Toplines
Russia is increasingly centralizing drone procurement for its Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), which will likely have both positive and negative consequences. A Russian milblogger claimed on April 13 that there is a “new rule” that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Directorate for Advanced Interservice Research and Special Projects will no longer issue drones to all frontline units.[1] The milblogger claimed that the Russian MoD will now only provide drones to the USF and that USF commander Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Vaganov will personally oversee the distribution. The milblogger accused Vaganov of being involved in military corruption and claimed that the new rule will create a drone “famine” in regular units.[2] ISW cannot independently confirm the milblogger’s claims, but the reported new rule would be consistent with Russia’s continued effort to centralize informal specialized drone units and its drone procurement and distribution system.[3] Centralized control over drone distribution may allow Russian forces to more heavily concentrate drones and to supply more trained personnel in select areas of the front, but may also hamper their ability to innovate quickly.[4] This new system will likely create a state monopoly over procurement, allowing for more corruption and eroding the volunteer-based procurement movement.[5]
The Russian State Duma adopted a law on April 14 that allows Russian President Vladimir Putin to authorize the use of the Russian Armed Forces overseas to defend “Russian citizens” being prosecuted in international or foreign national courts.[6] BBC’s Russian Service noted on April 14 that the phrasing of the law suggests that it does not apply to all Russian citizens arrested overseas.[7] BBC noted that it applies only to Russian citizens who are being prosecuted in international or national courts “vested with powers” by foreign states without Russian participation or by international bodies whose authority does not derive either from Russian international treaties or a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution adopted to implement powers provided for in Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter. The text of the law is likely purposefully vague, and it is unclear how Russian President Vladimir Putin would employ Russian forces in such a scenario.
The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to increase its production capabilities but is unable to achieve its maximum potential without further investment. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 14 that Ukraine produces most of the weapons Ukrainian forces use in all types of operations.[8] Zelensky added that the Ukrainian DIB could produce twice as much as it is producing today, but that insufficient funding is preventing this. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s partners stand to benefit from continuing to invest in the Ukrainian DIB as Ukraine seeks self-sufficiency and is increasingly able to export technology and weapons to partners.[9]
Ukraine’s European partners continue to strengthen Ukraine’s air defense capabilities while increasing joint production cooperation. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 14 that Ukraine and Germany signed 10 bilateral agreements, including an agreement to restart intergovernmental consultations between the Ukrainian president and German chancellor.[10] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Raytheon reported that Germany will finance a Raytheon contract with MBDA Deutschland worth 3.2 billion euros (about $3.7 billion) to supply several hundred GEM-T missiles for Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine.[11] Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated that Germany will also provide 36 IRIS-T air defense system launchers and will invest 300 million euros (roughly $354 million) in Ukrainian long-range strike weapons production.[12] Ukraine and Germany will also launch joint production of mid-strike drones using artificial intelligence (AI). Fedorov announced that Ukraine and Germany will exchange combat data to develop new technology and will start joint projects to analyze German weapons use on the battlefield.[13] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s expanding defense industrial cooperation with partners such as Germany will strengthen both Ukraine’s and Europe’s defense industrial bases (DIBs), as Ukraine’s accelerated wartime innovation cycle enables partners to bolster their own defenses and domestic DIBs.[14]
Key Takeaways
- Russia is increasingly centralizing drone procurement for its Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), which will likely have both positive and negative consequences.
- The Russian State Duma adopted a law on April 14 that allows Russian President Vladimir Putin to authorize the use of the Russian Armed Forces overseas to defend “Russian citizens” being prosecuted in international or foreign national courts.
- The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to increase its production capabilities but is unable to achieve its maximum potential without further investment.
- Ukraine’s European partners continue to strengthen Ukraine’s air defense capabilities while increasing joint production cooperation.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on April 14.
- Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian radar systems in Belgorod Oblast. Russian forces launched four cruise missiles and 129 drones against Ukraine.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian radar systems in Belgorod Oblast on April 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian radar station belonging to an airspace control system near Nikolayevka (roughly 43 kilometers from the international border) and a Kasta-2E radar station near Lubyanoye-Pervoye, Belgorod Oblast (roughly 80 kilometers from the international border) on April 13.[15]
Damage from Ukrainian strikes continues to hinder Russian oil exports from the port of Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai. Bloomberg reported on April 14, citing satellite imagery and people familiar with shipping data, that the two largest berths at the Sheskharis terminal in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, have yet to resume loadings following Ukrainian strikes overnight on April 5 to 6.[16] Two sources familiar with the port’s operations told Reuters on April 10 that Russia resumed oil and fuel loadings from the oil terminal on April 9 after a week-long suspension.[17]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces recently infiltrated in northern Sumy Oblast.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 14 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions and servicemembers south of Varachyne (north of Sumy City) in what ISW assesses were infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[18] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Sumy direction reported on April 14 that Russian forces attempted to conduct this mission by moving through a gas pipe in roughly platoon strength.[19]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Prokhody and most of Stepok (both east of Sumy City).[20] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Myropilske (east of Sumy City on the international border), west of Popivka, and southwest of Vysoke (both southeast of Sumy City).[21]
Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Korchakivka, northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, east of Sumy City near Turya and Marine, and toward Velykyi Prykil and Prokhody; and southeast of Sumy City near Novodmytrivka, Mykhailivka, and Ryasne and toward Taratutyne on April 13 and 14.[22]
The Ukrainian 14th Army Corps (AC) reported on April 13 that Ukrainian forces moved to new prepared positions near Myropilske (east of Sumy City on the international border) due to “intensive combat operations” and Russian numerical superiority.[23] Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on April 14 that Russian forces advanced near Myropilske.[24] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 10 that Russian forces seized Myropilske.[25]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[26]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 14 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Verkhnya Pysarivka, south of Vovchansk, and marginally south of Vovchanski Khutory (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[27]
Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Veterynarne and northeast of Kharkiv City near Zybyne, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Lyman, Synelnykove, Volokhivka, Okhrimivka, and Starytsya on April 13 and 14.[28]
Russian forces conducted guided glide bomb strikes against the Pechenihy Reservoir Dam on April 14. Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian forces targeted the Pechenihy Reservoir Dam with six guided glide bombs on April 14.[29] The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps (AC) reported on April 14 that four bombs struck the ground near hydrotechnical structures at the dam and that two hit the water in the reservoir.[30] The corps reported that the bombs failed to damage the dam itself and that Ukrainian authorities conducted controlled discharges of water from the dam. The corps stated that the strike was an attempt to flood the area as the water level of the reservoir is highest during the spring. The corps added that Russian-controlled Telegram channels purportedly from Kharkiv Oblast spread disinformation about a breach of the dam. ISW previously assessed that Russian strikes against the Pechenihy Reservoir Dam are part of a battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[31]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on April 14.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 14 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself and southeast of Kupyansk toward Novoosynove, Kurylivka, and Kivsharivka on April 13 and 14.[32]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) shelled a Ukrainian ammunition depot in Kurylivka.[33] Elements of the 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[34]
Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Borova toward Novoplatonivka on April 13 and 14 but did not advance.[35]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on April 14 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 14 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Kalenyky (east of Slovyansk).[36]
Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Stavky; southeast of Lyman toward Ozerne; south of Lyman near Dibrova; east of Slovyansk near Kalenyky and Kryva Luka and toward Riznykivka and Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Fedorivka Druha and Nykyforivka on April 13 and 14.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dibrova, Fedorivka Druha, Drobysheve, Nykyforivka, and Yarova (northwest of Lyman).[38]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Shrama Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are shelling Ukrainian positions near Ozerne and striking and shelling Ukrainian infantry northwest of Kalenyky.[39] Elements of the 85th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating toward Rai-Oleksandrivka.[40] Elements of the 123rd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating in the northern Slovyansk direction.[41] Elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[42] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in the Lyman direction.[43]
Russian forces recently infiltrated in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 8 and March 26 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions south of and in the southern outskirts of Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[44] Geolocated footage published on April 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position north of Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the FEBA at this time.[45] Geolocated footage published on March 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position west of Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the FEBA at this time.[46]
