Toplines
Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continues to make greatly exaggerated claims of Russian advances amidst Russian forces’ poor performance in their ongoing Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. Gerasimov visited the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces (GoF) command on April 21 and claimed — contrary to available evidence, including pro-Russian war reporting — that Russian forces seized over 1,700 square kilometers and 80 settlements in Ukraine, including the entirety of Luhansk Oblast, since early 2026.[1] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized about 700 square kilometers and 34 settlements in March and April 2026 alone. ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced 381.5 square kilometers and seized 13 settlements since the start of 2026, and that Russian forces have only seized two settlements and have actually lost 59.79 square kilometers across the theater since March 1. The Russian military command has also previously claimed to have seized Luhansk Oblast three times prior to April 21, two of which were after Ukraine’s Fall 2022 counteroffensive in the area.[2] Gerasimov made several exaggerated claims about Russian operations in specific parts of the frontline, even compared to other Russian sources. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces advanced to within seven kilometers of Kramatorsk and 12 kilometers of Slovyansk, but even the most expansive previous Russian claims that ISW has observed placed Russian forces at closest roughly 14 kilometers from Kramatorsk and nine kilometers from Slovyansk. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized 70 percent of Lyman, Donetsk Oblast and 75 percent of Novopavlivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, but ISW has not observed evidence to indicate that Russian forces have seized any of Lyman and has only observed evidence to indicate that Russian forces seized 20.51 percent of Novopavlivka. Gerasimov further claimed that Russian forces are fighting in or have seized several small settlements that are several kilometers away from ISW’s current assessed frontline. Gerasimov has been making speeches exaggerating Russian gains roughly once or twice a month for the last several months and has made comparable aggrandized claims on January 15 and 27, February 15, and March 16 so far in 2026.[3]
Even the most generous interpretations of other Russian sources do not support Gerasimov’s claims. The maximalist area of possible Russian gains, which includes areas where ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced into or infiltrated into combined with unconfirmed areas that Russian sources have claimed as seized, between January 1 and April 21, is 715 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory — only 42 percent of Gerasimov’s claimed Russian gains for this same period. It is notable that no Russian source has provided a map that encompasses a battlefield geometry that includes anything approximating 1,700 square kilometers of Russian gains in 2026. Some of Gerasimov’s claims encompass settlements that are several kilometers from the furthest extent of Russian sources’ claimed Russian advances. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces entered Borova, roughly 10 kilometers away from the furthest extent of ISW’s assessed Russian advances and roughly four kilometers away from the furthest extent of previous Russian claims. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces entered Studenok (northwest of Lyman), roughly 12 kilometers away from the furthest extent of ISW’s assessed Russian advances and roughly five kilometers away from the furthest extent of previous Russian claims. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces entered Zaporozhets (northwest of Orikhiv), roughly 12 kilometers away from the furthest extent of ISW’s assessed Russian advances and roughly three kilometers away from the furthest extent of previous Russian claims. Pro-Russian milblogger Rybar’s most recently published map of the frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast posted on April 20 shows Zaporozhets firmly under Ukrainian control, for example.[4] ISW has not observed any evidence of Russian forces operating in any of these settlements recently, but has observed evidence of Russian forces conducting air and artillery strikes against all of these settlements in the past two months.[5] Russian forces’ usage of these area-of-effect weapons further indicates that Russian forces likely remain a significant distance away from these settlements.
