Toplines

Iran and the United States will reportedly hold talks in Doha, Qatar, on June 30 to discuss the implementation of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) despite the recent exchange of fire between the United States and Iran. Iran will likely use these talks to try to secure the implementation of provisions in the MoU that help advance Iranian objectives, including the provision about the release of Iranian frozen assets. US President Donald Trump announced on June 29 that Iran requested talks in Doha on June 30.[1] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi stated on June 29, prior to Trump’s announcement, that no technical talks are currently planned for this week, however.[2] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei later stated after Trump’s announcement that Iran’s current priority is to ensure the implementation of the MoU.[3] Baghaei added that Iran will send a delegation to Doha this week to follow up on the implementation of the MoU, including clause 11, which focuses on the release of Iranian frozen assets. Baghaei denied that Iran will hold any negotiations on a final deal with the United States at any level in the coming days, however.[4] Baghaei claimed that the Iranian delegation’s visit to Doha has “nothing to do with” US officials’ trip to Qatar.[5] Baghaei’s remarks suggest that Iran continues to insist on the United States releasing Iran’s frozen assets before Iran agrees to discuss nuclear issues. Early access to frozen funds would give Iran immediate economic relief, reduce US leverage in nuclear talks, and provide Iran with funds that it could use to reconstitute its military capabilities and the Axis of Resistance.[6]

Clerics within Iran’s Assembly of Experts, including within the body’s leadership, appear divided over how the regime should implement the US-Iran MoU and how much latitude Iranian negotiators should have in talks with the United States. The Assembly of Experts is an 88-member clerical body that is responsible for appointing and supervising the Supreme Leader, according to the Iranian constitution.[7] Sixty Assembly members issued a 10-point statement on June 28 in which they warned negotiators not to violate Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s red lines.[8] These red lines include solidifying Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, securing compensation and the release of Iranian frozen assets, securing sanctions relief, and forcing US troops to withdraw from the region.[9] Mojtaba outlined these Iranian objectives in a statement on June 18.[10] The Assembly of Experts statement also reiterated that Mojtaba barred negotiators from discussing Iran’s nuclear program with the United States.[11] The statement notably did not receive unanimous support within the Assembly, even among its Board of Directors, which is highly unusual given the body’s seniority and its tendency to present a unified public posture on issues. The Assembly of Experts Secretariat later issued a statement on June 28 clarifying that the statement did not represent the Assembly’s official position and that official Assembly statements are only released by the Secretariat, the chairman, or the presidium.[12] The Secretariat added that the Assembly of Experts members who did not sign the statement either opposed the statement or were not informed about it. The chart below displays which Assembly of Experts leaders signed the original statement and which ones did not.

It remains unclear who pushed the group of Assembly members to issue the statement outside the Assembly’s normal process. This incident is at least the second incident in recent months that has publicly revealed divisions within the Assembly of Experts. Mojtaba’s selection as Supreme Leader previously divided the Assembly’s members, according to anti-regime and Western media. Anti-regime media reported in March that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders heavily pressured Assembly of Experts members to appoint Mojtaba as Supreme Leader, but that some Assembly members refused to attend the vote in protest.[13] The New York Times similarly reported in March that IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and former IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari pushed the Assembly of Experts to select Mojtaba as Supreme Leader after Ali Khamenei’s death.[14]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately appears to be trying to build support for the MoU among senior clerics and defend the Iranian negotiating team. Pezeshkian met with several senior Shia clerics in Qom Province on June 28, likely to rally clerical support for the agreement, present the MoU as a source of economic relief, and insulate negotiators from criticism by hardline clerics.[15] Pezeshkian emphasized that the government expects the MoU to create economic openings, including via sanctions relief and the release of Iranian frozen assets.[16] Pezeshkian told Ayatollah Mousa Shobairy Zanjani that the agreement is a major victory, the United States has lifted oil and petrochemical sanctions, and Qatar will soon release $6 billion USD of Iran’s $12 billion USD worth of assets currently frozen in Qatar.[17] Pezeshkian’s emphasis on economic relief suggests that he is trying to sell the MoU domestically as a tangible victory to ease public pressure and protect Iranian negotiating members from hardline criticisms, such as from members of the Assembly of Experts (see above).

