Toplines
Russian and Ukrainian reporting appears to confirm battlefield reporting that Ukrainian forces have achieved a drone advantage over Russian forces on the battlefield. Ukraine’s drone advantage is likely contributing to the stalling of Russian advances and recent Ukrainian counterattacks. Ukraine has markedly increased its mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, military equipment, and manpower since late 2025 and particularly in early 2026, which has impeded Russian advances across the theater and is likely also interfering with the Russian spring-summer 2026 offensive.[1] ISW has observed geolocated evidence that Ukrainian forces conducted 41 mid-range strikes in January 2026, 61 in February 2026, and 115 in March 2026. These Ukrainian strikes have largely targeted Russian forces and assets in eastern and southern Ukraine, including near occupied Donetsk City, degrading Russian preparations for offensive operations in recent weeks and months.[2]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on April 9 that Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces perform over 11,000 combat missions per day and struck over 150,000 verified targets in March 2026 alone — up 50 percent from February 2026.[3] Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces conducted over 350 mid-range strikes, including against 143 Russian logistics facilities and warehouses, 52 command posts, and 20 oil and energy infrastructure facilities. Syrskyi reported that Russian forces expanded their Unmanned Systems Forces to over 101,000 servicemembers as of early April 2026 and plan to increase it to 165,500 by the end of 2026.
Russian pro-war information space voices have also acknowledged that Ukraine is generating success with its battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts by using drones and other technological adaptations.[4] ISW has recently observed reports that Ukrainian technological adaptations and drone innovations enabled Ukrainian forces to inflict higher Russian casualties in the first quarter of 2026 (roughly from January 1 to March 31) as compared to 2025.[5] A Russian milblogger also claimed on March 12 that Ukrainian forces operating near the eastern junction of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts — the site of recent successful Ukrainian counterattacks — were simultaneously using 300 to 400 drones deployed to a depth of 20 kilometers to strike Russian forces. [6]
Russian officials have repeatedly attempted to advance a false narrative that Ukraine’s frontline and political stability are on the verge of collapse in an effort to convince the West to capitulate to Russian demands that Russia cannot secure militarily.[7] Recent evidence suggests that not only are Russian forces facing setbacks on the battlefield, but also that recent Ukrainian drone innovations have shifted the battlefield advantage in Ukraine’s favor. Ukraine’s recent successes are accomplishing tactical, operational, and strategic battlespace effects that undermine the Russian narrative that the Ukrainian frontlines are on the verge of collapse.[8] Ukraine’s indigenous drone industry has managed to develop these effective drone innovations in part due to contributions from Western partners.
Ukrainian forces’ increasing strikes against Russian air defense systems and drone interception rates have facilitated recent Ukrainian battlefield successes. Ukrainian forces in Winter 2025-2026 and Spring 2026 have made their most significant gains on the battlefield since Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 and have liberated the most territory in Ukraine itself since the 2023 counteroffensive.[9] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on April 9 that USF forces have destroyed nine Russian air defense systems in occupied Ukraine since April 1.[10] Ukrainian USF forces have increasingly intercepted Russian drones since late February and March 2026, intercepting a total of 2,975 in January, 3,679 in February, and 7,674 in March 2026.[11] Interceptor drones have important tactical battlefield implications as Russian forces rely on drones to disrupt Ukrainian defenses, which, in turn, enables Russian advances and prevents Ukrainian advances. Ukraine’s increasing interceptions of Russian drones are therefore contributing to slowing Russian advances and permitting Ukrainian counterattacks. Ukraine’s defensive successes, drone adaptations, and mid-range strike campaign are creating compounding effects that are degrading Russian frontline forces.