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka toward Novodmytrivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka and toward Tykhonivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Stepanivka; west of Kostyantynivka toward Dovha Balka; northeast of Druzhkivka near Pryvillya; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka, Pavlivka, and Novopavlivka on April 13 and 14.[47]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian drone pilot positions in Kostyantynivka.[48] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novohryhorivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[49] Drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian infantry in the Kostyantynivka direction.[50] Artillery and reconnaissance elements of the 77th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[51] Drone operators of the Burevestnik detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drone launch points in the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka direction.[52]
Russian forces recently infiltrated in the Dobropillya tactical area.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 13 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers east of Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[53]
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Dorozhnie on April 13 and 14.[54]
The Russian military command is reportedly employing servicemembers of tank battalions as infantry replacements. A Russian milblogger amplified on April 14 a letter reportedly from a subscriber that claims that the tank battalion of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) almost never uses tanks in combat and that the Russian military command instead takes two soldiers from each battalion’s company every two to three weeks to support infantry assaults and drone operators.[55] The subscriber noted that companies of the battalion no longer have their assigned three platoons in reality due to casualties suffered during assaults. ISW last observed elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade operating in the Dobropillya direction as of December 24, 2025.[56]
Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 439th Motorized Rifle Regiment (under the operational control of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[57] Elements of the 177th Separate Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Dobropillya direction.[58]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 14 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Serhiivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Molodetske on April 13 and 14.[59]
Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bilytske.[60] Elements of the 12th Engineering Brigade (CMD) are reportedly operating in Pokrovsk.[61]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 14 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka on April 13 and 14.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novopavlivka itself.[63]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on April 14 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into southern Novoselivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[64]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai; east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad and Sichneve; and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Kalynivske, Vorone, Zlahoda, and Novohryhorivka and toward Velykomykhailivka on April 13 and 14.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Sichneve and Voskresenka (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[66]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 14 that Ukrainian forces conducted a SCALP-EG missile and GBU-39 guided bomb strike on a Russian strike drone storage facility near Donetsk Airport in occupied Donetsk Oblast (roughly 110 kilometers from the front line).[67] Geolocated footage posted on April 14 confirms that the strike resulted in multiple explosions.[68]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on April 14 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself, northwest of Hulyaipole near Pryluky and toward Vozdvyzhivka, Kosivtseve, and Verkhnya Tersa, southwest of Hulyaipole near Hulyaipilske and toward Charivne, and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and Hirke on April 13 and 14.[69]
Russian forces reportedly violated the April 12 to 13 Orthodox Easter ceasefire in the Hulyaipole direction. An officer of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on April 14 that Russian forces did not cease operations during the ceasefire and continued to target Ukrainian forces attempting to evacuate the bodies of dead soldiers.[70]
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Dolynka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[71]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 14 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Konovalova and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk on April 13 and 14.[72]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces north of Orikhiv.[73] Drone operators from the 104th and 7th airborne (VDV) divisions are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Orikhiv direction.[74] Elements of the 11th VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[75]
Ukrainian forces continued mid-range strikes against Russian military and logistics assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Azovske (roughly 94 kilometers from the frontline).[76] A Ukrainian regiment reported on April 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian logistics depot and hub and a tanker truck in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast overnight on April 13.[77] Geolocated footage published on April 13 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian tanker truck in occupied Osypenko (roughly 93 kilometers from the frontline).[78]
Russian forces continued limited ground operations east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge and southwest of Kherson City toward Bilohrudyi Island on April 13 and 14 but did not advance.[79]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian communications infrastructure in the Kherson direction.[80]
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Nebo-U radar station in Feodosia (roughly 240 kilometers from the frontline).[81]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from occupied Donetsk Oblast; and 129 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones – of which about 90 were Shaheds – from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[82] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed one Kh-59/69 cruise missile and 114 drones, that 12 drones struck eight locations, and that drone debris fell on five locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that it is still collecting information about the three remaining launched Kh-59/69 missiles. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential and administrative infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Sumy cities and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[83] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces struck civilian and port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast, damaging two civilian vessels operating under the Panamanian and Liberian flags.[84] Ukrainian officials also reported that a Russian missile struck civilian infrastructure in Dnipro City, killing at least five civilians and injuring at least 25 others.[85]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/romanov_92/52252
