The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Key Takeaways
- US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that no vessels have breached the US blockade on Iranian ports since CENTCOM implemented its blockade on April 13. The US blockade on Iranian ports does not have a defined geographic boundary, and the United States can interdict vessels almost anywhere in international waters until they arrive at their final port. It is unclear whether any of the vessels that left Iranian ports on April 14 were authorized to do so under CENTCOM’s “limited grace period.”
- The United States’ decision not to renew a 30-day sanctions waiver for Iranian oil exports, which is set to expire on April 19, will further constrain Iran’s ability to export oil in addition to the US blockade on Iranian ports. Two US officials told Reuters on April 14 that the US Treasury Department will enforce sanctions on Iranian oil after April 19.
- Iran is reportedly considering temporarily pausing shipments to avoid testing the US blockade on Iranian ports and raising tensions ahead of possible talks, according to a person familiar with Iranian decision-making on the Strait of Hormuz speaking to Bloomberg on April 14. Iran would only be able to pause shipments for a limited period of time before it would start to run out of room to store oil. Iran could also pursue several other courses of action in response to the US blockade, including agreeing to a deal acceptable to the United States, attempting to run the blockade, or resuming the war.
- Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Mohammad Mokhber warned that Iran will “open new fronts” and “increase economic pressures” on US allies and regional countries in response to the US blockade on Iranian ports, likely to try to coerce the United States to end its blockade. Mokhber may have been referring to the Houthis, which has not conducted attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea during the war thus far. Arab officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 14 that Iran is pressuring the Houthis to “close” the Bab al Mandeb Strait.
- US President Donald Trump stated on April 14 that the United States and Iran may hold another round of talks in Islamabad, Pakistan, “over [the] next two days.” A senior Iranian source told Western media on April 14 that the United States and Iran are keeping April 17 through 19 open for possible talks, but that no date has been confirmed.
Toplines
US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that no vessels have breached the US blockade on Iranian ports since CENTCOM implemented the blockade on April 13.[1] CENTCOM implemented a blockade on April 13 against all vessels transiting to or from Iranian ports. The US blockade on Iranian ports does not have a defined geographic boundary, and the United States can interdict vessels almost anywhere in international waters until they arrive at their final port. US forces have previously demonstrated their ability to interdict vessels in international waters.[2]US officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 14 that US forces will likely attempt to intercept or “quarantine” any vessels that violate the blockade in the Arabian Sea to limit the threat of attacks from the Iranian coast.[3] Vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz are therefore not automatically breaching the US blockade. Commercially available maritime data indicates that at least eight vessels departed the Strait of Hormuz, including six Iranian or Iranian-linked vessels, on April 14. One of the vessels, the US-sanctioned Rich Starry oil tanker, departed from Ajman Port in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on April 13.[4] Other Iranian or Iranian-linked vessels, including the Elpis and Christianna, also left the strait after departing Iranian ports.[5] Commercially available maritime data also indicates that at least nine vessels entered the Strait of Hormuz, including three Iranian or Iranian-linked ships. One of the entering vessels was the Ocean Energy cargo ship, which docked at Iran’s Bandar Abbas Port on April 13.[6] It is unclear whether this vessel was exempted from the blockade. Reuters reported that a US military notice sent to mariners exempts humanitarian shipments to Iran from the US blockade.[7] CENTCOM also announced that six merchant vessels complied with the US direction to return to an Iranian port in the Gulf of Oman.[8]CENTCOM has not interdicted any vessels at the time of this writing.
It is also unclear whether any of the vessels that left Iranian ports on April 14 were authorized to do so under CENTCOM’s “limited grace period.” United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported on April 13 that CENTCOM granted “neutral vessels” currently docked at Iranian ports an unspecified grace period to depart. The complexity and variety of factors involved in the blockade, including determining vessels’ origin and destination and whether vessels are considered “neutral”, make it premature to try to assess whether some vessels have gotten through the US blockade.
