Toplines

The Iranian regime likely launched a “surprise attack” on US forces in Jordan on July 28 to erode the United States’ willingness to undermine the regime’s efforts to achieve its war aims, including securing Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated on July 28 that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) forces launched multiple ballistic missiles at Muwaffaq Salti Airbase in Azraq, Jordan, in an “attempted surprise attack.” The Jordanian Army said its forces intercepted five missiles.[1] Iran’s attack on July 28 ended a four-day pause in fighting between the United States and Iran. The United States and Iran exchanged near-daily fire between July 8 and 24.[2] The United States paused strikes on July 24 to restart talks with Iran.[3] Iran has repeatedly attacked US forces in the region during the war to achieve discrete objectives.[4] The Iranian regime likely calculated that it could degrade the United States’ willingness to continue the conflict by inflicting damage or US casualties during the current “pause” in strikes. IRGC-affiliated media argued on July 29 that Iran’s attack on Jordan demonstrated that Iran maintains the “initiative” in the war and will not allow the United States to “determine the rules of engagement.”[5] A newspaper published on the Supreme Leader’s website, Voice of Iran, separately argued on July 29 that the United States “should accept defeat” because it has, according to the newspaper, failed to achieve its strategic objectives in the war.[6]

Iran targeted US forces in Jordan shortly after rejecting any compromise over Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz in recent talks with Oman.[7] A senior Iranian official told Reuters on July 29 that Iran rejected a recent Omani proposal to place the strait under regional management with voluntary fees to pay for managing navigation, environmental protection, and other services.[8] Iran deemed the proposal “unrealistic.”[9]

The Iranian regime also likely sought for its attack on Jordan to signal the regime’s willingness to incur the risk of full-scale conflict with the United States in order to secure control over the strait. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Kazem Gharibabadi stated on July 28 that Iran would take any action, including war, to ensure its sovereignty over the strait.[10] Gharibabadi’s statement highlights the regime’s willingness to use force to secure control over the strait regardless of the risk of a US military response. Iran has continued to use force to assert its control over the strait. The IRGC Navy claimed on July 28 that it struck three tankers in the strait that were transiting along the southern route despite IRGC warnings.[11] An “informed military source” told IRGC-affiliated outlet Fars News that the strait is under “full Iranian control” and that no ship can pass through without Iran’s permission.[12]

The IRGC Aerospace Force conducted the attack in Jordan, but it is unclear if there was consensus among various regime factions to conduct the attack. The IRGC Aerospace Force stated that its forces conducted the attack in response to alleged US “aggressive actions.”[13] ISW-CTP continues to observe diverging viewpoints between various regime factions over the means through which Iran should attempt to achieve its war aims. IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, whom ISW-CTP continues to assess is playing an outsized role in decision-making, almost certainly supported the decision to launch the recent attack on Jordan. Vahidi has frequently overruled Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and President Masoud Pezeshkian, who are relatively more amenable to compromise and sought a deal with the United States to secure economic relief.[14] Vahidi previously drove the decision to fire ballistic missiles at Israel in early June and link the fighting in Lebanon to the war in Iran, which made a US-Iran deal dependent on Israel ending its conflict with Hezbollah.[15] Two senior US officials told the Wall Street Journal on July 28 that they believe the IRGC is actively trying to undermine negotiations to renew the ceasefire and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.[16]

That Vahidi and his allies likely supported the decision to strike Jordan does not mean that those within the regime’s pro-negotiations camp did not also back the strikes. The pro-negotiations faction — which includes but is not limited to Araghchi, Pezeshkian, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf — primarily disagrees with the IRGC over means, not ends. This group still seeks to secure Iranian control over the strait, an end to the US military presence in the region, and other regime objectives but views negotiations as the most effective way to secure these objectives.[17]

The United States and Saudi Arabia conducted strikes targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militia weapons and logistics supply sites across Iraq on July 28 in retaliation for Iraqi militia attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and US interests in Iraq and the region.[18] The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) stated on July 29 that US and Saudi strikes across seven Iraqi provinces killed at least 20 PMF members and injured 32 members.[19] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[20] The United States and Saudi Arabia struck several PMF brigade bases in Ninewa, Diyala, Salah al Din, and Kirkuk provinces, including the Iranian-backed Badr Organization-affiliated 30th and 52nd brigades and the Kataib Imam al Ali-affiliated 40th PMF Brigade.[21] These Iranian-backed brigades likely supported militia attacks targeting US interests in Iraqi Kurdistan in recent days.[22] Iraq analysts have noted that these brigades previously provided logistical support to enable Iraqi militia attacks on US and regional interests in March and April.[23]

The United States and Saudi Arabia also conducted several strikes on July 28 along the Iran-Iraq border targeting sites used for the Arbaeen pilgrimage.[24] Iran intended to use the Arbaeen pilgrimage to move weapons and advisers into Iraq, according to Israeli media.[25] The Arbaeen pilgrimage is an annual religious pilgrimage in which millions of Shia Muslims walk to Karbala to mark the martyrdom of Imam Hussein bin Ali.[26] Iraqi media claimed on July 29 that US and Saudi forces struck a guesthouse hosting Arbaeen pilgrims in Karbala Province and the PMF Basra Operations Command headquarters in Basra Province.[27] The PMF Basra Operations Command provides security for Arbaeen pilgrims traveling through the Shalamcheh border crossing between Iraq and Iran.[28] US forces previously struck the Shalamcheh border crossing on July 22.[29]

