Toplines
Russian state-owned bank Vnesheconombank (VEB) fired Chief Economist Andrey Klepach following media reports of a negative economic assessment he offered that contradicts Russian President Vladimir Putin’s theory of victory in Ukraine. Klepach provided an assessment of Russia’s economic and geopolitical challenges to the Moscow Exchange’s Nikitsky Club on May 21, concluding that the Russian war economy is stagnating as high defense spending, restrictive monetary policy, sanctions, and Ukrainian strikes constrain growth and investment.[1] Independent Russian media outlet the Moscow Times reported on Klepach’s assessment on August 14, and other Russian media outlets circulated his statements on August 15.[2] Independent Russian media outlet the Bell reported on August 16, citing a source close to Klepach, that VEB Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Igor Shuvalov fired Klepach that day after a “call from above,” and another source confirmed that Klepach’s dismissal was related to his economic assessment.[3] the Bell noted that Klepach served as the chief economist of VEB for 12 years and as a deputy minister of economic development for six years before that. He served in that capacity under Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina and current Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov while they were ministers of economic development. Klepach stated in his May 21 assessment that Russia can sustain a war of attrition without collapsing but that it cannot do so without risking a social crisis and falling further behind the United States, China, and Ukraine economically and technologically. Klepach stated that Ukrainian strikes against Russian port, petroleum, chemical, and logistics infrastructure are a noticeable macroeconomic barrier to Russian economic expansion, which he notes will likely slow to near-zero annual growth in 2026.
Klepach stated that Russian defense spending has greatly increased since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, leading the Russian military-industrial complex to increasingly crowd out the civilian economy, increasing constraints on civilian industrial sectors and causing them to contract.
Klepach stated that Russia’s high defense spending and tight monetary policy, likely referring to the high key interest rate that peaked at 21 percent in June 2025 and currently stands at 14 percent, are ”squeezing” the economy, assessing that investment will decline by 2.5 percent in real terms in 2026 and will likely see no growth in 2027.[4] The Kremlin continues to pressure the Central Bank to reduce the key interest rate to project economic stability and expand the capital available to the Russian defense industry despite ongoing fiscal inflationary pressures.
Putin clearly articulated a theory of victory in Ukraine relying on protracted attritional warfare at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 7, 2024.[5] Putin’s theory of the case assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances indefinitely; prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations; and that Russia can prevail in a war of attrition by outlasting Ukrainian will and that of Ukraine’s external supporters.[6] ISW has previously observed that Russia is increasingly struggling to sustain its method of waging a protracted attritional war, as losses exceed recruitment rates and financial and material costs rise, and that the Kremlin is exaggerating its tactical advances to present the appearance of continuous military gains.[7] ISW has, in fact, assessed that the Russian military is systematically misinforming Putin about the state of the front line in part due to the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian armed forces that milbloggers refer to as “beautiful reports.”[8] Putin is likely more aware of Russia’s economic problems than he is of the military situation but determined to similarly present an appearance of economic stability despite evidence of Russia’s ongoing economic issues.[9]
There is considerable evidence that Klepach’s assessment of the Russian economic problems aligns with reality, undermining the validity of Putin’s theory of victory. Russian business newspaper Vedomosti reported on August 18 that Russian businesses have transferred 384 billion rubles (about $4.5 million) in “voluntary” contributions to the Russian federal budget in 2026, roughly one-and-a-half times the total amount collected through this mechanism in 2025. Putin personally called on Russia’s top business leaders to make such contributions on March 26, 2026, to ease the burden for the protracted attritional war on the Russian treasury.[10] Klepach stated that the Kremlin may cut expenditures by 600 billion rubles (about $7.1 billion) in 2027 compared to 2026, reflecting the reality of the pressure on the Russian treasury despite this measure and increased revenues from higher crude oil prices.[11] ISW continues to assess that the Russian government has adopted suboptimal economic policies to sustain its war in Ukraine, leading to many of Russia’s current economic issues, including increased and unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, that impose complex challenges on Russia’s monetary and macroeconomic policy — all of which are concerns that Klepach acknowledges.[12]