Unverified reporting suggests that the Kremlin privately acknowledges Ukraine’s upper hand in drone operations on the battlefield and defense industrial base (DIB) production. A Russian milblogger citing unspecified sources reported on April 9 that Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov told Russian President Vladimir Putin that Ukraine has a “significant” technological advantage in drone warfare on the frontlines.[12] Belousov allegedly stated that the situation is “critical” for Russian forces as Ukraine both has numerical superiority in drones and has developed a new “generation of equipment.” Belousov allegedly told Putin that Ukraine was using “more sophisticated systems” that Russian forces are “largely unprepared” to counter. The sources claimed that Belousov highlighted several issues, including that new Ukrainian drones operate “around the clock,” that the drones are “virtually inaudible” until the moment they strike, and that Russian conventional defense methods such as standard detectors and electronic warfare (EW) are ineffective against the drones. Belousov allegedly stated that Russia needs to focus on developing its own next-generation systems and that current drone models purchased through external channels and foreign procurement are no longer adequately effective on the frontlines. Putin reportedly identified developing drone technology domestically as a priority going forward. ISW cannot verify the authenticity of this report.
Belousov spearheaded Russia’s successful drone initiatives that enabled Russia’s drone superiority in 2025, including the advent of Russia’s highly successful Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies.[13] Russian drone operations have faced setbacks from the February 1 blocking of their use of Starlink, which Russian forces relied on both for frontline communication and to extend drone ranges to strike further into the Ukrainian rear and generate BAI effects.[14] Russian drone innovation has also lagged as Russia has prioritized scaling production of a few drone models over innovation and, reportedly, due to the senior Russian military command’s resistance to change.[15] Belousov will likely continue attempts to proliferate new drone technologies aiming to overcome challenges posed by the Starlink shutdown and Ukrainian technological adaptations, and he may succeed in closing the current apparent Ukrainian drone advantage over time.
The Kremlin is deploying Russian military vessels to escort Russian sanctions-evading tankers through the English Channel. The Telegraph reported on April 8 that Russian Black Sea fleet frigate Admiral Grigorovich escorted the UK-sanctioned Universal and Enigma oil tankers through the English Channel heading west toward Plymouth.[16] The Telegraph reported that the British Royal Fleet Auxiliary Tideforce sailed behind the Russian vessels but did not intervene despite UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s prior authorization on March 25 to interdict UK-sanctioned vessels transiting through UK waters.[17] Data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform indicates that the Universal is sailing under a Russian flag and left the Port of Vysotsk, Leningrad Oblast, on January 18, 2026, and that the Enigma is sailing under a Cameroonian flag and left the Port of Primorsk, Leningrad Oblast, on March 29, 2026. Telegraph also identified two other sanctioned Russian tankers, Desert Kite sailing under the Gambian flag and Kousai under Sierra Leone’s flag, that entered the English Channel on the evening of April 7 and sailed east.[18] Kremlin officials have previously threatened the use of military force to aid Russian sanction-evading ships.[19] European states have been increasingly seizing Russian shadow fleet tankers in recent months, but the UK has yet to seize any tankers traveling near UK waters.[20]
Russian forces continue to conduct covert submarine operations near British undersea fiber-optic cables and pipelines in the North Atlantic Ocean. UK Defense Secretary John Healey reported on April 9 that Russian forces recently deployed an Akula-class attack submarine and two specialized reconnaissance submarines of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) to the North Atlantic Ocean in and around waters within the UK exclusive economic zone (EEZ).[21] Healey stated that Russian forces likely used the Akula-class submarine to divert Royal Navy vessels’ attention from the two GUGI spy submarines that ”spent time over” UK critical infrastructure. Healey stated that there is no evidence of any damage to UK undersea fiber-optic cables or pipelines, but that the UK would not tolerate any attempts to damage such infrastructure. Healey reported that Royal Navy vessels tracked the submarines during a month-long operation until the submarines departed from the waters within the UK EEZ. ISW has previously observed incidents of damage to undersea cables in the Baltic Sea against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[22]
Ukrainian forces used drones to destroy a Russian-controlled bridge in occupied Kherson Oblast, possibly for the first time in combat history. A commander of a Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces regiment told the Telegraph on April 7 that Ukrainian forces conducted a previously unreported drone-led operation in early 2025 that destroyed a bridge over the Konka River in occupied Kherson Oblast.[23] The Telegraph noted that Ukrainian forces conducted a two-month strike campaign against the bridge, using British Malloy T-150 heavy-lift drones over the course of 30 missions that delivered 1.5 tons of explosives that significantly damaged the bridge’s structure before Ukrainian forces conducted a final HIMARS strike to destroy it. Geolocated imagery from March 21, 2025, confirms that Ukrainian forces destroyed the bridge after March 14, 2025. Ukrainian officers told the Telegraph that this mission marked the first known case of Ukrainian forces destroying a bridge using drones, which severely complicated Russian resupply efforts to river islands in occupied Kherson Oblast and decreased Russian strikes in Kherson City.
