The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Note: ISW-CTP has revised its update structure due to the resumption of war between the United States and Iran. Iran is currently engaged in an information effort to frame its attacks on US bases and regional states as retaliatory and defensive. Iran is not merely responding to US strikes on Iran, however, but is engaged in proactive military operations to achieve discrete objectives. The revised update structure reflects some of these key objectives.
Note: CTP-ISW will pause publishing weekend updates starting on August 15, 2026. CTP-ISW may publish special updates on Saturdays and Sundays if events warrant, however.
Key Takeaways
- Several Iraqi sources have described in recent days that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is planning a possible operation to retake one of Kataib Hezbollah’s strongholds as part of a broader crackdown on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Zaydi reportedly ordered a study of the security and logistical conditions in Kataib Hezbollah’s stronghold of Jurf al Sakhr in Babil Province, according to unspecified Iraqi political sources on August 14.
- Iraqi sources’ discussions of plans for an operation against the militias may intend to encourage Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to acquiesce to the federal government and voluntarily disarm by September 30. Zaydi’s reported preparations for such an operation suggest that Iraqi security forces are preparing to enact such a plan if the militias do not oblige, however.
- Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) customs authorities seized two caches of electronic components that could be used for first-person view (FPV) drones at Yemeni ports and land crossings on August 13. ROYG authorities seized 23 fiber-optic cable spools at the Wadiah crossing in Hadramawt Governorate, on the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border, according to Yemeni media.
Toplines
Several Iraqi sources have described planning in recent days by Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi for a possible operation to retake one of Kataib Hezbollah’s strongholds as part of a broader crackdown on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Zaydi reportedly ordered a study of the security and logistical conditions in Kataib Hezbollah’s stronghold of Jurf al Sakhr in Babil Province, according to unspecified Iraqi political sources on August 14.[1] The sources told UK-based, Qatari-owned media that this study intends to develop mechanisms for Iraqi security forces to deploy near all entrances to Jurf al Sakhr and evacuate some Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) headquarters in the area as well as headquarters of groups operating under the guise of the PMF.[2] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes multiple Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the prime minister.[3] Iraqi military, security, and counterterrorism authorities—as well as “disciplined” PMF brigades—would then enter Jurf al Sakhr to assert control.[4] It is unclear which “disciplined” PMF brigades the Iraqi sources were referring to. An Iraq analyst noted in June 2026 that over half of the PMF brigades either attacked or supported attacks on US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region during the war.[5] Saudi media first reported that Zaydi was considering deploying Iraqi security forces to take control of Jurf al Sakhr on August 11.[6] Kataib Hezbollah has refused to allow the Iraqi government to exercise sovereignty over Jurf al Sakhr for over a decade and has used the area to store weapons and launch attacks against US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region, including in March and April 2026.[7] Conducting an operation to retake Jurf al Sakhr on the scale described by these sources would require significant planning, mobilization, and coordination among Iraqi security forces.
Iraqi sources’ discussions of plans in recent days to use force against the militias may intend to encourage Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to acquiesce to the federal government and voluntarily disarm by September 30.[8] Iraqi political sources claimed on August 14 that the Iraqi government prefers to reassume control over Jurf al Sakhr through diplomacy and calibrated pressure on the militias rather than deploying Iraqi security forces to “storm” the town.[9] Zaydi’s reported preparations for such an operation, including by studying local security and logistical conditions, suggest that Iraqi security forces are preparing to enact such a plan if the militias do not oblige, however.[10]
US and Partner Military Operations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Strike Campaign
Assessed Iranian War Aims:
- Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
- Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
- Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
- Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states
Iran continues to use force against commercial shipping to impose costs on regional states and enforce its claimed control over the Strait of Hormuz. The United Arab Emirates accused Iran of attacking two Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) tankers transiting the strait with drones on August 13.[11] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations separately reported on August 14 that two vessels—likely the ADNOC tankers—sustained minor damage from drone strikes in the strait.[12] ADNOC has disabled vessel transponders, staggered secretly timed transits, and used ship-to-ship transfers off the coast of Fujairah to move its tankers through the strait undetected.[13]
US-Iran Negotiations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
Some clerics close to the Supreme Leader’s office appear to be trying to contain intra-regime polarization over negotiations with the United States. Supreme Leader Political-Ideological Office head Ali Saeedi warned on August 14 that framing Iran’s choices as “negotiation or war” could deepen political polarization.[14] Saeedi stressed that negotiations can serve Iran’s interests if conducted under Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s supervision and alongside continued “resistance and steadfastness.”[15] Saeedi’s remarks suggest that some officials close to Mojtaba’s office may be trying to keep intra-regime debates over negotiations from developing into a broader political confrontation. Tehran Interim Friday Prayer Leader Ahmad Khatami similarly rejected both an “only war” and “only peace” approach on August 14, arguing that Iran should combine “active resistance” with “intelligent diplomacy,” including ceasefires when they serve Iran’s interests.[16]
Lebanon
Nothing significant to report.
