Toplines
Kremlin officials continue to reiterate Russia’s unwillingness to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations that fail to fulfill Russia’s demands for Ukraine’s complete capitulation, despite Ukraine’s repeated negotiation efforts. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov emphasized on August 14 that Russia is unwilling to accept a ceasefire that freezes the current frontline and reiterated Russia’s commitment to continue the war in Ukraine until Russia can secure a “long-term, reliable, and sustainable” settlement on its own terms.[1] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on August 12 during a meeting with the United Russia Party’s expert council that Russia will suspend or end the war in Ukraine “exclusively” on Russia’s terms, obliquely referencing Russia’s maximalist war aims of Ukraine’s complete capitulation.[2] The Kremlin appears to be doubling down on outright rejection of the concept of negotiations in order to unite the Russian public around a pro-war platform ahead of the September 18-20, 2026 State Duma elections. The Kremlin’s routine rejection of all Ukrainian ceasefire and peace proposals signals Russia’s continued unwillingness to end the war in Ukraine on any terms that fall short of fulfilling Russia’s maximalist demands.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly reiterated his commitment to peace negotiations and a willingness to make meaningful compromises to end the war, despite Russian efforts to falsely paint Ukraine as the intransigent party in peace efforts.[4]
Russia rejected Turkish and Ukrainian proposals for a moratorium on strikes against maritime targets in the Black Sea, further underscoring the fact that Moscow is systematically refusing even the most limited diplomatic proposals from Ukraine and third-party states. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated on August 8 that Turkey proposed to Russia and Ukraine a bilateral moratorium on strikes against merchant ships in the Black Sea.[5] Reuters reported on August 13, citing a source familiar with the matter, that Ukraine sent an offer to Russia through an unspecified third party suggesting that Russia and Ukraine both halt strikes against civilian maritime targets in the Black Sea over fears of the impact of such strikes on global food supply.[6] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on August 14 in response to Fidan’s August 8 statement that Russia did not receive an official request from Turkey for such a moratorium, but that Russia does not advise a mechanism similar to the 2022-2023 Black Sea grain initiative.[7] The 2022-2023 Black Sea Grain Initiative, which the United Nations (UN) and Turkey brokered with Russia, allowed cargo ships to sail between ports in Odesa Oblast and the Bosphorus Strait without fear of Russian drone strikes.[8] Russian officials repeatedly threatened to dissolve the Black Sea Grain Initiative and refused to extend the deal, leading to its eventual collapse in July 2023.[9] Zakharova claimed that there is no basis for a “half measure” that would give Ukraine a temporary respite, effectively rejecting the Turkish and Ukrainian moratorium proposals. Russian forces intensified their strike campaign against Ukrainian port infrastructure and internationally flagged vessels in the Black Sea throughout June, July, and August 2026 in order to degrade Ukraine’s economy and disrupt Ukraine‘s ability to export grain.[10] Ukrainian and Turkish proposals follow Ukraine’s intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns that have targeted Russian ground and maritime supply routes and Russian tankers, including those belonging to its shadow fleet, in the Azov-Black Sea region in July 2026.[11] Ukraine has notably decreased the frequency of these strikes following a request from US Vice President JD Vance near the end of July 2026.[12] Zakharova’s blatant rejection of the Turkish and Ukrainian proposed limited ceasefire in the Black Sea demonstrates Russia’s continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful negotiations, even those limited in scope.