[2] https://t.me/romanov_92/52137; https://t.me/romanov_92/52252
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-efforts-to-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations-2/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-efforts-to-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations-2/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-efforts-to-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations-2/
[6] https://sozd dot duma.gov.ru/bill/1181659-8
[7] https://sozd dot duma.gov.ru/bill/1181659-8; https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cm2502lelp5o
[8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2cBFKiHON4; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-economy/4112370-mozlivosti-virobnictva-ukrainskoi-zbroi-vdvici-bilsi-niz-vikoristovue-derzava-zelenskij.html
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2026/
[10] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18656 ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/zayava-prezidenta-ukrayini-pid-chas-spilnogo-z-federalnim-ka-103833 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2044078004478021838?s=20 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2044078009779433684 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18659 ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/upershe-za-ponad-20-rokiv-ukrayina-ta-nimechchina-proveli-mi-103853 ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/ukrayina-j-nimechchina-uklali-10-dokumentiv-na-riznih-rivnya-103841
[11] ; https://www.rtx.com/news/news-center/2026/04/14/rtxs-raytheon-to-deliver-patriot-interceptors-to-ukraine ; https://mod.gov dot ua/en/news/hundreds-of-patriot-missiles-300-million-for-deep-strike-capabilities-and-thousands-of-mid-strike-drones-ukraine-and-germany-sign-a-package-of-defence-agreements
[12] https://t.me/zedigital/6729
[13] https://t.me/zedigital/6730 ; https://mod.gov dot ua/en/news/ukraine-and-germany-sign-a-memorandum-on-defence-data-exchange
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-March-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-March-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2026/
[15] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37294
[16] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-13/russia-s-crude-exports-from-top-black-sea-port-remain-limited; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2026/
[18] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11687; https://t.me/immitis71/1741
[19] https://t.me/immitis71/1741
[20] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71785
[21] https://t.me/rybar/79496; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41879
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37272; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37274; https://t.me/wargonzo/33507; https://t.me/rybar/79496; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71785; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4112224-boi-trivaut-bila-marinogo-tregubov-pidtverdiv-so-rosiani-prosunulisa-na-sumsini.html
[23] https://t.me/Corpsarmy/866
[24] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4112224-boi-trivaut-bila-marinogo-tregubov-pidtverdiv-so-rosiani-prosunulisa-na-sumsini.html
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2026/
[26] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/1365
[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41879
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37272; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37274; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37296; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20453; https://t.me/severnnyi/7558; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41879; https://t.me/dva_majors/91257; https://t.me/rybar/79498; https://t.me/wargonzo/33507
[29] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1288837-sinegubov-sist-kerovanih-aviabomb-vorog-napraviv-na-pecenizku-dambu/
[30] https://t.me/corpsarmy16/2430
[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37272; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37274; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37296; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20453; https://t.me/gvZapad/18307; https://t.me/wargonzo/33507;
[33] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2043868759765700756; https://t.me/operationall_space/10862
[34] https://t.me/gvZapad/18310
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37272; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37274; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20453
[36] https://t.me/rybar/79499
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37272 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37274 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37296 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20453 ; https://t.me/gvZapad/18307 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/91257 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/04/14/ochikuye-protyvnyk-negody-na-slovyanskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-zbyrayutsya-organizuvaty-motokros-samogubcziv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIRlElzXDTk ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33507
[38] https://t.me/gvZapad/18307 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/91257
[39] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2043825990212993380; https://t.me/specnazahmat/2072 ; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2043825990212993380; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6502
[40] https://t.me/motopatriot78/50640 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50646
[41] https://t.me/rybar/79499
[42] https://t.me/gvZapad/18309
[43] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/1366
[44] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2043593413170253960; https://www.instagram.com/striga.17csp/reel/DVnqGomilcf/; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2043593437526548574?s=20 ; https://www.instagram.com/striga.17csp/reel/DW9P-MBiqNN/
[45] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2043593453611749458; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2043593450260517356; https://www.instagram.com/striga.17csp/reel/DW9P-MBiqNN/
[46] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2043593426495520828; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2043593429720998142 https://www.instagram.com/striga.17csp/reel/DWL-spIisXJ/
