live-or-die-in-dubai-8f9f561e?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-19-2026/ ; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/19/world/middleeast/uae-cuts-trade-ties-iran-missiles.html ; https://x.com/modgovae/status/2089760687291777203?s=20
[9]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-19-2026/ ; https://x.com/miadmaleki/status/2090021891389980677?s=20
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-19-2026/ ; https://x.com/miadmaleki/status/2090021891389980677?s=20 ; https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6662719
[11]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trumps-plan-to-squeeze-irans-economy-will-live-or-die-in-dubai-8f9f561e?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2
[12]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trumps-plan-to-squeeze-irans-economy-will-live-or-die-in-dubai-8f9f561e?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2
[13] https://www.irna dot ir/news/86240378/
[14] https://www.irna dot ir/news/86240378/
[15] https://www.irna dot ir/news/86240378/
[16] https://www.irna dot ir/amp/86240624/
[17] https://x.com/miadmaleki/status/2090021891389980677?s=20 ; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0562
[18] https://x.com/miadmaleki/status/2090021889120899152?s=20
[19] https://t.me/mehrnews/404804
[20] https://t.me/farsna/456377; https://www.irna dot ir/news/86240378/; https://almadapaper dot net/449248/ ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/خلال-استقباله-قاليباف-اميدي-ي-كد-موقف-العراق-الداعم-ل-نها-الصراعات-وحفظ-سيادة-الدول; https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/247007/CBI-chief-pays-visit-to-Iraq-to-broaden-trade-cooperation; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/439165; https://t.me/mehrnews/406033
[21] https://www.irna dot ir/news/86240378/
[22] https://www.irna dot ir/news/86240378/
[23] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/08/saudi-arabia-wants-iran-backed-militia-heads-roll-iraq-amid-talks-tehran
[24] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/08/saudi-arabia-wants-iran-backed-militia-heads-roll-iraq-amid-talks-tehran
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-august-10-2026/ ; https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/خاص-العراق-يشكل-قيادة-عمليات-البادية-لمنع-الهجمات-على-دول-الجوار ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/الداخلية-العراقية-تعلن-غلاق-71-مقرا-وهميا-للحشد-الشعبي
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-29-2026/ ; https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2082260118930956482
[27] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/08/saudi-arabia-wants-iran-backed-militia-heads-roll-iraq-amid-talks-tehran
[28] https://alhurra dot com/en/14420 ; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/standing-with-iran-the-integrated-combat-performance-of-iraqi-militias-during-operation-epic-fury/
[29] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/جرف-الصخر-اختبار-أوّل-صعب-لخطة-حصر-السلاح-في-العراق
[30] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/الزيدي-يتحرك-لإنهاء-ملف-جرف-الصخر-وإبعاد-المليشيات-عنها ; https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/iraq/2026/08/11/العراق-الزيدي-يتمسك-بحصر-السلاح-ويبحث-السيطرة-على-جرف-الصخر
[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-19-2026/
[32] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/08/saudi-arabia-wants-iran-backed-militia-heads-roll-iraq-amid-talks-tehran
[33] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/08/saudi-arabia-wants-iran-backed-militia-heads-roll-iraq-amid-talks-tehran; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudi-arabia-turkey-pakistan-sign-joint-defence-deal-amid-regional-turmoil-2026-08-07/
[34] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/18/iran-proxies-middle-east/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-armed-groups-dial-down-us-attacks-request-iran-commander-2024-02-18/
[35] https://ina dot iq/en/politics/51357-zidan-qalibaf-discuss-strengthening-bilateral-judicial-and-legal-cooperation.html ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/قاليباف-من-بغداد-يران-تدعم-خطوات-الحكومة-العراقية-لتنظيم-السلاح-وتلتزم-بالاتفاق-ال-مني ;
[36] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/قاليباف-من-بغداد-يران-تدعم-خطوات-الحكومة-العراقية-لتنظيم-السلاح-وتلتزم-بالاتفاق-ال-مني
[37] https://ina dot iq/en/politics/51357-zidan-qalibaf-discuss-strengthening-bilateral-judicial-and-legal-cooperation.html
[38]https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5308866-قاليباف-يناقش-في-بغداد-خطة-إيرانية-لـإخفاء-سلاح-الفصائل
[39] https://almadapaper dot net/449423/
[40] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/خاص-قا-ني-في-بغداد-لبحث-سلاح-الفصا-ل-ومسار-تصدير-النفط-عبر-هرمز ; https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/خاص-رسائل-إيرانية-للفصائل-العراقية-عبر-قاآني-وطلب-لبغداد-بشأن-هرمز
[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-say-they-attacked-najran-airport-aramco-facilities-saudi-arabia-2026-08-20/ ; https://t.me/army21ye/3649 ; https://saba dot ye/ar/news3770329.htm
[42] https://t.me/army21ye/3649
[43] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-say-they-hit-saudi-target-najran-airport-2026-08-04/ ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/houthis-say-they-targeted-aramco-in-saudi-arabias-najran-with-drone/
[44] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-august-12-2026/
[45] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/856079/
[46] https://almasdaronline dot com/articles/349429
[47] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/houthis-planning-to-seize-vital-bab-el-mandeb-strait-yemen-government-warns/
[48] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/houthis-planning-to-seize-vital-bab-el-mandeb-strait-yemen-government-warns/