The technological offense-defense drone race in Ukraine is advancing rapidly and expanding the kill zone. Former Ukrainian service member and drone warfare expert Dmytro Putiata reported on August 2 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone that was operating radio-controlled frequency hopping and spread spectrum (FHSS) technology, enabling the drone to evade Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) jamming and fly up to 40 kilometers in depth.[13] FHSS allows Russian drone operators to rapidly switch frequency bands, significantly increasing the drone’s EW resistance. FHSS-enabled drones will likely contribute to the expanding kill zone — the area (currently within 15 to 25 kilometers from the frontline) wherein the saturation of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones poses an elevated risk to any personnel or equipment.[14] The FHSS-enabled FPV drone represents the latest Russian technological adaptation to evade Ukrainian EW jamming. Russian forces previously began using drones operated on fiber optic wires to mitigate EW jamming in Fall 2024, after which Ukrainian forces responded by innovating and investing in interceptor capabilities.[15] Ukraine will likely continue to develop capabilities aimed at countering Russian FHSS-enabled FPV drones in order to reset the technological offense-defense drone race.
Key Takeaways
- Kremlin officials continue to reiterate Russia’s unwillingness to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations that fail to fulfill Russia’s demands for Ukraine’s complete capitulation, despite Ukraine’s repeated negotiation efforts.
- Russia rejected Turkish and Ukrainian proposals for a moratorium on strikes against maritime targets in the Black Sea, further underscoring the fact that Moscow is systematically refusing even the most limited diplomatic proposals from Ukraine and third-party states.
- The technological offense-defense drone race in Ukraine is advancing rapidly and expanding the kill zone.
- Ukrainian forces hit a Russian oil refinery in Leningrad Oblast and a Wildberries warehouse in Tver Oblast overnight on August 13 to 14. Russian forces launched 112 drones against Ukraine overnight.
- Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces hit a Russian oil refinery in Leningrad Oblast and a Wildberries warehouse in Tver Oblast overnight on August 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 14 that Ukrainian forces struck the Novatek Ust-Luga Oil Refinery in Slobodka, Leningrad Oblast, hitting two processing units and causing a fire.[16] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozhdenko acknowledged that Ukrainian drone strikes caused a fire at the port of Ust-Luga.[17] Tver Oblast Governor Vitaly Korolev claimed that a Ukrainian drone damaged a wall of a Wildberries warehouse in Kalininsky Raion, Tver Oblast, overnight.[18]
A Ukrainian source provided an updated battle damage assessment (BDA) for a Ukrainian strike against the Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast on August 7 to 8.[19] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) channel, which frequently reports on successful Ukrainian strikes, reported that the August 7 to 8 strikes damaged the Syzran Oil Refinery’s AVT-5 primary oil processing unit, AVT-6 primary atmospheric-vacuum distillation unit, fluid catalytic cracking unit, PGI-DIG/280 high-octane gasoline component production unit, and two additional units for the production of gasoline.[20]
A Ukrainian military source claimed on August 14, citing a source in Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), that the GUR used explosives planted under a section of the Trans-Siberian railway to destroy a shipment of North Korean KN-23/24 ballistic missiles and additional unspecified North Korean ammunition headed toward the Ukrainian theater on an unspecified date.[21] The source later deleted the initial post and stated that the GUR operation was “unconfirmed.”[22] Another Ukrainian military source rejected the initial report, however.[23] ISW is unable to confirm this Ukrainian report but will report any further evidence or confirmation of such a Ukrainian operation if it becomes available.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 13 and 14 but did not advance.[24]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 13 and 14 but did not advance.[25]
Russian forces continue to re-adapt drone systems to extend Russian intermediate-range strike capabilities. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 14 that Russian forces began fielding electronic warfare (EW)-resistant Dyagterev carrier drones to strike Ukrainian forces and assets deep in Ukrainian rear areas in Kharkiv Oblast.[26] ISW has not previously observed this drone in use on the battlefield. [27]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on August 11 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northeastern and central Kupyansk after what ISW assesses were infiltration missions.[28] The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps reported on August 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Impulse-M tracked unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) near Kamyanka (likely north of Kupyansk).[29]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger criticized Russian efforts to exaggerate battlefield advances in the Kupyansk direction. The milblogger claimed on August 14 that isolated first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against individual Russian service members do not represent the battlefield reality or Russian control over territory and criticized sources who inaccurately map such strikes as representative of control of terrain.