Gerasimov is likely attempting to obscure Russia’s disappointing lack of progress in its Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. Russian forces launched their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive no later than March 17 but have thus far failed to make any tactically significant gains, having lost about 10 square kilometers across the theater since March 17.[6] Russia’s rate of advance has slowed in northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine, including in its priority effort against the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast, and Russian forces have had to reduce their tempo of operations in several areas of the frontline due to heavy casualties.[7] Ukrainian defenses and counterattacks are imposing additional costs on Russia’s effort to maintain the facade that Russian forces are constantly advancing across all areas of the frontline simultaneously. Russia’s simultaneously decreasing recruitment rates and increasing casualty rates are threatening the sustainability of the Russian military command’s usual tactics of casualty-heavy, high-intensity waves of assaults and infiltration missions without significant changes to Russia’s force generation system.[8] Gerasimov’s April 21 speech covered Russian operations from the past two to four months, a more expansive time period than the singular months or less that he covered in his January, February, and March 2026 speeches, likely in an attempt to disguise the lack of significant gains by presenting larger claimed gains across a greater timeframe.[9] Despite stretching the timeframe covered in his claims, Gerasimov still could not present frontline claims that even the most expansive claims from Russia’s ultranationalist milblogger community would consider realistic. Russian milbloggers have repeatedly criticized Gerasimov for exaggerating Russian gains near Kupyansk and other parts of the frontline and the practices of seizing settlements “on credit” and sending “beautiful reports,” each alleging unsubstantiated Russian advances to higher-ups from which the military command then makes operational plans and objectives for Russian forces on the ground.[10] Gerasimov also reiterated several previous claims of seizing certain settlements throughout his speech, but presented them as recent claims, attempting to create the false impression that Russian forces are rapidly advancing on the battlefield —contrary to all available evidence.[11] Gerasimov’s monthly presentation of all these aggrandized claims is part of the Kremlin’s ongoing cognitive warfare effort that aims to portray Russian forces as making simultaneous advances across the theater. This campaign is trying to convince the West that the frontlines in Ukraine are collapsing, such that Ukraine should capitulate to Russia’s demands out of fear of intensified future Russian offensive operations.[12] Ukraine’s frontlines, in fact, are operationally stable, and Ukraine liberated more territory than Russian forces seized across the theater in February 2026.[13]
The Kremlin continues its efforts to militarize Russian society and appoint loyal veterans to positions of authority ahead of Russia’s State Duma elections in September 2026. Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a speech at an event celebrating municipal governments on April 21, in which he emphasized that Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine are returning from the war and becoming effective municipal officials.[14] Putin characterized these veterans as capable of making decisions that augment the effectiveness of municipal governments, of understanding Russian citizens’ needs, and of supporting the needs of frontline Russian troops, Russian veterans, and their families. Putin characterized Russian municipal authorities as the “face” of the Russian government and stressed that all Russian citizens must work toward strengthening Russia’s sovereignty, security, and sustainable independent development. Putin connected his efforts to militarize all levels of the Russian government with efforts to prepare for the September 2026 State Duma elections. Putin emphasized that the Kremlin is going to continue to leverage its Time of Heroes program, a comprehensive government program that places Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine in various positions in federal, regional, and local governments, and similar regional initiatives ahead of the elections. Putin also reiterated boilerplate rhetoric attempting to rally Russian society behind the war in Ukraine, stressing that only national unity can achieve Russia’s objectives and ultimate victory in the war. The Kremlin has been pursuing a concerted effort to appoint loyal veterans of the war in Ukraine to local, municipal, regional, and federal positions in an attempt to militarize the Russian government and broader Russian society.[15] The Kremlin is likely intensifying its effort ahead of the September 2026 State Duma elections to consolidate the Kremlin’s control and sustain support for Russia’s war in Ukraine as Russian society is feeling the impacts of the war more acutely and as Putin’s opinion ratings are dropping.[16]
Ukrainian long-range drone strikes continue to have significant impacts on Russian oil production. Reuters reported on April 21, citing five unspecified sources and Reuters’ own calculations, that Ukrainian drone strikes and disruptions to crude flows through the Druzhba pipeline have forced Russia to cut oil output by roughly 300,000 to 400,000 barrels per day in April 2026 compared to its production in January through March 2026, and a drop of 500,000 to 600,000 barrels compared to production levels from late 2025.[17] Reuters noted that this could be the sharpest decline in Russian oil output since 2020. Ukrainian forces have intensified strikes against port and oil infrastructure, particularly against assets along the Baltic Sea, since mid-March 2026, causing significant damage to all three of Russia’s major western oil export ports in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea.[18] Russia’s ability to continue exporting petroleum products and oil is partially dependent on Russia’s continued ability being able to store and transport them from its western ports. Continued Ukrainian drone strikes are degrading Russia’s ability to store and transport oil. Russia’s reduced storage and export capabilities from these Ukrainian strikes are reducing the amount of oil that Russia can sell and are impacting Russian oil export revenues that Russia relies on to fund its war in Ukraine.[19]
Key Takeaways
- Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continues to make greatly exaggerated claims of Russian advances amidst Russian forces’ poor performance in their ongoing Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.
- Even the most generous interpretations of other Russian sources do not support Gerasimov’s claims.
- Gerasimov is likely attempting to obscure Russia’s disappointing lack of progress thus far in its Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.
- The Kremlin continues its efforts to militarize Russian society and appoint loyal veterans to positions of authority ahead of Russia’s State Duma elections in September 2026.