The United States’ decision not to renew a 30-day sanctions waiver for Iranian oil exports, which is set to expire on April 19, will further constrain Iran’s ability to export oil in addition to the US blockade on Iranian ports.[9] Two US officials told Reuters on April 14 that the US Treasury Department will enforce sanctions on Iranian oil after April 19.[10] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also told reporters on April 14 that the US blockade on Iranian ports will ensure that no vessels from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are “able to get their [Iranian] oil.”[11] The PRC purchases more than 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports.[12] A sanctions-focused US analyst estimated on April 13 that a successful blockade on Iranian ports would cost the regime around $435 million USD per day, leaving Iran with few alternatives to export and import goods.[13]
Iran is reportedly considering temporarily pausing shipments to avoid testing the US blockade on Iranian ports and raising tensions ahead of possible talks, according to a person familiar with Iranian decision-making on the Strait of Hormuz speaking to Bloomberg on April 14.[14] Iran would only be able to pause shipments for a limited period of time before it would start to run out of room to store oil. A sanctions-focused analyst reported on April 13 that Iran’s onshore oil storage capacity is 13 days, after which Iran would have to shut down its oil fields, potentially causing long-term damage to the oil fields.[15] Iran’s limited storage capacity highlights the difficult position the US blockade has put Iran in. Iran appears to have three other courses of action that it could take to respond to the US blockade on Iranian ports. It is unclear which course of action Iran will pursue at this time. The courses of action include:
- Iran could agree to a deal acceptable to the United States, which would likely require Iran to make concessions on its nuclear program and other issues.
- Iran could attempt to run the blockade, a move that would almost certainly result in a US response and possibly the seizure of Iranian vessels central to Iran’s oil trade.
- Iran could restart or widen the conflict, although it is unclear whether a resumption of the conflict would necessarily end the US blockade on Iranian ports.
Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Mohammad Mokhber warned that Iran will “open new fronts” and “increase economic pressures” on US allies and regional countries in response to the US blockade on Iranian ports, likely to try to coerce the United States to end its blockade. Mokhber may have been referring to the Houthis, which have not conducted attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea during the war thus far. Arab officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 14 that Iran is pressuring the Houthis to “close” the Bab al Mandeb Strait.[16] Saudi Arabia has urged the United States to end its blockade on Iranian ports and return to negotiations due to concerns that the blockade could cause the Houthis to resume attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb Strait, according to the Arab officials.[17] Saudi energy officials told the Wall Street Journal that the Houthis have sent guarantees that their fighters will not attack Saudi Arabia or its ships passing through the Bab el Mandeb, however.[18] Previous Houthi attacks on shipping between 2023 and 2025 sharply increased shipping costs and contributed to global inflation.[19]
US President Donald Trump stated on April 14 that the United States and Iran may hold another round of talks in Islamabad, Pakistan, “over [the] next two days.”[20] A senior Iranian source told Western media on April 14 that the United States and Iran are keeping April 17 through 19 open for possible talks, but that no date has been confirmed.[21] Trump did not specify who would lead the US delegation in a potential second round of negotiations. US Vice President JD Vance, who led the US delegation in the first round of negotiations on April 11 and 12, told Fox News on April 14 that Iran moved closer to the US position but “didn’t move far enough.”[22] Two senior Iranian officials and one US official told the New York Times that Iran responded to the US demand for a 20-year moratorium on uranium enrichment with a pause “for up to five years.”[23] Iran’s willingness to pause enrichment for five years would represent an Iranian concession and notable inflection in Iran’s position. Vance also said that the Iranian delegation was “unable to cut a deal” and instead had to return to Tehran to get approval from “the Supreme Leader or someone else.”[24] Vance’s statement is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that the United States is negotiating with a de facto committee composed of competing political, military, and security factions, rather than a unified delegation with a clear mandate and unified positions.[25]
US and Israeli Air Campaign
New satellite imagery shows damage to several Iranian internal security and military sites in Tehran, Kermanshah, and Ilam provinces. These strikes occurred prior to the ceasefire.