[30]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Borova on August 13 and 14 but did not advance.[31] Geolocated footage published on August 14 shows two service members, whom Russian sources claimed are of the Russian 20th Guards Combined Arms Army (Moscow Military District), operating in eastern Oskil (southwest of Borova).[32] ISW cannot independently confirm that the service members in the footage are Russian. Russian sources are increasingly attempting to portray unidentified service members in areas relatively far from the frontline as Russian as part of a cognitive warfare effort aimed at aggrandizing Russian territorial gains for informational effects.[33]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against electrical infrastructure and Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 14 that Ukrainian forces struck four electrical substations near occupied Mykhailivka (roughly either 50 or 52 kilometers from the frontline), Lozivskyi (roughly 74 kilometers from the frontline), Svatove (roughly 17 kilometers from the frontline), and Arapivka (roughly 25 kilometers from the frontline).[34] Geolocated footage published on August 13 shows the aftermath of a Ukrainian strike against a Russian Kamaz truck along the T-1306 Severodonetsk-Luhansk City highway in occupied Severodonetsk (roughly 38 kilometers from the frontline).[35] A Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) regiment reported on August 14 that Ukrainian strikes destroyed nine and damaged another six Russian heavy armored vehicles, damaged five light vehicles, killed seven Russian service members, and injured four Russian service members roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline in unspecified parts of occupied Luhansk Oblast.[36]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on August 13 and 14 but did not advance.[37]
Russian forces are reportedly redeploying specialized drone operators in an effort to restore drone parity in the Lyman direction. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on August 14 that Russian forces are deploying additional unmanned systems units and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies drone crews to the Lyman direction to restore their drone parity with Ukrainian forces and provide cover for Russian assault groups.[38]
Russian forces continue devastating airstrikes against near-rear areas in the Kramatorsk direction. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 14 that Russian forces struck a residential building in Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast, with a guided glide bomb, killing one and injuring at least 22.[39] Zelensky stated that Russian forces launch at least 220 glide bombs against frontline areas per day.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on August 13 and 14 but did not make confirmed advances.[40] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 14 that Russian forces seized Novomykolaivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka).[41]A Russian milblogger claimed on August 14 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Kostyantynivka and east of Novopavlivka (west of Kostyantynivka).[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[43]
Geolocated footage published on August 13 shows Ukrainian forces conducting an airstrike against a Russian-occupied building in central Kostyantynivka, indicating that Russian forces have likely consolidated positions in southeastern Kostyantynivka beyond what is currently reflected on ISW’s maps.[44] The extent of Russian advances in the area remains unclear, however.
Russian forces continue to strike first responders in the Druzhkivka direction. Geolocated footage published on August 12 shows the aftermath of a Russian strike against two medical workers southeast of Krasnotorska (north of Druzhkivka).[45]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on August 13 and 14 but did not make confirmed advances.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 14 that Russian forces advanced in southern Dobropillya, north of Dobropillya, and south of Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions on August 13 and 14 but did not advance.[48]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on August 13 and 14 but did not advance, and Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks in the area.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces infiltrated into Komar (east of Oleksandrivka) but that Russian forces ultimately repelled the Ukrainian forces.[50] The milblogger rejected reports that Ukrainian forces liberated Filiya and Yalta (both north of Komar). A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged the recent successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operation in the Oleksandrivka direction, noting that the situation for Russian forces deteriorated by the end of July 2026 but claimed that the extent of Ukrainian advances is less than that Ukrainian sources have reported.[51]
