Toplines
Ukrainian forces are engaged in an operational long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets, exploiting overstretched Russian air defenses. Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against targets throughout Russia, ranging up to 1,400 kilometers from the international border, on the night of April 28 to 29.[1] Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on April 29 that Ukrainian forces struck the Transeft Perm Linear Production Dispatch Station, Perm Oblast, causing fires to almost all oil storage tanks at the station.[2] The SBU reported that the station is a strategic hub for Russia’s oil pipeline system and distributes oil in all four directions, including to the Perm Oil Refinery. Geolocated footage published on April 29 shows fires at the dispatch station.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukrainian Navy also struck the sanctioned Marquise oil tanker using unmanned service vehicles (USVs) 210 kilometers southeast of Tuapse, Krasnodar Krai, in the Black Sea.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Marquise was flying under the Cameroonian flag, had a carrying capacity of over 37,000 tons, and was traveling without cargo — likely waiting for loading at sea from another vessel. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi posted geolocated footage and reported that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian Mi-28 and two Mi-17 helicopters refueling at a field landing site in Voronezh Oblast, 150 kilometers from the frontline.[5] Geolocated footage published on April 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely also conducted strikes targeting the Orsk Oil Refinery in Orenburg Oblast (roughly 1,300 kilometers from the international border).[6]
ISW has observed geolocated evidence that Ukrainian forces conducted at least 18 strikes against Russian oil infrastructure and at least 41 strikes against Russian military assets in at least 19 Russian federal subjects in April 2026. Ukrainian forces have been steadily increasing the range, volume, and intensity of their long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia and occupied Ukraine’s territories since March 2026.[7] Ukrainian forces are exploiting the large attack surface of Russia’s deep rear and overstretched Russian oil infrastructure and military assets, supported by increased Ukrainian domestic drone production.[8] Ukrainian long-range strikes also continue to have outsized impacts on Russian oil exports, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stating on April 29 that Ukrainian strikes have left the port of Primorsk, Leningrad Oblast, operating at 13 percent below capacity; the port of Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, at 38 percent below capacity; and the port of Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast, at 43 percent below capacity.[9]
Russian President Vladimir Putin used his April 29 phone call with US President Donald Trump to reiterate his commitment to his original war aims and promote his cognitive warfare effort, falsely portraying Ukraine’s defenses as collapsing and Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable. Ukraine has largely stymied Russian advances across the frontline, blunting the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive thus far.[10] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed on April 29 that the Trump-Putin call lasted for 1.5 hours and that Putin briefed Trump on the current state of the war in Ukraine, claiming that Russia holds the strategic initiative and is “pushing back” Ukrainian positions and that Russia will achieve its war goals “in any case” but would prefer to achieve these goals diplomatically.[11] Putin and other Kremlin officials have consistently attempted to portray Ukraine as the intransigent party in peace negotiations for refusing to capitulate to Putin’s demands, despite Russia’s failure to offer meaningful concessions in return, and Putin again reiterated this point to Trump on April 29.[12] Putin again asserted that Russia is performing well on the battlefield in order to justify his demand for Ukrainian capitulation. The premise of Putin’s claim remains false, however. Ukrainian forces continue to deny Russian significant advances in several sectors of the frontline, including in Russia’s priority objective of Donetsk Oblast, and are imposing increasing costs and casualties on Russian forces for these continued offensive operations.[13] Ukraine has conducted significant counterattacks in southern Ukraine since January 2026 that have generated operational-level effects across the theater.[14] Russians are increasingly feeling the costs of the war as Russia’s economy continues to face significant challenges, casualties continue to mount, and recruitment becomes more difficult.[15] The Kremlin is very likely attempting to mitigate some of these costs by attempting to convince Trump and the West to push Ukraine to capitulate in a way that Russia’s full-scale invasion has failed to do and is obfuscating its own military and economic failures as part of this effort.
