Toplines

The Iranian regime is attempting to re-assert its control over the Strait of Hormuz by deploying mines and re-cultivating international perceptions about the threat to vessels in the strait after US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it had cleared mines in the strait. CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper announced on August 27 that US forces successfully removed the mines that Iran previously laid in the Strait of Hormuz’s internationally recognized traffic separation scheme.[1] Cooper’s announcement undermines the regime’s ability to use the threat of mines as an element of Iran’s strategy to disrupt traffic through the strait since the regime effectively “closed” the strait in March 2026.[2] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has pointed to the threat of mines that it placed along the internationally recognized traffic separation scheme as a means to force vessels into Iranian territorial waters and therefore make them liable to Iranian regulations and service fees. The elimination of one of Iran‘s mechanisms for sustaining the perception that the strait is “closed” directly challenges Iran‘s assertion that it controls the strait and risks hindering Iran’s ability to secure sovereignty over the strait, which is one of Iran’s war aims.[3]

Iran has responded to US CENTCOM’s announcement by taking actions that are intended to intimidate global shipping firms and reinforce Iranian “control.” Regime media has attempted to intimidate global shipping firms by repeatedly denying CENTCOM’s assertions that US forces have demined the strait.[4] The IRGC Navy claimed on August 31 that two sea mines stopped a supertanker attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz through what the IRGC deemed the “illegal route.”[5] CENTCOM denied that any ships have struck Iranian mines in the strait.[6]

Iran also attempted to re-deploy mines in the strait on August 30. CENTCOM announced that US forces struck two Iranian rocket launchers on Larak Island after observing the IRGC prepare to launch mines into the strait.[7] These strikes are the first US strikes in Iran since July 29.[8] This instance is also the first observed Iranian attempt in this war to deploy mines through a shore-based delivery method. The IRGC Navy exhibited a launcher that fired mobile mines from Fajr 5 rockets from the Iranian coast into the sea during a naval exercise in January 2025.[9] Fajr 5 rockets have a range of approximately 75 kilometers.[10]

Iranian forces’ suboptimal methods to intimidate ships in the strait suggest that Iranian forces are adapting under military constraints that are limiting Iran’s ability to threaten vessels. Iran’s use of missile launchers instead of fast attack craft (FAC) to lay mines in the strait on August 30 suggests that military constraints are forcing Iran to adopt less optimal means to lay mines. Iran has historically deployed FAC to mine the strait, which is a more precise method than firing mine-loaded projectiles.[11] The use of a shore-based delivery system may suggest that Iranian forces assess that deploying FAC for mine-laying operations exposes those vessels to unacceptable risk, especially after CENTCOM’s July 2026 airstrikes that destroyed more than 60 IRGC FAC near and in the Strait of Hormuz. CENTCOM also targeted other Iranian capabilities that supported Iran‘s disruptive activities in the strait, including coastal radar sites, anti-ship missile capabilities, drone launch sites, and command-and-control networks.[12]

Iran is also reportedly using FAC to surveil ships in the strait rather than through coastal radar systems. The head of a risk advisory firm stated on August 30 that the IRGC is using FAC to identify ships transiting the strait by physically approaching and reading the names of ships.[13] Such an approach suggests that the IRGC Navy may be unable to rely upon traditional coastal radar systems due to the degradation of these systems. Unspecified US officials told Axios on August 19 that CENTCOM’s campaign to degrade Iran‘s radar and maritime surveillance systems has diminished visibility of the traffic in the southern transit route and that Iran‘s ability to monitor traffic has been limited to “a few radars“ and some FAC.[14] These reports also suggest that Iran may have developed a rudimentary and suboptimal find, fix, and finish alternative targeting cycle using its radar and missile assets during the respite from US airstrikes since July 2026. Such a targeting cycle requires forces to detect and identify a specific threat (find), track and pinpoint its exact location in time and space to prevent escape (fix), and deploy military options to capture, neutralize, or destroy the target (finish).[15]

The Iranian regime attacked US bases in the region and claimed attacks on other bases in order to deter the United States and its allies from undermining Iranian control of the strait and isolating Iran economically. Iran responded to CENTCOM’s strikes on Larak Island by launching ballistic missiles and drones at the King Hussein and Muwaffaq Salti air bases in Jordan on August 30.[16] The Jordanian army intercepted eight missiles. US officials stated that nearly all incoming munitions were intercepted and that there were no significant impacts on the bases.[17] Regime media reported on August 31 that Iranian forces launched dozens of drones on US troops at Al Minhad Air Base in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and claimed multiple direct hits.[18] The UAE intercepted a drone over Emirati territorial waters but denied that any Iranian missiles struck the UAE.[19] The UAE announced on August 18 that it would halt all trade and financial transactions with Iran.[20]