The Russian population is also reacting to the perception of economic decline in ways that can further damage Russian economic and fiscal policy. The Washington Post reported on August 18, citing Russian Central Bank data, that Russians withdrew 286.4 billion rubles (about $4.5 billion) in June 2026, $7.3 billion in July 2026, and $3.4 billion in the first two weeks of August 2026.[13] A senior executive at Sberbank, Russia’s biggest retail financial institution noted that withdrawals in 2026 may end up being nearly double those of 2022. A bank run, combined with the other factors contributing to Russian economic decline, may pose serious domestic challenges for the Kremlin in the run up to the September 18-20, 2026, State Duma elections. The significance of those challenges is increased by reports that Putin is considering and preparing for a large-scale mobilization after the election.[14] Russia’s economy is not likely to collapse rapidly absent some additional major shock, but Russia’s economic deterioration increases the domestic costs Putin must face in demanding even more sacrifice from the Russian people for his unsuccessful war.[15]
The Kremlin continues reiterating its determination to prevent Russia’s deteriorating economic realities from reducing its maximalist war aims by refusing to engage in meaningful negotiations to end the war. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov emphasized on August 18 that Russia’s negotiating position rules out freezing the current frontline, effectively reiterating Russia’s commitment to continuing the war.[16] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had similarly stated on August 14 that Russia is unwilling to accept a ceasefire that freezes the current frontline and reiterated Russia’s commitment to continuing the war until Russia can secure a settlement on its own terms.[17] Senior Kremlin officials continue refusing negotiations likely because they must act on Putin’s belief that Russian forces can win the war of attrition by making gradual, creeping advances indefinitely while outlasting Western support for Ukraine and Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.[18] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly reiterated his commitment to peace negotiations and a willingness to make meaningful compromises to end the war, despite Russian efforts to falsely paint Ukraine as the intransigent party in peace efforts.[19]
Moldovan President Maia Sandu stated on August 18 that Russia deliberately launches some of its drones into Moldovan and NATO airspace. Sandu said that Moldovan authorities can differentiate between Russian drones intentionally launched to violated Moldovan and NATO airspace and those that did so accidentally based on the drones’ trajectories.[20] Sandu is notably the first European head of state or senior official to explicitly state that Russian forces intentionally launch some of their drones into the European airspace. ISW continues to assess that such drone incursions are part of Russia’s “Phase Zero” campaign that aims to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future provocations against NATO, including through Russian false flag provocations, sabotage, electronic warfare (EW) interference, and overflights.[21]
Zelensky submitted Acting Defense Minister Yevheniy Khmara’s candidacy as defense minister for Verkhovna Rada’s (Parliament) approval on August 18.[22] Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk reported on August 18 that the Verkhovna Rada will consider the candidacy in the near future. Zelensky appointed Khmara interim defense minister on July 16.[23]
Key Takeaways
- Russian state-owned bank Vnesheconombank (VEB) fired Chief Economist Andrey Klepach following media reports of a negative economic assessment he offered that contradicts Russian President Vladimir Putin’s theory of victory in Ukraine.
- There is considerable evidence that Klepach’s assessment of the Russian economic problems aligns with reality, undermining the validity of Putin’s theory of victory.
- The Russian population is also reacting to the perception of economic decline in ways that may further damage Russian economic and fiscal policy.
- The Kremlin continues reiterating its determination to prevent Russia’s deteriorating economic realities from reducing its maximalist war aims by refusing to engage in meaningful negotiations to end the war.
- Moldovan President Maia Sandu stated on August 18 that Russia deliberately launches some of its drones into Moldovan and NATO airspace.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky submitted Acting Defense Minister Yevheniy Khmara’s candidacy as defense minister for Verkhovna Rada’s (Parliament) approval on August 18.
- Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russia on the night of August 17 to 18. Russia launched 147 drones against Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against defense industrial and energy infrastructure in Moscow Oblast on the night of August 17 to 18. Russian opposition source Astra reported on August 18 that geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian drones struck the Karbolit chemical plant in Orekhovo-Zuyevo, Moscow Oblast (roughly 510 kilometers from the international border), causing a critical metal platform to collapse.[24] Moscow Oblast energy operator Mosoblenergo reported that Ukrainian strikes damaged a “higher-level” power grid organization in Moscow Oblast, shutting down 109 transformer substations and leaving 5,000 customers and 46 public facilities in Likino-Dulyovo and Orekhovo-Zuyevo without power.[25]
Ukrainian forces likely targeted another Wildberries facility in Moscow Oblast on August 18. Astra reported that Ukrainian forces likely struck a Wildberries logistics facility at Atlant-Park in Obukhovo but that the facility did not catch fire.[26] Ukrainian forces struck another Wildberries warehouse in Podolsk, Moscow Oblast (roughly 420 kilometers from the international border) overnight on August 15 to 16.[27]
Satellite imagery provided an updated battle damage assessment (BDA) of a recent Ukrainian strike against strategic bomber infrastructure in Samara Oblast. Satellite imagery captured on August 15 shows that Ukraine’s August 14 to 15 strikes against the Progress Space Rocket Center in Samara City (roughly 1,488 kilometers from the international border) hit Building 106A, which is reportedly responsible for modernizing Tu-95 bombers, two times.[28]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 17 and 18 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed on August 18 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mohrytsia and Sadky (both northeast of Sumy City).[30]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 17 and 18 but did not advance.[31] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 18 that Russian forces lost more territory than they gained near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) during the past month (since roughly mid-July 2026).[32] The source refuted Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claims of expansive Russian gains in the area.
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in Belgorod Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian drone ground control stations in Ustinka (roughly 12 kilometers from the frontline and northeast of Kharkiv City) and Zhuravlovka (roughly two kilometers from the frontline and north of Kharkiv City) on August 17 or overnight on August 17 to 18.[33]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 18 but did not advance.[34]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 17 and 18 but did not advance.[35]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction. Geolocated footage published on August 15 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position north of Novomykhailivka (southeast of Borova) indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[36]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces reportedly recently cleared Russian infiltrators from Lyman. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces acknowledged on August 18 that Russian forces had infiltrated northeastern and southeastern Lyman over the past few months but that they now remain only in the southeastern area, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely cleared northern and central Lyman.[37]
The Russian MoD claimed on August 18 that Russian forces seized Orikhuvatka (southeast of Slovyansk).[38] Russian milbloggers claimed the Russian forces also seized Yurkivka (southeast of Orikhuvatka).[39]
Russian forces continue attempts to advance toward Lyman but are reportedly failing to make tactical gains in the immediate vicinity of the town. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on August 18 that Russian forces have been attacking Lyman’s northern and southern flanks, including toward Drobysheve (just north of Lyman) and Yampil (southeast of Lyman), for several months but have only made progress between the Lyman and Slovyansk direction near Raihorodok (northeast of Slovyansk and southwest of Lyman).[40] Trehubov added that the Russian military command has not redeployed “elite” or “special” units to the Lyman direction and is only replenishing forces with new recruits.
