Toplines

Russian forces launched a massive combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine, continuing a pattern of stockpiling ballistic and cruise missiles for several days to amass enough for major attacks that cause significant civilian casualties. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on August 20 that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles; surface-to-surface and air-to-surface cruise missiles; ship-launched cruise missiles; Banderol-type loitering munitions; Shahed-type strike drones; and Gerbera-, and Parodiya-type decoy drones on the night of August 19 to 20.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down a majority of the drones and cruise missiles, that unspecified air targets struck 28 locations, and that debris fell at two locations. Ukrainian forces intercepted about 88.6 percent of the Russian cruise missiles, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 20 that Ukrainian forces generally intercept 93 percent of cruise missiles.[2] The Ukrainian Air Force ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian ballistic missiles launched and intercepted as of August 11.[3]

Russian ballistic missile strikes damaged residential buildings, a children’s hospital, a school, industrial facilities, and fuel infrastructure in Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast, killing at least 12 and injuring at least 40 in Kyiv City alone.[4] Ukrainian Prime Minister Serhiy Koretskyi reported that Russian strikes against Kyiv City lasted for almost nine hours and noted that Russian forces also struck Red Cross facilities and food warehouses near Boryspil, Kyiv Oblast.[5] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces struck civilian, critical, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts, a gas station in Kharkiv Oblast, and logistics infrastructure in Zhytomyr Oblast.[6]

Zhytomyr Oblast Military Administration Head Vitaliy Bunechko reported on August 19 that Russian forces conducted a jet-powered drone strike against a police department in Zhytomyr City, Zhytomyr Oblast during the day, and the Ukrainian State Emergency Service noted that the strike killed three, including two police officers, and injured 53 people.[7] Russian strikes continue inflicting substantial damage in ways that disproportionately impact civilians, despite a high Ukrainian interception rate of all projectiles except for ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles. Russian forces continue launching prolonged waves of ballistic and cruise missiles and long-range drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems and to exhaust air defenders and civilians.[8] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will continue the pattern of stockpiling cruise and ballistic missiles for periodic large, combined strike packages.[9]

Russia continues to set conditions to augment strike packages with North Korean missiles, including with upgraded KN-30 ballistic missiles. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) confirmed on August 20 that North Korea transferred around 50 KN-23, KN-24, and KN-30 (Hwansong-11C) ballistic missiles to Russia as of July 2026.[10] The KN-30 is an upgraded version of the KN-23 ballistic missile and is capable of carrying a warhead of up to 2,500 kilograms.[11] ISW has not observed evidence of Russian forces using the KN-30 against Ukraine. The GUR reportedly added that Russia began deploying six launchers for North Korean missiles in Voronezh Oblast and that the launchers will be able to launch a total of 120 missiles.[12] North Korean missiles could reportedly strike Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts from Voronezh Oblast. Ukrainian military expert Anatoly Khrapchinsky stated that Russian forces do not always leverage all of their launchers in each strike package, however, noting that Russia has about 160 Iskander launchers that can carry two missiles each, but that Russian forces launch on average only 16 to 26 missiles per strike package. Khrapchinsky added that Russian Iskander-M missiles are accurate to within five to 20 meters, whereas the North Korean KN-23 missiles regularly miss their target by hundreds of meters or even kilometers. The North Korean missiles also carry a significantly larger warhead weighing up to a ton — compared with the standard 480-kilogram warhead on Russia’s Iskander-Ms — and result in larger craters and shock waves.

Russian aerial drones penetrated Moldovan and Romanian airspace, and a Russian naval drone was destroyed close to a Romanian natural gas platform on August 20, demonstrating that the Kremlin has accepted the risk that its war against Ukraine will cause damage to other states, including NATO states. The Moldovan Ministry of Defense reported that a likely Russian Shahed-136/Geran-2-type drone entered Moldova airspace near Kotlovyna, Odesa Oblast, flew in Moldovan airspace for six minutes, then departed for Ukrainian airspace near Etilua, Gagauzia (roughly six kilometers from the Ukrainian border) on the morning of August 20.[13] The Romanian Ministry of National Defense reported that a drone of unspecified origin crashed in an uninhabited area four kilometers northeast of Grindu, Tulcea County (roughly five kilometers from the Ukrainian border) on the morning of August 20, causing a fire.[14] The Romanian Ministry of National Defense reported that a Romanian F-16 fighter jet destroyed a naval drone about 80 miles east of Constanta (along the Black Sea coast roughly 116 kilometers from the Ukrainian border) near the Neptune Deep natural gas platform on the morning of August 20.[15] Romanian authorities did not specify the origin of the naval drone, but Romanian Defense Minister Radu-Dinel Miruță stated that the naval drone was not Ukrainian.[16] Such incidents are likely an intended consequence of Russian strike packages that now take Russian unmanned systems so close to the airspace or waters of NATO states and Moldova that the drones regularly cross these boundaries.