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37272; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37274; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37296; https://t.me/sashakots/61095 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41845; https://t.me/dva_majors/91257 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50638; https://t.me/wargonzo/33507 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/04/14/ochikuye-protyvnyk-negody-na-slovyanskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-zbyrayutsya-organizuvaty-motokros-samogubcziv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIRlElzXDTk
[48] https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/32439; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2044027644199530942
[49] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15238
[50] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15236
[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/91252
[52] https://t.me/mod_russia/62646
[53] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2043838556573995026; https://t.me/bureviy_brigade/5064
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37272; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37274; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37296; https://t.me/wargonzo/33507
[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71788
[56] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2025/
[57] https://t.me/dva_majors/91263; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50640
[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/62646
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37272; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37274; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37296; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41847; https://t.me/wargonzo/33507
[60] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15239
[61] https://t.me/mod_russia/62653
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37272 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37274
[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41865
[64] https://t.me/motopatriot78/50637
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37272; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13716; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37274; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37296; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13724; https://t.me/z_arhiv/33406; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50637; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41865
[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41865
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37295
[68] https://x.com/RALee85/status/2044020549555253756?s=20; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34889
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37272; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13716; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37274; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37296; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13724; https://t.me/dva_majors/91257; https://t.me/wargonzo/33507; https://t.me/voin_dv/19256
[70] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/14/pershymy-posylayut-lyudej-na-mylyczyah-poblyzu-gulyajpolya-vorog-namagayetsya-pidtrymuvaty-intensyvnist-nastupu/
[71] https://t.me/voin_dv/19259
[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37272; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13716; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37274; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37296; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13724; https://t.me/dva_majors/91257
[73] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/113060; https://t.me/dva_majors/91266
[74] https://t.me/mod_russia/62646; https://t.me/mod_russia/62659
[75] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41855
[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37295
[77] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/18HWgy3Ypr/; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1288943-na-tot-zaporizkoi-oblasti-operatori-sil-oboroni-zavdali-udariv-po-logistici-rosijskih-vijsk/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/13/sklad-hab-i-czysterna-na-okupovanomu-zaporizhzhi-urazyly-rosijsku-logistyku/
[78] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2043823631197720878; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2043679774493569262; https://x.com/413_raid/status/20436791682363 31249; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34891
[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37272; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13716 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37274 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37296 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13724
[80] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41855
[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37294
[82] https://t.me/kpszsu/59933
[83] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/61702 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/14/okupanty-zavdaly-udariv-po-adminbudivlyah-u-chernigovi-ye-postrazhdali/ ; https://t.me/chernihivrada/3559 ; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1288655-poskodzeni-bagatokvartirnij-budinok-ta-adminbudivla-naslidki-ataki-rf-po-centralnij-castini-cernigova/ ; https://t.me/bryzynskyi/4022 ; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1288637-e-vlucanna-v-adminbudivlu-rosijski-vijska-atakuvali-centr-cernigova/ ; https://t.me/vilkul/15787 ; https://t.me/vilkul/15788 ; https://t.me/synegubov/21080 ; https://t.me/serhii_kryvosheienko/1360 ; https://suspilne dot media/1288529-belgia-ta-ispania-nadadut-po-milardu-evro-ukraini-na-sumsini-sili-oboroni-perejsli-na-novi-pozicii-1511-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1776177666&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[84] https://t.me/odeskaODA/15398 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/14/okupanty-zavdaly-udariv-po-adminbudivlyah-u-chernigovi-ye-postrazhdali/ ; https://www.facebook.com/oda.odesa/posts/pfbid02gkjjcNxEEYa6WvE3KBAnJUzxydVsN2kYmgywuAyLBm88qbx3ENg11DSTcqdm4t6Fl?locale=uk_UA ; https://suspilne DOT media/odesa/1288585-rf-atakuvala-pivden-odesini-u-portu-poskodzeno-sudno-pid-praporom-panami/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/04/14/rosiya-atakuvala-port-na-odeshhyni-poshkodzheno-czyvilne-sudno-zagorilos-sto/ ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1288647-droni-rf-vlucili-u-civilne-sudno-ta-portovu-infrastrukturu-na-odesini/ ; https://t.me/MinDevUA/14960
[85] https://t.me/UA_National_Police/63910 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/28706 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/28709 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1288815-armia-rf-atakuvala-dnipro-raketou-cotiri-ludini-zaginuli-25-poranenih/ ; https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/36475 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/14/u-dnipri-vzhe-chetvero-zagyblyh-vnaslidok-rosijskogo-udaru-rosiyan/