Order of Battle: Geolocated footage published on August 17 shows elements of the Russian 11th Tank Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) operating near Ozerne (southeast of Lyman).[41] ISW previously observed elements of the 11th Tank Brigade operating near Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City) as of July 17 and in the Lyman direction as of June 3, suggesting that elements of the brigade are split between the two sectors.[42]
Russian forces are reportedly adapting their strike tactics against Ukrainian logistics around Kramatorsk. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are hiding “waiter” drones equipped with microphones along roads around Kramatorsk that activate after detecting the sound of approaching Ukrainian vehicles.[43]
Russian forces likely consolidated some positions in Kostyantynivka which they had previously infiltrated. Geolocated footage published between August 6 and 18 indicates that Russian forces have expanded the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) in eastern and central Kostyantynivka.[44]
Russian milbloggers continue to refute some Russian MoD claims of Russian seizures in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. A Russian milblogger responded to the Russian MoD’s August 17 claim that Russian forces seized Andriivka (west of Druzhkivka), noting that the settlement is 15 kilometers beyond the previous known frontline.[45] The milblogger’s assessment of the front is in line with ISW’s assessment.[46]
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Dobropillya direction. Geolocated footage published on August 18 shows two Russian servicemembers raising flags in two areas in central Krasnopodillya (south of Dobropillya) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[47] The Russian MoD claimed on August 18 that Russian forces seized Krasnopodillya.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 18 that Russian forces advanced west of Novyi Donbas (southeast of Dobropillya) and north of Krasnoyarske (south of Dobropillya).[49]
Russia’s almost complete destruction of a settlement in the Dobropillya area demonstrates the challenges created for Russian forces by Russia’s reliance on glide bomb strikes to shape the battlefield. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 17 that Krasnyi Kut (northeast of Dobropillya), which the milblogger claimed is a contested “gray zone,” is almost completely destroyed such that Russian forces are struggling to gain a foothold in the settlement’s buildings.[50] Russian forces have relied on glide bomb strikes to turn settlements into ruins so as to create cover and concealment for Russian forces entering the settlement, and the milblogger’s comments suggest that Russian forces have largely razed Krasnyi Kut to the ground such that Russian forces cannot even hide in its ruins.[51]
Russian forces are trying to establish fire control over areas near Dobropillya before trying to storm the town itself. The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian infantry groups are already operating on the approaches to Dobropillya but noted that Russian forces still need to firmly establish a foothold in neighboring settlements and organize stable supply routes in order to conduct an assault on Dobropillya.[52] The Russian milblogger also claimed that a future Russian seizure of Torske (just southeast of Krasnyi Kut across the Kazennyi Torets River) will enable Russian forces to establish fire control over the area between the Kazennyi Torets and Hruzka rivers due to Torske’s tactical elevation.[53]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Oleksandrivka directions on August 17 and 18 but did not advance.[54]
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Head Oleksandr Hanzha announced on August 18 mandatory evacuations from 16 settlements in the Synelnykivsky Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[55]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in Karlivka (roughly 35 kilometers from the frontline) and a drone ground control station near Terny (roughly 10 kilometers from the frontline) on August 17 or the night of August 17 to 18.[56] A Russian source claimed on August 18 that Ukrainian drones struck a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Yalynske (roughly 36 kilometers from the frontline) on August 15.[57] Geolocated footage published on August 18 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian military cargo truck on the E-40 Luhansk City-Alchevsk highway southeast of Luhanske (roughly 35 kilometers from the frontline).[58]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on August 17 and 18 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[59]
Russian milbloggers continue to characterize Russian efforts in the Hulyaipole direction as aiming to envelop Orikhiv from the northeast while denying recent Russian official claims of Russian advances northeast of Orikhiv. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger refuted on August 17 the Russian MoD’s claim from August 17 that Russian forces seized Novosoloshyne (west of Hulyaipole and roughly 10 kilometers from ISW’s assessed nearest Russian presence) as premature, claiming that Russian forces entered the settlement “some time ago” and recently raised a Russian flag in the settlement but have not seized it.[60] The milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in the fields between Lisne, Danylivka, and Lyubitske (just north and east of Novosoloshyne) such that Russian forces cannot establish sustainable supply routes to their forward units in Novosoloshyne. The milblogger assessed that Russian forces likely aim to eliminate the Ukrainian pocket near Vozdvzyzhvika (just east of Lisne) and to seize Kopani (southeast of Lisne) to straighten the front and free up forces to attack Lisne and Lyubitske. The milblogger characterized the future Russian seizure of Novosoloshyne as necessary to establish a stable bridgehead on the western bank of the Verkhnya Tersa River.
Another Russian milblogger claimed on August 18 that Russian forces are trying to envelop Orikhiv from the Hulyaipole direction and aim to advance toward Novomykolaivka (northeast of Orikhiv and northwest of Hulyaipole) from the southeast.[61] Novomykolaivka lies along the H-15 Zaporizhzhia City-Donetsk City highway and is over 40 kilometers from ISW’s assessed closest Russian positions in the northern Hulyaipole direction and over 75 kilometers from Russian positions south of Orikhiv. The milblogger alleged that Russian advances near Novosoloshyne aim to outflank Ukrainian forces near Omelnyk (between Orikhiv and Novosoloshyne along the T-0408 highway).