- Satellite imagery from March 17 confirms that the combined force struck the IRGC Ground Forces 27th Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Provincial Unit in eastern Tehran City.[26] The 27th Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Provincial Unit is the IRGC Ground Forces’ provincial unit for Tehran City and the IRGC’s main unit in the city.[27] The 27th Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Provincial Unit oversees 23 Basij regional bases throughout Tehran City.[28] The 27th Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Provincial Unit deployed to Syria during the Syrian civil war and incurred casualties while fighting for the Bashar al Assad regime.[29]
- Satellite imagery from March 17 confirms that the combined force struck the IRGC Navy Headquarters in Tehran Province.[30]
- An OSINT account posted satellite imagery on April 14 that shows that combined force strikes destroyed several buildings in Mehran, Ilam Province, including the Mehran Border Regiment and Mehran Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Headquarters.[31]
- Satellite imagery shows that the combined force struck a headquarters belonging to the IRGC and Basij in Eslamabad-e Gharb, Kermanshah Province.[32]
- Satellite imagery posted on April 14 shows that the combined force struck the Artesh Air Force 11th Tactical Airbase, which is home to the Artesh Air Force Headquarters in eastern Tehran.[33]
Iranian Response
Iran may have struck a bulk carrier off the coast of Oman on April 7 before the ceasefire went into effect.[34] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on April 14 that two unidentified projectiles struck a vessel 112 nautical miles southeast of Ras al Hadd, Oman, on April 7, causing a fire on the vessel.[35] UKMTO reported that a Pakistani Naval vessel assisted the struck bulk carrier and resolved the incident.[36] This attack marks the 29th attack or incident affecting civilian vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz that UKMTO has recorded since the war began.[37]
Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response
Lebanese and Israeli officials met in Washington, DC, on April 14, which marks the first direct talks between the two countries in over 30 years.[38] Lebanese Ambassador to the United States Nada Hamadeh Moawad, Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yechiel Leiter, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz, and US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa attended the talks.[39] An unidentified US State Department official told Axios on April 13 that the officials would discuss measures to ensure security in northern Israel and Lebanese sovereignty.[40] Lebanese officials stated that Lebanon would demand an immediate ceasefire during the meeting and that Lebanon would not agree to future negotiations unless a ceasefire is implemented.[41] No official details about the meeting have been released at the time of this writing. Leiter stated that the talks were “excellent” and noted that the officials are all on the “same side of the equation” and are “united in liberating Lebanon” from Iranian influence and Hezbollah.[42] No Lebanese officials have commented on the talks at the time of this writing.
Hezbollah officials and supporters categorically rejected the Lebanese government’s direct talks with Israel. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem stated on April 13 that the Lebanese government’s decision to engage in direct talks was “stabbing the resistance in the back” and called on the government to cancel the talks.[43] Qassem stated that Hezbollah will not surrender and reiterated that Hezbollah’s objectives are to completely stop Israel’s operations and secure an Israeli withdrawal from all Lebanese territory.[44] Hezbollah Political Council member Wafiq Safa similarly rejected the negotiations and told the Associated Press on April 14 that Hezbollah will not abide by any agreement made during the talks.[45] Hezbollah supporters have also held protests in Beirut in recent days to protest the direct talks.[46] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) warned on April 14, about an hour before the talks began, that it expected Hezbollah to increase its rate of rocket attacks targeting northern Israel.[47]
Hezbollah claimed that it has conducted 47 attacks targeting IDF infrastructure and Israeli communities in northern Israel since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on April 13.[48] Hezbollah has claimed 44 attacks against Israeli targets in northern Israel as of 2:00 PM ET on April 14, which is similar to its claimed rate of fire targeting Israel on April 13 (see April 13 data in graph below). Hezbollah’s claimed rate of fire increased significantly in the hours leading up to the start of Israeli-Lebanese talks in Washington, DC, on April 14.[49] Hezbollah claimed that it launched three waves of rocket barrages between 11:00 and 11:30 AM ET, targeting between 5 and 13 civilian areas in northern Israel per barrage.[50] Hezbollah likely conducted these large-scale attacks to signal opposition to the Lebanese government’s direct talks with Israel.[51] The IDF warned that Hezbollah would likely increase its rate of fire targeting northern Israel on April 14.[52] An Israeli military correspondent did not report any casualties from Hezbollah’s rocket barrages targeting civilian areas on April 14.[53] An Israeli military correspondent reported that at least one Hezbollah drone impacted in Nahariya but did not causeany casualties.[54]
Hezbollah claimed that it has conducted 24 attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on April 13.[55] Hezbollah claimed that it fired four surface-to-air missiles (SAM) targeting IDF drones and fighter aircraft over southern Lebanon on April 14.[56] The IDF did not report any casualties from Hezbollah rocket, drone, or SAM attacks in southern Lebanon on April 14.
