Toplines
Russia is expanding launch sites for its long-range strike drones along the border with Ukraine and Belarus, likely to intensify its strikes against Ukraine and possibly NATO. The Telegraph reported on August 16 that Russia has built 59 new drone-launching rails at 10 different sites along its border with Ukraine and Belarus and that each base can house over 1,000 drones.[1] The Telegraph cited analysis of a drone intelligence firm that suggests that about 20 of the new launch-rails are extensively long, indicating that Russian forces may use them to launch Geran-4 and Geran–5 jet-powered strike drones that can fly at a range of 450 to 850 kilometers and 950 to 1000 kilometers, respectively.[2] Russia is likely building these additional launch sites in western Russia to increase its capacity to launch larger long-range drone salvos as part of Russia‘s regular strike packages across Ukraine. Russia also likely seeks to specifically use jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones to strike deeper into western Ukraine by leveraging the drones’ greater speed and survivability to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses.[3] Russia is also likely moving its drone launching sites into western Russia in an attempt to protect Russian drone infrastructure from Ukrainian drones. Ukrainian forces have successfully struck Russian one-way attack drone launch points near occupied Donetsk City, for example, so establishing alternative launch points further away in Russia may improve their survivability.[4] Russia also may be preparing to use its Rassvet satellite constellation (the Russian version of Starlink) by leveraging new launch sites, which could allow Russian forces to conduct higher-precision strikes against Ukraine‘s rear and air defense systems from multiple directions.[5] New Russian drone launch bases could also support future Russian strike packages against NATO, should the Kremlin decide to do so, as the bases would enable larger salvo volume, and the launching stations would support drone ranges into NATO territory.
A likely Russian strike vehicle — reportedly a Russian Banderol cruise missile / loitering munition — crashed in a corn field in Moldova on August 17, further demonstrating how the Kremlin has accepted the risk of Russian strike vehicles hitting countries bordering Ukraine during Russian strikes against western Ukraine. The Moldovan Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that an unidentified aerial object entered Moldovan airspace on August 17 and likely exploded near Talmaza (roughly 20 kilometers from the Ukrainian border), causing a fire.[6] The Ukrainian Air Force reported on August 17 that a Russian Banderol loitering munition flew into Moldovan airspace from Odesa Oblast.[7] The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the violation of Moldovan airspace and stated that Russian war against Ukraine continues to jeopardize Moldova’s security.[8] The Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation reported on August 17 that at least 12 likely Russian drones and missiles entered European airspace between July 15 and August 15.[9] Increasingly frequent Russian drone incursions into European and NATO airspace demonstrate that Russian President Vladimir Putin has adopted a reckless policy that accepts the risk of Russian drones entering European and NATO airspace as an acceptable consequence of its strikes against the westernmost parts of Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that these drone incursions are part of Russia’s “Phase Zero” campaign that aims to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future provocations against NATO, including through Russian false flag provocations, drone incursions, sabotage, electronic warfare interference, and overflights.[10] ISW continues to assess that NATO may need to consider negotiating possible air defense agreements with Ukraine as a matter of self-defense against Russian drone strikes against NATO countries, regardless of whether the Russian drone incursions are accidental or intentional.[11]
Russia’s intensified missile strike campaign against Ukraine reportedly contributed to record high monthly civilian casualties in July 2026. The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (UN HRMMU) reported on August 12 that conflict-related violence in Ukraine killed at least 437 civilians, including 17 children, and injured at least 2,610, including 166 children, in July 2026 — the highest number of civilian casualties in Ukraine since May 2022 and the highest number of child casualties since April 2022.[12] The UN HRMMU noted that the July 2026 civilian casualty rate is around a 30 percent increase from the previous record of at least 293 killed and 1,990 injured in June 2026 and that the vast majority of civilian casualties are in Ukrainian-controlled areas.[13] The UN HRMMU reported that missile and long-range drone strikes, particularly strikes against large population centers in Ukraine, remain the leading cause of the high number of civilian casualties, accounting for 183 civilian deaths and 967 civilian injuries, about 38 percent of the total civilian casualties in June 2026. The UN HRMMU reported that Russia’s short-range drone strikes caused the highest number of civilian casualties near the front thus far in the war in July 2026. Russian forces have recently intensified missile strikes against Ukraine and have launched at least 376 missiles in July 2026, the highest number of missiles launched in a month since Russia began large-scale missile and drone strikes against Ukraine.[14]
Key Takeaways
- Russia is expanding launch sites for its long-range strike drones along the border with Ukraine and Belarus, likely to intensify its strikes against Ukraine and possibly NATO.