- Ukrainian long-range drone strikes continue to have significant impacts on Russian oil production.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction and the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets. Russia launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 143 drones against Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets overnight on April 20 to 21. Ukrainian intelligence sources told Ukrainian media outlets on April 21 that Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) elements conducted a drone strike against the Transneft-Privolga Samara oil pumping station (roughly 1000 kilometers from the international border) of the Druzhba pipeline in Prosvet, Samara Oblast overnight, starting a large fire.[20] The sources stated that the strike damaged five tanks holding 20,000 cubic meters of oil each. The sources reported that the station produces Urals crude for export. Saratov Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev stated on April 21 that Ukrainian drones targeted an unspecified industrial enterprise in the oblast overnight.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 21 that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian equipment depot near Persianovsky, Rostov Oblast (roughly 210 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on April 20 to 21.[22] The North Caucasus Railway acknowledged on April 20 that an overnight Ukrainian drone strike damaged an overhead line at the Persianovka railway station in Persianovsky, delaying 15 trains.[23]
Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 21 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian weapons and equipment concentration area near Klimovo, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 10 kilometers from the international border) on April 20 or overnight on April 20 to 21.[24]
The Ukrainian General Staff and satellite imagery provided additional battle damage assessments (BDA) of prior Ukrainian strikes. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 21 that an April 17 Ukrainian strike against the Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast damaged an RVS-10000 storage tank, two sections of pipeline, and an ELOU AVT-6 crude oil distillation unit.[25] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) investigative journalist Mark Krutov published NASA Worldview satellite imagery taken on April 21 that shows that the smoke plume rising from the Tuapse Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai stretches over 300 kilometers long following Ukrainian strikes overnight on April 15 to 16 and April 19 to 20.[26]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on April 21 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Sumy City.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City), northeast of Myropilske, southeast of Prokhody (both east of Sumy City), and east of Taratutyne (southeast of Sumy City).[28]
An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Sumy direction reported on April 21 that Ukrainian forces repelled a roughly platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault along the international border between Kursk and Sumy oblasts.[29] The officer added that Russian forces used three armored vehicles, including a self-propelled howitzer, and three motorcycles, and advanced approximately 300 meters before Ukrainian forces destroyed the column. The officer noted that the Russian military command likely ordered the assault after Russian infiltration tactics failed.
The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) reportedly conducted a strike against a Ukrainian command post northeast of Sumy City. A Russian milblogger published footage on April 20 purportedly showing VKS elements conducting a guided glide bomb strike against a Ukrainian brigade command post near Mala Rybytsia (northeast of Sumy City).[30]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces recently infiltrated in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage published on April 21 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions and raising a flag in Veterynarne (north of Kharkiv City) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[31] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited assault elements of the Russian 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) with the claimed seizure of Veterynarne, and Russian milbloggers also claimed that elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Vakha Battalion (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) and the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies supported the assaults.[32]
Russian forces intensified offensive operations north of Kharkiv City and continued offensive operations near Vovchansk as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Okhrimivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[34]
Russian forces continue to claim settlement seizures without established control. The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps refuted on April 20 the Russian MoD’s April 17 claim of the seizure of Zybyne (northeast of Kharkiv City) and stated that Russian forces do not control the settlement.[35]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on April 21.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction as Russian forces continue their attacks while retaining a limited presence in Kupyansk. Geolocated footage posted on April 17 and geolocated on April 20 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian positions in northeastern Podoly (east of Kupyansk), indicating that there are likely no Russian positions in the area.[36] Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on April 21 that Russian forces in the area are concentrating their main efforts in the task force area of responsibility (AoR) in the Kupyansk direction and are attempting to reduce the Ukrainian bridgehead on the left bank of the Oskil River.[37] Trehubov reported that Russian forces are sustaining pressure along this axis despite significant losses, likely in order to regain the operational initiative. Trehubov reported that seasonal foliage is improving concealment conditions for small Russian infantry groups and is likely facilitating continued Russian infiltration attempts. Trehubov stated that Russian forces are also reportedly redeploying reserves from Russia to sustain offensive pressure on the Kupyansk sector. Trehubov reported that about 10 Russian call signs are active in Kupyansk as of April 21.