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 17 and 18 but did not make confirmed advances.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 18 that Russian forces advanced in central Bilohirya and north of and within Mala Tokmachka (both southeast of Orikhiv).[63]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian drone infrastructure and logistics in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone ground control stations near Novoivanika (one of multiple settlements roughly two to 95 kilometers from the frontline), Nove (one of multiple settlements roughly four to 110 kilometers from the frontline), and Mali Shcherbaky (along the frontline west of Orikhiv) on August 17 or the night of August 17 to 18.[64] Geolocated footage published on August 17 shows the aftermath of a Ukrainian strike against two trucks along the E-58 Mariupol-Berdyansk highway northwest of Berdyanske (roughly 90 kilometers from the front).[65]
Russian forces are reportedly using a new type of warhead on “waiter” drones to threaten the ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Kherson Oblast that Ukrainian forces have tried to protect with netting. Yevhen Yevtushenko, the head of the military administration of Nikopol Raion in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, published a photo on August 18 and reported that Russian forces are using a new type of ammunition in the Kherson direction.[66] Yevtushenko reported that Russian forces are deploying first-person view (FPV) strike drones with the warhead that sit on the nets Ukrainian forces have installed over highways, that the drone then waits in standby mode, and that the warhead then detonates when activated. Yevtushenko stated that the warhead detonates upon operator command, any movement of the warhead, or a change in the magnetic field, including when people with weapons or vehicles approach the warhead. Yevtushenko reported that the warhead can detonate even when the battery of the FPV drone carrying the warhead runs out.
Ukrainian forces continued striking energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea. Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the main electrical substation in occupied Sevastopol on the night of August 17 to 18, causing brief power outages.[67] Crimean occupation energy operator Krymenergo acknowledged on August 18 that Ukrainian drone strikes against southern Crimean power supply facilities overnight caused power outages in southern Crimea.[68]
Ukrainian forces likely struck a vessel carrying Russian cargo off the coast of Krasnodar Krai. Bloomberg reported on August 17, citing unspecified sources, that unspecified actors struck the Greek-managed Skiros oil tanker in the Black Sea after it loaded Russian-origin cargo at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal near Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, on August 16.[69] Lloyd’s List, a maritime intelligence firm, reported that Ukrainian forces may have conducted the strike.[70] Ukraine reportedly agreed in July 2026 to halt its drone strikes against oil tankers using the CPC terminal in Novorossiysk as long as the vessels were non-Russian vessels not under Ukrainian sanctions and not carrying Russian cargo.[71]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[72]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 17 to 18. The Ukrainian Air Forces reported that Russian forces launched 147 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Parodiya-type drones — including jet-powered Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Crimea.[73] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 111 drones, that an unspecified number of drones hit 19 locations, and that debris fell at three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian, industrial, and logistics infrastructure in Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and civilian and port infrastructure, including a civilian vessel, in Mykolaiv Oblast.[74] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported on August 18 that Russian strikes caused power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Odesa, Chernihiv, Kherson, and Kharkiv oblasts.[75] The Russian MoD claimed on August 18 that Russian forces struck a cargo ship in the Black Sea southeast of Odesa City during the day on August 18.[76] Geolocated footage published on August 18 shows the aftermath of a Russian Geran drone strike against two diesel locomotives with freight cars near Shakhtarske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the night of August 17 to 18.[77]
Russian forces conducted a Banderol loitering munition strike against Kharkiv Oblast on the morning of August 18 that resulted in high civilian casualties. Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on August 18 that Russian forces conducted a missile strike against Pechenihy, Kharkiv Oblast, killing at least ten civilians, injuring at least eight, and damaging civilian infrastructure.[78] Pechenihy Mayor Oleksandr Gusarov reported that Russian forces used two Banderol loitering munitions to strike the settlement.[79] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed the Russian strike against residential areas of Pechenihy.[80] Geolocated footage published on August 18 shows the aftermath of the Russian strike on a residential street in Pechenihy.[81]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://nikitskyclub dot ru/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/%D0%92%D1%8B%D0%BF-145-%D0%AD%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B8-%D0%B8-%D0%B3%D0%B5%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B5-%D0%B2%D1%8B%D0%B7%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%8B.pdf