Putin also proposed to Trump a short-term ceasefire for Russia’s May 9 Victory Day holiday, which celebrates the Soviet Union’s role in the victory over Germany in the Second World War.[16] Putin has unilaterally announced numerous ceasefires on the battlefield, including for Victory Day in 2025 and most recently for Orthodox Easter on April 11 to 12.[17] These unilateral ceasefires heavily favor Russia, as the Kremlin has used them to accuse Ukraine of ceasefire violations and to stockpile long-range drones and missiles for large, devastating strikes that disproportionately affect civilians and inflict high civilian casualties.[18] Russia notably stockpiled weapons for two large strike series within 48 hours of the cessation of the Orthodox Easter ceasefire.[19]
The Kremlin also reportedly used the Trump-Putin call to scold Trump for US-Israeli operations against Iran. Ushakov claimed that Putin expressed support for the ceasefire extension in the Middle East but that Putin also warned Trump of “inevitable, extremely dire consequences” for Iran, the Middle East, and world if the US and Israel “resort to force again.”[20] Putin also reportedly told Trump that a ground operation in Iran is “completely unacceptable and dangerous.” Ushakov’s readout of the April 29 Trump-Putin notably highlighted the situation in the Middle East before the war in Ukraine. Russia has continuously supported Iranian strikes against US military assets in the Middle East, reportedly including by providing Iran with satellite imagery to assist Iranian strikes against US forces, and all while Russia has continued to self-define the United States as one of its primary geopolitical adversaries.[21]
Russia’s war in Ukraine is forcing the Kremlin to once again downgrade the festivities for its annual May 9 Victory Day parade, an event that Putin has historically used to posture Russian military power and victory in Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on April 29 that the 2026 Victory Day parade in Moscow City will not include military equipment, the participation of students from the Suvorov and Nakhimov military schools in a parade, or the participation of personnel of the Russian cadet corps in a parade due to the “current operational situation.”[22] This announcement signals that 2026 will be the first year since 2007 that the annual parade will not feature Russian military equipment.[23] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov described the 2026 Victory Day Parade as occurring in a “truncated format” to minimize the danger from potential Ukrainian strikes, which Peskov referred to as “terrorist attacks.”[24] These statements support April 27 reports that the Kremlin decided against including military equipment in the parade, is downgrading the number of guests from several thousand to a few hundred, and is limiting the parade itself to a 40-minute duration.[25] Russian milbloggers and opposition sources have reported that the Kremlin has not begun rehearsals for the parade despite being within the two-week window in which Russia normally conducts rehearsals.[26] BBC’s Russian Service noted that while at least 40 Russian cities plan to hold their normal Victory Day parades, at least 10 more cities and eight Russian federal subjects plan to scale back or cancel either their parades or other Victory Day celebrations, such as fireworks or the Immortal Regiment march, which memorializes Russia’s war dead from World War II.[27] The BBC reported, citing a source from Russian state telecommunications operator Rostelecom and a source close to other Russian telecommunications operators, that the Kremlin plans to restrict mobile communications in Moscow City and the Moscow Ring Road on May 5, 7, and 9 in connection with the Victory Day parade.[28] Russian ultranationalist milbloggers thus far have made statements in support of scaling back the 2026 Victory Day parade, noting concerns of potential drone strikes launched from within Russia as well as from Ukraine.[29]
The Kremlin held relatively truncated Victory Day parades in 2023 and 2024 but notably used the 2025 Victory Day parade in an effort to posture Russia’s strength and global power status and to portray Putin as a respected world leader.[30] The 2025 Victory Day parade was also an attempt to conceal the degree of Russia’s military failures in Ukraine, including the failure to make any operationally-significant advances outside of Kursk Oblast and Russia’s unsustainably high casualties — failures the Kremlin has largely repeated going into the 2026 Victory Day celebrations.[31] The Kremlin will likely seek to use the 2026 Victory Day parade in Moscow City to portray Putin as an effective wartime leader and to promote the cognitive warfare effort that Russian forces are achieving victory across the entire frontline, particularly as Putin and the Kremlin have faced increasing criticism and domestic discontent since early 2026.[32]
The Kremlin is likely using the threat of “terrorist activity” to cloak voter suppression and illegal activities in occupied Ukraine ahead of the September 2026 elections. Putin stated on April 28 that Russia is facing growing “terrorist threats” ahead of the September 2026 elections and that Ukraine and its supporters have resorted to these “terrorist methods” because they cannot stop Russian forces’ advances on the battlefield.[33] Kremlin has long referred to Ukrainian strikes against legitimate military targets in Russia as “terrorist attacks.”[34] Putin stated that Russia must pay close attention to election security in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that those who deny “Donbas and Novorossiya’s historical right” to be a part of Russia will try to hinder elections as they have done before.[35] Novorossiya notably includes not only Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally declared as annexed, but also Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[36] The Kremlin has conducted numerous illegal referendums and elections in occupied Ukraine under intense Russian military presence and in clear violation of internation law.[37] The Kremlin deployed 10,000 Rosgvardia personnel to occupied Ukraine to monitor and likely coerce voting results during the 2024 Presidential elections.[38] The Kremlin is likely evoking claims of “terrorist activity” to set conditions and justify future Russian military presence and coercive practices during the September 2026 elections.