Hezbollah released a video on April 14 showing footage of a claimed cruise missile launch targeting northern Israel on March 24. The video shows Hezbollah fighters preparing and launching an Iranian-made Paveh long-range cruise missile toward an IDF outpost near the town of Misgav Am.[57] The Paveh has a range of around 1,650 kilometers and is part of the Soumar family of IRGC cruise missiles.[58] Israeli researchers first reported on March 19 that Hezbollah had received Paveh missiles from Iran.[59] Hezbollah has employed a variety of weapons in its attacks against Israeli targets (see graph below).
The IDF has continued to advance into the operationally and symbolically significant town of Bint Jbeil in southeastern Lebanon. IDF Northern Command Commander Major General Rafi Milo said on April 14 that the IDF completed its encirclement of Bint Jbeil and launched an attack on the town in “the last few days.”[60] The 35th Paratrooper Brigade (98th Paratrooper Division (Res.)), 89th Commando Brigade (98th Paratrooper Division (Res.)), and 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade (91st Territorial Division) are currently operating in Bint Jbeil.[61] An Israeli journalist published footage on April 14 of an 84th Infantry Brigade commander standing in front of a Hezbollah memorial in Bint Jbeil.[62] The memorial is located around 300 meters from Bint Jbeil’s city center, according to an Israeli geospatial analyst.[63] The IDF published footage on April 14 of three Hezbollah fighters, including a Radwan Force member, surrendering to the 84th Infantry Brigade after engaging Israeli soldiers in Bint Jbeil on April 13.[64] The IDF also announced on April 14 that Hezbollah fighters engaged and wounded ten 101st Battalion (35th Paratrooper Brigade) soldiers, causing three serious injuries, in Bint Jbeil on April 13.[65] Bint Jbeil is operationally significant for the IDF because it is located at the nexus of multiple main roads in southeastern Lebanon, including the Tebnine-Bint Jbeil road, that the IDF could use to advance north and link with Israeli forces advancing from other axes. Bint Jbeil is also symbolically significant to Hezbollah. Former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah proclaimed “victory” from a stadium in Bint Jbeil after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.[66] The IDF captured the Bint Jbeil Stadium on April 13, according to an Israeli journalist.[67] Hezbollah has also fought the IDF at Bint Jbeil in previous conflicts, including in 2006 and in the October 7 War.[68] An unspecified Israeli military official told Reuters on April 13 that the IDF will achieve full operational control of Bint Jbeil within days.[69]
Israeli forces have also continued to conduct ground operations in other areas of southern Lebanon. The IDF 933rd (Nahal) Infantry Brigade (162nd Armored Division) located and directed airstrikes targeting Hezbollah anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) crews, observation posts, and weapons depots in southern Lebanon.[70] 933rd Brigade forces also seized small arms, ammunition, and military vests from a Hezbollah cache in a civilian home.[71] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) account geolocated footage of the 933rd Brigade operating in Beit Lif, Bint Jbeil District, southeastern Lebanon.[72]
The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure and fighters across Lebanon. The IDF conducted multiple airstrikes on April 13 targeting Hezbollah weapons depots, rocket launchers, and headquarters located in Aadchit al Qoussair, Marjaayoun District, southeastern Lebanon.[73][74] The IDF reported that Hezbollah has launched around 130 rockets from Aadchit al Qoussair targeting northern Israel, particularly Kiryat Shmona, since March 2.[75][76] Aadchit al Qoussair is located around 10 kilometers from Kiryat Shmona. Lebanese media reported that the IDF conducted at least 44 airstrikes in southern Lebanon and western Bekaa Valley since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff at 2:00 PM ET on April 13.[77] CTP-ISW has not observed any reported Israeli strikes in Beirut or its suburbs since April 8, despite the IDF issuing an evacuation order for Beirut’s southern suburbs on April 9.[78]
Iranian Internal Security
Iran’s mounting economic strain could hurt its ability to finance post-war reconstruction. Iranian government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani acknowledged on April 14 that the government lacks sufficient financial resources to fully cover the cost of rebuilding homes that were destroyed during the war.[79] Iranian media separately reported on April 14 that damage to major industries, such as Iran’s steel and petrochemical industries, has deprived Iran of part of the foreign currency resources that these industries previously generated through exports, which has further tightened Iran’s foreign currency constraints.[80] The combined force struck major industrial and energy facilities, including the Mobarakeh Steel Complex in Esfahan Province and Khuzestan Steel Company in Khuzestan Province, damaging major production hubs that support the broader Iranian economy.[81] Iranian media reported on April 1 that the damage to the Khuzestan Steel Company will require at least six months and up to one year to repair.[82] The Mobarakeh Steel Company separately announced on April 2 that strikes on the company have forced it to shut down its production lines.[83]