[2] https://ru.themoscowtimes dot com/2026/08/14/vglavnom-gosbanke-kremlya-sprognozirovali-porazhenie-rossii-vekonomicheskoi-voine-naistoschenie-szapadom-a203552 ; https://nashaniva dot com/amp/en/402456
[3] https://thebell dot io/veb-uvolil-glavnogo-ekonomista-andreya-klepacha-za-vystuplenie-o-porazhenii-rossii-i-sotsialnom-krizise
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-6/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-6/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2025/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/ ;
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/;
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/
[11] https://nikitskyclub dot ru/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/%D0%92%D1%8B%D0%BF-145-%D0%AD%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B8-%D0%B8-%D0%B3%D0%B5%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B5-%D0%B2%D1%8B%D0%B7%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%8B.pdf
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/
[13] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/08/18/russians-pull-cash-banks-fearing-kremlin-will-seize-deposits-war/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/
[16] https://tass dot com/politics/2174751 ; https://www.vesti dot ru/ns/ushakov-o-vozmozhnosti-zamorozki-konflikta-s-ukrainoj-poziciya-rf-isklyuchaet-ehto; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/28022783
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/putins-theory-of-victory-in-ukraine/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2026/
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2026/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_19-4/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2026/
[5] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J4rIYmlZeIk&t=877s; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2026/; https://suspilne dot media/1374824-golova-mzs-tureccini-zaklikav-rf-ta-ukrainu-rozrobiti-mehanizm-moratoriu-na-udari-po-korablah-u-cornomu-mori/
[20] https://newsmaker dot md/ro/maia-sandu-susține-că-rusia-trimite-intenționat-unele-drone-în-moldova-va-fi-expulzat-ambasadorul-agreat-oleg-ozerov ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hWgnENm4Y0c
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2025/
[22] https://www.facebook.com/stefanchuk.official/posts/pfbid0sirECY7PuDCQKs8PYTQjfY5NMdimLBrdXd87pUHqTP3ttURRdrKxRarPTKvg7JVHl?rdid=NsE23RSTDXQY7yoY#; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/zelenskyj-podav-do-vru-kandydaturu-yevgeniya-hmary-na-posadu-ministra-oborony/
[23] https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/6222026-60441; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/
[24] https://t.me/astrapress/122468
[25] https://t.me/mosoblenergo/10188
[26] https://t.me/astrapress/122447 ; https://t.me/astrapress/122424
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2026/
[28] https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2089669539227213964?s=20 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2089690040238817643?s=20 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/29191 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/18/suputnyk-pokazav-naslidky-udaru-%c2%abflamingo%c2%bb-po-czentru-%c2%abprogres%c2%bb-u-samari/ ; http://www.trkterra dot ru/sitegalleryfile/8044; https://t.me/istories_media/13264; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2026/
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41913; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41915; https://t.me/severnnyi/9061
[30] https://t.me/dva_majors/97626 https://t.me/wargonzo/36292
[31]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41913; https://t.me/dva_majors/97626; https://t.me/wargonzo/36292; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46582; https://t.me/severnnyi/9061
[32] https://t.me/severnnyi/9063
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41922
[34] https://t.me/dva_majors/97626; https://t.me/wargonzo/36292
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41913; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41915; https://t.me/grvZapad/19482
[36] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2089448948943749471
[37] https://t.me/grvZapad/19483
[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/66591
[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121514; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/74234
[40] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1381558-atakuut-z-usih-napramkiv-aki-e-vijskovij-rozpoviv-de-tisnut-vijska-rf-na-limanskomu-fronti/
[41] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2089357090829525319 ; https://t.me/specnazahmat/2329
[42] https://t.me/severnnyi/8713 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3438
[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121485 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46589
[44] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4MptbxICspU; https://x.com/RackhamLeRousse/status/2089440338163196228; https://t.me/feniksdpsu/2248; https://x.com/RackhamLeRousse/status/2089615639371485268; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/872; https://x.com/RackhamLeRousse/status/2089653610955014304; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/4458; https://x.com/RackhamLeRousse/status/2089729849229283471
[45] https://t.me/dva_majors/97626