Ukraine’s domestic defense industrial base (DIB) and production capabilities continue to support allies. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 28 that some areas of the Ukrainian DIB have achieved a 50 percent surplus, which will allow Ukraine to export defense products to allies, including in the Middle East and Europe.[39] The EU Commission announced on April 29 that it launched a new stage of the EU BraveTech initiative — a platform for testing military technology in battlefield conditions in Ukraine that allows European DIB firms to accelerate the movement of innovations to Ukraine.[40] The EU Commission reported that the program possesses a budget of 35 million euros (roughly $40.9 million), and that the first selections for the program will take place in June 2026, with innovations reaching the battlefield by Fall 2026.
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian forces are engaged in an operational long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets, exploiting overstretched Russian air defenses.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin used his April 29 phone call with US President Donald Trump to reiterate his commitment to his original war aims and promote his cognitive warfare effort, falsely portraying Ukraine’s defenses as collapsing and Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable. Ukraine has largely stymied Russian advances across the frontline, blunting the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive thus far.
- The Kremlin also reportedly used the Trump-Putin call to scold Trump for US-Israeli operations against Iran.
- Russia’s war in Ukraine is forcing the Kremlin to once again downgrade the festivities for its annual May 9 Victory Day parade, an event that Putin has historically used to posture Russian military power and victory in Ukraine.
- The Kremlin is likely using the threat of “terrorist activity” to cloak voter suppression and illegal activities in occupied Ukraine ahead of the September 2026 elections.
- Ukraine’s domestic defense industrial base (DIB) and production capabilities continues to support allies.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, western Zaporizhia Oblast, Oleksandrivka, and Hulyaipole directions.
- Russian forces launched 171 drones against Ukraine.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Note: ISW has changed how it reports Russian order of battle (ORBAT) details in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment on April 20, 2026. ISW previously published all ORBAT information collected in a daily 24-hour reporting period in the daily assessment. Moving forward, ISW will only publish ORBAT information that is new or indicates a change in Russian units’ positions, deployments, redeployments, or command and control arrangements in order to focus the daily publication on inflections and new information. ISW continues collecting a large amount of repetitive ORBAT information and can make this unpublished data available to selected readers upon request. Please contact [email protected] for any request for information.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline text.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued limited ground assaults, infiltrations, shelling, and airstrikes in northern Sumy Oblast on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked.[41] The Russian MoD claimed on April 29 that elements of the Russian 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Novodmytrivka (southeast of Sumy City).[42] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Korchakivka (north of Sumy City) and east of Ryasne (southeast of Sumy City).[43]
Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against the Russian near rear in Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast (southwest of Glushkovo on the international border) on April 28 or overnight on April 28 to 29.[44]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 29 as Ukrainian forces continued to control the left (east) bank of the Vovcha River.[45] The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on April 29 that Russian forces face difficulties crossing the Siverskyi Donets and Vovcha rivers as Ukrainian forces continue to control the left (east) bank of the Vovcha River.[46] The commander reported that Russian forces are experiencing manpower shortages as the Russian military command has been deploying a large number of Kenyan mercenaries. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Zybyne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[47]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported Russian ground attacks in the Velykyi Burluk direction on April 29. A Russian milblogger claimed on April 28 that Russian forces advanced north of Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[48]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on April 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in northern Kivsharivka (southeast of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into eastern Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[50]
Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Borova direction on April 28 but did not advance.[51]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Major Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian truck with an anti-aircraft system in occupied Luhansk Oblast on April 29.[52] Geolocated satellite imagery published on April 28 shows the destruction of both transformers at a power substation in occupied Alchevsk (roughly 65 kilometers from the frontline) that Ukrainian forces struck on March 29.[53]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations and airstrikes in the Slovyansk direction on April 29, but continued to experience manpower shortages.[54] The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on April 29 that Russian forces are suffering from a lack of replacements due to manpower shortages, deploying previously wounded servicemembers and African mercenaries in assaults and transferring unmotivated logistics and artillery personnel to assault units.[55]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced and reportedly counterattacked in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area as Russian forces conducted an infiltration.[56] Geolocated footage published on April 28 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position on the southwestern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[57] Geolocated footage published on April 28 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in southern Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Chasiv Yar contrary to Russian claims.[58] Geolocated footage published on April 28 shows Russian forces raising flags in Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[59]
The Russian MoD claimed on April 29 that Russian forces seized Novodmytrivka (east of Kostyantynivka).[60] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted that Russian forces will be unable to establish full control of Novodmytrivka without seizing Ukrainian positions on the southwestern outskirts of Chasiv Yar and between Chasiv Yar, Chervone (east of Kostyantynivka), and Mykolaivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka), however.[61] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Kostyantynivka.[62]
Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Dobropillya tactical area on April 29 but did not advance.[63]
Newly published combat footage clarifies Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction as Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 29.[64] Geolocated footage published on April 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain a strongpoint in a previously assessed Russian infiltration area north of Pokrovsk.[65]
A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on April 29 that Russian forces are redeploying units from neighboring directions to the Pokrovsk direction to replenish losses and sustain intense assaults.[66]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Pokrovsk direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post near Pokrovsk overnight or on April 28.[67]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Novopavlivka direction. Geolocated footage published on April 29 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian positions northwest of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka), indicating that there are likely no Russian positions in the area.[68]
[Novopavlivka direction map]
Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction as Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults.[69] Geolocated footage published on April 28 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in central Novomykolaivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the area.[70]
Russian forces in the Oleksandrivka direction have reportedly shifted back to infiltration tactics after failed mass assaults in early April. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on April 29 that Russian forces have shifted back to infiltration tactics after failed mass assaults on April 1 and 2, and have intensified their use of Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones against Ukrainian logistics.[71]
Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against Russian drone operators in the near rear in the Oleksandrivka direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 29 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near occupied Komar (roughly 13 kilometers from the frontline) and Zaporizhzhia (roughly six kilometers from the frontline) on April 28 or overnight on April 28 to 29.[72]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point and drone unit workshop near occupied Bondarevske (roughly 85 kilometers from the frontline) on April 28 or overnight on April 28 to 29.[73]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction as Russian forces continued ground assaults and airstrikes.[74] Geolocated footage published on April 28 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in northern Varvarivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area along the T-04-01 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway.[75]
Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against Russian drone operators in the near rear in the Hulyaipole direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 29 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near Hulyaipole and Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole) on April 28 or overnight on April 28 to 29.[76]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast as Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the area.[77] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces advanced south of Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) and southeast of Prymorske (northwest of Orikhiv), and that Russian forces only maintain limited positions in southern Prymorske.[78] Mashovets also reported that Russian forces are only present in small infantry groups near the Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) railway station and in the southeast of the settlement, contrary to prior Russian claims. Mashovets reported that Ukrainian counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast have effectively halted Russian advances toward Orikhiv and Zaporizhzhia City and that Russian advances along a narrow sector to the north along the Dnipro River are unfeasible for Russian forces without first neutralizing Ukrainian defenses around Orikhiv.[79]
Order of Battle: The Russian military command may have redeployed elements of the Russian 47th Motorized Rifle Division (18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), the 45th Spetsnaz Brigade of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV), the 136th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th CAA, SMD), and the Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) to the Orikhiv direction.[80] Mashovets reported on April 29 that Russian forces redeployed elements of these units to the Orikhiv direction to reinforce the Russian 58th CAA’s efforts.[81] ISW last observed elements of the 45th Spetsnaz Brigade of the VDV operating in the Sumy direction as of April 16; the 136th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area as of April 22; and the Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area as of April 24.[82]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strikes against Russian military assets and air defense systems in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Major Brovdi reported on April 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor-M2 air defense system in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast between April 27 and 28.[83] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor air defense system near occupied Tykhonivka (roughly 76 kilometers from the frontline) between April 28 and the night of April 29.[84]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on April 29, including toward islands in the Dnipro River Delta, but did not advance.[85]
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea on the night of April 28 to 29. Geolocated footage posted on April 28 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile storage site south of occupied Ovrazhky, Crimea (roughly 215 kilometers from the frontline).[86] Major Brovdi published footage on April 29 showing Ukrainian forces striking a radar belonging to the Russian Ai-Petri Radio Engineering Battalion, likely of the 3rd Radio Engineering Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces’ [VKS] radio engineering troops), a pumping station of the Bitumne oil depot (roughly 214 kilometers from the frontline) on April 28, and an ammunition depot in occupied Crimea on April 29.[87] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian MR-10 radar, an air defense command post, and a 1L22 Parol-4 ground-based radar interrogator at the occupied Kacha airfield (roughly 223 kilometers from the frontline) between April 28 and the night of April 29.[88] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on April 29 that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot near occupied Pervomaiske (roughly 136 kilometers from the frontline) and a TES oil depot near occupied Simferopol (roughly 206 kilometers from the frontline).