[38]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 21 but did not make confirmed advances.[39] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces entered Borova and seized all of Luhansk Oblast.[40] Russian officials have claimed four separate times since October 2022 that Russian forces had seized all of Luhansk Oblast.[41]Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast overnight on April 20 to 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition and fuel and lubricants depot near occupied Aidar (roughly 90 kilometers from the frontline).[42]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces are reportedly intensifying small-group infiltrations and drone strikes in the Slovyansk direction amid changing weather and foliage conditions. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on April 21 that Russian forces have increased small-group activity given the warmer weather.[43] The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade reported that Russian forces are bringing up fresh drone crews to the Lyman direction, specifically to strike Ukrainian logistics.[44]
Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces entered Studenok (northwest of Lyman) and Staryi Karavan (northeast of Slovyansk).[45]
Geolocated footage published on April 20 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian positions in northern Nykyforivka (southeast of Slovyansk), indicating that Russian forces likely do not hold positions in the immediate vicinity of the Ukrainian position, contrary to Russian claims.[46]
Russian forces continue to target civilians in their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against the Fortress Belt. Slovyansk Military Administration Head Vadym Lyakh reported on April 21 that Russian forces conducted FAB-1500 and FAB-250 strikes against Slovyansk, injuring three civilians and destroying a school and other civilian infrastructure.[47] These airstrikes are likely a continuation of Russia’s BAI campaign, aiming to degrade Ukrainian logistics and defensive abilities ahead of ground operations to enable Russian forces to make more rapid, easier territorial advances.[48] Russian forces have integrated intentional civilian harm into their wider operation BAI template, indicating that the Russian military is weaponizing civilian harm as an intentional tool of war.[49]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area as Russian forces continued infiltration missions in the area.[50] Geolocated footage published on April 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southeastern Kostyantynivka.[51] Geolocated footage published on April 18 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in eastern Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[52] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[53]
Russian forces continue to conduct mechanized assaults in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area but are struggling to make gains as Ukrainian forces continue limited counterattacks in the area. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on April 21 that elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) with reinforcements from the 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps, SMD) conducted several assaults using armored vehicles and light motorized equipment in the Chasiv Yar direction in the past week.[54] Mashovets stated that Russian forces only managed to seize three windbreaks northwest of the Novopivnichnyi Microraion (northwestern Chasiv Yar) and that Russian forces have been unable to enter settlements west and southwest of Chasiv Yar. Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces periodically counterattack in eastern Kostyantynivka, complicating Russian efforts to consolidate positions in the area.
Ukrainian drone operations are complicating Russian advances northeast of Kostyantynivka. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that large numbers of Ukrainian drones are striking Russian mechanized columns near Stupochky (northeast of Kostyantynivka) en route to attack objectives, resulting in a broad contested “gray zone.”[55]
Russian forces continued costly assaults toward Dobropillya but failed to achieve a breakthrough. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on April 21 that elements of the Russian 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) are attempting to advance along a narrow axis toward the southern approaches of Dobropillya via Hryshyne and Novooleksandrivka (both northwest of Pokrovsk and south of Dobropillya), while seeking to expand their penetration toward Vodyanske (northwest of Pokrovsk and south of Dobropillya) and the outskirts of Dobropillya itself.[56] Mashovets reported that Russian assaults in this sector have devolved into protracted, attritional fighting, particularly around Hryshyne, where engagements during April have become ”meat grinding” operations with Russian advances reaching only several hundred meters per day.[57]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 21 but did not make confirmed advances.[58]
Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[59]
Russian forces continue their BAI campaign hindering Ukrainian logistics in the Pokrovsk direction. Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Okishev reported on April 21 that Russian forces have concentrated strikes northwest and north of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration near Hryshyne and Rodynske, using drones, artillery, and glide bombs.[60] Okishev stated that Russian drones are severely constricting Ukrainian logistics north of Pokrovsk and that Ukrainian forces rely on drone drops and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to conduct logistics.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 21 but did not advance.[61]
Russian forces have reduced the size of infiltration groups in the Oleksandrivka direction and continue to struggle with communications following the Starlink shutdown. Soldiers of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on April 21 that Russian forces reduced the size of their infiltrations groups from seven or eight soldiers to two or four members during March and that Ukrainian fortifications and barbed wire continue to restrict Russian advances.[62] The soldiers added that Russian forces are building Wi-Fi bridges to compensate for the Starlink shutdown, but such satellite dishes are more visible and require more manpower for setup, exposing them to Ukrainian strikes.
