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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 16, 2026

August 16, 2026

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 16, 2026

Toplines

Ukrainian forces have struck seven of Wildberries’ 10 largest logistics centers since July 2026 as part of the ongoing Ukrainian strike campaign aimed at degrading the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and dual-use logistics network. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 16 that Ukrainian forces struck another Wildberries warehouse on August 15-16, meaning Ukrainian forces have now struck and stopped operations at seven of Wildberries’ 10 largest logistics centers.[1] The Ukrainian MoD reported that Ukraine’s August 15-16 overnight strikes hit Wildberries’ largest logistics hub (with an area of 250,000 square meters) in the Koledino Industrial Park in Podolsk, Moscow Oblast (roughly 420 kilometers from the international border). The Wildberries Press Service confirmed that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at the facility and forced the company to reorganize its logistics chains.[2] Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov also acknowledged the strike on the Podolsk Wildberries facility.[3] Geolocated footage published on August 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking the warehouse in Koledino, causing a fire.[4]

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The Ukrainian MoD reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a warehouse in Domodedovo, Moscow Oblast (roughly 430 kilometers from the international border), on the night of August 15 to 16.[5] Geolocated footage published on August 16 shows a fire at the Severnoye Domodedovo logistics complex.[6] Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov acknowledged the Ukrainian strike on Domodedovo.[7]

Ukrainian officials have noted that Ukrainian forces are striking Wildberries warehouses as the company is involved in supplying the Russian military, including with drone components and navigation equipment.[8] Reuters reported in early August 2026 that Ukrainian strikes had destroyed at least 1.18 million square meters of Wildberries’ warehouse space, representing one-fifth of Wildberries’ total warehouse capacity at that time, and the impact of the Ukrainian strike campaign on the company has only grown since.[9] ISW continues to assess that a Ukrainian strike campaign against Wildberries logistics centers is putting additional pressure on Russia’s economy and already-overstretched air defenses.[10] Russia’s inability to protect Wildberries’ largest logistics hubs despite the ongoing Ukrainian campaign against such targets demonstrates how Russia lacks a sufficient number of air defenses to protect all of the necessary infrastructure in its rear.

Key Takeaways

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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for more reports about Ukrainian operations in Russia.

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian defense industrial facility in Rostov Oblast on the night of August 15 to 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 16 that Ukrainian forces struck the Kamensky Plant in Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, Rostov Oblast (approximately 178 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of August 15 to 16, causing a fire at the facility.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Kamensky Plant produces solid rocket fuel for Russian multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) ammunition and a number of missiles and aviation armament. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukraine‘s August 10 strike on the Zapsibneftekhim petrochemical facility in Tobolsk, Tyumen Oblast, damaged the plant’s central gas fractionation unit.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff also confirmed that a Ukrainian strike on the Orsknefteorgsintez oil refinery in Orsk, Orenburg Oblast on August 11 damaged the refinery’s hydrocracker unit, three primary oil processing units, and a secondary distillation unit for light petroleum fractions.[13]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 15 and 16 but did not make confirmed advances.[14] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 16 that Russian forces advanced to and are fighting in Khrapivshchyna (north of Sumy City).[15]

Russian forces continue to exploit grassy terrain in northern Kharkiv Oblast to conduct infiltration missions. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Sumy direction stated on August 16 that Russian forces are conducting aerial reconnaissance near the front and continue to leverage daily small infantry groups of one to three servicemembers to penetrate between Ukrainian positions despite losses.[16] The deputy commander noted that the grass in the area is over two meters high (about 6.5 feet), making it difficult for Ukrainian forces to identify the small Russian groups. The deputy commander stated that Russian forces are conducting counterbattery fire and show no signs of any weapons shortages. The deputy commander stated that Russian remote mining and drone strikes are complicating Ukrainian logistics.

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 15 and 16 but did not make confirmed advances.[17] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 16 that Russian forces seized Kudiivka (north of Kharkiv City).[18] Russian sources attempted to frame the alleged seizure of Kudiivka as the “gateway” to Kharkiv City as the settlement lies on the shortest route to the city along the E-105 Kharkiv-Belgorod City highway.[19] Russian forces have been advancing along other similarly direct highways to Kharkiv City from the neighboring Lyptsi direction since Russian forces launched their offensive in this area in May 2024. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces refuted the Russian MoD’s claim, stating that Russian forces are fighting within Kudiivka but have not established any strongholds.[20] The source added that there are Russian forces west of Kudiivka cut off from the main grouping.