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 28 to 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 171 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and other drones — of which roughly 120 were Shaheds, including jet-powered Shaheds — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[89] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 154 drones, that 12 drones struck 10 locations, and that downed debris fell on 12 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential, energy, medical, and railway infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts.[90] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure caused power outages in Donetsk, Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[91] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian missile strikes damaged industrial and residential infrastructure in Chuhuiv, Kharkiv Oblast on the afternoon of April 29.[92]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Russian and Belarusian authorities are reportedly cooperating to prevent Russian citizens with draft orders from avoiding conscription. The Belarusian State Border Committee confirmed to Belarusian-focused broadcaster Belsat on April 29 that Belarusian authorities will bar Russian citizens who have received a draft notice and an exit ban from traveling abroad to a third country through Belarus.[93] ISW continues to assess that Russia seeks to create a common set of federal laws, regulations, and institutions between Russia and Belarus as part of Russia’s effort to de facto annex Belarus.[94]
CORRECTION: ISW has corrected this update to report that the geolocated footage published on April 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain their position in Pokrovsk as opposed to advanced, which ISW had originally reported. We apologize for this error.
CORRECTION: ISW updated the April 29 to include reporting for the Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign and Significant Activity in Belarus sections that were not published in the update last evening. We apologize for this error.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/SBUkr/17434 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37947 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2049385907938263366; https://t.me/supernova_plus/51043 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/19165; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7476 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2283 ;
[2] https://t.me/SBUkr/17434
[3] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12890; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12891; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12892; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12894; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/35198 ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/10691
[4] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37947
[5] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/2049507459627143676 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2283
[6] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2049385907938263366; https://t.me/supernova_plus/51043; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2049488474869555469; https://t.me/supernova_plus/51085
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-template-020426/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2026/
[9] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18815
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/
[11] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79660
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-6/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2026/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2026/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/
[16] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79660
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2026/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2026/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2026/
[20] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79660
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2026/
[22] https://t.me/mod_russia/63019; https://www.bbc dot com/russian/articles/c172g8l514ro
[23] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/library/articles/2008/01/15/topol-m-provezut-po-krasnoj-ploschadi-9-maya
[24] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/04/29/kreml-ob-yasnil-usechennyy-format-parada-pobedy-atakami-ukrainy-i-tem-chto-data-ne-yubileynaya
[25] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/04/27/parad-pobedy-v-moskve-mozhet-proyti-bez-uchastiya-voennoy-tehniki; https://t.me/eschulmann/8824; https://x.com/amenka/status/2048757279017599373?s=20
[26] https://t.me/agentstvonews/14991; https://ru.themoscowtimes dot com/2026/04/08/z-blogeri-soobschili-ob-vozmozhnoi-otmene-parada-pobedi-v-moskve-iz-za-novih-ukrainskih-raket-a192058; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/04/27/parad-pobedy-v-moskve-mozhet-proyti-bez-uchastiya-voennoy-tehniki; https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c172g8l514ro
[27] https://www.bbc dot com/russian/articles/c172g8l514ro
[28] https://t.me/bbcrussian/94370
[29] https://t.me/sashakots/61411; https://t.me/rusich_army/29377; https://t.me/milinfolive/171386 ;
[30] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-16-2025/
[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/hiding-russias-weakness/
[32] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2025/
[33] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79653
[34] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_10-25/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_8-8/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-8/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2024
[35] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79653
[36] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/
[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_8-14/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_11-3/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-west-shouldnt-play-russias-game-with-ukrainian-elections/
[38] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_28-9/
[39] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/ye-rishennya-dlya-togo-shob-u-nashoyi-derzhavi-u-nashoyi-obo-104149
[40] https://ec.europa dot eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/mex_26_925
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37949; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37931; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37919; https://t.me/uvkkursk/339; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72038; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/29/tochkovymy-udaramy-hochut-rozporoshyty-oboronu-na-sumshhyni-vorog-ne-prypynyaye-sprob-atakuvaty-cherez-kordon/; https://t.me/severnnyi/7780
[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/63028; https://t.me/mod_russia/63029
[43] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72038
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37955
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37949; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37931; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37919; https://t.me/rybar/79859; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20550; https://t.me/wargonzo/33845
[46] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/29/znachnyj-vidsotok-protyvnyka-kenijczi-u-vovchansku-pozycziyi-syl-oborony-atakuyut-afrykanski-najmanczi/