Ukrainian forces continued intermediate-range strikes against energy infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 14 that Ukrainian forces struck four electrical substations and a gas distribution station in occupied Mariupol (about 114 kilometers from the frontline) and one electrical substation each in occupied Mykilske (about 54 kilometers from the frontline), Vinnytske (about 74 kilometers from the frontline), Rivnopil (likely 62 kilometers from the frontline), and Shyrokyne (about 126 kilometers from the frontline) in an unspecified period.[52]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction. Geolocated footage published on August 13 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian mechanized vehicles attempting a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault southeast to south of Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole), indicating that Russian forces have likely seized Olenokostyantynivka and Zelene (both east to southeast of Vozdvyzhivka).[53] A Ukrainian unit involved in repelling the assault reported that Russian forces conducted the mechanized assault for several hours and noted that Ukrainian forces struck three Russian armored vehicles and destroyed one.[54]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 13 and 14 but did not advance.[55] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near occupied Luhove (likely five kilometers from the frontline).[56]
Ukrainian forces continue intermediate-range strikes against Russian military assets, energy infrastructure, and railway logistics in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 14 that Ukrainian forces achieved eight hits against multiple electrical substations in Berdyansk (about 102 kilometers from the frontline), two hits against at least one electrical substation in occupied Andriivka (either 64 or 114 kilometers from the frontline), and hit electrical substations in occupied Kamyanka (about 31 kilometers from the frontline), Prymorsk (about 89 kilometers from the frontline), Chernihivka (about 39 kilometers from the frontline), and Prymorskyi Possad (about 98 kilometers from the frontline) in an unspecified time period.[57] The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems regiment operating in Zaporizhia Oblast reported that Ukrainian drone operators recently tested a new munition against a railway bridge in occupied Tokmak (about 27 kilometers from the frontline), rendering the bridge completely unusable with only four hits.[58]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 14.
Ukrainian forces continued intermediate-range strikes against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point and two ground repeaters for Geran and Gerbera-type long-range strike drones near occupied Zalizny Port, Kherson Oblast (about 45 kilometers from the frontline).[59] Brovdi reported on August 14 that Ukrainian forces struck an electrical substation in occupied Sokolohirne, Kherson Oblast (about 108 kilometers from the frontline), and the Balaklava Thermal Power Plant (TPP) in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea on an unspecified date.[60] A local Crimea-based Telegram channel claimed on August 13 that Ukrainian forces struck the Balaklava TPP.[61]
Satellite imagery collected on August 8 and 13 shows damage to the Syvash bridge between occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea, confirming an August 1 report from the Ukrainian General Staff that Ukrainian forces struck the bridge.[62] A local Crimea-based Telegram channel amplified satellite imagery collected on an unspecified date and reported that much of the Chonhar railway bridge between occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea has collapsed following Ukrainian strikes.[63]
Russian forces continue attempting countermeasures to protect logistics to occupied Crimea from Ukrainian strikes. The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems regiment operating in southern Ukraine reported that Russian forces are increasing the number of mobile fire groups operating along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway, rendering single Ukrainian strikes along this highway ineffective.[64] The Ukrainian commander reported that Ukrainian forces now need to conduct large drone strikes to penetrate Russian air defenses. The commander reported that Ukrainian drone operators are increasingly targeting Russian mobile fire groups escorting military convoys, which stops the convoys and makes it more efficient for other drone operators to target the remaining vehicles.[65]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[66]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 13 and 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on August 14 that Russian forces launched 112 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Banderol-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[67] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 90 drones, that Russian drones struck 11 locations, and that debris fell on six locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck commercial, logistics, civilian, and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[68] Kherson Oblast Military Administration head Oleksandr Prokudin reported on August 14 that Russian strikes de-energized several neighborhoods in Kherson City.[69]
Russian forces sometimes field more jet-powered drones than conventional Shahed-type drones in nightly strike packages. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on August 14 that Russian forces used five times more jet-powered drones in July 2026 compared to June 2026.[70] Ihnat reported that jet-powered drones account for up to two-thirds of some of Russia’s strike packages, and that the August 13 to 14 strike package contained at least 30 jet-powered drones.