- A likely Russian strike vehicle — reportedly a Russian Banderol cruise missile / loitering munition — crashed in a corn field in Moldova on August 17, further demonstrating how the Kremlin has accepted the risk of Russian strike vehicles hitting countries bordering Ukraine during Russian strikes against western Ukraine.
- Russia’s intensified missile strike campaign against Ukraine reportedly contributed to record high monthly civilian casualties in July 2026.
- Ukrainian sources provided an updated battle damage assessment (BDA) of a recent Ukrainian strike against Rostov Oblast. Russia launched 128 drones against Ukraine overnight.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on August 17.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian sources provided an updated battle damage assessment (BDA) of a recent Ukrainian strike against Rostov Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff published recently collected satellite imagery collected of the aftermath of Ukraine’s August 16 strike against the Kamensky Plant in Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, Rostov Oblast (approximately 178 kilometers from the frontline), that shows that the strike destroyed two explosive and gunpowder production workshops and damaged an additional four production workshops.[15] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) channel reported on August 17 that satellite imagery indicates that Ukrainian forces also struck several Russian air defense systems near the Kamensky Plant.[16]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 16 and 17 but did not advance.[17]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage published on August 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian building in central Kudiivka (north of Kharkiv City) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[18] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 17 that Russian forces continue infiltration missions in Kozacha Lopan (just northwest of Kudiivka) and that some infiltrators have almost reached southern Kozacha Lopan.[19] The source claimed that Russian forces have also increasingly infiltrated near Ivanivka (northeast of Kharkiv City and southeast of Vovchansk).
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 16 and 17 but did not make confirmed advances.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 16 that Russian forces advanced in central Kupyne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[21]
Russian tactical aviation is conducting missile and glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian drone infrastructure not far from the Ukrainian-Russian border in northern Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed on August 17 that Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) elements struck two Ukrainian drone ground control centers near Hryhorivka (likely referring to the settlement east of Velykyi Burluk and roughly nine kilometers from the border) and Prykolotne (between the Kharkiv and Velykyi Burluk directions and roughly 20 kilometers from the border) with a Kh-39 air-to-surface tactical missile and two FAB-1500 guided glide bombs.[22]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in Kupyansk. Geolocated footage published on August 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers in northern Kupyansk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[23] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on August 17 that Russian forces seized northwestern Kupyansk and areas of the town’s Yuvileynyi Microraion (southwestern Kupyansk) and resumed offensive operations toward Myrove (just northwest of Kupyansk).[24]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 16 and 17 but did not advance.[25] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that there are reports of intensified fighting near Shyikivka (east of Borova) but no footage of advances in the area yet.[26] The source reported that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ridkodub, Nove, Katerynivka, and Zelena Dolyna (all southeast of Borova).
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on August 16 and 17 but did not advance.[27] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 17 that there is fighting near the forested areas around Lyman.[28]
Russian forces are striking Ukrainian drone infrastructure beyond the Slovyansk sector. The Russian MoD claimed on August 17 that Russian Geran-type drones struck a depot near Havrylivka, Kharkiv Oblast (likely referring to the settlement off the M-03 Kharkiv City-Slovyansk highway), with quadcopter drones for use in the Slovyansk direction and an ammunition depot near Novomykolaivka, Donetsk Oblast (west of Kramatorsk and roughly 40 kilometers from the front).[29]
Ukrainian forces likely cleared Russian infiltrators from an area of eastern Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on August 17 shows Ukrainian forces clearing Russian forces in eastern Kostyantynivka, an area in which ISW previously observed evidence of Russian infiltration and Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces advanced.[30]
The Russian MoD continues to claim Russian seizures far from ISW’s assessed frontline. The Russian MoD claimed on August 17 that Russian forces seized Andriivka (west of Druzhkivka).[31] ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced to within about 15 kilometers of Andriivka and have infiltrated to within about 11 kilometers.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya and Pokrovsk directions on August 16 and 17 but did not advance.[32]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on August 16 and 17 but did not advance.[33] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported on August 17 that sources in the Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces continue to occupy Dachne (south of Novopavlivka on the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border).[34] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 17 that small Russian groups maintain a presence in the contested “gray zone” in the Filiya-Novopavlivka-Horikhove sector (south of Novopavlivka).[35]
Mashovets reported that Russian forces are trying to counterattack from Fedorivka (east of Oleksandrivka) in the Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad directions (both northwest of Fedorivka) as part of efforts to reach the blocked Russian groups near Sichneve (just west of Voskresenka), Voskresenka, and Oleksandrohrad.[36] Mashovets added that Ukrainian forces have blocked small Russian infantry groups fairly deep into Ukrainian-held areas of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, including near Hai (just south of Oleksandrivka), Radisne (southwest of Oleksandrivka), and Vyshneve (south of Hai).[37] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces are currently fighting for Pryvilne and Pavlivka (both south of Oleksandrivka).