[46] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/
[47] https://t.me/btr80/40599; https://t.me/Osintpen/3360; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12731
[48] https://t.me/mod_russia/66593
[49] https://t.me/divgen/83303
[50] https://t.me/rybar/82508
[51] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/
[52] https://t.me/rybar/82514
[53] https://t.me/rybar/82508
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41915; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41913; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121497
[55] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31445; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1381856-maut-viihati-2177-hlopcikiv-i-divcatok-u-troh-gromadah-sinelnikivsini-ogolosili-primusovu-evakuaciu-rodin-z-ditmi/
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41922
[57] https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/792; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/ukrayinski-drony-pidirvaly-sklad-boyeprypasiv-rosiyan-na-donechchyni/
[58] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2089617495384551903; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rt_bd1LQ_PY
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41915 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41913 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/20731
[60] https://t.me/rybar/82506 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/
[61] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/74239
[62]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41915 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41913 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36292 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46565
[63] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33686
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41922
[65] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2089413024050208868; https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/791
[66] https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/42995 ; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/42994
[67] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/107432
[68] https://t.me/rk_gov/46987
[69] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-17/greek-run-oil-tanker-comes-under-attack-in-russian-black-sea
[70] https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1158215/Ukraine-drone-strike-hits-Greek-tanker-despite-reported-Black-Sea-deconfliction-deal
[71] https://www.ft.com/content/725b4d15-bd8d-4083-a04e-db016338af2e?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[72] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[73] https://t.me/kpszsu/73277
[74] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31104; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/18/okupanty-vdaryly-banderollyu-po-chernigovu-travmovano-lyudynu/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/71848?single; https://www.facebook.com/story.phpstory_fbid=1506066414885691&id=100064470411119&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=7804fNwQ4jNjdoL7; https://t.me/vilkul/17566; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28174; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31444; https://t.me/vilkul/17566; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28174; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid0U9Rt6w5Hnb18tTimDnHSg7jikfW1GXY3pMvooTpXaMFGxg4zEqnpPP64NqBR7CMEl; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1381378-poskodzeno-civilne-sudno-budinok-i-avtobus-armia-rf-zavdala-udariv-dronami-po-mikolaivsini/; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/30297; https://t.me/astrapress/122431; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/30297; https://t.me/kyivoda/54298 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/17/vorog-zavdav-udaru-po-odeshhyni-sered-postrazhdalyh-dvi-dytyny/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/71833
[75] https://t.me/energyofukraine/7609; https://suspilne dot media/1381524-u-sesti-oblastah-ukraini-e-znestrumlenna-pisla-obstriliv-minenergo/
[76] https://t.me/mod_russia/66598
[77] https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30600; https://t.me/Osintpen/3359; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12727
[78] https://t.me/synegubov/24805 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/18/rossiya-nanesla-raketnyy-udar-po-poselku-pechenegi-v-harkovskoy-oblasti-pogibli-10-chelovek ; https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2089635260208226374 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/117548 ; https://t.me/severrealii/34077; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1381502-po-centru-pecenig-na-harkivsini-vdarili-dvi-banderoli-selisnij-golova/ ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/98429 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/98440
[79] https://t.me/gusarov_pechi/12768; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1381460-vnaslidok-raketnogo-udaru-po-pecenigah-na-harkivsini-zaginuli-10-ludej/
[80] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20411
[81] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2089646852471673025?s=20 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2089623389598032069 ; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2089646855541903512?s=20 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/71877 ; https://x.com/AMK_Mapping_/status/2089624901049356628?s=20 ; https://x.com/AMK_Mapping_/status/2089624901049356628?s=20