The US and Saudi strikes on July 28 reportedly killed at least four IRGC Quds Force officers in Diyala Province, which underscores the IRGC’s role in overseeing Iraqi militia attacks on the Gulf states and US interests in Iraq.[30] Iranian state media reported on July 28 that the strikes killed four IRGC Quds Force officers in Diyala Province.[31] Saudi media reported on July 29 that IRGC Quds Force officers directly oversaw the recent Iraqi militia attacks against Jordan and the Gulf. This report is consistent with previous Western media reporting that the IRGC formed multiple Iraqi militia cells that directly report to the IRGC, instead of pre-existing Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, in order to conduct attacks on Gulf countries.[32] Iraqi sources told Reuters in June 2026 that the IRGC created the cells to maintain plausible deniability.[33]

The Houthis are threatening to expand their attacks on Saudi targets, likely in order to coerce Saudi Arabia to terminate its blockade against Houthi ports and airports.[34] Houthi media reported on July 28 that the Houthis plan to “expand” the group’s blockade on Saudi Arabia by attacking Saudi oil pipelines and ports.[35] Houthi threats to expand attacks on Saudi Arabia are consistent with the Houthis’ efforts to raise economic and political costs on Saudi Arabia for blockading Houthi ports and airports.[36] The Houthis have attacked several Saudi vessels and state-owned oil industry assets as part of this effort since imposing their blockade against Saudi Arabia on July 20.[37] Houthi Spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed on July 27 that the Houthis launched drones targeting Saudi infrastructure vital to transporting oil from Saudi oilfields in eastern Saudi Arabia to export hubs on the Red Sea.[38] The Houthis’ threats to target Saudi vessels, ports, and pipelines indicate that the group is attempting to incapacitate the Saudi oil industry by disrupting vital infrastructure at several points in the supply chain. The Houthis also intend for these threats to wear down Saudi Arabia’s willingness to circumvent Iranian demands for control over the Strait of Hormuz, which supports Iran’s strategic objectives.[39]

Unspecified regional sources told Reuters on July 29 that the Houthis may start to impose fees on international commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea and Bab al Mandeb Strait.[40] An Arab state official claimed that the Houthis discussed prospects of establishing a regulatory authority to charge fees for vessels transiting the Bab al Mandeb, similar to Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority.[41] Unspecified sources told Reuters that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has held direct negotiations with the Houthis to secure safe and toll-free passage for PRC vessels navigating the southern Red Sea.[42] The Houthis have not confirmed or denied any plans to impose fees for passage through the Bab al Mandeb, however. The Houthis may plan to levy international passage fees in order to further coerce Saudi Arabia to terminate its blockade against Houthi ports and airports by raising global economic costs and international pressure on the Saudi government. It is unclear whether the Houthis intend to establish a fee system in order to achieve other potential strategic objectives, such as securing codified permanent control over the Bab al Mandeb.

Iran is attempting to bolster its air defense capabilities with assistance from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and improve its drone capabilities. Three sources told Reuters on July 28 that Iran reportedly signed a deal through a Hong Kong-based company to buy between 300 and 400 PRC-made man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS).[43] A European source separately told Reuters that the deal could include a shipment of Chinese QW-12, QW-18, and QW-19 MANPADS. A second unspecified source added that it is unclear whether Iran and the PRC have completed the deal.[44] Iranian forces may have previously used a Chinese-made MANPAD to shoot down a US F-15E fighter jet in April 2026.[45] Sources also told Reuters that China would deliver the MANPADS via aircraft to Pakistan, which would then be transferred to Iran by land.[46] The Pakistani military denied the source’s claim. Iranian and Pakistani diplomats have recently discussed increasing overland trade, according to multiple Iranian media reports.[47] This Reuters report follows an April 2026 New York Times report that China may have sent a shipment of Chinese MANPADS to Iran.[48] Iran also previously purchased 500 Russian MANPADS in December 2025.[49]

Iranian media separately reported on July 29 that Iran has developed a “new version” of its Hadid 110 drone.[50] Iranian media stated that the new version of the Hadid 110 has a jet engine with a solid fuel booster that enables the drone to fly at lower flight altitudes with higher speed and greater stealth capabilities.[51] Israeli media reported on July 29 that the upgrades to the Hadid 110 are designed to reduce air defense detection and interception time.[52] The drone reportedly lacks long-range capabilities, however.[53] Iranian defense officials and state media have recently emphasized the importance of evolving Iranian drone technologies to counter US air defense systems in the region.[54]

An unspecified actor conducted a drone attack targeting a US-owned tanker at a Mediterranean port in Damietta, Egypt, on July 29.[55] Reuters reported that an unspecified actor launched a drone that struck the gas storage tanker Energos Winter and caused a fire that spread to a second vessel.[56] The Egyptian Petroleum Ministry confirmed that a fire broke out at Damietta Port but did not indicate whether a drone attack caused the fire.[57] Israeli media claimed on July 29 that pro-Iranian Telegram channels mentioned Damietta Port as a potential Iranian target in retaliation for a Ukrainian attack on an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea.[58] No actor has claimed responsibility for the attack as of this writing.