Russian forces are using Geran-type drones to strike Ukrainian drone infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed on August 17 that Russian Geran drones struck a drone warehouse near Dmytrivka (near the M-30 Pavlohrad-Pokrovsk highway and roughly 50 kilometers from the front).[38]
Ukrainian forces continue their intermediate-range strike campaign targeting the Russian military’s energy assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukraine’s 1st Corps reported on August 17 that Ukrainian forces conducted the “Hell-2” campaign over the past month (since about mid-July 2026) to strike Russian military fuel storage and supply assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[39] The 1st Corps first reported on July 12 that it conducted its “Hell” operation that included drone strikes against a logistics base in occupied Novoamvrosiivka (roughly 110 kilometers from the front), damaging tanks and infrastructure and blocking the railroad tracks.[40]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Ukrainian forces likely cleared Russian infiltrators in an area southwest of Hulyaipole. Geolocated footage published on August 16 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian positions in central Hulyaipilske (southwest of Hulyaipole), an area in which ISW had previously observed evidence of a Russian infiltrator presence.[41] Additional geolocated footage published on August 17 shows Russian servicemembers raising flags in central and southwestern Novosoloshyne (west of Hulyaipole), and the Russian MoD claimed on August 17 that Russian forces seized the settlement.[42]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 16 and 17 but did not advance.[43]
Russian forces continue striking gas stations in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on June 29 shows Russian forces conducting first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against several gas stations in Zaporizhzhia City.[44] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration council member Vladimir Rogov claimed on August 16 that Russian forces conducted a Geran-4 drone strike against a gas station in Dniprovskyi Raion, Zaporizhzhia City.[45]
Russian forces conducted a double tap strike north of the Kakhovka Reservoir. The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported on August 17 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against emergency workers responding to previous Russian shelling of a building in Marhanets, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (north of Enerhodar across the reservoir).[46]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in Kherson Oblast on August 17.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range drone strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone repeater communication and power point on the Tendra Spit in Kherson Oblast (roughly 43 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of August 16 to 17.[47]
Russian forces continue striking gas stations in Kherson Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 29 shows Russian forces conducting FPV drone strikes against two gas stations in Kherson City, two gas stations in Molodizhne, and one gas tank in Darivka (both just northeast of Kherson City).[48]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range drone strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a storage, preparation, and launch facility for Russian strike drones near Hvardiiske (roughly 190 kilometers from the frontline); a Russian Orion-type drone ground control station in occupied Novofedorivka (roughly 185 kilometers from the frontline); and a ground repeater for guiding Russian Geran-type and Gerbera-type strike drones in occupied Olenivka (roughly 135 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of August 16 to 17.[49]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[50]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 128 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Parodiya-type drones — including jet-powered Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Donetsk City.[51] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 106 drones, that an unspecified number of drones hit 14 locations, and that debris fell at two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian force struck civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv Oblast, postal infrastructure in Donetsk Oblast, and port infrastructure and a Togo-flagged civilian vessel in Odesa Oblast.[52] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian drones struck a patrol boat in the Odesa City Port and a berthing terminal in the Izmail Port overnight.[53]
Ukrainian state-owned energy company Naftogaz reported on August 17 that Russian forces conducted 13 drone and missile strikes against Naftogaz facilities across the country in the past week (since August 10).[54] Naftogaz noted that Russian forces struck one unspecified facility several times in the week and that Russian forces particularly targeted mining infrastructure. Naftogaz reported that Russian forces have struck its facilities 293 times since the start of 2026.