Russian forces continue to strike Ukrainian rail logistics. The Russian MoD claimed on August 13 that Russian Geran-type strike drones struck locomotives in Odesa, Zaporizhia, and Sumy oblasts on unspecified recent dates.[71] The Russian MoD claimed on August 14 that Russian drones struck the railway station at the port of Izmail, Odesa Oblast.[72]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2133003/
[2] https://tass dot com/politics/2172045
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2026/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_19-4/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2026/
[5] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J4rIYmlZeIk&t=877s; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2026/; https://suspilne dot media/1374824-golova-mzs-tureccini-zaklikav-rf-ta-ukrainu-rozrobiti-mehanizm-moratoriu-na-udari-po-korablah-u-cornomu-mori/
[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-offers-russia-truce-black-sea-food-supply-fears-mount-source-says-2026-08-13/
[7] https://t.me/MID_Russia/88495; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2133041/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-in-the-black-sea/; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-61759692
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_11-19/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2023
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2026/;https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/;
[12] https://www.ft.com/content/725b4d15-bd8d-4083-a04e-db016338af2e?syn-25a6b1a6=1; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2026/08/12/8048342/; https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-halts-strikes-tankers-using-russian-port-us-request-ft-says-2026-08-12/
[13] https://x.com/kriegsforscherD/status/2083936792613441759
[14] https://texty.org dot ua/projects/116021/20-kilometers-of-the-gray-zone-the-front-line-has-become-blurred/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/; https://understandingwar.org/research/future-of-war/ukraine-and-the-problem-of-restoring-maneuver-in-contemporary-war/; https://understandingwar.org/newsroom/bbc-inside-the-kill-zone-on-ukraines-front-line-where-new-weapons-have-transformed-war/; https://understandingwar.org/newsroom/reuters-inside-ukraines-kill-zone/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2024/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_6-2/
[16] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41877 ;
[17] https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/11601
[18] https://t.me/pul69/29396
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/
[20] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/28779
[21] https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/2088175442981199977
[22] https://t.me/Kirilovolodimirovich/30182
[23] https://t.me/ssternenko/62307
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41871; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41873; https://t.me/wargonzo/36218; https://t.me/severnnyi/9019
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41871; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41873; https://t.me/severnnyi/9019; https://t.me/wargonzo/36218
[26] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121292
[27] https://www.facebook.com/reel/2175344393034724; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/13/iz-knyazyej-u-gryaz-na-harkivshhyni-perehoplyuvachi-povitryanyh-syl-zbyly-ridkisnyj-rosijskyj-dron-za-100-tysyach/
[28] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2087917344790061539 ; https://t.me/Svidky_Spasa/52; https://x.com/jim_beam77967/status/2087965256559505695
[29] https://t.me/corpsarmy16/3568; https://armyinform.com.ua/2026/08/14/nrk-z-elementamy-shi-%c2%abzalizna-brygada%c2%bb-vpolyuvala-ridkisnu-rosijsku-platformu-%c2%abimpuls-m%c2%bb/
[30] https://t.me/rybar/82442
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41871; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41873; https://t.me/grvZapad/19438
[32] https://t.me/endspiell/4139; https://t.me/Osintpen/3343; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12697
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/
[34] https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2088156263787958571 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2733
[35] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2087794111654806001; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/28714
[36] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1DL78KchTJ/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/14/one-bird-one-hit-speczpryznachenczi-8-go-polku-sso-za-100-km-vid-liniyi-frontu-nyshhat-logistyku-voroga-na-luganshhyni/
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41871; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41873; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46424; https://t.me/wargonzo/36218
[38] https://youtu.be/0h8MB9i9pkI; https://armyinform dot .com.ua/2026/08/14/vorog-kynuv-v-bij-ekipazhi-rubikonu-na-lymanskomu-napryamku/
[39] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2088169621249507674; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20386; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/14/shhodnya-rosiya-zastosovuye-proty-nashyh-pryfrontovyh-gromad-blyzko-220-kabiv-prezydent/; https://t.me/Donetsk_obl_prokuratura/6497; https://t.me/astrapress/122092;