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Russian fire control over major roads in northern Kharkiv Oblast is complicating civilian evacuations.  Vovchansk City Military Administration Head Tamaz Hambarashvili stated on August 16 that there are still 300 people living in Vovchanskyi Hromada, most of whom are located south of the frontline.[21] Hambrashvili stated that Russian forces are conducting constant drone strikes and expanding the contested “gray zones” in the area. Hambarashvili reported that Russian forces control all the ground lines of communications (GLOCs) such that only Ukrainian forces can conduct evacuations.

Sources continue to report how the pattern of lying about Russian advances within the Russian chain of command is leading to losses on the ground. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 16 that Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City) is currently a contested “gray zone” even though Russian authorities claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement in December 2025.[22] The source claimed that Russian forces now enter Vilcha “practically blind” under Ukrainian artillery and drone fire as nobody kept a reliable map of the minefields that both sides laid in the months after its claimed seizure.

Russian forces continue to strike religious infrastructure in Ukraine.[23] The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Cathedral of Saint Nicholas the Wonderworker reported on August 15 that shrapnel from a recent Russian missile and drone strike against Kharkiv City damaged the windows and surrounding areas of the church.[24]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 15 and 16 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[25]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 15 and 16 but did not advance.[26] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on August 16 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in western Kupyansk on the town’s southern outskirts but that Russian forces control northern and eastern Kupyansk.[27]

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 16 as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks near Ridkodub and Nove (both southeast of Borova).[28]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on August 15 and 16 but did not advance. [29]

Order of Battle: A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces reported on August 16 that elements of the Russian 673rd Separate Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion of the 144th Motorized Rifle Brigade (18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating in the Lyman direction.[30] This is the first time ISW has observed this unit involved in combat operations in Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces recently cleared Russian infiltrators from an area in western Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on August 15 shows Ukrainian forces operating in western Kostyantynivka – an area in which ISW previously observed a Russian infiltrator presence.[31] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 16 that Russian forces seized Pershomarivka (north of Kostyantynivka and east of Kramatorsk).[32] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 16 that Russian forces crossed the Kazennyi Torets River southwest of Druzhkivka, likely to flank Druzhkivka from the west.[33]

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Russian forces continue to intensify their glide bomb strikes against ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Fortress Belt to enable future offensive operations. Slovyansk City Military Administration Head Vadym Lyakh reported on August 16 that Russian forces continuously struck Slovyansk from the night of August 15 until late in the evening on August 16 with FAB-250 glide bombs, first-person view (FPV) drones, and Molniya-2 fixed-wing strike drones.[34] The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported on August 16 that Russian forces struck residential parts of Slovyansk with glide bombs.[35] A Russian milblogger posted on August 16 footage purportedly showing the aftermath of a Russian glide bomb strike on the Novokramatorsk Machine Building Factory in Kramatorsk.[36] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are striking high-rise buildings in Druzhkivka with glide bombs and are intensifying their strikes on Ukrainian GLOCs leading to Kramatorsk in order to increase pressure on the Kramatorsk-Slovyansk agglomeration.[37] Russian forces are conducting a battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against the Fortress Belt that relies more heavily on glide bomb strikes and aims to set conditions for future offensive operations against Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.[38]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on August 15 to 16 but did not advance.[39]

Russian forces continued striking Dobropillya with high-explosive glide bombs to degrade urban cover for Ukrainian infantry and drone crews. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on August 16 purportedly showing Russian forces conducting FAB-500 glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian drone ground control stations in Dobropillya.[40] Geolocated footage published on August 15 shows Russian forces conducting glide bomb strikes against a Ukrainian temporary deployment site in Dobropillya.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions on August 15 and 16 but did not advance.[42]

