Toplines

Iran’s latest proposal in negotiations offers no concessions and represents an Iranian effort to end the war on Tehran’s terms. The proposal, according to unspecified officials familiar with the matter speaking to the Wall Street Journal and an Iranian political analyst close to the regime, centers on a three-stage plan.[1] In the first stage, the United States and Israel would commit to a permanent and guaranteed end to the war.[2] In the second stage, the United States and Iran would negotiate over the status of the Strait of Hormuz, and the United States would lift its blockade on Iranian ports.[3] Iran still aims to exert sovereignty over the Strait after the war by charging tolls on vessels passing the Strait and would seek to satisfy this demand in negotiations, according to the New York Times and Wall Street Journal.[4] In the third stage, Iran and the United States would begin negotiating over the nuclear issue.[5]

The proposal illustrates that Iran’s current decisionmaker, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, believes Iran is winning despite the serious damage Iran has suffered. This agreement satisfies Vahidi and his inner circle because it refuses to discuss the nuclear issue up front, and it demands nearly all of Iran’s key demands, like a permanent and guaranteed end to the war and sovereignty over the Strait. Officials in Tehran, likely Vahidi and his inner circle, ordered the Iranian negotiating team not to discuss nuclear issues during the Islamabad talks.[6] Vahidi likely hopes to extract concessions from the United States, like an end to the blockade, without offering any serious concessions in response. Vahidi would have very little incentive to offer concessions on the nuclear program in the third phase of this plan if the United States committed to permanently ending hostilities with Iran and lifting the blockade. Iran and the United States remain far apart on the nuclear issue. Iran demanded a temporary suspension of enrichment for five years and stockpile dilution in its April 25 proposal.[7] The United States has asked for a 20-year enrichment suspension period.[8]

The United States remains opposed to the most recent April 26 proposal because it failed to address both Iran’s nuclear program and enabled Iran to assert “control” over the Strait of Hormuz. US President Donald Trump was reportedly dissatisfied with Iran’s revised April 26 proposal as it did not address Iran’s nuclear program, according to administration officials speaking to Western media on April 27.[9] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Fox News on April 27 that the United States cannot tolerate Iran determining who uses an international waterway or charging for access.[10] Rubio’s comments, one day after the White House became aware of the Iranian proposal, represent implicit opposition to Iran’s proposal.

Iran’s growing challenges in storing and exporting its oil could be one mechanism by which Iranian calculations change in negotiations. A US Sanctions analyst at Foundation for Defense of Democracies assessed on April 12 that Iran had about 13 remaining days of usable oil storage, which he calculated based on 50 to 55 million barrels of total onshore storage that was 60% full on April 12.[11] Iran likely extended the number of days before its oil storage is full by using old oil tanks in poor condition. Iran reactivated a 30-year-old very large crude carrier (VLCC) during April to hold oil, for example.[12] The VLCC had been unused for three years.[13] Market intelligence firm Kpler assessed on April 27 that Iran has between 12 and 22 remaining days before its oil storage is full.[14] Kpler’s 12-day estimate assumes that not all storage tanks can be used, but the basis for that assumption is not clear. Iran has recently activated storage facilities that are suboptimal, but those storage facilities presumably have other costs for Iranian capacity and oil exports associated with them. US President Donald Trump posted on April 28 on Truth Social that Iran told the United States that it is in a “state of collapse” and that Iran wants an end to the US blockade as soon as possible.[15]

Iran faces significant pressure on other parts of its economy. Combined force strikes during the war, as well as Iran’s difficulties with storing and exporting oil, have had negative ripple effects on other sectors of Iran’s economy. Reuters reported on April 27 that combined force strikes, including strikes on major Iranian steel producers such as the Mobarakeh Steel Company and Khuzestan Steel Company, reportedly destroyed about 25 to 30 percent of Iran’s total steel output.[16] A chemical engineer working at one of Iran’s biggest private construction contractors told the Associated Press on April 28 that it had to shut down a project with Mobarakeh, which cost 1,000 jobs.[17] The son of an Iranian rugmaker told AP that around 80% of rug and carpet manufacturers have stopped operations in the industrial zone of Kashan, Esfahan Province, due to the plummet of Iranian exports during the war.[18] A US sanctions analyst assessed on April 27 that the US blockade has exacerbated Iran’s gasoline crisis by preventing Iran from importing gasoline to sufficiently address Iran’s fuel needs.[19] Gasoline shortages previously caused mass protests in 2019.[20] 

It is unclear, however, whether this pressure on Iran’s economy will cause Vahidi and his inner circle to make concessions to the United States. Vahidi is an ideologue who has served in various capacities in the regime since the revolution. His ideological nature means he is more likely to judge ultimate success on whether or not he upholds the precepts of the Islamic Revolution. General economic pain imposed on the populace is unlikely to seriously affect his calculus, therefore, unless such economic pain threatens his current position or the regime’s stability.[21]