Iranian officials and media are signaling that Iran will not allow Oman to constrain Iran’s effort to establish control over the Strait of Hormuz. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency argued in an op-ed on June 29 that tying the future management of the strait to Omani consent would harm Iranian interests.[18] Tasnim argued that Oman can participate in and benefit from Iran’s control over the strait but cannot determine whether Iran manages the waterway.[19] Tasnim added that the strait is an “existential” issue for Iran but only an “economic” issue for Oman and argued that Iran should not let the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or Omani opposition return the strait back to its pre-war status.[20] UNCLOS does not permit states bordering international waterways to restrict transit passage or impose charges for transit.[21] Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati similarly stated on June 29 that Iran has adopted a “new and decisive approach” to organizing traffic, managing traffic costs, and maintaining the strait, and called this issue strategic and non-negotiable.[22] Velayati also warned Oman against letting external pressure, including from the Gulf countries, damage its relationship with Iran.[23] These comments come as the Omani government has signaled its opposition to Iranian control of the strait, including via a joint Gulf Cooperation Council-US statement on June 25 that explicitly rejected any Iranian attempts to exert control over the strait.[24] The International Maritime Organization (IMO) and Oman also announced a joint effort on June 23 to move hundreds of stranded vessels through the strait through a designated safe route along the Omani coast but later paused this effort on June 26 after Iran attacked a Singapore-flagged cargo ship on June 25.[25] The IMO-Omani route undermines Iranian efforts to control the strait by offering an alternative route to Iran’s illegitimate traffic separation scheme, which forces vessels into Iranian territorial waters. Omani Foreign Minister Badr al Busaidi additionally stated that Oman does not support transit fees for passage through the strait during an interview with French media on June 29.[26] Omani officials similarly told CNN on June 27 that Oman opposes “mandatory fees or tolls” in the strait.[27] Busaidi did not rule out “mechanisms related to maritime services,” such as “enhancing navigation safety,” and “combating pollution,” however.[28] Iranian media argued that Busaidi’s comment suggested that Oman would be open to charging fees for maritime services.[29] Iran has consistently sought to impose fees on vessels transiting through the strait as part of its effort to solidify control over the waterway.

An international media correspondent released on June 29 the reported text of the June 26 Israel-Lebanon-United States trilateral framework agreement’s security annex, which stipulates the process by which the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will backfill the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in southern Lebanon.[30] The annex includes a four-stage mechanism for the LAF and IDF to dismantle non-state armed groups in designated “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon.[31] The annex’s model for disarming non-state groups in pilot zones closely resembles a “clear-hold-build” counterinsurgency strategy. The agreement’s security annex stipulates that security forces will take “legal measures” against armed non-state fighters and destroy all non-state groups’ infrastructure and weapons, which an unspecified third party will verify.[32] LAF units will then hold and establish control over the pilot zones, coinciding with IDF units’ phased withdrawal from the zones, to prevent non-state armed groups from reconstituting in those areas.[33] The Lebanese government will finally begin reconstruction efforts in these areas with international assistance and political oversight.[34] The annex also stipulates that Israel and Lebanon will establish a military deconfliction body to verify disarmament progress in southern Lebanon and operate as an indirect backchannel between the IDF and LAF.[35] It is unclear whether the IDF and LAF will share responsibility for initial clearing operations in the pilot zones.[36] The security annex also does not clarify whether Israel and Lebanon will establish additional pilot zones in the future. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz told Israeli journalists on June 29 that the IDF will not “retreat a single millimeter” further from Israeli-held territory in southern Lebanon, except for the two current pilot zones, until Hezbollah is disarmed.[37] An unspecified official separately told Israeli media on June 28 that the annex will enable the IDF to retain its “freedom of action” in Lebanon, although the reported text does not clarify whether the IDF may continue to target Hezbollah in areas where the LAF is operating.[38]

Hezbollah officials and media are attempting to delegitimize the trilateral framework agreement by accusing the Lebanese government of violating Lebanese law and public interests. Hezbollah-affiliated media argued on June 29 that the agreement is invalid because it allegedly violates Lebanese sovereignty, popular consent, and the Lebanese constitution due to the agreement being signed under Israeli military “duress.”[39] Hezbollah officials, including Secretary General Naim Qassem, have made similar statements in recent days, claiming that the agreement and ongoing Lebanese negotiations with Israel constitute acts of “high treason” and violate the constitution, the sensitive sectarian National Pact, and Lebanon’s territorial integrity.[40]

Hezbollah is also likely attempting to mobilize non-Shia elements of the Lebanese public to oppose the framework agreement. Hezbollah-affiliated media published statements from Lebanese Sunni religious leaders that denounced the agreement and expressed support for Hezbollah on June 29.[41] Hezbollah may assess that platforming non-Shia opposition to the framework agreement strengthens the group’s narrative that the Lebanese government is violating the interests of all Lebanese civilians, rather than exclusively Hezbollah’s predominantly Shia support base.[42]

Hezbollah is pursuing multiple lines of effort to oppose the framework agreement and deter the Lebanese government from disarming Hezbollah. Senior Hezbollah officials are conducting an information operation to deter the Lebanese government from disarming Hezbollah by threatening renewed civil war in Lebanon.[43] Hezbollah Parliamentarian Hassan Fadlallah has repeatedly warned that Hezbollah will mobilize mass protests to stop the government from implementing the agreement, for example.[44] Other Hezbollah officials and allies, including Hezbollah Deputy Political Council leader Mahmoud Qamati and Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, have discouraged Hezbollah and Amal Movement supporters from organizing public demonstrations, however.[45] Hezbollah parliamentary bloc leader Mohammad Raad has also attempted to spread disinformation about the agreement’s provisions and alleged on June 27 that the agreement is a “cover up” for a permanent Israeli military presence in Lebanon.[46]