Iraq
Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias fired drones targeting unspecified targets in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, on August 14. An Iraqi security source told Saudi media that air defense systems in Erbil intercepted six drones that unspecified actors launched from Ninewa Province.[17] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias repeatedly launched attacks from positions in Ninewa Province targeting US interests in Iraqi Kurdistan in Spring 2026.[18] Informed sources told Iraqi media in late July 2026 that Iran has pressured the Iraqi federal government not to identify the militias responsible for recent attacks in Iraqi Kurdistan and regional countries.[19]
A member of Iranian-backed militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political wing stated on August 14 that no actor within or outside of Iraq should be able to prosecute Iraqi militias under Iraq’s Anti-Terrorism Law.[20] The Sadiqoun member’scomments follow reports that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is planning to present a new draft law to parliament that would support restricting arms to the state.[21] It remains unclear how this draft law would differ from existing laws that limit militia activity outside of the state, including Article Nine of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution.[22] The Sadiqoun member additionally argued that there are unspecified justifications for the militias to possess weapons and that the Iraqi government should not set a deadline for disarming the militias until US forces withdraw from Iraq.[23] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have continued to use a variety of excuses to retain their arms. The Sadiqoun member also claimed that the militias have strong popular support.[24] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have engaged in human rights violations in numerous instances, however. The militias helped the Iraqi state suppress the 2019 Tishreen Uprising protests and have refused to allow residents to return to multiple areas of Iraq, including Jurf al Sakhr, after helping the Iraqi government free these areas from Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) control.[25] The Sadiqoun member’s comments notably conflict with other Asaib Ahl al Haq-affiliated figures’ previous statements supporting efforts to restrict arms to the state.[26] The member’s statement is an indicator of possible internal fissures within Asaib Ahl al Haq on the issue of disarmament.
A member of former Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s coalition claimed on August 13 that all militias, including Iranian-backed Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, agreed to restrict weapons to the state during a State Administration Coalition meeting.[27] Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba have continuously refused to disarm.[28] These militias are among the most closely tied to Iran, and Iranian officials have also consistently opposed militia disarmament efforts.[29] ISW-CTP has not observed any indicators that Kataib Hezbollah or Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba have changed their stance on disarmament.
Themember of Sudani’s coalition also claimed that the militias’ only disagreement at this time is over the mechanism for handing over weapons to the state.[30] It is unclear if the militias are expected to hand over their weapons to the PMF or another Iraqi state institution. A Shia Coordination Framework source told Iraqi media on August 9 that the militias will hand over their weapons to the PMF before the September 30 disarmament deadline.[31] It is also unclear which weapons the militias would hand over to the state. Unspecified Shia Coordination Framework sources and sources close to the militias have previously told Iraqi and regional media that some militias intend to surrender small arms and inoperable weapons while keeping operational heavy weapons.[32] Such a reality would effectively circumvent efforts to disarm the militias.
Arabian Peninsula
Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) customs authorities seized two caches of electronic components that could be used for first-person view (FPV) drones at Yemeni ports and land crossings on August 13.[33] ROYG authorities seized 23 fiber-optic cable spools at the Wadiah crossing in Hadramawt Governorate, on the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border, according to Yemeni media.[34] Yemeni media also reported that ROYG authorities confiscated nearly 3,700 “dual-use” electronic components at the port of Aden, which authorities claimed could be used to assemble drones or for other illicit purposes.[35] A US-based Yemen analyst suggested that the Houthis were responsible for the smuggling attempt and reported that the equipment was intended to be used to assemble fiber-optic FPV drones.[36] ISW-CTP cannot confirm whether the Houthis were responsible for the smuggling attempt or what the intended use of the equipment was, however. Houthi-affiliated smugglers have previously used the Wadiah crossing to traffic drugs and other contraband into Saudi Arabia.[37]
The smuggling incidents follow the Houthis’ recent first deployment of a fiber-optic FPV drone in combat, which ROYG forces captured in Marib Governorate on August 11.[38] Members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, including Hezbollah and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, have adopted and proliferated FPV drones as strike platforms to attack US and Israeli forces and military assets in the region since March 2026.[39]
A Houthi military source told Houthi media on August 14 that the Houthis launched a drone targeting Saudi oil infrastructure in Najran, near the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border.[40] The source claimed that the Houthis attacked Saudi Aramco facilities in Najran in retaliation for Saudi aircraft overflights in Houthi-controlled Saada Province, in northwestern Yemen.[41] A Houthi military source previously told Houthi media on August 13 that Houthi drones targeted and struck the Saudi Aramco refinery at the Red Sea port of Jizan.[42] ISW-CTP continues to assess that the Houthis have threatened and attacked Saudi oil infrastructure in order to raise the political and economic costs of the Saudi blockade on Houthi ports and vessels and compel Saudi Arabia to cease its kinetic activity in Yemen.[43]