Russian milbloggers continue amplifying the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) claims of exaggerated Russian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction as part of the systematic Russian cognitive warfare campaign aimed at generating informational effects. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 15 that Russian forces control Yalta, Piddubne, and Myrne (all east of Oleksandrivka) – settlements that Ukrainian forces liberated during the 2026 Oleksandrivka direction counteroffensive – and that Russian forces are seizing new positions in and near Rybalske (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[43] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces back from the chain of settlements between Yehorivka (south of Oleksandrivka) and Voskresenka (east of Oleksandrivka) but noted that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in adjacent windbreaks. The milblogger claimed that the current state of the frontline, referring to its porous nature and lack of contiguous lines, allowed Ukrainian infiltrators to raise flags in settlements that Russian forces control in an attempt to downplay Ukrainian successes during the 2026 Oleksandrivka direction counteroffensive. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in many areas near Verbove (southeast of Oleksandrivka) and that Russian forces advanced towards Rybalske (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[44] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces liberated at least 626 square kilometers of tactically significant territory in the Oleksandrivka direction between January and August 2026, and that Ukrainian forces restored elements of tactical mechanized maneuver during the operation.[45]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 16 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian ammunition and equipment warehouses in occupied Karlivka (approximately 34 kilometers from the frontline).[46] Footage posted on August 15 shows a large fire at the Galaktika shopping center in occupied Donetsk City (approximately 50 kilometers from the frontline).[47] Ukrainian Center for the Study of Occupation Head and former Mariupol official Petro Andryushchenko reported on August 16 that Ukrainian strikes against Russian logistics in occupied Donetsk Oblast force Russian forces to constantly change logistics routes, increasingly deploy electronic warfare (EW) systems on transport, and assign at least three mobile fire groups to escort each Russian military convoy.[48] Andryushchenko noted that Ukrainian strikes significantly degraded Russian logistics in occupied Donetsk Oblast.

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on August 15 and 16 but did not advance.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 15 and 16 but did not make confirmed advances.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 16 that Russian forces advanced west of Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv).[51]

Ukrainian forces continue striking bridges in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast in order to disrupt Russian logistics efforts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a railway bridge near Svitlodolynske (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline) which Russian forces use for logistics on the night of August 15 to 16.[52]

Russian forces reportedly struck a bridge in Zaporizhzhia City in a continued effort aimed at disrupting Ukrainian logistics. Russian milbloggers claimed on August 16 that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike against the Probrazhensky Bridge over the Dnipro River in Zaporizhzhia City.[53]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 16.

Ukrainian forces are targeting Onyx and Zirkon quasi-ballistic missile launchers in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian missile unit concentration site in occupied Rezervne (roughly 250 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of August 15 to 16.[54] The Ukrainian Navy reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Bastion-M coastal missile system, which Russian forces used to launch Onyx and Zirkon anti-ship cruise missiles against Ukraine, in occupied Crimea on the night of August 15 to 16.[55] Geolocated footage published on August 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking the Bastion-M system southwest of Rezervne.[56]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

Note:  The Ukrainian military ceased reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[57]

Russian forces conducted a series of ballistic and cruise missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 15 to 16. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Onyx anti-ship missiles and Iskander-M/S-400/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk, Bryansk, and Voronezh oblasts; an unspecified number of Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from the airspace over Belgorod Oblast and occupied Kherson Oblast; and 106 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Parodiya-type drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Crimea.[58] Russian forces reportedly heavily targeted Kyiv, Poltava, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed three Kh-59/69 missiles and 85 drones, that unspecified Russian strike vehicles hit 13 locations, and that debris fell at three locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian ballistic missiles struck Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast and Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing two civilians and injuring 14 in Kryvyi Rih.[59] Zelensky added that strikes on Kyiv City and Oblast wounded six people, and Ukraine’s Strategic Communications Center reported that Russian forces struck a book market in Kyiv City.[60] The ArcelorMittal mining and metallurgical plant in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, confirmed that a Russian missile strike killed two workers, injured 13, and partially stopped production.[61] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Russian forces struck a metallurgical plant in Kryvyi Rih and claimed that Russian forces also struck defense industrial enterprises in Kyiv City and an oil refinery in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast.[62]

Russian forces continue to heavily target Odesa Oblast’s port infrastructure, including with jet-powered drones. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck four dry cargo ships and fuel tanks and warehouses in the Odesa City Port; a dry cargo ship in the Black Sea east of Odesa City; a defense industrial workshop in Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi; and a Ukrainian Navy patrol boat parking lot in Vylkovo on the morning and during the day on August 16.[63] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported that Russian forces struck residential buildings and a post office in a shopping mall on the night of August 15 to 16 and during the day on August 16, including with jet-powered drones.[64]