Key Takeaways
- Russian and Ukrainian reporting appears to confirm battlefield reporting that Ukrainian forces have achieved a drone advantage over Russian forces on the battlefield. Ukraine’s drone advantage is likely contributing to the stalling of Russian advances and recent Ukrainian counterattacks.
- Ukrainian forces’ increasing strikes against Russian air defense systems and drone interception rates have facilitated recent Ukrainian battlefield successes.
- Unverified reporting suggests that the Kremlin privately acknowledges Ukraine’s upper hand in drone operations on the battlefield and defense industrial base (DIB) production.
- The Kremlin is deploying Russian military vessels to escort Russian sanctions-evading tankers through the English Channel.
- Russian forces continue to conduct covert submarine operations near British undersea fiber-optic cables and pipelines in the North Atlantic Ocean.
- Ukrainian forces used drones to destroy a Russian-controlled bridge in occupied Kherson Oblast, possibly for the first time in combat history.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
- Russian forces launched 119 drones against Ukraine.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian long-range strikes continue to have effects on Russian oil exports. Presidential Commissioner for Sanctions Policy of Ukraine Vladyslav Vlasyuk reported on April 9 that 17 crude oil tankers were present at Russian Baltic Sea oil ports (presumably Primorsk and Ust-Luga in Leningrad Oblast) between April 1 and 8, compared to 27 in January 2026.[24] Vlasyuk stated that satellite imagery shows that there are only eight tankers at the Novorossiysk Port in Krasnodar Krai and that the port has not made any shipments since April 4.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on April 9 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, and southeast of Sumy City toward Novodmytrivka, on April 8 and 9.[25]
Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Division and of the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[26]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 9 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchanski Khutory, Starytsya, Synelnykove, Prylipka, Verkhnya Pysarivka, Hrafske, Symynivka, Zybyne, and Lyman, and toward Volokhivka and Okhrimivka on April 8 and 9.[27]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on April 9 that Russian forces are increasingly employing Shahed drones as mothership drones that carry other drones and employing them as radio relays for such drones.[28]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on April 9.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 7 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[29]
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in northern Kupyansk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[30]
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger published a map on April 9 that shows that Ukrainian forces control Kivsharivka (southeast of Kupyansk), contrary to prior Russian claims.[31]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Novoosynove and Kivsharivka on April 8 and 9.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Myrove (northwest of Kupyansk) and Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk).[33]
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are intercepting Ukrainian drones in Kurylivka.[34] Elements of the 153rd Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[35]
Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka and southeast of Borova near Novyi Myr, Hrekivka, Novomykhailivka, and Tverdokhlibove on April 8 and 9.[36]
Russian forces are reportedly employing Chelnok heavy all-terrain unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) in the Kharkiv (likely Borova) direction. A Russian milblogger published imagery on April 8 reportedly showing elements of the Russian 12th Tank Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st GTA) operating Chelnok heavy all-terrain UGVs in the Kharkiv (likely Borova) direction.[37] ISW last observed elements of the Russian 12th Tank Regiment operating in the Borova direction as of April 5.[38] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi noted on April 8 that the imagery of the Chelnok UGV is the first frontline appearance of the vehicle and also its first public appearance since April 2024 demonstrations.[39]
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast overnight on April 8 to 9. Geolocated footage published on April 9 by Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian logistics hub in occupied southern Perevalsk (roughly 77 kilometers from the frontline).[40]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on April 9 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman toward Yarova; north of Lyman near Stavky and Drobysheve; northeast of Lyman near Zarichne; south of Lyman near Dibrova and toward Brusivka and Staryi Karavan; and east of Slovyansk near Riznykivka and Kalenyky on April 8 and 9.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lypivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[42]
Russian forces are reportedly transferring troops from other unspecified directions to the Lyman direction, potentially in preparation for a future offensive. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on April 9 that Russian forces are accumulating infantry in the Lyman direction and are transferring forces from other unspecified directions in preparation for future offensive efforts.[43] The spokesperson added that Russian forces are bringing forward artillery, mortar, and drone operator positions to interdict Ukrainian logistics.