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41871; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41873; https://t.me/wargonzo/36218
[41] https://t.me/mod_russia/66498
[42] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33674
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41876
[44] https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/2087950860458361271; https://t.me/soniah_hub/17665; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/37571
[45] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2087875725600702558; https://t.me/Hollander2022/2158
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41871; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41873; https://t.me/wargonzo/36218; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46422
[47] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33677
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41871; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41873; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121290
[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46450; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41871; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41873; https://t.me/motopatriot78/55279
[50] https://t.me/motopatriot78/55279
[51] https://t.me/rybar/82439; https://t.me/rybar/82440
[52] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2733
[53] https://t.me/hawks411/925; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12693; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/08/14/zupynyly-bronovanyj-shturm-bilya-gulyajpolya-polyuvannya-na-okupantiv-v-oleshkah-dysko-buhanka-strim/
[54] https://t.me/hawks411/925
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41871; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41873; https://t.me/wargonzo/36218
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41876
[57] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2733
[58] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/14/rejky-azh-porozryvalo-piloty-vdaryly-novym-boyeprypasom-po-mostu-v-tylu-rosiyan/
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41876
[60] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2733
[61] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2026/
[62] https://x.com/giK1893/status/2088020290148114863?s=20 ; https://x.com/giK1893/status/2088040560430871037?s=20 ; https://x.com/wtrmln_frm_kyiv/status/2088038147774972406?s=20 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41688 ;
[63] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/107161
[64] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/14/vorog-zbilshyv-kilkist-mvg-to-my-pochaly-praczyuvaty-po-nyh-trasa-na-krym-prodovzhuye-palaty/
[65] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/14/odni-zupynyayut-inshi-dobyvayut-vorozhi-kolony-na-krym-palyat-spilnymy-zusyllyamy/
[66] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[67] https://t.me/kpszsu/72740
[68] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31044; https://t.me/cherkaskaODA/21725; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/14/u-smili-rosiyany-vdaryly-dronom-zi-shrapnellyu-po-zhytlovij-bagatopoverhivczi/; https://t.me/cherkaskaODA/21725; https://t.me/cherkaskaODA/21711; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4481; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4482; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4483; https://t.me/synegubov/24762; https://t.me/synegubov/24763; https://t.me/synegubov/24764; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1379160-cotiri-kerovani-aviabombi-vlucili-po-torgovomu-centru-u-peredmisti-harkova/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18512; https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/3073; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/14/dytyna-z-mamoyu-zagynuly-vnaslidok-pryczilnogo-podvijnogo-udaru-voroga-na-sumshhyni/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/14/udar-droniv-po-sumshhyni-u-burynskij-gromadi-zagynuly-zhinka-ta-9-richna-dytyna-shhe-chetvero-osib-poraneni/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18512; https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/3073; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/14/dytyna-z-mamoyu-zagynuly-vnaslidok-pryczilnogo-podvijnogo-udaru-voroga-na-sumshhyni/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/14/udar-droniv-po-sumshhyni-u-burynskij-gromadi-zagynuly-zhinka-ta-9-richna-dytyna-shhe-chetvero-osib-poraneni/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/46076; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/46080; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/46085; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65954; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65957
[69] https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/14539; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/64866
[70] liii https://www.facebook.com/yuriy.ignat/posts/pfbid0FVkhFEZqoKpqf8cy2hwvD73UgDBfAu1YLdkgX3XpbKiQz17ccUyK95wxMDETeS1fl?rdid=Skud1xC7B6JaivFd#; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/14/do-dvoh-tretyn-pid-chas-okremyh-atak-yurij-ignat-utochnyv-dani-shhodo-zastosuvannya-rosiyeyu-reaktyvnyh-bpla/
[71] https://t.me/mod_russia/66501; https://t.me/mod_russia/66484
[72] https://t.me/mod_russia/66492