Zelensky reported on August 16 that Russian strikes hit 13 Ukrainian regions in the past week (August 9 to 15), during which Russian forces launched over 1,550 strike drones, almost 1,560 glide bombs, and 62 missiles – most of which were ballistic missiles.[65]

Significant Activity in Belarus 

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/16040
[2] https://t.me/rwb_press_service/1700
[3] https://t.me/vorobiev_live/12473
[4] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2088832770596278366; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2088837964390637738; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2088834987202392443; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2088981522640412736; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2088934777315291167; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2088884061116760142; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2088863372443816269; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2088862396710338606; https://t.me/supernova_plus/58179; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13436 ; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2088802930216587269 ; https://x.com/Shayan86/status/2088830925832417476

[5] https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/16040
[6] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2088899239698919873; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2088889812363432300; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13436; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2088848185208848847
[7] https://t.me/vorobiev_live/12473
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2026/; https://kyivindependent dot com/wildberries-warehouse-major-oil-refinery-burn-as-ukraine-strikes-russias-ryazan-oblast-media-reports/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2026/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/
[11] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41894
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[14]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41889 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41887 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36256 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9040
[15] https://t.me/wargonzo/36256
[16] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1380154-namagautsa-vklinitisa-malimi-grupami-vijskovij-68-i-brigadi-rozpoviv-pro-sprobi-prosuvanna-armii-rf-u-bik-sum/
[17]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41889 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41887 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46494 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36256 ; https://t.me/rybar/82486 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46494 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9040
[18] https://t.me/mod_russia/66543
[19] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/28016669
[20] https://t.me/severnnyi/9043
[21] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1379990-ludi-viizdzaut-lise-koli-vinikae-prama-zagroza-nacalnik-vovcanskoi-mva-pro-situaciu-u-gromadi/
[22] https://t.me/severnnyi/9042 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-10-20/
[24]https://www.facebook.com/ugcc.kharkiv/posts/pfbid02ZCSNPmD9edxfLNXYzyVQ5D9MQWMx8uxo5AV3ivG9pz1iBVGZYKrwZ1x2JXuvEtkcl
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41889 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41887 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9040
[26]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41889 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41887 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9040 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19463 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36256
[27] https://t.me/grvZapad/19463
[28] https://t.me/grvZapad/19463
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41889; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41887
[30] https://t.me/grvZapad/19468
[31] https://x.com/Mocca2X/status/2088657279180759133; https://x.com/Mocca2X/status/2088657545800176097; https://t.me/MSP1465/945
[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/66545
[33] https://t.me/dva_majors/97540
[34] https://www.facebook.com/Vadymlyakh/posts/1693025516166429?ref=embed_post
[35] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/71727
[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46516
[37] https://t.me/dva_majors/97540
[38] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41889; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41887
[40] https://t.me/mod_russia/66541
[41] https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/37669 ; https://x.com/ChaMapping/status/2088840696468029765
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41889; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41887; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121402
[43] https://t.me/rybar/82470; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/
[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/55345
[45] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2026/
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41893
[47] https://t.me/supernova_plus/58104; https://x.com/NotWoofers/status/2088730491679572165
[48] https://t.me/andriyshTime/65615
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41889; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41887; https://t.me/wargonzo/36256
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41889; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41887; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46505; https://t.me/wargonzo/36256
[51] https://t.me/divgen/83257

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41893
[53] https://t.me/motopatriot78/55347; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121432
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41893
[55] https://t.me/ukrainian_navy/21896
[56] https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2088896918634082625; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2088921988085448948
[57] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[58] https://t.me/kpszsu/72984
[59] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20402
[60] https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2088900586708107682; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20402
[61] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1088113613720522&amp%3Bset=a.265374522661106&amp%3Blocale=ru_RU; https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/82456 ;
[62] https://t.me/mod_russia/66540
[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/66540; https://t.me/mod_russia/66557; https://t.me/mod_russia/66529
[64] https://t.me/odeskaODA/18590; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18597; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18606; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18611
[65] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20402

CORRECTION: As of September 1, ISW made a tweak to the copyright language on the Wildberries map.

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