Russian forces continued infiltrations and ground assaults northeast and southeast of Oleksandrivka on April 20 and 21.[63] Geolocated footage published on April 20 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in southwestern Sichneve (northeast of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[64] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized Boikove (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[65]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied southern Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on April 20 that Ukrainian forces struck three Russian ammunition depots and three supply depots near occupied Mykilske (roughly 59 kilometers from the frontline), occupied Makedonivka (roughly 106 kilometers from the frontline), and occupied Markyne (roughly 147 kilometers from the frontline) and two Russian logistics hubs near occupied Mykilske and Markyne during the previous week (between April 13 and 20).[66] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 20 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian ammunition depots near occupied Mariyanivka (roughly 76 kilometers from the frontline) and occupied Lisne (roughly 68 kilometers from the frontline) on April 20 or overnight on April 20 to 21.[67]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on April 21 but did not advance.[68]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 21 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted counterattacks.[69] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized Veselyanka and entered Zaporozhets (both northwest of Orikhiv).[70]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and mid-range strikes against Russian military assets in western Zaporizhia Oblast overnight on April 20 to 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 20 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post near Novopavlivka (roughly 94 kilometers from the frontline).[71] Ukrainian Special Operations Forces reported on April 20 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian repair base and a command post in occupied Hamivka (about 92 kilometers from the frontline) during the previous week (between April 13 and 20).[72]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on April 21.
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and mid-range strikes against Russian military assets in the Kherson direction on April 20 to 21. Geolocated footage published on April 20 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian drone operator command post in Hola Prystan (about seven kilometers from the frontline and southwest of Kherson City).[73] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 20 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian materiel and technical depots near occupied Novomykolaivka (about 42 kilometers from the frontline).[74]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces continued long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 20 to 21. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Kursk Oblast and 143 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and other long-range strike drones, including about 80 Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea and Donetsk City.[75] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 116 drones and one missile, and that 22 drones struck 17 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged energy, residential, and medical infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian strikes also damaged railway infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and Kharkiv City.[77] Chernihiv Oblast energy operator Chernihivoblenergo reported that Russian strikes against an energy facility in Nizhyn Raion left 54,000 subscribers without power.[78] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian strikes damaged residential infrastructure in Bohodukhiv, Kharkiv Oblast on the afternoon of April 21.[79]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://tass dot com/defense/2120089; https://t.me/mod_russia/62805; https://t.me/mod_russia/62806
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/; https://t.me/tass_agency/369012; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_3-29/; http://en dot kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78134
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2026/
[4] https://t.me/rybar/79648
[5] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2032124494001619125; https://t.me/zvezdanews/171693; https://t.me/borova_gromada/12365; https://t.me/synegubov/20731
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2026/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2026/ ; https://tass dot com/defense/2120089
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2025/
[11] https://tass dot com/defense/2120089
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2025/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2026/
[14] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79582
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-february-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2026/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-weakness-offers-leverage-2/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/
[17] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-cuts-oil-output-april-sources-say-2026-04-21/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2026/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2026/
[20] https://suspilne dot media/1294555-droni-sbu-urazili-naftostanciu-samara-u-samarskij-oblasti-rf-dzerelo/; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4114872-droni-sbu-urazili-naftostanciu-samara-aka-gotue-na-eksport-sort-urals-dzerelo.html; https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/sbu-urazila-dronami-naftostantsiyu-samara-1776765836.html; https://energybase dot ru/compressor-station/ldps-samara#map; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/news/2026/04/21/8031094/
[21] https://t.me/fedorishchev_official/637
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37562
[23] https://t.me/skzd_official/3913
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37562
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37562
[26] https://x.com/kromark/status/2046527542971019720; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2026/
[27] https://t.me/uvkkursk/327 ; https://t.me/rybar/79643; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/207612; https://t.me/dva_majors/91680 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/113492; https://t.me/wargonzo/33680 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/7663
[28] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/207612; https://t.me/z_arhiv/33423; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/113492
[29] https://youtu.be/LLjKgKKG8cs?t=509; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/21/shho-vy-tam-voshkayetesya-treba-jty-v-ataku-na-sumshhyni-vidbyvaly-ataku-organizovanu-suyiczydalnym-komandyrom/
[30] https://t.me/epoddubny/27165
[31] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2046490608890687617; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/17420; https://t.me/mod_russia/62813; https://t.me/mod_russia/62814