[47] https://t.me/rybar/79859
[48] https://t.me/rybar/79859
[49] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11795; https://t.me/mechanized33/992
[50] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/208722
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37931; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20550; https://t.me/gvZapad/18433
[52] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2282
[53] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7480; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7363; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37949; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37931; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37919; https://t.me/wargonzo/33845; https://t.me/gvZapad/18433; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20550; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/28945; https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2049463712600170890
[55] . https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/29/protyvnyka-treba-znyshhuvaty-shhe-na-pidhodah-intervyu-z-kombrygom-81-oaembr-myhajlom-kusyakom/
[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/42454; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72046
[57] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2049458122582839672; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2049458175875723345; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/1441
[58] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2049126472544055699; https://t.me/svo_alfa/347
[59] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2049371487212048627; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2049371491867705492; https://t.me/mod_russia/63010; https://t.me/VESTIDONETSK/20001;
[60] https://t.me/mod_russia/63028
[61] https://t.me/rybar/79882
[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72046
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37949; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37931; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37919
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37949; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37931; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37919; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/42477; https://t.me/wargonzo/33845; https://t.me/dva_majors/92157
[65] https://t.me/mod_russia/63017 ; https://x.com/meowqai/status/2049208507170168992
[66] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1301225-nazad-voni-ne-povertautsa-armia-rf-peretague-sili-na-pokrovskij-front-z-insih-napramkiv-vijskova/
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37955
[68] https://t.me/mod_russia/63022; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2049347142582718473
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37949; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37931; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37919
[70] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2049241487091622094; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2049241491764076908; https://t.me/mapukrdailyupdate/7971
[71] https://youtu.be/0lU8mfftN7k?t=644; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/29/vorog-hoche-vyrizaty-logistyku-na-olekandrivskomu-napryamku-lyutuyut-molniyi-ta-zhduny/
[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37955
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37955
[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37949; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37931; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37919; https://t.me/wargonzo/33845
[75] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2049219439086694609; https://x.com/meowqai/status/2049209179210936474; https://t.me/mod_russia/63017; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11791
[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37955
[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37949
[78] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3376 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3375
[79] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3375 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3376 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3377
[80] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3374)
[81] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3374)
[82] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6516; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/207830; https://t.me/donbass_sos/14549; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2047935456306778513; https://t.me/zayndi_zingiev/335
[83] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2282
[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37955
[85] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37949 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37931 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37919
[86] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2049118093696217453 ; https://t.me/ukr_sof/2777 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2026/
[87] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2282
[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37955
[89] https://t.me/kpszsu/60919
[90] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/29102; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/28539; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1301237-rosiani-vdarili-dronom-po-petrivci-na-harkivsini-poraneni-troe-ludej/; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/28526; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1300861-vnaslidok-nicnoi-ataki-na-harkiv-dvoe-ludej-postrazdali/; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/28534; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1300863-rosia-atakuvali-kotlari-harkivskoi-oblasti-vidomo-pro-sistoh-postrazdalih/; https://t.me/synegubov/21392; https://t.me/synegubov/21398; https://t.me/synegubov/21399; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3851; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3856; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3857; https://t.me/synegubov/21393; https://t.me/synegubov/21394; https://t.me/synegubov/21395; https://t.me/synegubov/21396; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3853; https://t.me/synegubov/21400; https://t.me/synegubov/21404; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3858; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3859; https://t.me/synegubov/21407; https://t.me/IzmailRDA/45711; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1300821-rf-atakuvala-izmail-bezpilotnikami-e-postrazdali/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/15731; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1300821-rf-atakuvala-izmail-bezpilotnikami-e-postrazdali/; https://www.facebook.com/noha.mykola.petrovych/posts/pfbid02siErrQYoD4PMNnuTE3Qw2piN6QDhiXTVTSrpHAC58ZjzTct9HrtXxEk2T9bHoDhcl; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1300845-rosijska-armia-vdarila-po-sostci-odna-ludina-zaginula/
[91] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4914 ; https://suspilne dot media/1300947-cerez-dronovi-ataki-rf-na-energoinfrastrukturu-ukraini-v-sesti-oblastah-e-castkovo-znestrumleni-spozivaci-ukrenergo/
[92] https://t.me/synegubov/21405; https://t.me/synegubov/21406
[93] https://ru.belsat dot eu/92964696/rossiyane-prizyvnik
[94] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quiet-conquest-belarus/?utm_source