Moldovan President Maia Sandu stated on August 18 that Russia deliberately launches some of its drones into Moldovan and NATO airspace and that authorities can assess intent based on the trajectory of the drones.[17] ISW is unable to confirm the intent of Russian drone incursions into the airspace of other states, but the net effect of these incidents normalizes the incursion of Russian weapons into and damage within Moldovan and NATO territory. Russian forces could prevent such violations of other states’ sovereign airspace and waters by redesigning their strike packages and moving strike vehicle trajectories away from NATO and Moldovan territory. That Russian forces have not adjusted their strike campaigns, along with the increasing frequency of these incidents, indicates that the Kremlin intends to normalize these violations against NATO.

The Kremlin will likely cause a significant number of Russian combat veterans of the war in Ukraine to be elected to the Russian State Duma in the September 2026 elections, particularly as members of the United Russia Party, as part of a concerted effort to militarize Russian society and cohere a pro-war and ultranationalist elite. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on August 19 that Russia must prepare in advance for the return of Russian servicemembers from the frontline in Ukraine when the war ends and must facilitate their reintegration into the Russian labor force and society.[18] All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company Deputy Head, Kremlin-coopted war correspondent, and United Russia Party candidate Yevgeny Poddubny claimed on August 19 that the United Russia Party intends to elect between 40 and 100 combat veterans to the State Duma in the upcoming September 18-20 Duma elections.[19] The Russian State Duma consists of 450 deputies elected for five-year terms and currently includes 310 deputies from the ruling United Russia Party.[20] The Kremlin appears to be aiming to have combat veterans make up as much as roughly 22 percent of the newly elected Duma, suggesting that the Kremlin intends to further militarize the Russian government and build up a cadre of loyal ultranationalist veterans who will support the Kremlin’s aggressive policies.[21] United Russia Party General Council Secretary Vladimir Yakushev stated on June 8 that 20 graduates of the Time of Heroes program — a Russian government initiative that places Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine into local, regional, and federal positions of power — have won the United Russia preliminary vote.[22] Yakushev stated that 10 of the veterans will run on party lists in the September 2026 Duma elections while the other 10 will compete in single-mandate constituencies. Another prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 20 that the Kremlin is increasingly promoting Russian veterans into the Russian government because a Duma deputy with combat experience wields a “special kind of legitimacy” that is ”difficult to publicly challenge.”[23] The milblogger stressed that Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine should ultimately become “a new elite” that will shape and determine Russia’s future.[24] These Kremlin-coopted Russian milbloggers are likely preparing Russian society for a more heavily militarized State Duma after the September 2026 elections.

The Russian government continues to respond inadequately to gasoline shortages and appears to be focused on mitigation strategies and ad hoc solutions instead of addressing the issue directly. Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Economic Minister Alexander Novak claimed on August 19 that the Kremlin is “monitoring” the gasoline shortage crisis across Russian regions and noted that Russia began importing fuel, banned fuel exports, and introduced lower-grade fuel in response.[25] Novak claimed that several Russian refineries will complete repairs and resume refining operations “soon,” and that “the situation will improve significantly.” Ukraine’s long-range strikes continue to have compounding consequences throughout the Russian economy. The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on August 19 that rising fuel prices are impacting Russian transportation and cargo flows.[26] The SZRU noted that the cost of road freight transport increased 4.5 to 5.5 percent and that Russian companies are trying to shift cargo flows to rail and sea, an effort that can only partially mitigate the problem because of the longer transit times of such forms of transportation. The SZRU reported that road freight transport costs increased significantly on routes between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia due to a fuel collapse in the Zabaikalsky Krai. No solutions that Russian officials have attempted appear to have significantly reduced gasoline shortages across Russia or the compounding effects within the Russian economy associated with them.[27]

Neither the Kremlin nor Russian milbloggers appear to believe that Russia will be able to fully intercept Ukrainian strike packages any time soon. Russian officials are increasingly shifting the burden of air defense to individual enterprises and regional governments to attempt to counter the effect of Ukrainian long-range strikes, but all of these entities are struggling to counter Ukrainian drones.[28] Russian milbloggers also continue to acknowledge the persistent issues Russia faces in combatting Ukrainian strike packages. Two prominent Russian milbloggers acknowledged on August 20 that Russian officials and private enterprises have very unrealistic expectations about establishing air defenses for strategic and industrial objects, as neither industrial enterprises nor Russian forces are equipped to adequately repel Ukrainian drones and missiles.[29] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged on August 19 that Russia cannot expect to totally intercept Ukrainian long-range drones and that Russia needs passive protection including anti-drone nets, shelters, and infrastructure redundancy to protect industrial assets.[30] This milblogger claimed that the Russian federal government, regional governments, and industrial enterprises should continue to share the responsibility for defense against Ukrainian strikes. Russian milbloggers called for establishing a layered approach that includes new air defense adaptations and defensive infrastructure.[31] ISW continues to assess that Russia will likely fail to adequately meet its growing air defense needs through its own defense industrial production and will be unable to cover both the frontline and its vast deep rear.[32] The layered and decentralized approach Russian officials and Russian milbloggers are proposing will require significant time and resources and would not necessarily overcome Russia‘s significant air defense needs or geographic limitations. Defensive fortifications around key industrial and commercial sites across Russia would also undermine the Kremlin’s ability to portray a sense of normalcy to the Russian public, which it has continually sought to do.[33]