These wartime losses coincide with the regime’s internet shutdown, which has further exacerbated Iran’s economic strain by imposing substantial daily losses on commercial activity. An Iranian Chamber of Commerce official stated on April 14 that the internet shutdown is causing $30 to $40 million USD in “direct” daily losses and up to $80 million USD when including “indirect” losses, which he argued is equivalent to the destruction of multiple major infrastructure assets each day.[84] NetBlocks reported on April 14 that Iran’s nationwide internet blackout, now exceeding 46 days, severely disrupts financial transactions, commercial activity, and business operations.[85] NetBlocks estimates that the countrywide internet shutdown costs the Iranian economy over $37 million USD per day.[86]
[1] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2044067513625936190/photo/1
[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vplvW0aBawM ; https://x.com/Southcom/status/2026779244504687043/video/1
[3] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/how-the-u-s-navy-is-blockading-the-strait-of-hormuz-to-choke-off-irans-ports-0a3f9784?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1
[4] https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156893/Signs-of-scramble-from-Iran-linked-ships-amid-US-blockade
[5] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-14/us-sanctioned-tanker-tests-trump-blockade-with-hormuz-transit
[6] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-sanctioned-chinese-tanker-passes-strait-hormuz-despite-us-blockade-data-shows-2026-04-14/
[7] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-sanctioned-chinese-tanker-passes-strait-hormuz-despite-us-blockade-data-shows-2026-04-14/
[8] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2044067513625936190/photo/1
[9] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-allow-waiver-iran-oil-expire-administration-sources-say-2026-04-14/
[10] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-allow-waiver-iran-oil-expire-administration-sources-say-2026-04-14/
[11] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-allow-waiver-iran-oil-expire-administration-sources-say-2026-04-14/
[12] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-allow-waiver-iran-oil-expire-administration-sources-say-2026-04-14/
[13] https://x.com/miadmaleki/status/2043456550929375596?sort_replies=likes
[14] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-14/iran-weighs-pausing-its-hormuz-shipping-to-avoid-derailing-talks
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-13-2026/; https://x.com/miadmaleki/status/2043456550929375596?s=20
[16] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-us-strait-of-hormuz-blockade-25fbd430
[17] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-us-strait-of-hormuz-blockade-25fbd430
[18] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-us-strait-of-hormuz-blockade-25fbd430
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/houthi-escalation-calculus-following-cautious-entry-into-the-iran-war/; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-cost-of-inaction-in-yemen/
[20] https://nypost.com/2026/04/14/us-news/president-trump-tells-the-post-us-iran-talks-could-be-happening-over-next-two-days/
[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-begins-iran-port-blockade-oil-prices-ease-hopes-dialogue-2026-04-14/
[22] https://www.foxnews.com/media/jd-vance-says-ball-in-irans-court-after-pakistan-peace-talks-stall
[23] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/13/us/politics/us-iran-deal.html
[24] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/13/us/politics/us-iran-deal.html
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-10-2026/
[26] https://x.com/EpicFuryMap/status/2044094972882800716 ; https://twitter.com/EpicFuryMap/status/2044094977588732394
[27] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/FINAL%20-%20The%20Tharallah%20Headquarters%20Unveiled%20JAN%2026.pdf
[28] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/FINAL%20-%20The%20Tharallah%20Headquarters%20Unveiled%20JAN%2026.pdf
[29] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Irans-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf?x97961
[30] https://x.com/EpicFuryMap/status/2044080390231457973 ; https://twitter.com/FSeifikaran/status/2033623387227013229
[31] https://x.com/EpicFuryMap/status/2044046877750898694 ;
https://x.com/EpicFuryMap/status/2044046872289878162 ;
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[34] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2043970018111541251
[35] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2043970018111541251
[36] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2043970018111541251
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[39] https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-peace-talks-us-blockade-irans-ports-day-2/#post-update-59890673
[40] https://www.axios.com/2026/04/14/iran-war-peace-talks-rubio-israel-lebanon-ambassadors
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[51] https://almanar dot com.lb/article/756252/
[52] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-warns-of-possible-increased-hezbollah-rocket-attacks-in-coming-hours/