Iran’s attacks on the US bases are the latest iteration of Iran’s established response calculus in which it responds to any US efforts to restore maritime navigation by targeting US bases.[21] Regime-affiliated media outlet Nour News argued on August 31 that Iran’s recent strikes against Jordan demonstrate the limits of US reliance on geographic distance for force protection, which is part of the regime’s broader efforts to isolate the United States from its partners in the region.[22] The same outlet separately argued on August 31 that Iran was not trying to defeat the United States militarily but rather raise the costs of the conflict enough to cause US officials to concede.[23] This argument is consistent with Iran’s attempts to deter the United States from undermining Iran’s efforts in the strait by claiming multiple successful attacks on US bases.[24]   

The Iranian regime is demonstrating increasing concern that worsening economic conditions could trigger renewed anti-regime protests and is expanding preventive measures to deter and suppress possible unrest. Regime officials have warned that economic grievances could fuel unrest, expanded internal security preparations, and increased pressure on suspected protest networks in recent weeks.[25] Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei warned on August 31 that the Iranian judiciary, Law Enforcement Command (LEC), intelligence services, and security forces are at their “highest level of readiness” and that the judiciary will act “more decisively than ever” against individuals who attempt to instigate unrest or undermine security.[26] Ejei also claimed that officials broadly agree on the need to strengthen security and decisively confront “anti-security elements” from within Iran.[27] Ejei’s remarks are an indicator that the regime increasingly views renewed protests as a plausible internal security threat and is trying to deter citizens frustrated with Iran’s weak economy from mobilizing into broader anti-regime movements. Ejei similarly instructed prosecutors amid electricity and gas shortages in December 2024 ahead of economically motivated protests to coordinate directly with intelligence, security, and LEC agencies to take measures to strengthen public security and act with “greater firmness” against efforts to create insecurity.[28]

Iran’s deteriorating economy is generating potential triggers for renewed unrest, but the regime has limited ability to address these problems, especially under the US economic campaign to isolate Iran.[29] Iranian foreign trade has fallen by 35 percent and annual inflation has risen to 66 percent as of August 26, according to Iranian government officials and Western media.[30] Iranian parliamentarians criticized Central Bank Governor Abdol Nasser Hemmati on August 31 over the instability of Iran’s exchange rate.[31] Iran also faces an acute gasoline shortage as a result of the US blockade on Iranian ports that has prevented Iran from importing refined oil and exporting non-refined oil. Some regime elements are calling for the regime to increase gas prices.[32] Iranian officials are likely reticent to significantly raise the cost of fuel because a gasoline price increase triggered nationwide protests in 2019.[33] The Winter 2025-2026 protests similarly began amid the Iranian rial’s collapse and worsening economic conditions.[34] The regime’s concerns about potential unrest do not necessarily mean that senior decisionmakers will change course in order to relieve economic pressure, however. ISW-CTP assessed on August 21 that IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and other anti-concession officials may tolerate greater domestic instability because they may calculate that the regime can suppress renewed protests as it has previously done in the December 2025 to January 2026 protests.[35]

Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are conditioning their disarmament on several conditions that the militias likely recognize the Iraqi federal government will not be able to implement, which underscores the militias’ intentions to resist disarmament. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada published 10 conditions for its disarmament on August 29 that include the full withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, the “liberation” of Iraqi political and economic decision-making from US “hegemony,” the withdrawal of Turkish forces from northern Iraq, and the expulsion of anti-Iranian regime Kurdish groups from Iraqi Kurdistan.[36] Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri reiterated these demands at a memorial ceremony for Shia cleric Mohammad Baqir al Hakim on August 30.[37] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that includes Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, released a similar list of preconditions on August 17.[38] It is unclear if the Badr Organization is also conditioning its disarmament on the Iraqi federal government meeting these demands or if Ameri is merely echoing Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada’s demands. Ameri has played a key role in supporting the Iraqi government’s disarmament efforts in recent months.[39][40]

Iran likely pressured these militias to condition their disarmament on the Iraqi federal government expelling Iranian Kurdish opposition groups to further incentivize the Iraqi government to crack down on these groups. The Iranian regime perceives anti-regime Kurdish groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan to be a direct security threat. Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have previously echoed Iran’s view of the Iraqi Kurdistan region as a base for Israel and Kurdish opposition groups to cooperate and launch attacks against Iran but have not previously demanded the expulsion of these groups until August 29.[41] The inclusion of this demand comes just over a week after several senior Iranian officials, including Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, met with Iraqi officials in Baghdad on August 19 and 20. Iranian officials likely discussed Iranian Kurdish groups in Iraq with their Iraqi counterparts during the meetings, particularly given that the Iranian government has urged the Iraqi federal government to take stronger action against anti-regime Kurdish groups in Iraqi Kurdistan in recent months.[42] An unnamed Kurdish politician and an Iraqi official told UK-based, Qatari-owned media on May 26 that senior Iranian officials, including IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, demanded that the Iraqi federal government remove all Iranian Kurdish opposition groups from Iraqi territory.[43] Iran may calculate that the Iraqi government is more willing to crack down and disarm anti-regime Iranian Kurdish groups as part of a disarmament deal with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.