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 123rd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) struck a Ukrainian vehicle northwest of Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk).[44] Night vision FPV drone operators of the 1234th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions near Ozerne (southeast of Lyman).[45] Elements of the 85th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating in the Rai-Oleksandrivka direction.[46] Elements of the 7th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly clearing Zakitne (northeast of Slovyansk).[47] Artillery elements of the Pyatnashka International Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Slovyansk direction.[48]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on April 9 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka and Illinivka and toward Dovha Balka; northeast of Druzhkivka toward Tykhonivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka, Pavlivka, and Novopavlivka on April 8 and 9.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kostyantynivka.[50]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and equipment near Staroraiske, (southwest of Druzhkivka), Serhiivka, and Novohryhorivka (both northwest of Druzhkivka).[51] Yolka interceptor drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in the Kostyantynivka direction.[52] Drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian infantry positions in the Druzhkivka direction.[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas and Ivanivka on April 9 but did not advance.[54]
A Russian milblogger claimed on April 9 that Novyi Donbas is a contested “gray zone.”[55]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Dobropillya direction.[56] Elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[57]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 9 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko, Vasylivka, and Novooleksandrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Molodetske, Kotlyne, and Novopidhorodne; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on April 8 and 9.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Myrne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and Serhiivka.[59]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Muravka; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Filiya on April 8 and 9 but did not advance.[60]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on April 9 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka toward Lisne; east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad and toward Novoselivka; and southeast of Oleksandrivka toward Vorone, Novohryhorivka, and Zlahoda on April 8 and 9.[61]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are striking Ukrainian forces near Andriivka (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[62] Elements of the 657th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Tykhe (east of Oleksandrivka).[63] Drone operators of the 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA) and of the Vega Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, GRU) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[64]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian air defense assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast overnight on April 8 to 9. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on April 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor-M1 air defense system near occupied Kalchynivka (roughly 70 kilometers from the frontline) overnight.[65]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on April 9 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka, Pryluky, Olenokostyantynivka, Dobropillya, and Tsvitkove and toward Vozdvyzhivka and Verkhnya Tersa; southwest of Hulyaipole near Charivne and Myrne and toward Hulyaipilske; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and Hirke and toward Staroukrainka on April 8 and 9.[66]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast.[67]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 9, but ISW has not collected any evidence to assess that Russian forces made any advances.
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk on April 9.[68]
Russian forces are intensifying drone strikes and cognitive warfare efforts targeting the civilian population of Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (southwest of Zaporizhzhia City). A Ukrainian military observer reported on April 8 that Russian forces have recently intensified drone strikes against civilians in Nikopol and begun a cognitive warfare effort attempting to terrify civilians into fleeing the city en masse, which would undermine the city’s economy[69] The military observer reported that Russian forces are using drones to drop leaflets threatening to strike civilian vehicles within the city in preparation for an alleged Russian attempt to cross the Dnipro River in the “next two weeks.” The military observer noted that Russian forces lack the strength to cross the Dnipro River, however.