[32] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/113527 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71904 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/42143; https://t.me/dva_majors/91713 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/17420 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71911; https://t.me/mod_russia/62814
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37537 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37539 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20497; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37563; https://t.me/severnnyi/7663 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/91680 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/42121 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71914 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33680; https://t.me/rusich_army/29253
[34] https://t.me/zovpobedy/17788; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/42121
[35] https://www.facebook.com/reel/850078358108563; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1293931-naselenij-punkt-v-kredit-minoboroni-rf-zaavilo-pro-zajnatta-zibinogo-na-harkivsini-v-zsu-zaperecili-cu-informaciu/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/
[36] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2046429876450893859; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2046429878652969297; https://vkvideo [dot] ru/video-121828295_456254482
[37] https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20500
[38] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1294375-rosiani-aktivizuvalisa-vzdovz-linii-frontu-na-harkivsini-zokrema-pid-kupanskom-tregubov/
[39] https://t.me/zovpobedy/17789; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/207635 ; https://t.me/gvZapad/18363 ; https://t.me/gvZapad/18360 ; https://t.me/gvZapad/17782; https://t.me/gvZapad/18366
[40] https://t.me/mod_russia/62805
[41] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_3-29/
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37562
[43] https://youtu.be/LLjKgKKG8cs?t=1518; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/21/zakripytysya-hoch-des-projty-hoch-kudys-pihotni-grupy-rosiyan-rvutsya-do-slovyanska/
[44] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/21/tryvaye-bytva-za-logistyku-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-vyrizayut-bud-yakyj-ruh-na-perednomu-krayu/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLjKgKKG8cs&t=2761s
[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/62805
[46] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2046462627602460886; https://t.me/shock3OA/6450
[47] https://t.me/slv_vca/35226
[48] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quest-to-intensify-the-theater-wide-battlefield-air-interdiction-campaign-against-ukraines-logistics/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2026/
[49] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37537 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37539 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37563 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33680 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/91680
[51] https://t.me/z4lpr/1576; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2046546263223439858
[52] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2046255582739407326; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2046255594277859671; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2046255547704299621;
[53] https://t.me/rybar/79641
[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3363
[55] https://t.me/rybar/79641
[56] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3365 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3366
[57] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3366
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37537 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37539 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37563 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33680
[59]
https://t.me/mod_russia/62806
[60] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_-e1L724OU; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/21/u-zvyazczi-z-shturmovymy-grupamy-praczyuyut-roboty-z-turelyamy-poblyzu-pokrovska-desantnyky-atakuyut-razom-iz-dronamy/
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37537; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37539; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37563
[62] https://suspilne dot media/1293707-uzimku-rosianam-vimknuli-dostup-do-starlink-ak-ce-vplinulo-na-front-rozpovidaut-ukrainski-vijskovi/
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37537; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37539; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37563; https://t.me/wargonzo/33680; https://t.me/voin_dv/19312
[64] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2046247546742309139; https://www.instagram.com/3battali0n/reel/DXWquoejZxK/
[65] https://t.me/mod_russia/62806
[66] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/20/vorozha-doroga-do-krymu-palaye-urazheni-arsenaly-ta-logistychni-haby-protyvnyka/; https://t.me/ukr_sof/2724
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37562
[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37537; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37539; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37563; https://t.me/wargonzo/33680; https://t.me/voin_dv/19312;
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37563 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/91680 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33680 ; https://t.me/romanov_92/52382 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2046548026211139661
[70] https://t.me/mod_russia/62806
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37562
[72] https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2046299884677116014?s=20 ; https://t.me/ukr_sof/2724
[73] https://www.instagram.com/reel/DXWtkNWDHp5/ ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2046312784632443113
[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37562
[75] https://t.me/kpszsu/60422
[76] https://t.me/chernigivoblenergo/5061; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1294225-znestrumleni-54-tisaci-abonentiv-unaslidok-poskodzenna-energoobekta-u-nizinskomu-rajoni/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/62167; https://t.me/astrapress/110354; https://t.me/police_su_region/36521; https://t.me/astrapress/110372; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/64445; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/04/21/vorog-atakuvav-sumy-6-postrazhdalyh-poshkodzheni-budynky-ta-avto/; https://t.me/synegubov/21241
[77] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/42154; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/42137
[78] https://t.me/chernigivoblenergo/5061; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1294225-znestrumleni-54-tisaci-abonentiv-unaslidok-poskodzenna-energoobekta-u-nizinskomu-rajoni/
[79] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/28387; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/21/vorozhi-drony-kilka-raziv-atakuvaly-bogoduhiv-pyatero-postrazhdalyh/