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[58] https://www.armyrecognition.com/archives/archives-land-defense/land-defense-2024/is-iran-ready-to-export-the-paveh-long-range-cruise-missile-to-russia ; https://israel-alma dot org/iranian-paveh-cruise-missile-351-supplied-to-lebanese-hezbollah/
[59] https://israel-alma dot org/iranian-paveh-cruise-missile-351-supplied-to-lebanese-hezbollah/ ;
[60] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2044092951920304134
[61] https://t.me/manniefabian/57740 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2043602558418121108
[62] https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/2044014269268635776 ; https://t.me/BenTzionM/7424
[63] https://t.me/BenTzionM/7424
[64] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2044097413590245795 ; https://www.idf dot il/337602
[65] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2044000040268558568?s=20 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/29917
[66] lxvi https://time.com/archive/6939518/surveying-the-damage-in-bint-jbeil/ ; https://t.me/manniefabian/57741
[67] https://t.me/manniefabian/57741
[68] https://time.com/archive/6939518/surveying-the-damage-in-bint-jbeil/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-3-2024/
[69] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-military-will-have-full-control-south-lebanon-town-within-days-says-2026-04-13/
[70] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2044026754898055252?s=20 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2044026766008721593 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2044026778079924442
[71] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2044026754898055252?s=20 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2044026766008721593 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2044026778079924442
[72] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2044041408663740742
[73] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2044089807769424336
[74] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2044089807769424336
[75] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2044089807769424336
[76] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2044089807769424336
[77] https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64263 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64249 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64256 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64273 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64275 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64276 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64278 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64294 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64295 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64297 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64298 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64307 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64298 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64314 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64315 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64316 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64317 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64319 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64336 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64344 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64346 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64350 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64356 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64370 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64383 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64386 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64396 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64403 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64411 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64422 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64430 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64433 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64443 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64450 ;
https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/64473
[78] https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/63176 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2042221963385426273; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2042221963385426273
[79] https://x.com/TavaanaTech/status/2043756305588826443 ;
https://vista dot ir/n/tabnak/vd9kl
[80] https://www.eghtesadnews dot com/بخش-اخبار-اقتصادی-67/780400-بانک-مرکزی-در-دوراهی-تورم-بقا-کدام-مسیر-عقلانی-تر-است-دوران-جنگ-زمان-جراحی-های-اقتصادی-نیست
[81] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-28-2026/
[82] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/307049 ; https://twitter.com/ariel_oseran/status/2039696649392377924
[83] https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1153657
[84] https://fararu dot com/video/بخش-جامعه-101/962763-خسارت-هر-روز-قطعی-اینترنت-به-اندازه-تخریب-چند-پل-b1-یا-چند-نیروگاه-برق-است
[85] https://x.com/netblocks/status/2043956543188562293?s=20[86] https://netblocks.org/cost/