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in Orikhiv.[70] Interceptor drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in Zaporizhia Oblast.[71]
Russian forces continued limited ground assaults northeast of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge and southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island.[72]
Russian forces are reportedly intensifying their activity in the Kherson direction. Ukrainian 30th Marine Corps Spokesperson Pavlo Drohal reported on April 9 that Russian forces have intensified their usage of drones and are conducting 550 artillery strikes weekly in the Kherson direction.[73] Drohal added that Russian forces continue attempts to cross the Dnipro River in small groups on rubber boats to push Ukrainian troops from positions on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River and seize positions on islands in the Dnipro River delta.[74]
Satellite imagery provided additional battle damage assessments (BDA) of the April 7 to 8 overnight Ukrainian strike against an oil terminal in occupied Feodosia, Crimea.[75] Radio Svoboda’s Skhemy project assessed on April 8 that commercially available satellite imagery taken on April 8 shows at least two fuel tanks burning at the Maritime Oil Terminal in occupied Feodosiya, which had survived October 2025 Ukrainian strikes against the terminal.[76]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces launched a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 8 to 9, damaging energy infrastructure in southern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 119 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other strike drones — of which about 70 were Shaheds – from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea; and occupied Donetsk City.[77] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 99 drones, that 16 drones struck 11 locations, and that debris from downed drones fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and energy infrastructure in Kherson and Odesa oblasts.[78] Ukraine’s largest energy company, DTEK, reported that Russian strikes severely damaged a power substation in Odesa Oblast.[79]
Russian forces reportedly used a new jet-powered Geran-5 strike drone against Sumy Oblast on April 4. Russian sources amplified footage on April 9 claiming to show Russian forces targeting Ukrainian oil and gas infrastructure in Moshenka, Sumy Oblast (about 50 kilometers west of the international border) with a Geran-5 jet-powered strike drone on April 4.[80] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the Geran-5 has similar characteristics to a small cruise missile due to its fast speed and heavy payload.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed that Geran-5 has a range of more than 600 kilometers, a 60-kilogram warhead, and a top speed of over 350 kilometers per hour.[82] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian forces used the Geran-5 drone for the first time in early January 2026 and that the drone could carry a warhead of about 90 kilograms and had a range of 1,000 kilometers.[83]
Russian forces are targeting Ukrainian mobile air defense groups with first-person view (FPV) Geran-2 (Shahed) strike drones. Russian sources published footage on April 9 purportedly showing Russian forces striking a Ukrainian mobile air defense group near Poltava City with a guided Geran-2 (Shahed) drone.[84] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov warned that Shahed strike drones could target Ukrainian mobile air defense groups across Ukraine if Russian forces improve their machine target acquisition and guidance on FPV-controlled Shahed drones or extend their ranges via mesh networks.[85]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2026/
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2026/
[3] https://t.me/osirskiy/1433
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2026/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2026/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment-2/
[10] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2190
[11] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2023 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2027 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2031 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2035 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2039 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2042 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2046 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2051 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2055 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2060 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2064 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2068 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2072 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2077 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2081 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2085 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2088 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2094 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2097 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2101 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2104 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2108 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2111 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2115 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2120 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2124 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2128 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2132 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2137 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2142 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2146 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2150 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2155 ;
[12] https://t.me/romanov_92/52164
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-partial-battlefield-air-interdiction-enabled-recent-russian-advances-in-pokrovsk/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-efforts-to-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations-2/
[16] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/04/08/russia-warship-mocks-starmer-in-channel/?msockid=33da14aec97c64171cf80249c88665ce
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/
[18] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/04/08/russia-warship-mocks-starmer-in-channel/?msockid=33da14aec97c64171cf80249c88665ce
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2026/
[21] https://www.bbc.com/news/live/cg54mdlqppjt?post=asset%3Ae6cb5a73-9825-4aa0-ae01-132f013280b5#post
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2026/
[23] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/04/07/british-drones-destroy-russian-controlled-bridge-dnipro/?msockid=33da14aec97c64171cf80249c88665ce
[24] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/09/dipstrajky-praczyuyut-cherez-problemy-portiv-na-baltyczi-ta-chornomu-mori-rosiyany-znyzyat-vydobutok-nafty/ ; https://www.facebook.com/vladyslav.vlasiuk/posts/pfbid02YcqZuEuTiCp7gwmv8jKA1r58FCSF5ou2hyQ1Y5zDhQ64HZ9Bc5kuEt4NtZWpddjxl
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37065 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37063 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33410 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/90974 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/7482