[1] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/الزيدي-يتحرك-لإنهاء-ملف-جرف-الصخر-وإبعاد-المليشيات-عنها
[2] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/الزيدي-يتحرك-لإنهاء-ملف-جرف-الصخر-وإبعاد-المليشيات-عنها
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/
[4] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/الزيدي-يتحرك-لإنهاء-ملف-جرف-الصخر-وإبعاد-المليشيات-عنها
[5] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/standing-with-iran-the-integrated-combat-performance-of-iraqi-militias-during-operation-epic-fury/
[6] https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/iraq/2026/08/11/العراق-الزيدي-يتمسك-بحصر-السلاح-ويبحث-السيطرة-على-جرف-الصخر
[7] https://alhurra dot com/en/14420 ; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/standing-with-iran-the-integrated-combat-performance-of-iraqi-militias-during-operation-epic-fury/
[8] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5306201-بغداد-تتحرك-لتطويق-مواقع-فصائل-يديرها-الحرس-الثوري-دون-احتكاك
[9] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/الزيدي-يتحرك-لإنهاء-ملف-جرف-الصخر-وإبعاد-المليشيات-عنها
[10] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/الزيدي-يتحرك-لإنهاء-ملف-جرف-الصخر-وإبعاد-المليشيات-عنها
[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-says-iran-attacked-two-adnoc-vessels-strait-hormuz-no-injuries-2026-08-13/
[12] https://apnews.com/article/iran-uae-us-strait-hormuz-august-14-2026-e8565c608ac5283ec8103c85df924b13
[13] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/second-adnoc-lng-tanker-crosses-strait-hormuz-amid-iran-war-ship-tracking-data-2026-05-06/ ;
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/hungry-sell-uae-slips-hidden-oil-tankers-through-strait-hormuz-2026-05-07/ ;
[14] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1405/05/23/3670677
[15] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1405/05/23/3670677
[16] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1405052313136
[17]
https://www.alhadath dot net/iraq/2026/08/14/اسقاط-6-مسيرات-في-سماء-اربيل-والهجوم-انطلق-من-نينوى
[18] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/CTC-SENTINEL-062026_cover-article.pdf
[19] https://almadapaper dot net/446096/
[20] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/573095/الامن-النيابية-لن-نسمح-لاي-شخص-بالدولة-وخارجها-التعامل-مع-الفصائل-وفق
[21] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/PM-Al-Zaidi-moves-to-legislate-state-control-of-arms
[22] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/militias-iraqs-security-forces-historical-context-and-us-options
[23] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/573095/الامن-النيابية-لن-نسمح-لاي-شخص-بالدولة-وخارجها-التعامل-مع-الفصائل-وفق
[24] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/573095/الامن-النيابية-لن-نسمح-لاي-شخص-بالدولة-وخارجها-التعامل-مع-الفصائل-وفق
[25] https://alhurra dot com/en/14420 ; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/standing-with-iran-the-integrated-combat-performance-of-iraqi-militias-during-operation-epic-fury/ ; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm847
[26] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/بعد-خطوة-الصدر-العصا-ب-لا-ذريعة-لسلاح-خارج-الدولة ; https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=259692
[27] https://964media dot com/707481/
[28] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-kataib-hezbollah ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-harakat-hezbollah-al-nujaba ; https://t.me/centerkaf/5671 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/الحميداوي-يرفض-تفكيك-سلاح-المقاومة-سنطوره-ونعظم-ترسانته ; https://t.me/Akram_Alkaabi/232 ; https://t.me/Al_Nojaba/1381
[29] https://almadapaper dot net/437522/ ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/حصري-قا-ني-يرسم-خطا-حمر-في-بغداد-لا-حصر-لسلاح-الفصا-ل-ولا-صدام-مع-الدولة
[30] https://964media dot com/707481/
[31] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/سلاح-الفصا-ل-لى-الحشد-اتفاق-على-التسليم-قبل-نهاية-يلول-خاص ; https://rudaw dot net/english/categories/iraq/1077800
[32] https://almadapaper dot net/442723; https://almadapaper dot net/443607; https://almadapaper dot net/444587; https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/العراق-لماذا-تتم-عملية-حصر-سلاح-الفصائل-سراً
[33] https://almasdaronline dot com/articles/349143 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2088254250283307228?s=20
[34] https://almasdaronline dot com/articles/349143 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2088254250283307228?s=20
[35] https://almasdaronline dot com/articles/349143
[36] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2088254250283307228?s=20
[37] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5234967-yemeni-officer-drug-smuggling-networks-linked-houthi-preventive-security
[38] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2087708130708762650 ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/2087830693002760476 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-august-13-2026/
[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/hezbollahs-pivot-to-fpv-drones-requires-israeli-overmatch/ ; https://www.ynetnews dot com/business/article/s17na31xmx; https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2026/07/20/israels-iai-unveils-hypnosis-system-for-confusing-enemy-drone-swarms ; https://www.jpost dot com/defense-and-tech/article-902952; https://www.jpost dot com/defense-and-tech/article-897569 ; https://www.militantwire.com/p/bomb-ready-analysis-of-iran-backed
[40] https://saba dot ye/ar/news3764799.htm
[41] https://saba dot ye/ar/news3764799.htm
[42] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/2087922917996912971
[43] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-august-13-2026/