Ukrainian military officials continue to note how Russia is increasingly using jet-powered Geran-type drones that are harder to defend against. Colonel Artem Skurativsky, the head of the air defense department of Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces, stated on August 17 that Ukrainian forces achieved an average interception rate of 80 to 93 percent of Russia’s Geran-2 and Shahed-136 drones such that Russia had to further adapt its drones to include jet-powered drones like the Geran-3s that can fly faster to evade air defenses and have longer ranges.[55] Skurativsky stated that the Geran-3 can fly from the Belarusian border to Kyiv City in 35 minutes — four times faster than previous Geran versions. Skurativsky noted that the drones have disadvantages, however, such as their larger size that make them more detectable on radars and their large radiation signature that make them vulnerable to Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems (MANPADS). Skurativsky reported that Geran-3 jet drones make up about 20 percent of the total number of Geran-type drones Russian forces are using in their large strike series and that Russian forces continue to heavily rely on Geran-2 in these strikes. Skurativsky noted, however, that the increased use of jet drones indicates Russia’s increased production capacity, as other Ukrainian officials have recently reported.[56]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/08/16/russia-builds-secret-drone-bases-in-nato-striking-distance/
[2] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/3-tysyachi-droniv-geran-4-5-na-misyats/
[3] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/3-tysyachi-droniv-geran-4-5-na-misyats/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2026/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2026/
[6] https://www dot army.md/ro/comunicate-de-presa/informeaza-4 ; https://suspilne dot media/1381268-povitrani-sili-zaavili-so-rosijska-banderol-zaletila-do-moldovi-u-moldovi-zafiksuvali-vibuh/ ; https://tv8 dot md/2026/08/17/video-alerta-la-stefan-voda-explozie-si-incendiu-dupa-prabusirea-unui-aparat-de-zbor-primele-imagini/307539
[7] https://t.me/kpszsu/73209
[8] https://www dot moldpres.md/eng/politics/mfa-condemns-violation-of-airspace-of-the-republic-of-moldova-such-incidents-unacceptable
[9] https://t.me/CenterCounteringDisinformation/18879
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2025/ ;
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2026/
[12] https://ukraine.ohchr.org/en/Protection-of-Civilians-in-Armed-Conflict-July-2026
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/
[15] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41903
[16] https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2089254197091074393?s=20
[17] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41895; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41897; https://t.me/wargonzo/36276
[18] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12721; https://t.me/ua_16_ompb_58_ompbr/318
[19] https://t.me/severnnyi/9049
[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41897; https://t.me/synegubov/24784; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41895
[21] https://t.me/divgen/83269; https://t.me/divgen/83275
[22] https://t.me/mod_russia/66571
[23] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12721; https://t.me/ua_16_ompb_58_ompbr/318
[24] https://t.me/grvZapad/19473
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41895; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41897; https://t.me/synegubov/24784; https://t.me/grvZapad/19473
[26] https://t.me/grvZapad/19473
[27]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41897 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41895 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9049 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36276
[28] https://t.me/severnnyi/9049
[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/66570
[30] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/37637
[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/66569
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41895 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41897 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36276 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41897 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41895
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41897; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41895; https://t.me/wargonzo/36276
[34] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1380594-pid-okupacieu-dacne-bojovi-dii-trivaut-u-genstabi-prokomentuvali-zvilnenna-dnipropetrovsini-vid-vijsk-rf/
[35] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3559
[36] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3559
[37] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3560
[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/66565
[39] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1463315908888808
[40] https://t.me/azov_media/8577
[41] https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/37684 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2089048395155464590 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2089048398556954798 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2089048401853780372
[42] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2089278885661913402; https://t.me/voin_dv/20720 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/66567
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41895 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/4189 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36276 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46545
[44] https://t.me/Brigada_VARYAG/85 ; https://x.com/ShahedTracker/status/2088425457481888155
[45] https://t.me/vrogov/25610
[46] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/71790
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41906
[48] https://t.me/Brigada_VARYAG/85; https://x.com/ShahedTracker/status/2088425408177824027
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41906
[50] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[51] https://t.me/kpszsu/73149
[52] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31096; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/17415; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/17/udar-po-novij-poshti-v-kramatorsku-ye-zagyblyj-ta-poraneni/; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/17415; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18632 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18632; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18641
[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/66564
[54] https://t.me/NaftogazUA/2947
[55] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/17/ahillesova-pyata-rosijskyh-reaktyvnyh-shahediv-yak-ukrayina-protydiye-novij-zbroyi-voroga/
[56] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/; https://www.facebook.com/yuriy.ignat/posts/pfbid0FVkhFEZqoKpqf8cy2hwvD73UgDBfAu1YLdkgX3XpbKiQz17ccUyK95wxMDETeS1fl?rdid=Skud1xC7B6JaivFd#; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/14/do-dvoh-tretyn-pid-chas-okremyh-atak-yurij-ignat-utochnyv-dani-shhodo-zastosuvannya-rosiyeyu-reaktyvnyh-bpla/; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/na-terytoriyi-alabugy-buduyut-majdanchyky/; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/3-tysyachi-droniv-geran-4-5-na-misyats/; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosiyany-zupynyly-vyrobnytstvo-geran-3-gur/; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosiya-nakopychyla-6-2-tysyachi-droniv-kamikadze-geran/