[26] https://t.me/rusich_army/29087 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/62529
[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37097; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37065 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37063; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41688; https://t.me/severnnyi/7482; https://t.me/wargonzo/33410; https://t.me/dva_majors/90974
[28] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/09/diagnoz-protyvnyka-nervovyj-zryv-poblyzu-vovchanska-shahedy-vykonuyut-roli-matok/
[29] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2041952805079150884; https://x.com/MaximeFago89056/status/2041951268201984288; https://t.me/taran_Z_war/575
[30] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2042039461861630401; https://t.me/skala425/837
[31] https://t.me/rybar/79344
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37097; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37065 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37063; https://t.me/gvZapad/18263; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50375; https://t.me/wargonzo/33410; https://t.me/dva_majors/90974; https://t.me/rybar/79344
[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/33410
[34] https://x.com/ChaMapping/status/2041904307294105629; https://t.me/taran_Z_war/575; https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2041920451060867310; https://t.me/taran_Z_war/583; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2041921693518799171
[35] https://t.me/army_corp_10/1989; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/08/flagovtyk-ne-vyjshov-u-kupyansku-vuzlovomu-polonyly-rosijskyh-tankistiv/
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37097; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37065 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37063
[37] https://vk dot com/wall-226071110_62861
[38] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2026/
[39] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosiyany-pokazaly-bezpilotnu-mashynu-rozminuvannya-chelnok/; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosiyany-pokazaly-bezpilotnu-mashynu-rozminuvannya-chelnok/
[40] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34801; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2190; https://t.me/army_1usc/877; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2042276369384735116
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37097 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37065 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37063; https://t.me/dva_majors/90974 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33410 ; https://t.me/gvZapad/18263
[42] https://t.me/dva_majors/90974
[43] https://suspilne dot media/1284924-rf-atakuvala-energeticnu-infrastrukturu-na-odesini-pisla-kontraktu-18-25-garantuut-vidstrocku-1506-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1775721631
[44] https://t.me/Osintpen/2765 ; https://t.me/OMSBr_123/1758 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11653
[45] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2041927605583249889; https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/14153
[46] https://t.me/motopatriot78/50381 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50392
[47] https://t.me/motopatriot78/50391
[48] https://t.me/wargonzo/33409
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37097 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41707 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37065 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/206281; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37063; https://t.me/wargonzo/33410
[50] https://t.me/wargonzo/33410
[51] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15219
[52] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15218
[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/90965
[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41707 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37097
[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41707
[56] https://t.me/mod_russia/62515
[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/50381 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50392
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37097; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37065; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37063; https://t.me/dva_majors/90974; https://t.me/wargonzo/33410;
[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41698
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37097; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37065; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37063
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37097 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37065 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37063
[62] https://t.me/voin_dv/19204; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11651
[63] https://t.me/voin_dv/19215
[64] https://t.me/sashakots/60996; https://t.me/voin_dv/19219;
[65] https://x.com/1usc_army/status/2042158566010675264 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/04/09/tretij-dron-zbyvav-soboyu-na-okupovanij-donechchyni-znyshhyly-rosijskyj-zrk-yakyj-chynyv-shalenyj-opir/;
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37097 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37065 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37063 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/19217
[67] https://t.me/voin_dv/19218;
[68] https://t.me/dva_majors/90974
[69] https://t.me/voice_of_major/7885
[70] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2041981304955359288; https://t.me/gv71msp/274
[71] https://t.me/dva_majors/90998
[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37097; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37065; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37063
[73] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/09/zahodyat-na-gumovyh-chovnah-na-ostrovy-v-delti-na-hersonshhyni-ataky-tryvayut-u-rezhymi-non-stop/
[74] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/09/zahodyat-na-gumovyh-chovnah-na-ostrovy-v-delti-na-hersonshhyni-ataky-tryvayut-u-rezhymi-non-stop/
[75] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2026/
[76] https://t.me/cxemu/4750; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2025/
[77] https://t.me/kpszsu/59722
[78] https://t.me/khersonskaODA/54331 ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/54336 ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/54354 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/15276 ; https://t.me/dtek_ua/4247 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/15285 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1284916-na-odesini-vnaslidok-vecirnoi-ataki-droniv-poskodzeno-obekt-energetiki/ ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1284916-na-odesini-vnaslidok-vecirnoi-ataki-droniv-poskodzeno-obekt-energetiki/
[79] https://t.me/dtek_ua/4247
[80] https://t.me/rybar/79367 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/170224 ; https://t.me/stalins_sokol/113 ; https://t.me/rybar/79235 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/72493
[81] https://t.me/rybar/79367
[82] https://t.me/stalins_sokol/113
[83] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2026/
[84] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7273 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/170244
[85] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7273