Iran’s highest national security decision-making body is reportedly preparing for a potential protest wave as economic deterioration and social pressure intensify, according to anti-regime media. Anti-regime media reported on April 28 that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) convened a meeting chaired by SNSC Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr—a close ally of Vahidi—after intelligence assessments warned of a possible resumption of protests in the coming days.[22] Unspecified sources told anti-regime media that Iran’s security institutions expressed concern about potential protest calls and assessed that worsening economic conditions, such as inflation, unemployment, and rising prices, could trigger renewed unrest.[23] The report stated that security agencies presented a highly critical picture of Iran’s economy, citing shutdowns in the oil, petrochemical, and steel sectors, widespread unemployment partly driven by internet disruptions, and a broader halt in economic activity due to the closure of financial markets.[24] These assessments warned that Iran’s economy cannot withstand more than six to eight weeks of a naval blockade and that reconstruction of damaged industrial sectors could take years.[25] The SNSC coordinates and authorizes the regime’s protest response, while internal security forces execute the crackdown.[26] Former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the SNSC in January 2026 to crush the protests “by any means necessary.”[27]

Iran’s prolonged internet shutdown is also posing severe economic damage and accelerating unemployment, which likely increases pressure on regime stability. Iranian security institutions also assessed that approximately 20 percent of internet-dependent workers have lost their jobs and projected that up to two million additional private-sector workers could become unemployed by the end of spring.[28] An Iranian Chamber of Commerce official stated on April 14 that the internet shutdown is causing $30 to $40 million USD in “direct” daily losses and up to $80 million USD when including “indirect” losses, which he argued is equivalent to the destruction of multiple major infrastructure assets each day.[29] NetBlocks reported on April 28 that Iran’s nationwide internet blackout, now exceeding 60 days, had severely disrupted financial transactions, commercial activity, and business operations.[30] NetBlocks estimates that the countrywide internet shutdown costs the Iranian economy over $37 million USD per day.[31]

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf appears to be trying to retain political support and remain a key actor in negotiations despite prior signs of opposition from Vahidi and his inner circle. Two hundred and sixty-one Iranian Parliament members issued a statement on April 27 declaring support for Iran’s negotiating team and Ghalibaf.[32] Parliamentarians added that they trust the negotiating delegation, especially Ghalibaf, and expressed support for its defense of national interests.[33] This statement follows recent reports indicating that Ghalibaf has grown frustrated with internal divisions and has considered resigning from the negotiating delegation.[34] Some outlets have claimed that he has already resigned due to disagreements over nuclear concessions.[35] Ghalibaf publicly defended negotiations on Iranian state television on April 18, arguing that diplomacy with the United States, alongside military power, is necessary to secure Iran’s objectives.[36] Ghalibaf also criticized hardline officials, including SNSC member Saeed Jalili and hardline parliamentarian Amirhossein Sabeti, both affiliated with the ultraconservative Paydari (Stability) Front, for opposing negotiations.[37] Paydari Front–affiliated members of Parliament also did not sign the recent parliament statement.[38]

Infighting among hardline factions has escalated into a public media confrontation amid intra-regime competition over negotiations. Intra-regime power struggle between pragmatic hardliners and ultrahardliners indicates the absence of a decisive central arbiter, which has allowed factional disputes to unfold publicly. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim published an Op-Ed on April 24 and criticized negotiation expectations by arguing that talks aim to avoid war and its costs and must proceed based on the principles of “dignity, wisdom, and expediency.”[39] Tasnim warned that some actors raise “unrealistic expectations,” including full sanctions relief, a comprehensive ceasefire that includes the Axis of Resistance, long-term peace guarantees for Iran, and economic flourishing.[40] Tasnim warned that viewing negotiations through an “unrealistic expectations” lens reflects unrealistic wishful thinking. Ultraconservative Paydari (Stability) Front-affiliated Raja News accused Tasnim of downplaying the Supreme Leader’s red lines by framing these demands as unrealistic and argued that Tasnim’s proposed approach repeats the logic that led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action because Tasnim depicts core demands such as full sanctions relief and a lasting ceasefire as ”unattainable.” [41] Raja News suggested that this logic resulted in ”pure damage.”[42] The lack of a decisive central authority due to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s absence has likely allowed these disputes to escalate into the public domain rather than remain contained within regime channels.

Iran continues to cooperate with key US adversaries, such as Russia and China, as it prepares for a potential resumption of conflict with the United States and Israel. An Iranian defense delegation, including Defense Ministry Spokesperson Brigadier General Reza Talaei Nik, attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization defense ministerial summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on April 27 and 28.[43] The Iranian delegation held separate meetings with the Russian, Chinese, and Belarusian defense ministers on the sidelines of the summit.[44] Talaei Nik and Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov emphasized that Iran and Russia will continue to support each other “regardless of the situation.”[45] The SCO summit comes after Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasized the importance of Russo-Iranian strategic relations in a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg on April 27.[46] These meetings may be part of a broader Iranian effort to secure support ahead of a potential resumption of conflict with the United States and Israel. Russia helped support Iranian strikes in the Middle East throughout the war, such as by providing Iran with satellite imagery of US, Gulf, and Turkish military assets in the Middle East.[47]